CHAPTER – X

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The international conflict not only varies in degree, but it is also a multi dimensional phenomenon. This is determined apart from the psychological factors, by economic, political, military, technological and other related developments. The normalizations of relations becomes important in the context of conflicting states. The normalization of relations is one of the processes undertaken to minimize and undo conflicts between nations.

The conflict among different nations, between two Germanys, Korean, Vietnam are obviously examples of initial estrangement and eventual rapprochemas. In all these cases one can notice a strenuous course of normalization of relations. Even in the case of India-China and India-Pakistan the breakdown of relations after 1962 in respect of India and China and since the partition of India into Hindustan and Pakistan in respect of India-Pakistan the conflict and strenuous course of normalization process could be seen.

In the preceding chapters an attempt was made to describe and analyse the important causes of the conflict between India and China, and India and Pakistan and relations among these three countries using a triangular approach.
Coming to India-China relations, India and China had good relations before the war of 1962. The period of 1950s can be characterized or summarized as the period of harmony and cooperation between these two. But later Tibetan revolt and road building in Sinkianag area escalated tension between two and it was resulted in the crucial event that is 1962 war.

In the conflict between India and China relations and normalization, there are several internal and international factors which are impeding and assisting normalization process. The normalization is impeded because of internal factors like, border problem. Border problem remains to be a crucial question between these two to be resolved. This was unresolved because of both having different views. Secondly the Chinese support to insurgency in Nagaland and Mizoram, which affects the integrity of India itself. Lastly the Defense Budget wherein two countries give place for more expenditure, created tension between India and China.

The international factors like, the Chinese ambition to dominate Asia, its relation with India’s enemy Pakistan, and also rivalry arise due to India occupying prominent position in non-alignment. It has become sore eye to China. Factors which assist normalization of relations are, the change in foreign policies of India and China, the importance of domestic public opinion, the perceptions of leaders.
changed, the necessity of economic development, which are of internal or domestic nature on the other hand the international factors like systemic changes in system, the end of cold war between nations, large extent reduced tensions and diplomatic negotiations, change in international outlook of India also assist towards normalization of relations.

De Castro, Renato Cruz in his article in ‘Issues and Studies’ published in 1999 May-June issue examined the prospects of Sino-Indian relations came to the conclusion that “geography, history and their status as regional powers has put a curse on the two countries – the curse of an ‘enduring rivalry’. Therefore these countries are bound to pay the price of this curse”. This was of course an instance of an entire genre of writing also in evidence since the turn of the country, which generally proceeds from the assumption that the chief characteristic of the relationship is power asymmetry, which operates on a zero sum basis. It is this characteristic which, so runs the argument, effectively choked the possibility of any significant convergence of interests – regionally or globally. The rational for such assessments are easily located in the course of this relationship since the mid-1950s. Few would contest the view that till the turn of the century, the nature of Sino-Indian relations had been shaped by two defining events, the border conflict of October 1962 and the Indian nuclear tests of May 1998. The first jolted the relationship out of a somewhat
idealistic/romantic and possibly unsustainable framework and brought triangular balance of power politics into play, as the PRC embarked on its "all weather friendship" with Pakistan with the objective of keeping India under the pressure of a threat on two fronts. It is possible to argue that had the Pakistan factor not been deliberately injected into the Sino-Indian equation, the bilateral issues would have been sorted out earlier than they were. The second event redefined the strategic contours of not just Sino-Indian relations, but the Asian subcontinent as well. It coincided with the post-Soviet economic (re)globalization of international relations, wherein both India and China were attempting to keep their bilateral equation stable even as both were readjusting their relations with the major powers as also with the sole super power, the US.

However, what analyses such as the one cited above tend to downplay, if not entirely discount, is the apparent rapidity with which Sino-Indian relations have moved from a stagnant, though tension-ridden, state of cold peace, to a dynamic and multidimensional engagement, the centerpiece of which is rapidly increasing trade. The tendency to evaluate Sino-Indian relations within a 'conflictual' framework, has an overly deterministic flavour and appears to prejudge as it were, the fundamental nature of this relationship. It is also somewhat less convincing at a time when more than a decade of confidence building has transpired, during which a comprehensive set
of mechanisms and procedures have been laid down and are, by now, well established to address the dispute in question. An entire structure of dialogues at different levels and of diverse kinds – political, strategic, defense, economic and finance – has evolved, with the objective of resolving such misunderstandings and addressing such issues, as arise from time to time, with speed and dispatch. These achievements are the basis on which this analysis has asserted that the core issue of contention between India and China, the disputed boundary, has moved into the post-conflictual stage. In other words, if current trends continue, force is unlikely to be used to settle the ongoing dispute – the prospects for the outbreak of hostilities are not generally seen as very high with the declining salience of the purely military perspective as the main shaper of perceptions.

Historically, there are few, if any such instances, wherein two countries, which have had a border conflict leading to a complete breakdown of contact, have managed not only to prevail over “the curse of geography and history” but advanced in the direction of jointly visualizing a constructive and cooperative framework for their role in a rising Asia and sculpting a global vision, in as short a time span as these two Asian giants. This is largely the outcome of the resurgence in interdependencies between India and China, driven by the forces of globalization and accelerated by information technology. Thus, if there is a framework, which convincingly captures the overall current
scenario, despite the backdrop of strategic uncertainty, it is, one of building bridges/synergies and deepening détente by focusing on the common ground and by accepting that even as both nations are pursuing their respective national interests, the growth of each is based on accommodating the other’s needs and emergence.

