CHAPTER – IX

SOVIET-US FACTORS INFLUENCING INDIA, CHINA AND PAKISTAN TRIANGULAR RELATIONS
After the World War II, the United States of America (USA) and the Soviet Union (USSR) emerged as two Super Powers dividing the world into two groups – the Capitalists and the Communists. While the USA emerged as the leader of the Capitalist-group, the Soviet Union emerged as the Communist world. After the World War-II the foreign policies of these two Super Powers underwent great transformation. South East Asia became a focal point in the foreign policy of USA, after the emergence of communist regime in China. In the years immediately following the close of the World War II, USA generally adopted the attitude of neutrality in this region, though she generally opposed colonialism. It was only after the emergence of Communism in China in 1954 that USA decided to intervene in South East Asia more effectively with a view to contain Communism. United States of America’s relations with USSR had been in ups and downs. It is a matter of common knowledge that US did not like the establishment of the Communist regime in Russia and did practically everything to overthrow it. It was only in 1933 that USA accorded recognition to the Soviet government, but the hostility did not completely die. During the war US rendered every possible help, the Soviet Union to resist the aggression of Axis powers. Despite all the help to the Soviet Union continued to be suspicious of USA and put many restrictions on the movement of the
Americans in Russia. USA also started influencing the South Asian countries in various ways and strategies to maintain the balance and to sustain her supremacy over the nations. The political, geographical, cultural factors which caused wars and disputes among the nations especially developing countries like India and Pakistan prompted US to operate its factors in their bilateral relations.

The USSR also emerged as another Super Power after World War-II. The Soviet Union Foreign Policy was guided by the fear of west. Its policies towards the USA were changed during the regimes of its rulers. The Soviet Union tried to develop friendly relations with the Third World countries and offered them necessary economic and military assistance. In the Post-World War-II period, Soviet Union took keen interest in South East Asia. It concluded treaty with China in 1945. It also signed treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual help with China. When China condemned Soviet Union for its policy of destalinisation the relations between these two countries strained. There were a number of border incidents which further strained their relations. The development of intimate relations between China and America in the Seventies also contributed to the strained relations between Soviet Union and China. Similar to the tendency of US the Soviet Union also started influencing the international relations and bilateral relations of countries in South Asian continent, most specifically India and Pakistan. India had practically no relations with Soviet Union.
before independence. After independence cordial relations could not be developed between the two because of various factors. However after some time the relations between these two countries began to improve. Mostly the decision of India to recognize Red China contributed towards the improvement of relations. In case of Pakistan, in view of prevailing tension between USA and the Soviet Union, and Pakistan's alignment with USA, the relations between Pakistan and Soviet Union were far from cordial. These relations were further strained by the Soviet support of India on the Kashmir issue. Infact in the triangular relations between India, China and Pakistan, the present study revealed that there are Soviet and US factors in influencing in each others relations. However, after the collapse of the USSR, the US emerged as a single Super Power and the dawn of Unipolar world and end of cold war, the US and Russia continued to influence the relations among the three countries.

It is essential to analyse in this chapter the Soviet and American factors influencing India, China and Pakistan triangular relations. As the international system is profoundly permeated by the linkage phenomenon and the relations between the two countries are never determined by exclusively bilateral considerations. India’s relations with China and Pakistan can be better understood only within the broad framework of these national-international linkages.
The Role of United States of America in South Asia:

From the beginning, Pakistan has been a factor in Indo-US relations. The US began to woo Pakistan has a link in its global security network from the late 1940s and enhanced its international standing by including it first in the Baghdad Pact and then by signing a military aid Pact under the Central Treaty Organisation (CENTO) which pushed both India and Pakistan into an arms build up. On the other hand, it refused to back India on Kashmir. On its side, India upset the US by campaigning for China to be admitted to the United Nation, at the time of the Korean War and its high-profile championship of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). The other factor, which soured Indo-US relations, was India’s gradual tilt towards the Soviet Union. Although the US gave substantial aid to India, it often had terms attached to it. For instance, it refused to build up the steel industry in India on the ground that the steel plants were being planned for the public sector. The Soviet Union was more forthcoming and the consequent Moscow-New Delhi industrial and economical and economic relationship which grave, continued till the collapse of the Soviet Union.

In the 1980’s the Soviet interventions in Afghanistan, which India failed to oppose created further difficulties. The US built-up a close military relation with Pakistan which fuelled India’s fears since US military aid and had earlier been used by Pakistan against India. The
US also blocked sports of American high technology equipments to India such as Super Computers and nuclear sensitive parts.

It was only after the end of the Cold War and especially after the disintegration of the Soviet Union, that New Delhi’s ties with Washington began to improve. India’s economic reforms, which actually began in the 1980’s, gain further impetus in the 1990’s and as the country moved increasingly toward a market oriented economy, it added to its attractions for the Americans.¹

Several other reasons besides the economic argument and a new global power balance were put forward at different levels for better Indo-US relation. India with its strong democratic, pluralist and secular credentials is opt to be appreciated specially because of its geo-strategic position.² Evidences of a change in the American stance were perceptible from the early 1990’s. Today the Cold War has receded into the background and the Pakistan has become less important in its policy considerations. In 1990, the US withheld delivery of 38 F-16 frieghter aircrafts for ground that Pakistan had violated in terms of the Pressler Amendment which stipulates that countries perceived to be developing nuclear weapons may not receive aid of any sort. Form 1993, Washington took a number of other positions favorable to India.

On Kashmir too, there was some evidence of Washington bowing to Indian objections to Assistant Secretary of State, Robin Raphael's
statement in 1993 that the matter should be resolved according to the relevant UN resolutions. The Clinton administration quickly backtracked and adopted New Delhi's position calling for a resolution under the terms of the Shimla Agreement.

There was also a certain amount of military cooperation. In January 1995, US Secretary of Defense, William Perry visited India and signed an agreement establishing a framework for military cooperation. Subsequently in May-June 1995, Indian and American Military Units conducted joint exercises on land and sea. US special force and Indian para commandoes held high altitude exercise in the Nahan hills and five American and Six Indian Ships and maritime Air Crafts took part in naval exercises called Malabar-II in the Arabian Sea. This signified that Indian fears of American Naval presence in the region were decreasing.

The US according to political analysts was actually following a policy of 'even handedness' or equivalence which was also summed up as 'tilting both ways' that is, courting both India and Pakistan. This means the American officials visited the capitals of both the countries on their trip to South Asia. In addition, a number of irritants remained between India and the United States, the chief one being the issue of non-proliferation. India believed that the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) was inherently discriminatory and had, therefore consistently refused to sign it.
India and United States co-sponsored resolutions in the UN General Assembly, proposing a Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban (UNGA Resolution 48/70) and cut off in the production of weapons grade material (UNGA Resolution 48/75 L), in discussion that followed, India argued that a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) must be linked to a time-bound programme of total nuclear disarmament by the nuclear powers. On the other hand, the United States along with the other nuclear powers insisted that the Non-proliferation goal must be disassociated from the disarmament goal. India thus turned out to be a CTBT ‘spoiler’ much to Americans frustration.

