Chapter III

GENESIS AND GROWTH OF MILITANCY IN KASHMIR
After discussing some of the important issues which resulted in the estrangement of the Kashmiris from the Indian nation, the most crucial phase of Kashmir politics, "the militancy phase" starts. For the last nearly 12 years, the whole state especially the Muslim dominated areas, are passing through the most crucial phase of death and destruction. Whole Kashmir got transferred into a sort of "Hobbesian state of nature" with its attributes of universal fear, uncertainty and absolute insecurity. The trouble started when a large number of Kashmiri youths restored to an underground armed struggle and challenged Indian's control over the state of Jammu and Kashmir. In order to get rid of this kind of situation the Indian Security Forces adopted different methods against these armed militants and their sympathisers. The counter attacks by the militants were equally effective and this finally gave rise to a war like situation in which life, property, honour and dignity of Kashmiri men and women remained no more safe and secure.

This situation had simmered for a few years before it exploded fully in the beginning of the 1990. Its causes are both immediate as well as long term. This volcanic eruption of militancy is both spontaneous as well as the result of some planning as is true of every militant movement. In order to understand the growth of militancy in Kashmir, it is imperative to analyse the causality and dynamics of Kashmir situation as it has evolved in recent years. An in-depth analysis of such a complex situation deserves a careful examination of varied issues which have contributed to the growth and evolution of such a phenomenon.

Although, it was largely expected that the Accord of 1975 (Indira-Abdullah), would mark a decisive shift and thus help in the improvement of centre-state relations but in return, the relations got more and more strained. Even before Sheikh has assumed power as Chief Minister, Mrs. Indira Gandhi in a statement said that relations between Kashmir and the Indian union would continue as before.\(^2\) She also projected the Accord of 1975 as a device to bring Sheikh Abdullah back to power. In her statement to parliament on February 25, 1975, she said, “nobody had denied Sheikh Abdullah’s previous role which he played for the unity of the country. Later on he changed his mind and there was disagreement and estrangement between centre and state. Now that he is again expressing his willingness to work for unity and secularism, we welcome him”.\(^3\) Such type of statements largely provoked the Kashmiri people. Demonstrations followed in Srinagar condemning the Kashmir Accord. This was just before Abdullah was to be sworn in as Chief Minister. The statement annoyed Sheikh Abdullah and he refused to appear for the ceremony. Sheikh was livid with rage, according to Mir Qasim, “You have made a statement as if I have sold out Kashmir for the chair of Chief Minister .... I pleaded that he should not be influenced by the radio version of the statement [by Mrs. Gandhi]”.\(^4\)

After this statement of Mrs. Gandhi, Abdullah was finally persuaded to accept the office of Chief Minister on 25 February 1975. Returning to the post after nearly 22 years, he received an enthusiastic welcome, but his popularity had suffered a jolt. There was continuing criticism in the Valley of his deal with Mrs. Indira Gandhi. And he had never been popular in Jammu and Ladakh, where his return was resented.\(^5\) His opponents used the same epithets against him which his associates used against Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad, G.M.Sadiq, Mir Quasim and

\(^3\) See Lok Sabha Debates, February 24, 1975.
\(^4\) Mir Qasim, My Life and Times, New Delhi, Allied, 1992), pp. 142-143.
\(^5\) Bhattacherjea, n.2, p. 236.
others, by calling them “puppets”, “stooges” or “courtiers”. Some felt that it would have been better if he had stuck to the 1947 stand. The pro-religious organisations called him a traitor on his account. He took a very strong stand against Jama’at-i-Islami and said that, “I am fighting an in-depth battle, the ‘Jama’at’ has to be resisted politically and fought back socially”. Further he maintained that the Jama’at-i-Islami Darasghahs (educational institutions) were the real source of communal poison. The very first use he made of emergency power in 1975, was to ban Jama’at-i-Islami Darasghahs numbering about 120 which remained closed till the emergency was lifted.

The re-establishment of trust and confidence between the state and the central governments about which both the parties spoke so highly could not materialize. Immediately after signing the Accord of 1975, both the parties started giving provocation to each other. The union government had committed to review some of the not so important central laws and constitutional provisions applied to the Jammu and Kashmir state between 1953, when Sheikh was dismissed from the government and 1975, when he returned to power. Not only was the commitment not honoured but every reminder of the center’s pledge was dubbed as an undesirable act. When these differences remained unresolved, it resulted in an open war between the centre and the state. Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah totally refused to dissolve the National Conference as asked by the Congress led central government and demanded the dissolution of Pradesh Congress Committee in the state. On 15 August 1976, Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah welcomed whole-heartedly the ten Congress members including Abdul Gani Lone into his National Conference and it created a serious tension between National Conference and the Congress led central


7 Ibid.

8 Ibid.

government. Mrs. Indira Gandhi and Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah leveled serious charges against each other and this put further negative impact on the centre state relations. Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah said that, “forgetting my past experiences, I agreed to co-operate with Congress, but soon had to regret my decision”. When this tension increased largely, Sheikh began to demand the pre-1953 position, in which he had enjoyed the position of Prime Minister.

The differences in the interpretations of events that took place in 1953 and thereafter became a source of constant irritation between centre and the state. Sheikh Abdullah and other leaders of the National Conference described the post August 1953, period as a dark period of 23 years. About the development of the state during this period the perception and pronouncement of the two parties also differed widely. Sheikh Abdullah blamed centre for an artificial and exhibitionist show of false progress in the state of Jammu and Kashmir. He added that the people of the state refused to yield before the temptation and the terror that followed August 1953. These factors obviously resulted in worsening of his relations with the ruling Congress (I) in New Delhi. The situation soon reached such an impasse that the Congress party’s legislators decided to withdraw their support to Sheikh Abdullah, resulting in the resignation of his government in March 1977. They also staked their claim for power. However, the Governor L.K.Jha, did not agree to their claim and decided to dissolve the assembly and ordered fresh elections. The state was brought under Governor’s rule.

Though Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah was now less popular than before, still there was no rival to him in the Valley, although, the Janata Party, now ruling in New

10 Abdul Gani Lone was the Chairman of People’s Conference. He was also one among seven executive members of All Parties Hurriyat Conference (APHC), a separatist conglomerate of about 23 organisations. Mr. Lone has been killed in the month of May 2002 and after that his son took over his role.
12 Patria, New Delhi, 11 May 1976.
13 Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah’s Presidential Address at a session of the National Conference held at Jammu on April 24, 1975.
Delhi also entered the fray. The main plank of Abdullah’s programme was the restoration of autonomy of the state, an objective he had failed to secure in the Kashmir Accord. Since Sheikh Abdullah was unable to campaign for election because of his illness, so he recorded a cassette with the message that the election was a ‘referendum’ on Kashmir’s self-respect, that they could now show the world they were masters of their destiny and that New Delhi could not dictate their future. The cassette was played throughout the Valley till the elections for the new Constituent Assembly were held.

These elections are considered fair in the election history of Kashmir. National Conference won 46 of the 75 seats in the Assembly (42 in the Valley). Congress was cut to size (10 seats in all; none in the Valley). Janata Party did slightly better (13, with only 2 in the Valley). Candidates sympathetic to Pakistan did not well. Jama’at’s representation came down from 5 to just 1.

Abdullah returned to office on 9 July. But his relations with the new ruling party at the centre (Janata Party), still remained strained. On May 23, 1977, he even threatened to secede if the people in the state were not assured place of honour and dignity in terms of safeguards provided under Article 370 of the constitution. This has happened because the erstwhile Jana Sangh which became a major constituent of the Janata Party, had always demanded abrogation of the Article 370.

Mrs. Gandhi’s return to power in 1980, did not signify resurgence of cordiality. On May 13, 1980, while addressing a large public meeting at mazar-i-shudha (martyrs graveyard), he (Abdullah), declared that “no one would be allowed to enslave us again, whether it is India or Pakistan. Further he said, if any attempt was made to play with our fate, it would lead to disastrous consequences”. The centre-state relations were further worsened by the income tax raids on Srinagar’s business elite on April 21, 1981. The raids struck at some of the staunchest supporters of the

15 Verma, n. 6, p. 61.
16 The Hindustan Times, July 15, 1980.
Chief Minister and his party. "The victim was myself", Sheikh Abdullah told 'India Today' describing the people raided as just instruments. Mrs. Gandhi gave a great provocation to Abdullah. On one famous occasion during the political tours of Jammu and Kashmir, Mrs. Gandhi not only attacked Abdullah vehemently but allowed herself to declare that without centre's help and tolerance his government could not lost even for half an hour. She attacked Sheikh Abdullah by name and said bluntly that the minorities in Kashmir felt no longer safe. Similarly serious tension occurred on the permission for passing the Resettlement Bill of 1982. The bill passed by the state assembly provided for the return to Jammu and Kashmir of the state subjects who migrated to Pakistan 40 years ago and have since become Pakistani Nationals. In a speech from the rostrum of the holy shrine of Hazaratbal, Sheikh Abdullah denounced all critics of the bill as "Hindu communalists of North India" and accused them of wanting to upset the present communal configuration of Kashmir's population, presumably with a view to reducing the Muslim majority into a minority.

The last years of Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah were very unhappy. He was unable to persuade New Delhi to make any meaningful gestures towards restoring Kashmir's autonomy. He was also very much worried about the activities of his rival Congressmen who were always trying to dislodge him. Abdullah was never a good administrator in his bad health, he was worse. Corruption mounted, with his own party in the lead. Worse, his family got into the act and grabbed some of the best real estate in the Valley. He employed his wife Begum Akhtar Jehan, two sons, daughter-in-law, son-in-law and many other kith and kin to government and semi-government posts on fat salaries.

18 *The Times of India*, June 3, 1982.
20 *Times of India*, June 3, 1982.
21 Bhattacharjea, n 2, p. 238.
In June 1982, Sheikh Abdullah suffered his second heart attack and this time he did not recover fully. During his last days, a bitter war of succession erupted between his son Dr. Farooq Abdullah and Son-in-law Ghulam Mohammad Shah. Now he behaved like a conventional potentate and nominated his son Dr. Farooq Abdullah as his successor. Sheikh Abdullah died on September 8, 1982, and Farooq Abdullah became Chief Minister of the State.

