CHAPTER I
Introduction

1.1: NEED/ RATIONALE OF THE STUDY
“From the earliest times in educational theory and practice, moral education has been seen as the very core of the educational process, and moral upbringing has been regarded almost without question, as the central feature of education itself”. The truth of this is immediately apparent from an examination of the work of any or all the greatest theorists and practitioners of education. Recent years, however, have witnessed a revival of interest in moral education as such, as evidenced by the establishment of several curriculum projects in this area and by the appearance of moral education as subject on the time table of many secondary schools in India. At present, the subject of moral education is becoming increasingly prominent in educational discussions at all levels. Parents, teachers and society at large have been concerned about morality and moral education of children.

In recent days in many societies there seem to be a general decline and reluctance on the part of many school-goers to accept what religious education has offered them in the name of moral teaching. This development should be viewed carefully in the light of contemporary needs of children. Therefore, this demands that schools must consider alternative ways of approaching moral education. Research evidence shows that moral values occupy a prestigious place in an individual’s life. By moral values, we mean those values which when applied to human behaviour, exalt and refine life and brings it into accord with the standards of conduct that are approved in our democratic culture. Moral values are evaluations of actions generally believed by the members of a given society as either wrong or right. The most fundamental aspect of moral development consists not in unwilling adherence to a set of rules and regulations, but in building and strengthening positive sentiments for people and ideals.

Moral education provided must enable people to do their own moral thinking rather than encouraging them to confirm to an externally imposed moral code. It must be educationally sound, broad based and rooted in reason. It must, therefore, be based upon solid, empirical evidence of the stages through which the child passes in his moral growth. Moral education necessarily begins with the family and to some extent may involve other institutions before
children come to school. In schools, children are subject to its systematic influence and that influence may not be as strong as that of family, but its persistent educative and socialising effects are important. For many children it is the only source of regular moral influence they encounter, apart from that of their home and their peer groups. It is a fact that home is on many moral issues listed in its approach.

School plays a vital role in moulding the personality and morality of children. School programmes, therefore, should be designed in such a way that it should make students to develop, not only knowledge but also morality, spirituality, well defined personality and emotional balance. In most of the schools, teachers give importance to the academic achievement of students, neglecting their moral development. However, there is no doubt that children should be trained and educated in moral values to make their future, safe and happy. The present situation of India demands a system of education which, apart from strengthening national unity, must strengthen social solidarity through character formation. Teacher plays a major role in moulding personality of students. If teacher wants to be successful mentor, he/she needs to have criticality in making decisions, spiritual, ethical and practical in his/her approach. Present study aimed at assessing moral judgment among teachers working in secondary schools of Karnataka. It also aims to study few of the selected personality correlates, which have direct influence over moral judgment of these teachers. The researcher wants to study influence of teacher adjustment, job satisfaction and mental ability on their moral judgment.

The first term ‘value development’ of reference for the National Commission on Teachers (1983) was "to lay down clear objectives for the teaching profession with reference to the search for excellence, breadth of vision and cultivation of values". The Working Group to review teachers training programmes in the light of the need for value orientation (WG) set up by the Government of India in 1983 recommended for the inclusion of a value education component in the teacher education programme besides spelling out details of curriculum, methodology and teachers role.

1.2: Concept of Value Education

Value education is generally referred to a broad range of learning activities. They range from training in mental hygiene, physical health, appropriate social behaviour, etiquette and manners, civic rights and duties to aesthetic and even to religious training.
Some people consider value education is simply a matter of developing appropriate behaviour and habits involving inculcating of certain values, habits and virtues. In opposition to such a conception, it is very well noted that value education has cognitive component which should not be ignored. The aim of value education is to cultivate the ability to make moral judgment based on sound reasoning.

Moral development of a child automatically results from the social life at the school. The child as a member of the group imbibes the attitudes, values and general behaviour of the group and continually tries to mould himself according to the group norm. Such adjustment to life constitutes his/her moral development. Value education is a process of aiding the child in such adjustment. Such a view is criticized on the grounds that, though children learn the norms of group behaviour from the social life at the school, such learning does not constitute value education. Morality is not concerned so much with 'what is' as with 'what ought to be' and 'what ought to be done'.

Value education, according to one more view, is essentially a matter of educating the feelings and emotions. It is the 'training of the heart' and consists in developing the right feelings and emotions. It does not involve any cognitive abilities that can be trained. Like poetry, it is 'caught' rather than taught. It is essentially a matter of creating the right atmosphere, imitation and learning by example in relation with nature or modeling one self after an ideal. Such a view is countered by saying that mere imitation of a 'good' person and modeling oneself after an ideal does not confer any morality on an individual. Morality 'radiates' from one person to another. Moral development includes both moral thinking and moral behaviour. Moral thinking is characterised by the exercise of rational choice. A moral person is not only a person who does the 'right' thing but also one who does the 'right' thing for the 'right' reason.

1.3 NEED AND IMPORTANCE OF MORAL EDUCATION

“From the ancient times in theory and practice of education, moral education has been seen as the very core of the educational process. Moral upbringing has been regarded as the central feature of education itself”. The truth of this is apparent from examination of the work of the greatest theorists and practitioners in the field of education.

Right from the Vedic times, Hinduism has given all importance to moral education and socially acceptable behaviour of people. Saints like Ramakrishna Paramahamsa and Swami Vivekananda have stressed the significance of moral values in everyone’s life.
Swami Vivekananda says “we cannot have a great nation with men of low character. Character is destiny and character is only precious jewel that one can cherish to wear”. Swami Vivekananda gave importance to “man making education”, “nation building education” and “character formation education”. Swami Vivekananda says that “progress of the nation has achieved in many areas has become useless because of our less character”.