**US stand on Kashmir and India’s Reactions:**

The Kashmir conflict was one of the focal points of American foreign policy in India and Pakistan. Pakistan expected US support on Kashmir problem, while the US did not imagine her further involvement in the conflict.\(^4\) According to India, the Kashmir question was altered when Pakistan sign a mutual defense assistance agreement with the US in May 1954.\(^5\) The Security Council, at the initiative of U.S. enlarged the scope of their discussion and included all the problems connected with Indo-Pakistan relations. As a result, a bitter controversy arose between Indian representatives and the President of the Council over the description of the Agenda for 22\(^{nd}\) January 1948. Indian objectives were brushed aside and it continued to discuss all the problems which then existed between the two countries.\(^6\)
It was a major victory for Pakistan. Pakistan’s attempt to confuse and by-pass the main complaint from India was thus a great success and India was never to recover from the initial defeat. In fact the Security Council had yielded to the successful manoeuvring by Pakistan which sought to sidetrack the main issue of her complicity in the tribal invasion of the State of Jammu and Kashmir. From the initial reaction of U.S. in the Security Council, it could be concluded that the Council gave scant consideration to the Indian complaint and followed a policy to which India was opposed from the beginning.7

**US Policy and Kashmir Dispute:**

The improved state of Indo-US relations in 1956 was severely affected by the attitude taken by the United States in supporting Pakistan in the Security Council. In the initial stages of the debate a ‘holding resolution’ was passed by the Security Council in the initiative of the U.S.A. and the U.K. and three other powers with ten votes in favour and absence on the part of by the Soviet Union on 24th January and on February 14, 1957.8 The U.S. was involved in the Kashmir dispute reluctantly, since it was first brought before the United Nations.9 The U.S. did not succeed in her efforts to bring pressure on India and Pakistan to resolve the questions. Pakistan regarded U.S. efforts as half-hearted. Both the countries were resentful of U.S. Pakistani leaders felt that they were being pressured to make concessions so that India might concentrate on the Chinese threat. In October, 1958, Ayub
Khan said that the Kashmir question was a 'time bomb' never far removed from the flash point.\textsuperscript{10}

India felt that her crisis with China was being used as a pretext for forcing it to abandon its essential position in Kashmir. The U.S. made it clear that her interest was only to assist in promoting an agreed settlement on Kashmir, acceptable to both parties, and that she was not trying to force one country to yield to the other. However, the most decisive factor in undermining the potential for agreement on Kashmir was American military assistance to Pakistan.\textsuperscript{11} The U.S. played a central role in this Kashmir issue almost since its inception. She adopted position, supporting Kashmiri people's right to determine their future through a free and fair plebiscite under the auspices of the U.N. However, on this issue, the U.S. did not openly pressurize India.\textsuperscript{12}

After the Sino-Indian clash of 1962, U.S. showed greater interest in India. U.S.A. took a serious view of the Chinese aggression in India and offered military and as well as air-umbrella to India to check the tide of Chinese aggression. After the war she agreed to give extensive military assistance to India, in spite of the protests lodged by Pakistan. But as India wanted to play an independent role she condemned the use of 'gas' in North Vietnam by U.S.A. This embittered the relations between the two countries. So much so that Johnson took a unilateral decision to postpone the proposed visit of India's Prime Minister to the
United States in 1965. That, however, did not deter and she continued to be critical of American policy in North Vietnam.

During the Indo-Pak conflict of 1965, U.S.A. did nothing to check Pakistan from using the American arms against India, in inspite of a clear assurance that the American arms would not be used by Pakistan against India. Thus like Great Britain, U.S.A. has also be favourably disposed towards Pakistan. This can be explained the fact that Pakistan was a member of different military alliances sponsored by U.S.A.

In the Indo-Pakistan War of 1971, U.S.A. once again showed a bias for Pakistan. She did not utter a word against the military regime in spite of their brutal massacre of innocent Bengalis in East Pakistan. But when a war broke out between India and Pakistan, U.S.A. tried to seek immediate ceasefire in the sub-continent through Security Council resolutions. All these resolutions were, however, voted by Soviet Russia and thus U.N. was prevented from taking any action. U.S.A. also tried to help by ordering its task force of U.S. Seventh Fleet to move towards the Bay of Bengal on the pretext of evacuating U.S. citizens in East Pakistan. The fleet included life nuclear-powered aircraft carrier Enterprise. This was a clear move of a military blackmail and was severely criticized by U.S.S.R.
Thus the Indo-American relations continued to be at low key throughout the Presidency of Nixon. After Nixon’s exit also there was no marked improvement in the relations between the two countries.

With the election of Jimmi Carter as the President of the United States of America, hopes went high for the development of more friendly and intimate relations between U.S.A. and India. This hope was further strengthened with the victory of the Janata Party in India. A process of improving the relations with U.S.A. was soon started by the Janata Government. It openly declared that it would like to end the special tilt towards Soviet Union, which had characterized India’s foreign policy in the preceding years. It made special efforts to improve relations with U.S.A. However, Indo-American relations suffered a setback due to refusal of United States to supply nuclear fuel to the Tarapur atomic power station. United States took this decision on the ground, that in terms of Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act, 1978, U.S. could not supply nuclear fuel to countries which had not agreed to full scope safeguards and inspection by the U.S. experts. This was contrary to the contractual obligations of Indo-U.S. nuclear cooperation agreement of 1963 and was naturally condemned by India. In terms of the above agreement United States was expected to supply fuel to Tarapur atomic power station till 1993.
The developments in Afghanistan and the Indian stand thereon also greatly contributed to misunderstanding between India and United States. India's refusal to openly condemn Soviet intervention in Afghanistan was not liked by United States. On the other hand, American attempt to arm Pakistan to the teeth, despite protests from India, also created tension in their relations.

With the assumption of office by Rajiv Gandhi sincere efforts were made to improve relations with United States. Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi paid a visit to United States to thrash out the various issues. But much progress could not be made due to supply of highly sophisticated arms to Pakistan by United States. On the other hand United States refused to supply to India certain military items which had been approved earlier. On the other hand, the forthright stand of India on bombardment of Libya by Reagan also produced some tension in their relations. Thus we see that there are a number of points of tension between the two countries. Despite the fact that there were not direct economic or political clash of interests between the two, and the fact that both are democratic countries. With firm faith in individual liberties, the relations between the two have not developed along friendly lines.

But the sudden fall of the Janata Government in 1979 and return of Mrs. Indira Gandhi to power in the elections of 1980 gave rise, to the thinking that the relations between India and U.S.A. would once again
cool down. The failure of India to openly condemn Soviet intervention in Afghanistan has not found favour with U.S.A. The special tilt displayed by Indira Gandhi Government towards Soviet Union has also contributed to cooling of relations. The victory of President Reagan was interpreted in certain quarters as an event which might lead to improvement of relations between the two countries. The new President as well as the Indian leaders had expressed hope that the relations between the two countries would grow along friendly lines.13

The Role of Russia in South Asia:

The emergence of South Asian States from the colonial yoke in 1947 opened up the opportunities for their active interaction with the rest of the world, including with the erstwhile Soviet Union. Although even under the Soviet system, Moscow's policies were largely governed by its view of the geo-political interests of the Soviet states; nonetheless, they were invariably couched in ideological terms. Following the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the ideological façade has fallen off and Moscow's foreign policy is solely determined by the national interests. The national and geographical interests of Russia as the dominant power in the former Soviet space or Eurasia and those of India the dominant power in South Asia, tend to broadly coincide, although they may not be necessarily identical.
Initially Soviet Union was skeptical and suspicious about India's policy of non-alignment, but subsequently it began to appreciate an even value it in its politico-strategic Cold War against the west and later on rivalry with Communist China also. The curve of Indo-Soviet multifaceted friendship and cooperation began to rise since the mid-fifties and Moscow established itself as an important player in the region. A broad coincidence in their geo-political interest account for uninterrupted friendship between New Delhi and Moscow despite ups and downs and many historical changes, including the very disintegration of the Soviet Union into fifteen independent states.\textsuperscript{14}

As stated earlier, India had practically no relations with Soviet Union before independence. She had merely expressed sympathy for Soviet Union when Germany attacked her in 1941. After independence cordial relations could not be developed between the two. India's decision to support the developments in Greece and her stand in Korea caused difference between the two countries. Decision of India to join the Commonwealth and her opposition to the communist revolution in Malaya created a suspicion in the mind of Soviet Union that India was heading towards Anglo-American bloc.

