CHAPTER – III

SINO-INDIAN
RELATIONS AND
DIVERGENT ISSUES
Geographic units created at the end of the colonial rule in the first half of the twentieth century generated a plethora of problems of placing the newly independent nations of South Asia in a tight spot, which in their struggle to maintain sovereignty and attempts to tie up with foreign countries for expediting the modernization process, had few alternatives to choose from. In the process they were drawn to the diplomatic design of the economically powerful but ideologically distinct economies, which by and large, defined their relation in the immediate neighborhood.

As discussed in the preceding chapter, China and India are two great Asian powers and ancient nations bordering on each other. The two peoples have, through long years of exchanges established a profound friendship. In modern history, both countries suffered deeply from colonial aggression and oppression and their peoples all along shared mutual sympathy and support. After World War II, India gained its independence and China its liberalization. India was among the first few countries to establish diplomatic relations with New China. For its part China, always regarded the establishment and development of long-term friendly relations and cooperation with India a focus in the pursuance of its policy of good-neighborliness.1
In the early days after the forging of diplomatic ties, China and India not only shared similar or identical views on a series of major international issues, but coordinated their efforts and actively cooperated in aiding each other in their diplomatic struggle.²

For instance China supported India in the latter’s struggle for the recovery of Goa; India stood for the restoration of China’s legitimate seat in the United Nations and the return of Taiwan to China. During the Korean War, India opposed the UN resolution which slandered China as an ‘Aggressor’. China asked India to help pass on its warning to the United States – a move which grew out of China’s trust in India, and later, China recommended India as Chairman of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission on the Korean POW question.

China also entrusted India with helping Chinese civilians in the United States to return to the motherland. During Premier Zhou Enlai’s visit to India in June 1954 he and Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru jointly proposed that the Five Principles of Peaceful coexistence be applied not only to Sino-Indian relations but to international relations in general. During Prime Minister Nehru’s visit to Beijing in October of the same year, leaders of the two countries had another in-depth discussion on bilateral relations and on international issues of common interest. The two sides also signed in that year their first trade
agreement. Despite its own food shortage at the time, China went ahead with the decision to supply India with grain to help it tide over its food problem. At the Asian-African Conference held in 1955 the Chinese Premier and the Indian Prime Minister jointly contributed to the success of the conference through friendly consultations.

Although China and India enjoyed fairly good relations in the early years following the establishment of diplomatic ties, this did not mean that there were no differences between them. The political relations between India and China over the past half century have been topsy-turvy with many highs and lows.

Chinese have been militarist as a people with continuous warfare and whatever peaceful traditions existed in ancient China have been overridden not merely by the expansionist policy inherited from the past but by the militarist traditions of the last half of the century. When Mao Tse-tung came to power he was under the hypnotic spell of militarization and therefore he talked about the ‘power coming through the barrel of gun’. Even later, Mao’s advocacy of ‘inevitability’ of a war reflected his love for militarism.

Subsequently, when there was a renewal of contacts under British rule, these had taken place in rather unfortunate circumstances. It was a period when China was exposed to the humiliation of a large
number of foreign countries including Britain, USA, Japan and Russia, imposing a regime of extraterritoriality on her. It was also the period when a number of opium wars were fought by the British colonial power, using Indian troops to compel the Chinese people to continue their pernicious addiction to the drug, specially cultivated India for export to China. This certainly had not endeared India to Chinese minds. This was further compounded by the burning of the Summer Palace in Beijing by British Indian troops and the practice of using Indian Policemen in cities like Shanghai and Hong Kong who in Chinese folklore took on the same role as the bogeyman in the West.

The rivalry between these two countries though manifested itself in the form of border problem, was actually deep rooted. The political systems in these two countries were divergent. While one was democratic the other was totalitarian. Both were struggling to demonstrate their viability. While one was open, the other was closed. One was widely accepted in the world, the other a suspect. One had won independence through non-violence, the other through bitter and prolonged conflict. Moreover, while one offered refuge to a great religious leader, the other drove him out along with thousands of his countrymen who refused to accept a totalitarian and repressive regime. Hence to suggest, as has often been done that there was
much in common between these two giants is to gravely misunderstand
the essential difference between them.  

India’s relations with China especially during the post-war world
was largely characterized by the perspective of mutual doubts and
threats with divergent issues un-solved till today. The fragility of their
relationships, however became evident when each of them made
digressing responses to the involvement of the super powers in Asian
region and outside. The steady intrusion superpower in Asian affairs
generated strategic concerns common to both the countries.

A curious but important characteristic of India-China relations is
the existence of asymmetric perceptions of mutual threat between these
two countries. Indians tend to be deeply apprehensive regarding China.
Chinese, on the other hand tend not to perceive a serious threat from
India, and find it difficult to understand why Indians might find China and
its actions threatening.  

Divergent Issues in India – China Relation – An insight:

Underneath the apparent bonhomie, the relation between India
and China started showing the signs of strain due various divergent
issues unsolved though the territorial issue had shown the seeds of
acrimony notwithstanding the fact that India was friendly in pioneering
China’s struggle for freedom and its place in the P5 (five nuclear weapon states).\textsuperscript{5}

The Tibet Factors an Issue:

In 1950, the Tibet issue, a most important factor arouse between India and China on the very first year of their relations. The People’s Liberalism Army on October 1\textsuperscript{st}, 1949 defeated the Kuomintag (National Party) of China in a civil war and established Peoples Republic of China (PRC).

Mao Zedong, the Commander of the Liberation Army and the Chairman of the Communist Party of China viewed Tibet as an integral part of the Chinese State. Mao was determined to bring Tibet under direct administrative and military control of People’s Republic of China and saw Indian concern over Tibet as a manifestation of the Indian Government’s interface in the internal affairs of the People’s Republic of china. The PRC sought to reassert control over Tibet and end Lamaism (Tibetan Buddhism) and Feudalism, which it did by force of arms in 1950. To avoid antagonizing the people’s Republic of China. Nehru informed Chinese leaders that India had neither political nor territorial ambitions, nor did it seek special privileges in Tibet but that traditional trading rights must continue with Indian support.\textsuperscript{6}
When Peoples Liberation Army moved into Chamdo and down the Aksaichin dirt tract into western Tibet, India and Nehru could not longer avoid the issue. Military action in Tibet was considered by India but the Indian army was inadequate for the task. The Indian response was contained in the Nehru’s doctrine for the Himalayas and in his flat assertion that the Mc Mohan line was our boundary map or no maps. Nehru also moved to negotiate treaties with Nepal, Bhutan and Sikkim, to seek a non-war pact with Liaquat Ali and accepted an invitation to visit the United States. He also held his hand on Tibet. In short Nehru kept all his opinions open. In the conditions of time all these were astute moves. He had earlier made clear that India had no territorial or political interest in Tibet and would welcome close relations with Peking. In the face of the Chinese challenging in Tibet, he did not hesitate to lay down the minimum condition for friendship with China namely recognition by China of political frontiers and territorial borders claimed by India. In no doing, he left it to China to choose between amity and confrontation with India.

On January 1950 Chou-erlai reiterated his Government’s determination to liberate the people of Tibet and stand on guard at the Chinese frontiers. The Indian ambassador in china, K.M. Panikkar under instructions from Nehru personally conveyed to Chou-erlai Indian regard to Tibet. Chou Enlai replied that “while the liberation of Tibet was
a sacred duty of his government they were anxious to secure their ends by negotiations and military action. The impressive military actions however gone to raise grave doubt among informed circles in India regarding China bonafides.\(^9\)

Friendly warning brought forth a surprisingly strong protest from China. It openly accused India of deliberately attempting to obstruct the exercise of Sovereign rights in Tibet. It also entered India for treaty a domestic problem of China as if it had been International dispute. Sarder Vallabhai Patel the then Home Minister publicly criticized the Chinese intervention in Tibet as “Unjustified”. As was revealed later, on 7\(^{th}\) November 1950, he had also warned Nehru of the danger of adopting its prejudicial action in Tibet. In a prophetic version he drew Nehru’s attention to Indian North East frontier in the changed context. A process of rethinking had started among some circles in Parliament even earlier. P.C. Baresh (Congress) described the Mc Mohan line as an imaginary line which would put Indian “Statesmanship in this particular area. To great test in the year to come.”\(^{10}\)

Many prominent leaders of congress warned the Government against adopting a complacent attitude towards China. J.B. Kripalani questioned India’s wisdom in having pressed for China’s admission to United Nations at so early a stage. He regretted that nation which had
been struggling for its own freedom should have strangulated the freedom of a neighboring nation with whose freedom India was intimately connected.\textsuperscript{11}

