Chapter IV

IMPACT OF MILITANCY ON INDO-PAK RELATIONS
Although the relations between India and Pakistan were never cordial, yet after the volcanic eruption of militancy in Kashmir, these relations reached at the low ebb. The clash between these two countries occurred on diplomatic, political and even on military fronts. Besides the adoption of a belligerent attitude of the rulers of India and Pakistan, the representatives of these two countries also began to battle in different international foras just to score points over each other. Not only this, the intermittent skirmishes on the borders in which both light and heavy artillery is used became order of the day. This as a matter of fact resulted in the complete deterioration of their relations. The situation reached to a point where from it became clear that the conflict on Kashmir presents the first serious possibility of altering the political status quo in South Asia since the emergence of Bangladesh in 1971. President Bill Clinton in his address to the United Nations General Assembly in New York on 27 September 1993, included Kashmir among the major trouble spots in the world. The US President said, “Thus, as we marvel at this era’s promise of new peace, we must also recognize that serious threats remain. Bloody ethnic, religious and civil wars range from Angola to the Caucasus to Kashmir”.

Accusations and Counter Accusation

India blamed Pakistan for backing terrorists and secessionists in Kashmir while as Pakistan accused India of trying to suppress Kashmiris who are demanding their right to self-determination. The government of Pakistan denied the backing of secessionists in Kashmir and insisted that the uprising is entirely indigenous and

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spontaneous and that the Indian charges of Pakistani interference are both self-serving and misleading. She accused India of being intransigent and asserted that Pakistan cannot remain a silent spectator to the sufferings of the Kashmiri people. The government of Pakistan also assured complete political, moral and diplomatic support to the people of Kashmir in their struggle for freedom. Blaming India for the human rights violations in the state of Jammu and Kashmir, Pakistan asked the international community to exert moral and political pressure on India to desist from the use of force and allow the people of Kashmir to freely exercise their inalienable right to self-determination as promised in the UN resolutions.

Similarly India charged Pakistan with financing, arming, training, abetting and encouraging terrorism in Kashmir and described it as the biggest patron of human rights violations in the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir. Rejecting Islamabad's demand for the right to self-determination in Kashmir, New Delhi said, self-determination cannot be applied to territories that are a part of sovereign and independent states. New Delhi reiterated that the accession of Kashmir with the union of India is final and the successive elections held in the state of Jammu and Kashmir were free and fair in which the people had elected their own governments. India had always accorded high priority for protection of human rights and political pluralism. There is vigorous democracy in the country characterised by elected legislators and independent judiciary. This is standing testimony of India's commitment to human rights and pluralism and India did not want that these principles be imposed on the state from outside', the External Affairs Ministry said. India also requested the international community particularly America to declare Pakistan a 'terrorist state' if the latter does not stop assisting the 'terrorists' in Kashmir who according to the former are violating the human rights at a large scale.

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No Change in Pakistan’s Kashmir Policy

Mohammad Zia-ul-Haq’s death in August 1988, changed the complexion of politics in Pakistan. It had less immediate effect on the country’s foreign policy. Although domestic questions were subject to new interpretation, Pakistan’s external needs pointed to a continuation of relationships and programmes already initiated. Therefore, the widespread impression that the restoration of democracy in Pakistan would pave a way for dialogue and thus help to break the psychological barrier between the two countries proved wrong. The new Prime Minister Ms. Benazir Bhutto like her father gave a call for a thousand-year war with India.\(^5\)

Soon after becoming Pakistan’s Prime Minister, Ms. Benazir Bhutto hosted the fourth annual meeting of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC). The SAARC conference provided the new Prime Minister with the opportunity to exchange views with the heads of states/governments of each of the member nations, including Rajiv Gandhi. The event marked the first time since 1960, that an Indian Prime Minister had come on official visit to Pakistan. This meeting between the two Prime Ministers was widely seen as an opportunity for members of the new post-partition generation to resolve their differences. In early 1989, top-level talks were instituted. Two agreements were signed whereby the two leaders agreed not to bomb each other’s nuclear installations and that they would respect the 1972 Shimla Accord signed by their parents. But Rajiv and Benazir were both subject to their own domestic pressures, which did not give them the necessary latitude for any constructive policy reassessments. For Benazir Bhutto detente with India meant that her political opponents, of whom Nawaz Sharif, leader of the IJI (Islamic Jamhoori Ittehad) was the most vociferous, would accuse her of being pro-India and thus discredit her government at home. Rajiv Gandhi likewise faced difficulties over rapprochement with Bhutto at a time when Pakistan was being widely condemned in India for supporting the Sikh separatist movement.

At best the Bhutto-Gandhi summit of 1989, provided more urgency for those engaged in finding a formula for the five-year border war in the Siachen. Rajiv referred to the Siachen Glacier dispute at an official banquet in his honour. ‘We seek an end to clashes and conflicts that have led to the loss of so many lives in the forbidding icebound terrain of the north’, he said.\(^6\) Benazir spoke of the Siachen Glacier as a ‘flashpoint’ for an expanded conflict between the two states. She noted the futility of such renewed hostility and called for a quick, statesmanlike settlement of the problem. Siachen, the world’s highest battleground, was a significant test of the future relations between India and Pakistan. A breakthrough there, to the satisfaction of both parties, would be an incremental step towards the resolution of more sustained issues in the future. Failure to resolve the dilemma, however, would convince both sides that their only recourse was the military option. Both countries lamented the heavy expenditure on their armed forces when their development programmes were in such desperate state, but they were unable to use the opportunity that could have helped them to save their human and economic resources lost on the conflict at an inhospitable terrain.

In the middle of February 1990, Benazir Bhutto send Mirza Mohammad Aslam Beig, the Army Chief with a high level delegation to Iran. It was during this visit that ‘strategic consensus doctrine’ was outlined. According to Baig, this concept of ‘strategic consensus’ would include not only Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Turkey but also Saudi Arabia, Iraq and anybody else.\(^7\) It will not be out of place to mention here that Iran was the first country which gave moral support to the militants in the valley.

Benazir Bhutto took a categorical position on the Shimla Agreement. She maintained, ‘in the Shimla Agreement when we say that we have agreed to have bilateral negotiations with India, it is on the basis of UN resolutions. This does not in

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7. The main content of the ‘strategic consensus’ as General Beig himself put it, is the new ‘emerging reality’ between Iran, Afghanistan and Pakistan in that order. When he said ‘any body else’ he had in mind Kashmir also where already militancy was a high pitch.
any way compromise our position. Also there is nothing in the Shimla Agreement which completely rules out the role of United Nations or other international forums. On February 10, she initiated a debate on Kashmir in the joint session of the Pakistan National Assembly and said: 'the present trouble in Kashmir is an expression of Kashmir’s will for independence. It is the fire smouldering for the last forty two (42) years inside Kashmir. It is a revolution which has been passed on from one generation to another'. Mrs. Bhutto drew a parallel between the freedom movement in Kashmir and that in Eastern Europe. She said, when the entire world is in the grip of a wave of freedom and the Berlin wall is breaking, the Kashmiris have risen against their illegal and unconstitutional occupation by India. The Kashmir’s sacrifices will never go waste. Pakistan will never comprise on the Kashmir’s right of self-determination. India has flouted and resiled from its commitment.

**Beginning of the Worst phase of Indo-Pak Relations**

As the insurgency in Kashmir gained momentum and the law and order situation deteriorated, Indian officials continued to assert that the trouble was instigated by Pakistan. They argued that Pakistan’s ISI— The Inter Service Intelligence—which had been set up by General Zia-ul-Haq and was known to have played a leading role in the war in Afghanistan, was also active in Kashmir. These officials firmly believe that Pakistan was waging its own ‘proxy war’ in Kashmir, not only by supporting the militants by giving them arms but also by allowing them to train in their territory. In February 1990, Indian intelligence had disclosed over 46 camps throughout “Azad Kashmir”, which they described as ‘safe houses’ where militants were given weapons and explosive training. During the first half of 1990, there arose a constant outpouring of complaints that a new version of ‘Operation Gibraltar’ was in progress, inspired, it may be, by Benazir Bhutto in memory of her father. At one moment the Prime Minister of India, V.P. Singh warned the Indian

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8 "Benazir for Indian Pullout from Siachen", *The Times of India*, February 9, 1989.
people that they must morally prepare for war with Pakistan. Regarding bilateral negotiations the government of India continued to maintain its position at the official level that the Shimla Agreement provides the necessary framework for resolving all outstanding issues. In his ‘Indira Gandhi Memorial Lecture’ on May 1990, Prime Minister V.P. Singh stated that the Shimla Agreement commits the two countries to settle their differences by peaceful means through bilateral negotiations without recourse to force. Indeed bilateralism is the bedrock of the agreement. It also enshrined the principle of respect of each other’s territorial integrity, sovereignty and non-interference in each other’s internal affairs.11

After the dismissal of Benazir Bhutto and formation of Islamic Jamohori Itehad (IJI) government led by Nawaz Sharif, diplomatic warfare between India and Pakistan over Kashmir assumed new proportions. Mr. Nawaz Sharif assured full moral, political and diplomatic support to the Kashmiri separatist militants. He even threatened to liberate Kashmir by all possible means and thus re-unite the two parts of the state.12 However, Nawaz Sharif’s Kashmir policy came under severe domestic criticism. Amongst some circles in Pakistan it was believed that, regardless of statements to the contrary, the US was favouring an independent Kashmir in order to be able to use it as a base for American strategic objectives and that, by not taking a tough enough stand on Kashmir, Nawaz Sharif was acceding to this objective. The scenario which the West is trying to create here goes something like this’, said Mian Zahid Sarfraz, a former political college of Nawaz Sharif:

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\text{If Kashmir can’t be buried on Indian terms, then it should become an independent country rather than a part of Pakistan through a plebiscite as originally envisaged. But if Kashmir becomes independent or is given some such status, it will at best be a landlocked domain, an international protectorate doomed to remain under Indian}
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12 Ibid.
control forever....By accepting this US vision, Nawaz has forsaken national security.\textsuperscript{13}

It was clear, however, that despite a certain ambivalence in Nawaz Sharif's statements, Pakistan's long standing commitment to resolving the Kashmir issue on the basis of the UN resolutions, meant that the policy shift required to accommodate the 'third option' of an independent Kashmir was in fact not acceptable.

In view of this growing Indo-Pak animosity John Kelly, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs told a House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee in 1990: "we are concerned at the recent flare-up of tension between India and Pakistan over Kashmir. The United States thinks the best framework for a resolution of this dispute can be found in the 1972 Shimla Agreement".\textsuperscript{14} With the weakening of the Indo-Russian relationship following the collapse of the Soviet Union, as Indian commentators observed the United States was also aware of the significant opportunities for developing stronger ties with India. Indian military purchases from the United States increased from $56,000 in 1987 to $16 million in 1990.\textsuperscript{15} Pakistan was, however, facing difficulties with its relationship with the United States because of its nuclear programme. In October 1990, under the terms of the Pressler Amendment, American military supplies were cut off and this was a clear indication that America was less interested in Pakistan.