One of the great world religions, Buddhism, originated in India, has analysed an individual into five groups of changing constituents. They are (i) corporeality, (ii) feeling, (iii) perceptions, (iv) mental formations and (v) consciousness. Like everything else in the universe, a person is in process of continuous change, with no fixed underlying entity. Everything is transitory and impermanent (anicca), in continual unease and unrest (dukka), and objectives (anatta). In this ever-flowing flow of psychophysical events, everything takes place according to universal causality, the law of deeds (karma) by which each act brings on its own inevitable result. The idea of karma was not original with the Buddha, but he gave it a distinctly ethical interpretation. Good deeds bring good results and evil deeds bring evil results. This furnishes the basic condition for moral development.

Christianity considered character training as the central task of education. It even condoned practices that are far away from morality, if they appeared to be conducive to the establishment of a proper sense of moral rectitude in children.

Islam also advocates the concept of moral development and expects each person responsible for his religious life.

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In recent days in many societies there seem to be a general decline and reluctance on the part of many school-goers to accept what religious education has offered them in the name of moral teaching. This development should be viewed carefully in the light of contemporary needs of children. Therefore this demands that schools must consider alternative ways of disseminating moral education.

Past research shows that moral values occupy a prestigious place in an individual’s life. By moral values, we mean those values which when applied to human behaviour, exalt and refine life and brings it in accordance with the standards of conduct that are approved in
our democratic culture. Moral values are evaluations of actions generally believed by the members of the society as either wrong or right. The most fundamental aspect of moral development consists of willing adherence to a set of rules and regulations, and in building and strengthening of positive sentiments for people and ideals.

Moral education enables people to think morally, rather than encouraging them to confirm to an externally imposed moral code of conduct. Moral education must be based upon solid empirical evidence of the stages through which the child passes in his moral growth.

Moral education necessarily begins with the family and to some extent may involve other institutions before children come to school. In schools, children are subject to its systematic influence. The influence may not be as strong as that of family, but its persistent educative and socialising effects are important. For many children it is the only source of regular moral influence they encounter, apart from that of their home and their peer groups. It is a fact that home is on many moral issues severely listed in its approach.

Moral education involves not only social education but also extends beyond it, in so far as it covers the way the individual deals with his own powers and potentialities as well as how he behaves in his relationship with other people and the community at large.

The most constructive factors in moral education are happiness, purposeful, stimulating atmosphere which encourages the child to explore his/her own powers and offers loving guidance and setting appropriate limits to behaviour.

The school has been deliberately organised for educational results. Therefore, it should be based on publicly accepted principles. School should help children to develop proper and accepted patterns of behaviour. Bullying, cheating, creating fear, adopting irrational practices, decisions based on personal will, the pointless maintenance of tradition and the irrelevant use of status – all these are not acceptable in any institution and certainly in one which is committed directly to moral instruction.

A mismanaged school is not only an immoral place in itself, but also develops in pupils, beliefs and dispositions that are highly non-educative.

The teacher occupies a pivotal role in imparting moral instruction to the students. The students should be encouraged to have proper role-taking opportunities for their moral development. Teachers should discuss some of the live moral issues stress on the significance of moral thinking on positive lines. Mere quoting from scriptures, telling stories form Ramayana and Mahabharata will not serve the purpose rather opportunities should be created, to the students, to think on live problems involving moral dimension.
The ultimate aim of moral education is to raise the level of moral judgment and behaviour thereof in such a way that judgment and behaviour are based to as great extent as possible upon general moral principles.

1.4: MORAL DEVELOPMENT AND ITS PERSPECTIVES

Morality refers to a doctrine of beliefs, values, or principles that govern human conduct in two ways: (i) by prescribing positive behaviors that benefit others and (ii) by proscribing negative actions that harm others. The former set of behaviors, often called prosocial behaviors, include sharing, helping, and comforting. In terms of moral judgment, these actions are viewed as good and ought to be carried out. The latter type of actions, often referred to as inhibitory or negative morality, include violations of others' rights and welfare, such as hitting, harming, and otherwise injuring others physically or psychologically, actions viewed as bad which one ought not to do.

While defining morality might be a fairly straightforward matter, speculations about its origins and development have proved far more contentious. So, too, has the role of schools and classroom teachers in promoting its growth. This entry offers a summary of the major differing views on the origins of morality and its development. It focuses on two forms of moral development—judgment and identity—that have generated decades of empirical research and have affected moral/character education in the United States. In the context of describing the normative developmental changes that occur from early childhood through late adolescence, the entry explores the roles of gender, ethnicity, and culture on moral development.

MORAL DEVELOPMENT: PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES

In the field of psychology, morality and its development has been variously defined by different types of psychologists. Psychoanalysts, such as Sigmund Freud (1856–1939), believe that morality is rooted in the avoidance of guilt and shame and that its development is a product of the super-ego. In a similar vein, some developmental and social psychologists, such as Martin Hoffman and Jonathan Haidt, point to emotions as the basis of morality. According to Hoffman and other evolutionary psychologists, the origins of these moral emotions or senses date back to many millennia. This is called as the ancestral environment or environment of evolutionary adaptation. While modern speculation about the biological and evolutionary basis of morality dates back to Charles Darwin's *The
Descent of Man, it has experienced resurgence in the 21st century as findings from neuroscience have emerged.

Behavioral psychologists, like Skinner (1904–1990), offer a plainly contrasting view of the origins and development of morality regarding the mind of the newborn as a so-called blank slate, devoid of any inherent moral emotions or inclinations whatsoever. Direct experiences and the consequences they cause, are the sole sources of all learning, moral and otherwise. In short, moral values are essentially synonymous with cultural mores. Morality has no biological or evolutionary basis, nor is it motivated by emotions, conscience, or judgment; it is simply those behaviors reinforced as good or bad, driven by the rewards they beget or the punishments they offset.

Despite the historic importance and one-time ascendency of the foregoing views, the work of cognitively oriented developmental psychologists has dominated the field of moral psychology since the 1960s. Entrenched in influential work on moral judgment by Jean Piaget (1896–1980), Lawrence Kohlberg (1969) created a three-level, six-stage cognitive-structural model of the growth in moral reasoning and judgment. Like emotion-based theories, cognitive-structuralism posits that biology is important to moral development (of course in terms of maturation of cognitive capacities, not the possession of inherent emotions). Like behavioral views, cognitive-structuralism posits that the environment plays a critical role in moral learning (of course through thoughtful discussions of moral dilemmas, not mindless associations between behaviors and reinforcers).

