II. CONTRIBUTION OF VĀÇASPAṬI MĪṢRA TO THE MĪMĀṂŚĀ SYSTEM.
INTRODUCTION

The term 'mīmāṃsā' occurs in the sense of desire to understand, enquire into or discussion in the ancient Vedic texts. But, there are no traces of mīmāṃsā as a separate discipline in the early Vedic literature. Similarly, the words 'mīmāṃsēta' and 'mīmāṃsā' are found used in the ancient Dharmasūtras such as those of Bodhayana and Vasiṣṭa. The parallel references among Gautamadharmsūtra, Apastambhadrmsūtra and Jaimini's Pūrvamīmāṃsā sūtras show that even at early times rules for the interpretation of the Vedic texts were formulated and generally accepted. It is clear from Mahābhāṣya of Patañjali that the mīmāṃsā doctrines were well developed and embodied in aphoristic literature. The references in Āpastambha's Dharmasūtra to 'Nyāyavitsamaya' and 'Nyāyavid' show that mīmāṃsā as a system must have emerged and elaborated before the time of Āpastambha. Further, the fact that Jaimini refers to a number of ācāryas in his sūtras leads one to think that mīmāṃsā as a discipline must have existed long before the time of Jaimini. With this background, a brief account of the mīmāṃsā literature from Jaimini's sūtras, the first extant work on mīmāṃsā śāstra up to the time of Vācaspati Miśra is given.
1. The PūrvaMīmāṃsa Sūtras of Jaimini

This Jaimini's PūrvaMīmāṃsa sūtras contain sixteen chapters, the last four of which are generally known as 'Sankarṣakānda'. The first twelve chapters are more popular than the last four and many great writers like Kumarila have written commentaries on the 'Dvādasālakṣaṇī'. The first chapter deals with Pramāṇas on Dharma, the second the Bheda, the third the Angatva, the fourth the Prayōjyaprayōjaka bhāva, the fifth the Krama, the sixth the Adhikāra, the seventh and the eighth Atideśa, the ninth Ūhā, the tenth Bādha, the eleventh Tantra and twelfth Prasanga. These constitute the most important part of the system.

The date of Jaimini is not definite and a work 'Chāndogyānivāda' - a ritualistic work of the Kalpasūtra character is attributed to him. A Srauta sūtra and a Grhya sūtra are also ascribed to him.

2. Upavarsa's Vṛtti

Upavarsa is the earliest commentator and he is the author of Vṛtti on the twenty chapters of Pūrva and Uttara Mīmāṃsa Sūtras. He is held in great reverence as is clear from the association with his name of the title 'Bhagavān'. Sabarasvāmin refers to him as 'Bhagavān Upavarsaḥ'.

3. **Sabara Bhāṣya**

Sabarasvāmin, the author of bhāṣya is the next important scholar in this field. His bhāṣya is the earliest extant commentary on Jaimini's sūtras in the bhāṣya style. It is lucid and clear in expression and simple in diction. Both in matter and manner it resembles Patanjali's Mahābhāṣya and Śankara's Brahmaśūtra Bhāṣya.

Sabarabhāṣya makes a great contribution to the elucidation of the sūtras. It also serves as the basis of later studies in Pūrvamīmāṃsa. It was due to differences of opinion between Kumārila and Prabhākara the teacher and the taught in respect of interpreting and understanding the bhāṣya of Sabara, that two schools of Mīmāṃsā arose. The two schools of Mīmāṃsā thought are called Kaumarila or Bhāṭta school and Prābhakara or Guru school.

4. Kumārila

Kumārila has written Ślokavārtika, Tantravārtika and Tuptika which are the three parts of the commentary on Sabarabhāṣya.

Ślokavārtika is a critical commentary in Anustup metre on the tarkapāda (first pāda of first adhyāya) of the Sabarabhāṣya. Tantravārtika is a critical commentary on the Sabarabhāṣya from the second pāda of the first adhyāya up to the
end of the third Adhyaya. Tuptika is the commentary on the Sabarabhasya from the beginning of the fourth Adhyaya to the end of the twelfth Adhyaya. This is a short gloss known for its brevity and conciseness in covering the different topics.

As the Varttikakara of this Sstra, Kumarila's position is unique unlike the Varttikakaras of other Sstras, for those who have been superseded in their authoritativeness by the Bhashyakaras. Kumarila is accepted as more authoritative than the Bhashyakara Sabarasvami himself. In many places Kumarila's interpretation of the sutras considerably differs from that of the Bhashyakara, not on account of bias, but logical discipline.

5. Prabhakara Misra

Prabhakara Misra is an illustrious scholar of Mimamsa system. He has written two commentaries on Sabarabhasya, the 'Laghvi' otherwise known as 'Vivarana' and the 'Bhhati' also called 'Nibandhana'.

In his interpretation of Sabara's Bhashya he differs from Kumarila on all fundamental points of Mimamsa Sstra. He established a new school of Mimamsa thought which is called after his name.
Vācaspāti Miśra is an important writer whose contribution to Mīmāṃsā is through the following works:

1. Tattvabindu
2. Nyāyakāṇika.

The first work mentioned above is an independent exposition of Abhihitānvayavāda by refuting other views including the Anvītabhidhānāvāda of Prabhakara. The second work is a commentary on the Vidhiviveka of Mandana Miśra which discusses the meaning of Vidhi in contrast from the different views held in that regard including those of Sabarasvami, Kumarilabhātta, Prabhakara and Bhartrmitra. A study of these works is presented here with a view to show the contribution of Vācaspāti Miśra to the Purva Mīmāṃsā school of thought.

Tattvabindu

Among the many points of difference between Kumarila and Prabhakara, one is about the efficient cause of Sabdabodha. Kumarila advocated 'Abhihitānvayavāda' while Prabhakara propounded 'Anvītabhidhānāvāda'. These two Vādās have engaged the minds of the followers of both the schools.

Vācaspāti Miśra wrote his Tattvabindu for the purpose of
elucidating Abhihitānvayavadā after meeting the challenges against it from the point of view of other theories such as Sphota and especially from the point of view of Anvitābhidhānavadā of Prabhakara. A study of Tattvabindu is presented in this section below.

(1) Mangala

Vācaspati Misra in keeping with the tradition has performed Mangala as:

Ahaye budhnāya namō bradnāya namō namōstu gaṇapataye
Āryayai bhārathyai namō namō vistarāsravase.