As mentioned at the every outset, if the achievements garnered since the beginning of the 21st century are taken into account, they add up to an impressive picture. But it is essential to bear in mind that what we see today, is the outcome of a process that has evolved over a period of time, in a manner that can best be described as incremental. In one of his visits to India in early 1985, speaking about Indo-US relations in an interview to a news magazine, Henry Kissinger had said that, “the foreign policies of great nations like ours and yours are determined by certain realities which confine possible changes to certain limits”. This could equally apply in the India-China context – and therefore brings up the question whether we have reached those limits. As mentioned in Chapter V, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s visit in January 2008 was almost self-reflexive in its tone and tenor – it conveyed a sense of a pause in the political momentum of the high-achievement visits of the recent past. This should be neither surprising nor unexpected, given that both China and India at this point are positioned very differently, both vis-à-vis each other and in the external arena. But this does not ipso facto imply, ‘thus far and no further’. The
process of incremental engagement testifies to the fact that it has also been one of attempting to push beyond, what appeared to be the limits of the relationship at any given point in time. Setbacks and tension-ridden situations notwithstanding, the trend has been in the forward direction. There is an evolutionary continuum, in built in the logic of incremental engagement, which lends a dynamic edge to the process, so that it also continually factors in the changing reality. Looking at the series of visits since 1996, which have consciously pushed and shaped the nature of the political engagement, it is striking that they all have been high on achievement. More importantly, they have brought the relationship to a stage when summit meetings and regular high-level exchanges must acquire, if they have not so far, a normalcy, detached from the expectation of a breakthrough on each occasion. As has been argued earlier, it is this interaction that has shaped the politics of Sino-Indian engagement and promoted bilateral understanding. To approach each visit with a mindset of high expectations is to be unmindful of the fact that the 'possible changes' have to proceed within 'certain limits'.

To make the point clearer, if we take the post-1976 period, since the re-establishment of diplomatic relations between India and China, all high-ranking visits between them (keeping in mind their respective domestic, regional and global contexts), have resulted in a decisive and substantial transformation in the India-China relationship. Rajiv Gandhi's landmark 1988 visit ended the decade long stalemate or even
stagnation, that had followed the first breakthrough, i.e., resumption of diplomatic ties, by putting the contentious issues on the backburner and pushing other aspects of the relationship forward. Li Peng's visit in 1991 inaugurated the phase of managing bilateral tensions through the mechanism of confidence-building measures, concretized in the Agreement on the Maintenance of Peace and Tranquility in the Border Areas which was signed during Narasimha Rao's 1993 China visit. It was however the 1996 visit by Jiang Zemin, which by taking an unambiguously and publicly, as far as Pakistan was concerned – neutral position vis-à-vis the Kashmir problem, which initiated far-reaching consequences. His visit may also be assessed in terms of the effort to sharpen the focus on the Sino-Indian relationship in South Asia. It also resulted in the Agreement on Confidence Building Measures in the Military Field. Pokhran-II in May 1998 – and the nuclearisation of the South Asian subcontinent – brought about a strategic reconfiguration, but also a brief rupture, in the understanding that was building up between India and China. Prime Minister Vajpayee's letter to US President Clinton and the verbalization of the Indian apprehension with respect to China, produced inevitable discordant strains. It impelled China to briefly discard its neutral stance in the Kashmir problem during the Indo-Pak war in Kargil in 1999. Indian President Narayanan's June 2000 visit followed by Premier Zhu Rongji's visit in 2002, once again consciously attempted to close the
Pokhran-II chapter and we witness the commencement of yet another transition in the nature of the relationship as economic factors began making their presence felt. With Vajpayee's June 2003 visit to China, some meaningful movement on the India-China border was finally visible. The two countries appointed Special Representatives, whose mandate was to "explore from the political perspective of the overall bilateral relationship, the framework of a boundary settlement". This decisive step, acknowledging the necessity of a political solution to the border as well as stressing the need for a final solution in the spirit of mutual accommodation and adjustment in many ways, had not only brought bilateral understanding on the verge of a qualitatively new phase, but also enabled the two countries to break free of strictly bilateral confines. There are certainly differences in the approaches and expectations of both sides regarding the boundary settlement; there are quietly likely somewhat different strategic calculations; the discussions are not likely to reach a speedy conclusion. But, peace and tranquility continued to be maintained in the border areas, which has rendered them remarkably tension free. More crucially, the border is no longer the sum and substance of the relationship.

Nonetheless, the time is certainly more than ripe for a debate on the issue of the disputed boundaries among different sections of opinion across the country. This debate should take into account this new thinking, with a view to counter old stereotypes and formulate
imaginative proposals towards a possible final settlement that the ruling elite in both countries appears so clearly desirous to achieve. It would not be too far fetched to suggest that the appointments of the Special Representatives and the intention to arrive at a political settlement implied that both countries were ready to reach a settlement, which would have redrawn the maps somewhat. Possibly, India was hoping for a settlement along the existing status-quo. This certainly is the message that appears to come out of the undoubtedly most strategic proposals on the boundary – the 2003 Agreement on the Guiding Principles. In the period immediately following, there was tremendous optimism regarding an early settlement and then inexplicably, there was yet another setback. Since the discussions are out of the public realm, there is much speculation in the mass media in India – mostly of the negative mind – and the question is whether this is desirable. The inability to reach a settlement strengthens the belief that the main dispute now concerns Tawang, which is non-negotiable, from India's perspective. This has led to the suggestion that the settlement be postponed indefinitely. Others speculate on the possible consequences of sorting the matter, even if it implies conceding more than we bargained for. Still others think that a new generation would be able to push through a final settlement. The plethora of views only shows the complications attendant on letting the issue simmer on the backburner – it has less heat, but it is nevertheless a burner. And by being
indefinitely postponed, undoubtedly, the eventual settlement is in some danger—and for that reason it could become dangerous.

The situation calls for thinking of new and innovative solutions. The focus on territorial boundaries has obscured the fact that India and China are not mere nation-states but civilizational-states. Leaving aside the populated areas, on which the 2003 Agreement is very definite, there are vast areas which have never been demarcated. Among other things, we need to look at boundaries not as fixed, inviolable, sacred lines, which have to be militarily defended against any violations, but in terms of ‘spaces’ or ‘frontiers’, where historically peoples, ideas and cultures have circulated and interfaced. Borders of contention, tension-ridden peripheries and militarized boundaries not only disrupt these interfaces but also the livelihood of the communities residing in these spaces, whose vital lifelines are dependent on cross-border flows and permeability. There are issues both of the marginalized groups and their entitlements and also overall state stability and security. There is of course a caveat here—‘spaces’ are essentially cultural notions and any intervention that occurs here is primarily a cultural phenomenon. It is thus important that these spaces emerge as zones of cultural confluences, not clashes. The shift from the territorial imperative to the political imperative is only the first step for it is only this shift that can facilitate the emergence of new solutions. Such a shift signifies, among other things, a rise of modernity in foreign policy and diplomacy. In our
case, that is no less important than ‘resolving problems left over from history’.