While Kohlberg's theory and research continued to influence the field, the last quarter of the 20th century witnessed the gradual rise of empirical and theoretical work on the development of moral self-understanding and identity. The interest in moral identity and its role in moral behavior were brought into focus with Augusto Blasi's 1980 review of empirical research on moral cognition and moral action. After describing the relatively modest relations between moral judgment and moral behavior, Blasi posited that the observed gap might be explained by moral identity or the extent to which moral values and goals are regarded as core or essential aspects of the self. Individuals with strong or well developed sense of the self-as-moral would be more likely to act in accordance in with their moral judgments. The critical mechanism is a sense of personal responsibility to act and the concomitant need to maintain “self-consistency” (Blasi, 1983).
MORAL JUDGMENT DEVELOPMENT: KOHLBERG'S COGNITIVE-STRUCTURAL MODEL

Based on a longitudinal study of 75 males as well as numerous cross-cultural studies in disparate countries like Canada, Mexico, Taiwan and Turkey, Kohlberg advocated that moral judgment develops along a three-level, six-stage continuum. Each of the three levels is composed of two stages, which describe the structure of thinking individuals use as they reason through a moral dilemma. The Moral Judgment of Interview (MJI) consists of five moral dilemmas. In the classic Heinz and the Drug dilemma, issues of life and property rights are put at odds, and one must decide whether the Heinz should steal a drug that might save the life of his wife. However, it is not the determined course of action itself (steal/do not steal) that is used to score one's level and stage moral judgment. Rather, it is reasoning that one employs to render the decision that is of greatest interests to cognitive-structural theorists such as Kohlberg.

The first level of development is characterized by largely egocentric reasoning, where good or right actions are defined in terms of their consequences to the self. In this stage, first and most primitive form of reasoning, there is an unquestioning deference to superior power (e.g., “might makes right”) and the physical consequences of action (regardless of meaning or value) dictate whether it is good or bad. At stage two, right action consists of that which instrumentally satisfies one's own needs and the needs of others. While elements of fairness and reciprocity are present, they are construed in a physical, pragmatic manner (e.g., “you scratch my back and I'll scratch yours”) and not in terms of justice. Empirical research suggests that these two stages of reasoning are typical of children aged 4 through 10.

The second level of development morality is seen as conforming to and even maintaining the expectations, rules, and norms of the one's family, group, or society.

Kohlberg referred to stage three as “good-boy-good-girl orientation” because of its emphasis on pleasing others by conforming to stereotypical images of various social roles (e.g., being a “good son” by helping your mother with chores or a “good husband” by sacrificing your own safety for that of your wife).

At stage four a higher level of abstraction is achieved and employed in moral reasoning. Rather than conforming to familial roles and expectations, the emphasis is now on maintaining law and order. Right behavior consists of doing one's duty, showing respect for authority and maintaining the given social systems (e.g., legal, religious). Empirical
research suggests that these two stages of reasoning are typical during late childhood (Stage Three) and adolescence (Stage Four).

Finally, the fifth level of development is characterized by a significant shift from given norms and conventions toward autonomous moral principles and values. At stage five, a “social-contract orientation” is achieved, and right action is defined in terms of general rights and standards. While still possessing legalistic overtones, reasoning at this stage involves a clear awareness of the relativism of personal values and opinions. Accordingly, an emphasis is placed upon procedural rules for reaching consensus and the possibility of changing the law (not simply conforming to it) to maximize social utility.

At stage six, moral development reaches its pinnacle, and reasoning is characterized by consideration of universal moral principles. Prominent among these principles is respect for life and the notion of that all humans—regardless of class, color, and creed—possess an inherent dignity and worth that cannot be bought or bartered. Empirical research suggests that relatively few people achieve stage five reasoning and fewer still stage six. Indeed, stage six was all but removed from the model in the later 1980s because so few people demonstrated such thinking, and it is not included in the definitive scoring manual for the MJI (Anne Colby & Kohlberg, 1987).

CRITICISMS AND CORRECTIVES TO KOHLBERG AND COGNITIVE-STRUCTURALISM

As with any theory, Kohlberg's model of moral development is not without shortcomings. Three of these shortcomings are discussed below.

Gender Bias: Perhaps the most famous criticism of Kohlberg's theory was launched from within his own research group at Harvard University. In the late 1970s Carol Gilligan began to raise concerns about gender bias in the theory, suggesting that justice-based philosophical orientation of the model emphasized traditional masculine values and traits (e.g., individual rights, rationality, and impartiality) and thus marginalized traditional feminine values and traits (e.g., interpersonal care, intuition, and social relations). Her book, In a Different Voice, which offered an alternative stage model of care-based moral development, was widely read, if not fully embraced. This and other prominent books on caring inspired numerous empirical investigations into the question of gender differences in moral orientation and judgment. These investigations lend some credence to Gilligan's critique but taken together show that gender differences are not as great as she claims (e.g., Walker, 2006). Where, for example, Gilligan posits a dichotomy—males are justice oriented and females are care
oriented—the research indicated that males and females possess both justice- and care-based orientations (with females being only slightly more care oriented). With regard to moral reasoning itself, the vast majority (86%) of the 80 MJI studies reviewed by Walker revealed no such differences. Nonetheless, Gilligan's critique was in important one that pushed the field of moral psychology beyond its philosophical moorings in formal ethics and liberal social science.

**Cultural Differences:** A second and equally heated debate that Kohlberg's theory generated concerns his claims of universality; that is, that people the world over—from tribal nomads to inner-city urbanites—undergo the same six-stage developmental progression in their capacity to reason morally. In the most comprehensive review of this claim, involving 45 cross-cultural studies using the MJI, John Snarey reported general support for it but with a few major caveats. Chief among these is a bias favoring complex urban societies and middle-class populations (i.e., both score slightly higher). Similarly, cross-cultural studies employing the Defining Issues Test (i.e., a widely used pen and paper adaptation of the MJI) have shown educational attainment to be the single best predictor of moral reasoning scores. Age, gender, and ethnicity explain relatively little variance (if any at all) once education is accounted for.