This is an invocatory stanza for different gods in which the word 'Ahaye budhnāya' indicates salutations to Śiva and the word 'bradna' indicates salutations to Sun who is in charge of giving health. Lord Gaṇapathi is offered salutations as he is in charge of removing the obstacles. Then Vācaspati Misra offers his respect to goddess of speech Bharathi and finally he salutes Hari who is in charge of sustenance.

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1 Tattvabindu with Tattvavibhavana, edited by V.A. Ramaswami Sastri, Annamalai University Sanskrit Series No.3, 1935.
(ii) Five views on Šabdabodha

After the customary mangala, Vācaspati Miśra introduces the main theme of his work 'Tattvabindu'. He refers to the commonly accepted view that in this world there arises, immediately after hearing a cluster of words, a knowledge (of the sentence) whose subject is that meaning which is anadhip (so far not grasped), undoubtedly in the case of the persons who have understood the relation of the words:

Ihakhalu padakadambaka šravana samanantaramavivādam vidita saṅgatiṇāṁ anadhitṛtarthā visaya dhīrudyayam-āsādayati pumāṁ.²

It is clear from this that the meaning of the sentence cannot arise separately from the words without mutual relation. Words do not have the capacity to convey the meaning. So far as the import of the sentence is concerned, it arises immediately after the hearing of the cluster of words forming a sentence. Further, the Šabdabodha (the import of the sentence) has for its subject that meaning which is not yet grasped. Such a knowledge cannot arise without some definite cause. It is in this connection that Vācaspati Miśra introduces five views regarding the Nimitta or efficient cause of Šabdabodha. These are the traditional views on Šabdabodha which are elucidated in the present work.

² Ibid., pp. 45-6.
First view of Śābdadādhana

This view is of the Vaiyākaraṇas who say that the Vākya-śpōta conveys the meaning of the sentence and they describe śpōta as being devoid of parts (avayavās) though it is experienced as possessing avayavās through avidyā (ignorance):

Anavayavamēva vākyam anādyavidyōpadarṣita alīka varṇa pada vibhāgam asyāṁ nimittamiti kēcit.3

Second view of Śābdadādhana

According to Naiyāyikās the cognition of the last varṇa (of the sentence) coupled with the impressions produced by the experiences of the previous words with their meanings is the cause for the Vākyārthajñāna:

Pāramārthika pūrvapūrva padapārthānubhavajanita samskārasaṁhitam antyavarṇavijñānamityēkē.4

This view agrees with the following statement of Vātsyāyana bhāṣya:

Vākyasthalēṣu khalu varṇēṣu uccaṛatsu prativarṇam tāvat śravaṇam bhavati ārtam varṇam ekam anēkam vā padabhāvena na pratisandhātte pratisandhāya padam vyavasyati, padavyavasāyena śmrtyā padārtham pratipadyate pada samūha pratisandhānācča vākyam vyavasyati sambaddamsa padārthān gṛhītvā vākyārtham pratipadyate iti.5

3 Ibid., p.6. 4 Ibid., p.6 5 Ibid., pp.6-7.
It may be noted here that according to Tattvavibhāvanā on Tattvabindu this is the opinion of some old Mîmâṃsakâs and that it follows Sabarabhâṣya statement namely:

Pûrvapurva varṇajanita samskāraḥ antyōvarṇo vācaka-ityadōṣah.

Third view of Sābdabōdha

This view is propounded by the Mîmâṃsakâs such as Upavarsa and others. They hold that the cause of the vâkyâarthajñâna is the group of varṇâs which are reflected in the mirror of reflection produced by the family of impressions generated by the experience of each varṇa, pada and the meanings of words:

Pratyēka varṇa pada padârthānubhava bhâvita bhâvanâ-nicayalabhďha janmaśmrti darpanârudhā varṇamālā ityanye.

The cause of the vākyartha-jñâna is the varṇamālā – the group of varṇās.

Fourth view of Sābdabōdha

This view is that of the Anvita-bhidhānavaďins namely Prābhâkarâs who maintain that the cause of the vâkyârthaprâtîti is the cognition of the padas themselves which convey meanings

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7 Ibid., p.7.
related to one another on the basis of ākankṣhā, yōgyatā and sannidhi:

Padānyeva ākankṣhita yōgya sannihita padārthāntara anvita svārthābhidhānītyapare.  

Fifth view of Ṣabdabōdha

This view is propounded by Kumārila and is closely followed by Vācaspata Miśra. Kumārila opines that words convey their meanings which in their turn generate the Ṣabdabōdha which is the cognition of the vākyarthā:

Padāirṛya samabhivyāhārayadbhiḥ abhihitāḥ svārthaḥ ākankṣhā yōgyatā āsatti sadriśināḥ vākyārthadhihītavah ityācāryāh.

This view is further substantiated by the following two statements:

Padārthaiḥ padavijñāte vākyārthaiḥ pratipadyate  

and

Padārthaiḥ avagataḥ santō vākyartham gamayanti.

These five views of the efficient cause of Ṣabdabōdha are discussed by Vācaspata Miśra. An account of these views with Vācaspata Miśra's elucidation is given here.

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8 Ibid., p.7.  
9 Ibid., p.8.  
10 Tantravārtika 2.1.46 quoted in Tattvabindu, op.cit., p.8.  
A. The first view - SPHÔTAVĀDA

It is already noted that this is the view of the Sphôtavādins who hold that the vākyasphôta devoid of parts and properties is the efficient cause of Šabdabodha. In order to elucidate this Sphôtavāda, Vācaspati Miśra puts forward a question which has two alternatives. Whether the sphôta which is devoid of parts is to be accepted as the efficient cause of the vākyārtha on the basis of experience of the world or on the basis of the difference of the meanings of words and sentences which cannot be otherwise explained. In the case of the first alternative there is another question - whether the vākya is to be considered as one composite unit (avayavin) possessing many parts such as varṇās and padās (syllables and words) or whether it is completely devoid of any such parts?