Being positioned differently in a vastly transformed scenario, also implies that both China and India need to reinvent or redefine if you will, the nature and dimensions of their relationship and interaction. The earlier approaches – primarily bilateral prisms, nationalistic outlooks or power perspectives – are actually fallacious and not simply inadequate, in terms of explaining the complexity of the relationship in the wider globalizing context. To begin with, there is the question of their respective rises. Commonplace in the international discourse now, the notion of ‘rise’ has never been precisely formulated and usages tend to veer between economic and political/power implications. China and India have been described as “planet powers as well as world powers” but ‘rise’ is still loosely used to explain what is fundamentally an economic phenomenon. Here there are obvious differences in the way China and India are perceived. The ‘rise of East Asia’ and China’s centrality to the processes of economic integration there, its far larger share in global trade and the attention it has drawn in recent times in connection with its pursuit of energy and other resources, have brought a more increase critical focus on China’s rise and its implications in the West. The aspects invariably singled out are the authoritarian nature of the state in China and uncertainty as regards its actual intentions. Would China be a ‘responsible stakeholder’ in the international system
or bide its time to emerge as the primary challenge – to and eventually replace – the US and would it do so peacefully or otherwise. India on the other hand presents a far more engaging proposition with its impressive economic growth and democratic credentials and more importantly, no fundamental conflict of interests vis-à-vis the US. A caveat may be introduced here – there are still fairly sharp debates as to China and India’s actual and potential capabilities and that the rise of India and China is not a conclusive certainty – within these countries, as also outside, there are several experts who have convincingly established that there still are formidable domestic challenges ahead. From the perception of most Asian states, the rise of India and China would be the strongest and most enduring argument for the rise of Asia – hence it is important that both steer absolutely clear of competitive power politics in the region. There should not be a dividing line between China and India in all Asian sub-regional theatres, which would put these countries in a position of having to make a choice.

The mutual perceptions of India and China in this regard as well, are of equal if not greater significance. To the extent that they differ from the prevailing (mainly western) perceptions, they would symbolize their strategic economy and independence. At another level, these perceptions cannot also be disaggregated from the larger political and economic processes shaping the different regions cumulatively. Chinese analysts have noted that for "a long period, India and South
Asia were not priorities in Beijing’s foreign policy agenda”. Subsequently, Chinese perceptions began to reflect an awareness of India’s emergence, if not rise, but are not unduly worried about it. To start with, there was a tendency to “dismiss India as a poor competitor, citing the many problems facing the country, such as poverty, poor infrastructure, and a sluggish bureaucracy”. The last ten years have seen a gradual interest in the emergence of India wherein due note is being taken of India’s regional and global assertiveness, its defense modernization and the growing Indo-US ties. Of all the components that contribute to India’s growing profile however, it is the economic aspect, which appears to impress the Chinese, specifically the IT sector and software technology. Strategically and militarily, the Indian capabilities are not of the order that can pose a challenge, and politically, while this “democracy with Indian characteristics, quite different from that of Western countries”, is “respected” by the Chinese, they are “not inclined to admire or copy it”. Finally, India is seen as one of the three major Asian powers (along with China and Japan) but, internationally, “India’s status is relatively low and its influence limited”. On balance, it is not India’s rise per se, but the role of extra-regional powers and the manner in which India would seek to address its security concerns, that could be potentially problematic.

The general discourse of China’s rise in India, by and large does appear to shift somewhat from what is typically seen in the west. The
focus appears to be not so much its potential impact on the global balance of power although that also occupies strategists, but its implications for India’s relative power position. In the periodic threat assessments, which emanate from within certain sections of the defense and strategic community in India, the China threat has been an enduring feature. In their assessments therefore, China will, to a greater or lesser degree, be a threat – rise or no rise. The fact is that both countries are on the rise, simultaneously, although, having commenced on their reforms more than a decade earlier than India. China’s achievements have been far more prominent and have had a greater impact on the global scene. There are fundamental differences as well in the nature of their respective rises and there is also a significant asymmetry in terms of overall power, but there can be no doubt that whatever be the paths, they will have a profound impact on both regional and global equations. It is also important to keep in mind that this rise is taking place in a globalizing world and even as the forces of globalization are assisting the rise they also simultaneously constrain it. This is evident if we simply take into account the various levels at which economic integration is taking place among nations or the range of non-traditional threats that transcend sovereign boundaries which have emerged. Equally, befitting its status as an emerging major power, India would have to give a credible demonstration of thinking
globally and therefore, serious thought to the formulation of a global policy.

It has been stated earlier, that over the last decade and more, the politics of Sino-Indian engagement has gradually moved beyond the management of bilateral problems. One implication of this assertion is that greater interest will devolve on how they will manage their interaction involving third parties as well as their interface in the multilateral settings, which are increasingly numerous and complex. How they manage their outstanding bilateral problems are likely to generate comparatively less concerns, with the exception of the China-Pakistan relationship, which continues to cast military shadows on India-China relations. In the post-Soviet period, the PRC changed its pronounced tilt towards Pakistan to a more even-handed approach vis-à-vis the subcontinent since the mid 1990s, and was concretely demonstrated in 1996 and then during the 2001 Kargil war. But this balance is likely to be put to severe tests, particularly where there are power implications. It would certainly be of considerable interest to observe China’s stance on the question of India’s nuclear status.

It could be said that there is a positive dimension as well to the “take no sides” position – India has every reason to appreciate such positions as China might take, that do not endorse Pakistan’s maximalist position on the issue of Kashmir. By the time Premier Zhu
came to India in 2002, it appeared that China was realizing the implications and costs of using Pakistan. As both India and China improve their relationship and become more powerful – continuing that policy would be the surest way of getting embroiled in the South Asian quagmire. More importantly, although the Chinese had adjusted their obvious tilt towards the Pakistani position on Kashmir by the early 1980s, it was an unambiguous public position taken much later, which produced significant results. Ambiguities in critical areas – which includes the extent of China’s nuclear assistance to Pakistan – will only show the process of mutual accommodation, particularly as the global commitments of India and China enlarge. Of course, the key aspect is the Indo-Pakistan relationship and much hinges on the continuation of the peace process between them, which would not only further ease triangular dynamics but could possibly see both the US and China playing a positive role in promoting the process of change in Pakistan.