It is important to keep in mind Kohlberg's model and these empirical studies focus on only one component of moral functioning: the development of moral judgment. Even if people across the globe exhibit the same invariant cognitive-developmental progression in their capacity to reason through a set of standardized hypothetical dilemmas, there remains plenty of room for cultural variation in the content, prioritizing, commitment to and expression of moral values and judgments.

The work of cultural psychologists such as Richard Schweder and Hazel Markus provides great insights into some of these differences. So, too, does the work social-cognitive domain theorists such as Elliot Turiel, Larry Nucci, and Judith Smetana. They point to distinctions between three domains of judgment: the personal, social conventional, and moral. In doing so, domain theorists distinguish cultural mores from moral principles and identify where they may overlap and conflict. Furthermore, domain theorists believe that each domain has its own developmental trajectory. This conjecture is meant to serve as a corrective to Kohlberg's model, which is seen as conflating the personal and conventional with the moral.
The Thought/Action Problem: Perhaps that most enduring and damning shortcoming of Kohlberg's theory relates to his claim that moral judgment “can be a quite powerful and meaningful predictor of action” (Kohlberg & Candee, 1984, p. 397). As noted above, Blasi's 1980 review of the literature investigating the relations between moral reasoning and moral action suggested otherwise. This finding was not news to philosophers who had long since been writing about the thought/action problem. And, of course, most people need only look at their histories to find examples of behavioral engagement at odds with moral judgment.

In educational settings, the epidemic of academic cheating offers a disconcerting illustration of the phenomenon: Most students cheat, even if they believe it is wrong or unjustifiable to do so. In short, while judgment may be a necessary component of moral action, it alone is not sufficient to compel it. Blasi's review made this clear and in doing so ushered in a new era of theorizing and research on moral motivation, one focusing on moral self, identity, personality, and character.

MORAL IDENTITY: BLASI'S SELF MODEL AND ITS LEGACY

It is important to note at the outset that despite the theory's limitations in predicting behavior, Blasi does not seek to rid moral psychology of its interest in moral judgment. He recognizes its importance, regarding it as necessary but insufficient in explaining the complexity of human moral motivation and functioning. In particularly, the movement (or lack thereof) from thought to action needs further explanation, and Blasi's self model offers one.

Rooted in the work of Eric Erikson (1902–1994) and Jane Loevinger (1918–2008), Blasi posits that the observed gap might be explained by moral identity, that is, the extent to which one regards moral values and goals as core or essential aspects of the self, “those aspects without which the individual would see himself or herself to be radically different” (Blasi, 1984, p. 131). Individuals with strong or well-developed sense of the self-as-moral are more likely to act to in accord with their moral judgments. The critical mechanism is a sense of personal responsibility to act and the concomitant need to maintain self-consistency.

Blasi's self model also suggests that moral identity is not a unitary construct. Whereas some individuals may see honesty and fairness as essential aspects of themselves, other individuals may highlight compassion and caring for others as most salient to their sense of self-as-moral. In Varieties of Moral Personality, philosopher Owen Flanagan (1991) echoes Blasi's conjecture, arguing that “ethical goodness is realized in a multiplicity
of ways”. Lawrence Walker and his colleagues conducted several studies of moral maturity and exemplarity, focusing on three types: just, brave, and caring (Walker, 2004). Research on moral identity has extended into domains beyond, but related to, the moral domain. Jim Youniss and Miraday Yates's work on civic identity provides a good example.

Finally, Blasi contends that moral identity is developmental in nature, that how the “essential self” is perceived and defined changes over time. Moreover, the centrality of morality to the self varies between individuals; the self comprises many qualities and their hierarchical ordering varies from person to person. In their seminal work on the development of self-understanding through childhood and adolescence, Damon and Hart found that moral qualities such as honesty and loyalty did not become a part of study participants' self-definitions until they reached adolescence. In the twenty years since Damon and Hart's 1988 book *Self-understanding in Childhood and Adolescence* was published, very little progress was made in creating a model of moral identity development comparable to Kohlberg's model of moral judgment development. It is clear that just as very few people ever achieve stage six reasoning ability, very few experience a full integration of morality and self. In their landmark 1992 study *Some Do Care: Contemporary Lives of Moral Commitment*, Anne Colby and William Damon give insights into the lives of people with extraordinary commitment to moral causes and actions.

For these exceptional individuals, morality has been so completely integrated into their sense of self that they report feeling as though they had no choice. Though in a different way, this sense of not choosing but rather acting automatically is at the heart of the connections between moral expertise and schema accessibility that Daniel Lapsley and Darcia Narvaez (2004) make in their social-cognitive approach to moral development.

**MORAL EDUCATION: INTEGRATIVE ETHICAL EDUCATION AND OTHER APPROACHES**

Most Americans embrace the idea that public school curricula include some form of moral or character education. Indeed, the moral and civic purposes of education have a long history in both Western and Eastern political thought. The content and form as well as demand for moral education has varied greatly over time, even within the brief history of U.S. democracy (Colby et al., 2003). This does not mean moral education is without its detractors or that there is no lively debate about the “what” and “how” of moral teaching and learning. Nonetheless, in the early 2000s there was increasing concessions and convergence among once divergent camps in the field. Traditional character educators, whose chief
objective was the inculcation for moral virtues such as honesty and chastity, have now conceded that moral reasoning has a place in the curriculum. Meanwhile, cognitive-developmentalists such as Kohlberg have realized the motivational value of character traits.

This transformation and its history are beyond the scope of this entry, but interested readers should consult William Damon's *Bringing in a New Era of Character Education* and Daniel Lapsley and Clark Power's *Character Psychology and Character Education*. In addition, Larry Nucci's *Education in the Moral Domain* and Nel Noddings's *Educating Moral People: A Caring Alternative to Character Education* are excellent resources for classroom teachers as they strike a balance between theory and practice. Rheta DeVries and Betty Zan's *Moral Children: Constructing a Constructivist Atmosphere in Early Education* remains a long-standing and oft-cited guide for educators.

