CHAPTER-II
SPEECH ACT THEORY AND RELATED THEORIES OF PRAGMATICS

2.1. Preliminaries
The present chapter entitled ‘Speech Act Theory and Related Theories of Pragmatics’ aims at providing conceptual background to the study. This involves information about all those important theories, key concepts, ideas and principles in pragmatics in general and speech act theory in particular. They play a significant role in understanding communicative and literary language. The chapter builds up a theoretical framework that is necessary for the study.

This chapter mainly focuses on various dimensions of speech act theory, which includes the concept of speech act, speech situation and speech event. It covers Austin’s contribution, Searle’s modification and development of the speech act theory, felicity conditions, direct and indirect speech acts. The chapter highlights Searle’s typology which involves five categories of speech acts as: assertives, commissives, directives, expressives and declaratives with the sub classification of the typology according to the exclusively selected utterances chosen from Girish Karnad’s six plays. The typology along with significant notions of speech act is applied in the next three chapters of the present thesis.

Pragmatics covers broad theories and principles like speech act theory, theory of conversational implicatures, cooperative principle, politeness principle, and irony principle. The chapter also sheds light on conversational maxims, presupposition, implicature and concept of deixis. The chapter touches upon modern linguistic approaches like socio-linguistics, discourse, discourse analysis, and dramatic discourse. An attempt will be made to discuss difference...
between spoken and written discourse, dramatic discourse and everyday conversation, and nativization of English in Indian context to make the study more authentic and convincing.

2.2. Theoretical Background

Language is the most elaborate semiotic system that human beings have developed for their social need of communication. If we observe language in use, we will find that linguistic communication is not achieved by individual units of language such as sounds, words or sentences. People primarily, essentially communicate through combinations of these language units. In that case, how do the following instances of language manage to communicate?

1. Help!
2. Work in progress.
3. Devadatta was here.

These, certainly, are examples of an isolated word, phrase and sentence. However, there is more to it than evident at first glance. They are real instances of language and not abstract illustrations of notions discussed by linguists. The example stated in ‘1’ may be a desperate cry of agony or a mild request. The example stated in ‘2’ may be printed in big letters on a signboard or may appear in the agenda of a meeting. The example stated in ‘3’ may be scribbled on a stone wall on a fort or may be neatly typed in the script of a play.

Thus, the particular instances should be clarified while considering these as units of linguistic communication. Furthermore, these instances could be produced by different speakers or writers. The example stated in ‘1’ may be uttered by someone drowning or a pop singer. The example stated in ‘2’ may come from the Department of Transport or a business secretary. The example stated in ‘3’ can be said by a college student or a playwright.
Similarly, these instances could be received by different listeners - a fellow diver, a concert hall audience, a driver, a business person, a passer-by or a class of students. The activity in which the participants are involved as well as the setting of communication would then also vary accordingly. As a consequence, in each case, not only the abstract linguistic units but the wholes of language, intentions and situations should also be considered. These wholes combine speech, writing, gesture, posture and so on and integrate linguistic organization. Provided that these conditions are fulfilled, 1, 2 and 3 can communicate effectively.

Another important point is that only meaningful combinations of language units can communicate. Meaning derives first from the rules of a specific language which suggest that only some combinations of sound (Phonemes) and forms (Morphemes) are possible, namely, the Syntax and the Semantics of language. In that sense the following combinations are well-formed utterances:

A – Excuse me, could you tell me where the Pune University is?

B – Thank you so much.

However, ‘B’ is not an answer that one would expect to the question ‘A’. This combination of sentences in this sequence is not meaningful because it fails to perform the act of giving directions. This leads to a fundamental tenet of linguistic communication which is, that we not only say things in language but we also do things, we perform actions. The identification of the speech acts we perform is a prerequisite for establishing meaning in communication.

All Linguistic communication involves linguistic acts. The unit of linguistic communication is not, as has generally been supposed, the symbol, word or sentence, but rather the production or issuance of the symbol, word or sentences in the performance of the speech act.
The aim of this study is to comprehend the purport, the deepest meaning of dramatic discourse, analysed in the light of speech act theory. This chapter deals with a brief account of the development of the speech act theory and related terms and concepts. This theoretical framework will serve as a guide to the analysis of the actual text discourse in chapter three. The researcher has surveyed the essential aspects of the theory with apt and sufficient examples to support the content.

2.3 Speech Acts

The term ‘speech act’ is derived from the work of the Cambridge Philosopher J. L. Austin in the series of William James lectures he delivered at Harvard in 1955. Later on, his work was published in the book entitled *How to Do Things with Words* (1965). Speech act theory believes in identifying utterances and turns as actual actions. This theory not only considers language used by the speaker but studies change in the state of behavior of the speaker as well as the listener at the time of communication.

J. L. Austin for the first time studied language from a different point of view and brought into notice that apart from statements true and false, and truth conditions there are other possibilities in language, which are non-assertive categories that include questions, commands, exclamations etc. He studied language from non-conventional point-of-view which is a kind of reaction to the traditional view of language. Besides Austin, John Searle contributed a lot to the speech act theory.

Although a speech act is concerned with the ‘performative’ aspect of utterances, a speech act has many other dimensions. According to speech act, language is used to make things happen. Human beings have a wide choice of linguistic expressions and they try to make it as effective as possible. The choice of language depends upon a number of factors, like social customs, traditions, culture, relationship between speakers and the kind of situation.
These factors lend ‘presupposition’ and ‘implicature’ to interactions. According to John Searle (1975) speech act is:

“Speaking a language is performing speech acts, acts such as making statements, giving commands, asking questions or making promises. Searle states that all linguistic communication involves linguistic (speech) acts.” (p.16)

Searle brings to notice the functional or performative aspect of speech; hence they are called speech ‘acts’. According to Searle, all utterances in a speech situation perform some kind of ‘act’ like commanding, asking, requesting, stating or committing.

The study of speech acts enables the understanding of the social, psychological, cultural, historical and similar other dimensions of communication. They are not mere artificial linguistic constructs as it may seem, their understanding together with the acquaintance of context in which they are performed are often essential for decoding the whole utterance and its proper meaning.

The meaning of utterances is made clear illustrating through appropriate and self-explanatory examples. Though some examples are general utterances, most of the utterances used for illustrative purposes are from Girish Karnad’s plays. The illustrative utterances are followed by the explanation of the character’s intention and the situational context. It supports the fact that pragmatic principles work in the Indian context too as naturally as in English, in which they were originally applied.

The speech acts are used in standard day-to-day exchanges as well as in jokes or drama. For instance, when the utterance ‘I am making you my queen.’ (p.26) is uttered by king Yayati to Sharmishtha it creates a social and psychological reality.
Here are few more examples from Girish Karnad’s selected plays:

1. SWARNALATA: *I was my father’s only child.* (p.59) is an assertive or representative act.
2. YAYATI (to Sharmishtha): *Your position will not be touched. You will remain the Senior Queen.* (p.29) is an example of commissive act performed by king Yayati.
3. BIJJALA: *I exist and God doesn’t.* (p.22) is an example of declarative act.
4. MUHAMMAD: *Bring the robes of honor for the royal envoy.* (p.30) is a directive act.
5. IMAM-UD-DIN: *You know, Sultan, I am just beginning to understand why they say you are the cleverest man in the world.* (p.30) is a forceful expressive act.

All the above are examples of different kinds of speech acts. Although they are taken from Karnad’s plays, they are self-explanatory.

### 2.4 Speech Act Theory (SAT)

According to speech act theory, words do not merely ‘say’ something, but they ‘do’ something. An action is performed by means of language. Different kinds of actions are performed by language, as in the following examples:

1. DEVADATTA: *I swear, if I ever get her as my wife, I’ll sacrifice my two arms to the goddess Kali, I’ll sacrifice my head to Lord Rudra.* (p.120) (Promise).
3. MAHOUT: *Listen, I could easily drag you to the window and see your face.* (p.192) (Challenge). These words are addressed to the Queen, who tries to hide her identity from the Mahout.
4. SWARNALATA: *Take care, madam. Not about what she is doing to you, but about what you are doing to yourself.* (p.8) (Warning).
5. BASAVANNA: A new rock inscription. And to justify it, a new campaign. A dozen battles. A hundred new hero stones, to be greeted by the wails of a few thousand fresh widows and orphans. (pp.24-25) (Informing, Describing, Narrating).

From the above examples, it can be observed that the utterances, considered in isolation, do not carry meaning. The communication is incomplete or incorrect without considering the situation and context in which it takes place. A speaker does not merely express meaning, but also expresses an attitude. The attitude is expressed by performance of a speech act. For example, the attitude of humanity is expressed in the use of words like ‘please’ in an utterance performing the function of a request. A sense of warning is inherent in words like ‘take care’ or ‘watch out’. The speaker ‘uses’ these words to convey both, meaning and attitude. Thus, it can be said that meaning and usage are interrelated.