However, after sometime the relations between U.S.S.R. and India began to improve. The decision of the Government of India to recognize Red China contributed towards the improvement of relations.
Soviet Union was also impressed by the role of India in and outside the United Nations as an anti-colonial power. The efforts of India to establish ceasefire in Korea and her refusal to brand Red China as an aggressor was also greatly appreciated by Soviet Union.

With the death of Stalin a change in Soviet Foreign policy took place which also affected the Indo-Soviet relations. The two countries were also brought together by the Pakistan's decision to join the Western military alliance. The Soviet support on the Kashmir issue further cemented the friendship between India and Soviet Union. The two countries also signed a trade agreement. In 1955 Bulganin and Khrushchev visited India and were accorded tremendous welcome. This visit helped to strengthen Indo-Soviet friendship. They also supported India on Goa issue.

During the Suez crisis, India along with Russia condemned the aggression on Egypt and called for efforts to halt aggression and restore peace. She took a firm stand in the U.N.O. to condemn aggression. She also agreed to offer forces for the U.N. Emergency Force in Egypt, which was not an occupation force but a force to protect Egypt-Israeli armistice line. The Suez crisis coincided with a revolt in Hungary. Soviet Russia intervened and crushed the revolt. India condemned the Russian attitude as "a gross and brutal exercise of violence and armed might against weaker countries". However,
Government of India did not agree to the demand of the opposition parties that she should not recognize the Kadar Government. Though a rift was caused between Soviet Union and India but this was soon bridged.

Soviet Union provided 500 million dollars to India for the Third Five Year Plan. Again when the Western oil companies refused to supply oil to India, Soviet Union agreed to supply the same at a cheaper rate. In 1955, Soviet Union vetoed the action of Security Council over Kashmir. In 1961, Russia supported India's cause on the issue of Goa.

The Chinese aggression on India in 1962, did not affect the cordial relations between Soviet Union and India, U.S.S.R. agreed to cooperate with India in building 'MIG' Fighter Planes. This clearly demonstrates that she supported India in the conflict with Red China.

Soon Pakistan and China came closer, which made Soviet Union think of revising her policy towards Pakistan. Pakistan had special strategic importance for Russia. Therefore, Russia did not want to offend Pakistan either. During the Indo-Pak clash in 1965, Russia adopted an attitude of neutrality towards the two countries Russia made an appeal to both the countries on September 4, 1965, to stop military operations and settle the conflict. On September, 8, 1965, China instigated Pakistan to continue fighting and held out a threat to India.
but Brezhnev warned ‘third parties’ not to interfere in the Indian sub-continent.

**Tashkent Declaration:**

On September 17, 1965, Russia offered her good offices and prepared to convene a meeting at Tashkent to enable the two countries to begin talks. The offer was accepted and four days later the ceasefire was announced. President Ayub Khan and Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri finally met at Tashkent from January 3 to 10, 1966. The two countries were convinced that their outstanding problems could be solved through negotiations only. As Russia was deeply interested in preserving peace in the sub-continent she refrained from blaming either side for starting the conflict and tried her utmost to bring peace between the two countries. Soviet efforts ultimately yielded results and the historic Tashkent Declaration was signed on January 1966, by Shastri and Ayub Khan. The two leaders declared their solemn resolve to restore normal and peaceful relations between their countries and to promote understanding and friendly relations between their peoples. They also affirmed their obligation under the Charter not to have recourse to force and to settle their disputes through peaceful means.

The two countries agreed to withdraw their armed personnel by 25th February, 1966 to the positions held by them prior to August 5,
1965. They also agreed to observe the terms of the ceasefire along the
time of division in Jammu and Kashmir.

The leaders of the two countries acknowledged with deep
appreciation and gratitude of the friendly and noble part played by
Soviet Union in arranging the Tashkent meeting.

The Tashkent declaration was widely welcomed. It signified the
victory of the principle of settling international problems by peaceful
means by direct and frank negotiations between the leaders. Soon after
signing the Tashkent declaration, Shastri met with a tragic death. The
new Government under Indira Gandhi pledged to honour the death
declaration in letter and spirit and to work for lasting peace in the sub-
continent.5

In 1968 with the Russian decision to supply arms to Pakistan the
relations between India and Soviet Union became little cold. The public
opinion in India was much agitated over these developments. The
Government of India made no change in her policy towards Soviet
Union though it was made clear that India was not happy with the Soviet
Union.

Within few months of the Soviet-Pak arms deal, the Warsaw Pact
powers headed by the Soviet Union invaded Czechoslovakia. Indian
Government expressed profound concern and anguish over the
incident. But when the Security Council adopted a resolution condemning Soviet action, India abstained from voting.

Thus we find that generally Russia has been supporting India on various issues but her support could not be taken for granted except where Soviet and Indian interests coincided.

**Treaty of Peace:**

In 1971, relations between India and Soviet Union reached an epoch-making stage, with the signing of the Indo-Soviet Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation. This treaty was concluded at a time when the clouds of war were gathering fast on the horizon as a result of the belligerent attitude of the military Junta in Pakistan. This treaty was concluded on August 9, 1971. The treaty was significant because it pledged Soviet Union to stand by India in the rigorous testing times to follow.

By virtue of this treaty the chances of Sino-American intervention in the event of an Indo-Pakistani clash could be safely ruled out. This treaty was of great political significance to India and marked a turning point in her foreign policy. This was the first political treaty concluded by India with any big power. The conclusion of treaty did not imply that India had abandoned her traditional policy of non-alignment. It simply implied that she had modified and readjusted this policy keeping in view the realities of the situation.
Commencing on the treaty Swaran Singh, the then Foreign Minister of India, said, "We are convinced that this treaty will serve as a shining example of how relations between two friendly countries can be and should be developed and how they serve not only the interests of two countries but be an important stabilizing factor for strengthening peace and security in this region and throughout Asia and the World".

The treaty actually came into force on August 18, 1971, after it was ratified by the parliaments of the two countries. Although the treaty by and large received an approval, it was criticized, by certain people. It was contended that if the treaty has paved the way for the establishment of Soviet basis in the country and it would render the job of normalization of India's relations with China more difficult. Doubts were also expressed whether the treaty could help in solving the refugee problem.

A little later when actual hostilities broke out between India and Pakistan, U.S.A. tried to bring a resolution in the U.N. Security Council on December 5, 1971, seeking an immediate ceasefire on the Indian sub-continent. The Soviet representative Yakov Malik objected to the U.S. bid to equate India and Pakistan and vetoed the resolution. Soviet Union pleaded that the situation in East Pakistan had arisen because of the action of the Pakistani military junta. On December 8, 1971, the U.N. General Assembly passed a resolution which called upon India
and Pakistan to take forthwith all measures for an immediate cease-fire and for withdrawal of their armed forces from each other's territory. India, however, refused to comply with this resolution of the U.N. General Assembly. On December 14, 1971, Soviet Union used her veto in the Security Council for the third time within nine days to negative a U.S. motion calling for an immediate Indo-Pakistan ceasefire.

After the surrender of Pakistani forces at Dacca before the joint command of Muktibahini and Indian forces, India declared unilateral ceasefire. There was a feeling in certain quarters that India took this decision at the instance of some other power (which implied Soviet Union), but this was denied both by the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister. Thus the Indo-Soviet treaty showed that it is an effective instrument for maintenance of universal peace and international security and development not only in India and Soviet Union but the region as a whole.