In 1951 Seventeen point agreement signed between India and China by which Tibet conceded control of her foreign relations and surrendered her treaty making power to Peoples Republic of China. With this, India lost its old trading agencies in Gartak, Gyunsse and Yatung. On 1\textsuperscript{st} January, Indian Government announced conclusion of barter agreements stipulated an exchange of 50,000 tons of rice for 37,000 bales of jute during the first quarter of 1951. 2\textsuperscript{nd} February Indian Government took over Tawang South of McMohan line without opposition from China.\textsuperscript{12}

The Article XIV, contained the 17 point agreement between China and Tibet (1951) which while unequivocally ending Tibet's dejure control over its foreign reactions promised that there would be "peaceful co-existence" with the neighbouring countries, on the basis of equality, mutual benefit and mutual respect for territory and sovereignty all of which later enshrined in Panchasheel.\textsuperscript{13}

On 29\textsuperscript{th} April 1954 an agreement on inter-course between Tibet region of China and India was signed in Beijing. The preamble to the
agreement contained five principles which come to be known as Panchasheela:

1. Mutual respect for each other’s territorial sovereignty.
2. Mutual non-aggression.
3. Non-interference in each other’s internal affairs.
4. Equality and Mutual benefit and
5. Peaceful co-existence.

This agreement also provided for;

a. Withdrawal of Indian Military escorts.

b. Handing over of Indian postal telegraphic communications to China.

c. Establishment of travel facilities for religious pilgrims from both sides of the border, and

d. Mutual establishment of three trade agencies in both countries.14

Chou-Enlai paid a brief visit to India in June 1954. A joint communiqué released after a series of discussions and both countries reiterated their faith in Panchsheela. The people of India and the government welcomed Chou-Enlai with warmth and goodwill. The visit of Chinese premier said to be brought in “Hindi-Chini bhai-bhai” ness that is the feeling prevailed them.15 India and China were brothers.

Up until 1959 despite border skirmishes and discrepancies between Indian and Chinese maps, Chinese leaders amicably had assured India that there was no territorial controversy on the border.
though there is some evidence that India avoided bringing up the border issue in high level meetings.

In 1954, India published new maps that included the Aksai Chin region within the boundaries of India. When an Indian reconnaissance party discovered a completed Chinese road running through the Aksai Chin region of the Ladakh District of Jammu and Kashmir, border clashes and Indian protests became more frequent and serious.16


"The Sino-Indian boundary has never been delimited. Historically no treaty or agreement on the Sino-Indian border question has ever been concluded between the Chinese Central Government and Indian Government".17

Tibetan Revolt:

It may be recalled that even before the Tibetan rebellion of March 1959 serious differences regarding the border had developed between India and China. The outbreak of that rebellion further aggravated these
differences and immediately led to an intensification of military activities on the border.¹⁸

**Dalai lama Episode:**

China struck again in Tibet in March, 1959. After a period of strained relations with the Dalai lama demonstration broke out in Lhasa and the Tibetan Cabinet proclaimed its independence. The 17 point agreement of 1951 was declared null and void. The Chinese reorganized the preparatory committee for the Tibet autonomous region with Panchen Lama as acting Chairman. The People's Liberation Army suppressed the revolt and shelled Norbilingki, the palace of Dalai lama. He was persuaded by his close associates to leave the country and was given political assyum in India. The Dalai lama spiritual and temporal head of the Tibetan people, sought sanctuary in Dharmsala, Himachal Pradesh in March 1959, and thousands of Tibetan refugees settled in northwestern India, particularly in Himachal Pradesh. The People's Republic of China accused India of expansionism and imperialism in Tibet and throughout the Himalayan region.

The reaction in India was explosive Nehru still described events as more “a Clash of will than of arms” but press and the Lok Sabha was than upset. Chinese propaganda described India's help to the Dalai lama as interference and the rebellion in Tibet as master minded in
Kalmpong by Tibetan Indian expansionists, American imperialists and Kuementong reactionaries.\textsuperscript{19}

The result was that Chinese took the position that there had been various forms of Indian complaints in the rebellion and further that it was entirely improper to Indian leaders to expresses sympathy for Tibetans, or present such expression by other persons and groups in India. The Indians felt that China was trying to intimidate the Nehru Government into adopting a stand on the Tibetan affairs which was more to Pekings liking. There were both major points in disputes and apparently the ways in which the two sides genuinely perceived the situation. Minor controversies also exacerbated tension, the activities of Dalai lama once he fled to India, being the source of one of them” confrontation was the result.\textsuperscript{20}

\textbf{Border Disputes:}

Though the Tibet factor and providing shelter to Dalai lama were to be cause of Chinese exasperation, it is the territorial dispute between India and China which has excruciatingly embillered their relation for the last six decades.

The dispute arose due to several misperceptions and has been sustained by the obduracy of both the countries in supporting their respective positions relating to the boundary demarcation. Chinese
attempt to redefine its boundary soon after the PRC came into existence had its repercussion on India damaging the cordial relation that both countries had during the former's national struggle climaxing in a war and draining the meager resources of India to keep it vigil on a border lying in the most adversarial terrain.21

A characteristic feature of the continuing India-China boundary dispute is the consistent position of India the boarder question based on treaty agreement and custom. China on the contrary has consistently sought to make a case in its favour by taking recourse to force and disregarding facts of history.

The entire border between India and China can be broadly classified into three sectors namely western sector middle sector and the eastern sector as discussed in the preceding chapter.

India's northern frontier with China runs a distance of about 2390 miles. In addition to the north are the countries of Nepal, Bhutan whose frontiers are with China are 670 ad 250 miles long respectively. While dealing with the question of settling the border problem with China one must, therefore, think of this enormous length specially as the border runs through some of the most difficult mountain areas of the world. Usually, a sector-wise approach is adopted in analyzing the border differences and this is unavoidable because the nature of the problem
are different in each of the three sectors, he western sector with the additional complication of Pakistan having occupied a part of the Jammu and Kashmir State; the middle sector with the six main passes enumerated in the Sino-Indian Agreement of 1954; and the eastern sector where we have to deal with the McMahon Line.

In the western sector there is an added complication involving Pakistan. A 200-250 mile length border out of a total of about 1100 mile upto the Shipki Pass in the extreme west was occupied by Pakistan. These include Gilgit, Hunza and the Shksgam valley. The Shaksgam valley, however, has been later occupied by China under the Sino-pak Agreements have all combined to play their part of our long northern frontier. Before evolving a solution to how these can be resolved, it is pertinent to make a sector-wise examination. For this purpose it is apt to begin with the western sector where Pakistan too is involved and where also lies the main area occupied by China since 1950 namely the Aksai Chin plateau and its environs.22

THE WESTERN SECTOR:

The boundary in the western sector between Jammu and Kashmir and Sinkiang and Tibet is about 1770 kilometers in length. The frontier between Sinkiang and the Pakistan occupied portion of Kashmir is 480 kilometers long and involve a disputed area of about 13,000 to
15,500 square kilometers. The rest of this border is between Ladakh and Tibet. In the western sector the boundary runs along the Mustagh Range and the April Range across the Karakoram pass via the Qara Tagh pass and along the main Kuen Lun Ranges to a point east of longitude 80° E and 40 kilometers north of Hajit Langer. This boundary is an obvious physical boundary between the Gilgit area and Sinkiang following the main karakoram watershed dividing the streams flowing into the Tarim basin. Further at south east the boundary runs along the watershed across Lanak La Kone La and Kepsang La then follows the Chenesang River across Pangyong lake and the Kallash Range. Here the boundary constitutes the watershed between the Indus system in India and the Kotan system in China. In this area, China claims the Aksaichin district, the Changmo Valley, Pangong Tso and the Spangar Tso area of north east, Ladakh, as well as strip of about 5000 square kilometers down the entire length of eastern Ladakh.

In order to have clear understanding of the border problem in the western sector it is highly essential to know about Ladakh. Ladakh lying in the Valley of the upper Indus at an attitude of about twelve thousand feet is a sparsely populated area. The topography is unique consisting of very high mountains with intervening Valleys and scattered plains. Before the Tibetan uprising against their Chinese communist
overlords, Ladakh hardly received any mention in the world press and very few people know about it. It was in this place that India and China fought a war over the possession of high alkaline plain known as the Aksai Chin where the frontiers of Tibet, Sinkiang and Ladakh marched together.