The performance and kind of speech act depends on the intention and attitude of the speaker and the effect that it has on the hearer. Hence, a hearer may or may not heed the warning given by the speaker or he may accept a challenge thrown at him by the speaker.

Speech act theory explains the use of language in relation to the context, the attitude of the speaker and its effect on the hearer. All these aspects are important in understanding the complete meaning of utterances and their consequences. Characters in different plays express themselves, their meaning and attitude through their dialogues. When speech act theory is applied to their utterances, it enables complete and deep interpretation of utterances in a systematic manner.

Requesting, promising, warning, challenging, judging, asserting, and so on are different communicative strategies that perform various functions. According to linguists, they are called speech acts. Speech act theory analyzes
communicative strategies or speech acts from the perspective of their functions instead of forms.

The speech act theory states that many functions can be performed with words. Linguists like Austin (1965) and Searle (1969, 1975) have added new ‘performative’, ‘functional’ dimensions to communication. According to them, communication is not limited to linguistic expression, but it has to be treated like a performance. The systematic study of studied words as ‘doing’ things and utterances as ‘performing’ actions is called speech act theory.

### 2.4.1 Speech Act Theory and Austin’s Contribution

Language is an inseparable part of our everyday lives. It is the main tool used to transmit messages, to communicate ideas, thoughts and opinions. It situates us in the society we live in; it is a social affair which creates and further determines our position in all kinds of social networks and institutions. In certain circumstances we are literally dependent on its appropriate usage and there are moments when we need to be understood quite correctly. Language is involved in nearly all fields of human activity and, maybe, that is why language and linguistic communication have become a widely discussed topic among linguists, lawyers, psychologists and philosophers. Stephen Levinson (1983) notices:

“…Austin launched his theory of speech acts. There are strong parallels between the later Wittgenstein’s emphasis on language usage and language games and Austin’s insistence that “The total speech act in the total speech situation is the only actual phenomenon which in the last resort we are engaged in elucidating.” (p.227).

Levinson takes into account Ludwig Wittgenstein’s focus on language usage while explaining how Austin arrives at the importance of speech act performed in a speech situation.
Thus, it can be said that the notion of speech acts was pioneered by the American language philosopher J.L. Austin. It is Austin who introduces basic terms and areas to the study and distinguishes locutionary, illocutionary and perlocutionary acts. Austin proves that there are undoubtedly more functions language can exercise. The theory of speech acts thus comes into existence and Austin’s research becomes a cornerstone for his followers.

2.4.1.1 Constatives and Performatives

J. L. Austin comes up with a new category of utterances – the constatives and performatives. The notions of constatives and performatives are central to the speech act theory.

2.4.1.1.1 Constatives

Constatives are statements or assertions. Constatives describe truth and falsity. Constatives depend on the facts, and can only be judged with reference to them. A constative is the expression of a belief, together with the expression of an intention the hearer forms or continues to hold like a belief. Constatives are divided into assertives, predicatives, retrodictives, descriptives, ascriptives, informatives, confirmatives, concessives, dissentives, disputatives, responsives, suggestives and suppositives. A constative utterance performs the following functions:

a. It conveys a message.

b. That message can be compared to the real world and declared to be true or false.

c. A failed constative is false, unclear, or void of reference.

The examples of successful constative utterances are as follows:

1. MAHOUT: *I was born on a full moon. There was an eclipse.*
   (p.196)

2. KAPILA: *This is Pavana Veethi- the street of merchants.*
   (p.122)
On the other hand a performative rather than conveying a message, acts upon the word; it doesn’t say something, it does something.

2.4.1.1.2 Performatives

Performatives are historically the first speech acts to be examined within the theory of speech acts. A performative is as an utterance which contains a special type of verb in it, which is called as a performative verb, by force of which it performs an action. In other words, in using a performative, a person is not just saying something but is actually doing something. A performative, unlike a constative, cannot be true or false; it can only be felicitous or infelicitous and it does not describe, report or constate anything.

Following are the examples of successful performatives:

1. ARVASU: *I am not coming!* (p.111)
2. RAIBHYA: *I accept his challenge.* (p.128)

The characteristic feature of the performative utterance, in contrast to the constative, is that it does not describe a state of affairs independent of itself, it describes reality itself. It is, therefore, a self-reflexive utterance. The acts of naming, marrying, bequeathing and betting are the classical examples of performatives given by Austin. The performative is therefore, in the most exact sense, an act and not a representation of something else.

A performative is a first person indicative active sentence in the simple present tense. This criterion is ambiguous though and that is why, in order to distinguish the performative use from other possible uses of first person indicative active pattern, Austin introduces a ‘hereby’ test since he finds out that performative verbs only can collocate with this adverb.

1. SIVIDEVA: *I (hereby) order you to burn their books.* (p.101)
2. MUHAMMAD: *I (hereby) announce from next year, we shall have copper currency in our empire along with the silver dinars.* (p.48)
3. KING: I (hereby) promise you Mother, she’ll be your obedient daughter-in-law. (p.20)

AZIZ: I (hereby) am a dhobi from Shiknar. (p.92)

While the first three utterances would make sense under specific conditions, uttering of the fourth would be rather strange. From this it follows that (1, 2, 3) are a performative, (4) is not.

These are speech acts of a special kind where the utterance of the right words by the right person in the right situation effectively is, or accomplishes the social act. In some cases, the speech must be accompanied by a ceremonial or ritual action. Whether the speaker in fact has the social or legal standing to accomplish the act depends on some things beyond the mere speaking of the words. These are felicity conditions.

2.4.1.2 Happy Performatives and Unhappy Performatives

1. SHEIKH: You can’t pollute the time of prayer. It’s a sacred time. We can’t stain it with the blood of a Mussulman. (p.44)

In the above example the words are uttered by a man of religion at the appropriate time and place and in an appropriate situation, which makes it an instance of Happy Performative. On the contrary, if the same words would have been uttered by any other ordinary individual, it is an instance of Unhappy Performative.

2. MUHAMMAD: Najib, I want Delhi vacated immediately...Nothing but an empty graveyard of Delhi will satisfy me now. (p.53)

When these words are uttered by Sultan Muhammad, certain appropriate conditions are fulfilled. Sultan Muhammad orders his minister Najib, and he is a man of authority. He also has authority to give orders to Najib. Najib is
obliged to obey the orders of Muhammad. The same words would be an example of Unhappy Performative had they been uttered by Muhammad in some other context, in some other country where he is not accepted as a king. Hence, the speaker, listener, context as well as situation should be appropriate for Happy Performative. Having defined performatives, Austin then draws a basic distinction between them. He distinguishes two general groups - explicit and implicit performatives.

### 2.4.1.3 Explicit and Implicit Performatives

Explicit performative utterance is any utterance beginning with ‘I’ followed by an illocutionary verb such as ‘promise’, ‘apologize’ or ‘request’, in the simple present tense and active voice with the correct sound. For instance, the utterances ‘I hereby promise to give you chocolate.’ and ‘I promise that I shall be there.’ are explicit performative.

The devices of explicit performatives are: mood, tone of voice, adverb and adverbial phrases, connecting particles, special verbal devices of the connecting particle, accompaniments of the utterance, and the circumstances of the utterance. For instance:

A: *I order you to leave.*
B: *Will you leave?*

An explicit performative is the one in which the utterance inscription contains an expression that makes explicit what kind of act is being performed. Yule (1996) points out that the explicit and the implicit performatives are completely different from each other. He says:

> “The explicit and implicit versions are not equivalent. Uttering the explicit performative version of a command has much more serious impact than uttering the implicit version.” (p.52)

Explicit versions make clear the intention of the speaker; hence the impact is direct and more serious. For example:
1. **PARAVASU:** *Trust me. I’ll help you.* (p.170)

2. **MOTHER:** *I shall offer the goddess a hundred fowl in sacrifice.* (p.221)

In the above utterances the verbs *trust,* and *shall offer* are examples of explicit verbs so the utterances function as performative utterances.

In Implicit performatives, the words like promise, request etc. are not used. One has to understand the intention of the speaker, which is implied or suggested in the manner of speech or the form of the utterance. For example:

3. **MUHAMMAD:** *There isn’t time. We have to start before nightfall.* (p.30)

In this utterance there is no explicit verb indicating the act of setting off. But there is an implicit suggestion which implies that Muhammad is performing the act of starting as it is getting late.

**PADMINI:** *My son is sleeping in the hut. Take him under your care.* (p.176)

In the above utterance, Padmini implicitly performs the act of handing over the charge of her son to Bhagavata.

### 2.4.1.4 The Locutionary, Illocutionary and Perlocutionary Acts

Austin (1965) introduced the terminology, locutionary, illocutionary and perlocutionary acts. He believes that language is a mode of action whose major function is to convey information. The locutionary, illocutionary and perlocutionary acts are, in fact, three basic components with the help of which a speech act is formed. This can be demonstrated with the help of a simple example: *‘Would you close the door, please?’*

The surface form, and also the locutionary act, of this utterance is a question with a clear content (Close the door.) The illocutionary act conveys a request from the part of the speaker expressed in the interrogative form and the
The perlocutionary act expresses the speaker’s desire that the hearer should go and close the door.