The period from 1996 to the present has witnessed an expansion in the Sino-Indian relationship, from being one solely focused on the bilateral bone of contention to a broader, multifaceted, multidimensional and multi-layered one. It bears repeating that this is the outcome of a broad-based consensus in both countries on the need to engage with each other. The range of views in India is more diverse, given the plethora of political parties and the greater public airing of views and contentious. The left parties have often been accused of at times
promoting Sino-Indian relations at the cost of India’s vital interests – the current debate on the civil nuclear cooperation with the US being a case in point. The manner in which the Left has opposed the deal with the US and the continuous interaction between the Communist parties in India and the CPC has also raised the speculation that there is some attempt by China to interfere in Indian domestic issues. This is likely to have an extremely unsettling impact in the strategic circles in India, with possibly some implications for the above-mentioned consensus.

In many ways, the present should also be seen in India as a period of ‘strategic opportunity’ vis-à-vis China. Some of the old ways of thinking and increasing, have to be firmly discarded and new and creative approaches, commensurate with this new stage in the relationship must be adopted – in the process, the apprehensions of each will have to be more sensitively and satisfactorily addressed by the other. Even as the processes of incremental engagement carry on, India will have to squarely address the challenge of understanding the many paradoxes that is the face of this new China. In the process, politics will – and must – play a central role. The achievements of the last decade and a half testify to the importance of the political. Talking about, and with China, is talking political.

It is believed that three Ts are very important in Chinese Foreign policy at present which are Tibet and Taiwan and Trade. Perhaps Tibet
issue is behind all these conundrums. China has far reaching geographic, strategic and political interests in Tibet. It is a place from where China can control the whole of South Asia and India in particular. Although India has already recognized Tibet as an integral part of People’s Republic of China but it is not comfortable with the preposition that India had given shelter to Dalai Lama and other Tibetans who fled Tibet in 1950’s. After five decades of peaceful struggle Dalai Lama too had adopted a defensive posture vis-à-vis China by surrendering the demand of Tibetan Independence. Now he speaks up for Tibetan autonomy under Chinese sovereignty. Still it seems that Tibet is the root cause between India and China and a reason behind uncanny Chinese behaviour.

Although China had never put forth any condition regarding Tibet but it seems as if some hitch is there, which implies that China would resolve boundary issue only when it feels comfortable with Tibet. If it is not so, it would keep border problem to continue and border talks to linger on without reaching to any conclusion. Recently there have been reports about Chinese plan to divert the Brahmaputra river for its own advantage is a very serious matter, but Indian leadership did not raise the issue during the Chinese President’s visit to India in November 2006. Officially there have been no comments from Chinese side also about the project, but if it is so it may hamper bilateral relations.
The ongoing Chinese military modernization programme whereby it conducted an anti-satellite missile testing in January 2007 is also a matter of concern for India. Although Chinese leadership has assured India that it was not directed against any country but still India’s security threats cannot be undermined. This can give rise to arms race in the region.

The year 2010 saw India and China celebrating the 60th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations. Premier Wen Jiabao visited India and participated in the closing ceremony of the Festival of China in India which will brought to a close the calendar of activities organized in both China and India to commemorate this occasion.

The six-decades of the India-China relationship behind Indians have a record that is chequered. We became arbiters of our national destinies from the date of India’s Independence and China’s liberation in the late 40s of the last century, inspiring many others in Asia and Africa to end colonialism and foreign domination. This was the time when India and China in a sense, rediscovered each other, understanding the potential of the synergy between two of the largest populated nations in the world on the global stage. The vision of our founding fathers is within our reach today as we regain our place in Asia and the world as leading global economies. The awareness of historical
contact between the two peoples of India and China created the basis for our well-intentioned attempt in the 1950s to build a new type of relationship based on Panchasheela, or the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence. It was an attempt which, however, faltered, telescoping into the troubled phase that enveloped our relationship in the sixties up until the mid seventies.

The leadership in both the countries understood the untenability of any sustained estrangement between India and China. The last three decades have been marked by well-intentioned efforts of exploration towards establishing the framework of a stable, peaceful, productive, and multi-sectoral relationship between India and China. Contradictions are sought to be managed, and the differences have been prevented an expanding bilateral engagement and building on congruence. There are elements of cooperation and competition that form the warp and weft of their relationship.

There are both challenges that the relationship confronted us with and also opportunities. As the Prime Minister of India has said, India and China will continue to grow, simultaneously, and our policies will have to cater to this emerging reality. For India, the situation is complex since China is not only our largest neighbour but also because China is today a major power in the world both from the geo-political point of view and the more current geo-economic point of view. In the world of
today, China is a factor in several equations and therefore, it is intellectually satisfying to see that scholarship in India is increasingly dedicated to looking more closely at all facets of China.

China’s rapid economic growth over the last three decades has been spectacular and riveting. It is now the second largest economy in the world with a GDP of roughly $5.5 trillion, China has begun to deal in the currency of global power and its economic success is impacting its foreign, defense and security policies. The appellation of assertiveness is frequently applied to China’s profile in global affairs today. The question that is always asked is whether India’s relationship with China will be one dominated by increasing competition for influence and resources, as India’s economic needs grow. It can be believed that neither of these countries has the luxury of seeing each other in antagonistic terms. The view that India and China are rivals is an over-generalisation and over-simplification of a complex relationship which encompasses so many diverse issues. The proposition of competition and rivalry should not be exaggerated in a manner that it overshadows the genuine attempts to manage and transact a rationally determined relationship.

It is true that divergences persist. India and China have a disputed border. There are legacies as well as lessons bequeathed by history. This is a complex problem and the cartographies that define
national identity are materialized in the minds of people in both countries. At the same time, these countries are making a serious attempt at trying to arrive at a fair, reasonable and mutually acceptable solution to the boundary question as the recent 14th round of the Special Representatives talks might testify. The absence of a solution to the question is not due to lack of efforts but arises from the difficulty of the question.

What also needs to be appreciated is that the India-China boundary is one of the most peaceful of all borders. They have in place a well organized set of confidence building measures to ensure peace and tranquility on the border. They are currently talking to each other on establishing mere such mechanisms. There is maturity of both sides to understand the complexity of the issue and to insulate it from affecting their broader relationship. This policy on both sides has paid dividends and has contributed towards reducing the possibility of conflict.