Farooq Abdullah in Power

Except for his height and bearing Farooq had little in common with his father. He knew little of politics. Since much of his adult life had been spent abroad so he loved a luxurious life. He was handsome, well meaning and had a foreign wife. Although, 47, he dashed around the Valley on a motorcycle in a teenager fashion. One exotic passenger on his pillion was the film actress Shabana Azmi, whom he took all the way up from Srinagar to the mountain resort of Gulmarg. He spent much of his time in playing golf.

During his stay in London in 1974, Dr. Farooq visited the ‘Azad Kashmir’ to attend the convention organized by the Plebiscite Front there. This was before Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah has converted the Plebiscite Front into the National Conference. Farooq as an ‘observer’ listened the speeches stressing Kashmir’s demand for independence. This was to become the slogan of Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF). The JKLF leader Amanullah Khan was present as were Mohammad Maqbool Bhatt and Hashim Qureshi, who would hit the headlines as “terrorists”. When he returned, he briefed Mrs. Indira Gandhi about the convention. But this visit of Farooq to the ‘Azad Kashmir’ provided a large ammunition to his political rivals. Dr. Farooq Abdullah after becoming the Chief Minister of the state, consistently maintained that the state’s accession to India is final and irrevocable. Moreover, he maintained secular postures in his dealings with the people and with regard to other government activities. However, the relations with the central

23 Akbar, n 14, p. 186.
government became tense immediately when he took the question of the Resettlement Bill, passed during his father’s time and waiting for the assent of the Governor who had returned it to the assembly for reconsideration. Farooq got the bill reconsidered and passed again by the assembly. But the confrontation with the centre was avoided by agreeing to refer it to the Supreme Court because the reaction in Jammu was hostile and it was expected that it will give rise to the communal riots. Farooq Abdullah was keen on early elections to strengthen his position within the party. He immediately got the assembly dissolved which paved the way for the elections of 1983.

The polling was fixed for 5 June 1983, and the election campaign proved disastrous for relations between Kashmir and the centre. The elections generated a lot of heat and two premier parties became more and more hostile towards each other. This hostility reached to its height when Dr. Farooq Abdullah demanded the dissolution of Congress unit in the state and Mrs. Gandhi reacted that the Kashmir Congress is an organization of the local people and not of the outsiders. Dr. Farooq also used the issues like region, religion, family etc., during his election campaign. He propagated that the 1983 election is a plebiscite to allow the people to say which political party, National Conference or Congress (1) they like. He also reiterated his party’s demand of pre-1953 position for the state.

Mrs. Indira Gandhi devoted ten days to her campaign with little prospect of winning in the Valley. She concentrated on gaining seats in Jammu where her speeches were distinctly communal in tune and focused on the Resettlement Bill. She warned the Hindus about the return of Muslims from Pakistan once the Resettlement Bill will get passed. She said that only Congress could stop the 'Muslim National Conference' from taking such an alarming decision. Her party succeeded in receiving the support from Rashtriya Swamsavak Sung (RSS) and the

Virat Hindu Parishad, but in the Valley she was provoked by placards describing Congress as ‘Muslim Killers’ (after the Assam riots); in Srinagar; a few boys in the crowd stripped to demonstrate their alienation and she blamed Farooq Abdullah for that.

Moreover, Dr. Farooq Abdullah made an alliance with the Awami Action Committee Chief Moulvi Mohammad Farooq. This alliance between the two leaders came to be known as ‘Double Farooq Alliance’ and marked an end for the first time to the 50 years old rivalry between the Sheer (lion) and Bakra (He goat) forces in the Kashmir. It became a slogan that Sheer and ‘Bakra are brothers, what for has Indira Gandhi come? Moulvi Farooq revived the issue of plebiscite in the election and when asked whether he was an Indian or not, he said, “I am proud of being a Kashmiri”.27 However, the National Conference neither in its manifesto nor in its campaign had endorsed any separatist ideas.

The elections were held but these elections had resulted in the polarization of two regions of the Jammu and Kashmir state. Congress won 23 out of the total 32 assembly seats representing Jammu region. But it was defeated in those areas where Muslims were in majority. The valley overwhelmingly voted for National Conference. The Congress (I) leaders of the state rejected these elections by describing them rigged. The Pradesh Congress(I) chief Mufti Mohammad Syed commented, “this is exactly like the Z.A.Bhutto’s 1978 elections in Pakistan; this election has no legitimacy, it is based on fraud”.28

Emboldened by his success in the elections, Farooq decided to take on the mantle of opposition to the Congress in the rest of the country also. He joined the coalition of the opposition parties in their fight against the Congress. During 5-7 October 1983, he hosted a conclave of opposition leaders in Srinagar on the issue of centre state relations. Mrs. Gandhi already annoyed at the behaviour of the National

27 Verma, n.6, p. 81.
28 India Today, June 30, 1983.
Conference activists in Srinagar, was furious with Farooq Abdullah. The grounds for defection were prepared. Farooq was charged of having close association with those who are determined to ‘destroy India’. This frontal attack on Dr. Farooq Abdullah made him not only politically confused but also administratively impotent. On the other hand, the situation in the valley began to demand an immediate concern as the first warning shots of militancy were fired.

In October 1983, during the one day cricket match between India and West Indies, Pakistani flags were waved and anti-India slogans were raised. In February the kidnapping and killing of Ravinder Mahotre, a junior Indian diplomat in Birmingham (UK), by Kashmir Liberation Army (KLA), which was associated with the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF), led to the increased pressure against Farooq Abdullah. Recalling his visit to ‘Pak Occupied Kashmir’ (POK), he was accused of having links with the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF). Mrs. Indira Gandhi even went to the extent of accusing Farooq Abdullah publicly in a press conference for encouraging anti-national elements. After the execution of Maqbool Batt he was equally accused by the separatist and pro-Pakistan elements and this created a grave problem for him.

The Congress decided to teach Farooq Abdullah a lesson by dislodging him. They went ahead with their plans to unseat Farooq in alliance with the Gul Shah faction of the National Conference. The Congress had 26 members, Shah’s group

31 From August 15, 1983 onwards there were a series of bomb blasts. These blasts took place at different places like Anantnag, Indernag, Nagbal, Administrative Block and Iqbal Library of Kashmir University, old SRTC bus stand Sopore and in Great Britain Indian Diplomat Ravinder Mahotre was killed by Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Army. After this Maqbool Batt was hanged and his death created tension in the state. Even on May 20, 1984, while protesting against Bhivandi riots in Srinagar, several army vehicles were set on fire.
32 Marvah, n. 29, p. 53.
33 Ibid.
claimed. Together they could claim a majority in the 75 member assembly. They approached the Governor Brij Kumar Nehru for the dismissal of Farooq Abdullah. The Governor refused to accept their claim to form the Shah government as he was aware of the possible grave consequences of such a course of action. Brij Kumar Nehru paid the price for speaking out his mind and he was transferred to Gujarat. He was succeeded by Jagmohan as the new Governor in 1984. This new Governor was a trusted agent of Mrs. Indira Gandhi. He had proved himself during the emergency which she had imposed eight years earlier. As Chief Executive of Delhi Development Authority, he had faithfully carried out Sanjay Gandhi’s clean-up operation. He had been also the hero of the Turkaman Gate as he ‘successfully’ evicted the Muslims from there.

On July 2, 1984, the Farooq government was dismissed by Jagmohan on the advice of Mrs. Indira Gandhi and G.M. Shah was installed as Chief Minister of the state with the full backing of Congress party. Thus National Conference got divided into two groups National Conference (Khalida) and National Conference (Farooq).

Farooq Abdullah’s dismissal was largely criticized. The four non Congress Chief Ministers (from Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka, Tripura and West Bengal) walked out of a National Development Council meeting to protest Farooq’s dismissal. They were also joined by leaders of other nineteen political parties in describing the dismissal as undemocratic and urging the removal of Jagmohan from Kashmir. Brij Kumar Nehru Jagmohan’s predecessor, described the dismissal as shabby operation and spoke of money being flown in from Delhi to facilitate the change. General K.V. Krishna Rao said that Farooq had been removed by dubious means. It has been perceptively observed that Kashmir problem actually began in the month of June.

34 Ibid.
35 Bhattacharjea, n. 2. p. 247.
36 Ibid. P. 249.
37 Ibid.
1984. The critical decision was the unsavoury sabotage of Farooq Abdullah’s government by the centre which seemed more concerned with power than democracy. People in the valley felt very much cheated by the toppling and they began to lose their faith over the Indian democratic polity.

What was the legacy of Shah government? It imposed on Kashmir the longest ever spells of curfew and was therefore, nicknamed as *Curfew Sarkar*. In its first three months Kashmir remained under curfew for 72 days. It revived and sought support from Muslim fundamentalists in Kashmir and Hindu fundamentalists in Jammu. The communal riots between the Hindus and Muslims took place in the Valley in which some temples and houses of the Kashmiri Pandiths were damaged.

However, Shah Government did not last long. Jagmohan dismissed it on 7 March 1986, and imposed Governor’s rule on Kashmir. But there was increasing opposition against it. Jagmohan took a number of steps towards “streamlining the administration”. He turned his attention towards corruption and nepotism, which here was in plenty. But he could not win over the hearts of people because of his lack of sympathy with the Kashmiris and their identity. He was of the opinion that as long as Kashmiri identity exists, Pakistan and America would continue to exploit it. So he stressed for the abolition of article 370. He was never ready to accept that if India did not recognize and satisfy the Kashmiri identity, people would look to the outside powers for their support.

During his tenure in office the criteria of job reservations were so changed that the percentage of Muslim candidates selected by the Subordinate Services Recruitment Board (SSRB) was brought down to nearly half. Hardly any Muslim was left in Raj Bhavan, the Governor’s office and residence. The slaughter of sheep was

40 Puri, n. 1, p. 35.
41 *Ibid*, p. 36.
42 *Ibid*.
43 Bhattacharjea, n. 4, 251.
banned by him on *Janmashtami* day in the Valley. All this decreased his popularity in the Muslim community.

Political reactions were not slow in coming. Quazi Nisar, a fiery young preacher of Anantnag insisted that the law should not be used for religious purposes. He collected a large crowd and slaughtered a sheep in full public view in a street of Anantnag. He was arrested but became an instant celebrity with considerable following. Similarly a large number of people came to the streets of Srinagar and other parts of the Valley to protest against what they regarded as less than their due share in service selections and lack of other day to day essentialities.