2.4.1.4.1 Locutionary Acts

The locutionary act can be viewed as a mere uttering of some words in a certain language, while the illocutionary and perlocutionary acts convey a more complicated message for the hearer. An illocutionary act communicates the speaker’s intentions behind the locution and a perlocutionary act reveals the effect the speaker wants to exercise over the hearer.

According to Austin (1965), a locutionary act is an act where the speaker says something and produces certain noise or utters words in proper order that must carry meaning, sense and reference with them. Here, grammar and phonetics play a vital role. According to him a locutionary act i.e. the actual utterance and its ostensible meaning, comprising phonetic, phatic and rhetic acts correspond to the verbal, syntactic and semantic aspects of any meaningful utterance.

Austin’s idea of locutionary act involves:

1. To perform the act of uttering certain noises (a phonetic act).
2. To perform the act of uttering certain vocables or words (a phatic act).
3. To perform the act of using that sentence or its constituents with a certain more or less definite ‘sense’ and a more or less definite ‘reference’, which together are equivalent to ‘meaning’ (rhetic act).

From this division it follows that the locutionary act comprises other three subacts, phonetic, phatic and rhetic. This distinction as well as the notion of locutionary act in general was often criticized by Austin’s followers. Searle even completely rejects Austin’s division and proposes his own instead. Searle felt that Austin’s rhetic act is nothing else but a reformulated description of the illocutionary act and he therefore suggests another term, the so-called propositional act which expresses the proposition (a neutral phrase without
illocutionary force). In other words, a proposition is the content of the utterance. The proposition is thus expressed in the performance of an illocutionary act. What is essential to note here is that not all illocutionary acts must necessarily have a proposition. Searle modifies Austin’s ideas and states that there are utterance acts similar to Austin’s phonetic and phatic acts. Utterance acts together with propositional acts are an inherent part of the theory of speech acts but what linguists concentrate on the most is undoubtedly the issue of illocutionary acts. Following are examples of locutionary acts:

1. SHARMISHTHA: *Sir, you are holding my right hand. And I am a princess.* (p.21)
2. CHITRALEKHA: *I married him for his youth. For his potential to plant the seed of the Bharatas in my womb.* (p.65)

### 2.4.1.4.2 Illocutionary Acts

Illocutionary acts are considered the core of the theory of speech acts. As already suggested above, an illocutionary act is the action performed by the speaker in producing a given utterance. The illocutionary act is closely connected with speaker’s intentions, e.g. stating, questioning, promising, requesting, and giving commands, threatening and many others. Austin (1965) observed:

> “Illocutionary act is an act, which is uttered by the speaker with intention, by keeping motive in mind. It includes asking or answering a question, giving information, warning, announcing a verdict, or an intention pronouncing sentence, appointing, appealing, criticizing, describing, and many more suggestions.” (p.98)

The illocutionary force of utterance is a phonological utterance with an intention while expressing it. This is the act, which is governed by culture and with illocutionary force behind it. If a speaker utters, ‘*It’s too hot here.*’ s/he accepts the hearer to do a certain action like bringing a glass of water or
switching on the fan. The force behind the illocutionary act is a request. Austin in his book *How to Do Things with Words* (1965) gave five different classes of speech acts. This classification, on the basis of illocutionary force, is as follows:

2.4.1.4.2.1 **Verdictives**
Verdictives are kinds of judgment or giving verdict by jury, arbitrator or umpire, executives using rights or authority exercising power. The class involves appointing, voting, ordering, urging, advising, warning etc. For example:

MUHAMMAD: *Tell the Nayab Vizier I want her stoned to death publicly tomorrow morning.* (p.79)

2.4.1.4.2.2 **Exercitives**
Commissives are part of verdictives and exercitives. For example:

YAYATI: *Till the next full moon, I shall see that you are sent home.* (p.16)

King Yayati’s utterance is called as an exercitive because it is commissive and carries a kind of judgment in it.

2.4.1.4.2.3 **Commissives**
Commissives are the third type. It means committing someone for future action. It includes declaration, announcement and undertaking. Commissives are part of verdictives and executives. For example:

MUHAMMAD: *I shall build an empire which will be the envy of the world.* (p. 08) (undertaking)

2.4.1.4.2.4 **Behabitives**
For Austin behabitives include various social categories in themselves like apologizing, congratulating, commending, condoling, cursing, and challenging. For example:
KAPILA: *She is not for the likes of you. What she needs is a man of steel.* (p.124)

### 2.4.1.4.2.5 Expositives

Austin was not that much satisfied with this classification and he found expositive and behabitives are very troublesome to classify and even to define. The last two classes are not clear and called cross-classified. In conversation, general use of words is expository.

Sometimes it is not easy to determine what kind of illocutionary act the speaker performs. To hint his intentions and to show how the proposition should be taken the speaker uses many indications, ranging from the most obvious ones, such as unambiguous performative verbs, to the more opaque ones, among which mainly various paralinguistic features (stress, and intonation) and word order should be mentioned. All these hints or factors influencing the meaning of the utterance are called Illocutionary Force Indicating Devices, or IFID.

Another important thing, which should not be forgotten while encoding or decoding speech acts is, that certain speech acts can be culture-specific and that is why they cannot be employed universally. The interpretation of speech acts differs throughout the cultures and the illocutionary act performed by the speaker can be easily misinterpreted by a member having a different cultural background.

From this it also follows that the illocutionary speech act is communicatively successful only if the speaker’s illocutionary intention is recognized by the hearer. Similarly, one illocutionary act can have more utterance acts.

### 2.4.1.4.3 Perlocutionary Acts

Perlocutionary acts, Austin’s last element in the three-fold definition of speech acts, are performed with the intention of producing a further effect on the hearer. It is an act having an effect on those who hear a meaningful utterance.
For instance, by telling a ghost story at night one may accomplish the cruel perlocutionary act of frightening a child. Following are exclusive examples from the selected plays of Girish Karnad:

1. BIJJALA: *This cursed wedding shall not take place!* (p.56)
   In the above utterance king Bijjala fulfills all the necessary conditions and serves as an example of peformative act after which the planned wedding won’t take place.

2. MAHOUT: *Touch her here on her shoulder. Rub gently.*
   (p.233)
   In the above example the Mahout’s utterances addressed to the King are fantastic examples of performative act. The Mahout describes the actions and points out the shoulders even while he performs the act of rubbing them.

Perlocutionary act convinces the audience or reader to take some kind of action. According to Austin, communication is a process either illocutionary or perlocutionary. Perlocutionary effect is a sequence to illocutionary action. Sometimes it may seem that perlocutionary acts do not differ from illocutionary acts very much, yet there is one important feature which tells them apart.

There are two levels of success in performing illocutionary and perlocutionary acts which can be best explained with a simple example:

‘Would you close the door?’

Considered merely as an illocutionary act (a request in this case), the act is successful if the hearer recognizes that he should close the door, but as a perlocutionary act it succeeds only if he actually closes it.

There are many utterances with the purpose to affect the hearer in some way or other, some convey the information directly, others are more careful or polite and they use indirectness to transmit the message.

Peter Grundy calls speech act as a language of action and gives three aspects of meaning of the utterance: The first aspect conveys the truth value of the uttered words. Second aspect of the utterance counts the force behind the utterance,
what’s actual/hidden intention behind the utterance. The third aspect of meaning of the utterance will have effects or consequences that are not entirely foreseeable and the speaker hopes it will mollify the addressee or even make the addressee angry.

Thus locutionary acts are simply the speech acts that have taken place, illocutionary acts are the real actions which are performed by the utterance, where saying equals doing, as in betting, welcoming and warning and perlocutionary acts are the effects of the utterance on the listener, who accepts the bet or pledge of marriage, is welcomed or warned.

2.4.2 Searle’s Contribution to the Speech Act Theory

The founder members of the theory of speech act are Ludwig Wittgenstein and J.L. Austin. Wittgenstein is the philosopher who came forward with a new dimension of language that emphasized the meaning aspect of language and presented the view that meaning of language depends on its actual use. He called the notion as ‘Ordinary Language Philosophy’ or ‘Philosophy of an Ordinary Language.’

Inspired by the great philosophers like Ludwig Wittgenstein, and eminent linguists like J. L. Austin, P. F. Strawson, John Rawls, H. P. Grice, and William P. Alston, John R. Searle developed and modified the theory of speech act with some innovative ideas. He believed in the concept of actual usage of language in the social scenario.