Another issue of concern is the management of trans-border rivers. Many of the rivers nourishing the plains of Northern India and also areas in North-east India arise in the highlands of the Tibetan Autonomous Region and are a source of livelihood and sustenance for millions of the people of both the countries. We are alert to reports of China damming trans-border rivers and have sought assurances from
China that it will take up action to negatively affect the flow of the rivers into India so that India’s rights as the lower riparian are not adversely affected. China has assured India that the projects on the Brahmaputra are run of the river projects and are not meant for storing or diverting water. India should look forward to working closely with China in this critical area of environmental and livelihood security.

There is then, the question of the China-Pakistan relationship. India firmly believes that a stable and prosperous Pakistan is in India’s interest, and India is not against Pakistan’s relations with other countries. It is agreed that relationships between countries are not zero-sum games, but India do not hesitate to stress her genuine concerns regarding some aspects of the China-Pakistan relationship particularly when it comes to China’s role in PoK, China’s J&K policy and the Sino-Pak security and nuclear relationship. The need for mutual sensitivity to each other’s concerns cannot be denied. The issue of giving stapled visas to Indian nationals from the state of Jammu and Kashmir arises in a similar context. Indians believe that the India-China relationship will grow even stronger as China shows more sensitivity on core issues that impinge on India’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. Let us hope this can be realized.

The global trend towards multi-polarity and a more even distribution of power has been accelerated by the recent global
economic crisis. While the immediate financial aspects of the crisis may have been addressed, its structural causes in terms of global imbalances remain unsolved. This provides an opportunity to India and China to work together. Our consultations within the G-20 have shown the way in this regard. Similarly, we have partnered well in BASIC (for the climate change negotiations), and in the BRIC grouping of Brazil, India, Russia and China. Such cooperation will also be strengthened on the important issue of UN Reform and that we will be able to build common ground on the issue relating to the expansion of this Security Council and India’s interest in permanent membership. In the immediate region in which both countries are located, Asia, as well, there is common ground between India and China on combatting terrorism and extremism enhancing maritime security, and on the need for a peaceful environment to permit the domestic economic growth and development of the two countries. An open, balanced and inclusive architecture to enable a transparent dialogue on these issues that concern security and stability in Asia is in the interest of both the countries.

As India and China continue to pursue their interests, and so long as their overwhelming preoccupation remains their domestic transformation, and both understand that this goal requires a peaceful periphery, it is essential that the elements of competition in the bilateral
relationship can be managed and the elements of congruence can be built upon.

India China Historical background and current realities were expounded by Sun Shihai of the institute of Asia Pacific studies of the Chinese Academy of social sciences, in his speech to the Asia Pacific Summit of Canada held at Vancouver October 13-14, 2004, he made out that the relationship between the two giant neighbours cannot be characterized as being competitive or cooperative. On issues where they have common interest they are cooperative, while on some issues where they have clashing interest they may become competitive. However competition does not mean conflict or confrontation. India and China have become less emotional and more mature and pragmatic. Geo economics in recent years has become important than traditional geo-politics and security concerns. Therefore it is imperative for both India and China to learn to have with peace and cooperation as it is well said “You can change friends but you can’t change neighbours”.

The relations between India and Pakistan have never been cordial as history reveals ever since Pakistan birth in 1947. Pakistan is India’s closer but the most difficult neighbour. The relations between the two countries have been full of tensions, conflicts and wars. The reasons for this state of permanent hostility could be divided into three broad categories. The first arose out of the Pre-partition controversies
between the Indian National Congress and the All India Muslim League, the two - nation theory and the demand for Pakistan. The rancour and acrimony left by that era has now been passed to the mindset of the leaders of the two countries and colours their vision while looking at one another. The passage of time has failed to wipe out the scare left by that phase of our subcontinents history. The second category of reasons arose out of the way the partition of the subcontinent had been implemented. The subcontinent had evolved into one integrated economic and political unit. The division of such a country on an arbitrary basis could not have been accomplished without leaving imbalances and inequities and grounds for complaints. The third categories of causes are related to the original two and are their direct outcome. They led to conflicts and three wars.

In Pakistan there was a general feeling that India had not reconciled herself to the partition of the country and would make an attempt to destroy her entity. Their political estrangement particularly in the years following partition was due to many and diverse problems created or thrown up by the partition of the Indian sub-continent which embittered in varying degrees the relations between the two nations even in the very formative phase of their relationship. More important ones among them are : (a) the problem of religious minorities in either nation, communal disturbances and heavy loss of life and large scale migration (b) the problem of evacuee property, both movable and
immovable left behind by the people leaving their respective nations, the question of recovery or compensation for it (c) river water disputes (d) the problem of division and distribution of assets and liabilities, debts and military stores at the time of partition (e) boundary disputes and (f) the issue of the Indian Princely States and their integration with either of the newly formed nations and the issue of Kashmir.

India and Pakistan relations are grounded in the political, geographic, Cultural and economic links between the Republic of India and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan. The two countries share much of their common geographic location but differ starkly in religious demographics. Diplomatic relations between two are defined by the history of the violent partition of British India into these two states and numerous military conflicts and territorial disputes thereafter. India and Pakistan have fought three wars in Kashmir and their conflict now contains the seeds of a nuclear holocaust.