From these books and numerous other resources, the following sampling of recommendations for classroom practices rooted in Darcia Narveaz's 2006 “Integrative Ethical Education” (IEE). As the name suggests, IEE explicitly brings together traditional character education and cognitive-developmental approaches. It is also rooted the four component model of moral functioning (Rest, 1986), which highlights the need to foster growth in students' morality in terms of (i) sensitivity, (ii) judgment, (iii) motivation, and (iv) action.

**Moral Sensitivity:** According to Rest, moral sensitivity is the first component of moral functioning. While psychoanalysts, emotion-based theorists, evolutionary psychologists, and domain theorists all contend that some degree of moral emotional awareness and sensitively is bred in the bone, all would also agree that the social environment and education are important in turning on and tuning in moral emotions and sensitivity. Teachers seeking to foster students' moral sensitivity should create learning environments and curricula that offer frequent exposure to moral emotions, virtues, concepts, and issues; they should help students take the perspective of others (e.g., classmates, historical figures, contemporary politicians,), and they should call attention to examples of caring and justice as well as insensitively and injustice, including bias, sexism, and racism. In doing so, teachers can help students identify moral emotions and issues and express and manage them.

**Moral Judgment:** Firmly rooted in Kohlberg's cognitive-structuralist model, this component of functioning concerns the capacity to interpret complex moral dilemmas. Whether real or hypothetical, moral dilemmas require people to discern the competing interests and values at stake and to render a judgment that—depending on the nature of the dilemma—gives due weight to one's own well-being, concern for others, respect for law and
tradition, and principles of justice. To foster these capacities educators should engage students in dilemma discussions. Doing so effectively, however, is not easy.

**Moral Motivation.** This component has been relabeled numerous times in the literature (motivation, commitment, and focus) as it is probably the broadest of the four. After all, the motivation to act or not to do so is a multifaceted phenomenon contingent on both personal and environmental factors. As described above, one of the most important personal factors is moral identity. Students who see themselves as moral beings are more likely to act like moral beings. Teachers can foster students' moral identity development by exposing them to moral exemplars (e.g., honest, brave, caring) and by creating opportunities for students' to clarify and cultivate the meaning and importance of moral values and goals in their lives. Moral motivation and identity are also strengthened when educators create school and classroom cultures in which making the right choice and being a good citizen in the community are recognized and rewarded.

**Moral Action.** The final component of moral functioning is moral action. Even if students possess the necessary sensitivity, judgment, and motivation to act rightly, they may not possess the needed skills or know-how to do so. Resolving conflicts with others, challenging bias and racism when they occur, and taking the initiative to start or even lead good works are not easy tasks. Educators must teach these skills by creating authentic opportunities for students to practice and hone them. Community service projects and school-based organizations offer venues for such skill development. Teachers should both encourage and mentor students' efforts to address social, moral, civic, and political issues that affect them and their communities.

Moral learning in classrooms does not only occur through formal curriculum or extra-curricular programming. The “hidden curriculum” of schooling, as Philip Jackson famously called it, consists of (often unexamined) norms and policies that collectively give form and meaning to a wide range of behaviors. School governance structures, disciplinary procedures, the allocation of rewards, norms of teacher-student interaction, all communicate morally laden values. Issues of fairness, due process, equal opportunity, respect for differences, and equity in the distribution of scarce resources and rewards (such as teacher attention and grades) permeate the institution of public education. These factors should not be ignored. Teachers must be mindful of the rules, procedures, and norms they establish in their classroom, and they must be mindful of how they go about following them. When possible, students should be included in the process of establishing the governance structures.
and disciplinary procedures of their school and classroom communities; they should be
given a voice in the process and on-going responsibility for ensuring that the place in which
they live and learn is fair, just, and caring.

1.5 THEORIES OF MORAL DEVELOPMENT

1.5.1 Development

Before considering some of the most useful theoretical approaches towards
“children’s moral development”, it will be better to examine briefly the meaning of the term
“development”. The term itself suggests a progressive change towards some more complex
level, which is usually irreversible in nature. But the prediction of the end state of any
developmental process depends on what it is that is developing. We can more or less predict
with certainty that under appropriate conditions a caterpillar will develop through specific
stages into a butterfly of a particular kind. The implication here is that there is some pre-
existing genetic structure which determines the end state, the culmination of the whole
process, and also that there is a gradual unfolding which under normal circumstances is not
arrested or reversed.

This model of development taken from plant or animal biology can be applied up to a
point to aspects of man’s biological development, but the same criteria cannot hold for
man’s social, intellectual or moral growth, precisely because of the very factors that
distinguish him, as a human being, from other organisms.

Theories of the maturational or unfolding type, which presupposed a genetic
structure that would gradually emerge as the child grew older, have been discredited, since
evidence shows that man does not simply unfold without the help of outside influence.
Children deprived of sensory stimulation, perceptual variation or adult contact are clearly
hampered, since developmental process depends upon accommodating to such influences,
assembling them and interpreting them. Social interaction and adult attention have been
considered to be necessary factors in the developmental process.

Similarly, although it is possible to take of an end state when referring to plant or
animal life, few people now would want to claim any kind of end state in relation to human
development. One reason for this is that human life offers a vast variety of possibilities and
since its quality differs from one culture to another, it is impossible to predict how an
individual might turn out.

Therefore it can be concluded that development is a necessarily evaluative concept
rather than a purely descriptive one, when applied to man.

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1.5.2 Moral Development

An examination of three main psychological approaches to moral development – the psychoanalytical viewpoint, the learning theory approach and the cognitive developmental view – offer insight into different aspects of a child’s moral growth.

The psychoanalytical approach, as manifested in Freud’s monumental work, sees morality as conforming to cultural standards through a process of internalisation.