Searle claims that speech act cannot be successful without intention. He thinks that speech act is an act of communication, which involves speech situation, a speaker, a hearer and an utterance. According to him a hearer plays a very important role because a speaker tries his level best to convey what s/he wants to say with performative language but hearer fails to understand or is unable to accept what the speaker is trying to say. The illocutionary act will not be fulfilled if it is infelicitous or inappropriate.
Searle’s (1969) major contribution is classification of illocutionary acts and necessity of felicity conditions. Among the ideas Searle uses in his book is the distinction between ‘illocutionary force’ and ‘propositional content’. He does not give any definitions of these notions, but introduces them by reference to examples. According to Searle, the utterances:

1. Sam smokes habitually.
2. Does Sam smoke habitually?
3. Sam, smoke habitually!
4. Would that Sam smoke habitually! (p.22)

indicate the same propositional content (Sam smoking) but differ in the illocutionary force indicated (a statement, a question, a command and an expression of desire, respectively.)

Searle modified Austin’s theory of speech act. According to Searle there was a big problem of linking illocutionary force with Illocutionary Force Indicating Devices (IFIDS). Based on this, he brought a change in Austin’s theory of speech act. First, he kept illocutionary and perlocutionary acts as they are. Secondly, he split locutionary act into two divisions:

1. Utterance act- uttering word, morphemes, sentence
2. Propositional acts- referring and predicting

Thirdly, he criticized Austin’s notion of speech act on the following grounds: He argued that Austin did not classify illocutionary acts but classified illocutionary verbs only and even then he was unable to classify all the verbs into illocutionary verbs. According to Searle, Austin’s classification is not based on principles, which are steady and unambiguous. That gave rise to overlapping of categories. Therefore, he classified the illocutionary acts convincingly into five categories.

2.4.2.1 Searle’s Classification of Illocutionary Force or Searle’s Typology
Searle’s classification helps to become aware of basic types of illocutionary acts and their potential perlocutionary effect on the hearer.

2.4.1.1 Assertives or Representatives
Assertives or representatives are such utterances which commit the hearer to the truth of the expressed proposition. It is an illocutionary act which states the facts. The class involves: asserting, concluding, affirming, believing, concluding, denying, reporting, etc. For example:

1. DAMODARA: Marriappa, this Bankanna accompanies the King on his way to the fields in the morning. Carries the pot of water to wash His Majesty’s behind. (p.67)
2. SHARMISHTHA: One day we went for a swim in the lake...we finished our swim and stretched out on the grass, our hair spread out to dry in the sun. (p.19)

2.4.1.2 Directives
Directives are attempts by the speaker to get the addressee to do something. It is an illocutionary force that gets things done by the addressee. The class involves: ordering, requesting, asking, begging, challenging, commanding, daring, inviting, insisting, etc. For example:

1. SHASTRI:...Tell him the corpse is beginning to stink...Call him...Remove the corpse— (p.13)
2. NAGA: Don’t be afraid. Put your head against my shoulder. (p.269)

2.4.1.3 Commissives
Commissives commit the speaker to some future course of action. The class involves: promising, offering, guarantee, pledging, swearing, vowing, undertaking, warrant, etc. For example:

1. YAVAKRI: I promise you this—you’ll be dead within the month. (p. 125)
2. QUEEN: *I shall not deprive the world of your voice. I shall not desecrate it.* (p.221)

### 2.4.1.4 Expressives

Expressives express a psychological or mental state of the speaker. The class involves: thanking, congratulating, apologizing, appreciating, deploring, detesting, regretting, thanking, welcoming, etc.

For example:

1. **MAHOUT**: *Thank you, madam. You are like a mother to me.*
   
   (p. 210)

2. **NITTILAI**: *I am glad you are not playing Indra. I don’t like that god of yours.* (p.164)

### 2.4.1.5 Declaratives

Declarations effect immediate changes in the institutional state of affairs and which tend to rely on elaborate extra-linguistic institutions. In declarations the speaker alters the external status or condition of an object or situation, solely by making the utterance. For example:

1. **JAGADEVA**: *If you are Basavanna, I am Jaganna—the Solitary Saint.* (p.98)

2. **MUHAMMAD**: *Back to Delhi, Barani, I have to get back to Delhi with my people.* (p.97)

Thus, Searle’s classification helped to become aware of basic types of illocutionary acts and their potential perlocutionary effect on the hearer. Searle’s categories are clearly marked and they do not overlap each other. They cover the range of all possible illocutionary acts. Illocutionary force can be linked to the Illocutionary Force Indicating Devices (IFIDS). Searle’s typology helps to classify acts clearly into locutionary, illocutionary and perlocutionary without any confusion. It is based on definite criteria.

### 2.4.3 Felicity Conditions

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The term ‘felicity conditions’ was proposed by Austin. He produced a typology of conditions which performatives must meet if they are to succeed or be ‘happy’. He called these conditions ‘felicity conditions’, which are as follows:

1. There must be an accepted conventional procedure having a certain conventional effect. That procedure must include the uttering of certain words by certain persons in certain circumstances.
2. The particular persons and circumstances in a given case must be appropriate for the invocation of the particular procedure invoked.
3. The procedure must be executed by all participants both correctly and completely.
4. Where, as often, the procedure is designed for use by persons having certain thoughts or feelings, or for the inauguration of certain consequential conduct on the part of any participant, then a person participating in and so invoking the procedure must intend so to conduct themselves, and further must actually so conduct themselves subsequently.

Austin states that it is also necessary for the procedure and the performative to be executed in appropriate circumstances in order to be successful.

These circumstances are more often called felicity conditions. These are conditions necessary to the success of a speech act. They are conditions needed for success or achievement of a performative. Only certain people are qualified to declare war, baptize people or sentence convicted criminals. In some situations the speaker must be sincere, as in apologizing or vowing and external circumstances must be suitable.

Austin introduced three major types of felicity conditions viz. sincerity conditions, conditions for execution and preparatory conditions. These conditions are further developed with addition of three more conditions by Searle viz. general conditions, content conditions, and essential conditions.
Few striking examples of felicitous utterances from the selected plays of Girish Karnad are as follows:

1. **PARAVASU:** *The Sacrifice must go on.* (p.144)
   The above words when uttered by Paravasu sound felicitous because he is the Chief Priest and has the authority to decide anything regarding the sacrifice.

2. **MUHAMMAD:** *Najib, see that every man involved in this is caught and beheaded.* (p.52)
   This is an order given by Sultan Muhammad to Najib regarding punishment to be given to disloyal people.

The five major types of felicity conditions are: general conditions, content conditions, preparatory conditions, sincerity conditions and essential conditions.

2.4.3.1 **General Conditions**
In general conditions the participant should know the importance of language used and he should be serious about it and should not be nonsensical towards it. For instance, participants must share knowledge of the language and must be serious while communicating.

2.4.3.2 **Content Conditions**
Content conditions concern the appropriate content of an utterance. For example:

   **AZIZ:** *Listen to this carefully – we will not remain in the Sultan’s service for long.* (p.57)

2.4.3.3 **Preparatory Conditions**
Preparatory conditions include the status or authority of the speaker to perform the speech act, the situation of other parties and so on. For example:

   Muhammad Tughlaq’s declaration of shifting of the capital or introducing copper currency.
2.4.3.4 Sincerity Conditions
The speaker should genuinely intend to fulfill the future action. There are some speech acts such as taking an oath where this sincerity is determined by the presence of witnesses. A good example is the way divorce takes place in Islamic religion. The bride or groom only has to repeat the word ‘talaq’ three times. If she or he utters the words with true intention, the marriage tie is considered to be broken.

2.4.3.5 Essential Conditions
It must be possible for the speaker to carry out future action as per the utterance. If Muhammad Tughlaq announces that copper currency must be introduced, he must have the essential conditions like machinery, workforce etc to do so.

The lack of felicity conditions helps in understanding their importance. For example, in Lewis Carroll’s Alice in Wonderland the Mad Hatter asks a riddle, ‘What is common between a raven and a writing desk?’ The participants in the speech event rack their brains for some time, then give up and ask what the answer is. The Hatter is unable to answer because he does not know the answer because he has no sincere intention of asking the riddle.

There are hundreds or thousands of illocutionary acts and that is why, for better understanding and orientation, some linguists proposed their classification. The classification which is the most cited in the linguistic literature is that of Searle who divides illocutionary (speech) acts into five major categories: assertives, declaratives, commissives, expressives and directives. Searle extensively added and modified Austin’s theory of speech act. He felt that in speech act the hearer plays a very important part. If the hearer cannot understand the speaker’s intentions and words then the illocutionary act is called as infelicitous.

2.4.4 Direct and Indirect Speech Acts
When the assertive sentence form is used to make a statement or the interrogative form to ask for information, it is called a direct speech act. When a polite request is made in the form of an interrogative statement, ‘Can we move to the Assembly Hall?’ it is called indirect speech act. In this question, the verb ‘can’ does not question the ability of the listener to proceed to the assembly Hall; it is a polite and effective way of making a request.