Three alternatives:

Thus, three alternatives are put forward. The first alternative is that the vākya is a composite whole possessing many parts. The second alternative is that the vākya is totally devoid of any parts. These are the two alternatives which come under the basis of the experience of the world. The third alternative is that vākyasphôta denotes the vākyārtha on the basis of the difference of meanings of words and sentences.
The first alternative: Here, the first alternative that the vākya possesses parts is shown to be unsound. This is in view of the accepted doctrine of the Vaiyākarāṇas that the varṇās are vibhūs i.e., those possessing paramamahattā. According to this doctrine, it is not possible to posit the production of an avayavin which is bigger than the avayāvās which are possessing paramamahatva. Hence, the first alternative on Śābdabōdha is not sound. Further, this alternative is not sound from the point of view of the Naiyāyikā theory that śabda is a quality of ether. The varṇās or padas which are thus regarded as qualities cannot be the material cause of the sentence, because it is unanimously held that only a substance and not a quality can be the Samavayikāraṇā. If one takes the view of the Siksākārās that varna is produced from the particles of vāyu it can be argued that since varṇās are momentary, the contact of one varṇa with another cannot be thought of when the varṇās come in a sequence and they cannot produce any avayavin. Further, they do not have the contact as the Asamavayikāraṇā which is very essential for the productic of an effect in the form of an avayavin. It is however absurd to suppose that part is one and produces the whole. If two or more parts do not come together, the substance as effect is inconceivable. It is also not possible to maintain that vākya is one composite whole with many parts.

The second alternative: The second alternative that vākya is one unit devoid of parts is also not tenable. It results
from this view that vākya alone conveys the meaning, but the
varṇās or pādas do not convey the meaning as they are not the
avayavins. It is further noted that varṇās and pādas do not
have real existence in language. Vākya being nitya is alone
manifested. This manifestation of vākya is achieved by
Dhvanis (sounds). Due to their different places and modes
of articulation, the dhvanis generate an invalid cognition of
the real śabdaspḥāta as possessing many parts like varṇa and
pada. This is compared with the experience of a person who
looks at his own face through a gem or mirror of varied shape.
Here, the second and the succeeding dhvanis in a pada or a
vākya are not superfluous because the first dhvani itself is
not successful and complete so as to be at the end of the
manifestations by the series of dhvanis. In the same way,
the last dhvani cannot be taken as manifesting the unitary
sphota because it does not have the capacity to manifest the
latter unless it is strengthened by the impressions (samskārās)
produced by the experiences of the previous dhvanis. Thus,
the manifestation of sphota by dhvanis can be compared with
the examination of a gem by an expert jeweller who satisfies
himself about the genuineness of a gem after a series of detailed
examination. The question how the dhvani cognitions manifest
sphota can be answered by the fact that the invalid cognitions
sometimes lead one to a valid knowledge:

Ārādvanaspatou harita pravāhasya vyaktātaram vanaspati- tattvā pratitiheṭutva darśanāt. 12

How Dhvani cognitions manifest Sphota:

The next question is how the dhvani cognitions manifest sphota and this is answered by Vācaspata Misra by saying that invalid cognitions sometimes lead to a valid knowledge and he illustrates this point by giving the instance of the cognition of trees at a distance as a row of green grass as it leads one to that of green trees which does not exist there:

Ārādvanaspatou harita pravāhasya vyaktātaram vanaspati- tattva pratitiheṭutva darśanāt. 13

The Sphōtavādin argues in favour of the acceptance of Sphota as a unitary sabda. This becomes necessary because

until and unless we accept Sphota, the explanation with regard to 'a word' and 'a sentence' will not be proper. The question here is - can the varṇās separately produce the cognition of unitary śabda or in combination? The first alternative is not convincing because it is against the experience of every person. The second one has two alternatives. Whether varṇās in reality are associated with one another or they are together cognised. They are not associated with one another because in context of the words to convey meaning they are Nitya and Vibhu. We also cannot say that varṇās are cognised together as the time factor is to be taken into account.

The objections by Varṇavādin and answers:

(1) The advocate of Varṇavāda again argues that the last varṇa in combination with the impression of the previous sounds in a word or sentence conveys the idea.

Here, the Sphottavādin questions the nature of impression - is it that samskāra which produces a smṛti or is it on the basis of Śrīti passage, 'वर्हिन प्रोक्षति'. As the uncombined varṇās cannot produce samskāra the second alternative is ruled out. The first alternative is also not possible as it involves many adṛśtās which does not come under the purview of perception. If one argues that samskāra helps last varṇa in recollecting śabda and so no plurality of adṛśtās, it is also not acceptable as such a thing is against samskāra. Samskāra is the only capacity of Atman for the object recollectic
This is to be posited in Atman and not in samskāra as its existence is based on cognition of ideas. The argument that no additional adṛṣṭa is accepted except an additional function is not satisfactory as it involves gauravadōsa.

(ii) If the advocate of the varṇavāda says that all varṇās in a pada or vākya recollected together convey the idea and hence no Sphota is required, Sphōtavādin says that it is not correct as the varṇās in words - nādi, dīnā, etc., being the same in one recollection, do not convey the same idea. At the same time it cannot be said that different samskārās produced by the experience of various varṇās produce one smṛti as they give out different ideas. As varṇās are Vibhudravyās they do not possess any sequence and if at all they say that they possess order, it is only with reference to a cognition which presents them and speaking sequence to varṇās on the basis of cognitions is absurd.

Hence, Sphōtavādin says that a unitary sabda 'Sphota' is to be accepted to explain satisfactorily that sabda conveys idea and it should be accepted as dhvani which we experience. Only when dhvani separately manifest it, then only Sphota is possible. Hence, it is to be said that unitary Sphota is accepted.

(iii) Here again, Varṇavāda opposes the Sphōtavāda by putting a question - whether the cognitions of varṇās present
only those varṇās or a sound element devoid of any form or property in addition to these varṇās. If we accept the first view, no sūjota is known in addition to varṇās, which cannot be said as manifestations of another sound element. In the second view, a sound element apart from varṇās, if it is accepted, which while cognised is known as sabda, the conveyor of ideas, is it Sabdatva which is to be considered as the conveyor of ideas? If it is accepted as Sabdatva, as a common property for all sabdas, it can be objected that all ideas may be known to each and every listener of sabda, but, the experience of differences in ideas, should be explained by sabdas only.

The Sabdatva, though one and devoid of form and properties has got manifestations like gakāra, aukāra and visarga in the word gauḥ which produce cognitions of different ideas is not correct on the basis that it could be explained by sabdas themselves which is acceptable to both. Just like Sabdatva, Sattā, Varnatva, can also be taken as conveying the ideas through manifestations. Hence there is Vinigamanāvirahā – no means to prefer one generality to others.