Aksai Chin, which literally means a desert of white stones, is a high and desolate Plateau which is square area of approximately ten thousand miles and 17,000 ft above the sea level. It lies between the Karakonam and Kuenleun Ranges. Aksai Chin is one of the bleakest places. Nehru described it as a land where no people live and no blade of grass grows. Though this place is desolate and inhospitable for human habitation it was not without importance. An ancient trade route lay across it and in its brief summer when for a few hours around noon the ice melted in the streams to give water for beasts, caravan of yaks crossed it from what is now Sinkiang of Tibet, carrying Silk, jade, hemp salt or wool. The importance of this route was once again recognized in the present century when it became essential for China to use this route to quell the revolt and ascertain control in Tibet.

By the mid 1890’s the Chinese acquired knowledge of the border from the Karakoram pass to the Chang Chemno River and they claimed Aksai Chin as their territory. In 1899 the British Government proposed
a new boundary alignment between Kashmir and China. The main intention of the British was to secure for Hunza, an ally of British which was a tiny principality lying north-west of Kashmir. As per this proposal Aksai Chin and Qara Qash basin were to be conceded to China for its recognition of Hunza’s claims over Raskam valley and Taghdumbash.

This proposed border agreement would have entailed major territorial concessions by the British, since the Government of India demonstrated both on maps and through the existence of authority in the Aksai Chin that they considered the Kuenlun range to be the de facto boundary between Sinkiang and Kashmir. Indeed, most of the territory currently in dispute between New Delhi and Peking would have been conceded in China. The Chinese missed an excellent opportunity by not replying to this boundary proposal because the British never repeated this offer and subsequent British maps continued to depict the boundary along the Kuenlun range.

Thus we can see that Ladakh which was under the rule of different rulers in different periods in history ultimately became subservient to the Dogras of Kashmir in 1840s. Ladakh, subsequently came under the influence of British rulers when Kashmir itself became an ally of the British. British Government in India was afraid that without a proper demarcation of boundary in the north-west between Kashmir
and China there were bound to be dispute. As a result, they initiated efforts to create a boundary between Kashmir and China. However all their efforts proved to be futile. When India became independent, it inherited this undermarked border in the western sector.

**MIDDLE SECTOR:**

The boundary between the Aksai Chin region and Nepal is known as the middle sector in the terminology of the Sino-Indian dispute. The boundary in the middle sector runs along watershed from Ladakh to Nepal. It is 625 Kms long and adjoins the states of Himachal Pradesh and Uttar Pradesh. The traditional frontier of Himachal Pradesh follows the water parting between the Spiti and the Parachu rivers and then continues along the watershed between the eastern and western tributaries of the Sutlej. The Uttar Pradesh boundary lies on the water parting between the Sutlej and the Kali the Alakananda and the Bhagirathi. The boundary crosses the Sutlej near the Shipki La (pass) on the Himachal Pradesh – Tibet border. From there it runs along the watershed passes of Mana, Niti, Kungri-Bingri, Dharma and Lipu Lekh, finally joining the triple point junction of China, Nepal and India. In this sector the Chinese claim nearly 2000 sq kms.

The British frontier policy in the middle sector in the 19th century was clear. Here a number of small hill states existed. The British after
the Gorkha war (1814-16) annexed Kumaon, one of the states and later tried to bring the remaining states also under its influence. They however found these states to be under the defacto control of Tibetan and hence found it difficult to annex them. This continued unresolved throughout the British rule. After the attainment of independence in 1947, the Indian Government consolidated its authority over these territories by excluding the Tibetan authority. China and Tibet protested against this act.

Between the middle sector and the eastern sector Nepal, Sikkim and Bhutan form a kind of Zonal frontier between India and China. During the nineteenth century these states were all in varying degrees in dependence or allegiance to China. Britain perceived Chinese influence over these states as a challenge and a potential threat to their own position. The endeavour of the British policy throughout the nineteenth century was to make these Himalayan states owe allegiance to the British and they succeeded to a great extent.

British considered annexing Nepal after they defeated it in the Gorkha war (1814-16). However they desisted from the move jest it would incur Chinese reaction. They were content thereafter with a situation in which Nepal continued in form under China's suzerainty, but in fact accepted British control of her internal and external affairs. In
1890 China signed with British a convention recognizing Sikkim as a British protectorate and delimiting the Sikkim-Tibet boundary. In 1910 over the protests of China, the British signed a treaty with Bhutan in which that Kingdom bound herself to be guided by Britain in her foreign relations. British also tried to bring Tibet under its influence as it suspected the evil designs of Russia over Tibet. However it failed in its endeavor.

THE EASTERN SECTOR:

The boundary in the eastern sector is 140 kms. long and runs from the eastern limit of Bhutan to a point near the Talu pass at the trijunction of India, Tibet and Burma. This line is called the Mc Mohan Line after Henry Mc Mohan, a British representative, who signed the 1913–14 Simla convention. The boundary was established along the Himalayan crest of the northern watershed of the Brahmaputra, except where Lohit, Dihang, Subansiri and kemang rivers break through that watershed. The only variance from the watershed principle is near Miayetun and the two Tibetan pilgrim places of Tstokaro and Tsarisarpa.

North-East Frontier:

In the north–east, the traditional boundary was formalized at a Tripartite Conference held in Simla from October 1913 to July 1914 and
attended by the Plenipotentiaries of the Governments of India, Tibet and China. The Indian, Tibetan and Chinese Plenipotentiaries had equal status. The boundary between India and Tibet in the sector east of Bhutan was confirmed by an exchange of notes between the Tibetan and Indian representatives on 24th and 25th March 1914. The boundary was delineated on two sheets of a large-scale map of the north-east frontier. Two copies of the map were signed and sealed by the Indian and Tibetan representatives. The line was drawn after full discussion and later re-affirmed by a formal exchange of notes. The Indo-Tibetan boundary line as agreed upon by the Indian and Tibetan Plenipotentiaries was incorporated on the map attached to the draft convention and was never challenged by the Chinese representatives at that time or afterwards. There is nothing to indicate that the Tibetan authorities were, in any way, dissatisfied with the delineation. On the other hand, Lonchen Shatra, the Tibetan Plenipotentiary, stated explicitly in the letters exchanged that he had received orders from Lhasa to agree to the boundary as marked on the map.

There is no doubt that the McMahon Line (so called after Conference) merely confirmed the natural, traditional, ethnic and administrative boundary in the area. It runs mostly along the crest of the High Himalayan Range which forms the natural frontier between the Tibetan plateau in the north and the sub-montane region in the south.\textsuperscript{32}
The British presented the Simla conference as an attempt to mend relations between China and Tibet between whom fighting was going on at that time. However the main thrust was to make China accept the division of Tibet into two, namely inner and outer Tibet.\(^{33}\)

The main point of contention during the six months of negotiations was the boundary between China and Tibet. McMohan the British representative to the conference proposed that an Outer and an Inner Tibet be created. Outer Tibet – or that area traditionally under Lhasa’s control – would be master of its own internal affairs and could thus serve as a buffer between India and China. Inner Tibet – an integral part of China would serve as a buffer between Lhasa’s Tibet and Russian – dominated Outer Mongolia. From British India’s point of View this formula offered protection from both Russia and China and recognized at the same time that the farthest reaches of ethnic Tibet could not practically be controlled from Lhasa.\(^{34}\) The Chinese saw through the game of dividing Tibet to take a great part of it or separate it from China. However their opposition to the proposal was not over the question of division but as to where the division should run. This was the issue upon which the conference finally broke down.

On July 3\(^{rd}\), 1914 the Simla convention was signed by British and Tibet. The Chinese Government refused to be a party to it even though
Chen, the Chinese representative to the conference had initiated the draft agreement an act which usually meant informal acceptance. Subsequently, Britain made unsuccessful efforts to gain Peking’s adherence to convention.

China did not raise any objection to Mc Mohan’s formula at Simla or in the subsequent years after the conference during which Britain still hoped for Peking’s acceptance of the convention. It was only in the late 50’s and early 60’s of the present century, when the differences became acute that China started questioning about the validity of the line while India consistently argued it to be the border.

By 1950 the centre of interest in the Himalaya had once again shifted to Tibet. China had never relinquished claim to ultimate suzerainty over Tibet, even though it had bowed to the expulsion of the Chinese mission in 1912. With the intention of recapturing Tibet, China launched an invasion on October 7th, 1950. The using of the forgotten route through the Aksai Chin in Ladakh facilitated the easy conquest of Tibet.