2.4.4.1 Direct Speech Acts

When speakers use language, most of the time it carries some function with it. Sometimes the form of a sentence is so simple that the hearer easily recognizes the speaker’s intention. The intention is loaded with function, which is function of the language also. These functions can be-to give information, to express feelings, to direct or to request. Sometimes a speaker uses direct strategy of communication or indirect mode for expressing his/her thoughts, ideas and feelings. For example, ‘Can you bring my book?’

Direct speech act is an act where the relationship between form or structure and its function is direct, straight. Usually, in English, speech act of asserting comes under declarative sentence type whose function is to convey information. It may be true or false. For example, the declarative act of Chitralekha-‘I married Pooru for his youth.’ (p.65) may be true or false. Secondly, the speech acts of ‘order’ and ‘request’ fall into ‘imperative sentence type’ and function as direct speech acts. For example, Paravasu’s order to his younger brother Arvasu-‘Cremate the body right now.’(p.144) Third sentence type is interrogative which works as asking a question and the speech act of questioning is included in it. For example, Naga asks Rani: ‘I shall come home every night from now on. May I?’ (p.269)

In above-mentioned examples, assertion is used to make declaration; interrogative is used to ask question and imperative used to give order and to make request. The form of the utterances matches the function and in that sense they are said to be direct. Nozar Niazi (2002) says:
“A direct speech act has only one function, whereas an indirect speech act performs more than one function simultaneously.”
(p.28)

The utterance ‘Can I get one more roti?’ has an implied force in it. The structure of the utterance is interrogative but the implied force (meaning) is request and not to know the answer in ‘Yes’ or ‘No’ form. This notion in contrast to the direct speech act is called as indirect speech act. For example, the utterance of Yayati- ‘Why should she mind?’ (p.24) is literally a question but used for the act of challenging.

Let us examine the utterance of Bijjala- ‘This life is transient, Basavanna.’ (p.25) the utterance of king Bijjala is a statement. It does not just provide information to the hearer (Basavanna) but the indirect speech act/non-literal meaning that accompanies the utterance is to make Basavanna aware of the importance of time. The utterance is an example of an indirect speech act. It is also an expressive utterance which reflects the opinion of the speaker.

2.4.4.2 Indirect Speech Acts
Indirectness is a widely used conversational strategy. People tend to use indirect speech acts mainly in connection with politeness (Leech, 1983: 108) since they thus diminish the unpleasant message contained in requests and orders. For instance, Swarnalata’s utterance addressed to Chitralekha:

SWARNALATA: Why don’t you rest, Madam? I’ll come again a little later. (p.53)

In the above example the speaker (Swarnalata) explains or even excuses the reason why she makes a request. Speakers often prefer indirect speech acts so that they do not infringe the hearer’s face, which might be the case here too. Sometimes direct addresses may even appear impolite as in ‘You go and take rest madam.’ and ‘Take rest madam’. The latter would be absolutely unacceptable in some contexts.
A glaring example of indirect speech act from the play *Tughlaq* is as follows:

MUHAMMAD: *So you too believe that piece of gossip?* (p.17)

The above utterance ends in a question mark, but grammatically, it is a statement and pragmatically, a locutionary act.

However, politeness is not the only motivation for indirectness. People also use indirect strategies when they want to make their speech more interesting, when they want to reach goals different from their partners’ or when they want to increase the force of the message communicated. For example: Vishakha tells Arvasu not to listen to Paravasu’s orders and bother about cremating Raibhya’s body.

VISHAKHA: *Refuse. He killed his father. Let him atone for it. Don’t get involved in it.* (p.145)

The motivation for indirectness seems to be more or less clear but the question most linguists deal with is: How is it possible that the hearer understands what the speaker actually communicates by his utterance?

### 2.5 Speech Situation and Speech Event

A speech event is an activity in which participants interact via language in some conversational way to arrive at some outcome. It may include an obvious central speech act, such as *‘She is satanic.’*, as a speech event of ‘warning’, but it will also include other utterances leading up to and subsequently reacting to that central action.

Hence, a speech event is the actual act of communication that takes place in a given context among participants who are bound by facts like gender, social background, culture, context, etc. George Yule (1996) explains the notion of speech event as:

“The speaker normally expects that his or her communication intention will be recognized by the hearer. Both speaker and
the listener are usually helped in this process by the circumstances surrounding the utterance. These circumstances, including other utterances are called speech event.” (p.47)

So, Yule implies that since participants are part of the speech event, they help each other and cooperate to make the speech event successful. Speech event involves seven important components necessary for communication. They are: sender or the addresser, a receiver or addressee, a message form, a channel, a code, a topic and setting or situation.

A speech situation is an activity that occurs in every speech event, there are a certain number of participants, related to each other in some way, belonging to a certain socio-economic strata etc. all those factors which direct and affect their utterances. The actual happening of the conversation is called the speech situation. Hence, if a birthday party is a speech event, the birthday boy conversing with his friends is a speech situation. How and what the friends say to each other depends upon a number of factors like their age, gender, closeness etc.

2.6 Related Theories of Pragmatics

Here, at this juncture, it is necessary to give in detail some of the fundamental related theories in pragmatics so that they help the researcher to analyse the conversational pieces from the respective plays of Girish Karnad.

2.6.1. Cooperative Principle

Communication is always an intended act. It is a process, which involves participation of speakers, listeners and medium of communication. One transfers ideas, thoughts and beliefs from one person to another and can develop sustainable relationship only when the participants are involved in, and cooperate with each other. Otherwise, communication will fail. People cooperate with one another by following or violating some norms of communication.
Philosopher Paul Grice (1975) brought the idea of cooperation in relation to language and linguistics. He has coined the phrase cooperative principle. Being cooperative means speakers use such language, i.e. code that can be understood by the hearer without creating problem to his or her culture, psychology and physiology and so on. Basic idea of this principle is that the participants cooperate, help and assist each other in the process of communication. Grice’s idea about being cooperative means one should contribute in the communication not less or more; as is required for the current purpose of communication; one should be simple and truthful in conveying the message and the participants expect that each will make a conversational contribution such as is required, at the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange.

2.6.1.1 Maxims of Cooperative Principle
The cooperative principle describes how effective communication in conversation is achieved in common social situations. For instance,

\begin{center}
A: \textit{Can you give me a thousand rupees?}
\end{center}

\begin{center}
B: \textit{I am going to the bank this afternoon.}
\end{center}

'B' is not the obvious answer to the question asked by ‘A’. The answer expected is either Yes or No. But ‘B’ replies that he is going to the bank, ‘A’ understands that he does not have a thousand rupees, but he can withdraw it from the bank in the afternoon. This understanding is the result of ‘cooperation’ in conversation.

The cooperative principle can be divided into four maxims, called the Grecian maxims. The Gricean Maxims are a way to explain the link between utterances and what is understood from them.

2.6.1.1.1 Maxim of Quality
This maxim expects the speaker to be truthful. In addition, it expects the speaker not to provide false or unjustified information. The speaker should not
use such language that does not have satisfactory evidence. The stress of this maxim is on truth and evidence. For example:

A: *Did you pass in all the subjects?*

B: *I got 70% marks.*

2.6.1.1.2 Maxim of Quantity

The speaker has to be as informative as is required and must not provide too much or too less information. Speaker who provides too less information can create risk to the hearer or speakers who provide more than necessary information lead hearer towards boredom. For example:

A: *Where will I find the book?*

B: *Top shelf, left side... near the table.*

2.6.1.1.3 Maxim of Relation

It is the third maxim which says that the speaker should be relevant to what s/he said before. It talks about logical connection of one utterance or sentence to another, previous paragraph to next and so on. For example:

A: *I want some more money.*

B: *I have already given you enough.*

2.6.1.1.4 Maxim of Manner

This maxim wants the speaker to be brief and orderly in arranging the message. In other words, it expects the speaker not to be obscure, ambiguous and avoid wordiness and to be direct and straightforward. The speaker has to be clear, and observe proximity in communication.

Consider the following utterance of Muhammad Tughlaq which is an example of observation of maxim of manner and in which Tughlaq’s instructions are clear and direct.

MUHAMMAD: *Najib, see that every man involved in this is caught and beheaded. Stuff their bodies with straw and hang them up in the palace-yard.* (p.52)
Grice did not, however, assume that all people should constantly follow these maxims. Instead, he found it interesting when these were not respected, namely either flouted or violated. Flouting would imply some other, hidden meaning. The importance was in what was not said. It is possible to flout a maxim intentionally or unconsciously and thereby convey a different meaning than what is literally spoken. Many times in conversation, this flouting is manipulated by a speaker to produce a negative pragmatic effect, as with sarcasm or irony. For example:

A: Please keep it a secret. Don’t tell me anything.
B: But I have already told you.

The cooperative principle, along with the conversational maxims, partly accounts for conversational implicature. Participants assume that a speaker is being cooperative, and thus they make conversational implicatures about what is said. Speakers who deliberately flout the maxims usually intend for their listener to understand their underlying implication. When a speaker makes an apparently meaningless or uninformative remark such as Truth is truth. The addressee assumes that the speaker is being cooperative and looks for the implicature the speaker is making.