After less than two years in office, V.P.Singh was replaced by Chandra Shekhar as prime Minister of India. Bilateral talks at the Foreign Secretary level resulted in some agreements; exchange of information regarding the deployment of forces and information on the dates, timings and places of military exercises. Chandra Shekhar's rule saw some high level bilateral dialogues between India and Pakistan. Chandra Shekhar met Nawaz Sharif at Maldives in March 1991, at SAARC summit. They agreed to establish a hot line between India and Pakistan and also to continue

\textsuperscript{13} Mian Zahid Sarfraz, Interview, \textit{Friday Times}, 6-21 June 1991.
\textsuperscript{15} \textit{Ibid}. p. 142.
Foreign Secretary level dialogue. But all this remained at the diplomatic level as the ground realities in Jammu and Kashmir saw no change. At the funeral procession of Rajiv Gandhi in May 1991, the two Prime Ministers met again in a brief meeting. It is at this meeting that the Nawaz Sharif had the audacity to suggest to Chandra Shekhar that India should surrender the Kashmir valley to Pakistan and retain only Jammu and Ladakh.\(^{16}\) However, this suggestion was rejected by the Indian Prime Minister.

After less than three months in power Chandra Shekhar was replaced as prime Minister following elections in June 1991. His successor was Narasima Rao, new leader of the Congress party after the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi in May. Although the BJP no longer wielded the same influence on Kashmir policy, Hindu communalism remained a factor during this period. It reached alarming proportions at the end of December 1992, with the demolition of Babri mosque at Ayodhia in Uttar Pradesh by Hindu fundamentalists. Immediately after the demolition process, the communal trouble spread throughout the country in which a large number of Muslims were killed and their property destroyed by the Hindu extremists often with the full connivance of police forces.\(^{17}\)

On the international front, while the credibility of India’s secular credentials had been shaken, extreme reactions in Pakistan led to the evacuation of the families of Indian diplomats. In Karachi more than twenty people were killed and a number of temples destroyed. Besides Pakistan a large number of temples were destroyed in Bangladesh, United Kingdom and Dubai. Pakistan raised the issue of the killings of Muslims in India in different international foras. The United Nations Secretary General, Boutros Boutros Ghali, restricted himself to appealing for “tolerance and human solidarity” after the Pakistan’s attempts to campaign for the U.N. intervention.... The Organization of Islamic Countries (OIC) assailed the failure of the Indian government to take appropriate measures to protect this important holly


\(^{17}\) For more details see the report of Krishna Commission.
Muslim Shrine... The External Affairs Ministry hurriedly sent around 30 heads of Indian mission abroad to counter any adverse reaction there, and reassured the international community about India's commitment to secularism. But the destruction of Babri mosque was a slur on the secular polity of India... as the international community cast aspersions on the credentials of India as a secular republic.

Nawaz Sharif and Narsima Rao met six times in a period of just over two years. The Foreign Secretary level talks had also continued. Economic relations of sorts had come into being. However, this did not have any kind of positive impact on the situation in Kashmir. The militants expanded their activities to the South of Pir Panjal range in Jammu, Rajouri and Poonch areas. The increase in the fighting power of militants disturbed the Indian security forces who while combating the militancy also resorted to large scale human rights violations. Pakistan on the other hand launched a diplomatic offensive to embrace India on the question of human rights issue. India responded equally both at domestic as well as international level and this kind of confrontation made Kashmir issue as an international flashpoint.

New Developments in Jammu and Kashmir

Meanwhile, new developments were taking place in the state of Jammu and Kashmir. In February 1993, about 23 separatist political parties grouped together and formed an umbrella organization known as All Parties Hurriyat (Freedom) Conference (APHC). Besides Moulvi Omar Farooq of the Awami Action Committee who became the first Chairman, the other prominent leaders of the APHC included Syed Ali Shah Geelani of the Jama'at-i-Islami, Abdul Gani Lone of the People's Conference, Professor Abdul Gani Batt of the Muslim Conference, Moulvi Abass Ansari of the Itihad-ul-Muslimeen and Sheikh Abdul Aziz of the People's League. The basic objectives which made different separatist political forces to form a joint political platform like APHC, were to check the inter-group clashes by deciding the

growing discontent between the various militant organizations and also to gain support for the ‘freedom movement’ at international level. Although the various components of the APHC differ over whether they want complete independence or unification of the state with Pakistan, they have one common objective that the people should be given the right to self-determination as accepted in both the UN resolutions of 1948 and 1949. Since the UN resolutions provide for a plebiscite to choose only between India and Pakistan, this time the APHC insists that the third option of independence should not be excluded. Therefore, as per the APHC constitution the best way to resolve the vexed Kashmir problem is the process of tripartite talks.

Whether it was a protest demonstration against the human rights violations, or submission of memorandums to UN observer’s offices or any bandh call or meeting with any foreign delegation or anti election campaign, the leaders of this conglomerate played an active role and thus invited some attention towards Kashmir issue.

In March 1993, Girish Chander Saxena, the successor of the Jagmohan was replaced by retired General Krishna Rao (for second term of office), as Governor of Jammu and Kashmir. He was directed to make the administrative machinery of the state functionable and thus evolve a new approach which will mark the end of the lawlessness in the state. The new Governor promised fresh elections but as militancy continued and causalities rose further, they were hedged by the condition that normal conditions must first return. The military measures taken to restore normalcy, however, only provoked fresh outburst of militancy: it was a vicious circle.

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21 The Constitution of Hurriyat Conference.


In October 1993, the mosque at Hazaratbal once more attracted international attention after thirty years. The Indian security forces besieged the shrine to capture a group of militants known to be taking shelter there. Pakistan condemned the Indian action in surrounding the mosque as sacrilege and onlookers, both domestic and foreign, feared the outcome would be similar to the storming of Golden temple in Amritsar when the army moved against Sikh militants in 1984. As in 1963, better sense prevailed over the hotheads in India who wanted the place to be stormed despite the presence of innocent pilgrims along with the militants. Negotiations took place and ultimately after a period of 32 days (17 October to 16 November), the issue was resolved peacefully without a shot being fired. The image of Indian restraint and care for innocents at Hazaratbal was, however, undermined by the actions of the Border Security Forces in Bijbihara where they shot at least fifty unarmed demonstrators who were protesting against the siege of Hazaratbal.

**Fight on the Issue of Human Rights in Geneva**

International concern over Kashmir reached a high point in February 1994, when the Pakistan Prime Minister, Benazir Bhutto, who had returned to office in October 1993, raised the issue in the United Nations Commission for Human Rights in Geneva. The situation in Kashmir was intolerable, she said, as the world’s silence. Despite its repression, India had failed to impose its will on the indomitable people of Jammu and Kashmir. Defending the Indian government’s position, the finance minister Dr. Manmohan Singh, said that the Prime Minister of Pakistan had given a

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24 One of Kashmir's holiest and most treasured relics is the *Moe-e-Mugaddas*, widely believed to be the hair of the Prophet Mohammad (PBUH). It was installed in Hazaratbal mosque near Srinagar in A.D. 1700. On December 27, 1963 it was found missing and it resulted in a large scale disturbances throughout Kashmir which took even some precious lives. It was under the pressure of intensive mass protest that the relic was brought back on January 4, 1964. Who lifted the holy relic and who brought it back is still a mystery.


26 Bhattacharjrea, n.23, pp. 269-270.
wholly erroneous view of the situation. Dr. Farooq Abdullah also defended India by condemning Pakistan for training and arming militants.27

Pakistan withdrew its resolution just before voting was scheduled to begin, as along with Iran and China, some other countries also appealed to Pakistan not to press for action on the motion. Commenting on the withdrawal of the resolution India’s Minister of State for External Affairs, Salman Khurshid said that this has vindicated our stand that Kashmir is a bilateral issue and should not be raised in international fora.28

Although Pakistan’s resolution against India did not gain enough support and had to be withdrawn after a request from Iran and China particularly, the fact that other countries were alerted to the human rights situation in Kashmir boosted the morale of the Kashmiri activists. It also surprised the government of India. ‘Indian policy makers were jolted by the new Pakistani aggressiveness that could only be attributed to a growing belief in Islamabad that this Indian government was weak, focused exclusively on the economy and distracted from national security concerns’, reported Shekhar Gupta in India Today.29

In 1994, the Indian parliament passed a resolution unanimously asking Pakistan to vacate the areas of Jammu and Kashmir which it had occupied through ‘aggression’. The two houses of parliament pledged themselves in the statutory resolution that all attempts to interfere in the internal affairs of India would be met resolutely. They affirmed on behalf of the people that India has the will and capacity to firmly counter all designs against its unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity. The state of Jammu and Kashmir has been, is and shall be integral part of India and any attempt to separate it from the rest of the country will be resisted by all necessary means.... The resolution called upon Pakistan to stop forthwith its support to

terrorism that was in violation of the Shimla Agreement and the internationally accepted norms of inter-state conduct.30

The Charar Sharif Crisis

In March 1995, a large number of heavily armed militants occupied the mosque at Charar Sharif. The mosque which is about twenty five miles from Srinagar is revered for its association with Nund Rishi, the Patron Saint of the valley. The militants who occupied this mosque, were mostly foreigners working under the command of a Pakistani national known as Major Mast Gull. There were also some local Kashmiri militants and together they claimed to have "liberated" the area from the Indian security forces. The Indian security forces responded by cordoning off the area as they had done at Hazaratbal. This time however, the mosque was destroyed by fire, which the militants blamed on the security forces, who in turn blamed the militants for the destruction of entire town of Charar Sharif. Krishna Rao the Governor of the state expressed grief and anguish over the destruction of the Shrine.31 Although more than forty people were killed in the encounter, yet most of the militants including their commanders (except Abu Jandal who was arrested) escaped unhurt.

Pakistan blamed India for the destruction of Charar Sharif and continued with its policy of highlighting the abuse of human rights on the international stage and point to the alienation of the Kashmiri people from Indian rule while putting the issue in its historical context and referring back to the UN resolutions. When Charar Sharif was under siege, Pakistan Prime Minister, Benazir Bhutto went on a nine-day trip to the United States from April 12, 1995. During her talks with President Bill Clinton which were friendly, Bhutto pleaded with the US to mediate Kashmir talks. At the conclusion of the visit, the two leaders issued a joint statement which said Jammu and Kashmir remained the 'Primary Source' of tension in the region and they agreed on

30 Kumar, n. 28, p. 104.
the need for substantive Indo-Pak dialogue to resolve the issue, taking into account the wishes of the people of the state. In the statement the Pakistani premier reiterated that Islamabad was amenable to US or other international mediatory efforts on Kashmir. At the end of this visit an agency report said that, the Americans, true to form, maintained Kashmir was a disputed territory. But they suggested that India and Pakistan solve the dispute bilaterally, and merely recorded Bhutto’s request for US mediation.