The Chinese occupation of Tibet created anxiety in India on a number of counts. Primarily, there were disparities in Chinese and Indian maps particularly with respect to the border between Tibet and India’s North East Frontier province.
Both the Simla Convention and the map attached to it were signed by Ivan Chen, the Chinese Government Representative. Although the Chinese Government later repudiated his signature the objections to the Simla Convention listed in their memorandum of 25th April, 1st May and 13th June 1914 and 30th May 1919 were solely in regard to the boundary between Inner Tibet and China and between Inner Tibet and Outer Tibet. China neither protested against the boundary between India and Tibet nor did she seek modification of it after the Simla Convention. It is significant too that the Chinese Government agreed in 1956 – 57 to consider the eastern sector of the McMahon Line, which for about 120 miles forms the boundary between Burma and China, as the traditional boundary between the two countries.

Nehru’s contention was that, primarily the boundaries of the two nations were clear and explicit and secondly, as the Prime Minister, Chou-En-Lai had himself assured that no territorial dispute existed there was no point in raising an issue that did not exist. In the course of negotiating the 1954 Agreement however the issue of the Indo-Tibetan boundary did arise indirectly in connection with pass areas in the middle sector of the boundary, east of Ladakh and west of Nepal. When the Chinese represented the passes in the region as there’s India refused to accept Chinese position. Subsequently both the powers accepted
these to be boundary passes lying at their borders. The first border disagreement between India and China occurred in the middle sector. It was the first instance in which People’s Republic of China specifically laid claim to Indian territory lying south of the great Himalayan barrier. Talks on this question began in 1955 but no agreement was ever reached.\textsuperscript{36}

Another disagreement between India and China centred on the border of Ladakh with Tibet Sinkiang. In 1957 Peking laid a Sinkiang – Tibet road running across Aksai Chin, which was an Indian territory. India was ignorant of its construction till Peking announced its completion, which was later substantiated by a Chinese newspaper publishing a small scale map giving a rough approximation of the road. When India came to know through one of its reconnaissance parties that the road was running through Aksai Chin, an Indian territory, it sent a strong protest to Peking. In a reply dated November 3\textsuperscript{rd}, 1958 the Chinese for the first time positively and publicly asserted their claim to Aksai Chin.

Even since 1959, relations between Peking and New Delhi deteriorated rapidly. The Chinese no longer gave evasive replies to the border question but started an open and bitter challenge to the validity of the entire Sino-Indian boundary as was conceived by India. They
questioned the very legitimacy of the Sino-Indian boundaries and called the entire boundary as a product of former British aggression against China.

Although relations between China and India were severely strained by border episodes the flow of official communications between the two Governments continued. It was felt that the meeting of the Prime Ministers of China and India was essential to diffuse the situation and thus resulted in the meeting of the two in April 1960 at Delhi.

The outcome of the meeting was not encouraging because the two party's contradictory stands. Chou En – Lai’s stand was that though Mc Mohan Line was absolutely unacceptable to China, it was willing to accommodate the Indian point of view in the eastern sector, if India accommodated to the Chinese claims to the western sector by giving away Aksai Chin to China. Nehru refused for this barter, for he was under a firm opinion that Aksai Chin belonged to India and Mc Mohan Line was the boundary line in the eastern sector.

China contended that the Sino-Indian boundary had never been formally delimited and that there were certain differences between the two sides over the issue. It also added that the Mc Mohan Line had never been recognized by the Government of India. China also laid its claim to Aksai Chin plateau in western sector, Barahoti village in middle
sector, Longju village in eastern sector. India refuted these claims of China and reiterated those territories to be Indian. As the two parties could not settle the border issues sitting across the table they resorted to the ultimate argument – the war in 1962.

**Kashmir Issue:**

China unlike the United States and some other countries kept a low profile for quite some time in its policy towards the Kashmir issue. That however does not mean that China is not very relevant to the problem.

**China the third Party:**

Whatever the shape of the Indo-Pakistan settlement on Kashmir it cannot be a complete solution of the Kashmir problem because of a part of the Kashmir dispute is to be settle by India and China. The Aksai Chin area is in Ladakh which is a part of Kashmir. China was not a party to the Kashmir dispute when India took it to the United Nations. But now according to India 14,500 square miles of the Aksai-Chin area in Kashmir is under Chinese occupation.

Apart from the dispute over the Aksai-Chin area, China is a party to the Kashmir dispute in another sense. In 1963, China and Pakistan signed a boundary agreement after negotiations on China’s border with the “Contiguous areas the defence of which is under the control of
Pakistan”. This related to the Kashmir area under the Pakistani occupation as a result of the 1947-48 war with India. The agreement was a temporary one, for it provided that after the settlement of the Kashmir dispute between India and Pakistan, “the sovereign authorities concerned” would reopen negotiations with China regarding the boundary of Kashmir so that a formal boundary treaty could replace the provisional agreement. India protested against the negotiations which resulted in the 1963 agreement and later against the agreement itself. In its view there could be no Sino-Pakistan border or a border dispute between them became the area bordering China under Pakistani occupation did not belong to Pakistan but to India. While vesting the agreement with a tentative quality the Chinese scored a point here. The Chinese have been maintaining that the Karakoram Range is the boundary between Sinkiang and Kashmir and their claim to Aksai-Chin derive from this agreement. By securing Pakistani recognition of their claim line, the Chinese were seeking to justify their claim to the Aksai-Chin area, a large part of which was already in their possession. Thus China became a third party to the Kashmir issue between India and Pakistan in 1963. Unless India and Pakistan agree to a settlement of the Kashmir issue on the basis of the de facto situation (which means Pakistan retaining the part of Kashmir is occupies) China will be a party.
to the dispute. Yet, India’s dispute with China over Aksai-chin (also a part of Kashmir) would remain.\textsuperscript{37}

**Nuclear Tests:**

Chinas first Nuclear Test took Place in 1964 and first hydrogen bomb test occurred in 1967. Tests continued until 1996 when it signed the CTBT. China had acceded to the Biological and Toxin weapons convention in 1984 and ratified the chemical weapons convention in 1997. As estimated by federalism of American Scientists, China is estimated to have 180 active nuclear Weapons war heads and 240 total war heads as of 2009 which would make it the second smallest nuclear arsenal amongst the five major nuclear weapon states. The first test of nuclear device took place on October 16, 1964 at the LOP Nur test site. Its last nuclear tests was on July 29\textsuperscript{th}, 1996.\textsuperscript{38} India had these ample notices of Chinas nuclear ambition. The conduct of nuclear tests by china has become threat to India’s security after 1962 war and the raising of China as a nuclear weapon state in south East Asia that too as a border state has become a divergent issue is Sino-Indian relations.

**Indo – Pakistan war and China:**

In the year 1965 the Indo-Pak conflict turned into a major war when there was an armed clash on the disputed Indo-Pakistan border in Kutch sector in April- May. Chinese came out in open support of
Pakistan. Charging India with carrying out the "U.S Scheme of making the Asians fight Asians thereby disrupting Afro-Asian unity".39

In August, India reported large-scale infiltration into Kashmir by Pakistani irregulars but before the trouble there took a serious turn. India and China had been charging each other with border violations and incursions.

China's Foreign Minister Chen Yi, on a visit to Karachi, backed Pakistan's "just action in Kashmir to repel Indian armed provocation". An ominous Peking statement on 7th September warned that "Indian aggression against any of its neighbours concretes its entire neighbor" and of a "Chain of consequences" if New Delhi did not mend its ways.41 Chou, on 9th September condemned "Indian aggression against Pakistan" as a threat to Asian peace and saw United States support and Soviet encouragement behind the "serious military adventure". On the same day Vice Premier Hieh Fu Chich told a Lhasa rally of "Wanton incursions" on China's border and "naked aggression on Pakistan" by "Indian reactionaries" and asked the people and armed forces of Tibet to be vigilant. Following this, a Chinese note alleged intrusions across the Sikkim-Tibet border and demanded Indian troop withdrawal from the contested posts on the Sikkim border.
The Chinese attitude did not change. On 11th September People’s Daily backed “Pakistan’s Just struggle against aggression and the Kashmiri people’s struggle for national self – determination”. The attack was on Soviet responsibility for the conflict and failure to distinguish between a ‘Just and unjust war’. As the war moved to its climax China virtually threatened to open a second front in Pakistan’s support when it issued a 72 hour ultimatum on 18 September demanding demolition of the alleged Indian military structures on the Tibet-Sikkim border and the return of 800 sheep and 59 yak alleged to have been taken away by Indian soldiers from Tibetan herdsmen. Prime Minister Shastri warned China that if Indians were attacked it would ‘fight with grim determination’.