2.6.2. Theory of Implicature
Implicature denotes either the act of meaning, implying, or suggesting one thing by saying something else. Implicatures can be part of sentence meaning or dependent on conversational context, and can be conventional or unconventional. According to Horn (2006):

“Implicature is a component of speaker meaning that constitutes an aspect of what is meant in a speaker’s utterance without being part of what is said. What speaker intends to communicate is characteristically far richer than what she directly expresses; linguistic meaning underdetermines the message conveyed and understood.” (p.03)
Conversational implicatures have become one of the principal subjects of pragmatics. Figures of speech such as metaphor, irony, and understatement provide familiar examples. H. P. Grice, who coined the term implicature, and classified the phenomenon, developed a theory to explain and predict conversational implicatures, and describe how they arise and are understood. The cooperative principle and associated maxims play a central role. It is generally assumed that participants in a conversation follow the cooperative principle. Thus, an implicature is certainly a prime example of more being communicated than is said. For example:

\[
\begin{align*}
A: & \text{ Did you bring the salt and sugar?} \\
B: & \text{ I brought the salt.}
\end{align*}
\]

In the above exchange it is understood by ‘B’ that ‘A’ has not brought the sugar, otherwise, he would have mentioned it. ‘B’ has adhered to the Maxim of quantity and knows that ‘A’ will infer that he has not brought the sugar. In this case, ‘B’ has conveyed more than he has actually said via conversational implicature. Speakers communicate meaning via implicatures and listeners recognize meanings via inference.

Conversational implicatures can be calculated, suspended, cancelled and reinforced. None of these properties apply to conventional implicatures. They are not based on the cooperative principle or maxims. They do not have to appear in conversations, they do not depend on any context. They are associated with specific words. Additional meaning is conveyed when those words are used. For example, ‘I have not yet completed the second chapter,’ where the word ‘yet’ conveys that I ought to have completed it by now.

2.6.3. The Notion of Presupposition

The notion of presupposition is borrowed from logic and it refers to those necessary preconditions or assumptions made during written or spoken conversations. For example:

‘Karnad no longer writes fiction.’
This utterance presupposes that Karnad once wrote fiction.

A presupposition must be mutually known or assumed by the speaker and addressee for the utterance to be considered appropriate in context.

Following is a striking example from the play *Yayati* which has cultural-presupposition in it:

    POORU: *Can Chitralekha use that other room while I use this one-for just one evening?*
    YAYATI: *What are you talking about? Do you want to keep your bride away from you?* (p.39)

It is a presupposition that newly-weds share a bed and chamber on the wedding night. A wedding is arranged on an auspicious day. The night too is auspicious for a union between husband and wife and birth of the next heir.

Negation of an expression does not change its presuppositions. For example, the below given utterance of the Queen in *Bali: The Sacrifice* presupposes that the Queen has done ‘it’ already one or more times.

    1. QUEEN: *I swear to you. It won’t happen again.* (p.217)

The below given utterance of the king Bijjala, serves as a promise, an assurance given to his wife, queen Rambhavati. It presupposes that she should not worry now and place full trust in him, that everything will be alright like it was earlier.

    2. BIJJALA: *Don’t you worry about anything now. Everything is going to be all right again*— (p.86)

The above examples prove that the notion of negation does not change its presupposition.

In this respect, presupposition is distinguished from entailment and implicature. For example:
SWARNALATA: *But, madam, your father is here. He has come to the city to greet the Prince.* (p.32)

The utterances of Swarnalata addressed to Devayani entail that Devayani’s father Shukracharya is in the city, but if the expression is negated, the entailment is not necessarily true.

Vishakha’s utterance—‘*He killed his father.*’ (p.145) addressed to Arvasu presupposes that he (Paravasu) has murdered his father Raibhya. But if the expression is negated—‘*He did not kill his father.*’ the negation cannot be true. Hence it is an entailment.

The cooperative principle plays a vital role in the interpretation of speech acts of the characters. Leech (1983) pointed out the limitations of cooperative principles and brought politeness principle into focus to make conversation a more successful activity. Here are those objections taken by Leech about cooperative principles:

1. It does not stand up to the evidence of real language use.
2. Cooperative principle does not work because the majority of declarative sentences do not have information-bearing function.
3. It has been argued that the maxims of the cooperative principle are not universal to language because there are linguistic communities to which not all of them apply. (pp.80-81)

Leech is not in total opposition to cooperative principle but thinks it is weaker than politeness principle. He advocated a notion of politeness as, it is the principle, which considers the relationship of the interlocutors involved in communication. Politeness helps to maintain healthy and friendly relationship in the society.

### 2.6.4 Politeness Principle

People use various types of techniques to show politeness, like expressing uncertainty and ambiguity through hedging and indirectness, polite lying, use
of euphemism, preferring tag questions to direct statements, modal tags, request information of which the speaker is uncertain, affective tags indicate concern for the listener, softeners reduce the force of what would be a brusque demand, and facilitative tags invite the addressee to comment on the request being made.

It has been noticed that women are more likely to use politeness formulas than men, though the exact differences are not clear. Most current research has shown that gender differences in politeness use are complex, since there is a clear association between politeness norms and the stereotypical speech.

In India, youngsters are expected to be polite with elders. Children are polite with parents and teachers. There is hierarchy in Indian society with respect to caste and social class. People belonging to lower caste need to show respect and behave politely in the presence of upper castes. The same applies to socio-economic classes. Leech proposed eight maxims of politeness principle, which are as follows:

2.6.4. 1 Maxims of Politeness Principle
Leech proposed the maxims of politeness principle with ‘cost’ and ‘benefit’ scales. The cost benefit scale considers the costs and benefits that an action will have on the speaker and the listener. It costs maximum to the speaker and minimum to the listener. The scale of benefit means to provide minimum benefit to the speaker and maximum to the listener that is greater politeness.

For example, the following utterance of Muhammad Tughlaq:

‘My empire is large now and embraces the South and I need a capital which is at its heart.’ (p.08)

Tughlaq wants to justify why he needs a capital. This is the only message that the listener gets, but Tughlaq has to use many words to explain his reasons.

Following are the maxims of Politeness Principle:
2.6.4.1.1 **Tact Maxim** – When the speaker is more tactful she/he is more polite. For example, the utterance of Najib to Muhammad Tughlaq - ‘I can’t think of anything right now, Your Majesty—except that the Sheikh has a striking resemblance to you.’ (p.21)

When Najib and Tughlaq contemplate on sending the Sheikh to confront the enemy on behalf of Tughlaq, he speaks tactfully and implicitly rather than openly.

2.6.4.1.2 **Generosity Maxim** – When the speaker is more generous or kind towards the listener, she/he is very much polite. In short, be nice to others.

For example, the utterances of Naga are observed very polite, generous and kind- ‘I said you are very beautiful. Poor thing.’ (p.267)

2.6.4.1.3 **Approbation Maxim** – It expects the speaker to praise the listener.

For example, the way Yayati talks to his newly wedded daughter-in-law, Chitrakekha and praises her in such a way - ‘...you are an educated woman, versed in the arts, trained in warfare.’ (p.61)

2.6.4.1.4 **Modesty Maxim** – Here, the speaker wants to show greater modesty towards the listener. For example, the utterances of the tribal girl Nittilai – ‘Arvasu, Your hands are clean. Even I have wounded—betrayed—my husband. You have remained good.’(p.155) are modest and humble.

2.6.4.1.5 **Agreement Maxim** – This maxim expects the speaker to agree with the listener. For example, Naga:...pull out the King Cobra. And take your oath by that Cobra. (p.266) in this utterance, Naga the speaker expects Rani the listener to agree with him.

2.6.4.1.6 **Sympathy Maxim** – It means to show more sympathy towards the listener.

For example, it has been noticed that the utterances of the Queen Mother who sympathizes with her son, who is the king – ‘You became the laughing stock of
the world. You had to swallow public humiliation.’ (p.216) are full of sympathy.

Use of these eight maxims in social context definitely helps the speaker to keep his image good and defensive. The word ‘image’ is known as face in the politeness principle. According to Hudson face is a public image, which gives identity to the speaker in the global scenario.

While following politeness and cooperative principles in speech, it is important to consider respect that is due to every participant. Conversation is necessarily a public affair and it would be very difficult to maintain relationships if conversational partners went about insulting and threatening others involved in the conversation. Societal norms expect that human beings do not give free vent to their feelings, particularly feelings of hatred and anger. Each speaker has a public face and it is necessary for speakers to cooperate with conversational partners in maintaining their public image or ‘face’ as it is referred to in pragmatics.

2.6.4.2 Notion of Face

The British social anthropologists Penelope Brown and Stephen Levinson identified two kinds of politeness, deriving from Erving Goffman’s concept of face. Face is the public self-image of a person. It refers to the emotional and social sense of self that everyone has and expects everyone else to recognize.