With the coming of the Janata Party in power it was expected that the close relations with Russia would suffer a setback. A demand was made in certain quarters for the snapping of the Indo-Soviet Treaty. The then Prime Minister Mr. Morarji Desai, refused to comply with this demand. However, he assured that the Indo-Soviet Treaty shall not be permitted to stand in the way of developing friendly relations with other
countries. However, the treaty was not nullified. Thus even under Janata Party, India's relations with Soviet Union continued to be cordial even though the special tilt towards Soviet Union was not permitted. With the return of Mrs. Indira Gandhi to power in 1980 the trend of development of more close relations with Soviet Union was resumed. Soviet Foreign Minister Gromkyo paid a visit to India in February, 1980, soon after the formation of Congress Government. In subsequent years the two countries concluded a number of agreements for greater cooperation in various spheres. At the international forums also the two took identical stands. Thus both expressed concern over the growing arm race and tension in various parts of the world. Soviet Union extended support to the proposal to declare Indian Ocean as a zone of peace and even gave an assurance that Soviet Union would not be the first to use nuclear weapons. It is noteworthy that till 1977 Soviet Union did not favour the proposal for declaring Indian Ocean as a Peace Zone, but in 1981 she agreed to do so. This was a major shift in Soviet policy. India also showed greater understanding of the Soviet position in Afghanistan and Poland and rather reacted mildly on these issues. Thus both Soviet Union and India have shown greater understanding of each of other's position and adopted common postures on various issues.\footnote{15}

Moscow's policy towards South Asian always accorded a continuous to do soto this day, priority to India. Pakistan the second
most important South Asian States joined the Western military alliance system and became the much aligned ally of the west, which naturally aroused Soviet hostility and ire. However even when relations with Pakistan were at their lowest, the former did not completely shut door on Pakistan. Efforts to wean Pakistan away from the West and subsequently from China also – with efforts of trade and aid continued. Moscow’s Tashkand diplomacy in January 1966 was the epitome of the Soviet efforts to take both the South Asian countries with it, and play the role of natural peacemaker between the two. In December 1971, Indo-Pak war leading to the liberation of Bangladesh, Moscow reverted back to a pro-India policy. Earlier on August 9, 1971 India and the Soviet Union signed a twenty-year treaty of peace, friendship and cooperation that further cemented their ties.

The Soviet Union also tried to enhance the presence in other South-Asian countries in order to counter the influence of its global and regional rivals – the USA and China. It is significant that in it relation with other states of the sub-continent like Nepal, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka etc. The Soviet Union was consistently guided by its policy of friendship with India.16

Post Soviet Russia – Initial Difficulties and Uncertainties:

Following the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the orientation of Russian Policy was for some time totally towards the West. Moscow’s
capability and reach as also its geo-political weight have greatly shrunk following the collapse of the Soviet Union, bringing about a radical shift in the country’s foreign policy objectives and priorities while India and Pakistan figure prominently in post-Soviet Russia’s South Asian policy calculations for obvious reasons; Moscow just maintains a much curtailed diplomatic presence in other South Asian capitals. Trade and other exchanges with them have also declined in view of Russia’s reduced capabilities and shrinking interests.

**President Yeltsin’s visit to India:**

India not only happened to be the largest buyer of Russian military equipment and major trading partner, but the two countries shared the legacy of long Indo-Soviet friendship and cooperation and their geo-political interests did not clash President Yeltsin’s visit to India in January 1993, and pro-Indian statements made by him on Kashmir issue made it clear that India continued to occupy the central position in new Russia’s policy toward South Asia. President Yeltsin’s made it categorically clear that Russia would not give military and technical aid to Pakistan. At the time he added, “We went some kind of relations with Pakistan”.  

A new twenty-year treaty of friendship and cooperation was signed between India and Russia, but without the strategic clause of the Indo-Soviet treaty. Moscow promised to support India’s claim for a
permanent seat in the UN Security Council. The emerging contours of Post-Soviet, India-Russia relations thus became clear during President Yeltsin’s visit to India.¹⁸

In the post-World War II period Soviet Union took keen interest in South-East Asia. Taking full advantage of Japan’s defeat Soviet Union occupied Manchuria and concluded a treaty with China in 1945. The inability of Britain to play an active role in the region on account of her weakened position also greatly helped Soviet Union to increase its influence.

In 1949, Soviet Union signed Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual help with China. Under this treaty it agreed to provide China financial and, technical know how and other help in reconstruction of the country. These relations continued to grow friendly till 1956 when China condemned Soviet Union for its policy of de-Stalinization. This created a rift which got widened in the subsequent years. This ultimately led to the cooling of relations between Soviet Union and China and suspension of Soviet aid to China. There were a number of border incidents which further strained their relations. In fact in subsequent years the two countries adopted mutually hostile attitude towards each other and clashed both in the United Nations and outside. The development of intimate relations between China and America in the
seventies also contributed to the straining of relations between Soviet Union and China.

Despite these tensions the two countries have been making efforts to improve relations and the leaders of two countries have held a number of meetings in this regard.\textsuperscript{19}

**Indo-Pak Relations – Soviet Factor:**

In the latter half of 1965, when the Indo-Pak war broke out, Soviet policy-makers saw their tasks in the Indian sub-continent as:

(i) Encouraging Pakistan's growing independence from Western influence;
(ii) Avoiding, in the process, pushing India into the clutches of the West;
(iii) Keeping China out of Indo-Pak relations; and
(iv) Increasing the extent of Soviet presence in the sub-continent to balance the hitherto exclusive Western presence.

For simultaneous pursuit of all these objectives peace in the sub-continent was indispensable to the Soviet Union.

Hence the Soviet initiative in organizing the Tashkent conference, even though in the attempt to be acceptable to both India and Pakistan, the Soviet Union had to play down its earlier support to India on the Kashmir question.
The Tashkent agreement has not led to the solution of the Kashmir problem nor even to any marked improvement in relations between India and Pakistan. In the event its permanent achievement appears to have been to establish the Soviet presence in the politics of the sub-continent.

Soviet support to India on the Kashmir question was decisive in relations between the two countries. From 1951 onwards the Soviet Union started supporting India on the Kashmir issue in contrast to its earlier policy of abstaining from voting on resolutions on the question. Though still sticking to the thesis that the Kashmir dispute was the creation of the Anglo-American bloc. Kashmir’s union with India was implicitly favoured by the Soviet Government.²⁰

Sino-Pak Equation:

There was a virtually exclusive focus in the media on the power equation and the China-Pakistan nuclear and missile collaboration and its implications for India. Given those predominant concerns, it is not surprising that very few commentaries or reports dwelt sufficiently on the implications of Jiang’s speech in the Pakistani Senate. But then, the post-Soviet world did not yet amount to a post-cold war situation in South Asia. China’s cold war history of a “zero-sum approach to Indo-Pakistani conflicts by standing with Pakistan”,²¹ more often than not, appeared as unqualified support to Pakistan. It completely
overshadowed the subtle India-China dialectic. In the light of the prevalent cynicism – nor entirely without reason – it is before not surprising that the political establishment, or the external affairs bureaucracy did not – and could not – quite assess the Sino-Pakistan relationship in this dialectical framework of hostility and distancing strategy. It equally responded mainly in either polarizing or zero sum categories. Neither is it surprising that Pakistani writings as well, till the end of the 1990's, do not show any awareness of this dialectic.  