India reported large scale Chinese troop movements all along the border and firing on 20th September along the Ladakh border and in the Sikkim region. On 19th September India alleged Chinese incursions while the next day China extended the ultimatum by 72 hours.

On 22nd September, China announced that the military installations had been demolished while Indian officials maintained that the so called fortifications were a myth and the Chinese announcement a “climb-down” to prepare for Pakistan’s acceptance of the Security Council resolution of 20th September calling a cease-fire. A more
plausible reason for the Chinese stance choice could be the fact India had accepted the cease fire call. China had warned India through United States not to extend the conflict to East Pakistan (Which was separated from West Pakistan by 1,200 miles of Indian territory. To this extent the Chinese ultimatum achieved its objective because the war did not extend to East Pakistan and India and Pakistan responded to the Security Council’s cease fire call.

**Mutual Expulsion of Diplomats:**

The withdrawal of Chinese forces seen later after the ceasefire was declared between India and Pakistan at instance of UN Security Council. In the 1965 Indo-Pakistan war the Chinese firm support to Pakistan seen as a factor, it wanted Pakistan to be its ally and they wanted to limit Indian influence in Asia by taking the side of Pakistan. So they supported Pakistan vehemently only to gain power balance in Asia.

In 1967 two Indian diplomats Mr. Raghunath and Mr. P. Vijai were expelled from Beijing on alleged charges of espionage activities later we see India retaliating to this by serving a deportation order on first secretary of Chinese embassy in India Chen Lu chi and third Secretary Hsich Chin Lao were declared persons non grants. With this the Indian embassy staff in Beijing was seized and their families were under
Political Split in Communist Party of India:

At the time of Sino-Indian border conflict a severe political split was taking place in the Communist Party of India. One section was accused by the Indian Government as being pro-PRC, and a large number of political leaders were jailed. Subsequently, CPI split with the leftist section forming the Communist Party of India (Marxist) in 1964. CPI (M) held some contacts with the Communist Party of China in the initial period after the split but did not fully embrace the political line of Mao Zedong.

Post Indo-Pakistan Issues:

Relations between the China and India deteriorated during the rest of the 1960 and the early 1970s as Sino-Pakistani relations improved and Sino-Soviet relations worsened. The PRC backed Pakistan in its 1965 war with India. Between 1967 and 1971 an all weather road was built across territory claimed by India, linking PRC’s Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region with Pakistan; India could do no more than protest. China continued an active propaganda campaign against India and supplied ideological financial and other assistance to dissident groups, especially to tribes in north-eastern India. China
accused India of assisting the Khampa rebels in Tibet. Diplomatic contact between the two governments was minimal although not formally severed. The flow of cultural and other exchanges that had marked the 1950s ceased entirely. The flourishing wool, fur and spice trade between Lhasa and India through the Nathula Pass an offshoot of the ancient Silk Road in the then Indian protectorate of Sikkim was also severed. However the bi-weekly postal network through this pass was kept alive which exists till today.

In late 1967, there were two skirmishes between Indian and Chinese forces in Sikkim. The first one was dubbed the "Nathu La incident" and the other the "Chola incident". On 11th September 1967 troops of the Indian Army's 18th Rajput Regiment were protecting an Engineering Company that was fencing the North Shoulders of Nathula, when Chinese troops opened fire on them. This escalated over the next five days to an exchange of heavy artillery and mortar fire between the Indian and the Chinese. 62 Indian soldiers from the 18th Rajput the 2nd Grenadiers and the Artillery regiments were killed. The extent of Chinese casualties in this incident was not known.

In the second, on 1st October 1967, a group of Indian Gurkha Rifles soldiers (from the 7th Battalion of the 11th Regiment) noticed Chinese troops surrounding a sentry post near a boulder at the Chola
outpost in Sikkim. After a heated argument over the control of the boulder a Chinese soldier bayoneted a Gurkha rifleman, triggering the start of a close-quarter’s knife and fire-fight, which then escalated to a mortar and HMG duel. The Chinese troops had to signal a ceasefire just after three hours of fighting but later scaled point 15450 to establish themselves there. The Gurkhas outflanked them the next day to regain point 15450 and the Chinese retreated across the LAC. The extent of Chinese causalities in this skirmish is also not known.

Indo – Pak war 1971 and China:

In the year 1971 a massive secessionist movement in Pakistan’s eastern wing (East Bengal, now Bangladesh) leading to army crackdown in Dacca on 25th March and unusual exodus of refugees into Indian territory. Chinese supported Pakistan and assured their support in the event of an Indian attack. The Chinese charged India with plotting to dismember Pakistan by creating a Bangladesh in its eastern wing. It also submitted a draft resolution in UN accusing India of launching a large scale attack on Pakistan with India declaring ceasefire on western front, the ceasefire accepted by Pakistan and the war ended.

On December Jemin Jing Pao carried a write up under the Title "Indian ambition to annex East Pakistan which said, the Indian
Government backed and abetted by social imperialism plotting to create a Bangladesh in East Pakistan is an attempt to divide Pakistan and realize its expansionist ambitions to annex East Pakistan.48

In August 1971, India signed its Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation with the Soviet Union, and the United States and the PRC sided with Pakistan in its December 1971 war with India. By this time the PRC had just replaced the Republic of China in the UN where its representatives denounced India as being a “tool of Soviet expansionism”.

Annexation of Sikkim:

Just as the process of normalization was slowly getting back into motion, the developments in the tiny Himalayan Kingdom of Sikkim threatened to put India and China once again in the warring camps. Following the Fifth General Elections in January 1973 in Sikkim a struggle ensured between the leaders of the democratic parties and the Chogyal leading to a virtual breakdown of the law and order situation in April. On 6th April 1973, in response to a written request from the Chogyal, Indian army took over the responsibility of maintaining law and order in the Kingdom. Two days later the entire administration was taken over by the Indian political officer in order to as stated officially in India, safeguard the interest of the people of Sikkim and ensure its
political stability and economic prosperity. China took strong exception to the Indian move and accused the Indian Government of taking over the administration of Sikkim under the pretext of disturbances and deciding to use force when the voice of Sikkimese people had grown louder and louder against the Indian control and oppression following the unequal Indo-Sikkim treaty of 1950.49 The Chogyal however, refuted the Chinese charges and maintained that India had no hand in the agitation for reforms and the Indian army already present had merely assisted the Sikkimese Government in the establishment of law and order.

The Sino-Indian relations were once again strained because of the Sikkim issue. Sikkimese National Assembly passed a resolution with an overwhelming majority on June 20th, 1974 endorsing a new constitution reducing the Chogyal to a titular head and calling for closer links with India, by seeking Sikkims participation in the economic and political institutions of India. Chogyal gave his assent to the new Bill on 4th July. On 3rd July, the People's Daily had come out with strong condemnation of India's role in Sikkim accusing the Indian Government of having 'concocted' a constitution Bill to hold all power and reduce Sikkim to an Indian colony.50
Later, on 23rd April 1975, the Lok Sabha adopted by an overwhelming majority a Bill paving the way for Sikkim to become the 22nd State of the Union. On 29th April, the Government of the People’s Republic of China issued a statement criticizing the Indian Government’s action and it added that it did not recognize India’s illegal annexation of Sikkim. On May 1st, 1975 India denounced China’s statement on Sikkim as interference in the internal affairs of India.

**Sumdorong Chu Valley Incident:**

Chinese troops intruded into Indian area of Sumdorong Valley of Arunachal Pradesh in mid of 1986. Large number of Indians protested against this fresh Chinese aggression. China rejected the charge and held that area concerned was in fact its own territory. Information available from other sources indicates that India had built this area as a ‘listening post’ or an ‘observation post’, which would provide a good view of interiors in Tibet. They vacated the area in winter and when they returned back in summer again, they were chagrined to see Chinese soldiers in occupation of that area.

Chinese have never been there but the helipad was a new development. There was a brief encounter between the two sides in 1986. China claimed that Sumdorong Chu Valley “lying to the North of actual line of control as well as the McMahon Line”, as drawn on the
map coordinates its territory “while India claims ownership of the territory “lying to the south of McMohon Line”.