(iv) Again, the Varṇavādins may raise an objection that Sabdatva being an eternal generality, exists in varṇās that are previously cognised in a word or a sentence; it may not depend on anusamhārabuddhi of the last varṇā to convey the idea, so it is to be accepted that first sounds in a word may
convey the idea. In this connection, Vācaspati Miśra hits the Prabhākaras who have denied the existence of Sabdatvajati. He says that Sabdatva never stands in the way of the reality of different varnas which are to be accepted as eternal. Just as Sabaleśotva is found along with gōtva in a black cow, so in sabda the properties like acītva and haltva are found along with sabdatva on the basis of experiences 'gakārah sabdah'. This cannot be explained without sabdatva:

Na ça sabdatvamēkam vastu sat gakārēdi nānētvavrīdhi, yēna tad bhāvikatvayā sabdatvam apākriyate. Sabaleśyēdī bheda vyavasthāpanāya gōtvidinōpi sāmanyatva apākaranā- prasangāt.14

Then the question is can sabda mean that which can be experienced by ear? Since like varnas, grahaṇās are also different, nothing can be said about the unitariness of Sabda. The ear could be inferred and is beyond senses, and the ear cognitions are inferrable. So nothing could be the object of unitary experience of Sabda. If the ear and its cognition of Sabda are not cognised by senses, how can the cognition of Sabda arise as conveyed by the word Sabda?

(v) Is it Sphota which is uniform in all varnās in a word or sentence, but different in different words and sentences? And are the varnās manifestations of unitary Sphota

14 Ibid., p.40.
to explain difference in Sphota cognition? Varnavādin questions: Sphotavādin, will the cognitions of previous varṇās help the last varṇa in combination with previous varṇās? Then the cognition of previous varṇās should not exist when the last varṇa cognition arises and so non-existing things are said to help in producing a real thing which is against experience. It is accepted that cognitions arise, perish and are never brought back. So, even if they suppose to exist at the cognition of last varṇa, they do not function in connection with last varṇa. That the varṇās, while cognised, separately manifest Sphota without depending on mutual combination is not correct, since it does not propound the existence of ākhandapadārtha separate from varṇās. So, it must be accepted on experience, as Varnavādin contends, that perceptions of different varṇās produce anusamhārabuddhi with those varṇās as objects.

Objections against Varnavāda:

Then many objections are raised by Sphotavādin to Varnavādin. The experience ‘gauch’ speaks unitary aspect of gauh, and this cannot be explained only if we accept varṇās as objects. It cannot also be argued that it is based on upādhi because nothing is to be said as upādhī. Here two upādhis are mentioned and refuted:

(1) Ekavijñānaviṣayatā (being the object of one cognition) and
(2) Ekābhidhēyapratyayahāṭutā (cause of cognition of one idea).
The former is not accepted for the cognition of upādhi as it must be known before the object is cognised through that upādhi. The second alternative is also not possible since it involves the fallacy of interdependence.

Varnavādin's refutation of Sphōtavāda:

The Varnavādin further refutes the Sphōta theory thus: The cognition of unitariness is not any authority to prove Sphōtavāda, but only a possibility which bears out oneness of the object cognised. Though elephants, horses, chariots and footmen are different and though çampaka, aśoka, kimsukā are different species of trees, they become objects of unitary cognition. 'It is an army', 'it is a forest', which present unitary objects like army and forest. It cannot be held that as experiences, as 'it is an army', 'it is a forest', 'it is a sabda' have as their objects another entity separate from parts:

Bhavati hi karituragapādatiṣu çampakaśokakimsukādiṣu nānātvāpi kinçidupādbhināsritya vyapadeśo laukikānām sēnāti vanamiti çā.\(^{15}\)

It cannot also be argued that for the lack of upadhi, the unitary sabda may be accepted, as it can be said that three varnās in the word gauh, while they become object of one cognition, become the cause of knowledge of one idea, just as

three or more stones supporting one oven:

Asti khalu ekābhidhēya dhīhētuh trayāṇāmapi varṇanam ekamāraṇā śānārōhināṃ grāvnaṃiva ekapithardhāraṇāṃ yaṃmat padamiti vyapadēdāh. 16

The fallacy of interdependence does not arise as the conception of the word is based on that of its capacity to convey one idea. The difference between the word and another found in pairs (i) gauḥ-aśvah, (ii) vrṣḥ-vrṣhabhā, (iii) nadi-dīnā is not possible to explain because it becomes the object of one cognition and conveys unitary idea. So, it should be said that unitary conception of pada is based on that of the idea conveyed by it.

Again, Varnavādin criticises the Sphota concept by noting absurdities. The view that previous dhvanis manifest Sphota not so clearly as the last dhvani, cannot be correct, as Sphota devoid of parts cannot be spoken as manifested by dhvanis. The sphota cannot be full or partial manifestation.

The view that the manifestation of Sphota is based on superimposition is not correct, since with reference to an object superimposition cannot be explained. It is not possible to say that it is devoid of parts. So, Sphōtavādin's view that padatattva is devoid of parts is not reliable. The experience we learn idea from sabda is not significant and

16 Ibid., p.54.
unacceptable. If we say that unitary sabda belongs to varnas when they are objects of recollection, they convey one idea. This is possible in case of sabda as it is the experience of the world.

The second alternative of Sphōtavādin's view is refuted thus by Varnavādin that unitary Sphota must be accepted as there is difference in ideas which cannot be explained in any other way. The Sphota if it is not perceptible, cannot be known by inference as it involves interdependence. There is no need for accepting unitary sabda like Sphota. The knowledge could be brought out by cognitions of varnas which appear different due to the order, or properties like hrsvatva convey different ideas as nadi, dinā, etc. The Varnavādin mentions many conditions - krama, nyūnatiriktatva, svara, vākya, sṛti, smṛti for differentiating one pada from another. If varnas are uttered by different persons, there is no cognition of idea. So, the padas must be uttered in an order by the same person.

The Points of Interest:

In this way, Varnavādin concludes that since the meaning or sense of a sentence or word can be cognised from the knowledge of the words in the combination of varnas, it does not force one to establishment of akhandapadatattva namely Sphota devoid of parts and properties.
Thus Vācaspati Miśra formulates refutation of the Sphōtavāda in the context of the efficient cause of Śābdabodha. It is done from the point of view of the Varnavādins, whose doctrine would be discussed and refuted in the next section. For the present, so far as the refutation of the Sphōtavādin is concerned, the Varnavāda is used as an effective weapon to demolish the concept of akhandatva underlying the Sphōtavāda. The Varnavāda is here regarded as superior to the Sphōtavāda because it does not postulate a thing like Sphota which goes beyond one's easy comprehension and also because it emphasises the varṇās and padas as the cause of arthapratīti. According to this view, the meaning of a sentence arises from the cognition of the last varṇa in it. This cognition of the last varṇa together with the impressions created by the cognitions of words and their meanings give rise to the cognition of the sentence meaning, just in the same manner the cognition in the last varṇa in a word together with the impressions created by the preceding varṇās of a word give rise to the cognition of the word meaning.