This led, among other things, to a neglect of the assessment of the commercial and economic potential in India and China relations – which was yet another reflection of the state of India’s China policy. Between 1984 when they signed the Trade Agreement and 1996, total trade between the two grew very slowly, and stood at a mere billion dollars annually. Apart from the constraints that are generally mentioned such as the competitiveness of Indian and Chinese trade and the limits of increasing economic interaction in hi-tech areas, the conclusion is inescapable that India neglected, if not failed, to capitalize on the current obsessive Chinese concern – economic development and increasing trade and investment. The single-minded devotion with which the Chinese had been pursuing economic reforms for the last two decades, and the quantum leaps in foreign trade, especially border trade with its other neighbours, bring India’s rather tardy approach into sharper focus. At a general level, the discourse on China in the public-
domain in India towards the end of the 1990s clearly had a dual aspect – while on the one hand, there seemed to be admiration for the Chinese economic progress, on the other, there was a deep-seated suspicion of the Chinese motives. The duality persists in the present as well. It was obvious that the post-1988 Sino-Indian achievements were not of the order that would temper the suspicious and apprehensions that had been nurtured for nearly three decades – especially if the cause of the suspicious was not being resolved – nor was perceived as such. But, the cliché of the two Asian giants pitted against each other in inevitable rivalry, was wearing thin in the new world order. What was emanating from many sources was the lack of a coherent, systematic and long term China policy/strategy, insofar as India is concerned.23

The Indo-Pak Conflict of 1965:

Although a number of factors led to the Indo-Pak conflict of 1965, the Chinese involvement in the sub-continen
tal affairs may be identified as the most important factor. Soon after the Chinese attack on India in 1962, Peking started instigating Pindi for confrontation with India. In 1963 during the course of his meeting with Mao-Tse-Tung, Mr. Z.A. Bhutto, the then Pakistani Foreign Minister was told that Pakistan had missed its opportunity to recover Kashmir because it kept on looking to the United States when Chinese armies were pushing in to India in October 1962. During President Ayub Khan’s visit to China in March 1963, just before the Pakistani attack in the Rann of Kutch, Marshal
Chen-Yi, Chinese Foreign Minister said that, “China was not afraid of offending an aggressor and assured Pakistan about Chinese help in any further confrontation with India”. It may be pointed here that at that time India was passing through a period of political uncertainty as the result of the death of Mr. Jawaharlal Nehru. There was no possibility of attack from Indian side.

With a view to testing India’s vulnerability as well as to seeing how Chinese respond in her favor, Pakistan attacked in Rann of Kutch in April-May, 1965. During the Rann of Kutch operation Pakistan received diplomatic support from China in the form of Anti-India Propaganda.24

The close friendship of Pakistan and China is based on their anti-Indian attitude. Pakistan considers India with her vast manpower, potential resources and dominant Hindu population as a permanent threat to her security and territorial integrity. She has been keen to cut India to size and willing to cooperate with any country for the purpose. Likewise China considers that India alone is capable of posing a threat to Chinese leadership in this part of the world. She finds in Pakistan as the most convenient and reliable ally against India.25

The emergence of Communist China was not welcome to Pakistan. However, Pakistan’s hesitation to recognize China did not last longer. Pakistan could not resist the temptation of competing with
India in making friendly overtures to Communist China. Pakistan Foreign Minister Mr. Zafrulla Khan strongly advocated China’s claim to the U.N. seat. It is just possible that Pakistani leaders might have also calculated that if China was seated in the U.N., she might be favorably disposed towards Pakistani claim to Kashmir pending in the Security Council in view of Pakistan’s friendly overtures. Like India, Pakistan also did not antagonize China during the Korean war, though she was wooing the USA. While joining SEATO Pakistani leaders assured Chinese privately that; Pakistan’s entry into the military alliance was not directed against China.

Pakistan tried to maintain correct relations with China even during the periods of tension with China. The most important motivation behind those Pakistani overtures seems to have been Pakistan’s hope that China would provide a counter-weight against India. The other important factor of Pakistan’s policy was to seek a favourable stand on Kashmir. It had also been Pakistan’s objective to cope up with India’s military superiority in be friending China, Pakistan had other objectives also, viz., to neutralize the Russian support to India and Afghanistan by exploiting Sino-Soviet rift.26

China-India-Pakistan:

In the three days that former President of India, K.R. Narayanan was in Beijing in May 2000, he met with all top ranking Chinese leaders
starting with President Jiang Zemin, whose team included the vice-premier Qian Qichen and foreign minister Tang Jiaxuan. He also met Li Peng, Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress, Premier Zhu Rongji, Li Ruihuan, chairman of the CPPCC and Hu Jintao, then member of the Politburo Standing Committee. All the meetings were characterized by warmth and friendliness and marked by expressions of goodwill and hopes for a close cooperative relationship. A significant agreement was signed on the establishment of an Eminent Persons Group (EPG), which would offer recommendations and more diverse inputs to enlarge the ambit of the cooperation. But, as is usual during such visits, what is left un-stated or does not figure on the agenda, is as important as what is placed on it. Conspicuous by its non-inclusion in the discussion between Narayanan and Jiang Zemin, was the matter of Pakistan. Again, it is quite obvious that there was nothing significantly more that China could possibly have had to say on that, after the fundamental shift in stance that Jiang’s 1996 visit had established. In fact, President Narayanan acknowledged that when he said that the India-China relationship had developed smoothly since Jiang’s 1996 visit to India. With that as a basis, the Chinese President urged the importance of the two nations taking “a strategic perspective” of bilateral relations and repeatedly stressed the need for a longer view by “scaling heights and looking afar”. The
Chinese clearly wished to take the view that the problem of Pakistan was no longer an "issue" between India and China.

But when the matter of terrorism was brought up, possibly for the first time at the highest political level in discussions with India, when Indian President K.R. Narayanan visited Beijing, President Jiang came out forcefully against terrorism and called for greater international cooperation in tackling the threat. He did agree that there can be no political justification for terrorism and also stressed the need for India and China to cooperate at the global level to combat it. Expectedly, he made no specific reference to Pakistan. Insofar as the Chinese have been gradually taking a more balanced approach towards the subcontinent and to the extent that there was an attempt to take a neutral stand on Kashmir, this was taken as a sufficiently positive trend. The Chinese were unlikely to abandon their "special" relationship with Pakistan and it would be extremely unrealistic of India to expect it. When the Indian President explained India's efforts to improve relations with Pakistan and the sabotage of the Lahore process by Pakistan's aggression in Kargil, he also made it quite clear that India would not resume a dialogue with Pakistan unless there was an end to cross-border terrorism.²⁸

There was no response here as well. From the Chinese point of view, they had attempted to take a balanced position – the lack of any
improvement at all in India-Pakistan relations since the Kargil conflict, drew forth the hope that both countries would resolve the issue among themselves. It is possible that the Chinese do not see any point in commenting on a situation which shows no movement – such has usually not been the Chinese practice. In retrospect, one can see that they were also watching the situation carefully and waiting for Indo-Pakistan relations to improve.

In the backdrop of Kargil, it appeared somewhat doubtful whether there was sufficient appreciation in China, that its reluctance to explain the extent and meaning of Sino-Pakistani military cooperation was about the most troublesome aspect in Sino-Indian relations. The Indian argument was that they had been raising those questions time and again but the Chinese response had not gone beyond giving customary and less than persuasive answers to those questions. A typical such response in the words of a former Chinese ambassador, “In its relations with India and Pakistan, China’s actions with either India or Pakistan are not directed against any third country or at the expense of interest of any third country.”