Perhaps the biggest hindrance to bilateral relations is the baggage of history. Partition left behind two mutually hostile nations and bitter memories. Wars have been fought in 1947 – 48, 1965, 1971. The Kargil conflict took place in 1999. The two nations came to the brink of nuclear war in 2001. The thorny issue of Kashmir separates the countries. Pakistan claims Kashmir to be the core issue. Pakistan has often tied progress in bilateral relations to progress made on Kashmir.
Presently, differences over the questions of demilitarization and self-governance in Kashmir persist. Despite the joint declaration, the 'K' is not going to be overlooked in course of time. Cross-border terrorism is another major problem. India has accused Pakistan of aiding and abetting cross-border terrorism in India, especially in Kashmir. Pakistan has said that whatever is happening in Kashmir is a 'freedom struggle' which Pakistan morally supports. Bilateral talks have often been stalled due to terrorist attacks. Pakistan has denied that it supports terrorism. Despite Pakistani promises that it is not allowing terrorist groups to operate from its territory, India has claimed that the terror infrastructure in Pakistan remains intact. The fact that both countries have nuclear weapons and has increased the threat perception in South Asia. There are other bilateral disputes like the Tulbul project Sir Creek Stachen etc. Pakistan's ISI is reputedly setting up new bases in Nepal, Bangladesh etc. to carry out anti-India organizations like ULFA. The dominant role of the military in Pakistan is a hindrance. Despite the fact that democracy has been installed the influence of the army has remained intact. The influence of military has certainly contributed a lot to the war mania in Pakistan. The increasing Islamization of Pakistan as was evident from the happenings in Lal Masjid is a cause for concern for India. Extremist ideologies in Pakistan are spilling over to India. The use of international forum by Pakistan to raise bilateral disputes is on irritant. Pakistan is a prominent member of
the Coffee Club which has opposed India’s bid for a permanent seat in the UN Security Council. India was accused Pakistan of not properly implementing SAFTA and discriminating against Indian goods. Many criminals who are wanted in India have taken shelter in Pakistan e.g. Dawood Ibrahim. India wants them back whereas Pakistan denies their presence on its soil. There are differences in values between the two countries. One is a theocracy and often totalitarian whereas the other is secular and democratic. These differences may hamper progress towards better relations. Pakistan has remained an important part of the Chinese game plan. The growing interference of Pakistan in Nepal and Sri Lanka indicates that Pakistan has decided outrightly to undermine Indian presence in its neighbouring countries.

In the light of above divergent issues and disputes, efforts have been made since the beginning of the issue to normalize cordial and friendly relations between these two neighbouring countries both at national and international levels, both in one way, two way and multiple ways and efforts were also made to build confidence and mutual trust between these countries.

Over the last decade, the inter related issues of Jammu and Kashmir and Cross Border Terrorism have plagued the bilateral relations between the two countries. The twin issues brought the two countries to a situation in the Kargil War in 1999 and to an almost near
confrontation after the attack on the Indian Parliament in 2001. However, after the incident of 9/11/2001, the USA has forced Pakistan to soften the recalcitrant attitude towards India, which has led to the resumption of dialogue between the two countries to resolve the outstanding issues between them. It is said that the Pakistan Army will have no role in the policy of Pakistan if there is durable peace between India and Pakistan. Now, it has to be seen whether the Pakistani army can give up its traditionally hostile attitude towards India and reach a solution on the issue of Jammu and Kashmir, which is an integral part of India that would lead to peaceful relations between the two countries which still remains an elusive dream for the peoples of the two countries.

The fundamental point that needs to be constantly, kept in mind, when seeking solutions to South Asian issues, is a commonality of perception in both countries, and among leaders in both political spectrums, that culturally, ethnically and geographically they emerge from one large entity of an undivided India. As a result, confidence building measures that need to be put into force would have to be built upon these already existing perceptions among the masses. These measures would find relatively easier acceptance than trying to change popular positions on such contentious issues as Kashmir, the demarcation of borders or settlement of evacuee property.
Numerous Confidence Building Measures between the two countries have been undertaken in a top-down manner. But they have been unable to remove the mistrust that continues to dominate the thinking of the elite in both countries. A classical example is the perceptual difference that exists over Kashmir, despite both sides releasing the futility of war, particularly after signing the Simla Agreement. Pakistan believes Kashmir is the core issue in Indo-Pak relations and unless it is resolved there could be no meaningful progress. The resolutions are not mutually exclusive. On the other hand, New Delhi has held that Simla has to be viewed in the totality of mutual commitment and obligations that both sides undertook after the 1971 war. New Delhi draws attention to the manner in which the Shimla Accord was signed and argues that UN resolutions, over the years, are irrelevant to changed ground realities. It believes that Kashmir is symptomatic of overall Pakistani attitudes and perceptions in creating better relations with India.

There is a wide divergence of perceptions over the meaning of lasting peace between the two countries. New Delhi is looking for a comprehensive solution to all issues bedeviling bilateral relations, while Islamabad, spurred by domestic political pressures, has hitched its wagon to the resolution of the Kashmir issue. While India proposes CBMs as incremental steps to improve bilateral relations, Islamabad perceives that New Delhi’s present difficulties in Kashmir could be
utilized to wrench the state away from the Indian Union. If Delhi seeks a status-quo its solution for a more peaceful South Asia, Islamabad is determined to undermine the unity of India. The chasm in understanding has become wider over the years and it looks unlikely that Islamabad would give up its attempts to take over Kashmir, unless New Delhi is able to prove its dominance on the ground by resuming the political process.

China Pakistan and India form a triangle with convoluted relationships. Security in the region is shaped by the intertwining policies of all three powers. The policies adopted by one country have an immediate impact on and response from the other two. A review of the history of these turbulent relations reveals that, in the period following the establishment of diplomatic ties, China and India were on friendly terms. The first decade of their relations was based on the myth of Hindi Chini bhai bhai (Indians and Chinese are brothers), while Pakistan, with its pro-west orientation, tilted towards the US-led capitalist bloc. There was, therefore, limited co-operation between China and Pakistan during the 1950s. This pattern of relations changed drastically with the advent of the 1960s. The heydays of Sino-Indian friendship turned into open rivalry, which led to severe border clashes in November 1962. Pakistan, whose relations with India had never been cordial, was disappointed when its Western allies began aiming India on a Scale it thought was unjustified. However, it found in China, with its
new anti-Indian sentiments, a potential ally. Thus in the wake of the Sino-Indian border clashes, relations between China and Pakistan improved remarkably.

Some scholars view these changes as a significant development in the triangular relationship and argue that the friendship between China and Pakistan developed in the backdrop of their common enmity towards India. Once Sino-Indian relations started improving, the traditional warmth between China and Pakistan began to cool somewhat.

The traditional friendship between China and Pakistan will probably continue to exist in the same spirit seen now. Bilateral economic co-operation and cultural exchange are likely to increase. China, under heavy US pressure, may reduce its assistance to Pakistan in key areas, such as development of its missile and nuclear programmes.\textsuperscript{41} Beijing will most likely pursue its policy of peaceful co-existence, reduction of tension, and peaceful resolutions of all disputes, including the thorny issue of Kashmir, for greater economic co-operation. Chinese intervention in any confrontation between India and Pakistan is therefore, unlikely.