India could not handle the incident. India was not even sure of the exact location of the troubled spot whether it was north or south of boundary. On August 1st, 1986, P. Shiv Shankar, India's External Affairs Minister, asserted on the floor of Parliament that the Chinese had not built a helipad on Indian side. Three days later, however K.R. Narayanan then Minister of State for External Affairs admitted to the existence of helipad in the Sumdorong Chu-Valley.

The government of India had shown utter ineptitude and inefficiency in dealing with Chinese. The External Affairs Minister agreed upon the need to avoid border incidents although each defended the stand of his own country. No border skirmish was reported thereafter but this did not ensure the absence of tension in the border area. India also concluded one military exercise near its northern border in march 1987 known as ‘Operation Checkerboard’ treated by Chinese as provocative. In response, china also mobilized its soldiers and weapons on its side of the boundary line. There were reports that ninety nuclear missiles planted in Tibet were targeted on objects in India.
In April, 1987, newly appointed Defence Minister K.C. Pant visited China on his way back from Pyongyang. He did not get any indication that China was preparing for a war. When he was still in Beijing, EMS Namboodripad General Secretary of CPI (M), had a three hour long meeting with Deng Xiao Ping. Deng emphasized the importance of settling the border dispute peacefully in a spirit of mutual understanding and mutual accommodation. In July 1987, N.D. Tiwari, the Foreign Minister of India during the course of his talks with Chinese leadership in Beijing suggested that pending the settlement of border dispute relations in other fields should be expanded. This was the reversal of long held Indian position of the importance of centrality of border dispute settlement.

N.D. Tiwari’s visit cleared the doubts and convinced the Chinese leadership that India did not want a war with China and this considerably helped in diffusing the mounting crisis on the border. The Ninth Round of talks could not take place owing to rising tension in Sumdorong Chu Valley and military buildup on both sides. In June 1987 Rajiv Gandhi himself admitted that problems could not be solved at the diplomatic level when he said that “to take real progress in fully normalizing relations with China, you have to make a change in the level of and methods of talks”.

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There is an account by two American journalists John Avedon and Maxine Pollock on China military built up in Tibet on July 15th, 1987. In the root of the Sumdorong Chu Valley problem, was the Indian government’s decision to extend full statehood status to Arunachal Pradesh in 1986. China criticized the move vehemently as it believed Arunachal Pradesh as its own territory. As it was put, “notwithstanding this opposition, Arunachal Pradesh was granted full statehood in December 1986 and as feared China took exception to it”.51

**Nuclear Explosions by India and its Effects:**

The nuclear explosion by India in 1974 proved its nuclear capability. Having accomplished this test, India showed to the world the competence of its scientists and engineers. The world witnessed the growing power and capability of India. Simultaneously, two successful wars with Pakistan created a sense that India was no more a weak country. This made China aware of the new reality which led it to think more positively in terms of India.52

It was in May 1998 that the Indian Defence Minister George Fernandes gave a statement regarding China as ‘enemy number one’ of India. Mr Fernandes was also known for his Pro-Tibet attitude led to a catastrophe in bilateral relations. This statement infuriated Chinese
and was taken very seriously by the Chinese leadership, as a result the relation between the two countries suffered badly.  

The Fernandes episode was yet not over that another crisis broke out with Indian nuclear tests. In May 1998 India conducted a serious of nuclear explosions in Pokran range in Rajasthan and made unwarranted accusations against China under the pretext of the ‘China Threat’ that seriously frustrated Sino-Indian relations. The letter of Indian Prime Minister to American President, claiming that tests were necessary in view of the presence of nuclear state in neighborhoods. Obviously China which had committed aggression against India in 1962, further angered the Chinese. China criticized Indian tests vehemently and was reluctant to give India nuclear weapon power state status. It seemed that bilateral relations came to a halt again. The JWG meeting was postponed and no diplomatic exchange took place for eight months.  

While China was not so much concerned about the tests per se she was unhappy about the fact that India highlighted the China’s threat as rational to exercise its nuclear weapon option. Indian tests have largely upset China’s calculation. It sees a challenge in India’s growing nuclear power. It thinks this would weaken the Chinese position as global power.
Accordingly the Indian nuclear tests have certainly compelled it to rethink its strategic perception. It did not mean any escalation in military activities by either side on their position held on their border. But this would definitely compelled China to take a fresh look at its options along its border as well in other spheres in dealing with India.

The US also thought it necessary to engage India rather than to isolate it. The US intension was to make India accept UN resolution 1172. India on the other hand was adamant to maintain “a minimum nuclear deterrent” and to develop a delivery system for such weapons. This as a background Jaswant Singh and US Secretary of State Strobe Talbott held eight rounds of diplomatic parleys between June 12th, 1998 and January 1999.

The advent of two nuclear weapon States on its southern border has perturbed Chinese leadership. This new reality has completely upset Beijing security paradigms for the 21st century world. The bickerings of nuclear issue continued for some time which put Sino Indian relations in jeopardy. India then deputed its Foreign Minister Jaswant Singh to initiate the Secretary level dialogue with major powers.55

China remains estranged for more than nine months and JWG meeting was also postponed. Serious crisis arose over the issue as
both countries had different and divergent views on the cause and solutions to the imbroglio. While China felt that onus lies with India to make the good the damage, India believed that China should be more sensitive to its security and strategic concern.

Xinhua reported at the end of May 1998 that India was in possession of Chinese territory. It also criticized Indian Government decision to shift J&K office from Prime Minister’s office to Ministry of Home Affairs, “clearly a domestic matter”. It is expected to cast new shadow on Kashmir issue, the major dispute between India and Pakistan over more than five decades. Chinese have also been urging to take UN resolution of Kashmir issue.56

Then Jawant Singh (Then as the PM's special emissary) held a meeting in July 1998 with Chinese Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan, during the ASEAN Regional Forum’s annual meet at Manila. The US factor that impacted on the “India China Détente” was a result of diplomatic parlels between Jaswant singh and Strobe Talbot held towards the last quarter of 1998. As China did not feel comfortable about Indian proximity with the US and therefore Beijing also responded favourably to Indian initiatives for a resumptions of relations with New Delhi.57
Military Modernization Programmes – A Hitech:

On top of the tension areas in China's defence modernization programme which included nuclear tipped land and air launched missiles along with long range aircraft have augmented the apprehensions and misunderstandings between the two countries.

India like many other countries including USA is wary of Chinese rapid military modernization and its annual double digit defense budget increases. Many Indian analysts feel that China may pose a threat to India in the long-term. It is also felt by many that a possible future conflict may take place between India and China and the site of such conflict will be either the Indian Ocean or the South-China Sea. In fact both countries are trying to increase their military presence in the other's traditional Zone of influence. China has adopted the policy of 'string of pearls' to encircle India i.e. by providing military assistance to India's neighbours like Pakistan, Bangladesh, Myanmar who do not have the best of relations with India. It has increased to defence cooperation with Sri Lanka and has played a pivotal role in the wiping out of the LTTE. India, on the other hand had carried out joint naval exercise in the Malacca straits and in the Pacific Ocean with countries like USA Japan and Australia. The Malabar 07 joint naval exercise which comprised five nations including India, has been believed by many to be the precursor to an Asian NATO. Such a strategic
grouping would have as one of its objectives in limiting of Chinese influence in the Pacific region.58

The Sino-Pak axis as well as the Sino-Russian military tie up has compelled India to raise its defense budget diverting resources from equally important human development programmes. The reason for such hefty allocation is modernization of the forces and increase of surveillance capabilities particularly through satellite imagery as per the recommendations of the National Security Council which reviewed the Kargil crisis. A thorough revamp of Indian defence establishment involving modernization of its conventional weapons is underway. Coordination among various security as well as intelligence agencies around the country, close and constant interaction with the troubled states, overall management of paramilitary forces along with the RAF, enhancement of the security systems of the states are some of the core areas on which the Indian government is concentrating to encounter possible security threats at the disputed borders. Pakistan’s integrated strategy of nuclear threat, sustained proxy war and widespread terrorism against India in the Kashmir Valley and northeast with the help of ISI was not taken note of earlier when budget allocation were made but the Kargil crisis has altered the Indian leaders about the inevitability of continued surveillance across the border. The northeastern border of India is most vulnerable and will
have a multiplier effect if Pakistan and China combine their efforts to create trouble in this region. 59

**China-Pak Defence Co-Operation:**

In view of Indo-Pak antagonism which is complicated by several interrelated phenomena, the Sino-Pak military collaboration has potentially whetting the tension and unnecessarily increasing arms race in the subcontinent. Due to lack of transparency each has apprehended the other of having improved missile technology with capacity to deliver nuclear weapons. This is accelerated by China's determination to create a strategic balance in its western flank to keep India in check even as though both the countries have kept up the efforts for cooperation with unremitting exercise. The military ties between China and Pakistan have persisted since India was targeted as the common enemy and more as so by Pakistan which considers India as the “greatest threat”. With the attainment of NWS by India and Pakistan and the historical animosity between both the countries sustained by several contentious issues the core of which is Kashmir, Sino-Pak military collaboration has signaled danger because the weapons acquired by Pakistan were in the past used against India. China has characterized this as “normal military trade and cooperation” but the competitive attitude of Pakistan has increased
India's apprehension underscored by growing terrorism across the western border and within India.