Meanwhile Farooq Abdullah signed an accord with Rajiv Gandhi on October 1986. This accord came to be known as ‘Rajiv Farooq Accord’. Immediately after this accord coalition government of National Conference and Congress (I) was formed under the Chief Ministership of Dr. Farooq Abdullah on November 7, 1986. It was the third historic accord relating to the state’s relations with the Indian union. The first two were signed in the year of 1952 and 1975. Interestingly enough, all the three accords were jointly signed by the two ruling families in Srinagar and Delhi.

The accord of 1986, was largely criticized in the Kashmir. Most of the opposite groups called it as an unholy and opportunistic. The pro-religious and pro-Pak groups termed it as a “Sellout of the State” to Delhi. The prestige and image of Dr. Farooq Abdullah suffered body blows. However, Dr. Farooq Abdullah tried to regain the support of common masses by announcing the Prime Minister’s promise of Rs. 1,000 crores of special central assistance to the state. But like the earlier promises this promise was also not fulfilled.

The ‘Rajiv Farooq Alliance’ was essentially an understanding to work together and share power. There was an informal understanding between National Conference and Congress (I), that the power would be shared in the ratio of 60:40. The alliances would have yielded better results had the Congress (I) fulfilled all those lofty

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44 Verma, n.6, p. 63.
promises made during the honeymoon period. In practice, the alliance only resulted in enlarging the circle of predatory and insensitive oligarchy.

The Emergence of Muslim United Front (MUF) and the 1987 Assembly Elections

In order to fight the National Conference-Congress Alliance at the polls a broad spectrum of political groups in the Valley formed a coalition called Muslim United Front (MUF). The MUF was formally launched in Srinagar on the first day of Muharram in September 1986, avowedly for protecting the political and religious rights of the Muslim community in the state. Some of the political and pro-religious groups which joined their hands together for a common cause were Jama'at-i-Islami, Uma'at-i-Islami, Anjumane Ittehad-ul-Muslimeen, Islamic Study Circle, Muslim Educational Trust, Muslim Welfare Society, Islamic Jama’it-i-Tulba, Majlis Tahafaz-ul-Islam (organization to protect Islam), Jama’it-ul-Ahali Hadis, Shia Rabitta Committee, Idara Tahquiqati Islami etc. The people’s Conference of A.G.Lone was among the first few parties to express their solidarity with the MUF followed by Awami Action Committee of Moulvi Mohammad Farooq and Awami National Conference of G.M.Shah. However, it is worthwhile to mention here that the people’s Conference and the Awami National Conference joined MUF after the 1987 Assembly elections. Although, the Jama’at-i-Islami was holding a dominant position in the MUF, yet Ittehad-ul-Muslimeen of Abass Ansari was enjoying almost the support of half of the Shias in Kashmir. Similarly, Dr. Quazi Nisar of Uma’at-i-Islami was enjoying the full backing of the young elements—students, teachers, religious activists etc. particularly in South Kashmir.

The aim and objectives of the MUF centered around issues such as promotion and protection of Islamic solidarity, adherence to the fundamental principals of Islam.

45 Rajiv Gandhi had announced that he would give the state Rs 1,000 crores for economic development. But nothing was given.


47 The Constitution of MUF, pp. 2-7.
maintaining its cultural distinctiveness, precious heritage and traditions, promoting co-operation among Muslims etc.\textsuperscript{48} The approach of MUF and its manifesto attracted a large number of people in the Valley because they felt that the victory of the Front would be a victory for the faith of Islam.

Every nook and corner of the street was flooded with the exhibition of green flags of the MUF. The crescent moon and the star signs of the Islamic faith on the green flag of the MUF, made the people to dance with joy on the streets. One of the twelve National Conference defectors of 1984, Khemlata Wakhlu, has written that there was a veritable MUF ‘wave’ in the Valley. MUF promised employment for educated youth and an end to government corruption, the latter being an especially sensitive issue with Kashmiris, who say that most of the Rs.70,000 crores given to the state as development aid by Delhi over the decades has been siphoned off by a nexus of corrupt politicians, bureaucrats and businessmen — all appointed or imposed, of course, by Delhi. But in the end it was politics and not economics that proved crucial. As Wakhlu writes, there was only one voice on the lips of the people, that in a democracy, we would bring the party of our choice in power, a party that will genuinely meet the aspirations of the people and heed their grievances.\textsuperscript{49}

Elections were held on March 23, 1987. It is generally believed that these elections were massively rigged. In constituencies were elections were manipulated, the polling agents of the opposition candidates were arrested and beaten up not only by the police but also by the National Conference candidates.\textsuperscript{50} In these elections the National Conference won 38 seats and its Congress (I) coalition 28, the Bhartiya Janata Party 2, and Independents 4. The MUF was given only 4 seats and secured 30 per cent of the total votes polled. In fact, there was a general consensus in the bureaucracy and intelligence agencies that the National Conference-Congress

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{48} Ibid.
  \item \textsuperscript{50} Puri, n.I, p. 53.
\end{itemize}

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scale rigging.\textsuperscript{51} An eyewitness report in a generally pro-establishment Indian magazine drew attention to 'rigging and strong-arm tactics... all over the Valley; to 'entire ballot-boxes [being] pre-stamped for NC'; to 'massive booth-capturing by [NC] gangs'; to numerous citizens 'simply not being allowed to vote'; and to government nominated supervisors 'stopping the counting as soon as they saw opposition candidates taking a lead'. Meanwhile, the administration 'worked blatantly in favour of the NC-Congress alliance', and 'the police refused to listen to any complaint'.\textsuperscript{52} The Governor's report on the elections also states that it was openly rigged.\textsuperscript{53} Thus the evidence suggests that the 1987 elections were as rigged and unfair as any other held in the history of the State, with the arguable exceptions of those of 1977.\textsuperscript{54}

The large scale rigging in 1987 elections had been regarded as the breaking point. Dr. Quazi Nisar, a MUF leader said, "I believe in Indian constitution. How long can people like us keep getting votes by exploiting Islam? We have to prove we can do something concrete, but this kind of thing simply makes people lose faith in the constitution".\textsuperscript{55} Similarly the Peoples Conference chairman Abdul Gani Lone queried in despair, If people are not allowed to vote, where will their venom go but into expression of anti-national sentiment.\textsuperscript{56}

Although, MUF lost the elections, they received a lot of public sympathy for their cause. People believed that Rajiv Gandhi and Farooq Abdullah deliberately took away their right to vote and betrayed them by such massive rigging. They began to perceive bad administration, rigging in the elections and many other problems as a consequence of

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\item [51] Askari H. Zaidi, \textit{Behind the Increasing Militancy in Kashmir}, \textit{Times of India\textit{, January 10, 1990.}}
\item [52] \textit{India Today\textit{, 15 April} 1987, p. 40-42.}
\item [53] Guar Bazaz Malik, \textit{Genesis of Kashmir Trouble\textit{, The Statesman\textit{, Delhi, March 29, 1990.}}}
\item [55] \textit{India Today\textit{, 15 April} 1987, p. 40-42.}
\item [56] \textit{Ibid\textit.}
\end{itemize}
accession to India. They thought that if they had been independent or part of an Islamic country, then perhaps they would not have faced such problems and discrimination.

Immediately after winning the elections the coalition government used different coercive methods to suppress their political opponents especially those having some connections with the MUF. Almost all the candidates of the MUF who were “defeated”, were arrested after the results were announced along with their prominent supporters. Some of them were arrested right inside the counting hall and were beaten up publicly by the police and National Conference candidates jointly. Most of them were detained under the Public Safety Act and sent to different jails in Jammu region. Some of them were even subjected to torture.

In fact, it was in prison during 1987, that the five young men who formed the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF) nucleus in the Valley in 1989-90, met and on their release, took a collective decision to go to Pakistan controlled Kashmir in search of military training and weapons. Yasin Malik, one of the five and currently Chairman of JKLF in Indian administered Kashmir (also the executive member of Hurriyat Conference), was beaten and abused while imprisoned in 1987. “They called me a Pakistani bastard. I told them I wanted my right, my vote was stolen. I was not pro-Pakistani but had lost faith in India”. Ajaz Ahmad Dar, who was killed when he made an unsuccessful attempt to eliminate the then Kashmir Police Chief Ali Mohammad Watali, was arrested right inside the counting-hall and beaten up by Mr. Mohi-ud-Din Shah of

57 Khemlata Wakhlu, n.49, p. 323.
59 The five young men include Ashfaq Majeed Wani, Mohammad Yasin Malik, Abdul Hamid Sheikh, Ajaz Ahmad Dar and Javid Ahmad Mir. All of them were active supporters of MUF and close associates of Pir Mohammad Yousuf Shah (the present Supreme Commander of Hizb-ul-Mujahideen) who contested the election of 1987, from Amira Kadal constituency but was “defeated”. Of the five Ajaz Ahmad Dar, Ashfaq Majeed Wani and Abdul Hamid Sheikh died in different encounters with the Indian Security Forces.
National Conference inside the Shergardi Police Station in presence of some senior police officers including Mr. Watali. Ashfaq Majeed Wani a brilliant student and athlete who had been denied admission to medical college because his parents could not afford the required bribe (a Maruti car), was detained on 23 March 1987, and subsequently charged with a crime allegedly committed on 4 April, on which date he was under police custody. Kept in solitary confinement, he was released nine months later, with cigarette-burns all over his body. Pir Mohammad Yousuf Shah alias Syed Salah-ud-Din, presently Supreme Commander of Hizb-ul-Mujahideen militant organization (and a veteran Jama'at-i-Islami activist), was actually a MUF candidate in a Srinagar constituency (his third foray into electoral politics) in 1987. He was arrested from the counting hall for the crime of taking a lead, and put away for nine months without charge or trial. Convinced that the "slaves have no vote in the so-called democratic set-up of India", he picked up the Kalashnikov in 1990. The intelligence reports of various agencies also suggest that a majority of Kashmiri youth who crossed over the Pakistan controlled Kashmir following the rigged elections were actually supporters of the Muslim United Front (MUF).

The persistent policy of denying Kashmiris the right of democracy resulted in the boycott of the 1989 Lok Sabha elections. The militant organisations in the appeal through handbills had conveyed clearly that "no one should come out of his house as we want to show the world that people of Kashmir do not believe in the finality of accession to India nor (do) we have any faith in Indian parliamentary democracy". As a result of the boycott call, no other opposition party dared to field its candidates in any of the three constituencies in the Valley. The National Conference won all the three seats from the Valley and from Srinagar its candidate was elected unopposed. In the Jammu region the two seats went to an independent candidate. The boycott against these elections was so complete that an Indian political analyst commented.