B. The second view: VARNĀVĀDA

After refuting Sphōtavāda, the second view is taken up for discussion. It is superior to Sphota as it does not postulate a thing like Sphota which is beyond comprehension. This view lays stress on varṇās and padas as the cause for the cognition of the meaning of the sentence arising from the
cognition of the last varṇa by the organ ear just as the
cognition of the last varṇa along with the impressions of the
preceding varṇas generates the recollection of padārtha.

These merits of the Vānavāda are relative with reference
to the postulates of the Sphōtavāda. But, the Vāda as such
cannot stand further scrutiny and hence it is subjected to
criticism by Vācaspati Mīra.

Refutation of Vānavāda

The refutation of this view starts with a question:
Does the last varṇa generate vākyārthapratīti after producing
the recollection of relation between last word and its sense?

If this is accepted, the Siddhantin argues that at the
time of mental impression producing its effect i.e., the
recollection of the padārtha, the perception of the pada which
happens to be the cause of impression does not exist and the
existence of the cognition of last varṇa in a word or sentence
cannot be explained. It cannot be argued that vākyārthapratīti
arises from the cognition of last varṇa without recollection
of relation between pada and padārtha as the experience of that
relation is of no use if it does not produce a recollection.
Hence, it cannot be explained why one does not have verbal
cognition if one does not get acquainted with the import of
the words. It cannot also be said that the cognition of last
varṇa, the impression of padārtha and recollection of padārtha
are simultaneous, as the cognitions are in Atman only succeeding one another. The cognition of the last varṇa cannot arise for the second time, at the time of recollection of padārtha since its cause i.e., samsarga which is characterised as fleeting and transient as the flash of lightning in a dark cloudy night is absent:

Ksanikam sādhanamasya buddhirapyanuvartate.
Māgandhakāra sarvaryām vidyujjanita ċrṣtivat. 17

It cannot also be said that the last varṇa or sabda by itself cannot convey the import of the sentence except through its cognitions. The cognitional unity of the last varṇa along with the impressions of the previous varṇas, padās and padārthās cannot be explained. Hence, this view cannot be accepted.

Thus, the second view which is of the Varnavādin is refuted by Vācaspati Misra mainly on the ground that the cognition of the last Varna along with the impressions of the previous varṇas, padās and padārthās cannot be taken as one unit at a time. This refutation paves the way for the third view.

C. The third view - VARNAMALAVĀDA

According to this view, the group of varṇas or Varṇamālā in one mirror-like reflection is the cause for arthapratīti. It can be thus explained: The relation between pada and

17 Ibid., p.82.
padārtha depends upon the time honoured usage. Our elders have not used for exchange of ideas and intercommunication only varṇas and padās, but have used vākyā. It is not the Sphota, but Varṇās. When it becomes the object of one recollection, it produces verbal cognition. The recollection of the padārtha coming from the knowledge of padās in a vākyā is complimentary to this Varṇamāla in the production of the vākyārtha.

Defects of this theory:

Among the various defects of this theory the first one is Gaurava. If Varṇamāla is accepted as the cause of the cognition of vākyārtha then in the sentences "arbhaka, gām ānaya", "arbhaka gām badhāna", "śisō gām ānaya", "śisō gām badhāna", each of which possesses one different word at least. One has to accept that each Varṇamāla which is a vākyā possesses different saktis to convey the vākyārtha, then one will have to accept numerous saktis. But according to Padavādin sakti should be accepted for padās only, and sakti of one word in different sentences is not different. Hence, there cannot be anavasthā.

The second defect in this view is Viṣayābhāva. It is as follows: The Varṇamāla cannot express the Vākyārtha viz., padārthasamsarga without padārthās. It is necessary that padārthās should be first cognised and then only the padārthās related to objects before the samsarga among them can be
cognised. So the cognition of padārthās as expressed by padās is indispensable for the cognition of the samsarga of the padārthās. As the same padārthajñāna is capable of producing a vākyārthajñāna, the Varnamāla is superfluous.

The third defect is that it is difficult to say the Varnamāla in a long sentence becomes the object of one mirror-like recollection (anusamhārabuddhi). It is hence possible to maintain Kumārila's Abhihitānvayavāda that words convey their ideas i.e., padārthās, which in turn produce the cognition of vākyārtha.

Thus, the Varnavāda as regards Vākyārtha is refuted from the point of view of Abhihitānvayavāda of Kumārila Bhatta which he intends to establish in the end. The refutation of the Varnamālavāda helps to maintain the Abhihitānvayavāda that padārthās conveyed by the words get themselves related according to the principles of ākankṣāyogyāta, and sannidhi and give rise to the import of the sentence.

D. The fourth view - ANVITĀBHIDHĀNAVĀDA

After the third view of Śābdabodha the fourth view is taken up. It is the view of the Prabhākara which is well known as 'Anvitābhidhānavāda'. Prabhākara says that words themselves convey their meanings and mutual relation, so that the meanings conveyed by words do not convey the meaning of the sentence.
This is how Abhihitānvaya is not tenable according to this view.

Words themselves convey their meanings. Here, they do so only as related to one another on the basis of ākāṅkṣā, yōgyāta and sannidhi. Hence, Sphōtāśabda need not be accepted.

Objections raised: Fallacy of inter-dependence:

Here, Vācaspāti Miśra raises some objections against this Anvītābhidhānavāda from the point of view of Abhihitānvayavāda. Firstly it is asked: when a word in a sentence conveys its idea and its relation to the other ideas, are the other ideas conveyed or not by their own expression in the sentence? In case other ideas are not conveyed, it is to be said that ideas in a sentence are conveyed by the first idea and so there is superfluity of the second and other words in a sentence. If it is admitted that other words also convey their own ideas, as well as their relation with other ideas then in the sentence 'Ukhāyām pañēt', till the word Ukха does not convey the idea of the adhikarana in the form of Ukха, until the word Pañēt conveys the idea of cooking as related to Ukха. Similarly in the case of the word Pañēt also. Hence, there is the fallacy of interdependence.
In order to avoid the fallacy of interdependence, the Anvītabhidhānāvādin may argue that the ideas conveyed by the words are related after the words convey their ideas.