The issue was not that there should not be any military cooperation between China and Pakistan, which is clearly impossible. But a major breakthrough in the India-China relationship could have been facilitated if there could take place a frank, no-holds barred,
strategic dialogue between them. That this was not happening, had political implications of an entirely different order, Jiang’s visit notwithstanding. South Asia was, and continues in many ways, to be facing a crisis, not so much because there is a likelihood of war in the region but because the degree of political and social instability in the region has grown. If the present trends continue, this will be a region of turbulence caused by religious fundamentalism and/or chauvinism. Beijing is all too aware of the turbulence caused by religious fundamentalism. When General Musharraf was in Beijing (twice in fact; once before the SAARC summit; from 20-24 December, 2001 and once on his way to Kathmandu for the summit in early January 2002) it appeared that the Chinese were distancing themselves from the South Asian crisis. The 4th January, 2002 People’s Daily quoted the Chinese Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Zhang Qiyue on 26 December, 2001, as saying that China hoped both India and Pakistan would exercise restraint in a bid to prevent escalation of border tensions and deterioration of bilateral relations. Zhang said China was seriously worried about the border clashes. As a neighbour and friend of both countries, China is very concerned about the development of the situation. There was a political message in that distancing. It followed, and for that reason was expected, that Zhu Rongji would convey a similar message to New Delhi. Premier Zhu distanced himself from the Pakistani positions as much as he could, without conveying any specific
view of the Pakistani position. The Chinese Foreign Minister announced that China had no intention of brokering peace in South Asia. The Indian External Affairs Minister, Jaswant Singh as well, said at a press conference on 13\textsuperscript{th} January that "China has neither any intention nor will it play any mediatory role between the two countries". Notwithstanding China’s special ties with Pakistan, India was committed to improving relations with Beijing, Mr. Singh said.\textsuperscript{31} As the former Chinese ambassador to India, Cheng Ruisheng, writing in 2001, put it, “In recent years, China had adopted a “separate policy” (a version that slightly differentiates from ‘parallel policy’).\textsuperscript{32} This is sought to be explained as follows: “Whereas the parallel approach underlines Beijing’s keenness to develop friendly relation with both India and Pakistan concurrently, the “separate approach” is an attempt to de-link Sino-Indian relations and Sino-Pakistan relations”.\textsuperscript{33} It is clear that the Chinese wanted to treat the two relationships (China-India and China-Pakistan) as if they had noting to do with each other. What Zhu Rongji could have done in New Delhi and did not do, was to address the obvious implications of the parallelism in Chinese approaches to India and Pakistan. To look at Kashmir as yet another inter-state dispute and to de-link it from the retrogressive forces in operation in both India and Pakistan amounted to deliberately steering away from the problem. It was understood that the Chinese could do little about the problem in Kashmir. But it could hardly take a distancing stand. South Asia was
and continues to be at a critical juncture. China as a global player has to play a positive role here as well.

**US Factor in Sino-Indian relations:**

The India-China relationship has entered choppy waters because of a perceptible hardening in the Chinese stance. Anti-India rhetoric in the state-run Chinese media has intensified even as China has stepped up military pressure along the disputed Himalayan frontier through frequent cross-border incursions. Beijing also has resurrected its long-dormant claim to the north-eastern Indian State of Arunachal Pradesh nearly three times as large as Taiwan.

The more-muscular Chinese stance clearly is tied to the new US-India strategic partnership, symbolized by the nuclear deal and deepening military cooperation. As President George W. Bush declared in his valedictory speech, "We opened a new historic and strategic partnership with India".

The Obama administration, although committed to promoting that strategic partnership, has been reluctant to take New Delhi's side in any of its disputes with Beijing. This has emboldened China to up the ante against India, with the Chinese Foreign Ministry employing language like "we demand" in a recent statement that labeled the Indian Prime Minister's visit to Arunachal Pradesh a "disturbance". The Communist Party's official newspaper, the People's Daily, after asking India to
consider the costs of “a potential confrontation with China”, ran another denunciatory editorial recently on New Delhi’s “recklessness and arrogance”.

New Delhi has hit back by permitting the Dalai Lama to tour Arunachal Pradesh and announcing an end to the practice of Chinese companies bringing thousands of workers from China to work on projects in India. And in a public riposte to Beijing’s raising of objections to multilateral funding of any project in Arunachal, India has asked China to cease its infrastructure and military projects in another disputed region – Pakistan-held-Kashmir.

The present pattern of border provocations, new force deployments and mutual recriminations is redolent of the situation that prevailed 47 years ago, when China taking advantage of the advent of the Cuban missile crisis, which brought the world to the brink of a nuclear Armageddon – routed the unprepared Indian military in a surprise two-front aggression. Today, amid rising tensions, the danger of border skirmishes, if not a limited war, looks real.

Such tensions have been rising since 2006. Until 2005, China was eschewing anti-India rhetoric and pursuing a policy of active engagement with India even as it continued to expand its strategic space in southern Asia, to New Delhi’s detriment. In fact, when Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao visited India in April 2005, the two
countries unveiled six broad principles to help settle their festering border dispute. But after the Indo-U.S. defense framework accord and nuclear deal were unveiled in quick succession in subsequent months, the mood in Beijing changed perceptibly. That gave rise to a pattern that now has become commonplace: Chinese newspapers, Individual bloggers, security think tanks and even officially blessed Web sites ratcheted up an "India threat" scenario.

A.U.S.-India military alliance has always been a strategic nightmare for the Chinese, and the ballyhooed Indo-U.S. global strategic partnership triggered alarm bells in Beijing. The partnership, though, falls short of a formal military alliance. Still, the high-pitched Indian and American rhetoric that the new partnership represented tectonic shift in geo-political alignments apparently made Chinese policy makers believe India was being groomed as a new Japan or Australia to America – a perception reinforced by subsequent arrangements and Indian orders for U.S. arms worth $3.5 billion in just the past year.

Clearly, New Delhi failed to foresee that its rush to forge close strategic bonds with Washington could provoke greater Chinese pressure and that in such a situation, the United States actually would offer little comfort. Consequently, India finds itself in a spot.

For one thing, Beijing calculatedly has sought to pressure India on multiple fronts – military, diplomatic and multilateral. For another,
the United States – far from coming to India’s support – has shied away
from even cautioning Beijing against any attempt to forcibly change the
territorial status quo. Indeed, on a host of issues – from the Dalai-Lama
to the Arunachal dispute – Washington has chosen not to antagonize
Beijing. That, in effect, has left India on its own.

The spectacle of the President of the most powerful country in the
world seeking to curry favor with a rights-abusing China by shunning the
Dalai Lama during the Tibetan leader’s Washington visit cannot but
embolden the Chinese leadership to step up pressure on India, the seat
of the Tibetan government in exile. Mr. Obama also has signaled that
America’s strategic relationship with India will not be at the expense of
the fast growing U.S. ties with Beijing.

The Obama team, after reviewing the Bush-era arrangements,
intended to abjure elements in its ties with New Delhi that could rile
China, including any joint military drill in Arunachal or a 2007-style naval
exercise involving the United States, India, Australia, Japan and
Singapore. Even trilateral U.S. naval maneuvers with India and Japan
were being abandoned so as not raise China’s hackles. As his
Secretary of State did in February, Mr. Obama undertook an Asia tour
that began in Japan and ended in China – the high spot – while skipping
India. In fact, Washington is quietly charting a course of tacit neutrality
on the Arunachal dispute.
Yet Beijing remains suspicious of the likely trajectory of U.S.-India strategic ties, including pre-1962-style CIA meddling in Tibet. This distrust found expression in the People’s Daily editorial that accused New Delhi of pursuing a foreign policy of “befriending the far and attacking the near”.