**Leighari’s Visit to Delhi**

In the eighth SAARC summit which was held in New Delhi Pakistani President Farooq Ahmad Leighari while discussing about his country’s problems with India suggested that bilateral issues should be discussed at the South Asian Summit. In a hard-hitting speech at the SAARC conference President Leghari implied that Indo-Pak problems were standing in the way of any forward movement by the SAARC. He made no direct reference to Kashmir, but asserted that movements for self-determination, freedom, democracy and respect for human rights across the globe could not be denied. Lasting peace was possible only if the principles of the UN charter are followed and commitments undertaken bilaterally and internationally are fulfilled. He called for an exercise in stock-taking on the progress made by SAARC in its first decade.

Reacting to the Leghari’s remarks Prime Minister P.V.Narsima Rao said that India is against Pakistan’s policy of raising the bilateral issues of the member countries in the SAARC summits. Mr. Rao asked for the bilateral negotiations and offered to resume the stalled dialogue between New Delhi and Islamabad. The two leaders had a meeting and in that meeting President Leghari strongly opposed the

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33 Kumar, n. 28, p. 111.
34 Address of Farooq Ahmad Leghari to the 8th SAARC summit quoted in *Hindustan Times*, May 3, 1995.
Indian move to hold elections in Jammu and Kashmir. The Pakistani President also talked to some Hurriyat leaders which later assumed a deep controversy as BJP largely protested against it.

When India announced to hold elections in Kashmir after a gap of almost seven years, Pakistan strongly opposed the move and this marked the complete end of official contacts between the two countries for quite some time.

General elections were held in May 1996. A coalition government headed by Deve Gowda came in to power and I.K. Gujral became the Foreign Minister of it. This government stated that the establishment and maintenance of good and stable relations with all the neighbouring countries of India was its foreign policy objective.

**New Initiatives Under Gujral Doctrine**

Gujral Doctrine as it started to be termed, reoriented India’s foreign policy towards its neighbours. Bilateral relations improved and there was a general upgradation in India’s political response to all the countries. Bilateral dialogue with Pakistan was revived. Mr. Gujral established personal contacts with the Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of Pakistan and restored the Foreign Secretary level dialogue. Visa policy was liberalized. Pakistan’s Most Favoured Nation (MFN) status in commercial relations was extended. However, this could not bring any sort of positive change in the hostile relations of the two countries. Responding to such efforts taken under Gujral Doctrine Pakistan made it clear that any improvement in economic, commercial, technological and people to people relations would matter only after the resolution of Kashmir problem.\(^{36}\)

Elections were held in Pakistan in early 1997 and Nawaz Sharif became Prime Minister of Pakistan enjoying more than two third majority. He appointed General Ayub’s son Gohar Ayub Khan as his Foreign Minister. This was the time when skirmishes along the LoC had increased to a dangerous level. Mr. Nawaz Sharif wrote to his Indian counterpart that they should immediately meet and talk to reduce the

\(^{36}\) *Times of India*, November 13, 1996.
level of tension and wasteful defence expenditure. The offer was accepted and the first meeting between the two Foreign Secretaries which took place at Delhi in March 1997, could not achieve much beyond an agreement to continue the dialogue. The Prime Ministers of the two countries (this time India’s Prime Minister was I K Gujral), met during SAARC summit at Male in May 1997, and agreed that next Foreign Secretary level moot at Islamabad in June must break new ground to reflect the mutual resolve of the two governments to establish good neighbourly relations.

The Islamabad meeting in June 1997, did not address the substance of the contentious issues, but concentrated on agenda and procedure. The list of items to be covered in the dialogue were agreed as follows:

1. Peace and security including CBMs.
3. Siachen.
5. Sir Creek.
6. Terrorism and drug trafficking.
7. Economic and commercial cooperation.
8. Promotion of friendly exchanges in various fields.

Separate working groups were to be set up for each of the eight items, with working groups for the first two items led personally by the Foreign Secretaries who would also coordinate and monitor the functioning of all working groups. It was decided to adopt an “integrated approach” to the dialogue, to ensure that progress was achieved on all issues. This provision was particularly important for Pakistan, since without it, speedy results would not be achieved on non-controversial subjects, while items like Jammu and Kashmir languish for want of common ground. Thus, taking an

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38 Ibid.
example, any breakthrough on trade would have to be accompanied by some progress in Kashmir, perhaps through reduction of Indian forces in the disputed state, or through some mitigation of human rights violations.

The outcome of the Islamabad session of the dialogue was accompanied by positive comments from both the two Foreign Secretaries. The then Indian Foreign Secretary, Salman Hyder, said that the outcome provides the basis for a comprehensive, constructive and sustained dialogue. His Pakistani counterpart, Shamshad Ahmad, said that they had successfully completed the first stage, entrusted by the Prime Ministers, to lay down a mechanism for establishing a friendly and cooperative relationship. To reflect the new cordiality arising out of the meeting, a number of practical steps were agreed to further improve the atmosphere between the estranged neighbours:

i) It was agreed to cease hostile propaganda against each other.

ii) The sides agreed to release detained fishermen, as well as the fishing vessels in each other's custody.

iii) Information on other detainees in the custody of two countries would be exchanged with a view to their eventual release.

The third meeting, held in New Delhi in September 1997, failed to register any further progress, and in fact witnessed a hardening of the Indian attitude, not only on setting up a working group to discuss Kashmir rather than highlight this situation. It was found expedient by both sides to reiterate their commitment to the process of the dialogue which was to be resumed at a mutually convenient date.

In their separate speeches to the UN General Assembly and also in their separate meetings with the American President Bill Clinton in September 1997, Nawaz Sharif and Gujral leveled serious charges against each other especially for the happenings in Kashmir. Asking the international community to bring about a "just

40 Ibid. p. 125.
41 Ibid. p. 126.
settlement" of the Kashmir issue on the basis of UN resolutions, Mr. Sharif said that India must be persuaded to reverse its missile programme.\textsuperscript{42} He also offered to open talks on a non-aggression pact with India, proposed that both nations should strike a deal to restrain their nuclear and missile capabilities.\textsuperscript{43} The two Prime Ministers also met for talks in New York but these talks ended with no breakthrough. Prime Minister Gujral said that he is cautiously optimistic that his friendship with Nawaz Sharif will help to ease the tension over Kashmir but again their meeting on the findings of a Common Wealth summit on October 26, achieved little.\textsuperscript{44}

**Nuclearisation of the Region and Aftermath**

On 11 May, 1998 and again on 13 May, 1998, the BJP-led coalition government, then having completed only seven weeks in office, conducted five nuclear tests at the Pokhran range in Rajasthan. When these tests were largely condemned world over, Prime Minister Vajpayee in his letter of 11 May to Clinton (soon leaked to the New York Times) cited China and Pakistan, India’s old adversaries, and clandestine nuclear collaboration between the two, as the principal justification for crossing the nuclear threshold. So preoccupied was Mr. Vajpayee with naming the two neighbours and so keen to gain the US support that even he offered ‘cooperation’ with Washington in its efforts to promote nuclear non-proliferation and ‘disarmament’. When this did not work and Pakistan accused India of having created a new threat to its security via nuclearisation, New Delhi changed its tune and said that its nuclear decision was not ‘Pakistan-specific’ and that it went beyond South Asia or regional considerations.\textsuperscript{45}

Nawaz Sharif, despite severe domestic political pressure, did not rush into conducting a test in retaliation. Indeed, he carefully weighed his options during the

\textsuperscript{42} The Pioneer, September 23, 1997.
\textsuperscript{43} The Times of India, June 17, 2001, p. 8.
\textsuperscript{44} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{45} Profoul Bidwai and Achin Vanaik, *South Asia on A Short Fuse*. (New Delhi, Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 55.
week after 11 May, reckoning that the economic consequences of crossing the nuclear threshold would be almost unbearable. There was advantage to be reaped from showing restraint: not only would Pakistan escape attracting opprobrium; it could seek to occupy the moral high ground as a responsible, peace-loving state. This would help it overcome to some extent the stigma that had got attached to it due to its involvement with the Taliban, and support to Kashmiri separatists in India, as well as the links of Pakistani military agencies with narcotics smuggling. Not only this, US was also offering Pakistan $5 billion package of economic and military assistance for not crossing the nuclear threshold.

However, after assuming the nuclear capability, the BJP-led coalition government launched a fiercely militant rhetorical attack on Pakistan, linking the new nuclear equation with the Kashmir dispute. On 18 May, L. K. Advani, the Home Minister of India announced that in the now-changed ‘geostrategic’ environment, which had rendered Pakistan much weaker in relation to India, New Delhi would follow a ‘Proactive’ policy on Kashmir, resorting to ‘hot pursuit’ into Pakistan territory of the militants. Advani, and following him, Fernandes, issued statement after statement chiding Pakistan, and threatening military action in Kashmir. Some of the BJP party functionaries even went a step further. They demanded that proud new nuclear India must ‘recapture’ the part of Kashmir that Pakistan illegitimately annexed in 1948-49.

Nawaz Sharif in the last week of May finally asked army chief, General Jehangir Karamat, to evaluate the Kashmir situation and the impact of India’s belligerent rhetoric on the Pakistan Army. Karamat was clear: the troops morale would collapse unless Pakistan conducted retaliatory tests and equalized with India. On 27 May, Pakistan suddenly announced it had definite intelligence reports that India was about to launch an armed incursion into its territory. The following day,

46 Ibid. p. 57.
47 Ibid.
five nuclear explosions were conducted at Chagai. On 30 May, Pakistan announced yet another test—a total of six to get even with India’s five earlier that month, in addition to the very first test of 1974. Thus in May 1998, the world added two more overt nuclear weapons states to its tally of five, increasing the global nuclear threat.

The crossing of the nuclear threshold by India and Pakistan was bound to shock, revolt, and anger the rest of the world. Following the tests, the United States, Japan and some other states in the industrially developed world imposed sanctions and cut off aid, loans and credit guarantees to India and Pakistan. The G-8 met to pass a tough resolution reprimanding India and Pakistan, calling upon them to sign nuclear restraint agreements such as the NPT, as well as the CTBT, i.e., to effectively give up their nuclear capability.

On 6 June 1998, at its 3890th meeting, the Security Council in its Resolution No. 1172 reprimanded India and Pakistan and urged them to exercise restraint. A number of international-multilateral fora, from the conference on Disarmament to the European Union, and from the Non-Aligned Movement to ASEAN (Association of South-East Asian Nations) Regional Forum sharply criticized the two. In November, the First Committee of the United Nations General Assembly passed a resolution by 98 votes to 6 reprimanding India and Pakistan for their tests and asking them to sign the CTBT.