Learning theories, as reflected for instance in the work of Bears, Bandura, Eysenck, assume that moral behaviour is the result of reinforcement, rewards or punishments, and that much moral conduct is a result of a child’s modeling himself on an admired adult. Individual differences in moral behaviour are explained in terms of differences in conditionality. As with the psychoanalytical approach, morality or moral conduct is seen as conformity to some sort of cultural or social norm. Cognitive developmental theorists, on the other hand (Piaget, 1964; Lawrence Kohlberg, 1969; Elliot Turiel et al., 1974), view moral development as an active, dynamic, constructive process leading to a state where the individual is able to act according to moral principles which he either accepts because he understands them and agrees with them or which he has worked out for himself. These theoretical stances have different implications for moral learning and moral education.

1.5.3 Piaget’s Theory of Moral Development

Jean Piaget (1965) is among the first psychologists whose work is directly relevant to contemporary theories of moral development.

According to Piaget, all development emerges from action; that is to say, individuals construct and reconstruct their knowledge of world as a result of interactions with the environment. He determined that morality, too, can be considered as a developmental process. Children begin in a heteronomous stage of moral reasoning, characterised by a strict adherence to rules and duties, and obedience to authority.

The heteronomy results from two factors: (i) the first factor is the young child’s cognitive structure, which means that the thinking of young children is characterised by egocentrism. That is to say that young children are unable to simultaneously take into account their own view of things, but with the perspective of someone else. This egocentrism leads children to project their own thoughts and wishes on to others. (ii) The second factor is young children’s relative social relationship with adults.

Piaget viewed moral development as a result of interpersonal interactions through which individuals work out resolutions which all deem fair. Piaget described that moral
judgment competence; the cognitive aspect of moral judgment behaviour develops through four stages. They are:

1. Amorality or Anomy (without law): The child lacks moral sensibility and does not care about right and wrong; child pays no attention at all to moral perspectives.
2. Socionomy or Imitation (law deriving from society): The child merely mimics moral language but sees no implications for his or her behaviour.
3. Heteronomy (law imposed by others): The child subordinates his or her behaviour to moral perspectives but without a clear understanding of their meaning. Child makes judgments in a differential way; he or she relies mostly on external authorities.
4. Autonomy (law deriving from self): The child is able to integrate many moral perspectives and make an integrated and differentiated moral judgment that does justice both to the abstract principles and the concrete situation involved. Moral autonomy is not absolute but always in regard to a particular moral perspective.

Piaget concludes that schools should emphasise cooperative decision-making and problem solving, nurturing moral development by requiring students to work out common rules based on fairness.

1.5.4 Kohlberg’s Theory of Moral Development

Lawrence Kohlberg (1969) modified and elaborated Piaget’s work, and laid the groundwork for the current debate within psychology on moral development. He proposed that children form ways of thinking through their experiences which include understandings of moral concepts such as justice, rights, equality and human welfare. He determined that the process of attaining moral maturity took longer and was more gradual than Piaget had proposed.

Kohlberg identified six stages of moral reasoning grouped into three major levels. Each level represented a fundamental shift in the social-moral perspective of the individual.

At the first level, the pre-conventional level, a person’s moral judgments are characterised by a concrete, individual perspective. Within this level, Stage-1 heteronymous orientation focuses on avoiding breaking rules that are backed by punishment. It also focuses on avoiding physical consequences of an action to persons and property. Stage-2 orientation focuses on the instrumental, pragmatic value of an action.

At the second level, the conventional level, individuals have a basic understanding of conventional morality, and reason with an understanding that norms and conventions are
necessary to uphold society. Within this level, at Stage-3 persons define what is right in terms of what is expected by people close to one’s self. This perspective is limited to local community. At Stage-3, there is a shift from defining what is right in terms of local norms to defining right in terms of the laws and norms established by the larger social system.

The third level, post-conventional level is characterised by reasoning based on principles, using a “prior to society” perspective. Within this level, Stage-5 has received substantial empirical support. Stage-6 remains as a theoretical end point which rationally follows from the preceding five stages. In essence this last level of moral judgment entails reasoning rooted in the ethical fairness principles from which moral laws would be devised.

Kohlberg’s stage theories of moral development have been empirically supported by findings from longitudinal and cross-cultural research (Power et al., 1989).

1.5.5 Domain Theory of Moral Development

In the early 1970s, longitudinal studies conducted by the Kohlberg research group began to reveal anomalies in the stage sequence. Researchers committed to the basic Kohlberg framework attempted to resolve those anomalies through adjustments in the stage descriptions. Other theorists, however, found that a comprehensive resolution to the anomalous data required substantial adjustments in the theory itself. One of the most productive lines of research to come out of that period has been the ‘Domain theory’ advanced by Turiel (1983).

Domain theory draws a distinction between the child’s developing concepts of morality, and other domains of social knowledge, such as social convention.

According to Domain theory, the child’s concepts of morality and social convention emerge out of the child’s attempts to account for qualitatively differing form so social experience associated with these two classes of social events. Morality is structured by concepts of harm, welfare and fairness.

These hypothesised distinctions have been sustained through studies over the past twenty years. These studies have included interviews with children, adolescents and adults; observations of child-child and adult-child social interactions; cross-cultural studies; and longitudinal studies examining the changes in children’s thinking as they grow older.

Morality and convention are distinct, parallel developmental frameworks, rather than a single system as thought of by Kohlberg. However, because all social events, including moral ones, take place within the context of the larger society, a person’s reasoning about the right course of action in any given social situation may require the person to access and
coordinate their understandings from more than one of these two social cognitive frameworks.

Thus domain theory has sought to explore how the child’s concepts of moral and conventional regulation relate to their developing understandings of personal prerogative and privacy.

1.6 MORAL JUDGEMENT

Moral judgment is psychological phenomenon exercised by an individual which is closely related to his subculture experience. It includes the concept of morality as visualised by an individual. Moral judgments vary from an individual to individual, from stage to stage and from one moral situation to another. It depends not only on the individual’s age and personality, but also upon his social states.