Two Denotative Powers to be Accepted:

But, this involves the acceptance of two denotative powers for words. This is neither warranted nor accepted on authority:

It cannot be argued that words convey only the ideas with their relation and that these ideas were first recollected by their juxtaposition in order to avoid the assumption of double śabda śakti for words. This is because recollection of the meanings of words should be based on their anubhavās as related to one another. In the example 'gām ānaya', gōśabda conveys the idea of cow as related to the action of bringing. This produces in the hearer a recollection of cow as related to the action of bringing but not a mere cow. Here arises a difficulty that the same gōśabda in the sentence 'gām paśya' would not

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convey cow as related to the action of seeing, since it is originally related to the action of bringing. Further, the argument that gôs'abda generates in the hearer on the ground of invariability (avyabhicâra), a recollection of its meaning only viz., cow and not the meanings of other words is not correct as that invariability is not accepted as cause of recollection. Recollection is actually produced by the mental impressions which is roused by the strong and constant previous experiences. Here, among the causes of the rousing of the mental impression, meditation and others are recognised and invariability is not at all recognised as a cause. Sâhaçarya though accepted as one of the causes, should not be mistaken as invariability.

The gôpadârtha cannot be said to be related to darśanakriya by âkankshâ. Hence, no possibility of cognising Vâkyârtha from verbal proposition, if anvitâbhidhâna is accepted.

Answers by the Anvitâbhidhânaãvâdin:

The Anvitâbhidhânaãvâdin answers all the objections raised from the point of view of Abhihitânvayavâda.

(a) Firstly, he says that there is no fallacy of interdependence as words through abhidhânasâkti convey anvitapadârthâs the meanings of other words are not invariably recollected from one word because of absence of abhyâsa. Then there arises recollection of its own meaning and its relation from a word.
Hence, words convey their own meanings together with their relation, but not the meanings of other words also. In order to support this argument, Anvītābhidhānavādin raises a question against Abhihitānvayavādin, what kind of cognition is that which one derives from words? There are only four recognised cognitions—Pramāṇa, Samāyāya, Viparyyaya and Smṛti. The cognition of the meanings from words is not a case of pramāṇa-jñāna because it does not possess as its object anything previously unknown. It is out of place to say that it is viparyyaya. As there is no fifth variety, it should be accepted as a case of recollection.

(b) Secondly, the opinion of Abhihitānvayavādin is that padārthas recollected by Abhidhānasakti of words, and not by Sāhaçarya, become the objects of knowledge of a sentence. This is not tenable because in the instances like 'gangāyāṁ ghōṣah prativasati', the bank which is only a secondary meaning of the word ganga is related to 'dwelling', the primary meaning of prativasati. It should be admitted that the recollection of isolated ideas first arises by the mere sāhaçarya of words and then arises the recollection of the anvita-padārthas from words. It cannot be said that padārthas are not mutually related because of the absence of verbal expectancy because the latter is nothing but the knower's desire for knowledge.

(c) Thirdly the argument of Abhihitānvayavādin that words
convey their meanings without mutual relation and those meanings produce Vākyārthajnāna on the basis of ākankṣa etc. is not correct because unless those ideas are conveyed by words, they are not considered as the cause of the Vākyārthajnāna.

(d) Fourthly, Anvitābhidhānavādin's argument is that one who perceives a white object and hears the neighing and the noise of the galloping, experiences that a white horse gallops without the cognition of words expressing meanings. Here, Anvitābhidhānavādin answers that this knowledge is arrived at either from inference or from presumption, but not from words.

If one experiences the neighing sound and the noise of galloping co-existing in the white object, the knowledge is inferential on the basis of probans. When, on the other hand, the neighing sound, the noise of galloping and the white object are independently known, it becomes a case of presumption provided no other object having these qualities are definitely known.

(e) Fifthly, if Sābdabdādha is generated by padārthās, it is not based on Sabdās. Hence, the padārthās not conveyed by words do not become cause of Vākyārthajnāna and the ideas conveyed by words possess the capacity to produce Sābdabdādha. In this case, the Abhihitānvayavādin has to accept two saktis one over padārthās to generate Vākyārthajnāna and other over words capable of creating sakti over padārthās, whereas for
an Anvītābhidhānavādin only one śakti is to be accepted over words which convey padārthās on the strength of the intention of the speaker and through that śakti alone one word conveys its meaning as related to the meaning of other words on the basis of ākankṣā, etc. Hence, it is appropriate to say that words which convey padārthās are the cause of the cognition of the Vākyārtha.

E. The Fifth View – ABHIHITANVAYAVĀDA

In the previous section, Vācaspāti Miśra has stated the view of the Anvītābhidhānavādin with his arguments in refutation of the objections raised by the Abhihitānvayavādin. As a follower of the Kaumārila school, he is convinced about the tenability of Abhihitānvayavāda. Hence, in the beginning of the fifth section dealing with Abhihitānvayavāda on Sābdabodha he makes an attempt at the refutation of the Anvītābhidhānavāda from the standpoint of the Abhihitānvayavāda.

The rejection of Anvītābhidhānavāda:

The Anvītābhidhānavādin is rejected firstly by Abhihitānvayavādin with the introductory remark that in absence of objection that which stands near to the effect becomes the cause of it. Hence, recollection of padārthās nearer to Vākyārthajñāna than the padās, is the cause of Vākyārthajñāna.

On the basis of Abhihitānvayavāda the recollection of
padārthas associated with one another becomes the cause of Vākyartha-jñāna on the strength of ākāṅkṣā, yogyata and śātti.

Objections and answers:

(1) It is argued by Anvitābhidhānavādin that recollections of meanings of words do not bear them as objects in their isolation. If one recollects a palace without its locality viz., Pātaliputra and Māhismati, one is not capable of understanding the two padārthas as related to each other:

Na khalu prāsadamātrasya smaranto asmarantasa taddēsam pātaliputram svarūpamātra smṛtyā māhismatyainam ghatayitumīśate.20

The words have no inherent capacity to denote the meanings as not related to one another. This is the main objection to the assumption that padārthas are the cause of Vākyartha-jñāna.