After analyzing the Triangular relations between India, China and Pakistan, it became pertinent to focus on Soviet and US factors in India’s relations with China and Pakistan in a broader framework.
India's relations with China in fact getting materialized since the early eighties. China as one of the three great powers was involved in the conflict between USA and USSR. It aligned itself with Soviet Union before the Sino-Soviet rift and was raising its voice against Capitalist countries in the West. India, though it not a party to this conflict, it certainly not free from its spill over effect. China's hostility with Soviet Union is as tense, as intimate is the relationship between Moscow and India. The Sino-Pakistani security and strategic nexus has remained a central issue in Indo-China relations ever since Beijing and Islamabad signed a historic border agreement and hence Pakistan is also an important factor in shaping Sino-Indian relations. In the Past India viewed the normalization of US-China relations with grave misgivings. After Indo-Pak war, November 1971, the US believed that Soviet Union would come to the aid of India. India's problems were that compounded by the US changing its policy from one of non-recognition of China to one of giving great power status in its own strategic considerations. In 2000, India's strategy led to rapid improvements in relations with the US and China. Later a new strategic triangle among the US, China and India emerged from the flux in international relations created by the end of cold war. These three countries more frequently perceived each of their national interests. The crux of the new triangle is that each actor fears alignment of the other two against itself. This fear exists for all the countries including Pakistan, especially strong for the weaker states like
India and Pakistan. The post cold-war Chinese-Indian-US triangular relationship differs in several ways from the Sino-Soviet-US triangle of the cold war era. The collapse of the Soviet Union, India’s rethinking of its traditional policies of non-alignment, US disengagement from Pakistan, explosive growth of Chinese power and deterioration of Sino-US relations. The relations between Washington and Islamabad severely strained by the Bin Laden operation, have deteriorated considerably since then. Pakistan is furious over being kept in the dark about the raid and the US is angry that the Pakistani investigation appears more focused in finding out how CIA was able to trackdown the AL-Queda leader then on how Bin Laden was able to live in Abbottabad for five years. Thus it is clear from the above study, that in the triangular relations of India, China and Pakistan, the United States remained major factor then followed by Moscow’s factor.

The Pakistani government’s continued stubbornness poses a strong challenge to India’s foreign policy. Pakistan’s “invader” mindset is evident from non-compliance with past treaties, support of cross border terrorism, view of historical events and the names of its missiles. It is simplistic to view Pakistan as a monolith. In actuality, Pakistan has a sizeable amount of diversity across ethnic groups, religious sects, and political ideology. Unfortunately, such diversity is not represented in its military dominated government. Moderate factions are often held at bay by the government’s backing of fundamentalist forces and its promotion
of a paranoid world view of its populous. Suppression both ethnic and political diversity had lead to numerous dissident factions seeking regional autonomy or a change of government. Despite a façade to the contrary, the Pakistani government shows no sign of significant or lasting change regarding Islamic fundamentalism which threatens the region and beyond. American policies based on encouraging Pakistan to restrain zealots, cooperate in capturing Osama Bin Laden, prior to US 'Bin-Laden operation', and maintain stability in Afghanistan is very limited. Pakistan's incorrigible behavior is the very problem. Pakistan misdirects American aid and furthers the very bothersome habits it is designed to eradicate. In the long term, Pakistan is a moribund nation, and American realization of this reality by preparation of contingency plans to deal with the consequences would provide true security in the region.

Despite events participating increased tensions between the two countries, the effort on the part of both governments has been to ensure that the Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) continue to remain in place to enable the people of both countries in the border regions in general and in the state of Jammu and Kashmir in particular, to maintain a semblance of normalcy in their lives.

However, the impressive range of CBMs, both of a military and non-military nature, have been overtaken by events such as the Kargil
conflict in 1999, the mobilization of troops in 2002, and the repeated terrorist attacks in India.

The CBM process has been its fair share of failure as well. Although there are hotlines connecting both military and political leaders in both countries, they have been scarcely used when required most. An ambitious attempt to begin with, these lines have fallen into disuse for the most part. And the absence of communication has led to suspicions, followed by accusations of the spread of misinformation. This neglect is the result of the fact that there are no stipulations for communication during disputes.

While over 70 Kashmir-related CBMs such as border crossings and trade have been agreed to in principle, only on inconsiderable percentage of them have actually seen implementation.

There is a disproportionate emphasis on military CBMs and an inadequate recognition of several momentous non-military CBMs. While the exchange of lists of nuclear-related facilities has been constant, regardless of the state of relations between the two countries, neither side has ever been satisfied that they are being given accurate information, thereby rendering the process redundant in all but name.

Many CBMs, which were originally crafted to address the stabilization of relations between India and Pakistan, post the nuclear
tests of 1998, have been agreed to in principle, yet have never seen implementation because of the belief that dominant issues such as those outlined in the composite dialogue need to be resolved before the CBM process can move ahead.

While CBMs can create trust between two nations, trust is also required of the inception stage, to bring about CBMs in the first place. One feeds off the other, and in the current scenario, when political will in both states is shown to be waxing and waning intermittently, CBMs which are difficult to establish, but easy to disrupt have not been fully effective, there is a lack of verifiability in many CBMs, which leads both countries to fall victim to mistrust, suspicion and misinformation on a variety of issues.

Governments on both sides often use CBMs as political tools to win over specific constituencies, which can be very damaging in the long run. Public conciliatory statements, which are meant to be CBMs can have the opposite effect, if they turn out to be insincere, and worse, if they have been inexpertly drafted as one saw in the aftermath of the statement issued after the Sharm el Sheikh meeting.

CBMs have been particularly ineffective, if not absent during times of conflict because despite declarations to the effect, neither country has moved beyond the point of ‘conflict avoidance’, towards actual confidence building measures and finally towards strengthening
peace, the ceasefire, which was implemented in 2003 was alleged to have been violated once by Pakistan in 2008, and the Indian Army has gone on record about numerous infiltrations and violations in 2009.

While many hundreds of thousands visit India and Pakistan from across the border, the visa formalities for them are far from conducive to confidence building. Each traveler has to register of a police station within 24 hours of his arrival in a city and 24 hours before departing from the same, the whereabouts only wherewithal of his hosts are to be laid bare to the authorities and must pass muster with them. These procedures leave inter-country travel to be far from desirable.