In the words of Brown and Levinson (1978):

“Face is something that is emotionally invested, and that can be lost, maintained, or enhanced, and must be constantly attended to in interaction.”(p.61)

Brown and Levinson give due importance to the notion of face. They suggest that it should not be neglected in the process of communication. According to them ‘face’ is an emotional phenomena.
The term face may be defined as the positive social value a person effectively claims for himself by the line others assume he has taken during a particular contact. Politeness in an interaction can be defined as the means employed to show awareness of another person’s face. In this sense, politeness can be accomplished in situations of social distance or closeness.

When a person’s polite image or self-image is threatened, it is an instance of negative face. For example, Mahout’s utterances addressed to the King are the examples of negative face.

1. MAHOUT: Hey, Who’s that? Are you deaf? Can’t you hear I am with my woman? Go away...You bastard, get the hell out of here. Or else ...I’ll bash your brains out...Stamp you into mud...Bloody hell! Are you deaf?...I said I’ll kill you. (p.202)

When a person’s image is respected, it is an instance of positive face or image. For example the utterances of Kurudavva addressed to Rani in her praise are the best examples of notion of positive face.

2. KURUDAVVA: Ayyo! How beautiful you are. Ears like hibiscus. Skin like young mango leaves. Lips like rolls of silk. (p.257)

2.6.4.2.1 Face-Threatening Act (FTA)

A face-threatening act (FTA) is an act which challenges the face wants of an interlocutor. Face-threatening acts may threaten either the speaker’s face or the hearer’s face, and they may threaten either positive face or negative face. It can be done in these ways: expressions negatively evaluating the hearer’s positive face, expressions which show that the speaker does not care about hearer’s positive face, expression of emotions, acts predicated a future act of the hearer, acts predicated a future act of the speaker towards the hearer, and acts expressing a desire of the speaker towards the hearer or his/her goods.
Following is a striking example of face-threatening act from the play *Yayati*:

SWARNALATA: *She is satanic. She can barge into the poisonous fumes and watch me choke while she remains untouched. She can creep into the hidden corners of my mind, claw those shadows out and set them dancing. I am terrified of her.* (p.08)

The above utterance of Swarnalata addressed to Sharmishtha serves as an example of face-threatening act. Swarnalata describes all the undesirable things that Sharmishtha is capable of. But ‘*I am terrified of her.*’ is a threat directed towards Swarnalata herself.

### 2.6.4.2.2 Face-Saving Act (FSA)

Face-saving act involves the act of blessing, praising, well-wishing, complimenting, etc. The act tries to create good intention of speaker towards hearer. For example:

BHAGVATA: *May you become successful in your search for completeness.* (p.116)

The act of blessing is an example of face-saving act and can be proved felicitous when it is uttered by special person, like old person, a priest, a guru, or revered person. These are the people who are qualified to bless. Here Bhagvata a special person, who may be older than Hayavadana and well-wisher of him, is a qualified speaker to perform act of blessing. Sometimes, this qualifies the addresser and also the addressee as believers in God. That is why act of blessing is considered as a religious speech act.

Thus, face-saving act involves praising, blessing, complimenting (in present or in absentia), well wishing, and glorifying someone who is present or absent. On the other hand face-threatening act comprises cursing, an appeal or prayer for evil or misfortune to befall someone or something. The above mentioned points and aspects of politeness principle reveal that politeness principle is very much
culture, class, and gender based. For instance, language of women is more polite and soft as compared to that of men. In very rare cases, they use abusive or harsh language. However, language of men in most cases is rude, loud, harsh and sometimes abusive also.

In Indian context, politeness principle is also caste-based. Arjun Jadhav (2007) observes:

“Indian social system is hierarchical in nature. Some people are at the higher step of the social ladder whereas others are given the low position. The people who are at the lower level have to please everybody and act upon everybody’s order. They have to use politeness strategy while interacting with their superiors. Humility or humbleness is the quality of being respectful to others. It is a face-saving strategy in pragmatics. Arrogant words inflame hatred and prejudice whereas words containing humbleness make the relations smooth...The person at the lower ring of the social system tends to use polite language whereas the person from the higher social rank, status or age is likely to use polite form of expression.”

(pp.211-212)

Both cooperative and politeness principles play a very significant role in the process of communication. It is believed that the interlocutors must attempt to follow the cooperative principle and be polite in order to be effective communicators.

In indirect speech acts, more is conveyed than actually said. Sometimes, the more that is conveyed is exactly opposite of what is said. In this case, it is called as irony.

**2.6.5 Principle of Irony and Its Types**

Irony is such a device where the user says something and means something different or opposite. The word irony was used for the very first time to refer to
double meaning. Irony consists in stating the contrary of what is meant or implies a meaning in opposition to the literal meaning. According to Harry Shaw (1976) irony is:

“A figure of speech in which the literal (denotative) meaning of a word or statement is the opposite of that intended. In literature, irony is a technique of indicating an intention or attitude opposed to what is actually stated.” (p.150)

Irony is of several types but as far as drama is concerned, the three relevant types are dramatic, situational and verbal:

2.6.5.1 Situational Irony

In situational irony a situation is often said to be ironic if the actions taken have an effect exactly opposite from what was intended. The discordance of verbal irony may be deliberately created as a means of communication as in art or rhetoric. Descriptions or depictions of situational ironies, whether in fiction or in non-fiction, serve a communicative function of sharpening or highlighting certain discordant features of reality. For example:

AZIZ: Anyway, why did you have to dress up in these ungodly clothes? Couldn’t you have come like a proper Muslim? (p.12)

Poor Aazam does not understand why Aziz is dressed like a Brahmin. This is an example of situational irony.

2.6.5.2 Dramatic Irony

Dramatic irony is that where, the author causes a character to speak erroneously out of ignorance of some truth of which the audience is aware. The audience knows that the character is making a mistake, while the character is making it. This technique highlights the importance of a particular truth by portraying a person who is not aware of it.

For example:
This is a dramatic irony. It is also a verbal irony. The real, true story is far more interesting than a fictitious tale of some distant land that Chitrarekha wants to hear from Swarnalata.

2.6.5.3 Tragic Irony
Tragic irony is similar to dramatic irony, tragic irony requires an audience and so it is observed exclusively in the theatre, movies, books, etc. In this form of irony the words and actions of one character or more betray the real situation and tragic results ensue from those words and/or actions, about which the spectators are aware before the actors. The character speaking may realize the irony of his words while the rest of the actors may not, or he or she may be unconscious while the other actors share the knowledge with the spectators, or the audience may alone realize the irony. Probably the Greek play *Oedipus the King* by Sophocles is the best example of tragic irony.

2.6.5.4 Verbal Irony
Verbal irony: When criticism or sarcasm is achieved through words, irrespective of context or actions, verbal irony takes place. Words can be biting, hurting or insulting though in polite form. For example in the play *The Fire and the Rain* Nittilai’s words asking about death are ironical. They are aimed at Yavakri’s Universal Knowledge sarcastically and thus challenge him at the same time insult him in a polite way:

NITTILAI: Actually I want to ask Yavakri two questions. Can he make it rain? And then, can he tell when he is going to die? (p.117)

2.6.6 Conversational Analysis
Linguistics covers a wide range of field with different approaches and different areas of investigation for example, phonetics, phonology, syntax, semantics,
In recent years new branches of linguistics have developed in combination with other disciplines, for instance, psycholinguistics, sociolinguistics, anthropological linguistics, stylistics, applied linguistics, etc. Turn taking and adjacency pairs are studied under conversational analysis or discourse analysis, which is related to pragmatics. Linguistic knowledge accounts for speaker’s ability to combine phonemes into morphemes, morphemes into words, and words into sentences. Knowing a language also permits combining sentences to express complex thoughts and ideas. These larger linguistic units are called discourse. Analysis of spoken discourse is sometimes called conversational analysis (CA). Conversational analysis attempts to describe the structure and sequential patterns of interaction. It studies turn taking, adjacency pairs, conversational maxims and different functions of maxims.

2.6.7 Discourse and Discourse Analysis
Just as discourse is important in everyday conversation, it is important in literature, particularly in drama because interpretation of the dramatist’s message rests to a great extent upon dialogue. Dialogue between characters on the stage is nothing else but conversational situations between the participant characters, within the context of the play.

Discourse analysis is an umbrella term for spoken and written communication beyond the sentence. Text is the basic means of the communication, be it spoken or written, monologue or interaction. It comprises both text and context. However, text is not just a product of discourse that is the actual written or spoken record of the language produced in an interaction. Text is the means of discourse, without which, discourse would not be a linguistic activity. In our everyday life, we engage in discourse in a multiplicity of roles when we speak on the phone, visit the doctor, tell a joke, watch T.V. etc. We actively engage in discourse as a speaker and hearer or readers and writers. During these activities, we continuously produce and interpret discourse. Every human act
that involves language necessarily makes use of texts in context. Using language is thus synonymous with engaging in discourse.