Morris, J.F. (1973) says moral judgment is an action based on five factors, namely:
(i) Normative considerations, i.e. considerations of accepted principles of conduct,
(ii) Considerations of self respect,
(iii) Consideration of respect for authority,
(iv) Conformity to beliefs, and
(v) Claims to independence.

Every moral judgment is made within the context of a concrete situation, purely situational. They are made on rational basis, are universal in forms sense and must be communicable.

Moral judgment in critical situations depends upon:
(a) Goal and philosophy of life of person.
(b) Influence of the environment.
(c) Moral maturity.
(d) Moral habit formation.

Piaget (1965) studied in Geneva about moral development. He is among the first psychologists whose work remains directly relevant to contemporary theories of moral development. He focused specifically on moral lives of children, studying the way how children play games in order to learn more about children’s beliefs about right and wrong. According to Piaget, all development emerges from action; that is to say, the individuals construct and reconstruct their knowledge of world as a result of interactions with
environment. Based on his observations of children’s application of rules when playing, Piaget determined that morality, too, can be considered a developmental process.

Piaget described that moral judgment competence being a cognitive aspect of moral judgment behaviour, develops through four phases; namely:

1. **Anomy** (lawlessness): The child lacks moral sensibility and does not care about right and wrong; he or she pays no attention at all to moral perspectives. The child merely mimics moral language but sees no implications for his or her behaviour.

2. **Hetronomy** (external morality): The child subordinates his or her behaviour to moral perspectives but without a clear understanding of their meaning. Child make judgments in a differential way; he or she relies mostly on external authorities.

3. **Socionomy** (External and internal morality): An essential stage of development if autonomy is to be achieved, even if many fixated at this level of moral judgment.

4. **Autonomy**: The child is able to integrate many moral perspectives and make an integrated and differentiated moral judgment that does justice both to the abstract principles and the concrete situations involved. Moral autonomy is not absolute but always regard to a particular moral perspective.

Thus Piaget viewed moral development as the result of interpersonal interactions through which individuals work out resolutions, which all deem fair.

**Lawrence Kohlberg** (1969) modified and elaborated Piaget’s work and laid the ground work for the current debate within psychology on moral development. He proposed that children form ways of thinking through their experiences which includes understanding of moral concepts such as justice, right, equality and human welfare. He determined that the process of attaining moral maturity took longer and was more gradual than Piaget had proposed.


Domain theory draws a distinction between the child’s developing concept of morality and other domains of social knowledge such as social convention. According to Domain theory, the child’s concepts of morality and social convention emerge out of the child’s attempts to account for qualitatively differing forms of social experience associated with these two classes of social events. Morality is structured by concepts of harm, welfare and fairness.

These hypothesised distinctions have been sustained through studies over the past twenty years. These studies have included interviews with children, adolescents and adults;
observations of child-child and adult-child social interactions; cross-cultural studies; and longitudinal studies examining the changes in children’s thinking as they grow older.

Morality and convention are distinct, parallel developmental frameworks, rather than a single system as thought by Kohlberg. However, because of all social events, including moral ones take place within the context of the larger society, a person’s reasoning about the right course of action in any given social situation may require the person to access and coordinate their understandings from more than one of these two social cognitive frameworks.

Thus Domain theory has sought to explore how the child’s concept of moral and conventional regulation relates to their developing understandings of personal prerogative and privacy.

Rest J.S. (1979) has conducted studies related to moral judgment and some selected variables. The findings of one hundred studies with his measure (D.I.T.) can be summarised as follows:

1. Moral judgment is a developmental one. A major source of variance in Rest’s measure of moral judgment is age, and other major sources of variation due to social experience and developmental, that is, they are related to amount and complexity of experience.

2. The process involved in moral judgment development is cognitive. Rest’s measure of moral judgment preference and recognition is related to conceptual comprehension of moral judgment, to intelligence and other cognitive variables.

3. While related to cognition, moral judgment is moral; it is not merely the application of cognitive skills or intelligence to moral questions or situations. Measures of moral judgment correlates with measures of moral attitudes, choices and behaviour to an extent not accounted for by IQ or other pure cognitive variable.

These findings of Rest et al. using his D.I.T. measure are consistent with findings of Kohlberg’s method of qualitative stage categorizations of spontaneous responses to dilemmas. Rest’s work, then, supports and classifies the fundamental assumptions of the cognitive developmental approach to moralisation.

1.7 JOB SATISFACTION

A teacher, who is happy with his job, plays a pivotal role in the upliftment of society (Umme, 1999). Well adjusted and satisfied teacher can contribute a lot to the well being of
his/her pupils. An unsatisfied teacher can become irritable and may create tensions which can have negative influence on the students’ learning process and it consequently affects their academic growth. Job satisfaction implies the overall adjustment to work situation. Attitude is readiness to react towards or against some situation, person or thing in a particular manner. The attitudes, ideas, feelings and interests of a child are influenced by the organization of his/her family, thinking of parents and customs of the society. Personality of parents, their education and their behaviour towards the children is the basis of development of attitudes. Teachers having favorable attitude towards their profession are generally successful, properly adjusted and well satisfied with their job.

Job satisfaction among school teachers has been considered as a vital factor for the improvement of the education system and thus has got an unshakeable place in educational researches. Satisfaction is a psychological phenomenon and its concept is highly intricate and subjective. Job satisfaction describes how content an individual with his or her job. It expresses the extent of match between the employees’ expectations from the job and the rewards that the job provides (Gupta & Gehlawat, 2013). Teacher’s job satisfaction is one of the key factors in school dynamics and is generally considered as a primary dependent variable in terms of which effectiveness of the school is evaluated. The well adjusted and satisfied teacher can contribute a lot to the well being of his/her pupils. A complex array of factors also affects job satisfaction among teachers. These factors can be categorized as intrinsic, extrinsic and demographic factors. Intrinsic sources originate from within the individual and have psychological value. Such type of satisfaction is essentially self-administered. Autonomy (that is, independence such as the ability to choose one’s own work pace) is one of the sources of intrinsic satisfaction. In US as school districts continued to cut budgets, increase class sizes, and implement teacher performance evaluations, teachers’ job satisfaction plummeted in 2012, reaching an all-time low, according to a survey released Thursday (Resmovitz, 2012).