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61 Mehraj, n. 58.
63 Interview in the Illustrated weekly of India, 10-16 October, 1992.
64 Zaidi, n. 51.
65 The Statesman, Delhi, November 17, 1989.
the only point left to be determined about the farce that goes by the name of the "elections" held in Kashmir Valley ... is that whether the turn out of the votes was four per cent as claimed by the official quarter or that it actually was only two per cent." The leading English newspaper of the state 'The Kashmir Times' pleaded after this election: let the image of Indian democracy not be tarnished further in Kashmir. Thus faith in the sanctity of the ballot had been completely shattered. Therefore, tempering with the democratic and electoral process in Kashmir has undoubtedly been a major factor, though not necessarily a causative one, towards growth of anti-Indian militancy in the Valley.

Eruption of Militancy in Kashmir

Kashmir had witnessed politics of protest and separatism earlier also but it used to be in defence of the perceived threat to its identity and it generally manifested itself either in the form of hartals or demonstrations. Even some times some minor militant groups were also formed but these militant groups could not survive for long as they failed to mobilize large scale mass support. It is for the first time in the post-independence era that the Kashmiri separatist movement took recourse to violent upsurge since late 1980's. In order to understand the causative factors of this present turmoil in Kashmir, it is mandatory to focus attention on certain varied issues which have contributed to the growth and evolution of such a great phenomenon.

(1) Inherited Legacies

The roots of the current crop of militancy in the state also lie in some of the legacies of the past. Two such legacies, one of the Plebiscite Front and the other of Alfatah are particularly relevant.

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The seeds of militancy were sown by the erstwhile Plebiscite Front during its 22 years of political existence. The basic objective of the Plebiscite Front was to press for the demand of holding a plebiscite under the auspices of United Nations to decide about the future of the state. However, the accord of 1975, resulted in disbanding of Plebiscite Front but one section of the organisation continued to pursue the cause of Plebiscite Front who were against the changing role of Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah.

The legacy of Alfatah and other militant organizations was no less serious. Past cases of espionage, bomb blasts and even hijacking of planes had left their mark on the mental make-up of Kashmiri youth. In the Kashmir Valley during the six year period from January 1965 to January 1971, no less than 80 underground cells and espionage rings operated including Alfatah, Al Baro and Al Kashmir. During this period, 281 (303) rifles, 309 guns, 8 sten-guns, 4 light machine-guns, 44 revolvers, 431 hand-grenades, 66(2'/) motar shells, 5 automatic rifles, 65 bayonets, 117 detonators, 30 bombs, 2 rocket-launchers, 3 wireless sets and 1,600 lbs, of explosives were recovered by the police. This list would show the extent to which separatist activities continued even after the Indo-Pak war of 1965, and the Tashkent Declaration of 1966.

Alfatah emerged a well-knit militant organisation with a plan to 'liberate' Kashmir by resorting to armed struggle. Alfatah derived its name from an Arab guerilla organisation committed to the liberation of Palestine. It alludes to a Qur'anic verse which implies "assistance from God and imminent success". But who was really behind the idea of creating this outfit, is shrouded in mystery. However, there are strong reasons to believe that Alfatah was also the brain child of Plebiscite Front leadership, as several prominent leaders of Alfatah were known close confidents of Mirza Mohammad Afzal Beigh. This organization commenced its

69 Jagmohan, n 46, p. 159.
70 Mehraj, n. 58.
activity in 1966. Gradually its ranks swelled. By 1969, it had become a full-fledged organization with a political wing and with a well-planned strategy of economic and militant subversion. With the arrest of some youth in bank dacoity case in 1971, police found some important clues about the activities of the organization and its activists. Large scale raids were conducted all over the state and about 250 youths were arrested. One Ghulam Rasool Zehgir was said to be Chief of this underground organization which had drawn a detailed programme of subversive activities on a large scale. The other prominent leaders of this militant organization were Nazir Ahmad Wani (then a director of agriculture in state government), Mohammad Fazlul Haq, Dr. Farooq Ahmad Bhatt, Dr. Abdul Alla and Mohammad Altaf Khan alias Azam Inquilabi, now-a-days one of the prominent separatist leader. The police had seized a diary which Zehgir had maintained about the plans of Alfatah and its members enrolled by him. It helped police bosses to nab all the activists of organization without giving them any chance to escape from their hideouts.

Alfatah was responsible for three major incidents of militancy in Kashmir, namely, (i) attacking and killing a constable Charandas of Border Security Force at Nawa Kadal bridge on February 13, 1967; (ii) dacoity on April 1, 1970, at Tehsil Education Office, Pulwama, from which about Rs 72,000 was looted; and (iii) Hazaratbal bank dacoity on January 2, 1971. during the course of which Rs 97,000 was looted. Besides these three incidents, the hijacking of Indian Air Lines plane in 1971, is also described the handiwork of this organisation.

Another incident of militancy in Kashmir took place in 1968, when a group of Kashmiri youth from Gandhi Memorial College tried to start an armed struggle in the state. The said group forcibly entered the Islamia College premises in the dead of night and tried to steal some rifles from the N.C.C. room of the college. They were arrested and later on the case came to be known as ‘Islamia College Conspiracy Case’.

71 Jagmohan, n, 46, p. 160.
Meanwhile, inside the jail, the central leadership of Alfatah got divided into two groups. One group led by Ghulam Rasool Zehgir was pro-Plebiscite Front leadership while the other headed by Nazir Ahmad Wani was deadly against the Plebiscite Front leaders including Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah who was Chief Patron of the Front. Towards the end of 1973, when Beig-Parthasarthy dialogue started, all the arrested activists of Alfatah were released on bail. The two factions which emerged inside the jail became two political parties when the leaders of these two groups were released. One led by Zehgir was called Awami Inquilabi Mahaz (People’s Revolutionary Front) and other headed by Nazir Ahmad Wani came to be known as People’s League. After the 1975 Accord, the group led by the Zehgir was wound up and its members were either included into government services or given other favours.

On the other hand People’s League emerged as the main anti-accord youth organization. It held a number of demonstrations against the accord and its members played an active role in making the bandh call given by former Pakistani Prime Minister Z.A.Butto, against the signing of the Kashmir Accord, a great success. The League’s prominent leaders included Nazir Ahmad Wani, Hamidullah Butt, Azam Inquilabi and Shabir Ahmad Shah. Later the League also got divided into two groups on the issue whether it should strive for an Islamic state or Islamic socialist state, the later coinage then being popular among the pro-Butto youth. Azam Inquilabi left the League and along with other like minded people formed the Islamic Students Organisation (ISO) which later on was rechristened as Islamic Jama’it-i-Tulba. Islamic Jama’it-i-Tulba was known as the militant students wing of Jama’at-i-Islami. Most of the youth of this organization who were the active supporters of Muslim United Front

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72 Ibid.
73 Azam Inqilabi was one of the prominent militants in Kashmir but has presently given up the militancy line. Now-a-days he has formed his own political party Mahaz-e-Azadi. Similarly, Shabir Ahmad Shah, a prominent separatist leader has also formed his separate political party known as Jammu and Kashmir Democratic Freedom Party.
74 Verma, n.6, p. 74.
(MUF) in 1987 elections, crossed over “Azad Kashmir” for the training of arms and ammunition and immediately after their return launched a massive militant movement in Kashmir under the banners of different militant organizations.

The Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF) is another organisation which since its inception has been engaged in militant activities in the state of Jammu and Kashmir. In 1964, Mohammad Maqbool Batt, Amanullah Khan and Farooq Haider formed the JKLF. Mohammad Maqbool Bhatt was the first person who realized the necessity of resorting to armed struggle for the “liberation” of Kashmir. During his first arrest in 1966, the police recovered from him a “declaration of war on India”. In 1967, a group of intellectuals mostly teachers were arrested from the Gandhi Memorial College for having established links with Mohammad Maqbool Batt. This group of teachers was considered to be the “core group” of the JKLF, in this part of Kashmir. In 1971, when ‘Ganga’ the Indian Airlines Fokker Friendship aircraft was hijacked to Pakistan, Maqbool Batt was waiting at Lahore airport to receive the hijackers. In November 1977, the JKLF sent the Indian High Commissioner in Britain N.G.Goray a tape recorded message threatening to kill him if Maqbool Batt was not released. The front is believed to be responsible for the killing of Indian diplomat Ravindira Mathore in Britain. Following his killing Batt was hanged in Tehar Jail on 11 February 1984. He was arrested then for having allegedly killed an officer of Intelligence Bureau in border district of Baramulla in North Kashmir. Commenting on his killing Abdul Gani Lone observed, Maqbool is the first martyr on the question of Kashmir’s accession.

Apart from sending different letters and memorandums to various international forums like the United Nations, Non-Aligned Movement meetings, Summits of the Islamic countries, Amnesty International and Asia Watch just to draw their attention

75 These were some of the documents prepared by his group related to plans of carrying out anti-India activities.
76 Verma, n.6, p. 74.
77 India Today, February 29, 1984.
towards Kashmir problem, the JKLF also staged an anti-India demonstration in 1982, when Mrs. Indira Gandhi was in Copen-Hagen and again in March 1982, in London, when she arrived there for the inauguration of Indian festival.

In the ongoing militant movement the JKLF was the first to strike. Amanullah Khan, the JKLF leader revealed in an interview to the Jung, that it was after 18 months of secret preparations that the JKLF struck on July 1, 1988, by exploding eight bombs in Srinagar. In September militants of this organization fired at a senior police officer, Ali Mohammad Watali and a retired session judge, Neel Kanth Ganjoo (he was later on killed in an another attack), who had sentenced Maqbool Batt to death.

2. Public Corruption

It is clear that no people can be won over by just bribing the so-called leadership, it as a matter of fact has an opposite effect of creating corruption, nepotism and favouratism which results in discontent of masses and therefore, anarchy. The policy of the central government vis-à-vis Kashmir was characterized by inaction: action to be taken only by then the situation was getting out of hand. There was rampant corruption as a result of this, there was utter dissatisfaction in the state of Jammu and Kashmir.