Discourse analysis is fundamentally concerned with the general principles of interpretation by which people normally make sense of what they hear and read. However, interpretation is not simply a matter of individual mental activity. In trying to decide the meaning of a text, language users relate the text to the situation, environment or context in which it found.

Thus, the study of discourse or discourse analysis is concerned with how speaker combines sentences in to broader speech units. Discourse analysis involves questions of style, appropriateness, cohesiveness, rhetorical force and differences between spoken and written discourse. In a conversation, speakers can organize the content because they constantly get feedback from the listeners in some form or the other. Immediate interactive feedback is not however available in a written discourse. It is necessary at this point to bring out the difference between spoken and written discourse.

2.6.7.1 Spoken Discourse and Written Discourse

The basic difference is in transmission of the message. Speech is transmitted by means of voice and sounds, while writing is transmitted by graphic means - letters (spelling and grammar, of course, play a big role).

Following are the major differences observed in spoken discourse and written discourse:

1. Spoken language is sparse, written language is dense, yet both kinds of interaction are organized, but follow different rules.

2. Spoken language is a process, speech is produced and received almost instantaneously and are an on-line process and the recipients can follow its production from the beginning to the end. With written language more time is needed to produce a message, needs to be polished, the receiver does not know how long it took for the
message to be written, the speaker can forget parts of the message he wished to convey. Written message can be revised.

3. Speech is gone immediately after we have stopped speaking/listening, it is stored in short term memory for a very short time (a few seconds), which is why we can tolerate false starts, pauses, gaps and the like - we forget them quickly. Only a very small portion of an instance of spoken interaction is stored into long-term memory.

4. In speech we use everyday words, written language uses complex lexicon.

5. The choice of some lexical items (synonyms, antonyms) are usually repeated in speech but they vary in writing.

6. In speech sentences are longer.

7. Speech includes verbal and non-verbal fillers, which are used to avoid silence, which in speech usually means that one has finished talking.

8. In writing, punctuation is used to separate the message into units, in speech pauses and prosody performs this.

2.6.7.2 Dramatic Discourse

Whilst poetry and fiction have been subjected to extensive linguistic analysis, drama has long remained a neglected field for detailed study. Drama should be of particular interest to linguists because of its form, dialogue and subsequent translation into performance. The subsequent interaction that occurs on stage is a rich and fruitful source of analysis and can be studied by using discourse methods that linguists employ for real-life interaction.
Difference between dramatic dialogue and every-day communication is as follows:

Dramatic discourse follows a logical and coherent arrangement of utterances. The grammatical structure is more strictly observed compared to ordinary conversation. Verbal or non-verbal cues during normal conversation enable the speaker to understand the need to repeat certain words, phrases and sentences. Dramatic discourse is calculated and planned with no scope for repetition even when desired. Dialogue is intentional, words are carefully selected. The play has a time limit, hence every word is important.

Hence, dramatic discourse has more internal intensity compared to ordinary speech. The illocutionary force of dramatic utterances has to be pure. Maxims of cost and benefit have to be strictly followed. Essential felicity conditions must exist to avoid ambiguity and waste of words. Economic and apt use of words is part of dramatic discourse. The significance of characters is established through the flow of speech that they receive in a play. Minor characters are given fewer dialogues. Waywardness and changes in topic are typical characteristics of everyday conversation but are not possible in dramatic discourse.

The purpose of dramatic discourse is to be understood clearly by a large number of audiences, where there is more chance of misinterpretation. Hence, dramatic discourse has to be clear, unambiguous, economical, well planned, organized and coherent. At the same time, it has to create an illusion of reality. This is generally achieved by maintaining idiolectic styles of various characters. Dramatic discourse needs to be memorable because there is no scope for repetition as in everyday conversation.

**2.6.8 Deixis**

There are several ways of achieving cooperation in speech and one of the ways is use of deictic expression of person, place and time. They also establish a psychological connection between speakers. Instead of mentioning places or
persons by name, the maxims of benefit can be achieved through deictic expressions. They abound in normal everyday speech as well as in dramatic discourse. Deictic expressions are thus part and parcel of indirect speech acts, which cannot be rightly interpreted if deictic expressions are misunderstood.

The linguistic forms of pointing are called deictic expressions, deictic markers or deictic words. Deictic expressions include: personal or possessive pronouns: I/you/mine/yours, demonstrative pronouns: this/that, spatial/temporal adverbs: here/there/now, other pro-forms so/do, personal or possessive adjectives my/your, demonstrative adjectives this/that, and articles: the. Deixis is clearly tied to the speaker's context. The most basic distinction being between near the speaker (proximal) and away from the speaker (distal). Proximal deictic expressions include this, here and now and distal deictic expressions include that, there and then. Deictic expressions fall into four categories:

2.6.8.1 Personal Deixis
In person deixis, there are three persons – the first, second and third, who may not be present. ‘I’ refers to the first person, and ‘you’ refers to the second person. He, she and it refer to the third person. Honorifics refer to persons with a higher status. A distinction is also made between familiar and unfamiliar addressees. Using a third person form where a second person form may be used is one way of communicating distance or unfamiliarity. For example:

YAVAKRI: I despised him for it. (p.130)

In the above example ‘him’ is personal deixis and used by Yavakri to refer his father. ‘It’ refers to his father’s blessings for Paravasu.

2.6.8.2 Spatial Deixis
In spatial deixis the relative location of people or things, the distance is mentioned in English with the help of adverbs ‘here and ‘there’. In older English, there were additional words in use like ‘yonder’, ‘hither’ and ‘thither’. For example:

YAVAKRI: It’s here, inside me.(p.130)
Yavakri points at the past through the deictic ‘it’. He cannot forget the past. It is permanently planted in his mind. Hence, the expression, ‘here’, is a deictic of place.

2.6.8.3 Temporal Deixis
In temporal deixis the proximal form ‘now’ indicates the time coinciding with the speaker’s utterance and the time of the speaker’s voice being heard. The distal expression ‘then’ applies to both past and future. For example, in the following utterance of Vishakha now stands for the present time.

VISHAKHA: Do we have to talk about it now. (p.130)

2.6.8.4 Social Deixis
In social deixis the use of honorifics is observed while addressing respected personalities or royal people. On the other hand juniors and subordinates are addressed in a different way. This class includes deictic expressions like ‘His Highness’, ‘His Holiness’, ‘His Majesty’, and so on. For instance, social deixis ‘Your Highness’ is used to Muhammad Tughlaq’s step-mother by Barani due to her higher social status.

1. BARANI: Your Highness may place full trust in me. (p.22)

The below given unique example of social deixis cannot be seen in western context. Its Indian way of addressing the person who has higher social status in religious context.

2. MUHAMMAD: Believe me, Sheikhsahib, I’m sorry. I am not disappointed. (p.28)

The person, spatial and temporal deixis forms can be seen in the common structural distinctions made in English grammar, that between direct and indirect speech. These expressions for person, place and time can be interpreted within the same context as the speaker who utters them.

2.7 Conclusion
This chapter gives a broad framework within which the researcher intends to analyse the selected plays of Girish Karnad. The above discussion proves that analysis of speech is not a simple process. Normal speech, with the intended meaning of the speaker and what the hearer understands and interprets, along with the context and common knowledge that speakers share illuminates several aspects. One can imagine how speech on stage can be all the more charming, complicated and baffling as the characters communicate directly amongst themselves but indirectly to the audience. The audience is an additional dimension and as stage techniques limit the communication between characters they are compelled to resort to certain devices. Speech is affected by gender, cultural factors and social faiths; hence these factors are briefly discussed as they affect the utterances of characters in the selected plays.

To dig out the meaning of stage conversation, which is translated into dialogues from the dramatic script, where one is not sure whether the character is speaking what he intends, what the actor intends or what the dramatist intends is a worthy exercise. An attempt has been made in the next three chapters to cite actual examples from selected plays and arrive at the real and deepest meaning, by applying the principles of pragmatics. It should however be borne in mind that this chapter is neither intended to summarize the principles of pragmatics and speech act theory nor to enlighten readers. The sole intention is to fix a framework within which the researcher intends to work.

The points discussed with the framework include Austin’s contribution to the theory, Searle’s modification of it, the locutionary, illocutionary and perlocutionary forces in utterances, felicity conditions, direct and indirect speech acts. The major conversational principles like cooperative principle and politeness principles are discussed along with their maxims with suitable examples. The chapter throws light on the inevitable notions of ‘face’, ‘face-saving’ and ‘face-threatening’ acts too. The concept of discourse is explained in detail along with the difference between spoken and written discourse as
well as dramatic discourse and everyday conversation. The notion of deixis plays an important role in conversations as well as is dramatic discourse; hence it is explained with appropriate examples from the selected plays of Karnad.

References:


