CHAPTER VII

POETIC FIGURES OF DANDIN

Now we propose to discuss the poetic figures, along with their main varieties, dealt with in the Kavyadarsa, with a general reference to their origin and conceptual development at the different stages of Sanskrit Poetics. First of all, we would take the figures which refer to the sense, treated at great length in the second chapter of the work, followed by the verbal figures dealt with in chapter III.

Ideal figures (arthālakārās).

(1) Svabhāvokti (natural description), also called jāti, is the description which brings to our mind's eye the actual form of an object (which may be either genus, quality, action or individual) in its different conditions. It is the primary figure which occupies supreme place both in poetry and the Poetics, as the writer remarks.

It appears from this statement of his that the figure was traditional. It is, however, unknown to Bharata, though his lakṣaṇa diṣṭa is comparable to it. In the gradual growth of the figures, it comes after the second stage of development, as noted above, though Dandin specifically gives it the first place in his alamkāra scheme to stamp its unique position. The figure might have developed from another figure, vārttā which is said to form a part of it. The term vārttā in

Dandin, however, is not at all related to the conception of this figure. The alternate term jāti for the figure shows that it originally consisted in a description of jāti (genus or a class of things), recognized as one of its four varieties in Dandin, which formed perhaps the earliest conception of the figure.

We find the first mention of the term jāti in the works of Bāṇa and according to Jayamanjula, Bhaṭṭi also knew it. Bhāmaha, though indifferent towards the figure on account of his peculiar viewpoint, defines it evidently in deference to its traditional prominence. Almost all the theorists accept the figure, though it has been differently conceived by some of them. Vāmana comprehends it in the scope of his ideal guna arthavyakti, in contrast to which Mammaṭa includes the guna itself in the svabhāvokti figure. Though Kuntaka vehemently rejects the figure, yet he agrees to admit it provided there is some kind of strikingness (vastuvakrata) in the matter in hand and, as we have seen, some

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2. De (MSP. II, pp. 26; 36) erroneously thinks that Dandin in KA, I, 85 alludes to the figure vārttā which term evidently means there 'a dialogue'; op. above, sect. I, chap. III, fn. 55; op. V. Raghavan: SCAS. pp. 96 ff. The figure vārttā, however, was known to Bhaṭṭi (X. 45) and the author of Viśṇu. (XIV. 11).


5. Bh. KAII. II. 33-4.

such strikingness is implied in Daṇḍin's words, 'rupam sāksād vivṛṇvatī'. Mahimabhaṭṭa defends the figure on the ground of this very element which does characterise the figure.

(2) Upamā (simile) is comparison based on similarity between two objects. Daṇḍin in this definition does not refer to the four requisites of simile, viz., the object and the standard of comparison, the common property and the words expressive of similitude, but he certainly knew them and recognised their importance.

The figure is very ancient and represents perhaps the oldest phase of the growth of the figures in Sanskrit Poetics. Daṇḍin's definition of it, when collated with the later expositions, seems to be primitive, comparable only to that of Bharata. In later theorists, we come across a well-developed form of its conception, though, of course, the basic idea remained the same throughout.

10. Elsewhere he does refer to upameya (II. 228), upamāna (II. 228; 230), dharma or tulyadharma or sāmaccha (II. 15; 16; 228; 231) and vyāñjaka śabda or ivasṛuti (II. 227; 234); cp. esp. his discussion of limpatīva etc. (II. 226 ff.).
11. See above, chap. I, on the concept of upamā in Yāska, Pārīni etc. Bharata has five varieties of the figure, three of which were adopted by Daṇḍin; see below.
Dandin divides the figure into thirty-two varieties, perhaps the largest number of forms. An examination of them shows that the formula of classification followed is not at all scientific and logical. His tendency to divide and sub-divide the figure into various forms is more than evident, while he might have collected, and collected laboriously, a good number of them from tradition. Such varieties may include dharmopama, vastu-, nindā-, prastāma- and asādhāraṇa- etc. Of these forms, the first two survived as pūrṇa- and lupta- respectively in later theorists. The next two varieties, evidently taken from Bharata, could not become popular with the later writers. Some other varieties, too, might have been current in tradition which the author seems to have unscrupulously followed. Many of them are superfluous and are variations merely based, in his own words, on a number of possible cases. Such varieties are niyamopama, anyyama-, samuccaya-, virodha-, caṭu-, asāmbhāvīta- and hetu- etc. which were, for good reasons, dropped in later theory, along with some other unimportant forms.

13. Op. Bhāmaha (II. 30), Udbhata (I. 32) and Vāmana (IV. 2. 1) among early writers and Māmaṭa (KPr. X. k. 87) and esq. Viśvanātha (SD. X. 14) who defines upamā as the expressed similitude of two objects havin; common property, in one sentence, among later theorists. The definition in SD. keeps the figure apart from the allied figures like rūpaka, vyatireka, upameyopama and anānvya; op. cit. vr̥tti.

14. Op. KPr. X. k. 87; SD. X. 15-7. Dandin describes only the dharmalupta-; he admits vācakapadalupta also in II. 61.

15. Bh. NS. XVII. 51-2.
like ācikhyāsa- and pratiṣedha-. The interaction of simile with other figures has also resulted into the formation of the varieties like śeṣa- and saṃāna- which have been framed by the blending of ideal and verbal śeṣa respectively. Again, there are forms which can be either identified with, or included in the scope of, other figures. The atiṣaya-, for instance, is identifiable with vyatireka, while abhūta- and vikriyā-, which are based on fancy, may be comprehended within the scope of utprekṣā. Similarly, the tulyayaṣa- can be regarded as a mere variation of Daṇḍin’s own figure tulyayokti. A good number of varieties, however, whether they were traditional or were the product of the writer’s own ingenuity, survive in later theory either as varieties as in Daṇḍin or as independent figures. The forms which remained as such are dharma-, vastu-, vākyārtha- and mālā, the last having been conceived quite differently. The varieties which were either promoted to independent status or attached, as varieties, to other poetic figures are more interesting to note. Of these forms, the viparyāsa- developed into pratīpa, anyonya- into upameyo-pāma (reciprocal comparison), utprekṣita- into a variety of pratīpa, aubhūta- into the form of atiṣayokti where there is statement of connection when it actually does not exist, mohā- into bhṛūntimāt, saṃāya- into saṃdaha, nīpaṇaya- and tattvākhyāna (which are comparable to each other) into:

16. KA. II. 96.

17. Daṇḍin’s bāhūpāma is the mālo pāma of later time, while his
niścaya, asādhāraṇa—into ananyā, bahu—into mālapamā and prativastu—into the figure of the same name. Of these varieties, samāya— which is comparable to Bharata's lākṣaṇa
named samāya, and the asādhāraṇa—, which is in the form of sadrāi upamā in Bharata, had attained independent status ever in Daṇḍin's own time, while the anyonya—
received that position as early as Bhāmaha.

Daṇḍin gives an exhaustive list of the words and phrases, sixty-four in number, which signify the idea of similarity.
A cursory examination of the list brings out the fact that similitude can be either expressed or implied. It is expressed

mālapamā approximates to the later rasenopamā.

18. Minutely speaking, nirṇayopamā can be identified with saṃdeha ending in niścaya ( SD. X. 36 ) and tattvākhyāna— with bhṛtāsahāmati ( op. Auval. I. 29 ). Tattvākhyāna— has been regarded as a direction of employment of simile by Vāmana ( IV. 2. 7 ).

19. Op. for detail, SD. X. 26; 36; 39; 46-7; 49-50; 87. The form prativastūpamā receives independent position after Bhāmaha who, like Daṇḍin, includes it in his upamā ( II. 34 ) and in a slightly changed exposition in and after Udbhata ( I. 51 ) and Vāmana ( IV. 3. 2 ); op. KPr. X. k. 101-2; SD. X. 49-50.

20. Bh.NS. XVII. 1.

21. Bh.NS. XVII. 54; from sadrāi upamā it gradually developed as asādhāraṇopamā— in Daṇḍin ) and finally as ananyā or —upamā which term Daṇḍin also knows ( KA. II. 353 ); op. Bh.KAL. II. 45; KPr. X. k. 91; SD. X. 26.

22. Op. KA. II. 358; Bhāmaha treats them separately ( III. 43). Sasādeha came later as saṃdeha ( op. Vāmana, IV. 3. 11; SD. X. 36 ), though KPr. ( X. k. 92 ) retains the old name.

23. Bh.KAL. III. 37-8; also op. KPr. X. k. 91; SD. X. 27.
by the words, iva, vat, vā, yathā, samāna, nibha, saṁ nibha,
tulya, saṁkāśa, ni kāśa and prakāśa and by the words beginning
with sadrā and ending with tultita in the list. Of these,
the words, iva, va, yathā and vat bring about what Ma mmaṭa
and Viśvanātha etc. call the śrautī simile, while the ārthī
simile is formed by the use of the words, tulya, samāna etc.
The idea of comparison is implied when the words from prati-
rūpaka to virodhin and phrases from spardhati to tasyānukaroti
are employed. On the basis of the meaning they convey, these
words or phrases can be classified as under: (a) words of
direct comparison, as iva etc., (b) words of phrases implying
similitude by denoting either (1) opposition, (ii) challenge
or victory, (iii) derision by or (iv) jealousy of the object
of comparison with regard to the standard thereof.

(3) Rūpaka (metaphor) has been defined by Dāņḍin as
the form of simile where the difference between the object of
comparison and the standard thereof is set aside, or in other
words, the upameya is represented as identical with the upamāṇa.

From Bharata to Viśvanātha, we do not observe any
basic difference in the conception of the figure, though
the various theorists superficially differ in their exposition
of the figure. The implicit similitude of Bharata as also of
Udbhāta, the superimposed identity of upameya with upamāna of
Bhāmaha, Vāmana and Ma mmaṭa and the superimposition of upamāna

or upamayā of Viśvanātha denote the same basic conception of 25
ruṣaka. The figure resembles the guṇa samādhi from which
Danḍin means to distinguish it on the ground that while in
the figure superimposition is based on similitude, in the guṇa
it is based on the compliance with the worldly usage, though
it may have been chiefly caused by the idea of similitude itself.

Like upamā, it has been divided into various forms number­
ing twenty in all. Here also his classification is not based
on any sound principle. The first three varieties, samasata­,
asamasta- and samastavyasta- have been formed merely on the
basis of compounds and the later theorists have justly ignored
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them with a passing reference only. The subsequent eight
forms (from sakalas- to savisesa­-) were adopted in later
theory, but with considerable reshuffle and modification, as
their treatment in Danḍin is unsystematic. The sakala- and
avyaya- become sāṅgaruṣaka in later theorists, resembling
its two forms, samastavyastuvivartya and ekadesa-vivarti respec­
tively, noticed for the first time in Bhāmaha. The forms,
 ekāṇga-, dvyaṅga- etc. are just unneeded divisions of ava­
yaya-, as also the two varieties, yukta- and ayukta-, based
on the appropriateness or otherwise of the superimposition.

25. Cp. Bh.NS. XVII. 57-8; Bh.KAl. II. 21-2; Udbhata i. 21;
Vāmana IV. 3. 6; SD. X. 23; KPr. X. k. 93.

26. Cp. SD. X. 33r. Bhoja (SKA. IV. 27 ), however, admits
them along with other forms of Danḍin and cites most of
his illustrations.

27. KAl. II. 22; Bhāmaha has only these two varieties. Also
The avayavi- is the nirañgarūpaka of the later writers. The savidesa- is comparable to sakala- in which it may well be included. The viśama-, again, which is combination of nirañga- and skadesavivarti is an uncalled-for variety. The remaining forms of rūpaka, excepting samādhāna-, are the result of its communion with other figures, namely, virodha, hetu, śleṣa, upamā, vyatireka, ākepa, apahnuti and, lastly, the rūpaka itself. In many of these combinations, the presence of rūpaka is unimportant. The hetu- is just a ākṣara futile variation and in its example, the idea of similitude is more prominent than that of superimposition. In viruddha-, virodha (which in fact is viṣama) has no connection whatsoever with rūpaka. The upamā- was in D.ṇḍin’s own time an independent figure and by Bhāmaṇa too it has been referred to as such. In vyatireka-, where vyatireka is more important than rūpaka, the two figures stand apart, and as its example shows, it is verily the independent vyatireka figure. The samādhāna- is comparable to viruddha-; it is in fact the figure viṣama (with solution) of later theorists. Rūpaka- is just a case of double superimposition which has no strikingness about it. The tattvāpahnava- is identical with apahnuti.

op. KPr. X. k. 33 f; SD. X. 30-2.
According to the later writers, it is not rūpaka at all, because in later theory, there is no scope of concealment (apahna) in rūpaka. Thus, out of twenty forms, only two varieties, namely, sakala- and avayavi- got acceptance of later theorists in the form of sāṅgarūpaka (samastavastu-viṣaya) and nirāṅgarūpaka respectively, while the third, avayava-, a sub-variety of sakala-, was retained as eka-desavivarti. Other forms were either abandoned or retained in the form of saṃśraṭīs.

(4) Dīpaka (illuminator) is the figure where a word (either a subject or predicate), remaining in one place, helps the entire sentence. The word may be indicative of either genus or action or quality or individual, and on this basis, the figure has been divided into four varieties. Again, the word may occur either in the beginning or in the middle or at the end; this serves another basis of division, though it cannot be regarded as scientific one. Third basis of classification is the repetition which may be of either sense or word or of both of them. This repetition has been registered as a separate figure, by name āvṛtti, of course, of the dīpaka class.

Among other forms, the ekārtha- can very well be included in the āvṛtti of sense, while śīṣṭārtha- is merely a case of the figure's interaction with śīsa. The important

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33. Early writers like Bhāma (II. 25), Udbhaṭa (I. 23)
variety of the figure is mālādīpaka which won common acceptance in later theory. Dāndin does not notice the later variety kārakadīpaka (case illuminator), where a case illuminates several verbs in succession; but it can be observed in its crude form in various examples of his dīpaka.

Dīpaka is a traditional figure. Bhārata defines it, though he is not aware of its numerous forms which we notice in Dāndin. The sub-figure, āvṛttti seems to be an invention of the writer himself, for his immediate predecessors do not know it. In later theory, it appears in some writers either as a mere variety of dīpaka or in the form of āvṛttidīpaka with independent status. The basic conception of the figure remained unchanged throughout, though we observe the addition of the element of similitude in it in writers from Udbhāta onward. The figure was finally conceived as association of the object of comparison and the standard thereof with one or common property/as a figure in which several attributes, some relevant and some irrelevant, are predicated to the same object.

and Vāmana (IV. 3. 19) admitted this basis, but later writers rightly rejected it; op. SD. X. 49 f.

34. Cp. KPr. X. k. 104; SD. X. 76-7 (as an independent figure).
35. Cp. KA. II. 103 etc.; for kāraka-, op. KPr. X. k. 103; SD. X. 49.
36. Bh.N3. XVII. 60; his example illustrates Dāndin’s kriyā-.
37. Cp. SKA. IV. 78; KPr. X. k. 103 f; SD. X. 48-9; in Kuval. I. 49-50, however, it is an independent figure.
38. Cp. Udbhāta (I. 28; but DhA.L. p. 120, quotes Udbhāta-
(5) Āksēpa (denial) is the statement of denial of anything. According as it refers to past or present or future, it is classified into three forms, vṛtti-, vartamāna- and bhaviṣyad-. On the basis of the objects to be denied, it may be divided into infinite varieties and we find twenty-one cases noticed by Dāṇḍin. An examination of these forms shows that all of them are not based on the objects negatived; many of them are formed quite arbitrarily. Only seven varieties, viz., dharma-, dharmīn( ), kāraṇa-, kārya-, sliṣṭa- (which in fact is the denial of the standard of comparison ), saṃsāya- and arthāntara- refer to the things to be denied. Of the remaining varieties, twelve (from anujā- to anukroda-) refer to one and the same object to be contravened, namely, the journey abroad of the lover, which has been revoked in diverse ways, including the ideas of permission, command and sullen indifference and the like which give the names to different forms. Evidently these ideas are not the objects of denial. The anuṣaya- expresses just repentance, while the hatu- is the apparent negation of praise with a reason and its example better illustrates vyājastuti.

From the dissection of the various forms of Āksēpa, it follows that the writer had a confused conception of the

vivaraṇakṛt saying that dīpaka is not always accompanied by upama); Vāmana (IV. 3. 13-9 ); kfr. X. k. 103; SD. X. 48-9 etc.

39. In the form of the negation of doubt, it approximates to saṁdeha ending in certainty; op. its example, II. 163 with SD.X. 35-6.
figure which, after him, underwent a constant conceptual change. The base of many of the directions of change may be traced in the varied forms of the figure and especially their examples in Daṇḍin. The wide scope of the figure in the form of denial of anything in Daṇḍin suffered restriction and demarcation in various ways in later theory. The first stage of its conceptual development we notice in his immediate successor Bhāmaha who defines it as the paraleipsis or apparent denial of the desired object with a view to signifying special meaning. Udbhata, Mamatta, Visvanatha and others follow this conception, while Vāmana develops a new one, according to which the figure consists in the negation or inutility of the standard of comparison in the presence of the object thereof. The basis of this conception lies in Daṇḍin's śliṣṭa- which in fact is the negation of the standard of comparison with a pun. Vāmana adds another explanation according to which ākṣepa is the figure where the standard of comparison is indirectly hinted at. The exposition, however, is farfetched and it unsuccessfully tries to approximate it to the figure samāsokti. According to Dhvanikāra, as Jagannātha evidences, all suggestive

40. Cp. De: HSP. II, pp. 70-1; also see above, chap. VI.
41. The seed, though indistinct, of the element of apparent (abhāsa) is traceable in Daṇḍin's example of hetu- (II. 168); also cp. Bh.Kāl. II. 67-9.
42. Cp. Udbhata II. 2-3; KPr. X. k. 106-7; SD. X. 64-5.
43. Cp. IV. 3. 27 and vr̥tti.
44. Cp. KA. II. 159-60; also the ex. of vartamāna-(II. 123 ).
negation or denial comes within the scope of the figure which,
in this case, virtually enters the sphere of the poetry of
subordinate suggestion (guṇībhūtavyāñgya).

The element of
suggestion is frequently noticed in the examples of the figure
in Dāṇḍin and the view of the Dhvanikāra seems to have been
inspired by him. In the period that followed, the scope of the
figure widened, and in Ruyyaka, Vidyādharā and Vīśvaṇātha etc.,
the case of apparent permission (vidhyābhāsa) of what is not
desired also came, along with Bhāmaha's exposition, within the
purview of the figure. The new trait appears to have been
based on some of the forms of the figure in Dāṇḍin, namely,
anujā, āśīrvacana- and sāciyā- where there is similar
apparent permission of what is not otherwise desired. Besides
these conceptions, we have a new exposition in Appaya who holds
that the suppression or negation, after thought, of something
really intended to be said (in order to convey a particular
meaning) is also a case of ākṣepa. The conception seems
to have been inspired by Dāṇḍin's vṛttas-- and arthāntaras--,
where a similar negation occurs.


46. It is probably with reference to such views that Agni-ṛ.
identifies ākṣepa with dhvani: cp. also De; mā. II, pp.70f.

47. Cp. examples of his anādara--, paraśa--, yatna--, para-
vasa--, udāya--, roga--, mūroccha- and anukroda-. It
may be noted that the ex. of his anādara-- (II. 133)
has been cited as an instance of vastudhvani by Hemaśandra
(KAn., pp. 37-8).

48. Cp. eṣh. SD. X.65a where Dāṇḍin's ex. of āśīrvacana
It follows from the above discussion that Dāṇḍin’s treatment of the figure, though confused and unscientific in itself, served as the fountain-head for the later theorists, and it constitutes, therefore, an essential string for grasping the multifaced development of its conception in later times.

(6) *Arthāntaranyāsa* (corroboration) is the figure where some other matter is added for the corroboration of the thing under discussion. Owing to the diversity of the corroborating material, it can be divided into numerous varieties of which eight forms have been exemplified by the author. According as the supporting factor is either universally applicable or it refers only to a particular case, the first two varieties, namely, visvavyāpin and visēṣastha have been formed. The next two species, śleṣāviddha and virodhavat are the result of its interaction with śleṣa and virodha respectively. The remaining four varieties have been formed arbitrarily, though it is important to note that three of them, namely, ayuktakārin, yuktatman and viparyaya seem to have inspired the later figures, visama, sama and arthāpatti respectively, while the yuktā-yukta is a combination of sama and visama.

In the basic conception of the figure, no change is noticed throughout the history of the poetic figures. Bhāṣāha, Vāmana and others follow Dāṇḍin substantially, while Bhāja

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( KA. II. 141 ) has been cited.

49. Kuval. I. 73,
50. Cp. KPr. X. x. 125-7; SD. X. 69-70; 71 and 33.
adopts his definition of the figure verbatim. The later expositors, however, present a somewhat developed conception of the figure; they classify the matter to be supported and the supporting factor into either general proposition and particular instance or the cause and the effect thereof. The classification appears to have been inspired from Dandin's treatment, though his forms are based on the corroboration of particular instance by a general proposition only and not vice versa.

(7) Vyatireka (contrast) is statement of difference between two objects (the similarity of which is an established fact), it being either expressed or understood. According as the semblance is explicit or implicit, the two prominent varieties of the figure, namely, sābdopātta and pratīyamāna, are formed. The two objects in the figure generally belong to two different classes, but sometimes they are homogeneous as in the last example which illustrates, for that reason, the sajātivyatireka variety. Again, the statement of difference can be made in two ways, viz., either by mentioning some distinct characteristic of one object or by referring to the different properties of both of them. The two species thus formed have been named ekavyatireka and ubhayavyatireka respectively. Two more varieties have been formed according

52. Cp. KPr. I. K. 109; SD. I. 61–2. These writers again divide the figure into two forms according as the corroboration is made by comparison or contrast.
as the statement refers either to a mere difference or to
superiority of one object over the other. Besides, there are
some varieties which have been formed by the communion of the
figure with śleṣa, ākṣepa and betu. Thus there are as many as
five different bases of classification of the figure. The
writer has however, tried to accommodate the numerous varie-
ties formed on the above bases only in ten examples with
the result that the bases and the species based thereon have
become all indistinct and confused.

The original conception of the figure remained unchanged
with the only exception that in post-Dāṇḍin writers the scope
of two objects has specifically been confined to the object
of comparison and the standard thereof. Again, the later
theorists incorporated the idea of representing upamāya as
superior to upamāna in their definitions, perhaps on the sug-
gestion of Dāṇḍin himself who alludes to this fact while ex-
plaining his examples, though it is absent in his defi-
nition of the figure. It is also noteworthy that superiority
in his illustrations invariably belongs to the upamāya, just
as we notice it in later theorists, though in some of them,

53. Viśvanātha ( SD. X. 52-4 ) enumerates 48 divisions of the
formed on different bases many of which we notice in
Dāṇḍin. In Bhoja ( SKA. III. 32-3 ) also, we have com-
paratively a better classification.


55. Op. KA. II. 122; the videsanidāsana of Bhāmaha, guṇāti-
rektiva of Vāmana and vyatireka of Yāmāna ( Kṛ. X. k.
105 ) and Viśvanātha cannot the same idea of superiority
we also observe the idea of presenting upameya as inferior to the unamāna.

(8) Vibhāvanā (peculiar causation) is the figure where, after denying the generally accepted cause of an effect, another cause is adduced, or the effect is described as spontaneous or taking place in the absence of its usual cause.

In later theory, we notice no change in the basic conception of the figure, though it has gradually received a clearer exposition at the hands of the later writers who have generally stressed the point of spontaneity of the effect in their definitions.

(9) Samāsokti (concise speech) consists in the depiction of an object, not at hand, but similar to the object intended to be described. The similarity of the objects, caused by the use of pun, may be due either to some similar action or to some alike attribute; and on this basis, the figure is divided into two forms, namely, tulyakāryā and the tulyavidēśanā. Another sub-variety, bhinnabhinnavidēśanā is formed when some of the attributes are dissimilar. Besides, there is a variety called apūrvā where the object at hand abandons its previous characteristics.

of upameya. Daṇḍin’s atisayopamā, where atidya signifies superiority, is in fact the vyatireka figure.


57. Cp. Bh, Kal. II. 77-8; KPr. X. k. 107; SD. X. 66. Sboja (SKA. III. 9) and the author of Anu-P. (343. 27-8), however, accept Daṇḍin’s definition verbatim.
The theorists widely differ in their conception of the figure. While some writers, following the line of Daṇḍin, define it as the description of aprastuta (standard of comparison) conveying a reference to prastuta (the object of comparison), others and especially the later theorists, hold that it is the depiction of prastuta implying an allusion to the aprastuta. This conception of the figure approximates, on one hand, to Daṇḍin's gṛṇa samādhi and Vāmana's figure vakrokti and, on the other, to the figure aprastutaprasādāsā of later theory. In Daṇḍin, however, the figures, samāsokti and aprastutaprasādāsā, are distinct from each other, the former describing aprastuta in order to imply the prastuta and the latter commending aprastuta with a view to conveying a derision of prastuta. But the later conception of aprastutaprasādāsā cannot be very well distinguished from the older scope of anyokti, and it was perhaps for this reason that the later theorists entirely reversed the conception of the latter.

(10) Atidayokti (hyperbole) is the expression of something...
special transgressing the ordinary limit of worldly usage. The writer stamps atisayokti as the best of figures and regards it as an element which emblazons other figures. Although he does not divide it formally, yet he notices some general cases of its occurrence, involving doubt, ascertainment or extensive-ness of the container (ādraya), which last case seems to have developed into the later figure adhika.

The figure seems to be very old. In Bharata, we have a laksana named atisaya from which it appears to have been envolved. In Viṣṇudharmottarapurāṇa, the figure gets an early recognition. Although retaining the basic conception intact, the theorists succeeding Dandin give the figure various defini-64 tions with a distinct tendency to restrict its range. The vast scope of the extraordinary expression which can very well accommodate the later varieties of the figure or even some independent figures of later times, has been contracted in later theory into a denial of connection between two objects when it actually exists. This restricted conception forms one of the varieties of later, atisayokti, while other forms of the figure in later theory are fresh innovations. The

63. Bh.3. XVII. 2.
64. Bhāmaha (Kāl. II. 94) describes it as the expression of some extraordinary merit; Vāmana (IV. 3. 10) conceives it as the imagination of some probable attribute and its excellence. Bhaja (3KA. IV. 81-2), however, borrows Dandin’s definition and cites his examples.
65. Op. later varieties like rūpaka-, sāpamāva-, saṃbhandha-, saṃbhandham-, akrama-, āpala-, atyanta- etc. in Apāya
restriction of the scope seems to be due to Daṇḍin's illustrations of the figure which are all of limited range. Thus the seed of the contraction of the scope of the figure was sown by the writer himself. A still narrower conception of the figure occurs in the theorists who confine it to the idea of the swallowing up of the object of comparison.

(11) Utprekṣā (poetical fancy) is the figure where a particular condition or action of an animate or inanimate object is fancied in a different way. It is usually expressed by the words like manya,śaṅke, dhruvam, prāyaḥ, nūman and iva. No distinct classification of the figure has been made by the author. His two examples, however, which refer to animate and inanimate objects respectively, appear to have inspired the later varieties like phala- and hetu-.

We notice a gradual process of refinement in the exposition of the figure, though it retained its original character intact throughout. The definitions of the figure given by Bhāmaha and Vāmana, however close to Daṇḍin's exposition, present comparatively a developed form. The later writers

(Kuval. I. 36-43) and others, and the figures like militia (KPr. X. 130 and esp. Kuval. I. 146 which cites Daṇḍin's example of atīśayokti) and adhika (KPr. X. k. 128; Kuval. I. 72) which are comprehended within the scope of Daṇḍin's figure.

67. KPr. X. k. 100 f; SD. X. 46.
68. Bhāmaha (II. 31) defines it as the supposition of a different quality or action on that of a particular object; Vāmana's (IV. 3. 9) definition also refers to the same conception.
like Māmata and Viśvanātha define it still more scientifically as the supposition ( saṃsārāvāna ) of the identity of the object of comparison and the standard thereof. Of the numerous varieties of the figure in later theory, we have scarcely any trace in the earlier writers.

While dealing with the figure, Daṇḍin makes an interesting reference to a current topic of controversy. The famous verse, 'limpati vā tamō'vānī ' etc. ( ' darkness smears, as it were, the limbs' ) raises the polemical point whether it illustrates upamā or utpākṣā. The discussion which is full of arguments and counter-arguments is a fine specimen of hair-splitting in the field of Rhetorics. What the author wants to establish is that the verse does not contain upamā, since its essential requisites, viz., the object of comparison ( in its proper meaning ) and the standard thereof as also the common property, are absent here; only the word

69. Co. “Pr. K. k. 32; SD. X. 40. Bhoja ( SKA. IV. 50 ) and the author of Aṇmī-P. however, adopt Daṇḍin’s definition. Viśvanātha deals at length with its species and subspecies numbering x 176 in all.

70. Kā. II. 226-33. The question has also been discussed by Bhoja ( SKA. V. 176 f. ), Ṛṣyaka ( AS., AB. ed. p. 56) etc.

71. He argues that 'limpati' ( smears ) cannot be the standard of comparison, since there can be no comparison with a verbal form, as the scholars ( op. Aṇmī-P. III. 1. 7 ) say. If for the sake of argument, it is regarded as the standard of comparison, then the question of common property would arise for, without it there can be no simile. If 'smearing' be the common property, what the limpati which is identical with 'smearing' would be? After all, it cannot be both the common property and the one possessing it. If the common property is said to be implied here as in 'the face is like the moon,' the
expressive of similitude, namely, īva, is present, but it is indicative of utpaksā also. Finally Dāṇḍin rules that the verse illustrates the figure utpaksā, because the particular act of smearing has been fancied herein in a different way, that is, it has been supposed to have been caused on the limbs by darkness.

(12) Hetu (cause) consists in the striking expression of the cause of an action. Dāṇḍin regards the figure, along with sūkṣma and leśa, as the best embellishment of speech.

The figure has been divided into kāraka- (efficient cause) and jāpaka- (logical cause). The kāraka- has again been divided into three forms on the basis of the threefold division of action (karman) into nirvartya (to be caused), vikārya (to be modified) and prāpya (to be attained).

72. An Ruyyaka (AŚ., NSP. ed. p. 58) Māmata (Kṛd. X.K. 91 vṛtti) and Viśvanātha (SD. X. 45 f.) etc., observe darkness which does not besmear the limbs has been supposed here to do so. It is thus an example of vastāutpaksā in later theory.

73. This conception of the figure which has not been defined
The jñāpaka- has been subdivided into ārtha ( implicit ) and sābda ( explicit ). Then follow the causes referring to abhāva ( non-existence ) which is of four kinds, namely, prāgabhāva ( non-existence before birth ), pradhvamśabhāva ( non-existence caused by desctruction ), anonyabhāva ( mutual non-existence ) and atyatābhāva ( absolute non-existence ). The subsequent bhāvabhāva ( negation of non-existence ) is virtually bhāva ( existence ). Again, Dāṇḍin refers to the infinite varieties of citrahetu ( unusual causes ) and deals with some of them, namely, dūrakārya ( where the effect stands afar from the place of its cause ), kāryāntaraṇa ( where the cause comes after the effect ), ayuktakārya ( where the effect is contrary to its cause ) and yuktakārya ( where it is in tune with its cause ). The writer illustrates in all fifteen forms of the figure which seems to have originated from Bhārata's laksana of the same name. After Dāṇḍin, some writers like Bhāmaha and Vāmana rejected or at least ignored the figure. Udbhata, who does not refer to it, develops its kāraka variety into an independent figure named kāvyaliṅga or kāvyahetu which wins wide recognition in later

by him is hinted at in Ka. II. 237.

74. Cp. Vākya.III. 45 f. which the author seems to have drawn upon; cp. Ratna. also.

75. These forms have been taken from the Kāśyikas; cp. Tarkasamācara ( ed. Krs̄iha Sastri ) pp. 64-5.

76. Bh. NS. XVII. 1.

77. Bhāmaha ( II. 36-7 ) rejects it alongwith sūkṣma and leśa,
theory. The jñāpaka variety appears in later writers in the form of anumāna figure. The abhāvahetu were abandons
ed by later theorists, though they attracted notice of writres like Bhoja. The citrahetu manifest themselves in various forms in later theory; the dūrkārya assumes the form of asamārati and the tatsahaja and kāryāntaraja are adjust-
ed in atisādayokti in the form of akramātisādayokti and atyantāti-
dayokti, while the species, ayuktākārya and yuktākārya develop into the figures viśama and sama respectively.

Meanwhile, the figure develops a new conception which appears as early as Rudraṭa who defines it as the expression of identity of the cause and its effect. The conception which almost ousted Dāṇḍin's one establishes itself entirely on a different ground.

(13) Sākṣaṇa (subtle) is the meaning indicated delicately by gesture or facial expression; secret meeting with her lover at night is meant when the beloved closes the

while Vāmanda does not refer to it at all. Mammaṭa (KPr. X. k. 119 vr̥tti) also rejects it.

75. Op. Udbhata VI. 1; KPr. X. k. 114; SD. X. 62; etc.

79. Appaya: Kuval. (ed. Bhoḷa Shankar) p. 276; KPr. X. k. 117; SD. X. 63; etc.

80. SKA. II. 16-7; III. 12 f.

81. Op. KPr. X. k. 124; SD. X. 69 for asamārati; Kuval. I. 41 and 43 for the forms of atisādayokti which have been comprehended in one variety in KPr. (X. k. 101) and SD. (X. 47). Also op. Namaśandra (KĀn., p. 223) who cites Dāṇḍin's example of kāryāntaraja as an instance of akramatva dosa becoming a guṇa in atisādayokti and Bhoja (SKA. I. 140) who cites it under apaṇakrama becoming a guṇa in
lotus-petals before him, and desire for sexual pleasure in
signified when there is a blush on her face.

The figure appears for the first time in Dandin. Bhāmaha
rejects it on account of its being devoid of vakrokti, while
Udbhata and Vāmana ignore it. Later theorists generally
retain the figure intact along with its original conception.
Appaya, however, divides its scope into two figures, sūkṣma
and pākṣita.

(14) ṿarga (slight trace) is the concealment, under
some pretext, of a thing that has almost come to light.
According to another view quoted by Dandin, praise or censure
presenting contrary appearance also come within the purview
of the figure. This conception, however, does not appear
to have been patronised by him, for he has given another figure,
by name vyājastuti, with almost a similar scope.

The figure seems to have developed from Bharata's
lakṣāṇa of that name, though its second form resembles in
substance his lakṣāṇas, guṇātīkāta and sārṣaṇa. Again,
it is absent in Visṇudharmottara which has, however, another
figure named upanyāsa closely comparable to it. In post-
Dandin period, Bhāmaha repudiates it, while Udbhata and Vāmana

citrāhētu. For viṣama and sama, cp. KPr. X. k. 125-7;
SD. X. 69-70; Kuval. I. 92.

82. Op. VII.2; also cp. Kuval. I. 167-8; SD. X. 63. Appaya
gives another exposition according to which the figure
consists in the depiction of the cause as synchronising
with its effect.

83. Op. SKA. III. 21; KPr. X. k. 122; SD. X. 91; etc.
take no notice of it. The two different views regarding the figure, which we notice in Daṇḍin, are represented in later theory by the figures vyājokti and vyājastuti respectively, though in Bhoja, the first conception has been assigned to the figure apahnuti. Appaya and Jagannātha conceive the merit and demerit presenting contrary appearance as the scope of the figure in order to distinguish it from vyājastuti, though the point of distinction cannot be held to be satisfactory.

(15) Yathāsāmkyaya (relative order), which is also called saṃkhyāna and krama, consists in the arrangement of words in a particular order, so that they may refer, in the same sequence, to the the things already enumerated.

Vāmana, due to his peculiar viewpoint of attaching the element of similitude to his figures, conceives it as the relative enumeration of objects of comparison and the standards thereof perhaps on the suggestion of Daṇḍin's example of the figure where, however, upameyas and upamānas have come by chance.

84. KA. II. 343-7; it, however, refers to only one phase, i.e. praise manifesting itself as censure.
86. Op. vyājokti in Vṛmāna IV. 3. 25; KPr. X. K. 118; SD. X. 92; Kuval. I. 153; for vyājastuti, op. SKA. IV. 56; KPr. X. k. 112; SD. X. 59- 60; Kuval. I. 70.
87. Op. SKA. IV. ex. (of apahnuti) 82-3 which are KA.'s II. 266-7 (ex. of leṣa).
88. Kuval. I. 138 and vṛtti which quotes KA. II. 269 and 271, admitting a saṃkara of leṣa and vyājastuti there.
89. Op. KA. II. 273; according to Bhāmaha (II. 88), this name was given to the figure by Madhāvin.
The general conception of the figure remains the same throughout. Some authors like Kuṭṭaka and Kuṛyaka, however, disclaim the figure, for it does not suit their peculiar standpoint.

(16) **Preyas** ( 'dearer') is the expression of sweet and exalted compliment born of devotion and causing pleasure (prīti). The pleasurable sensation may be felt either both by the addressee and the addressee or by the former only. The writer distinguishes prīti from rāti, though he implies some proximity between the two. Tarunācāsapati defines prīti as affection with reference to gods, preceptors and elders; it is in a way the dominant emotion of preyas, as Dandin would have it, while rāti (love) is the enduring emotion of the erotic sentiment. The writer treats preyas independently of the rasavat, perhaps because the latter in tradition did not comprehend the former within its scope.

Dandin's conception of the figure is comparable to Bharata's lākṣaṇa priyavacas. In later theory, it was

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91. Bh. Kal. II. 89; Uddyāna III. 2; KPr. X. k. 108; SD. X. 79; etc.
92. Cp. comm. on KA. II. 275 and 280-1. The scope of prīti thus comprehends all aspects of non-sexual love, though Dandin's examples refer only to its one aspect, viz., devotion to gods, which fact leads Dr. V. Raghavan (Ka. pp. 107-10) to think that Dandin's preyas is equivalent to bhakti which is synonymous with prīti. But Dandin's definition certainly does not set the limit, and it is not fair to restrict the scope of his preyas on the basis of his examples which are, of course, of limited range. It may be noted that Sudrāta (XVI. 13) mentions sneha (by which he means love of friendship) as the dominant emotion of preyas which he stamps as rasa.
conceived as a subordinate form of bhāva (emotion), just as the figure rasavat was considered to be the secondary form of rasa (sentiment). Thus from the narrow signification of pṛiti in early theorists, the figure received a wider conception of emotions in general, including those enduring as well as the transitory ones, in later writers. Inspiration for the change seems to have come from the exposition of the figures, prayas, rasavat and urjasvin in Udbhata. Bhaja, on the other hand, invents, on the model of the figure, a guṇa of that name and relates it to flattery (caṭūkti) in which sense prayas lived long in later literature. Besides, the figure develops into a new rasa in Rudraṭa, perhaps on the suggestion of Daṇḍin's correlating it with the sentiment of love.

(17) Rasavat (‘possessed of sentiments’) consists in exalted expression made charming by the sentiments which are the ripened forms of dominant emotions in union with other elements like vibhāva, anubhāva and saṁcāribhāvas. On the basis of the number of rasas, the figure is divided into eight forms.

Daṇḍin inherits the rasas from tradition as distinct from poetic figures, but due to his prepossessed attitude

93. Bh. ES. XVII. 5.
95. Op. IV. 2 ff; op. below for rasavat etc.
96. SKA. I. 63 ff.; acc. to him, (SKA., K. ed. p. 705), the
towards the figures, he relegates the rasas to subordinate position. He is followed in this respect by Bhāmaha, Udbhata etc. Later, the rasa theorists compromised with the situation by saying that the rasas assume the form of poetic figures when they come as subservient to other elements or emotions; otherwise they retain their independent status. Bhija channels the figures, preyas, rasavat and āurjasvin into two separates courses of figures and excellences; he maintains that the said figures retain their position as such only when they are possessed of exaltedness, in the absence of which they are reduced to the gunas, preyas, bhāvika and aurjitya respectively. He relates, thus, the figure rasavat to the conception of bhāvika in his own peculiar way. His curious theory seems to have been suggested by the remark of Dāndin that the three figures should be possessed of exaltedness (utkaraśa).

(18) Āurjasvin (vigorous) is the exalted expression of pride of vigour. Bhāmaha follows this conception of the figure. In Udbhata, however, we notice a change. He relates

figures preyas etc., when they are not possessed of exaltedness, become gunas; also op. below.

97. Cp. XII. 3; also op. fn. 92 above.
98. Cp. Bharata (NS. VI. 18; 18) who elaborates rasas as independent elements belonging to drama.
100. Cp. DhA. II. 5 ff.; KPr. IV. k. 26 vṛtti; also op. SD.X. 95-6; Kuval. I. 17). But Kuntaka (VJ. III. 11 ff.) vehemently rejects rasavat as a figure.
the figure with emotions and sentiments coming up from improp-
riety; and consequently in later theory the subordinate
aspect of pseudo-rasas (rasabhāsas) and pseudo-bhāvas
(bhāvabhāsas) was regarded as the sphere of this figure.

As noted above, Bhoja stamps its unexalted form as the aurjitya
guna, while he develops a new rasa named udbhata on the suggest-
ion of Daṇḍin’s definition of the figure.

(19) Samāhita (co-incidence) is the concurrence of an
undertaking and its accomplishment by chance. Bhāmaha follows
Daṇḍin in respect of this figure also. Vāmana, due to his
peculiar viewpoint noted above, puts forth quite a new exposit-
tion; he defines it as the conversion, by mistake, of the
object of comparison into the standard thereof. Udbhata,
on the other hand, totally discarding the earlier conception,
links it up with the allaying of sentiments and emotions,
and his theory wins general acceptance in the later writers.

101. SKA. KM./III.xvii8 pp. 704-5.
103. Cp. its ex. in KAl. III. 7 (for he does not define it).
106. Bhoja (SKA. V. 166 ff.) employs Daṇḍin’s definition
and the example of the figure for his udbhata rasa.
107. Cp. III. 10; Bhoja (SKA. III. 34) also follows him.
108. Cp. IV. 3. 29 and vṛtti; for his peculiar viewpoint, see
under yathāsaṁkhya.
To accommodate Daṇḍin's conception of the figure, a separate figure named samādhi was introduced in later theory.

(20) Paryāyokta (periphrastic speech) is the figure where the intended meaning is conveyed by some indirect device. The figure undergoes some conceptual change after Daṇḍin and Bhāmaṇa. The later theorists define it as the indication of the intended meaning by a turn of speech (bhāṅgī). This conception seems to be the result of a different, and perhaps more accurate, interpretation of Daṇḍin's 'prakāra-nātarākhyāna'. Some theorists, like Bhoja and Appaya, accepted both the expositions of the figure. Still another conception of the figure is observed in its definition by Jayadeva, which, however, could not win recognition in the theory.

(21) Udātta ('exalted') is the figure which describes beautifully either nobility of intention or supermundane

110. KPr. X. k. 125; SD. X. 85; Kuval. I. 118.
111. Cp. KA. II. 295-7; Bb. KAL. III. 8.
113. It should mean 'conveying in a different manner or periphrastically', but the meaning ill suits the example: 'I am going to drive the kokila bird away; you two please stay here freely.' Appaya (Kuval. I. 69) introduces another form of the figure and defines it as accomplishment of one's object by some pretext, evidently to accommodate the example better.
115. Candrā. V. 70.
Bandin's own udaraiva where also sow excellent quality is implicitly depicted.

The two forms of the figure retain themselves in later theory, with a slight change in respect of the second form. Udbhata replaces the idea of nobility of intention by that of an action of a great man. Again, subsequently, the idea of its representation as collateral to the subject in hand was suffixed to the conception.

(22) Apahnuti (concealment) consists in denying something real and presenting in its place something else of unreal nature, evidently with a view to affirming it more strongly.

The author mentions the denial of attribute (dharma, quality (visaya) and form (svarupa) as its three varieties, while some other forms like upamapahunti and tattvapahnavarupaka have been referred to by him in other contexts. Danidin does not

116. Op. KA. 300 and 303; also op. Udbhata: IV. 17, where 'upalakshanata' should be taken as antithesis of itivrttatva (matter-of-fact speech).


118. Op. Bharmaha (Kal. III. 12) (referring only to its second form); for the two forms, op. Kuval. 4. 162; Kfr. X. k. 115; SD. X. 94; etc.

119. Op. SD. X. 94. The idea is apparently the result of wrong interpretation of Udbhata's upalakshanata in the sense of 'being collateral to the subject in hand'; op. also fn. 116 above.

120. Op. KA. II. 34 (along with II. 309) and II. 95. According
admit the element of similitude in the figure, as is evident from his definition as well as the illustrations. But soon after him, the element was introduced by Bhāmaha and Vasana who were followed in this respect by most of the later theorists.

(23) Śliṣṭa (paronomasia) is the figure where words having identical form yield different meanings. The figure is very ancient. Though Bharata does not mention it, his lakṣaṇas, aksarasamāghāta and sōbhā involve double entendre. The figure appears for the first time in Viṣṇudharmottara.

Dandin refers to its two main varieties, namely, abhinnapada (where another meaning is obtained without dividing the word) and abhinnapada (where the word is split up in order that it yields another meaning). The two forms were retained in later theory as abhanga and sabhaṅga ślesa respectively. Of other forms, vīrudhakriya and virodhin are evidently the result of its coalition with the figure virodha, while the abhinakriya to Appaya (Kuval. 1. 29 vr̥tti), Dandin's tattvākhyānopapāmā belongs to the sphere of bhrānta-pādhūni, while to Bhoja (SKA. IV. 41-3 f.) the first form of leda is the anupamāya apādhūni.

121. Forms like pratigedhopama (I. 34) which are the result of other figures' interaction with apādhūni contain this element.

122. Cp. Bh. Kal. III. 21; Vāmana IV. 3, 5; Bhoja (SKA. IV. 41-3) divides apādhūni into aupamāyavatī and anupamāyā (with and without the element of similitude). As De (HSF. II, pp. 101-2) points out, some writers (cp. Udyota, ed. Candorkar, p. 39) introduce still another form of apādhūni named ganyamānapamāyā (where the comparison is implicit); also cp. for the figure, Kṛ. X. k. 96; SD. X. 38.

123. Bh. NS. XVII. 1.
may be related to the figure dipaka. Some varieties developed later into independent figures. Thus niyamavat and niyamā-
keśaparūpokti assumed the form of parisāmkhyā figure, latter
having the intermixture of ākṣepa also, while avirodhin can be
regarded as the precursor of the later pumaruktavadābhāsa.
Besides, the author speaks of its interaction with other figures,
evidently as a beautifying element, which aspect of the figure
we have already discussed.

In the later period, the figure was elaborated with more
scientific acumen. It was classified into verbal and ideal
forms which appear perhaps for the first time in Bhūmaha.
Dandin is also unaware of the classification of the meanings
the figure yields intyhat bearing on the context and that
conveyed incidentally, though some of his illustrations may
exemplify the two classes. In later theorists, the matter
became the centre of an interesting controversy, viz., whether
or not the concept of suggestion is essential for obtaining the
incidental sense.

124. Cp. Hemacandra's KaM., p. 277; KPr. IX. k. 84 vṛtti;
SB. X. 32.
125. Cp. the example of abhinnakriya (II. 316) with that of
dīśātārtthādīpaka (I. 113-4).
126. Cp. the examples (II. 319-20) with those of parisāmkhyā
in KPr. X. k. 119; SB. X. 31-2; etc.; for pumarukta-,
cp. KPr. IX. k. 86; SB. X. 2.
127. Cp. III. 17; also cp. KPr. IX. k. 34 f; SB. X. 111; 57.
128. Mummata holds the former view, while Appaya defends the
latter position; see for detail, Dr. Shcola Shankari Hundi
Kuvak. pp. 100-2. The ex. of incidental sense in Dandin
is KA. II. 311 where the word cēm, primarily meaning
'a kind ' , incidentally yields the sense of 'moon' also
(24) **Viṣeṣokti** (statement of difference) is the representation of incongruous character (vaikalya) of quality, genus, action or individual, with a view to conveying some special meaning. Daṇḍin illustrates in all its five varieties, four based on quality, genus etc. and the fifth animated with the figure hetu, while scope for other forms has expressly been admitted.

Daṇḍin’s conception of the figure could not win wide recognition in later theory which, however, developed, on the inspiration of his view, the figure viṣama. On the other hand, the later vibhāvanā approximates to his conception of viṣeṣokti, the illustrations of which in him can well serve the purpose of the former figure; and it is for this reason that Appaya conceives his ‘vaikalya’ (incongruous character) as the absence of the entirety of usual causes. Bhāmaṇa follows a different line. He defines it as the retention of the characteristics of an object even in the cessation of a substantial part thereof, and to add to the confusion, Viṣama introduces the element of similitude in the figure. Discarding earlier expositions, a new conception arises in later

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129. The word should not be taken to mean ‘incompetency’, as Vidyāsākara has done, since the meaning does not suit the examples.


theory according to which the figure consists in representing an effect as not taking place even in the presence of its usual causes. This conception seems to have been evolved from Bhāmaha’s exposition.

(25) Tulyayorṣītā (equal pairing) is the figure where the object under description and the objects having attributes similar to those of the former are represented side by side for the sake of either praising it or censuring it. The figure approximates to the writer’s own tulyayogopamā, a variety of simile, with the only difference that it contains the idea of praise or censure of the relevant object. Earlier writers like Bhāmaha and Vāmana virtually accept the variety of simile as their tulyayorṣītā. In later theory, we observe the noticeable change that the scope of the figure is confined to the connection, with the same common property, of the objects which must either be all relevant or irrelevant ones, whereas in Daṇḍin, the relevant and irrelevant objects are connected with one common property. This conception of Daṇḍin’s tulyayorṣītā is admitted in later theory as the proper sphere of dīpaka, which, however, does not contain the idea of praise.

132. Cp. KAL, III. 23-4; Vāmana IV. 3. 23 (he defines it as the confirmation of similarity even when the object of comparison is devoid of a certain characteristic of the standard of comparison).


or derision of the object under depiction. Not only this, it even tends to enter the area of his own dipaka as much as the verb herein, just as in kriyādipaka, helps the entire sentence, itself remaining in one place.

(26) Virodha (incongruity) consists in the presentation of antithetical objects with a view to effecting strikingness in expression. Daṇḍin gives, without any specific classification, six illustrations, fifth of which suits the viṣeṣokti better than the present figure. Bhāmaha and Udbhata follow, or rather improve upon, his definition, though they, along with Daṇḍin, fail to notice the essential element of apparent contradiction in the figure. Vāmana’s definition recognises the element for the first time, though his conception is so comprehensive that it tends to cover the other figures also based on apparent contradiction. His conception of the figure, however, establishes itself in later theory with, of course, requisite restrictions. The figure was finally conceived as an apparent

135. Cpa. KPr. X. k. 104; SD. X. 47-3. Appaya (Kuval. I. 45-7) refers to Daṇḍin’s conception also.
137. Cpa. KA. II. 338. It may be pointed out that Appaya (Kuval. I. 78 vrtti) notes this example under Daṇḍin’s viṣeṣokti.
138. Cpa. Ka. KA. III. 25 taken in Udbhata IV. 9. Bhāmaha divides the figure into kriyā and gupā virodha which may be exemplified by Ka.’s examples, the first by II. 334; 337 and 338 and the second by the remaining ones. He might have been inspired by Daṇḍin’s examples. Out of six examples of Daṇḍin only the last one (II. 339) contains the element of apparent.
incongruity consisting in representing objects as antithetical to one another, albeit they are not so; and it was finely elaborated into various divisions in later theory.

(27) *Apgastutaprasama* (indirect censure) is the figure where censure of the object under description is implied by the praise of some other object. The figure makes its first appearance in Dandin whom Bhāṣaḥa follows in spirit. His conception, however, was either dropped by later theorists or transferred to the figure *vyājastuti* which, on its part received a wider interpretation at their hands. Vāmana gives a new exposition to the figure by defining it as a symbolic reference to the object of comparison by presenting another object similar thereto. In later period, we come across an entirely different conception of the figure which was defined as the description (and not 'praise') of aprastuta conveying a reference to the aprastuta. This later conception is comparable to Dandin's *samāsokti* or Bhojaḥanyokti, a variety of *samāsokti* in him.

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139. Op. IV. 3. 12; his illustrations, however, exemplify the later asastuti.
140. *Kṛ. X. k. 110; SD. X. 67-8; etc.*
141. *Kāl. III. 29.*
144. Op. *Kṛ. X. k. 93-9; Kural. I. 65 vr̥tti; SD. X. 58-9; etc.*
(28) **Vyājastuti** (artful praise) is the figure wherein praise is implied by apparent censure. The figure makes its first appearance in Viṣṇudharmottara in the form of nindāstuti, while Bharata's laksāpa, guṇānuvāda also is comparable to it. Dāndin's vyājastuti closely resembles the second conception of the figure lesa, though the latter's scope is wider inasmuch as it comprehends also the idea of censure implied by apparent praise. Early writers like Bhāmaha and Vāmana follow Dāndin's exposition, but the latter theorists subscribe to the wider conception of the figure which is embraced by his lesa and it is interesting to note that Bhoja expressly identifies the two figures. Appaya still expands the scope of the figure by recognising its two forms, the first (ekaviṣaya) as comprehended by lesa and the second (bhinnaviṣaya) explained by him as the praise or censure of one implied by the censure or praise of another. This second form of vyājastuti covers the scope of Dāndin's aprastutapraśāsā, as admitted by Appaya himself.

(29) Nidārśana (illustrative simile) is the figure where a person or a thing engaged in a particular action points...
to a consequence, good or bad, similar to the action. The
nirdardana appears in Bharata in the form of a laksana and the
author of the Visnudharmottara knows it as a figure.

Dandin's conception of the figure is adopted in substance
by early writers like Bhamaha and Vamanaka who, however, define
it quite differently. In later theorists, the figure
receives a wider range; it is defined as a figure where two
correlated objects, whether their relationship is probable or
otherwise, display the condition of the original and its counter-
feit. The aspect dealing with the probable relationship
appertains to the earlier conception of the figure, while the
second form is an innovation. Appaya describes three different
forms of the figure, the last of which refers to Dandin's
conception, the remaining forms being later developments.

(30) Sahokti (co-mention) is the mention of qualities
or actions of a thing as occurring together. The conception
of the figure remains the same throughout and the various
expositions differ only superficially. According to Bhamaha,
seusa often accompanies the figure, while Visvanatha thinks
Visvanatha thinks that it must contain the element of exaggera-
tion, which Dandin's examples do possess.

150. Bh. NS. XVII. 2.
151. Bh KAL. III. 33-4; Vamanaka IV. 3. 20; also cp. SKA. III.31.
152. SD. X. 51; Mamnata (Kfr. X. k. 97), however, has the
aspect referring to the improbable relationship only.
(31) Parivrtti (barter) is the figure wherein there is an exchange of things. Though the basic conception of the figure did not change, its exposition received improvement at the hands of the later theorists who classified the things exchanged into either equal or smaller or greater. Bhoja introduces, besides the idea of exchange, that of vyatygaa (transfer from one place to another), but his innovation failed to win general acceptance.

(32) Aesia (benediction) is the expression of good wishes for some coveted object. The figure already exists as a laksha in Bharata's work and Bhatti illustrates it, though it is absent in the Visnudharmottara. Danadn evidently admits it out of regard for tradition. Bhamaha disdains it, while Udhaata, Wama and almost all the later writers drop it altogether. Kuntaka rightly decides those who treat it as a poetic figure.

Bhavika. At the end of the treatment of ideal figures, Danadn refers to a poetic figure named bhavika which he also

156. Op. Bh.KAL. III. 41; Wama IV. 3. 16; KPR. X. K. 113; SD. X. 80; KUVAI. I. 112; etc. All the above writers, except Bhama, divide the figure into three forms.
158. KAL. III. 56-6.
159. Op. VJ. III. 44.
terms an excellence pervading the whole composition. Evidently Dandin inherited the concept from tradition, but we do not know what exact position this alaṃkāra-guṇa occupied before him. It is possible, however, that it enjoyed an independent status, along with the mārga-guṇas, in the form of an excellence applicable to the whole composition (prabandha), for it is significant to note that Dandin places it after the saṃkīrṇa (conjunction of different figures), implying thereby that the figure is a new addition to the list which must have exhaust-ed with saṃkīrṇa. This peculiar position of the figure in Dandin's scheme raises the presumption that it occupied in earlier tradition a unique place, quite distinct both from the poetic excellences and figures, and that our author, due to his peculiar viewpoint, included it, like the mārga-guṇas and saṃāhyāṅgas etc., in his pervasive conception of alaṃkāra. According to the evidence of Jayamaṅgalā, Bhaṭṭi devotes a full canto (XII) to the illustration of the concept, though it is not known what he exactly means by the term.

The conception of bhāvika in Dandin comprehends a scope wider than a particular guṇa or alaṃkāra can possess; it involves multifarious elements of vast application. It is really

160. Its enumeration after saṃkīrṇa may also imply that it is free from the grip both of svabhāvokti and vakrokti elements; cp. Ṛṣṭ. on KA, II. 363.

161. We cannot safely connect it, as Raghavan (SCAŚ, pp. 129-1) proposes to do, with Bharata's bhāvita (the 12th aṅga of lāśya (Bh. hŚ, XX. 182), given as bhāvika by Aśkīnavagupta and Sāradātanaya.
difficult, therefore, to assign it a place in a clear-cut scheme either of the guṇas or of alaṃkāras. According to Dandin it consists in (i) mutual assistance of all the parts or elements of the plot, (ii) avoidance of redundant attributes, (iii) the depiction of things in their proper place and in (iv) so arranging the matter that the intended depth of theme comes out clearly. All these elements are controlled, as a whole, by bhāva, the intention of the poet, and hence the name bhāvikā. As Dr. De rightly points out, the bhāva here should be taken as an aesthetic element relating to the essential poetic conception of the poem itself, so that the poem is viewed as a product of the poet's mind and not merely as a more or less external application of rhetorical precepts. So bhāvika, according to him "is all-pervading characteristic of the poem as a whole which controls its subject-matter as well as its expression, as a vivid externalisation of the poet's essential poetic idea. It emphasises that aspect of poetry in general which is the expression of the poet's mind as an aesthetic fact, and which is the main problem of Western Aesthetics, but is practically ignored elsewhere in Śākskṛt poetics."

162. Ratna. (on KA. II. 364; 366) explains bhāva as a poet's persevering endeavour leading to successful accomplishment of a composition; it is acc. to him the faculty of distinguishing good from bad, which a poet must possess. Ruyyaka (AS. 183. ed., pp. 221-3) interprets it as a poet's feelings or thoughts which are reflected in a reader's mind.

163. Op. CFPSP, pp. 54-8. As De further remarks, though earlier theorists were mainly concerned with external rhetorical
Although Bhāmaha, like Daṇḍin, enumerates bhāvika among the poetic figures and also refers to it as a characteristic excellence applicable to a composition as a whole, his exposition of the concept is based entirely on a different ground. According to him, it consists in representing objects, whether past or future, as if they were present, the condition of representation being that the theme must have picturesque, exalted and striking meaning and the words used must be perspicuous.

Despite its closeness to the svabhāvokti figure from which it became necessary to distinguish it in later time, Bhāmaha's bhāvika, like that of Daṇḍin, emphasises the importance of subject-matter, lucid diction and charming expression and as such stands above the restricted scope of guṇas and alāmākāras. This conception of Bhāmaha comes down in Udbhāta and through him in later writers like Mammaṭa, Viśvanātha and Appaya, but in the long journey, it loses the wide range it once commanded and is reduced to merely a narrow rhetorical figure consisting in so vivid a description of past or future that it appears to be actually present. Some writers like Vāmana and elements, they exhibit, however vaguely, their consciousness of the internal problem by admitting that the element which controls a composition as a whole is the poet's bhāva.

164. KAl. III. 52-3.
165. Cc. Ruyyaka: Aś., TSS. ed. p. 224; SD. X. 33f. Keith (HSL. np. 330-1) equates it with Aristotle's ΕΒΕΥΕΛΑ. Viśvanātha distinguishes it also from prasaḍa guṇa, the sentiment of wonder and the figures atisāyokti and bhrāntimat.
Rudrata totally ignores the concept, while Bhoja develops a new conception apparently on the line of Dandin's idea of poet's intention termed bhava and assigns it a place in his guna scheme and gives rasavat as its counterpart in alamkaras. But his exposition is, on the whole, vague and farfetched.

Although Dandin's conception of bhavika could not win popular recognition in later theory, yet it must be admitted that his exposition is comparatively more comprehensive and scientific.

Besides the alamkaras discussed above, Dandin also refers to a few more. He deals with them in the course of his treatment of other figures as their mere varieties, but it is evident from his own admission that they were regarded as independent figures by other theorists. Such figures are ananvaya, conceived as asadharaṇopamā, sasamdeha as samdayopama and upamarupaka described as a form of rupaka. He also mentions utprekṣā-vayava as a variety of utprekṣā, though he does not deal with

167. We cannot hold with Sovani (Bhand. Gom. Vol., II, p. 399) that Vamanma analyses Dandin's bhavika into his ideal gunas, āleṣa and ojas, for the concepts bear just superficial resemblance.
it in course of his treatment of the figure. All these figures find a place in the works of Bhaṭṭi, Bhāmaha and Vāmana, though Udbhata refers to ananvaya and saṃdeha only, while Audrāta mentions only the latter one.

Dāṇḍin also deals with the phenomenon of the conjunction of poetic figures which he terms saṃkīrṇa. He divides it into two forms, namely, interdependent combination of figures and their independent communion or equal co-existence. In later theory, these cases were recognised as saṃkīrṇa (commixture) and saṃṣṛṭi (conjunction) respectively, which terms our author employs indiscriminately in his work. It may be remarked casually that a large number of subspecies of Dāṇḍin’s figures are the result of such combinations, as is evident from the foregone discussion of his individual figures.

As has been said above, Dāṇḍin comprehends, in his all-absorbing conception of alaṃkāra, the saṃdhyāṅgas (forms of dramatic junctures), vṛttyāṅgas (forms of dramatic manners) and the lakaṣaṇas, which elements in fact belong to the drama proper, as Bharata and later dramaturgists maintain. The dramatic junctures are five in number, viz., mukha (introduction), pratimukha (progression), sarbha (development),

170. Op. Bh.KAL. III. 35; 43; 45; 47; Vāmana IV. 3. 11; 14; 32-3. The figure ananvaya may be traced back to Bharata’s saḍṛśi variety of upanā (NS. XVII. 54).

171. Op. KPr. X. x. 139-42; also op. Dr. B.S. Vyāsa: Hindi KUyAL., pp. 285-304. For the phenomenon, also Op. Bh.KAL. III. 49; Vāmana IV. 3. 30-3; SD. X. 97-3 etc.
visarṣa (pause) and nirvāhana (conclusion), further subdivided into sixteen numbers in all. The dramatic manners are four, namely, kaiśikī (graceful), sāttvati (grand), ārābhaṭī (violent) and bharati (verbal), each subdivided again into four forms. The word, ādi (’et cetera’)
in Kavyādāra II. 367 still widens the sphere of alamkāra which tends to include the vīthyaṅgas (forms of vīthi drama like udṛghātyaka etc.) and the lāsyāṅgas (forms of lāsya dance like geyapada etc.) also. What Dandān means to emphasise is that all elements of poetry and drama, in whatever capacity they might be, come within the fold of the concept of alamkāra which could otherwise hardly accommodate these elements. The case of lakaṇṇas, however, is different for they can be well fitted into the alamkāra scheme, as Bharata himself implies by calling them poetic embellishments. Although Bharata nowhere distinguishes the two concepts, yet it is evident that he develops them separately, giving more prominence to the lakaṇṇas. Following his line, Abhinavagupta deals with the concept of lakaṇṇa in detail. He refers to ten different

173. Br. NS. XX. 1-73; Dr. II. 44-57; III. 5; SD. VI. 171-5; cp. Keith: SDr., pp. 326-8.
175. Br. NS. XVII. 1-39; cp. esp. XVII. 42; Śiṅgabhūpāla, Sarasvatānaya etc. call these lakaṇṇas by the name of bhāṣaṅga; cp. also Keith: SDr. pp. 323-30.
176. Cp. Br. NS. XVII. 16 ff; It may be noted that Bharata knows only four figures, but deals with thirty-six lakaṇṇas.
views with regard to it, his own theory being that the lakshaṇas are more comprehensive than the alaṃkāras inasmuch as they are inseparably one with the body of poetry since they impart beauty to poetry by themselves and are not added, like alaṃkāras, to it for extraneous embellishment. Thus, according to him, lakshaṇa is the poetic expression itself put in tune with rasa, and as such it constitutes the poetic gift. Again in his view, lakshaṇas beautify even the alaṃkāras by bestowing on them the intrinsic charm without which comparisons like 'gavaya (Qayal) is like a cow' do not form simile.

Abhinava-gupta's elaboration of the concept could not win the approval of later writers who either summarily dismissed the lakshaṇas or recognised their importance only in the sphere of drama. Consequently, in course of time, they almost disappeared from the arena of Poetics proper, being swallowed up by the alaṃkāras with which they coincided in function from the earliest period.

Many of the lakshaṇas developed, as early as Dāṇḍin's time, into poetic figures either in substance or in name or even in both. If they survived as independent entities in some theorists, their existence was superfluous and insignificant. The lakshaṇas appearing in Dāṇḍin as poetic figures are hetu, saṃśaya- (upamā), nidārśana, atiśaya, leśa, āśis and priyavacṣas (preyas). Some

178. Also cp. V. Raghavan: SCAS, pp. 12-4; De: HSP. II, p. 5.
lakṣaṇas like drṣṭānta, nirukta, arthāpatti etc. assumed the part of figures in later theorists. It may be added that conceptions of most of the lakṣaṇas changed in course of their migration, while some appear to have changed their names in the process. Thus we may detect the spirit of the lakṣaṇas, guṇātipāta, sarhaṇa, dīṣa, prasiddhi and aksarasamghāta in the later figures vyājastuti, aprastutapradāna (according to Daṇḍin's conception), svabhāvokti, udāttta and śleṣa respectively.

Again, as Aphasisugupta points out, these lakṣaṇas have an indirect hand in the formation of a number of varieties of figures which we notice in Sanskrit theorists and especially in earlier writers.

**Verbal Figures (sabdālakṣāras).**

Daṇḍin gives the verbal figures evidently a secondary place in his scheme, though he deals with them in great detail. His treatment is far more elaborate than that of Bhāmaṇa and a host of others who followed him.

Among the verbal figures, first comes anuprāsa which he deals with under the guṇa, mādhurya as its verbal aspect. It is a word-sequence where there is a formal harmony that is felt with previous word or words. It corresponds to the later śrutyanuprāsa consisting in the grouping of similar sounds in the form of letters belonging to the same place of articulation. There is another form of anuprāsa which has been defined as

179. Cp. AB. pp. 380; 401; for a detailed study of lakṣaṇas, see V. Raghavan: SCAS., pp. 1-44; De; HSP. II, pp. 4-5.
the repetition of similar letters bordering upon one another and retaining thereby the impression of previous alliterative sounds. This variety approximates to the later chekānuprāsa and vṛttyanuprāsa. Anuprāsa seems to have been evolved from the older figure yamaka. In fact, the two figures are what Bharata would term sabdābhyaśa or verbal repetition in a wider sense. Yamaka may be understood, within its range, as padābhyaśa or the recurrence of words, the other being the repetition of syllables. Bhāmaha's treatment of anuprāsa is comparatively more elaborate; he divides it on the basis of the vṛttais, lāṭī and grāmyā which classification gets further elaboration in the works of Udbhata, Rudraṭa and others.

Yamaka consists in the peculiar repetition of a group of letters, which may take place either mediately or immediately or both ways. Again, it may occur (i) in the beginning of a metrical line, (ii) in the middle (iii), at the end, (iv) in the beginning, middle and end, (v) in middle and end, (vi) in the beginning and middle, (vii) in the beginning and end or (viii) in the entire line. Still again, the recurrence may cover one line or two or three or all the four lines.

180. Cp. KPr. IX. k. 79 f.; SD. X. 4. In Bhāmaha (II. 5) as in Daṇḍin, it is simply anuprāsa.
182. Cp. Bk. KAl. II. 5-6; Udbhata I. 1-20; etc. For elaborate treatment, cp. SKA. II. 70 ff.; KPr. and SD., loc. cit. The main forms are: śrutī-, vṛtī-, varṇa-, pādā-, chekā- and antya-.
183. This basis of division may be traced back to Bharata (XVII. 62); Bhāmaha (II. 9-10) also refers to it.
Of the numerous varieties formed on these bases, Dandaśastra nearly forty forms. Besides, he describes seven other varieties which he probably inherited from tradition. These species are: (i) sāmdaṣṭa where the repetition occurs at the end of the first line and is followed up in second and third lines both in the beginning and at the end and lastly in the beginning of the fourth, thereby giving the verse the shape of a pair of tongs; (ii) samudga or the repetition of a hemistich; (iii) pādābhyaṣa, the repetition of a full line; (iv) ślokābhyaṣa, the recurrence of a verse in the following one; (v) mahāyamaṇḍa consisting in the sameness of four lines which are, on their part, possessed of the repetition of letters; (vi) vijātiya, formed by combining the different forms, and (vii) pratilomayamaṇa, repetition in reverse order.

Although Dandaśastra expressly strikes out the figure from the sphere of his verbal mādhurya stamping it as not invariably conducive to sweetness, yet his attitude towards it appears to be strongly favourable. What he probably means there is that the figure does not constitute the mādhurya guṇa, though in its own sphere it occupies a kingly position, as his elaborate treatment of the figure shows. His predilection for yamaka which he "gives one of the fullest treatment in the whole realm of Alamkāra literature," is also indicated by the sustained labour he puts in composing its difficult illustrations.

184. Of these forms, sāmdaṣṭa finds a mention in Bhaṭṭi, Bhāmaha, Rūdrata etc. and samudga in writers from Bharata onward. Mammaṭa's mahāyamaṇa is equal to Dandaśastra's ślokābhyaṣa.
The history of yamakā is sufficiently old. Bharata describes it in detail, illustrating its ten varieties; many of which survive, either in name or in substance, in Bhāṭṭi, 187 Dāṇḍin and others. Most of the writers who came after Dāṇḍin developed an aesthetic attitude towards it. The figure did not visualise conceptual change throughout its long history, though we notice a slight improvement in its exposition. Bharata and Dāṇḍin do not refer to the requisite difference of meaning in the repeated unit of words which characteristic element has been mentioned for the first time by Bhāmaha and has been scrupulously followed by later writers.

Among verbal figures, Dāṇḍin also deals with some citrālāśkāras (amazing figures or verbal feats). Of these, gomūtrikā (zigzagging) consists in the similarity of alternate letters of two hemistiches. The revolution of a verse in two directions is called ardhahārama, while that in all the directions is termed sarvatobhadra. The svaraniyama, athāna- and

186. Cp. Rām., Sundar., 15-17; Rudradāman’s insc., of 2nd cent. A.D. The tradition recorded in Kājadeśkhara’s KM, however, that Citrāhrada expounded the figure (cp. above) is of dubious character.
188. Bhāmaha (II. 9-17) gives only 5 varieties and Udāhata altogether omits it. Māmaṭa (Kṛ. IX. k. 83 vṛtti) calls it a ‘knot’ in poetry like that in sugar-cane which hinders the realisation of rasa. Vāmana (IV. 1. 1-7), Rudraṭa, Bhoja (SKA. II. 53-67) and the author of Agniṣ., however, give it an elaborate treatment.
189. Cp. Bh. AAL. II. 17; SKA. II. 53; Kṛ. IX. k. 83; SD. X. 8; etc.
varṇa-constist in the restricted use of vowels, letters of particular sthānas (places of articulation of sounds) and syllables respectively. These forms involve verbal ingenuity of a high degree and have been rightly called duṣkaramārgas (dictions hard to be accomplished) by the writer who, however, successfully tries his hand on these literary feats in his works.

Another form of arduous verbal jugglery is the prahelikā (riddle or enigmatic speech) which has been elaborated at great length by the author. The riddles, according to him, serve useful purpose in literary clubs, in secret consultations in public and in perplexing the minds of others. He gives its sixteen varieties stamped as good species by older ācāryas as distinct from bad ones which number fourteen.

The sixteen varieties are: (1) samāgatā, where meaning is hidden by coalescence of words, (2) vāñcitā, where real meaning is lost in the apparent one, (3) vyuṣkrāntā, the use of semantically connected words at great distances, (4) pramūṣitā, obscure meaning, (5) samāmarūpā, conveyance of derivative meanings, (6) paruṣā, conveyance of grammatical meanings, (7) samākhyaṭā, conveyance of meaning by numerics, (8) prakalpitā, assumed meaning, (9) nāmāntaritā, hidden names, (10) nibhrātā, hidden meanings, (11) samānāsadbā, confusing use of synonyms,

190. Cp. KA. II. 83; 96; 186. For his literary tour de force, see below, sect. III, chap. IV.

191. KA. III. 96-124; he, however, does not define it. Bhāṣaha (II. 19) defines it as riddle of the yamaka class intricated by various roots and their senses. Dharmadāsa Sūri defines it as concealment of real meaning and
(12) saṃmūḍhā, vexing use of words, (13) parihārikā, avoidance of usual meaning, (14) ekacchānā, hidden asraya or container, (15) ubhayacchānā, hidden container and container, and (16) saṃkīrṇā, a combination of various forms.

The tradition of citrabandhas seems to be quite old, though Bharata does not refer to them. Bāna mentions them and Bhāravi and Māṇḍūka, as also Daṇḍin himself, employ them in various degrees. Bhamaha tells us that some Rāmasarman dealt with prahelikās in Acyutottara ('correct answer') and in later period, Dharmadāsa Śūri (13th century) treats them exclusively in his Vidagdhamukhamahāṇana. With regards to the admissibility of these artificial feats in the sphere of poetry, there were two distinct opinions. While some writers like Daṇḍin, Rudraṭa, Bhoja and the author of Agni-Purāṇa attach much importance to these forms, a good number of others show their indifference or aversion to this kind of artificial poetry.

conveyance of some other instead, finally resulting into an indication of both the meanings.

192. Op. Kād. (para 4) which refers to such literary feats as aksaracchāna, mātrā-, bindumati and guḍhasaturthapāda, besides prahelikā; also op. Kirāt. XV; Sidd. XXX; etc.

193. KAL. II. 19.

194. Rudraṭa devotes a full chap. (V) to these citrabandhas; also op. ŚKA. II. 103-37; KPr. IX; Agni-P. etc. On the other hand, Bhamaha (II. 19-20) makes a passing ref. to one of the forms, prahelikā. Udbhāta and Vāmana ignore them; also op. Dha. III. 42-3 ff. and esp. SD. X. 13-4, which discredit these verbal jingles as causing hindrance in the enjoyment of rasa.
An assessment of Dandin's treatment of poetic figures.

Dandin being one of the earliest theorists, his treatment of poetic figures is important from the point of view of trac­ing the early history of their development in Sanskrit Poetics. Of course, it is comparatively immature for evident reason. Dandin treats in all forty-eight figures, thirty-nine belonging to ideal embellishment and the remaining to verbal decoration. He appears to have faithfully followed the traditional enumeration except with regard to the figures ananyā etc. and the fact explains his inclusion of figures like preyas and ādis which, strictly speaking, cannot be termed as such.

His exposition of individual figures presents somewhat rudimental form. Most of his definitions suffer from the fallacy of definition—too wide (ativyāptidoṣa) due to which many figures appear to encroach upon the sphere of other alaṃkāras. A special mention may be made of the figures based on incongruity which, though defined separately, overlap each other and specially tend to be drawn towards the conception of the main figure of the class, vis., virodha. It was perhaps for this reason that the later theorists felt the need of modifying the definitions of many figures and in some cases even of giving entirely a new exposition to them.

Dandin had not evolved a definite basis for the classification of figures. The so-called basis of the elements of sva-bhāvokti and vakrokti cannot be held to be a logical one, nor is it comprehensive enough to cover all the figures. There is no specific demarcation of sphere of the two elements and it is
often difficult to categorise the figures in a particular class. Again, the author does not possess a logical scheme of the division of individual figures which in most cases have been divided and subdivided quite arbitrarily into innumerable varieties. The tendency has been followed to the extent of absurdity in the case of figures like upamā and ākṣepa. There are, in Daṇḍin, some figures which have not been conceived precisely or at least explained properly. Such figures are anuprāsa, ākṣepa, vyatireka, hetu, paryāyokta, viḍeṣokti and nidardana. Again, there are some figures like apahnuti and aprastutaprasaṁsā which could not receive full justice from him.

As regards the illustrations, they are generally expressive, but in some cases, they represent either a narrower or a wider scope than the definitions really afford. Examples with too narrow a scope are in a way helpful in understanding the exact conception of the figure in case its definition is not so precise. There are cases where the exact nature and scope of figures and especially their varieties are determined by illustrations alone; the various forms of ākṣepa, for instance, are defined, so to say, by their examples. The illustrations which present a scope too wide for definitions result into the formation of a large number of new figures in later times.

Such new figures which may be traced back to Daṇḍin's examples are adhika, anumāna, asāṁvatī, parisamkhya, pratīpa, bhṛantimat, mīlita, viṣama, samādhi, sama, atyukti (inspired from Daṇḍin's opposite form of suṣa, samādhi), niscaya and kāraṇakādipaṇa.
On the whole, Dandin's chapter on alākāras gives an impression that the doctrine is passing through a formative stage with bright prospects ahead which we do visualise in later theorists. His treatment of figures, with all its merits and defects, affords, above all, an important link between the doctrine in the making on one hand and its steady development on the other.