The corruption in Kashmir was so endemic that its occurrence was viewed with cynical forbearance. It had benumbed the body and the soul. Construction of spacious and costly bungalows and farmhouses by the politicians, businessmen and bureaucrats, their life-style and conspicuous consumption, the proliferation of Marutis like ants on the roads, and the low yield of taxes, were all indications of large scale corruption prevailing in the state. But practically nothing was done to eliminate it. The messy river of corruption continued to flow with uninterrupted ugliness.

It is the culture of public corruption that makes the administration inhuman as well as costly. "Fundamentalist and secessionist" Trends, witnessed in Kashmir during the last few years, are to some extent, reaction to the culture of corruption, callousness and consumerism. The discontentment of the public on account of corruption undermines the image of the government and swells the ranks of the "fundamentalists and secessionists". Corruption has been always viewed as a model to bring about national cohesion in a pluralistic society even by some sociologists and political scientists. According to them, the device could be efficacious in integrating a part threatening to secede from the country. However the same corruption model adopted by the government of India misfired in case of Kashmir. The unjust system perpetuated by successive rulers resulted in the present situation, where for India, it has become a matter of recapturing and re-conquering Kashmir. It was probably because of this that great thinker St. Augustine advocated that unjust ruler should be killed, it was obviously the best way to prevent things from drifting towards a revolution.

Farooq Rehamani, former Chairman of the People's League and a prominent separatist leader had been propagating for years, "What to speak of the outsiders, even our own people are treating us like sheep and plucking our wool mercilessly". When Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad was eased out of office under the Kamraj plan, on January 30, 1965, a commission of inquiry was set-up, under the 'Jammu and Kashmir Commission of Inquiry Act 1962', to inquire into the allegations of corruption against Bakshi and his family. Justice Ayengar constituted a one man commission. The inquiry was first of its kind in the post-independent India. Schedule II of the report of the commission contains 38 allegations of corruption against Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad. However, it is sufficient for the purpose of the present study to reproduce the allegation no.7 of the schedule in extenso: Bakshi


Ghulam Mohammad and his relatives as mentioned in part A of the schedule I, who were persons of modest means in 1947, had by 1963, acquired vast assets and pecuniary resources valued at about rupees one and a half crores (1½ crores), and this process of acquisition was facilitated by the abuse of his official position, or by exploitation of his family, friends and other relatives, with his knowledge or connivance of his official position as Deputy Prime Minister and later as Prime Minister of the state of Jammu and Kashmir (as he was then called the Prime Minister). The commission assessed the role of public servants in these words, “The most saddening and depressing of the materials placed before me were the affidavits of the officials who confessed to have knowingly done improper acts extending even to tampering with official records to the prejudice of the state and the state property and monies in carrying out the desire or order of Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad to benefit him or his relatives”. 82 This was an expose of just one political family in Kashmir.

The return of Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah after 1975 Accord, raised many hopes. In fact, Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah on his return, took a pledge to clean the system. His first task after assuming the reigns of power was the announcement and that too repeatedly, of the threat of doom’s day for corrupt officials in the state. He retired 25 important government officials including some heads of departments for having dubious reputation during the very first year of his Chief Ministership. 83

However, Sheikh Abdullah soon discovered that neither was the social atmosphere congenial for such a change nor was his own party ready for such a “hazardous and unprofitable enterprises”. Thus he himself took advantage of the situation and during his reign of power the corruption acquired new fungus and depth in the state of Jammu and Kashmir. From 1975-1981, Sheikh Abdullah’s known immovable assets were estimated to be worth more than Rs. twenty Crores

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82 Ibid.
(Rs. 20,00,00,000). This is what Abid Hussain has recorded in his book, ‘Life of Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah: An Open Book’. His assets were mainly in the shape of illegal-occupied government lands of the highest commercial values in the state and a series of palatial buildings that have come up over these lands. These buildings have been constructed with the money and materials obtained from contractors working with government departments.  

In April 1981, a team of central income-tax officials visited Kashmir and conducted raids on big business houses to unearth black money. Afraid of getting exposed, the leaders of the National Conference launched a massive campaign against these raids and declared it a conspiracy of the centre to undermine the special status of Jammu and Kashmir guaranteed under the constitution. These officials of income tax department were humiliated and even physically attacked. Some of the officials were later airlifted back to Delhi with fractured legs and bruised bodies. Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah instead of encouraging the raids, took it as a conspiracy to finish him politically. He felt extremely annoyed and expressed his resentment. There was no doubt that Sheikh had become a protector of capitalists and racketeers who had unmerited gains through dishonest means and the honest practices and laws were meant only for the un-influential poor people: Sheikh Abdullah and his family considered themselves above law. Farooq Rehmani of People’s League has described this incident in his book by saying that, “while the general public in Kashmir had become very happy about the income tax raids, Sheikh Abdullah became worried and created hurdles in their way”. Against these raids the National Conference appealed to the people to observe a bandh, which was however, not responded.

After taking over as Chief Minister of the state, Farooq Abdullah took some important steps for the eradication of corruption from the public life. He removed some
officials and even dismissed a few members of the cabinet against whom there were some serious allegations of corruption. However, this “honesty” could not last long. He did the same like his predecessors and that too in a more sophisticated way. During his tenure as Chief Minister, corruption assumed dangerous dimensions. In a public statement on July 16, 1988, G.M. Shah alleged, “Dr. Farooq Abdullah has a fleet of motor vehicles of latest models, valued Rs 32 lakhs of which only one motor-bike is worth 73,000. I demand that the Chief Minister should indicate the source of income from which he purchased these vehicles”. But there was no response. Like the other leaders of Kashmir, G.M. Shah is equally responsible for the promotion of corruption in the state. In March 1988, Shah himself disclosed in a public statement, that he had paid Rs 1 lakh to the Awami Action Committee Chief Moulvi Farooq, for securing his help in getting Muzaffar Shah elected from Srinagar city parliamentary constituency in the December 1984, Lok Sabha elections. While it was generally believed that G.M. Shah was speaking the truth, still no one dared to ask him where from he got this amount.

Thus after earning in abundance by the malpractices of politics and misuse of official positions, there emerged a neo-rich class in the society. This neo-rich class consisted of politicians, top bureaucrats and big businessmen. This neo-rich class of the society has grown economically so strong that they provided the best of education to their children, manipulated the admission of their kith and kin in professional institutions, absorbed them in the best of government jobs and gave huge dowries to their daughters in their marriages. On the other hand, the honest and hardworking class of the society who were burning their blood in order to earn their living, got poorer because of the exploitation by these rich drones. They were living in dilapidated houses, their children could not get admission to professional colleges in spite of their merit, their entry was banned in the job market because they could not either pay amount to the ‘concerned managers’ or there was no one to recommend

88 Jagmohan, n. 46, p. 201.
89 Ibid.
90 Hajini, n. 80.
their cases. Moreover, their daughters waited endlessly for the grooms because they were not in a position to pay huge dowries.\footnote{Ibid.}

Thus the corrupt model applied by the government of India in the state of Jammu and Kashmir for national cohesion, became highly disintegrative as it resulted in the emergence of social inequalities because of the complete misuse of official positions by the local governing classes. The unending exploitation by the local elites over the common Kashmiris forced them to think in terms of some other means because there was no peaceful way to make an end to this kind of situation. Therefore, the phenomena of public corruption generated a widespread disillusionment among the people and resulted in their alienation from the Indian nation and thus worked to the advantage of anti-India forces.

3. Discriminative Attitude of the Central Government and Non-Development of the State.

In almost all important areas, which are related to the development of Kashmir and welfare of its people, the attitude and approach of the government of India, by no means, has been laudable. This is why the living standard of the people of Kashmir is very poor in spite of the fact that Jammu and Kashmir state is having a considerable wealth of natural resources. But because of the central governments apathy and lack of technical know-how, the state is not in a position to explore these resources. The proper use of these resources could have proved best in raising the living standard of the people and also in creating more and more employment opportunities for the unemployed youth, a good number of whom declared war against India in the early 1990.

For the purpose of making plan allocations out of general resources, the states of India have been divided into special and non-special categories on the basis of the formula evolved by late V.N.Gadgil in 1969. Those states which were placed under 'special category status' get central plan assistance for their plans in the form of 90
per cent grants and 10 per cent as loan. The states in the ‘non-special category’ get just 30 per cent of the plan assistance as grants and 70 per cent as interest bearing loan. Jammu and Kashmir has been placed under the first category along with Himachal Pradesh and other hilly states. But the irony is that Jammu and Kashmir continued to receive plan assistance as 70 per cent loan and 30 per cent grants. As a result of this unfair treatment, the central debt to Jammu and Kashmir went up to Rs 2,032 crores till March 1987. It was supposed to pay about Rs 200 crores annually towards loan and interest installment, a burden which the state could not bear. Similarly in the matter of assistance from external organizations like the World Bank, too Jammu and Kashmir has been denied a fair deal. Out of some three hundred World Bank assisted projects, the state’s share has been just three up to 1987.

After the independence of India, much attention was paid towards the industrialization of the country. But performance varied from the region to region. Some regions experienced fast industrialization while others have lagged behind. Jammu and Kashmir state also fell behind. An indication in this effect is available in the per capita value added in manufacturing sector across regions. This value in 1986-87, for the state was estimated at Rs 22.4 against 1025.6 in Maharashtra, Rs. 754.8 in Tamil Nadu and Rs. 539.9 for the country as a whole. The discrimination of the centre towards the state of Jammu and Kashmir can be seen from the following table:

92 It was only after the eruption of militancy that state of Jammu and Kashmir was provided plan assistance as 90 per cent grants and 10 per cent loan. But the arrangement soon turned out to be a mere Jugglery. The centre introduced institutional finance as a resource to plan. This meant that 30 per cent of funds would come from such government of India’s (GOI) institutions as NABARO, LIC and Rural Electrification Corporation (REC) by way of loan. The rate of interest on these loans is commercial and these are available to any body. This rate is higher than what GOI would charge on its loans to the state in the pre-special category status. The state turned out to be a net loser under this arrangement. Even its plea to give this kind of dispensation to the state with retrospective effect from 1969, was rejected in the full planning commission meeting held under the chairmanship of Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee on June 27-29, 2001. This could have waved the accumulated debt to the state to tone of Rs 1200 crores. See the Kashmir Times July 1, 2001, also Greater Kashmir. August 17, 2001.
Table 2.1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>S.No.</th>
<th>Name of the State</th>
<th>No. of factories</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Maharashtra</td>
<td>13075</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Uttar Pradesh</td>
<td>6669</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Punjab</td>
<td>4713</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Haryana</td>
<td>1885</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Bihar</td>
<td>1284</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The authorities of the state government claimed that they had recognized as many as 23,700 small scale units till April 1987, which according to them were providing employment to more than one lakh people. But about 60% units were sick and no sustained effort was made which could have saved the deteriorating conditions of this important sector.