Abhihitānvavādin answers this by saying that the mental impressions have no capacity to produce a valid recollection as presenting those objects which have and had not been experienced earlier. But, the mental impressions have the capacity to produce the recollection of the meanings of words from the group of words in juxtaposition. The recollection of meanings of words have the support of ākāṅkṣā, etc., and become the kārana to produce the valid cognition of the mutual

20 Ibid., p.113.
relation of the padārthās. This mutual relation of the padārthās is itself the Vākyarthā.

This Vākyarthajñāna should be taken as pramāṇa, otherwise pratyabhigñā will never arise because it is generated by a recollection or a mental impression.

(ii) An objection can be raised here, as to how a mental impression or a recollection produced by the impression owing to its existence to experience an object would generate with the limitation of different space, time, etc. would generate another cognition of the same object. In order to answer this objection it is necessary to accept that recollections possess an extraordinary power to produce recognition. Just as a power of that kind is associated with the recollections of the meanings of words and samskārās in the case of recognition so in the case of Vākyarthajñāna also such a power of Padārthasmṛtis and samskārās can be assumed if one does not look at it with prejudice.

(iii) Anvītabhidhānnavādin however maintains that if padārthās are recollected from any source do not possess the power to produce Vākyarthajñāna, if it is argued that they have such a power, they will have to be accepted as seventh pramāṇa or, in order to maintain that there are only six pramāṇās. Āgama or verbal testimony will have to be merged into the above pramāṇa. If we say that padārthās become objects of experience possess power to generate the cognitions of Vākyarthā
two or three saktis have to be accepted. Two saktis on words and one on their meaning or one sakti on words and two over their meanings. But if Anvitaabhidhānavāda is accepted, only one sakti over words is enough and this has lāghava. Hence, Anvitaabhidhāna should be accepted.

Though Anvitaabhidhānavādin accepts the principle of lāghava he says that investigation should be made to find out the principle of lāghava. An impartial investigation would show that one padaśakti as recurring to the meanings of words in mutual relation as done by the Anvitaabhidhānavādin, gives rise to the contingency of all words becoming synonymous, because the sakti referred to by him is connected with anvaya only and because that anvaya relation would be one and the same.

The Anvitaabhidhānavādin tries to maintain that there is no fallacy of all words becoming synonymous because the relation is known when the related objects are cognised and the related objects are different. The argument of the Anvitaabhidhānavādin is that words convey the related things and not that they convey their relation also.

This contention is refuted as inconclusive. Here a question is raised: What is meant by a related thing? (Vyatiśakta). Does it mean only the object or the object as well as the relation? Words which convey concepts through abhidha cannot convey the relation also.
A quality like colour cannot exist without a substance. Similarly, a word connoting quality expresses its own substance. Can we apply the same principle to the padartha also is the question. The answer should be in the negative because the padartha are known by words without their mutual relation. If it is maintained that padartha are not known without their relation, it will have to be accepted that linga cannot be known without the cognition of the lingin in the paska, so lingatva cannot be known. Hence, the process of inference itself becomes difficult to explain. Hence, it is said that anvita is known by words. It means that both padartha and relation are conveyed by words.

Two Alternatives:

The Abhihitavayavadin reduces the whole problem into two alternatives. The first alternative is to become contented with the fact that on the basis of laaghava, words are taken as conveying only the padarthasvarupa, but not the relation through their sakhti and that the padarthasvarupa generates the cognition of the Vakyarth. The second alternative is to accept that words convey both the padarthasvarupa and their relation on the ground that without them the cognition of Vakyarth would not possibly arise, in spite of a thousand and one efforts made in that direction.
Which Alternative to Choose?

Between these two alternatives, which is to be accepted? This is the question. In order to answer this question, the Abhihitānvayavādin shows the weak points in the second alternative. It is stated that the words become capable of conveying the relation between one padārtha and another on the strength of Samabhivyāhāra. Otherwise, the juxtaposition or co-utterance of words would be without any purpose. The possession of a particular sāmarthya on the part of the objects does not depend upon any other pramāṇa apart from the necessity of the principle of Anyathānupapatti between the objects and their effects. As the knowledge of relation arises from a visible or invisible thing other than words, we cannot attribute it to words. Vedas declare that the meaning of the word is not known from any other source and hence Ākhyātapratyaya cannot convey the agent of the action etc., through Abhidhā. On the basis of the juxtaposition or expectancy, words convey the mutual relation of the meanings by their secondary significative power (lakṣanā) because they are spoken by a person with the intention of conveying the anvaya. Even the words which are not in juxtaposition do not stop their functioning with the production of the knowledge of their own meanings. Nobody uses words for conveying the padārthās only, but, the words are uttered by the speaker with the intention of conveying to the hearers his ideas through these words. Nobody intends to know the padārthās which are
already known. Hence, words are used in a particular order to convey an idea which is not known. In this light, the juxtaposition of words in a particular order becomes purposeful in so much as its sole object to convey an idea hitherto unknown. It is with this intention that the Vārtika says — the cognition of the Visistārtha i.e., the mutual relation of the padārthās is generated by Samabhivyāhṛti i.e., co-utterance of words.

On the basis of recollection of the padārthās produced by the words in juxtaposition which cannot be otherwise explained and strengthened by ākankshā etc. Words convey the relation between one padārtha and another by laksanā. Hence, there is no necessity of imposing any special sakti on words.

The problem to be faced by accepting ANVITĀBHIDHANAVĀDA

Abhihitānvayavādin argues that if we accept Anvitābhidhānavāda, the Vedic words do not generate an unknown kind of jñāna. To this Anvitābhidhānavādin replies that just as laukika words used in conversation convey ideas and relation so also Vedic words convey ideas and relation. Anvitābhidhānavādin says that authoritativeness of Vedas cannot be accepted as the complete understanding of the import of Vedas is impossible. At this Abhihitānvayavādin coolly remarks: If such a thing happens, nothing is lost to them who accept everything on sound reason:
So, one has to follow the path of a true Āstika that what is understandable as an indispensible factor which contributes to the understanding of the meanings of Vaidika words. Hence the relation between words and their meanings is considered to be but natural.

It is further questioned – Does that relation pertain to the meaning of one word related to the meaning of the another or to the meaning of one word only? In the second alternative, another question arises – Do words convey their meanings alone or the mutual relation also? If words convey meanings only, they do not produce the cognition of Vākyārtha and cannot be considered to be the efficient cause of the cognition of the mutual relation of the padārthās i.e., Vākyārtha. Therefore, the two other alternatives lead to the explanation that words have the utility for producing the cognition of the relation of the padārthās.