Certain concerns need to be addressed by the governments of both countries, in order to maximize the effectiveness of CBMs:

While CBMs which focus on improved communication links and people-to-people interaction could create the necessary environment for deeper issues to be tackled, the impact of the CBMs still hinges on political will for their implementation. If the political will is present, the measures can be seen through to their fruition.

The hostilities distinguishing Indo-Pak relations are systemic, and further hampered by newer security threats, socio-politico-economic strife and India’s preponderance in the larger South Asian region. Therefore, there is no viable alternative to a gradual and incremental
peace process through military and non-military CBMs. The derailment in the peace process occurs when there is an attempt to find instant solutions to old and complex problems.

There is no need to prefer military over non-military CBMs – both have their place in the peace process and both are needed. It is not essential that both states possess equivalent or balanced military capabilities to take the steps necessary towards furthering peace.

Policy makers on both sides need to bear in mind that war, whether of a conventional or proxy nature will not advance their national interests. Both sides stand to gain both, economically and politically from a stable peace. Motivations do not necessarily need to be in concert. The Indian public was enraged after 26/11, and promises without concrete results have frustrated India for years. On the other side, Pakistan wants faster results and more emphasis on Kashmir, lest the CBMs lose their meaning, and peace in the subcontinent remains elusive. Yet both sides must agree that the peace process continue unabated.

Based on the experience thus, far, it is clear that future measures catering to conflict prevention and confidences building must provide for more explicit means of arbitrating implementation problems. To this intent, it is imperative that all CBMs be made verifiable. Further, the experiences of successes and failures of other regions should be
examined, as also the possible role which could be played by non-state actors such as the private sector, professional and business organizations, civil society, so on and so forth.

In terms of stakeholders, it is commonly understood that the term would include Indians and Pakistanis in general and the people of Jammu and Kashmir in particular. However, there is a need for more emphasis on the importance of Kashmiris in the CBM process, if not the dialogue process itself. It is their participation which would make the process more meaningful. Earlier CBMs, particularly the bus routes, would have been better structured in Kashmiris had been consulted on the modalities. What is required, therefore, is not just CBMs between countries, but among the different constituencies of Jammu and Kashmir in their own respective regions, as also on both sides of the LoC. The Kashmir identity must be addressed via media of community-to-community CBMs, to bring back Kashmiris of non-Muslim faiths, particularly Pandits, to the region. Security aspects in connection with the sharing of political and economic power needs to be factored in, to ensure that they may become true stakeholders. Attention needs to be refocused from macro issues of the Kashmir conflict to micro issues, which would bring greater benefit to the people at large and both governments could consider the following
Short term:

- The composite dialogue process should be continued. Given that India has agreed to disconnect Pakistan’s actions against terror groups from the dialogue process (on the strength of Pakistan’s commitment to the issue), this should be undertaken without delay. Notwithstanding that, the CBM process must continue unabated.

- Regular meetings between local commanders of the BSF and the Rangers would help resolve matters concerning infiltration, particularly with regard to the ceasefire violations and should be started.

- In consultation with Kashmiri stakeholders, additional CBMs need to be identified and active Kashmiri participation be ensured in the dialogue process. Specifically, CBMs to assuage economic imbalances among rural Kashmiris should be embarked on. In addition, land routes within the region should be made part of future infrastructure projects to ensure better inter and intra-region connectivity.

- Obtaining visas and travel permits should be facilitated and made easier, and visa formalities/registration be eased to provide for a more conducive environment in cross-border travel. People-to-people interaction should continue, and road, rail and air linkages
should be structured so as to ensure that they are not regularly disputed.

Medium-term:

- The agreement prescribing attacks on each others’ nuclear facilities should be extended to identified populations and economic targets.
- The agreement requiring notification on military exercises et al should be extended to associating military observers with major field exercises.
- Pakistan should end support of any kind for militancy in the region and address India’s concerns regarding infiltration.
- There is a lack of political representation and freedoms in the area of the Jammu and Kashmir state administered by Pakistan. It would be in their interest as well as India’s if these concerns were addressed, and the people granted more say in their governance.
- Civil society and track II initiatives should be taken into active consideration towards a comprehensive solution of the crisis in the region.
Long-term:

- The redeployment of troops from the region has been debated by both governments and should be examined in full practically.
- India should begin to engage Pakistani citizens towards sensitizing them to the conflict situation and build domestic pressure on Pakistan to strengthen its relations with India.
- The dichotomy between the maintenance of Jammu and Kashmir's independence via Article 370 of the Indian Constitution and the requirement to further include the state in the mainstream of Indian politics and society would need to be addressed comprehensively. While Kashmiris need to be included in the dialogue process, they also need to be made to understand the valid national security concerns of India and Pakistan.

Domestically, India has the advantage of a stable government and brilliant, far-sighted leadership. Our strategies are in seasoned hands. All we need is an innovative idea that will be able to design a border package acceptable to popular aspirations. This might be a time-consuming process, but with patience and diligence, it is achievable and will be achieved.
Since Independence, India has struggled to maintain a balanced place in the world as an old civilization and a new nation in a hostile neighbourhood. It avoided Cold War entanglements as much as possible while plotting an independent course. It championed the cause of developing nations. India's foreign policy rose to the challenge posed by the end of the Cold War. Though the initial outlook in the early 1990’s seemed bleak, the post-Cold War era presented a unique opportunity to engage countries based on strategic and economic grounds. Overall, the first decade of the post Cold War era was a difficult time as foreign policy often tilted to compensate for previous leanings. Overtime, India’s policy has matured into a balanced engagement of the major powers and strategically important regions. India must continue to engage while avoiding entanglements. Its alliances must be limited by mutual goals, and not be forced to serve as a wedge in larger rivalries. Foreign policy must tread a focused path between advancing long term goals and agile enough to respond to abrupt changes. In the coming decade, India’s foreign policy will aid in choosing allies, forming partnerships based on mutual interests, and in fending off old and new enemies. The issues of international terrorism, Islamic fundamentalism, competition for a sphere of influence and acquisition of energy will dominate India’s policy in the foreseeable future. India’s policy should be grounded in present concerns as well as historical dialectics; a patchwork combining the legacy of an ancient
civilization, security imperatives of the Raj and its importance as a cultural and commercial crossroad.