As far as factory employment is concerned, the state of Jammu and Kashmir was largely discriminated. This discrimination has been illustrated in the following table:

Table 2.2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>S.No.</th>
<th>Name of the State</th>
<th>No. of persons employed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Uttar Pradesh</td>
<td>6,85,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Bihar</td>
<td>3,73,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Punjab</td>
<td>2,10,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Haryana</td>
<td>1,36,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Jammu and Kashmir</td>
<td>21,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


A glance at the relevant record of the central government will show that thousands of crores of rupees have been invested for the development of industries in
public sector in various states in India but in Jammu and Kashmir state, the investment on this account is ridiculously low, not exceeding few million rupees in two nominal public sector undertakings styled as Indian Telephone Industry (ITI), and Hindustan Machine Tools (HMT) watch unit, with equally nominal employment potential. Together these two units employed 1,600 persons and had an annual production of Rs 16 crores till 1987. This formed less than 0.01 per cent of the total investment of Rs 50,000 crores throughout India. Similarly, there are only 19 public sector corporations, out of which 9 relate to the industrial sector. Except 3 corporations — DISCO, SICOP and SRTC which for some time showed marginal profits, all other suffer losses worth crores of rupees every year.

The State of Jammu and Kashmir possesses a considerable hydel potential and can generate about 15,000 MW power. But due to some restrictive clauses of the Indus Water Treaty between India and Pakistan, any kind of storage on any of the rivers in the state is strictly prohibited. The treaty therefore, restricted the state of Jammu and Kashmir to generate electricity from its own water resources and thus causes it an annual damage of Rs 6,000 crores.\textsuperscript{93} Despite such a heavy loss, no sort of compensation has been given to state. The centre contends that it had invested about Rs 540 crores in the first phase of Salal, yielding 3,315 MW power. The fact is that Jammu and Kashmir received only 80 MW power from Salal. The rest is going to central kitty. In order to meet the immediate power crisis in the State, the government decided to install 75 MW gas turbine in the Srinagar by December 1989. Besides this, a large number of other measures were announced to ensure a smooth supply of electricity in the state. But the only rise was in the power tariff and this met with a lot of resistance from the people resulting in some innocent killings. Most of the population of state derives its sustenance from pursuit in agriculture and other allied sectors. But because of the poor infrastructure and poor supply of electricity, these sectors are not showing good results.

As far as power consumption is concerned, disparity can be shown from the following table:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>S.No.</th>
<th>Name of the state</th>
<th>Power consumption per capita</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Jammu and Kashmir</td>
<td>9.1 KW/hrs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Haryana</td>
<td>238.0 KW/hrs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Punjab</td>
<td>300.5 KW/hrs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Uttar Pradesh</td>
<td>524.0 KW/hrs</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Statistical Digest 1976-77 and 1985-86.

During the last four decades, the literacy has risen to only 27 per cent. Despite such a low literacy rate, still most of the educated youth who came out from various educational and professional institutions, fail to get jobs anywhere in the state. The state economy during the last few decades has also not witnessed a satisfactory growth rate which would have helped in the gainful absorption of most of the educated man-power. According to the live register of employment exchanges, the number of unemployed matriculates by the end of 1986, had reached a figure of 26,559. The number of unemployed graduates in the same period reached to 10,689, and that of post-graduates to 2,866. In case of professional education, the number of unemployed engineering graduates in the state had increased from 166 in 1977, to 433 in 1986. Today unemployment seems to have beaten all the records and it seems quite impossible for the government to control this kind of menace. It is quite obvious that the majority community of Kashmiri Muslims who constitute the backbone of the 'revolutionary' militancy are discriminated not only in All India Services but in State Services as well.

94 "Education—Employment Linkages, some observations from Jammu and Kashmir State",

Paper presented by Dr. R.L. Bhat at Srinagar in a National Seminar on 'Polity, economy and society' on October 31, 1989.
The given below tables shows representations of different communities in the state government services as well as in the state owned enterprises. The data in these tables will highlight how far Kashmiri Muslims are true when they claim that they are discriminated in their own home state.

Table 2.4
A Brief Summary of Figures of Employees Working in Government Departments as on 01-07-1987

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>S.No.</th>
<th>Category of services</th>
<th>Hindus</th>
<th>Muslims</th>
<th>Sikhs</th>
<th>Others</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Gazetted</td>
<td>6,307</td>
<td>5,140</td>
<td>717</td>
<td>159</td>
<td>12,323</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Non-Gazetted</td>
<td>49,705</td>
<td>73,780</td>
<td>5,555</td>
<td>2,136</td>
<td>1,31,176</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Inferior</td>
<td>14,370</td>
<td>32,011</td>
<td>1,010</td>
<td>1,469</td>
<td>48,860</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>70,382</td>
<td>1,10,931</td>
<td>7,282</td>
<td>3,764</td>
<td><strong>1,92,359</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2.5
Percentage of Each Community in Employment of Government Departments of the State as on 01-07-1987

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>S.No.</th>
<th>Category of services</th>
<th>Hindus</th>
<th>Muslims</th>
<th>Sikhs</th>
<th>Others</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Gazetted</td>
<td>51.18</td>
<td>41.71</td>
<td>5.82</td>
<td>1.29</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Non-Gazetted</td>
<td>37.89</td>
<td>56.24</td>
<td>4.23</td>
<td>1.64</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Inferior</td>
<td>29.42</td>
<td>65.52</td>
<td>2.06</td>
<td>3.00</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2.6
Percentage of Employment and the Percentage of each Community

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of the community</th>
<th>No. of employees in Govt. services</th>
<th>Percentage of Employment</th>
<th>Percentage of population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hindus</td>
<td>70,382</td>
<td>36.59</td>
<td>32.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslims</td>
<td>1,10,931</td>
<td>57.65</td>
<td>64.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sikhs</td>
<td>7,282</td>
<td>3.79</td>
<td>2.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>3,764</td>
<td>1.95</td>
<td>1.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,92,359</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.00</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.00</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Table 2.7

Number of Employees Working in State-owned Corporations Undertakings/Autonomous Bodies and Banks as on 01-07-1987

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>S.No.</th>
<th>Category of services</th>
<th>Hindus</th>
<th>Muslims</th>
<th>Sikhs</th>
<th>Others</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Gazetted</td>
<td>1,115</td>
<td>1,160</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2,381</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Non-Gazetted</td>
<td>6,201</td>
<td>11,065</td>
<td>1,123</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>18,499</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Class IV</td>
<td>3,082</td>
<td>6,508</td>
<td>272</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>9,928</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>10,398</td>
<td>18,733</td>
<td>1,499</td>
<td>178</td>
<td>30,808</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## Table 2.8

Percentage of Employment and the Percentage of Population

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of the community</th>
<th>No. of employees</th>
<th>Percentage of Employment</th>
<th>Percentage of population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hindus</td>
<td>10,398</td>
<td>33.75</td>
<td>32.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslims</td>
<td>18,733</td>
<td>60.80</td>
<td>64.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sikhs</td>
<td>1,499</td>
<td>4.87</td>
<td>2.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>178</td>
<td>0.58</td>
<td>1.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>30,808</td>
<td><strong>100.00</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.00</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## Table 2.9

Community-wise and Category-wise Percentage and Number of Employees

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category of services</th>
<th>Hindus</th>
<th>Muslims</th>
<th>Sikhs</th>
<th>Others</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gazetted</td>
<td>1,115</td>
<td>1,160</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2,381</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage</td>
<td>46.83</td>
<td>48.72</td>
<td>4.37</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Gazetted</td>
<td>6,201</td>
<td>11,065</td>
<td>1,123</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>18.499</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage</td>
<td>33.51</td>
<td>59.82</td>
<td>6.08</td>
<td>0.59</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class IV</td>
<td>3,082</td>
<td>6,508</td>
<td>272</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>9,928</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage</td>
<td>31.04</td>
<td>65.55</td>
<td>2.75</td>
<td>0.66</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Table 2.10

Employment of Different Communities in Officer's Category in Central Government Establishments in Kashmir as on 01-01-1989

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>S.No.</th>
<th>Category of service</th>
<th>Community</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Officer</td>
<td>Hindus</td>
<td>1,613</td>
<td>83.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Officer</td>
<td>Muslims</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>6.89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Officer</td>
<td>Sikhs</td>
<td>161</td>
<td>8.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Officer</td>
<td>Others</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>1.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>1,928</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 2.11

Employment of Different Communities in Clerical and Non-Gazetted Services of Central Government Establishments in Kashmir as on 01-01-1989

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>S.No.</th>
<th>Category of service</th>
<th>Community</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Clerical</td>
<td>Hindus</td>
<td>4,043</td>
<td>79.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Non-Gazetted</td>
<td>Muslims</td>
<td>662</td>
<td>12.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Staff</td>
<td>Sikhs</td>
<td>320</td>
<td>6.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Staff</td>
<td>Others</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>1.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>5,100</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 2.12

Employment of Different Communities in class IV Category in Central Government Establishments in Kashmir as on 01-01-1989

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>S.No.</th>
<th>Category of service</th>
<th>Community</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Class IV</td>
<td>Hindus</td>
<td>5,622</td>
<td>72.87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Class IV</td>
<td>Muslims</td>
<td>1,212</td>
<td>15.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Class IV</td>
<td>Sikhs</td>
<td>560</td>
<td>7.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Class IV</td>
<td>Others</td>
<td>331</td>
<td>4.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>7,715</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: These tables have been prepared on the basis of the information provided by Saif-ud-Din Soz in the *Economic and Political weekly*, March 31, 1990.
Thus in the light of aforementioned facts and figures, it can be safely concluded that the irresponsible and discriminative attitude of the government of India towards Kashmiri people might have definitely forced them to think in terms of separatism or secessionism.