For over three decades Pakistan has been a regular and one of the largest market of Chinese military hardware. It accounted for one third of the value of Pakistani weapons import from 1966 to 1980. According to a study, “in the twenty five plus years since Beijing began exporting arms to Pakistan, the PRC has become Pakistan’s most reliable and extensive supplier of military hardware transferring military related exports of virtually every description and destined for every brand of Pakistani military – personnel, equipments ammunition, small arms, mortars, armored personnel carrier, tanks, naval vessels, aircrafts missiles and missile technology. China has provided short to international range missile capable of carrying a nuclear warhead. As china M-11 Missile sale to Pakistan was a matter of grave concern to India, the Bush administration threatened to intensify economic sanctions against China if it went ahead with the planned sale of M-11 missels to Pakistan as well as active assistance in developing Pakistan’s nuclear capability.

China-Pak Nuclear Ties: Pakistan’s covert nuclear program which began in 1972 at Kahuta was an attempt to overcome its strategic weakness against India. It was a measure also to achieve foreign policy
goals. There had been regular reports in the media about the Chinese support to Pakistan's nuclear programmes. These include reliable reports of Chinese technicians being present at Kahuta.63 The most serious of these reports was that China transferred to Pakistan a design based on its fourth nuclear explosive device to be tested at Lop Nor in Xinjiang.64

In September 1986, these two countries signed an agreement committing Chinese assistance to the nuclear energy sector. Under the arrangement, the PRC sold two mini research reactors to Pakistan in November 1989 and February 1990. In November 1989 China also agreed to sell a 300 megawatt pressurised water nuclear plant based on the design of its own first nuclear energy plant at Zinshan then under construction. In August 1990, Beijing agreed to supply enriched Uranium to Islamabad.65

India’s fears of China’s overwhelming nuclear and missile capabilities were accepted by Clinton administration. The Clinton administration observed that India’s nuclear and missile programme ‘initially were driven by security concern about China’.66

Threat Perception in official defence Reports:

Sharply contrasting threat perceptions are apparent in the official defense statements issued periodically by the Indian and Chinese
governments. Indian defense reports were issued annually by the Ministry of Defense of the government of India. The analysis of India’s security environment in every one of those reports referred directly to China.

The 1999 – 2000 defense report doubled over the previous report the amount of space devoted to China. China ‘continued the process of modernization of its Armed Forces. The defense cooperation between China and Pakistan also continues. 'Sino-Pakistan and Pakistan-North Koream defence cooperation, which encompass transfer of nuclear technology assistance in the missile development programme and the transfer of conventional military equipment to Pakistan is yet another area of concern and potential instability.67

There is a sharp contrast between the long litany of Indian concerns about China, and the paucity of comparable China’s concerns about India expressed in official Chinese defense statements. The People’s Republic of china issued its first ever defense white paper in July 1998. That was just two months after India’s nuclear tests and the 'China threat' justification of those tests, and in the midst of a serious deterioration of Sino-Indian relations that followed those events.68
ASSYMMETRICAL COVERAGE IN ELITE FOREIGN POLICY JOURNALS

A second type of data documenting the very different perceptions of mutual threat in China and India comes from analysis of the content of elite foreign policy journals. These journals present thoughtful analytical articles for domestic and foreign readers interested in Indian and Chinese foreign affairs respectively. The authors of many of the articles in these journals reflect, to some degree of analytical interpretation and policy advice given to higher-level decision makers. They also, to some degree, reflect the view of a significant portion of the attentive foreign policy audience in the two countries. The central point here is that elite Indian journals are very concerned about China while Chinese journals are far less concerned with India.69

Dalai Lama – Vajpayee meeting wrong signals:

The meeting between Prime Minister A.B. Vajpayee and the Dalai Lama has caused further strain in Sino-Indian relations. A meeting of these two leaders in the third week of October 1998 has created a controversy. The Tibetan spiritual leader has had meetings with Prime Minister I.K. Gujral and H.D Deve Gowda. But those meetings took place in an atmosphere of improving relations with China. Given the strains in Sino-Indian relations since of Pokhran – II, china does not see
the latest meeting as a routine one. On the Indian side, the Prime Minister's office issued a brief press release about the meeting.

The Chinese Government reacted strongly to the news. A Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokesman said in Beijing. “The meeting violated the commitment of the India side of not allowing the Dalai Lama to engage in anti-China political activities in India”. He said that it had hurt the feelings of the Chinese people and expressed his country's deep resentment and regret”. The Dalai Lama, he said was not merely a religious figure but a political exile who “has engaged in anti-China activities aimed to split the motherland and undermine national harmony”.

The Chinese had protested when the Dalai Lama met Gujral and Deve Gowda but the language used then was comparatively mild. It has been the Chinese policy to lodge a protest whenever government officials of any country met the Dalai Lama. The Chinese Government protested against President Bill Clinton’s meeting with the Dalai Lama in the office of Vice – President AlGore when the Dalai Lama visited Washington in 1996.

Official sources in India initially described the Dalai Lama’s meeting with Vajpeyee as a courtesy call. But in the wake of the Chinese reaction, the External Affairs Ministry said in a statement that
the “reaction of the Chinese side is neither called for nor justified. His Holiness the Dalai Lama has been received in his capacity as a revered spiritual and religious personage by successive Indian Prime Ministers”. There it was not a violation of any commitment given to China. The Ministry claimed that Tibet was no longer an issue in bilateral relations between the two countries.

**Karmapa Lama Issue:**

An Important event in Sino-Indian relations in the year 2000 was Karmapa Lama Issue. Ugyen Thinley Dorje the 17th Karmapa Rinpoche, who is a 14-year-old and the third highest leader in Tibetan Buddhism flew China and reached Dharmastala on 7th January and joined Dalai Lama. Beijing reacting to this, warned India on January 11th, that giving political asylum to the Karmapa would violate the five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence. On January 14th, India officially declared to China that the 17th Karmapa has arrived Dharmasala but was not granted refugee status to him. Later on January 22nd, the Dalai Lama wrote to Indian Prime Minster urging him to accord protection to the Karmapa. He also represented to allow him to get education in India.

The flight of the Karmapa Lama to India raised the sensitive question of India offering refuge for Tibetan spiritual leaders and exiles.
This has also created a delicate diplomatic situation between New Delhi and Beijing. India has delayed officially granting asylum to the karmapa Lama and the PRC officials claimed that he was only there to retrieve the belongings to his predecessors, the 16th Lama. Indian foreign affairs officials find themselves in the unenviable position of trying to improve relations with China while placating the large, Tibetan community in dharamsala.\(^{70}\)

**Mutual Allegations and Counter Allegations:**\(^{71}\)

a) China's Allegation of Discrimination:

China has often alleged discriminatory attitude against its companies by the Indian government. While India has rejected such charges, it is nonetheless true that there are security concerns regarding the participation of Chinese companies in sensitive areas of the Indian economy. The National Security Council Secretariat had recommended that FDI flowing in from China in sensitive sectors like telecommunications should be subject to security vetting. India and China are likely to be competitors in many sectors of the global economy. China’s economic penetration into Latin America, Africa, and the Caribbean are matters of concern for India. Talks of a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) between India and China have faced major opposition from India's domestic industry, especially because the two countries are competitors in many product categories. Also, import tariffs in India are
higher than those in China. Part of the concerns of the domestic industry in India against such FTA stem from the fact that many earlier FTAs were signed in a hurry.

b) Issues of Visas Denial:

The thorny issue of Arunachal Pradesh continues to haunt relations between India and China. India had planned a visit to China of 107 IAS officers for the purpose of training. China, however, denied visa to an IAS officer belonging to Arunachal Pradesh cadre. The reason for the denial was that China considers Arunachal Pradesh to be part of its territory and its residents as Chinese residents.