By June, the sanctions had begun to bite. The Pakistan rupee, within three weeks of the tests, plunged from Rs 40 to Rs 56 to the US dollar. The Indian rupee lost 15 per cent of its value. The effects were compounded by the unfolding of the Asian meltdown. Foreign investment flows began to dry up. Withdrawal of state credit for US and Japan exports and infrastructure projects meant that their costs rose sharply. The cost of borrowing for Indian industry in international markets rose significantly. Most important, the drying up of aid from Japan, the largest donor to India, seriously affected social sector spending, including schemes such as drinking

water supply, rural sanitation, literacy and health programmes, in which the poor have the highest stake.

In October, the US Congress gave a special one year authorization to Clinton to lift sanctions selectively. In November, many prohibitions on multilateral loans and export credit and guarantees were lifted but 40 Indian 'entities' (companies, laboratories and institutions) with 200 affiliates or subsidiaries were placed on the US blacklist for trade. Pakistan, virtually on the brink of economic collapse, got a breather in the form of an assurance that Washington would not veto an urgently, desperately, needed IMF loan.

After the terrorist attacks on America (on September 11, 2001) when global campaign was initiated against terrorism, Washington lifted most of the sanctions on India and Pakistan. America and India agreed to cooperate in different fields. The interaction of the forces is only a part of the far-reaching policy shift brought about by Defence Minister George Fernandes' trip to Pentagon in January 2002, and the Defence Policy Group meeting in December last year that was co-chaired by the Indian Defence Secretary and his US counterpart. The "intensive military cooperation" agreed upon includes both military hardware sales and possible joint action in South Asia. While the thread that binds the Indo-US military ties is terrorism emanating from the Afghanistan-Pakistan arc, the two sides are pitching for higher stakes-regional energy security and a partnership in development of weapons and equipments.\(^{50}\) Similarly after giving full support to America in its war against terrorism in Afghanistan and also after his historic speech on 12 January 2002, (in which he announced a stern action against all those organizations which are involved in any kind of terrorist activity not only in Pakistan but also in any country of the world) which was appreciated world over, Mushraf was invited to America. The Pakistani President went America in February 2002. Although he did not get the arms aid he had asked for, yet on the economic front America has agreed to write off one out of three billion dollar loan with which Pakistan is burdened.... The US has

promised Islamabad 150 million dollars for oil and gas exploration, 34 million for education, 2 million for technical support for conducting elections and one million for training under expanding defence cooperation. Bush has further ordered that Pakistan be paid an additional 220 million dollars to compensate it for the cost relating to the US led attacks on Afghanistan. Moreover, he has promised to buy from Pakistan apparel worth an additional 142 million dollars to help resuscitate its stagnant economy.\(^5\)

The impact of both India and Pakistan having gone overtly nuclear on the process of Indo-Pak dialogue was unimaginable. The climate of mistrust, acrimony, newly generated tensions and the international pressure demanded a rethink on part of both the countries on their worst relationship. India and Pakistan had to enter into a dialogue and thus ease the tension and suspicions. While as both the countries were convinced of the necessity to work for mutual confidence yet the modalities and mechanism for initiating such a dialogue could not be agreed upon.

The Prime Ministers of India and Pakistan met each other at Colombo in the end of July 1998, on the side lines of SAARC summit. They wanted to have a pragmatic and candid dialogue about the nuclear issues and also to agree upon a mechanism for official level talks. They met on 29 and 30 July 1998, but the meeting ended in a stalemate. Pakistan proposed eight confidence Building measures (CBMs) for reducing tensions over Kashmir. These include: strengthening of the UN military observers group to patrol both sides of the LoC; release of Kashmiri detenues; removal of Indian army pickets in Srinagar and other Kashmiri towns and villages; phased reduction of Indian troops in the Valley; cessation of search/arrest operations; transmission of information about missing persons; sanctioning of the ICRC and UN human rights monitors in Kashmir and recognition of the All Parties Hurriyat Conference as legitimate Kashmiri representatives.\(^6\) India out rightly rejected these and reiterated the stand that Kashmir is its integral part and New Delhi would accept

\(^5\) Kashmir Times (editorial), February 18, 2002.
no outside interference. She asked for settling other issues, increasing economic and
cultural cooperation and allowing the rise in other ties to submerge the two countries
differences over Kashmir. There was hardly any kind of unanimity over the issues
between the two countries.

The 12th NAM summit took place at Durban in the end of August 1998. During
his inaugural address to the summit, the President of South Africa Dr. Nelson Mandela
remarked that "all of us remained concerned that the issue of Jammu and Kashmir
should be resolved through peaceful negotiations and should be willing to lend all the
strength we have to the resolution of this matter." Nawaz Sharif did not attend the
summit. However, Pakistan's Foreign Minister Sartaj Aziz met Indian Minister of State
for External Affairs, Ms. Vasundhara Raje, on 3 September 1998 and announced that
both India and Pakistan had agreed on the modalities for the resumption of Foreign
Secretary level talks. Nothing happened till Nawaz Sharif and Vajpayee met again in
New York on 23 September 1998, while attending the UN General Assembly session.
They agreed that the Foreign Secretaries would meet at Islamabad on 15 October 1998,
to discuss Kashmir, peace and security and the confidence building measures. These
were only the first two items of the agenda agreed upon in June 1997, during the
Foreign Secretary level talks held at Islamabad. The remaining six items on the agenda
would be discussed in November 1998. It was during this summit at New York that
both Nawaz Sharif and Vajpayee had agreed to restore the hot line between the two
countries, people to people contacts were to be strengthened, trade between the two
countries was to be increased, the railway link between Kokrapar in Pakistan to
Munnabo in Rajasthan — India, was to be restored, visa rules were to be relaxed and a
direct bus service between Delhi and Lahore was to be started. Both of them had also
agreed to put in efforts to stop cross-border firing.

53 Ibid, p. 11.
54 Mehraj Hajini, "Internationalisation of Kashmir issue and India's response", The
At the October round of Foreign Secretary level talks both sides reiterated their stands on Kashmir and the security concerns they had. India proposed a "No First Use" agreement (regarding the use of Nuclear Weapons), while as Pakistan insisted to sign a "Non Aggression Pact", however, this could not materialise. Nothing much came out of these talks except that the dialogue had started once again and the next round of talks was decided to be held at New Delhi in November 1998. But before these talks were to be held, the Home Minister of India Mr. Advani called Pakistan a terrorist state and this enhanced the tension between the two states. However, still the Foreign Secretaries of the two countries had a meeting at Delhi in November 1998. During the meeting, India made the following proposals to Pakistan:

a) Give up state sponsored terrorism in India and dismantle the terrorist camps in Pakistan for arming and indoctrinating militants.

b) Close down more than 30 camps functioning in 'Azad Kashmir'.

c) Deny use of Pakistan territory and facilities to fundamentalist and militant organizations to fuel religious violence.

d) Hand over to India 32 terrorists and under-world operators of Indian origin sheltered in Pakistan.56

Responding to Indian charges Pakistan suggested the involvement of the UN Military Observers Group along the LoC to verify India's allegations regarding the Pakistan's involvement in aiding and abetting terrorism. But India rejected the suggestion outright as she did not want any international observers. Pakistan strictly denied the existence of terrorist camps or presence of any of the terrorists in that country. In return Pakistan accused India for promoting sectarian strife in Karachi, Sindh and other provinces of that country.57

These talks could not achieve anything concrete due to both sides adhering to their stated positions. Issues like Tulbul navigation Project, Siachen, Sir Creek, trade,

56 Nanda, n. 16, p. 13.
57 Ibid, p. 131.
terrorism and drug trafficking and cultural exchanges, which were expected to be discussed seriously, were paid less heed as most of the time of this meeting was spent in the exchange of accusations and counter-accusations. Still this was a good beginning for Indo-Pak relations to be brought on course and the achievements of the meeting could be listed as under:

a) India and Pakistan to set up technical committees on the supply of surplus power to India.

b) India proposed elimination of double taxation to promote trade.

c) Pakistan’s proposal for setting up a mechanism for quick flow of information on trade and investment was agreed upon.

d) Pakistan agreed to issue visas within six weeks to the applicants in India.

e) Both countries agreed to set up mechanism for regular meetings and exchange of operational information between CBI of India and FIA of Pakistan for combating various kinds of crimes including counterfeit currency.

f) The proposal for the introduction of bus service between Delhi and Lahore was concretised.

g) Both countries agreed to free the fishermen in each others custody.

**Vajpayee’s Visit to Lahore**

The summit meetings between Nawaz Sharif and Vajpayee and also the Foreign Secretaries meetings augured well for better Indo-Pak relations. The Foreign Secretaries in their meetings at Delhi had concretized the process of establishing a bus service between Delhi and Lahore. Vajpayee decided to visit Lahore in the first bus journey and Nawaz Sharif decided to welcome him whole-heartedly. It seemed that both the leaders were very keen to work for the improvement of Indo-Pak relations. Vajpayee along with some eminent personalities visited Lahore on 20-21 February 1999, with the inaugural run of Delhi-Lahore bus Service. They were given a warm welcome at Wagh check post where Nawaz Sharif himself received Vajpayee
formally. This was an historic march and there were large expectations that this visit will mark the beginning of the new chapter of Indo-Pak amity.

Vajpayee and Nawaz Sharif signed the Lahore Declaration on February 21, 1999. The two Prime Ministers agreed to intensify all efforts to resolve all issues including the issue of Jammu and Kashmir as well as intensify their composite and integrated process for an early and positive outcome of the agreed bilateral agenda. The Foreign Secretaries of India and Pakistan, Mr. K. Raghunath and Mr. Shamshad Ahmad also signed a memorandum of understanding to mutual adherence to the principles of the UN charter, implementation of the Shimla Agreement and the resolution of all outstanding issues including Jammu and Kashmir. India agreed on bringing Kashmir on the agenda and Pakistan agreed to bilateral talks.

The two Prime Ministers announced a number of confidence building measures such as; prevention of conflict, condemnation of terrorism, determination to combat terrorism, advance notification for the conduct of ballistic missile flight tests, minimize the potential of freak nuclear accidents and abide by moratorium on nuclear testing. It was also agreed to take the Indo-Pak talks to the level of Foreign Ministers by keeping the process of Foreign Secretary level talks going on. They also agreed to modify the travel restrictions in order to make people to people contact possible. At the end of the visit both Vajpayee and Nawaz Sharif had a press conference. At that press conference both of them said that they had discussed all nuclear issues including CTBT and a nuclear free world. Nawaz Sharif also said that Pakistan would hold consultations with India on the issue of Most Favoured Nation (MFN) status under the WTO framework. Thus Lahore Declaration was described as a turning point in a

58 Lahore Declaration, February 21, 1999. (For full text see Lahore Declaration in appendix VI).

59 Ibid.


61 The Times of India, February, 22, 1999.

relationship that has only produced hate, suspicion and strife. The joint-venture by the two Prime Ministers was sufficient enough to tell the people of the sub-continent and the world at large that the time has now come to sort out differences and disputes because the most important issue is not just the absence of nuclear war or even peace, but meaningful peace, where the people of Pakistan and India can enjoy a better quality of life in the coming millennium.

The Foreign Secretaries of India and Pakistan met at Srilanka on the side lines of the SAARC summit. They agreed to take concrete steps for the implementation of the Lahore Declaration urgently. They also agreed to a six-point programme including setting up of a committee on humanitarian issues to deal with the release of civilian prisoners, relaxation of visa regime, identifying areas of cooperation in information technology and Y2K and WTO related issues. The two countries also exchanged some prisoners. The government of India announced some more steps to ease visa and travel restrictions for several categories of Pakistani nationals. Not only this, a seventy five member business delegation from Pakistan attended the Federation of Indian Chamber of Commerce and Industry (FICI) conference here in early April 1999. There was also a two day meeting of the Pakistan Rangers and the BSF along with the representatives of narcotics and border survey departments. They agreed to exchange information on the activities of cross-border narcotics smugglers and deportation of Indian and Pakistani nationals from each other's country. The representatives of the Federation of Indian Export Organisation interacted with the Karachi Chamber of Commerce and Industry. India Pakistan Chamber of Commerce and Industry was inaugurated on April 10, 1999. The test firing of Agni II on 11 April 1999, had been communicated to Pakistan on 10 April 1999.

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65 The Hindustan Times, April 11, 1999.
All these activities would make one to believe that positive progress was being made in improving Indo-Pak relations. The basic approach seemed to be at that time to take forward the negotiations and understanding. The US led western world was highly appreciative of the joint initiative of Nawaz Sharif and Vajpayee which culminated in the signing of Lahore Declaration. The new developments which were taking place between India and Pakistan would convince any body that the log jam was easing in favour of understanding. But all these hopes dashed on the ground when Lahore Declaration was followed by Kargil conflict.

**Kargil Conflict**

Kargil sector had seen no worthwhile military activity since 1971 Indo-Pak war except perhaps in Turtuk sector. LoC was respected by both sides.\(^6^6\) Summer defences were vacated by both sides during the winter as the high altitude and snow clad rugged mountains were not considered suitable for military operations. Even the utility of this sector during the winter for the infiltration of the militants was also considered marginal if at all.\(^6^7\) But it was a big surprise for India to know that good number of guerrillas who were enjoying the backing of Pakistani army, occupied some Indian positions in Mashkoh Valley, Drass, Kaksar and Batalik of Kargil sector vacated by Indian armed forces during the winter. According to different sources, the major aim behind this intrusion was to dominate the National Highway between Srinagar and Leh and thus cut Siachen and Leh off from Srinagar.\(^6^8\)

When India came to know about this intrusion, meeting of the Cabinet Committee on Security was convened on 25 May 1999. The political directive given to the army was to evict the pockets of intrusion and restore the sanctity of the LoC. No time frame was given. The only restriction imposed was that the LoC will not be crossed. Should it become necessary to cross it, the approval of the cabinet had to be

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66 Nanda, n. 16, p. 144.
sought. The ground forces launched a major offensive and this operation was termed as "operation Vijay". They met with a strong resistance from the intruders and thus felt it very difficult to evict them and restore the sanctity of LoC immediately.

The army requested for the help of Indian air force in pushing back the intruders. The request was considered as the Cabinet Committee on Security on 26 May 1999, directed the Indian Air Force to help the army in their operation against the intruders. Pakistan also advised its armed forces to remain ready and meet any eventuality. As a result of this latest Indian military offensive tensions between India and Pakistan reached a dangerous point of escalation especially after the downing of two 'intruding' Indian MIGs by the Pakistani army. Due to this mounting tension the Indian navy was put on high alert. It was moved to Arabian Sea to control the sea lanes and to blockade the supply of oil and other essentials to Pakistan once the government will decide about the same. Even the amphibious units of the army were also moved from Andaman and Nicobar Islands to the Western theatre. Pakistan also followed the suit by deploying its reserve divisions on important positions. Pak navy and air force was also put on high alert. It is said that Kargil was the first military conflict in nearly 30 years between the two recently nuclearised rivals, and the only large-scale conventional engagement ever between any two nuclear states. (The Ussuri River conflict between China and USSR never involved air strikes nor had the same escalation potential).

When the intensive fighting was going on in Kargil sector, Pakistan questioned the validity of the alignment of the LoC in Kargil area and demanded that it should be redefined. During the day-long visit of Pakistan Foreign Minister, Mr. Sartaj Aziz to new Delhi on June 12, a tough India told Pakistan to vacate from Kargil without any pre-condition. The situation was getting more and more escalated and the chances of

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71 Bhidwai and Vanaik, n. 45. p. VII.
a full-scale war to be fought with nuclear weapons manifolded. The nuclear threats were being exchanged. It is in place to mention here that Indian and Pakistani high officials exchanged nuclear threats, whether directly or indirectly, no fewer than 13 times in first five weeks during the Kargil crisis. Therefore, it would have become quite difficult for the international world to play down the significance of such threat-mongering. Nawaz Sharif visited China and had some sort of conversation with Chinese authorities. On June 20, 1999, the G-8 countries asked the intruders to withdraw to the Pakistan side of LoC and thus help in defusing the tension. On June 24, Clinton dispatched General Anthony Zinni, Chief of the US Central Command, and Gibson Lampher, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, to Islamabad to reportedly pressure Pakistan, especially its army, into ending the aggression.

On the invitation of President Clinton, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif rushed to Washington. The US President received Pakistani Prime Minister at Blair House on 4th July 1999. The two leaders held meeting in which Pakistan agreed to ask the intruders to withdraw from the Indian side of the line of control (LoC), after assurance of Clinton that "he will take personal interest in the resolution of Kashmir issue." In a joint statement issued at the end of this meeting Prime minister Nawaz Sharif said that concreted steps will be taken for the restoration of the LoC in accordance with Shimla Agreement. Thus a phased pullout of intruders began and by July 14, 1999 (50th day) the intruders vacated from the Kargil area.

Both India and Pakistan ended up paying heavily for Kargil. Pakistan was politically weakened, winning hardly any kind of support from the international community especially from its old friend China. Kargil dealt another blow to democratization, further weakened the crisis-ridden economy and aggravated the

74 Bidwai and Vanaik, n.45. p. VII.
76 Mitra and Ramananda, "Us, them and the US", Outlook. July 19, 1999, p. 28
77 The Hindu, July 5, 1999.
regime's legitimacy crisis. Besides the killing of a number of Pakistanis, the economic cost for that country was around 700 million US dollars.\(^78\)

India lost hundreds of men-410 according to the government. (This is almost certainly a gross underestimation. The number of wounded was said to be 594, when an injured-death ratio 4 or 5 to one is the accepted Indian norm. The causalities were probably much higher.) The economic cost for India was over 10,000 crores ($2.5 billion) in direct expenses—Just to recover its own territory in 'peace times'. The economic toll has mounted as the Kargil LoC became a super-Siachen which is patrolled round the year. (Siachen glacier is the highest point of military confrontation anywhere in the world. Since 1984, India and Pakistan have lost more than 10,000 lives patrolling it, at the expense of $ 10 million a day.)\(^79\)

Although the Kargil conflict came to an end, it brought the relationship between the two countries at the lowest ebb. It also gave rise to a fresh crop of militants inside Kashmir who later on resorted to \textit{fidayeen} (suicide) attacks and inflicted heavy damages on Indian Security forces. Meanwhile, the shooting down of Pakistani naval aircraft carrying Pakistani navy personal by Indian air force MIG-29 air defence fighter near Runn of Kutch in July further escalated tension between the two countries.

On October 12, 1999, Nawaz Sharif was dethroned in a bloodless military coup and General Pervaz Musharraf, the Chief of the Pakistan army, declared himself as Chief Executive of Pakistan. This in fact was the fourth time when military had taken over in Pakistan. General Musharraf reiterated his country’s commitment and assured full moral and political support to the Kashmiri freedom fighters fighting for the 'liberation of their motherland'. After the hijacking of Indian airline plane IC814, Indo-Pak relations, which were already at a disastrously low level, went further sliding down. In the wake of this hijacking, Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee called upon the world to declare Pakistan a terrorist state and urged US to take the initiative in this matter. But the White House rejected the demand by citing lack of credible evidence of Pakistan's

\(^79\) Bidwai and Vanaik, n. 45. pp. X-XI.
involvement in the hijacking. The demand of the hijackers was conceded as in exchange of the plane three dreaded militants namely Maulana Masood Azhar, Ahmad Umar Saeed Sheikh and Mushtaq Ahmad Zargar were released.

Although general Mushraf repeatedly expressed his willingness to talk to India any time any were and at any place ever since he took as Chief Executive of Pakistan but the government of India always rejected his offer on the ground that Pakistan is promoting ‘terrorism’ in the state of Jammu and Kashmir. The government of India reiterated its demand that Pakistan must first end cross-border terrorism if it seriously wants to resume talks with India. Commenting on the prevailing situation Pakistani Foreign Minister Abdul Sattar said that he sees Pakistan and India heading for a conflict as tension rise between the two countries. “I see great dangers ahead”, Sattar told journalists at a press conference in Karachi...efforts need to be made urgently to reverse the built up of tensions between the two countries which can lead to a conflict.

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81 Immediately after his release, Maulana Masood Azhar, a former member of Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (HuM) was able to attract a large number of HuM cadres into his newly formed Jashi-e-Mohammad (JeM) (Zaffar Abbas, “A who’s who of Kashmir Militancy”, *The Herald* August 2000). The JeM was also successful in taking over some of the physical infrastructure of the Harkat-ul Mujahideen (Zaigham Khan, *militants versus Military*, *The Herald*, May 2000). The Sipahi-e-Sahaba, a sectarian organization inside Pakistan sends its members to fight for the JeM. (In a rally held during February 2000, Azam Tariq announced that 10,000 Mujahideen from his organisation would join JeM. See Zaigham Khan, “Militants versus Military”, *The Herald*, May 2000). The JeM also has the support of a large number of Deobandi Madrasses of Pakistan. The JeM considers suicide attacks as one of the lethal weapons crucial for fighting Indian Forces in Kashmir. After the terrorist attacks on America and also on J&K legislative assembly and Indian Parliament, JeM like HuM and Lashkar-e-Taiba was also declared a terrorist organization by America for having its close links with Taliban and AlQuida of Osama Bin Laden. After this Pakistan took a stern action against JeM and arrested most of its leaders including Moulana Masood Azhar.

Ahmad Omar Saeed Sheikh a British National fought in Bosnia and Kashmir. He is the main accused in the kidnapping and killing of US reporter Daniel Pearl.

Mushtaq Ahmad Zargar is the chief commander of Al-Umar Mujahideen. He is considered one among the top most Kashmiri militants who proved quite headache for the Indian Security agencies.


Clinton’s Visit to South Asia.

India’s diplomats did all they could to dissuade President Bill Clinton from visiting Pakistan during his South Asian trip in March 2000. New Delhi said that Clinton’s decision to visit Pakistan marks a tacit acceptance of the military coup in Pakistan and a rejection of the principled position taken so far by New Delhi: that it will not talk to an illegal military regime in Islamabad. However, both White House and State Department spokesmen have made it clear that one of Clinton’s main purpose in meeting Pakistan’s military Chief Executive is to avert a conflict on the sub-continent.

President Clinton visited India from 20-25 March, 2000. While addressing the joint session of Parliament on 23 March 2000, he praised India for democracy and diversity and said that these are the two lessons which she can teach to the entire world. He also asked India to think about the signing of CTBT and the resolution of Kashmir conflict. He made it clear that America does not want to play any kind of mediatory role on Kashmir issue but can help in facilitating a dialogue between the two countries. The final solution is to be found by India and Pakistan themselves, the American President said.

Earlier at a joint press statement Mr. Clinton had said, “both our nations want a peaceful future. I recognize that India has real security concerns. We certainly share your outrage and heartbreak over last night’s brutal attack in Kashmir (in which 35 Sikhs were killed)…. It reminds us of what tremendous suffering this conflict has caused India…. The violence must end. This should be a time of restraint, for respect for the Line of Control, for renewed lines of communication”. He later elaborated that there was no military solution to the problems between India and Pakistan. He emphasized the importance of renewing the dialogue. In reply to a question by peter Jenning’s of ABC World news Clinton replied— “the most I can do right now is to oppose violence, particularly violence propagated by third parties in Kashmir and to

84 Ibid.
85 Ibid.
86 Hindustan Times, April 24, 2000.
87 “US shares India’s outrage”, The Times of India, 22 March 2000.
reaffirm the LoC.... I believe that there are elements within the Pakistani government that have supported those who engage in violence in Kashmir."^{88}

Besides lifting some of the sanctions imposed on India after conducting nuclear tests, the USA and India also signed business deals worth $4.4 billion which showed that economic interests would play a decisive role in improving the relations between the two countries (India and USA).

After his five days visit to India, Clinton had a brief stop in Pakistan. There was no formal arrival ceremony for Clinton at Islamabad. In an address to the people of Pakistan on PTV on 25 March 2000, he said, “I have listened carefully to General Musharaf and others. I understand your concerns about Kashmir. I share your convictions that human rights of all its people must be respected. But a stark truth must also be faced. There is no military solution to Kashmir. International sympathy, support and intervention cannot be won by provoking a bigger, bloodier conflict. On the contrary sympathy and support will be lost. And no matter how great the grievance, it is wrong to support attacks against civilians across the line of control". During his address major focus was put on the restoration of democracy, a scaling back of Pakistan’s nuclear programme and an easing of tension in Kashmir. He also reiterated US policy not to mediate in the Kashmir dispute but said that he would do whatever he can to restore Lahore process.

Announcement of Ceasefire

On July 24, 2000, Abdul Majeed Dar, the Chief Commander of Hizb-ul-Mujahideen (HM) militant outfit announced a ceasefire in Jammu and Kashmir, the rationale behind which, he believed to be the wishes of the people of the State. The Huriyat Conference, the United Jihad Council and Jama’at-e-Islami of Pakistan opposed the move very strongly. The ceasefire was finally withdrawn by the Supreme Commander of Hizb-ul-Mujahideen Syed Sala-ud-Din when India refused to accept his demand of involving Pakistan in the talks.

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On November 19, 2000, the Prime Minister of India Mr. Atal Bihari Vajpayee announced that security forces were directed not to initiate combat operations against militants in Jammu and Kashmir for the holy month of Ramadan. The decision was made in view of the fact that the people of India were heartened by the steady improvement in the situation in Jammu and Kashmir and the longing of people for peace and normalcy. Commenting on this initiative General Parvez Musharaf said that "New Delhi would soon realize the futility of its efforts to impose a military solution in Kashmir. There is no alternative to a peaceful resolution of the dispute and no justification for delaying the commencement of a meaningful dialogue for its settlement. A visit to Pakistan by an All Parties Hurriyat Conference (APHC) delegation to hold consultations could help in this regard".

On December 21, 2000, the Prime Minister of India Mr. Atal Behari Vajpayee, announced to extend the ceasefire in operation in Jammu and Kashmir, beyond the Ramadan, for another month, till republic Day, 2001. Within hours of the extending of the ceasefire by India in Jammu and Kashmir, Pakistan announced a "partial withdrawal" of its troops on the Line of Control and urged India to reciprocate. The Hizb-ul-Mujahideen deemed the extension a futile exercise unless India was prepared to follow it up with concrete steps towards resolution of the Kashmir problem. They saw little meaning in the extension and said that it was only meant to give relief to the weary and tired personal of the armed forces.

On January 23, 2001, the government of India extended the ceasefire by another month. On February 23, 2001, the ceasefire was extended by three more months. Now this ceasefire lasted up to the end of May, 2001. The unilateral ceasefire which remained for almost six months, has failed to make any change anywhere other than borders. During the entire course of ceasefire, figures relating to incidents of violence,

93 Ibid
civilian killings, grenade attacks, abductions and arms-snatching make interesting reading, compared to the period before cessation of official combat operations against militants. From November 28, 2000 to May 15, 2001 (169 days of ceasefire), there were 17 *fidayeen* attacks, 213 grenade attacks by militants, as against 127 such attacks during six months before the ceasefire. There were 166 blasts triggered off by militants as against 138 before the ceasefire. Similarly there were 110 cases of arson as against the 67.... During the six months of ceasefire 535 civilians were killed as against 423 before it. 65 police personal were killed by militants during the ceasefire period, as against 44 during an equal number of days before the ceasefire. 189 security force personal of paramilitary forces and the army were killed as against 153 before this period. However, the officials claim that the number of militants killed and arrested during ceasefire period was very low. 587 militants were killed as against 886 in equal number of days. Only 159 militants were arrested during the period, as against 335 during an equal number of days before the ceasefire. 94

**Panth Mission**

On April 6, 2001, the Vajpayee government had nominated the Planning Commission Deputy Chairman, K.C. Panth, as its representative to hold a broad-based dialogue with all Kashmiri groups, including those who have shunned the idea of a negotiated settlement of the problem. The centre invited all Kashmiri militant organizations and the Hurriyat Conference for a dialogue without any pre-conditions. But the Panth mission failed to yield any thing concrete as except Shabir Shah's party almost all the separatist forces refused to talk to Mr. Panth.

**Agra Summit**

Pressure was building on the government of India from diverse sources to start a dialogue with Pakistan. The international community, led by the US, but also including Russia and China were asking for the resumption of Indo-Pak dialogue to sort out their bilateral problems peacefully and through negotiation. These countries have had their own concerns for peace and stability in the sub-continent, particularly

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94 "Cease-fire was marred by increased killings", *Kashmir Times*, June 3, 2001.
for the avoidance of a nuclear war between the two adversaries. Moreover, the
domestic political and economic considerations of India and Pakistan were also
demanding that the process of negotiations should be started immediately.

It is in this context that Indian Prime Minister Mr. Atal Bihari Vajpayee invited
General Parvez Musharaf to India for talks. Musharaf, now the President of Pakistan
reached to Delhi on 14 July 2001, for a three-days visit. The warmth with which he
was received in India was unprecedented. No Head of State of Pakistan has received
the attention that President Musharaf got in India. The Newspapers and TV channels
treated the event as a major happening and President Musharaf was portrayed as a
long-lost son of Delhi who was keen to create history by writing a new chapter in the
history of the sub-continent. Responding to this warm welcome President Musharaf
said that he has come to India with an open mind and is sure that this meeting will
help to iron out differences on contentious issues.

The Pakistani President delivered a positive, “feel good” speech at the banquet
hosted in his honour by President K R Narayan. The General spoke of seizing the
opportunities presented by a new century and a new millennium to work together
particularly through regional co-operation, for mutual economic development. “I would
like communications to open, trade to flourish, mindsets to change and stereotypes to
disappear. The children of India and Pakistan must not be made to live under the constant
shadow of conflict. They must also not be made to live in deprivation”, he said. At the
tea party organized by Pakistani High Commissioner at his residence, Musharaf met
some Hurriyat Conference leaders there and reportedly assured them that Pakistan would
not come under any pressure, whatsoever on the Kashmir issue and would continue to
offer moral and political support to the just Kashmiri struggle.

95 S.D. Muni, “Talking to General Musharaf on Kashmir”, New Hope, January-February
2001, p. 3.
96 Ghazanfar Butt, “It could have been a better Summit”, The Pioneer, July 21, 2001.
Next morning Prime Minister Vajpayee and President Musharaf were at Agra in the vicinity of the Taj to start a dialogue to improve India-Pakistan relations. The focus of the Pakistan President was on Kashmir, while Prime Minister Vajpayee favoured a composite dialogue which would seek to improve bilateral relations, and which would also include discussions on Jammu and Kashmir. The discussions between the two leaders got off to a good start. Having broken the ice-a scheduled 15-minute meeting was extended to an hour and a half.

Meanwhile, Information and Broadcasting Minister Sushma Swaraj told media men present that the talks were proceeding along the right lines, and that the leaders were discussing various items included in the composite dialogue, but did not mention Kashmir. Eight hours later, just after midnight Pakistani side reacted to this by saying that Kashmir was discussed in the meeting.

The next morning, Musharaf had an informal breakfast with some editors. Then Mr. Vajpayee and Pakistani President held nearly two hours of one-to-one talks followed by one hour of delegation level meetings. While India insisted on linking the Kashmir issue with cross-border terrorism, the Pakistani side emphasized that it should be recognized as the central issue between the two countries. Five drafts of the declaration were exchanged by the officials but none satisfied both sides. The drafts were rooted through the Foreign Secretaries, who after vetting, submitted them to their leaders. Here again disagreement surfaced on the contents.

The two leaders were to meet for the final meeting to sign the declaration or agreement but wide differences surfaced again on the specific issue of Kashmir. Finally on the mid-night of 16th July, Musharaf left for home and this way the Agra Summit failed to produce even a joint declaration. Thus the problem continued as it was.

**Terrorist Attack on Indian Parliament and the Aftermath**

Addressing to the joint session of Congress on September 20, 2001, on the issue of terrorist strikes on America, President Bush announced the start of a "War on

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100 *The Times of India*, July 17, 2001.
Terror”. He said, “this is not, however, just America’s fight. And what is at stake is not just America’s freedom. This is the world’s fight….This is the fight of all who believe in progress and pluralism, tolerance and freedom….Every nation, in every region, now has a decision to make. Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists. From this day forward, any nation that continues to harbor or support terrorism will be regarded by the United States as a hostile regime”.

Despite severe criticism at domestic level, Pakistan President General Parvez Musharaf also joined his hands with the American led coalition against terrorism. Musharaf announced that he has committed himself to fight terrorism domestically and internationally and that he has the vision to change the direction of Pakistan. Thus Pakistan emerged as a strong ally in this war as it placed its bases and facilities at the disposal of the US to fight against Al Quida and Taliban forces in Afghanistan. This way Pakistan made the choice which the USA and the democratic world wanted it to make. Another reason which might have convinced Pakistan to support the coalition against terror would have been that within two days after September 11 attacks, the Indian Cabinet had offered the US fullest cooperation, including the use of its airbases.

While America and its allies were busy in their war against terror in Afghanistan, a group of five armed terrorists stormed into the complex of Indian Parliament on December 13, 2001, fired indiscriminately resulting in the death and injury of dozens of people. These terrorists would have planned to storm the whole Parliament House, however, the security forces foiled their bid by killing all of them on the spot. This was described as an attack on the ‘heart’ of Indian’s democracy and was in fact second of its nature. Earlier on October 2, terrorists had attacked the Jammu and Kashmir Assembly at Srinagar in which more than 40 people lost their lives.

101 President Bush’s address to a joint session of Congress and the American People on Sep. 12, 2001, Distributed by the office of International Programs U.S. department of State. Web site: http://usinfo.state.gov.


The government of India said that they have sufficient evidence that the attackers on Indian Parliament were Pakistani nationals, wedded to a Jehadi cause and owing allegiance to Islamabad-backed terrorist organizations, the Lashkar-e-Taiba (Let) and the Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM).\textsuperscript{105} All most the entire international community including Pakistan condemned this attack on Indian Parliament. The separatist and militant groups active in Kashmir also strongly condemned the attack and distanced themselves from it. Even the Pakistan based Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammad denied their involvement in the attack and accused the Indian Intelligence Agencies for having engineered it to defame Pakistan.\textsuperscript{106}

After the 13 December attack on the Parliament House, India adopted a highly bellicose posture vis-à-vis Pakistan. Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee told the nation that the fight against terrorism has reached its last stage.\textsuperscript{107} His address and the cabinet resolution to liquidate the terrorists and their sponsors wherever they are, gave rise to widespread speculation and debate on India’s next moves. On December 14, 2001, Pakistan High Commissioner Ashraf Jehangir Qazi was summoned to South Block and told that Pakistan should close the offices of the Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM) and the Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), cut off their sources of funding, freeze their assets and place their leaders under detention. India also rejected Pakistan’s offer of a joint probe to determine the identity of those responsible for organizing the attack on Parliament.\textsuperscript{108} Realizing that other countries most of all the US could compel the Musharaf to initiate action against terrorist organizations, the Indian government on December 20 formally called the envoys of the US, UK, Germany and France to brief them on the progress made in investigating the December 13 attack. The message was clear; they must pressure Musharaf into acting against the Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) and Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM), whose leaders are publicly using threats of assassinating

\textsuperscript{105} Sayantan Chakravarty, “The Plot Unravels”, \textit{India Today}, December 31, 2001, p. 5.
\textsuperscript{107} \textit{The Hindu}, December 14, 2001.
Indian leaders. What New Delhi was also subtly suggesting was that it couldn’t remain satisfied with the recent changes in the semantics and vocabulary of Washington and Islamabad’s description of terrorism.¹⁰⁹

The results were quick to follow. America described first Lashkar-e-Taiba and later Jaish-e-Mohammad as stateless terrorist organizations harmful to both India and Pakistan. President Musharraf was told by America to take a stern action against these organizations and their cadres. Musharraf’s historic speech on January 12, 2002, his subsequent moves to crackdown on terrorists and fundamentalist forces in his country and his forthright declaration that terrorism has no place in the ongoing struggle in Kashmir were described some positive signs which would help to de-escalate the tension.¹¹⁰ Musharraf also expressed his determination to carry on his fight against terrorism to its logical end and offered olive branch of peace to India. His offer for de-escalation on the borders, de-nuclearisation and resumption of dialogue were rejected by India severally and thus the level of tension increased alarmingly.

The fragile peace between nuclear rivals-India and Pakistan shattered daily by their fighting on the borders for nearly 13 years, has worsened further after over 1 million soldiers from the two armies were deployed following the attack on Parliament. All most on the entire 3,310 km. long frontier with Pakistan, India deployed her troops backed by armour and artillery formations. Islamabad on the other side responded similarly. Both sides also mobilized their navies and placed their air forces on high alert. Veterans of the 1965 and 1971 wars with Pakistan claim the present deployment is unprecedented and any small incident is like to ignite a war along the tense frontier.¹¹¹ The economic costs for this military deployment are also very high. Only in the course of one month’s period after this deployment, India’s

¹⁰⁹ Ibid, pp. 31-32.

¹¹⁰ The Kashmir times (editorial), February 4, 2002.

¹¹¹ Rahul Bedi, “One way or another, we want it to end”. Kashmir Times, February 15, 2002.
costs were around Rs 2,400 crore while as Pakistan spend around Rs 1,200 crore during the same period.¹¹²

New Delhi withdrew its High Commissioner from Islamabad with most of his staff, asked the Pakistan High Commission to reduce their staff strength by more than a half, cancelled the Samjhauta Express and the Delhi-Lahore bus service — both of which operated normally even during the height of the Kargil conflict... banned the over-flight of Indian territory by Pak planes, and declared its firm decision not to have any thing to do with Pakistan till they demonstrate their determination to behave properly by handing over to India the twenty criminals hiding there and by putting a stop to cross-border terroristic activities.¹¹³

The tension between India and Pakistan reached very high. US Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage has called the region one of the world's most dangerous spots were two nuclear powers daily glare, shout and shoot at each other.¹¹⁴ Besides America, the G-8 countries, Europe, Russia, Britain and the United Nations expressed their concern over the increasing tension between India and Pakistan and asked both the countries to exercise restraint. During the SAARC summit at Kathmandu in the early January 2002, President Musharaf met Prime Minister Vajpayee and shook their hands. The two Foreign Ministers also met each other, however, they did not initiate any formal or informal dialogue despite intense international pressure to ease the growing tension.¹¹⁵


(In the first week of January 2002, the government of India has passed to Islamabad the list of 20 names—the list of India’s most wanted protected by Pakistan. Some of them are as under: Maulana Masood Azhar (released in exchange of the passengers of IC-814), Syed Salaudin, Ayub Memon, Dawood Ibrahim, Tiger Memon, Chhota Shakel, Gaginder Singh, Abdul Karim, Shahid Akhtar Sayed, Zahoor Mishti, Wadhavan Singh Babbar, Lakhbir Singh Rode, Athar Ibrahim, Ranjeet Singh Necta and Paramjit Singh Panjwar).¹¹⁴

¹¹⁴ Bedi, n. 111.

In view of this fluid situation, US Secretary of State Collin Powell visited India and Pakistan. During his visit to the region Collin Powell said that US is very anxious to prevent a fourth war...possibly a nuclear one...between the rivals. He asked the two countries to restore the process of dialogue and evade the tension. After his visit he remained in contact with the leaders of the two countries. Commenting on his initiatives for peace between the two countries Musharaf said, “everyday, Mr. Powell was speaking to Prime Minister Vajpayee or Jaswant Singh, one of them, I know that. And almost everyday or every second day he was talking to me and asking to go for direct negotiations”. Although Powell could not succeed in bringing the two countries on the negotiating table, yet after his visit and his subsequent attempts for peace, the tension between the two nuclear neighbours lessened to some level. But any hope of a détente have faded away as in the first week of April 2002, leaders of both the countries hardened their positions, ruling out a de-escalation in the near future.

Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee has been categorical that Pakistan has not fulfilled the Indian conditions for a dialogue and says India has no intention of withdrawing troops from the border. Delhi accuses Islamabad of remaining unyielding on its demand to hand over 20 terrorists wanted for committing heinous crimes in India. Nor has there been a significant reduction in cross-border terrorism especially in Kashmir—that India says is the most important condition for talks to resume.

Pakistan, which had so far been making all the conciliatory noises, has said it is not going to push for a dialogue any more. General Pervez Musharaf has accused India of looking for a “face saving formula” to end the stand-off and indicated he was in no mood to grant any further concession. In an interview to the Hindu on April 1, 2002, Musharaf left it to India to open the “shut door” on bilateral diplomatic ties. In

116 Bedi, n.111.
117 General Musharaf’s interview with The Hindu, April 1, 2002.
118 Shishir Gupta and Hassan Zaidi, “Despite expenses on the military stand-off crossing Rs. 2500 crore, domestic political compulsions force the two sides to return even more belligerent”. India Today, April 15, 2002, p. 46.
an another interview published on 8 April, 2002 in Germany’s Der Spiegel magazine, Musharaf said that Pakistan may use nuclear weapons against India as a last resort in the event of war.

**Attack on Kaluchak Army Camp**

While as US Assistant Secretary of State Christiana Roca was in New Delhi holding talks with Indian officials and pressing for early resumption of Indo-Pak dialogue to defuse tensions, a group of *fidayeen* (suicide squad) attacked a residential complex of an army camp in Kaluchak, on Jammu Pathankot road on 14 May 2002, and killed 7 bus passengers and 25 army men and their family members. Again India blamed that the attackers had come from Pakistan and the later is doing nothing to stop the export of terrorism to the former. Pakistan as usual denied its involvement in the attack. The US secretary of State describing the attack a barbaric act said, “On behalf of my government, I would like to unequivocally condemn the attack”. The US Secretary of State requested India to exercise restraint. The Vajpayee government warned that the country’s restraint in the military stand-off with Pakistan may not last in the wake of the militant attack. “Events like this will ensure that restraint by India will not last”, Said Minister of State for External Affairs Umar Abdullah. The Chief of the Indian armed forces General S Padmanabhan said that the time for action against Pakistan has come. The Prime Minister of India said that the war against terrorism would enter into a decisive phase. On May 17, both Houses of parliament in one voice— both the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) as well as the entire opposition passed a resolution condemning the Kaluchak and other terrorist activities backed by Pakistan in Kashmir and other parts of the country stating that India will keep every option open to counter the offensive against this nation and people of India. The Cabinet Committee on Security also met in the same week and seemed very much united on


120 Ibid.

121 *Times of India*, May 16, 2002.
taking action against terrorists and mobilizing opinion against those who harbour
with terrorists. Thus it was quite clear that anything would happen at any time as the
forces were already in an eyeball to eyeball position and Pakistan had announced its
readiness to meet any kind of eventuality. There were wide speculations that at least
India would launch air strikes and would also use artillery fire power to hit at
militant camps and launching pads across the LoC. Reacting to these speculations
Pakistan said that the minutest misadventure against Pakistan would be considered a
declaration of war on the country and the whole Pakistani nation would react with
full vigour and strength and can even make the use of nuclear weapons. Thus the
level of tension increased to an all times high and this became a cause of serious
concern for the whole world.

America asked India and Pakistan to exercise restraint as it firmly believed in
a nuclear flashpoint theory. America pressurized Musharaf to stop infiltration into
Kashmir and asked India to demobilize its forces from the border once Pakistan stops
terrorism. US Secretary of State Colin Powell said, the only thing that counts is that
Musharaf stops infiltration across the Kashmir. Like-wise President Bush said,
Musharaf should show results in stopping people crossing the LoC and ending
terrorism rather than testing missiles. It is in place to mention here that when the
tension was mounting Pakistan carried out a series of missile tests. Similarly, Russia,
United Kingdom European Union and Japan asked Musharaf to take concrete and
visible steps to stop terrorism. These powers also asked India to opt for self-restraint
and defuse the tension. The Prime Minister of Japan even warned Musharaf that
economic aid to Pakistan will be for review if he does not curb cross-border terrorism
in Kashmir.

125 Ibid.
The Vajpayee government on May 18, asked Pakistan to recall the High Commissioner, Ashraf Jehangir Qazi. Mr. Qazi had continued to stay in India despite the return last December of his Indian counterpart Vijay Nambir in the wake of the December 13 attack on parliament. On May 21 Prime Minister Vajpayee visited the state of Jammu and Kashmir. His visit to the state was viewed with utmost importance because of the building tension on the Indo-Pak border. On the first day of his visit to the state, Abdul Gani Lone senior leader of the separatist All Parties Hurriyat Conference (APHC) was shot dead in Srinagar. The Prime Minister expressed grief over the assassination of the Abdul Gani Lone to whom he described as “a man of peace”. He said that Mr. Lone had been working for peace in Jammu and Kashmir and those who had killed him were against the peace initiative. But the peace process initiated by Mr. Lone would not suffer any setback.... When asked about the possibility of an Indo-Pak war Mr. Vajpayee said that he did not see any war clouds hovering over India and Pakistan, even as troops on either side of the International Border and Line of Control continued to exchange heavy fire.127

On the other hand due to the intensive international pressure, President Musharaf while addressing his nation on 27 May also said that any part of Pakistan territory cannot be allowed to be used for terrorist activities against any country.128 However, despite the efforts of the Russian President Valadimir Putin and Kazakistan President Nursultan, Vajpayee and Musharaf refused to talk to each other in the Almaty conference held on June 4, 2002, in Kazakistan. The conference ended with a condemnation of terrorism in all forms, no matter, when where and by whom. In a two page declaration on ‘Eliminating Terrorism and Promoting Dialogue Among Civilisations’, the 16 nation conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia (CICA) said: The fight against terrorism should be global, comprehensive and sustained. It should not be selective or discriminatory and also

avoid applying double standards. Earlier, the speeches by Vajpayee and Musharaf did not deviate from the expected. The Pakistani President stuck to his well-worn positions, calling upon India to return to the path of dialogue, threatening to respond with resolution and determination if war was thrust upon it, and still refusing stoutly to address any of India’s core concerns on terrorism and infiltration. Vajpayee replied that New Delhi was willing to discuss all issues including Jammu and Kashmir with Islamabad, but for the cross-border terrorism that has to end.... He replied his assurance that should Musharaf implement his promise on the ground, India would match it appropriately. In his opening remarks, Nazarbayev called upon India and Pakistan to resolve their problems peacefully. China’s President Jiang Zamin asked the two countries to act in the large interests of world peace and development.

Finally, the intensive diplomatic efforts made by America and some other powers to defuse the tensions started to show some encouraging results. The war clouds hovering over the sub-continent appear to be some what receding as it is said that during his visit to the region on 6 and 7 June 2002, US Deputy Secretary conveyed the pledge from General Musharaf to end cross-border infiltration on a permanent basis. In return, India agreed to respond appropriately and in the first instance reopened its skies to the over flight of Pakistan aircraft, identified a new envoy to Pakistan and ordered some naval ships in the Arabian Sea to their home basis. However, the process of negotiations has not been restored as yet.

Cost of Confrontation: Conservative Estimates

South Asia is the poorest, the most illiterate, the most malnourished, the least gender sensitive and the most deprived region in the world. It contains about 22 per cent of the world’s total population. Nearly 40 per cent of the world’s poor live in this

130 Quoted in Hindustan Times, June 5, 2002.
131 Ibid.
region. How much ironical is it that India and Pakistan which spend lavishly on
defence activities constitute more than 50 per cent of this poor population of South
Asia. India along with Pakistan ranks amongst the lowest of the world’s 174 countries
according to Human Development Index. \(^{132}\) Both are insignificant world figures
because of their poverty, with less than a dollar a day average per capita income.

The unending animosity which is mostly the result of their Kashmir phobia has
completely blocked the ways of India and Pakistan towards peace, progress and
prosperity. It has also given rise to different kinds of fears and suspicions. These
mutual fears and suspicions have not only deprived India and Pakistan of their due
role in important national and international affairs but has also led them towards an
endless arms race where both are spending billions of dollars annually on maintaining
and strengthening their war machineries in order to score points over each other. The
bellow given tables lists the balance of power:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Balance of power</th>
<th>Pakistan</th>
<th>India</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Defence expenditure (2001)</td>
<td>$3.3 billion</td>
<td>$13.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army Manpower</td>
<td>5,50,000</td>
<td>11,00,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanks</td>
<td>2,285</td>
<td>3,414</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Towed artillery</td>
<td>1,417</td>
<td>4,175</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force Manpower</td>
<td>40,000</td>
<td>1,40,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combat Aircraft</td>
<td>353</td>
<td>737</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attack Helicopters</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy Manpower</td>
<td>22,000</td>
<td>55,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aircraft Carriers</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Submarines</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Destroyers</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frigates</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


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## Table 3.2
### Indian and Pakistani Missile Programmes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ballistic Missiles</th>
<th>Payload (kg)</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Max. range (km)</th>
<th>Fuel</th>
<th>Status</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>INDIA</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prithvi-I</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>BSRBM</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>Liquid</td>
<td>Army version, in service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prithvi-II</td>
<td>500-750</td>
<td>SRBM</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>Liquid</td>
<td>Air Force version, in trial</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prithvi-III</td>
<td>500-750</td>
<td>SRBM</td>
<td>350</td>
<td>Liquid</td>
<td>Naval version, in trial</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agni-IA</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>MRBM</td>
<td>700</td>
<td>Solid</td>
<td>Ready for induction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agni-I</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>IRBM</td>
<td>1500</td>
<td>Solid-Liquid</td>
<td>Ready for production</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agni-II</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>IRBM</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>Solid-Liquid</td>
<td>Ready for production</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agni-III</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>IRBM</td>
<td>5000</td>
<td>Solid-Liquid</td>
<td>Development</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| **PAKISTAN**      |             |          |                 |       |                                     |
| Hatf-I            | 500         | BSRBM    | 80              | Solid | In service                          |
| Hatf-IA           | 500         | BSRBM    | 100             | Solid | In service                          |
| Hatf-II(M-11)     | 500         | SRBM     | 300             | Solid | In service                          |
| Hatf-III          | 500         | SRBM     | 600             | Solid | Untested, claimed ready             |
| Ghauri I (Nodong I) | 600     | IRBM     | 1000            | Liquid| One test, claimed ready             |
| Ghauri II (Nodong II) | 700      | IRBM     | 1500            | Liquid| Two tests, claimed ready            |
| Shaheen-I         | 1000        | MRBM     | 700             | Solid | One test, claimed ready             |
| Shaheen-II        | 1000        | IRBM     | 2000            | Solid | Development                         |

**BSRBM**  Battlefield Short Range Ballistic Missile.  
**SRBM**  Short Range Ballistic Missile.  
**MRBM**  Medium Range Ballistic Missile.  
**IRBM**  Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile.  
(All above Missiles can deliver nuclear warheads).

India and Pakistan have engaged themselves in one of the worst phases of arms race in the region. By spending huge amount on purchasing weapons from the developed countries, India and Pakistan ranks among the top list of ‘developing nations weapons purchasers’. They also detonated their nuclear devices and even this too could not mark the end of their arms race as was expected by some analysts. This obnoxious process has brought further trouble for their teeming millions who were already crying for the basic essentialities of life.

According to the Human development index, life expectancy in India is 61.6 years. Infant mortality is 73 per 1,000 births. Mortality rate is 111 per 1,000 births for children under five years. The percentage of malnourished children is 53. Those without access to safe water is 19 per cent. Without access to sanitation 71 per cent and the literacy rate is 65 per cent. The largest illiterate population in the world is in India. It has almost 2.5 times more illiterate people than whole of the sub-Saharan Africa. Also one third of the absolute poor in the world live in India. Most of them go to bed without taking any kind of meals.

The case of Pakistan is in no way different. In about 140 million populous country — like Pakistan 64 percent are illiterate. 28 per cent are living below the poverty line. 45 per cent are without access to health services. 50 per cent are without access to safe water. 67 per cent are without access to sanitation. Malnourished children under 5 years are 40 per cent. Similarly education expenditure (as % of GNP) is 2.7 per cent and health expenditure (as % of GNP) is just 1.85 per cent. While as defence expenditure (as % of GDP) is 6 per cent, about 22 per cent of the total national budget. The other big chunk of government expenditure is used towards serving its external debt of about $40 billion (nearly 72 per cent of its GDP).

Now a question arises here, when the socio-economic situation of the two countries is so grim, then why they are largely increasing their defence expenditure

133 Ibid.
134 Ibid.
135 Ibid.
every year at the cost of their teaming millions? The hatred towards each other which is largely the result of their dispute over Kashmir has deafened the ruling elite in the two countries to the extent that they are not ready to listen that by spending more and more on defence programmes, they are losing out in the race of development. They are not ready to accept that the process of competitive militarization will yield nothing special for them except large scale destruction and devastation. India the abode of one third of world’s poorest population is not ready to mind that the cost of each nuclear bomb corresponds to the cost of building 3200 modest houses under Indian conditions. The expenditure on each Agni Missile can finance the running of 13,000 primary health centres.\footnote{136}{Bidwai and Vanaik, n. 45, pp. 165-166}

Eminent Pakistani economists late Mehbub-ul-Haq was in favour of reducing military spending levels for both India and Pakistan by 5 per cent a year. Over a period of five years which would have released $2.2 billion, a sum that is four times the resources required for achieving the goal of universal primary education within the next five years. He has further said that India and Pakistan together spend billions of dollars every year on defence. If they can reduce this defence expenditure, they can finance their entire social agenda in the next 15 years and can fulfill all the five services with an additional $8 billion coming from peace dividends.\footnote{137}{India Today, May 8-15, 1998.} But as the present situation reveals this sounds a far fetched dream.