4. Impact of Communal Violence

Another menace that vitiated the atmosphere in the Valley, was the steady rise of Hindu communalism in almost all parts of India. Communal rioting had become endemic, with Muslims being the main sufferers and the police often appearing supportive to the Hindu rioters. The communal strife in Poonch on 21 July 1988, on the burial ground of Muslims spread to other towns like Mandi, Mendur, Surankot, etc. and took the lives of two innocent people. In most of the villages, the religious places of the minority were destroyed and also suffered arson and looting. Similarly there was communal trouble in Doda when a police sub-inspector tried to stop some Muslims from slaughtering a cow. This was strongly resisted and described as an intervention into the religious affairs of Muslims.

The ‘Ojhari’ camp blast in Pakistan on 10 April 1988, in which a large number of Pakistanis were killed, had an adverse affect over this part of Kashmir. It was discovered that the camp had been secretly used as a depot for ammunition meant for Afghan mujahideen. The mourning processions were taken in Srinagar in which the anti-India and Pro-Pakistan slogans were raised. A major loss was incurred to the belongings of minority community. The death of Pakistani President (General Zia-ul-Haq), in an air-crash on 17 August 1988, was mourned in almost all the parts of Kashmir.

By the end of 1988, the situation in Kashmir had considerably deteriorated. The communal violence in Rajouri and the Buddhist agitation in Ladakh in which the

95 Verma, n.6, p. 227.
96 Correspondents Reports, “ISI and Changeover Afghanistan”, View Point (weekly), Lahore, 1 June 1989, p. 9.
97 Verma, n. 6, p. 228.
Muslims were the soft targets from both sides, made the Kashmiris to think seriously about their safety and security in the future. The aggressive rise of Hindu communalism and the country-wide killing of Muslims after the demolition of Babri mosque, openly with the connivance of police further strengthened their belief and they increasingly felt that their salvation lies in secession from India. On the other hand the trembling statements of Hindu communal leaders of India further provoked the Kashmiri people especially the Muslim youth when they said that they (Muslims) have no place here in India. Bal Thakrey, the leader of Shiv Sena had audacity to say that the people who are not loyal to India must vacate Kashmir and go elsewhere.  

Thus different communal acts and activities both inside and outside the state, have had a tremendous impact on the psyche of Kashmiri Muslim youth and this played a decisive role in their alienation from India.

5. Fears About The Erosion of Autonomy

The Hindu Fundamentalists have always been inimical towards the special status conferred on the Jammu and Kashmir state under Article 370 of the Indian constitution. They consider the instrument of the accession executed by the Maharaja of Kashmir in 1947, as an instrument of conquest. Balraj Madhok in his book “Rationale of Hindu state” prefers to maintain that India’s claim to Kashmir is not only based on the instrument of accession (signed by the Maharaja), but also the right of conquest. When some of the Hindu fundamentalist organizations launched a massive campaign against the special status of Jammu and Kashmir granted under Article 370 and pressed for its complete abrogation, Prime Minister Nehru had said more than once that it will erode away, and it has, indeed, been eroding away. Nehru was right as the state’s National Conference Flag was wrapped up. The Sadar-i-Riyasat was re-designated as Governor and the Wazir-i-Azam as Chief Minister like in all other states. Nor were these changes confined to nomenclature and symbols.

98 Syhamdalla Paliwal, “Avenging a Betrayal”, One Nation Chronicle.
Within two years after the adoption of the state constitution in 1957, the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, the Planning Commission, the Finance Commission, the Election Commission, the Census Commission and the Comptroller and Auditor General was extended to the state. The old customs barrier was gone. The services were integrated. Jammu and Kashmir became a constituent of the Northern Zonal Council. All these decisions were taken by the government without any prior reference to the state assembly.100

The communalization of Indian politics and a unitarian approach to nation building created reverberations and fear psychosis in religious minorities especially Kashmiri Muslims. The melancholy cry of BJP which is the political arm of Hindu revivalist groups has been the abrogation of Article 370 of Indian constitution. In its important convention held at Udhampur Jammu in the first week of March 1989, the BJP sought the abrogation of Article 370. The BJP Vice President K.R.Malkani maintained that when his party asks for the abrogation of this article, the reasons are psychological and not constitutional. He said the fact that Article 370 apparently gives special status to any state, creates a divisive atmosphere in the country, it encourages some Kashmiris to think that they could also opt for Pakistan, it also encourages some other states to ask for a special status. The fact that the special status state is also the only Muslim majority state puts a premium on communalism in the country.101

The Bhartiya Janata Party, for the second time since the independence marched upon Srinagar during its Ekta Yatra.102 This yatra which started from Kanyakumari to Kashmir, was taken out by Bhartiya Janata Party President Dr. Murli

101 Ibid.
102 The Rashtriya Jana Sangh and its state affiliate the Praja Parishad conducted the Kashmir agitation in 1953. Jana Sangh president Dr. Syama Prasad Mukerji, launched the agitation by entering state without the then required entry permit. He was arrested for violating the permit system. He died in jail under mysterious circumstances.
Monohar Joshi. This was as he said to ensure the abrogation of article 370. This *yatra* created a fear psychosis among the people of Kashmir as it was linked to the notion of colonizing the Valley with Hindus so as to change its demographic character. Even Dr. Farooq Abdullah criticized the *yatra* and said that BJP was concerned only about the land but not people of the Valley. The BJP's hysterical opposition to article 370 has a long lineage, and *Hindutva* communalists have played a destructive, divisive and characteristically reactionary role in the state's politics for decades. This kind of situation also contributed to a growing feeling of alienation and anger in Kashmir.

6. New Developments in the International Arena

New developments in the international arena, too, had a tremendous impact on the Valley especially on the youth. The success of the Iranian revolution might have definitely given some sort of confidence to some Kashmiris that if the people of Iran can overthrown the Shah, why can't the Kashmiris 'liberate' their mother-land from the Indian control. The word *mujahideen* (holy warriors) became international currency in the eighties when they were depicted as committed guerrillas risking their lives against the godless Soviet supported regime in Afghanistan. For this reason, they were given the most sophisticated weapons by the United States of America via Pakistan. The Palestinian liberation movement, the liberation movement of Tamil Elm, the signs of Eastern Europe freeing itself from Soviet domination and later the break-up of the mighty Soviet Union itself into several independent nations also contributed to the alienation of Kashmiri people and thus strengthened their separatist feelings. Since the situation in the valley was quite ripe as some of the Islamist forces had already indoctrinated the youth of the Kashmir about the possible

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106 Ajit Bhattacharjea, n. 2, p. 255.
threats posed to Islam by different forces especially the Hindu communalists. The Jama’at-i-Islami had established its youth wings and had also enrolled about 17,000 students in 125 schools of various categories. Some of them were ready to fight against the ‘illegal occupation of Kashmir by India’, as they were already very much annoyed because of the aforementioned reasons.

Meanwhile, the Jama’at-i-Islami had been a constant supporter of General Zia- ul-Haq. His assumption of power over a decade heralded an era of Islamic revivalism which had a lasting impact on the minds of geographically close and emotionally vulnerable Kashmiri people. General Zia was toying with the idea of pan-Islamism. In his own words, the concept of pan-Islamism can be implemented step by step beginning with putting the bilateral relations among the Muslim countries on a new footing between Pakistan-Sudia Arabia, between Pakistan-Jordan, between Pakistan-Indonesia, between Pakistan-Iran and coordination between Pakistan and Afghanistan.

Pakistan had virtually remained a natural rival of India in its dispute over Kashmir ever since the partition of the sub-continent in 1947. The United Nations had also left the Kashmir problem to be resolved bilaterally between India and Pakistan. But the bilateralism could not work in case of Kashmir. So Pakistan was always in search of an opportunity to take advantage of the situation and that opportunity was very much prevailing inside the Kashmir. Thus she began to think seriously about the strategy of training the Kashmiri youth to fight a guerrilla war on behalf of Islam against India.

7. Pakistan Factor

No analysis of present situation in Kashmir will be complete unless the ‘Pakistan factor’ is carefully explored. The political upheaval in East Pakistan and

India’s direct military intervention in it gave rise to 1971 war between the two countries. This war lasted for about two weeks and resulted in the surrender of Pakistani troops and emergence of Bangladesh. Thus the war ended on 17 December with a spectacular victory of India. This time Kashmir was not an issue but it was affected by the peace negotiations.\textsuperscript{110}

The advantage gained by the Indian army was lost by its civilian masters as they could not succeed in achieving India’s long established policy objective of converting the ceasefire line of Kashmir into an agreed International Border. Pakistan’s immediate concerns were to secure the withdrawal of Indian Troops from its territory and the release of its 93,000 prisoners of war. Bhutto succeeded in convincing Prime Minister Indira Gandhi that if he accepts the demand of converting ceasefire line of Kashmir into an International Border, it will be seen at home equivalent to surrender and will seriously undermine his position. Bhutto told her (Indira Gandhi) that Pakistan was now convinced that it could never win a war with India, that Kashmir was lost. \textit{Bharosa keejiye} (trust me) Bhutto pleaded.\textsuperscript{111} The relevant paragraph of Shimla Agreement signed on 3 July, 1972 between Zulfkar Bhutto and Mrs. Indira Gandhi reads:

\begin{quote}
\textit{In Jammu and Kashmir the line of control resulting from the ceasefire of 17 December 1971, shall be respected by both sides with out prejudice to the recognized position of either side. Neither side, shall alter it unilaterally, irrespective of mutual differences and legal interpretations. Both sides further undertake to refrain from the threat or the use of force in violation of this line.}\textsuperscript{112}
\end{quote}

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{110} Ajit Bhattacharjea, n. 2, p. 233.\\
\textsuperscript{111} Akbar, n. 14, p. 179.\\
\textsuperscript{112} Shimla Agreement on bilateral relations between India and Pakistan signed by the P.M. Indira Gandhi and President Bhutto in Shimla on July 3, 1972, Part II. (For full text see Shimla Agreement in appendix IV).
\end{flushright}
Bhutto was even able to insert a reference to the UN into the text as well one to further discussions on, among other matters, 'a final settlement of Jammu and Kashmir'. This way the future of the state was left wide open.

Thus the Shimla Agreement of 1972, could not mark the end of Kashmir dispute. In fact, it imposed an obligation on both the governments that the two Prime Ministers should meet to work out the final settlement of Jammu and Kashmir state. That is one reason why Pakistan continued to refer to Kashmir problem as the major irritant in Indo-Pak relations. In his first broadcast to the nation after signing the Shimla Agreement, Z.A. Bhutto asserted his country's determination to 'take revenge', to put right the humiliation inflicted upon her by India. He also referred to Indo-Pak confrontation as a confrontation of 1,000 years. During his visit to Beijing, Bhutto declared on May 29, 1976, that advance from normalization of relations to peaceful coexistence between India and Pakistan could be achieved only after a settlement of Jammu and Kashmir dispute. Z.A.Bhutto reiterated that he signed the Shimla Agreement for safeguarding Pakistan's immediate national interests and never for a moment did he resign from the position that the final solution of Indo-Pak relations lay in the acceptance of the UN General Assembly resolutions on Kashmir.