Previously also China had refused visa to many officials and politicians from Arunachal Pradesh. Furthermore, it refused visas to four officers from the states that were to take part in an international vegetable science and technology fair. Even in the eighties the then Chief Minister of Arunachal Pradesh, Gegong Apang and Speaker T.L. Raj Kumar were denied visas by China. In 2006 the Chinese ambassador to India, Sun Yuxi claimed that Arunachal Pradesh was a part of China, just prior to the visit of Chinese President Hu Jintao to India. At that time Indian Foreign Minister Pranab Mukherjee had said on the floor of Parliament that Arunachal Pradesh was an integral part of India.
What makes the denial of visa this time different from previous occasions is that while previously the visa requests were made by the state, this time it was made by the Centre. Coming at a time when the Special Representatives of India and China were holding border talks, the Chinese refusal to grant visa was definitely a dampener in relations. India responded by canceling the whole trip. To this, the Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson said that India should not bring bilateral differences to the fore till the border issue was settled. The Chinese Government further said that Indian officials were welcome to China to participate in the training programme there. China however did not clarify as to whether the IAS officer from Arunachal Pradesh was also welcome. Thus border disputes remain a problem area in Sino-India relation.

c) Chinese Incursions:

China has laid claim on a small tract of land in North Sikkim and has even threatened to demolish existing stone structures in Finger Area. Finger Area is a territory that falls north of Gyangyong in Sikkim and overlooks a strategically important valley known as the Sora Funnel. India has strongly rebutted these claims, lodged an official protest and barred Chinese troops from entering the area. At the same time, India has produced a 1924 map of the Survey of India where the stone cairns have been identified and shown a part of Indian Territory.
The relations between both the countries touched lowest ebb when Chinese made 38 incursions into the area. India was used to incursion by Chinese troops across the 4,057 km LAC in all the three sectors – Western (Ladakh) middle (Uttarakhand, Himachal) and eastern (Sikkim, Arunachal) – in a bid to strengthen China’s claim over disputed areas and ensure New Delhi does not change its Tibet policy.

d) Issue of Tiger Trade:

Differences arose between the two neighbours over a Chinese proposal to revoke the ban it had put for long on trading of tiger parts. China maintains many tiger farms where tigers are bred. There are stockpiles of tiger parts in these farms. These tiger parts are used in traditional Chinese medicines. So far there has been a ban on trade of these parts.

Now China wants to re-start the trade. However China’s plans have alarmed India, especially given the dwindling numbers of tigers in India as recently found by the Wildlife Institute of India. India believes that if China revokes the ban on trade of tiger parts, then there would be demand for tiger parts in China. This would be an incentive for poaches who would poach tigers in India and sell their body parts in China thereby earning huge profits. This may eventually result in the extinction of tigers from India.
India scored a major victory over China in the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES) held in The Hague in 2007 where the Chinese resolution to revoke ban on tiger trade which was opposed by India, was rejected India was ably supported by many environmental groups on the matter.

e) Issue of Yarlung Tsangpo Project:

India has objected Chinese Government's efforts to dam and generate 40,000 Megawatt power from Yarlung Tsangpo (Brahmaputra) in Tibet. Under this project China wants to divert 200 billion cubic meters of waters to the Yellow River for easing water shortages in cities of Shaanxi, Beijing and Tianjin in Northern China. The dam and diversion plan is at the Tsangpo Rivers big U-turn at 7,782 meter - high Namcha Barwa, the world's deepest canyon before entering India.

Grounds of Indian Objection:

1. The water diversion project at the Great Bend will spell disaster for the Tibetan plateau and the lower riparian countries, India's North East and Bangladesh.

2. India is also facing a security dilemma over the Chinese control over the principal watershed of South and Southeast Asia in Tibet.

3. India fears Chinese reported plans to use nuclear technology in the project will lead to environmental concerns in the Eastern Himalayas.

4. Indian experts say the mega scheme could be disastrous for the 185 million peoples of India's North East and Bangladesh.
5. The regions regular earthquakes that can hit 8.0 on the Richter scale can destroy the proposed Chinese dam and cause devastating floods downstream.

Recent hiccups into India – China Relations:

1. The 13th round of talks took place against the backdrop of China’s renewal assertions over Arunachal Pradesh, India’s northeastern state that is claimed in entirely by both countries and recent strains in bilateral ties due to Beijing’s perceived hostile posturing on issues affecting, Indian interests.

2. In March 2010, China tried to block $60 million watershed development project for India at the Manila based Asian Development Bank on grounds that part of it was meant for Arunachal Pradesh, India has also not forgotten Beijing’s attempt to block a waiver by the Nuclear Suppliers Group that cleared global nuclear trade for New Delhi in 2008.

3. It has been exposed that Chinese strategist contends that Beijing should break up India into 20-30 independent states with the help of ‘friendly countries’ like Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nepal and Bhutan. It was published in the new edition of the website of the China International Institute for Strategic Studies (CIISS), an influential think tank that advises Beijing on global and strategic issues.
4. India worries about China diverting the Bramhaputra River, Chinese involvement in the arms trade around Assam and China’s stance toward Arunachal Pradesh which Beijing calls ‘South Tibet’.

5. The interaction between China and Nepal is irritating for India. One can recall that the Nepalese government recently approved the launch of direct flights between Kathmandu and Kunming. The thrice weekly flights will be plied by China Eastern Airlines and will make Kunming the third mainland city after Beijing and Guangzhou to have direct air links with the Nepalese capital.

**India’s answer to Chinese designs:**

China was “seriously dissatisfied” when Manmohan Singh visited Arunachal Pradesh in October 2009 for a campaign tour ahead of state elections. China has made clear to India that the territories in Aksai Chin in Ladakh, north of Kashmir, and Arunachal Pradesh in North-East India belong to Tibet and are thus parts of China. China claims about 90,000 sq km (55,900 square miles) of Arunachal Pradesh along the border as part of its territory that it sees as “southern” Tibet.

A war of words erupted again in late 2009, following Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s visit to Arunachal Pradesh which China claims to be a part of Southern Tibet. “We demand” said a Chinese
foreign ministry spokesperson, “the Indian side address China’s serious concerns and not trigger disturbances in the disputed region so as to facilitate the healthy development of China-India relations”. A month later the Dalai Lama too was granted permission by New Delhi to visit Tawang in Arunachal Pradesh.

India in turn, protested China’s plans to fund a hydro-power project in Pakistan – controlled Kashmir, which claims as its territory. New Delhi also reacted strongly to the Chinese Embassy in Delhi – issuing visas stamped on a separate sheet of paper to Indian passport holders from Kashmir.

An Overview:

India and China the two Asian giants are the neighbor countries and history also identified these two as Trans-Himalayam twins. There were the emerging super powers of the world. Friendly relations between these nations are necessary for peace, security and stability of south Asia and the world at large. But the relations between these two countries are marked by zigzag pattern having a long history of ups and downs. Various factors contributed for hampering the smooth conduct of relations between these two since their emergence as independent nations. At the heart of Sino-Indian disputes lies the long standing boundary dispute. The bone of contention between these two nations
besides other factors as discussed in this chapter are Transkorakoram Tract, Aksai chin region and Arunachal Pradesh which china regards it as south Tibet. China has refused to acknowledge the McMohan Line, now known as Line of Actual control. Border skirmishes have taken place more than once in the past. These two nations fought war in 1962 heading towards hostile co-existence. China supporting Pakistan in Indo-Pak wars, Nuclear explosions of India and its effects, Sumdorong Chu Valley incident, Chinese modernization program and its nuclearisation, issues of visa denial, Chinese incursions, issues of Tiger trade, Yarlung Tsangpo project issue and soon have contributed to bitter and un-cordial bilateral relations. But on the other side, restoration of and normalization of relations between these two countries is of paramount importance. In 1954 both agreed 'Panchasheel' and the slogans of 'Hindu-Chini Bhai Bhai' were raised during those days. After deterioration of their relations, various factors contributed for initiating normalization of relations and bilateral understanding. The factors responsible for resumption of dialogue between India and China and various stages and arrangements made for process of normalization of relations and Confidence Building Measures are discussed in the succeeding chapters.
REFERENCES:


8) *Ibid*.


33) Mongolia was divided into outer and inner Mongolia, Outer Mongolia later became free from Chinese hold and was recognized even by China as Mongolian Peoples Republic.


44) According to Z.A.Bhutto the Chinese threat was conveyed through the US representatives at Warsaw.


52) Ibid, p.41.


60) STPRI Year Book, 1980.


68) Ibid.