Left to fend for itself, New Delhi has decided to steer clear of any confrontation with Beijing. As the Prime Minister of the Tibetan government in exile, Samdhong Rinpoche, has put it: “For the past few months, China has adopted an aggressive attitude and is indulging in many provocative activities, which are being tolerated by Indian government in a very passive manner”.

Still, even as it seeks to tamp down tensions with Beijing, New Delhi cannot rule out the use of force by China at a time when hardliners there seem to believe that a swift, 1962 style military victory can help fashion a Beijing-oriented Asia. Having declared that America’s “most important bilateral relationship in the world” is with Beijing, the Obama team must have cautioned China against crossing well-defined red lines or going against its self-touted gospel of China’s “peaceful rise”.

The growing Indo-US relationship worries China and is being viewed by Beijing as its encirclement by the Superpower, as it is afraid of China’s economic rise. India’s close cooperation with the US in
defence, high-technology exchanges, politics and diplomacy has led to
the Chinese perception that India may become a cooperative partner to
the US in encircling and restricting China strategically and economically.
The Chinese Prime Minister, during his December 2010 visit to New Delhi, adopted a tactical retreat when pressed hard by the Indian media
on Chinese concerns about Indo-U.S. strategic ties; but behind the
curtains of a welcoming public face, the visit was aimed at calculating
the real platform of India-US relationship in the context of China.

US – India Security Relations: Implications for China:

Remarkable changes have taken place in the framework of US-
India security relations in recent years. During the Cold War,
estrangement characterized the two democracies because of India’s
non-aligned policy, close relations with the erstwhile Soviet Union and
tensions with Pakistan coupled with the US containment policy towards
the Soviet Union, and the US alliance with Pakistan. Based on common
strategic, economic and political interests after the end of the Cold War,
the US and India have moved from being ‘estranged democracies’ to
‘engaged democracies’. Such a change is primarily due to America’s
adjustment of its strategy and policy toward India as well as South Asia
and the Asia Pacific. The changing US-Indian security relations will
have a great impact on China’s security environment.
US-India Changed Relationship: Impact on Pakistan, China and Russia:

While Pakistan has attempted to balance Indian superiority by seeking external ties, India has perceived this as a way of upsetting the natural balance of power in South Asia.\(^35\) For America, Pakistan’s role in the United States’ military strategy is especially important when America’s personal interests are in jeopardy (anti-communism containment of the erstwhile Soviet Union, and counter terrorism). As Pakistan is a traditional ally of the United States and a frontline state in fighting terrorism, without a more normal India-Pakistan relationship, the India-US relationship will remain highly sensitive to Indian perceptions of Washington’s relationship with Islamabad.

It is widely accepted both in the United States and India that China is likely to pose a long-term strategic challenge to them. How will China deal with the outer world after it consolidates its economic and technological ascent? There are different assumptions in the United States and India. Some believe that the future role of China in the Asia-Pacific region will be stable and defensive, rather than destructive and offensive. Others assume that – based on aspects of its strategic culture – China may undertake an offensive foreign policy at the point of time when Chinese leaders think the international balance of power is in their favor. The United States and India have mutual interests, but different policies, in terms the nature of their future dealings with a rising
China. There are also essential divergences on issues such as Taiwan and human rights between China and the United States. There are also basic differences on issues including border problems and non-proliferation between China and India.

With the end of the Cold War, the balance of power in South Asia has been upset, and the influence of Russia in South Asia has weakened. Russia still maintains a stable cooperative relationship with India, especially in the field of defense. In the joint statement of Russia-India strategic partnership issued on October 3, 2000, the two parties claimed "democratization of international relations" which is obviously aimed at hegemonies. During President Putin's three-day visit to India in early December 2002, both sides signed the Delhi Declaration on Further Consolidation of Strategic Partnership, which heightened the bilateral relations to a new level.

The India-China-U.S. Triangle:

There are two defining characteristics of the security environment in the Asia-Pacific region after the end of Cold War: (1) The United States has become the only superpower in the world today. It is also the most important external power in Asia, and plays a key role in South Asian security; (2) China and India are emerging Asian powers. Each has a population of over a billion, possess nuclear weapons and numbers among the fastest growing economies in the world. Relations
among these three countries will undoubtedly dominate the course of events within the Asia-Pacific region in the 21st century. Their interactions and how they deal with the triangle will, to a large extent, influence future peace and stability in the region.

The United States and India, the largest democracies in the world, share common political values and strategic interests. Their common geo-political, economic and socio-political interests are advancing a cooperative agenda (which their differences over nuclear proliferation may not be able to halt). With the US-India relationship moving forward over the past two years, the two countries have developed a comprehensive co-operative framework covering democracy, economy and security. The Untied States now pays more attention to India’s role as the largest democracy than it did before. India’s continuous and fast growing economy, especially its information technology industry, attracts great investment from transnational corporations based in America. In the security arena, the US leadership has gradually begun to ‘forget’ India’s nuclear tests and has come to recognize India as a de facto nuclear power, as also its preponderant position in South Asia. With India’s support for America’s unilateral action in missile defense, the US and India moved from divergence to cooperation in the field of non-proliferation. After 9/11, counter-terrorism has been a new field of strategic cooperation for US and India. In a related development, Pakistan turns out to be less of an ‘obstacle’
for the US-India framework of relationships. China and the United States, the largest developing and developed countries respectively, also have comprehensive common strategic interests.

What is more likely is the emergence of a ‘soft balance of power’ system among the three countries. Alternately, at one end, a vicious competitive relationship among the three countries may emerge, and the ‘soft balance of power’ may be changed into a ‘hard balance of power’ similar to that in the Cold War era, if one of them regards the development of relations between the two other countries as a challenge to its national interests, or if any two in this triad forge a relationship as a means to contain the third country. At the other end, it is possible for China, the US and India to establish a relatively harmonious relationship if they can seek out common views and interests, and push their differences aside to deal with bilateral and trilateral relations within a strategic perspective.

South Asia is one of the most unstable regions in world today. Focusing on the Kashmir issue, the conflict between India and Pakistan has lasted for more than half a century, during which three wars have been fought. The Kashmir issue includes many conflicting factors: territorial dispute, ethnic and religious divergence, political opposition and nuclear confrontation. One can also find in the Kashmir issue three threats for today’s world: national separatism, religious extremism and
cross-border terrorism. India and, immediately thereafter, Pakistan tested their nuclear weapons and then became de facto nuclear powers in the year 1998. The United States has initiated a counter-terrorism campaign after 9/11, which focuses substantially on this region. These various elements are new factors in the conflict over Kashmir between India and Pakistan.36

US relations with India, Pakistan, China : India with China:

Sino-US

Sino-American or China-United States relations refer to international relations between the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the United States of America (USA). Most analysts have characterized present Sino-American relations as complex and multi-faceted, with the United States and the People’s Republic of China being neither allies nor enemies. Generally, the U.S. government and military establishment do not regard the Chinese as an adversary, but as a competitor in some areas and a partner in others. As of 2010, the United States has the world’s largest economy while China’s economy is the second largest. China has the world’s largest population while the United States’ population is the third largest. The two countries are the two largest consumers of motor vehicles and oil. They are the two largest emitters of greenhouse gases.
Relations between the People’s Republic of China and the United States have generally been stable with some periods of tension, especially after the breakup of the Soviet Union, which removed a common enemy and ushered in a world characterized by American dominance. There are also concerns which relate to human rights in the Peoples’ Republic of China and the political status of Taiwan.