It was late Zia-ul-Haq who took a categorical position that Kashmir is a Muslim majority area and therefore, it should become a part of Pakistan. Zia again and again emphasized that Kashmir is the *shah rag* (aorta) of Pakistan policy. He often reiterated that both India and Pakistan should stick to the two UN resolutions of August 1948 and January 1949. Pakistan under his leadership never missed any opportunity to raise the question of Kashmir in different international forums.

It is believed that the process of instigating of local Kashmiri youth was started under an effective strategy formed by the late President General Zia-ul-Haq

113 Bhattacharjea, n 2, pp. 233-234.
114 Chopra, n. 108, p. 100.
around mid 1980's. In this regard it is said that General Zia had worked out a plan called “Operation Topac” in April 1988, for nurturing local ‘insurgency’ with the objective of liberating Kashmir from Indian ‘domination’. General Zia did not find much sense in the earlier “ham-handed” military options. He instead decided to exploit India’s internal vulnerabilities. The new strategy which was entrusted to the Field Intelligence Unit (FIU) of the Pakistan army, played a significant role in the ‘eruption of militancy in Kashmir’. The General Zia is supposed to have spelt out details of the operation during a high level meeting held at his palace in April 1988. The main portion of General Zia’s reported speech reads:

*Gentlemen, I have spoken on this subject at length before. Therefore, I will leave out the details. As you know due to our preoccupation in Afghanistan, in the service of Islam, I have not been able to put these plans before you earlier. Let there be no mistake, however, that our aim remains quite clear and firm — liberation of the Kashmir Valley — our Muslim brothers cannot be allowed to stay with India for any length of time now. In the past, we had opted for ham­handed military option and therefore, failed. So, as I have mentioned before, we will now keep our military option for the lost moment as a 'coup de grace' if and when necessary. Our Kashmiri brethren in the valley, though with us in their hearts and minds, are simple minded folk and do not easily take to the type of warfare to which, say, a Punjabi or an Afghan takes to naturally against foreign domination.*

The General continued:

*The Kashmiris however, have a few qualities which we can exploit. First his shrewdness and intelligence; second, his power to*

116 Verma, n. 6, p. 209.

117 This operation was named after Topac Amin, an Inca prince, who fought a non­conventional war against Spanish rule in 18th century Uruguay

persevere under pressure and third, if I may so say, he is a master of political intrigue. If we provide him means through which he can best utilize these qualities—he will deliver the goods. Sheer brute force is in any case not needed in every type of warfare, especially so in the situation obtaining in the Kashmir valley, as I have explained earlier. \)

The major components of this three-phased “Topac” plan were as follows:119

**Phase 1**

Promote a low-level insurgency against the state government, so that it is under siege, but does not collapse and fall under central rule.

Place chosen men in all the key positions to subvert the police forces, financial institutions, the communication network and other important organizations.

Whip up anti-India feelings amongst the students and peasants, preferably on some religious issues, in order to enlist active support for rioting and anti-government demonstrations.

Organise and train subversive elements and armed groups with capabilities initially to deal with Para-military forces located in the valley.

Adopt and develop means to cut off lines of communication between Jammu and Kashmir and within Kashmir and Ladakh by stealth, without recourse to force. The roads over Zojilla up to Kargil and over Khardungla were to receive special attention.

In collaboration with Sikh extremists, create chaos and terror in Jammu and divert attention from the Valley at a critical juncture and discredit the regime even in the Hindu mind.

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Establish virtual control in those parts of Kashmir Valley where the Indian army is not located or deployed. The Southern Kashmir Valley may be one such region.

Phase 2

Exert maximum pressure on the Siachen, Kargil and Rajouri-Poonch sectors to force the Indian Army to deploy reserve formations outside the main Kashmir Valley. Attack and destroy base depots and headquarters located at Srinagar, Pattan, Kupwara, Baramulla, Bandipora and Chowkiwala by covert action at a given time. Some Afghan mujahideens by then settled in Azad Kashmir, will then infiltrate in the selected pockets with a view to extending areas of influence. This will require detailed and ingenious planning. Finally a special Force under selected retired officers belonging to Azad Kashmir, with the hard core consisting of Afghans, will be ready to attack and destroy airfields, radio stations, block Banihal Tunnel and Kargil-Leh Highway. At a certain stage of the operation Punjab and adjoining areas of Jammu and Kashmir will be put under maximum pressure internally by offensive posture.

Phase 3

Detailed plans for the liberation of Kashmir Valley and establishment of an independent Islamic State in the third phase will follow. In the event of any serious trouble, the Chinese and other friendly powers were expected to come to their rescue. At the end of his speech the late President Zia-ul-Haq said:

_I wish to caution you once more that it will be disastrous to believe that we can take on India in straight context. We must, therefore, be careful and maintain a low military profile so that the Indians do not find an excuse to pre-empt us, by attacking at a time and at a point of their own choosing at least before phase 1 and Phase 2 of the operation are over. We must pause and assess the course of operations after each phase, as our strategy and plans may require drastic changes in certain circumstances._
The question whether the aforesaid plan was genuine or not is indeed very important, but it will not be easy to answer it either way. The Pakistani government has strongly denied the existence of "Operation Topac" and said that it was a handiwork of the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) of the government of India to blame Pakistan for the happenings in Kashmir.\(^{120}\) Pakistan has strongly denied any kind of role in promoting violence in Kashmir. In view of the charges and counter charges leveled against each other by India and Pakistan, it seems to be quite immaterial whether such a plan was conceived and executed by Pakistani agencies or it was merely model or scenario worked out by the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) or any other branch of Indian government. However, one thing is very much clear that Pakistani authorities have accepted to be providing moral, political and diplomatic support to the separatist movement in Kashmir which according to them is purely indigenous and spontaneous one. This in fact has been one and the same policy of all most all the governments of Pakistan and confirms the belief that Pakistan's involvement in Kashmir crisis cannot be ignored.

Thus from the above mentioned facts it is quite clear that the situation in Jammu and Kashmir is not merely the result of the "proxy war" or "terrorism" from across the border as claimed by India. It has two sides—both internal and external—which essentially are mutually inclusive. The accumulated discontent that goes at the root of the crisis has been the outcome of the combination of the number of factors discussed above. Pakistan has only exploited the situation by providing necessary means to the rebelling young Kashmiri Muslims and this gave rise to armed militancy in Kashmir.

Thus finally the militancy was launched in 1989-90. This militancy received a massive public support. Not only the common Kashmiri Muslim but also the government employees, the police and even some top bureaucrats supported the separatist slogans raised by different separatist militants.\(^{121}\) The militant upsurge of

\(^{120}\) Jagmohan, n. 46, p. 410; Verma, n.6, p. 221 and see also Chopra, n 108, p. 115.

\(^{121}\) Marvah, n. 29, p. 67.
1989-90, in Kashmir was so sweeping that only in its first instance it broke down the intelligence network of India in the state and rendered the administrative machinery entirely dysfunctional. The situation reached to a point where from it became a question of re-establishing Indian state’s writ over Jammu and Kashmir.

The constant fighting between militants and Indian security forces gave rise to a war like situation where death and destruction became order of the day. In this kind of situation there was no aspect of life in the state that remained unaffected. Thousands of the people were killed and innumerable turned physically disabled. Besides this property worth billions of rupees got destroyed. A large number of houses and even localities have been ravaged during encounters or exchange of fire between the Indian security forces and the armed militants. Not only this, a large number of population especially Kashmiri Pandiths were rendered homeless.

After the eruption of militancy, the state witnessed a complete breakdown of administrative machinery. There was virtually no government functioning in the state and it came under the ‘governance’ of either militants or security forces. The situation reached to such a point that the Chief Minister had to resign and the state was brought first under Governor’s and then under Presidential rule which lasted for nearly seven years. As a consequence of large-scale violence, all pro-Indian political parties became dormant in the Valley. Many of their leaders either fled the

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122 The exact number of killings is not available. There is a huge difference between the official figures and that of the separatists. By the end of 2001, according to police a total of 30,384 souls including 3,327 police and security personal, 12,701 civilians and 14,356 militants perished. However, it is being disputed not only by separatists who say around 80,000 stand killed but also by the Chief Minister Dr. Farooq Abdullah. Kashmir Times, January 29, 2002.

123 Marvah, n. 29, p. 10.

124 The Governor’s/Presidential rule over the state of J&K started from January 1990 and came to an end only after the State Assembly elections were held in October 1996. Almost all the separatist forces asked the people to boycott these elections and one separatist conglomerate Hurriyat Conference even launched a door-to-door anti-poll campaign to make the process a big failure. Like all other elections (except that of 1977), the fairness of the 1996 assembly elections has also been challenged.
Valley or announced their retirement or dissociation from the politics. Some of them took a pro-militant stand.

Initially the militant movement sought to achieve the single objective of 'liberating' Kashmir from the dominion of India but immediately differences cropped up on the issues like secularism and theocracy among separatist militants which resulted in the division of the separatist movement. These issues which were the result of the controversy over the questions like 'independent Kashmir' (propagated by a militant outfit Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front JKLF) and merger of Kashmir with Pakistan (propagated by another militant outfit Hizb-ul-Mujahideen), created such a discard among the separatist militants that they not only traded charges but also mounted offensive against each other resulting in clashes frequently. In this conflict they were joined by other militant organisations whose number was increasing alarmingly. These inter-group clashes, which spread throughout Kashmir took not only hundreds of precious lives but also destroyed property worth crores of rupees. This animosity between these militant groups diminished some support of Kashmiri people towards them. In order to deal with this kind of situation internally and also to gain support for the Kashmir cause externally, All Parties Hurriyat (Freedom) Conference (APHC) was formed.

All these and other related developments which took place inside the state of Jammu and Kashmir after the eruption of militancy in general and impact of the same on Indo-Pak relations in particular have been dealt comprehensively in the proceeding chapter.

125 Marvah, n. 29, p. 108.