1.8 STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM
Keeping in mind the afore said explanations, the statement of the problem is stated in the following way

“MORAL JUDGMENT AND ITS CORRELATES AMONG SECONDARY SCHOOL TEACHERS OF KARNATAKA”
1.9 RESEARCH QUESTIONS
The following research questions have been formulated for the study.

1. Whether levels of moral judgment influence the ability to think of secondary school teachers?
2. How demographic variables influence moral judgment of secondary school teachers?
3. How moral judgment is related to adjustment, attitude and job satisfaction among secondary school teachers?
4. Does domicile of secondary school teachers influence their moral judgment?
5. How gender, age, domicile etc influence moral judgment, adjustment, attitude and job satisfaction among secondary school teachers?

1.10 OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY
The main objectives of the study are as follows:

1. To assess the levels of moral judgment (through the moral judgment test prepared by the investigator) among secondary school teachers.
2. To find out the influence of selected demographic variables (gender, age, area, school type, subjects taught, income) of teachers on moral judgment.
3. To find out the relationship between moral judgment and adjustment among secondary school teachers.
4. To find out the relationship between moral judgment and job satisfaction of secondary school teachers.
5. To find out the relationship between moral judgment and attitude of secondary school teachers.
6. To find out the influence of selected demographic variables (gender, age, area, school type, subjects taught, income) of teachers on adjustment, job satisfaction and attitude.

1.11 HYPOTHESES OF THE STUDY
Following are the null hypotheses formulated for the present study.

1. There is no significant relationship between moral judgment and adjustment of teachers.
2. There is no significant relationship between moral judgment and job satisfaction of teachers.
3. There is no significant relationship between moral judgment and attitude of teachers.
4. Male and female teachers do not differ significantly with respect to
   a. moral judgment,
   b. adjustment,
   c. job satisfaction and
   d. attitude.

5. Teachers with different age groups do not differ significantly with respect to their
   a. moral judgment,
   b. adjustment,
   c. job satisfaction and
   d. attitude.

6. Teachers hailing from urban and rural areas do not differ significantly with respect to their
   a. moral judgment,
   b. adjustment,
   c. job satisfaction and
   d. attitude.

7. Teachers working in government and private schools do not differ significantly with respect to their
   a. moral judgment,
   b. adjustment,
   c. job satisfaction and
   d. Attitude.

8. Teachers teaching science and arts subjects do not differ significantly with respect to their
   a. moral judgment,
   b. adjustment,
   c. job satisfaction and
   d. attitude.

9. Teachers with different levels of income do not differ significantly with respect to their
   a. moral judgment,
   b. adjustment,
   c. job satisfaction and
   d. Attitude.
1.12 OPERATIONAL DEFINITION OF THE TERMS USED IN THE STUDY

Moral judgment
In this study moral judgment is operationally defined as the scores obtained by the teachers in the five areas of moral judgment as defined by Piaget namely, moral realism, communicable responsibility, the efficacy of super punishment retribution versus restitution and immanent justice in the moral judgment test designed by the investigator.

Adjustment
In this, personality adjustment refers to the state of judgment of an individual on five dimensions of life namely home, health, emotional, social and vocational as assessed on H.M. Bell’s personality adjustment inventory i.e. scores obtained by teachers with reference to adjustment inventory of H.M.Bell.

Job satisfaction
In this study operational definition of job satisfaction is defined as the score obtained by the teacher in the area of extent of satisfaction with the job as defined by Sudha B.G. and Sathyanarayana.B.S.

Attitude
In the study, attitude refers to the state of attitude towards four dimensions namely teaching profession, students in general, school wore as a whole and professional growth as assessed in P.R.Nayar’s attitude inventory i.e. scores obtained by the teachers with reference to attitude inventory of P.R.Nayar.

1.13: DELIMITATION OF THE STUDY
1. The study was confined to find out moral judgment, adjustment, job satisfaction and attitude of teachers towards teaching profession only.
2. The study is limited only to eight districts of Karnataka coming under the four educational divisions namely, Shimoga and Davangere Districts from Bangaluru division; Chikkamangalore and Hassan Districts from the Division of Mysore; Gadag and Haveri Districts from Belagaum Division; and finally Bellary and Koppal districts from Gulbarga Division.
1.14 OVERVIEW OF THE STUDY

The entire thesis is divided into 6 chapters. A brief description of each chapter is given below.

Chapter I: Introduction
This chapter deals with concept of value education, need and importance of moral education, and theories of moral development. Further, the chapter highlights the theoretical constructs of moral judgment, job satisfaction and attitude. Chapter continues with brief methodology part consisting of statement of the problem, research questions, objectives and hypotheses of the study, operational definitions of the terms used, and delimitations.

Chapter II: Review of Literature
This chapter deals with extensive review of studies collected from various sources. The review of literature is done under moral judgment and its development, moral judgment and related correlates and moral judgments and other issues.

Chapter III: Design of the study
A complete methodology followed for the study has been delineated in this chapter. The major issues of variables employed, locale, sample, tools employed for data collection, procedure employed for data collection, and statistical methods employed have been discussed in detail.

Chapter IV: Construction of moral judgment test and other details
A comprehensive account of construction of the entire moral judgment test by the researcher is given in this chapter. Starting from collection of items, editing, content validation and establishment of psychometric properties have been explained. Further, scoring of question based on the story has been given.

Chapter V: Analysis of results
In this chapter, analysis and interpretation of data collected have been described. Explanations for both descriptive and inferential statistics have been given along with the graphical presentations, wherever necessary. Hypotheses wise analysis was undertaken to get a complete clarity of the results.
Chapter VI: Discussion, summary and conclusion

This chapter contains major findings of the study, general discussion, suggestions, suggestions for further research and conclusion.

Bibliography

Appendices