While there are some irritants in Sino-American relations, there are also many stabilizing factors. The Peoples’ Republic of China and the United States are major trade partners and have common interests in the prevention of terrorism and in preventing nuclear proliferation. China and the US are each other largest trading partners excluding the European Union. China is also the US’s largest foreign creditor. China’s challenges and difficulties are also mainly internal, and therefore there is a desire on the part of the PRC to maintain stable relations with the United States. The Sino-American relationship has been described by top leaders and academics as the world’s most important bilateral relationship of the 21st century.

Pak-US

In February 2010, Anne W. Patterson (U.S. Ambassador to Pakistan) said that the United States is committed to partnership with Pakistan and further said “Making this commitment to Pakistan while the U.S. is still recovering from the effects of the global recession reflects
the strength of our vision. Yet we have made this commitment, because we see the success of Pakistan, its economy, its civil society and its democratic institutions as important for ourselves, for this region and for the world”.

In March, Richard Holbrooke U.S. Special envoy to Pakistan had said U.S.-Pakistani relations have seen ‘significant improvement’ under Obama. Furthermore he also said ‘No government on earth has received more high-level attention’ than Pakistan. Pakistan is a major non-NATO ally as part of the War on Terrorism. A leading recipient of US military aid, Pakistan will expect to receive approximately 1.3 billion for 2010. 25% of the military is subsidized by the US government.

As on 8th February 2011, US administration is reported to suspend high level contracts with Pakistan and may also suspend economical aid). All this happened when Davis, an alleged private security contractor, was on an American diplomatic mission in Pakistan shot dead two Pakistani locals last month in what he said was in self-defense after they attempted to rob him. Pakistan acted tough on him despite US demands that he be freed because he enjoys diplomatic immunity. But later the case took a strange turn. The two Pakistani locals who were shot dead by David came out to be the spies of ISI, Pakistan’s intelligence agency.
India-US

According to some foreign policy experts, there was a slight downturn in India-US relations following the election of Barack Obama as the President of the United States in 2009. This was primarily due to Obama administration’s desire to increase relations with China, and Barack Obama’s protectionist views on dealing with the economic crisis. However, the leaders of the two countries have repeatedly dismissed these concerns.

In November 2010 Obama became the second U.S. President after Richard Nixon (in 1969) to undertake a visit to India in his first term in office. On November 8, Obama became the 2nd U.S. President ever to address a joint session of the Parliament of India. In a major policy shift Obama declared U.S. support for India’s permanent membership of United Nations Security Council. Calling India-U.S., relationship a defining partnership of 21st century he also announced removal of export control restrictions on several Indian companies and concluded trade deals worth $10 billion which are expected to create/support 50,000 jobs in the U.S. during this visit.37

India, United States and China: Emerging Balance of Alignments:

As India continues its surge towards emerging as a key regional power, it is bound to engage in the global environment as an autonomous centre of power with its own regional agenda and global
priorities. It will also continue to make efforts to seek its rightful place in the global community through strategic dialogue and partnership with other centres of power, particularly the U.S. The US today remains the only power with the economic and military potential to impinge on a wide range of issues affecting India’s national strategic interests. Recognizing India’s growing economic power and regional influence, the US has shown greater willingness to deal with India.

India does not presently rank very high on China’s strategic radar, but the latter remains keenly aware of India’s potential challenge. This is borne out by its steady opposition to India’s bid for permanent membership of United Nations Security Council. China has also been resistant to the international, albeit informal, endorsement of India as a nuclear power, following the Indo-US nuclear deal. It also views with unease India’s steady strategic engagement with major global powers, particularly the US, which could increase its power capabilities and influence beyond its shores and emerge as a major rival for China in Asia and beyond. It is not surprising therefore that China has tended to view the warning Indo-US relations with some concern as potentially threatening its position in the region. According to a Chinese scholar, ‘unlike the US, which worries about the rise of China and not the rise of India, what concerns China most is how to prevent the US-Indian relations from becoming a formal alliance in South Asia’.

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China has exercised restraint in terms of any public statements against the improving the Indo-US relations for its own strategic reasons; China would not want to risk upsetting the US as this would have a detrimental effect on Sino-US relations. China and the US already have security concerns and deep sealed mutual suspicions. The US is clearly uneasy with China’s rapidly modernizing military capabilities, human rights and intellectual property rights violations and balance of trade issues.

It bears reiterating that for India, Sino-Pak-US Conundrum has been a significant feature of South Asian strategic landscape. China and the US remain the key external prayers, who have in the past both separately and together played an important role in shaping India’s security dynamics in South Asia. There is little doubt that as long as India continues to be wary of China’s preponderant power across the border and its encroaching role in South Asia, it will find it useful to explore any relationship, which will give it a certain leverage and diplomatic manoeuvrability in dealing with a powerful neighbour whose future intentions remain uncertain at best. Given the US long term interests in containing the increasing power of China, there is bound to be a strategic convergence between both India and the US, who have shared interest in checking China’s unbridled power in the region.39
Having said that, it is important to keep in mind that India has a track record of not being a camp follower and there is little doubt that it will strive to retain its own autonomy and initiative vis-à-vis China. It is unlikely that India would either rock the boat of seeking normalization with China or be seen as being inextricably tied to the US overarching global strategy. As an analyst has argued, ‘the best insurance against assertive Chinese power (for India) lies not in participating in any evolving anti-China alliance but rather in emerging as a strong and independent power centre on Chinese periphery’. To that extent, the Indo-US relations may remain an irritant for China, but will not substantially after India’s quest for keeping the Sino-Indian relations on an even keel.40

An overview:

After analyzing the Triangular relations between India, China and Pakistan, it became pertinent to focus on Soviet and US factors in India’s relations with China and Pakistan in a broader framework. India’s relations with China infact getting materialized since the early eighties. China as one of the three great powers was involved in the conflict between USA and USSR. It aligned itself with Soviet Union before the Sino-Soviet rift and was raising its voice against Capitalist countries in the West. India, though it not a party to this conflict, it certainly not free from its spill over effect. China’s hostility with Soviet Union is as tense, as intimate is the relationship between Moscow and
India. The Sino-Pakistani security and strategic nexus has remained a central issue in Indo-China relations ever since Beijing and Islamabad signed a historic border agreement and hence Pakistan is also an important factor in shaping Sino-Indian relations. In the past India viewed the normalization of US-China relations with grave misgivings. After Indo-Pak war, November 1971, the US believed that Soviet Union would come to the aid of India. India’s problems were that compounded by the US changing its policy from one of non-recognition of China to one of giving great power status in its own strategic considerations. In 2000, India’s strategy led to rapid improvements in relations with the US and China. Later a new strategic triangle among the US, China and India emerged from the flux in international relations created by the end of cold war. These three countries more frequently perceived each of their national interests. The crux of the new triangle is that each actor fears alignment of the other two against itself. This fear exists for all the countries including Pakistan, especially strong for the weaker states like India and Pakistan. The post cold-war Chinese-Indian-US triangular relationship differs in several ways from the Sino-Soviet-US triangle of the cold war era. The collapse of the Soviet Union, India’s rethinking of its traditional policies of non-alignment, US disengagement from Pakistan, explosive growth of Chinese power and deterioration of Sino-US relations. The relations between Washington and Islamabad severely strained by the Bin Laden operation, have deteriorated
considerably since then. Pakistan is furious over being kept in the dark about the raid and the US is angry that the Pakistani investigation appears more focused in finding out how CIA was able to trackdown the AL-Queda leader then on how Bin Laden was able to live in Abbottabad for five years. Thus it is clear from the above study, that in the triangular relations of India, China and Pakistan, the United States remained major factor then followed by Moscow's factor.
REFERENCES:


10) Ibid, p.63, p.244.


33) *Ibid*.