To this the Abhihitānvayavādin replies that words no doubt give the intention of conveying the relation of padārthās but they convey by Abhidhāśakti the padārthasvarūpa only. Since the relation of padārthās is known by other means of knowledge, there is no necessity of presumption i.e., Arthāpatti. To arrive at the conclusion that words possess a peculiar power

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to convey not only their meanings, but also the meaning of the sentence. On hearing a statement from a reliable person we are sometimes prompted to action or to desist ourselves from action. Sometimes on hearing such a statement we realise pleasure, pain or fear. Here, our knowledge is the cause of our mental state. This does not take place without the presence of words. This knowledge does not present the padārthās only to produce such effects, but the qualified padārthās i.e., padārthās and their relation. Therefore, the words used by the reliable person give the intention of conveying the qualified padārthās and thus cannot be explained without recollection of isolated padārthās through words. The power of words to produce a recollection of padārthās does not rule out their power of being the vehicle of intended Vākyārtha. Hence words cannot be taken as conveying the qualified padārthās by Abhidhāna. As in the case of laukika words, so in the case of Vaidika words in a sentence do produce a cognition of the qualified padārthās through laksanā on the basis of their conveying isolated ideas.

To say that words give the intention of conveying isolated ideas only which by themselves do not bear any fruit to the hearer would be denying one's understanding of the Vākyārtha through the cognition of the words.
What is the Vyāpāra for knowing Relation?

It cannot be argued that words which bear out the intention of conveying their meanings and their relation convey both by Abhidhāna. If this is accepted, one has to accept that the word 'ganga' in the sentence 'gangāyām ghūṣah' would, on the basis of tātparya convey the idea of bank by Abhidhāna. To say that the idea of bank is conveyed by the word ganga on the basis of relation to its meaning namely stream and is not conveyed by Abhidhāna, is favourable to what has been said with words. So, the tātparya does not invariably prove the existence of a special padaśakti for conveying the Vākyārtha. Here Vācaspati Miśra gives a classic example: The pieces of wood though they are intended for cooking never accomplish their fruit by themselves, but fire alone accomplishes it and through that they also accomplish it. Similarly the words conveying the meanings have no special significance and therefore cannot implicate the existence of a special padaśakti. The words convey their meanings by Abhidhāna but not their relation also. Thus, the tātparya which is known from the incompatibility of primary sense and the relation to the Vākyārtha does not explain the existence of a new śabdaśakti. This is because, such an explanation would result in our acceptance of śakti over words like 'ganga' and over objects like 'kāśtha' in the senses of bank and cooking respectively.
Lakṣaṇā is not always adopted in a sense on the exclusion of the primary sense of a word, but there are acceptance and abandonment of the primary sense according to the nature of secondary sense. For instance in 'gangāyam ghūṣaḥ' the primary sense of the word 'ganga' is abandoned on the adoption of lakṣaṇā in the sense of bank. But in an instance like 'Dandinō gaççanti', the primary sense of the 'dandin' merges into the body of the secondary sense. Hence, the relation of padārthās is conveyed by words by lakṣaṇā. The padārthās are also included in the secondary sense, since without them the sentence sense is of no use.

It cannot also be argued that words convey the Vākyārtha by lakṣaṇā because it does not satisfy its own definition. In that case, the lakṣaṇā will have to be defined in such a way to present instance also within its scope.

Here it may be objected, can we not define lakṣaṇā in such a way as to convey a new sense that can be related to the Vākyārtha through the cognition of its relation to the primary sense when the primary sense is incompatible with the intended sense of the sentence? In the instance, 'Odanam paçati çaitraḥ pitharaḥ', the ideas çaitra, pithara, etc. have nothing unrelated to Vākyārtha. So no lakṣaṇā is to be accepted in words in the sense of Anvitārtha.
To this the Siddhāntin replies that if there is no laksanā, then are the things that can be known by other means of knowledge accepted to be conveyed by words. Nobody accepts Abhidhāsakti in the word 'agnihōtra' in the Vedic passage, 'māsam agnihōtram juhōti', though it cannot convey the idea of māsāgnihōtra by laksanā. If it is said that on the basis of similarity the word is gauna and that there is no necessity for accepting Abhidhāna in the sense of māsāgnihōtra, it may be said that even here, without any special Abhidhāna the Anvitāvasthā may be cognised. If padavṛtti does not satisfy the definition of laksanā, a fourth kind of padavṛtti may be accepted on the basis of experience.

The objection that Anvitāvasthā cannot be taken as the secondary sense of the words is thus answered. The Anvitāvasthā is previously known in its general capacity, though it is known afterwords in its special capacity at the time of association with padārthās.

Now a question is raised against the Anvitābhidhānāvādins. What is the Abhidhā power of śabdās which convey the anvaya by it? It is not the movement which exists in objects possessing form, and śabda does not possess any form as it is a Vibhudravya or a Vibhuguna. The form is defined as the measurement of a substance not all pervasive. There is no authority to say that it is an invisible kind of movement like olision (prayātana). The cognition of anvaya arises from the
cognition of sabdas, when that relation between sabdas and arthas is known and recollected. So this cognition presenting sabda as such is the Vyāpāra of the cognition of Svārthaḥ.

Abhidhā is that alone in which sabda possesses an inborn potency and generates the cognition of padarthaḥs by that power. It does not independently produce the cognition of arthas, but through rousing mental impressions of those arthas previously known. So, there is no scope for the presumption that the cognition of arthas first rouses impressions of words and then produces recollection of words and is called Abhidhā, but it is cognition of sabda, which invariably generates the recollection of padarthaḥs.

The further objection on this is that sabda never rouses mental impressions as it is not enlisted in the list beginning with meditation. The answer is sabda also could be included in the list. It includes well the padas just as the pupil implies the presence of the teacher and the priest reminds the presence of the sacrificer. The relation between words and ideas is eternal and it is Vāya-vācakabhāva i.e., the relation between the conveyor and the conveyed. The cognition of sabda coupled with the impressions produced by the experience of artha generates the recollection of the svārtha. The relation between the conveyor and the conveyed is nothing other than that between the cogniser and the cognised or the recollector and the recollected.
Here, the opponent may object by saying that the disciple implies the presence of the teacher through the relation between the teacher and the pupil and that there is no necessity of the relation between the recollector and the recollected. In the case of śabda some other relation should be discovered. Since there is no suitable relation, the association with the Abhidēyārtha can be accepted.

At this, the Siddhāntin retorts that if Anvitābhidhāna is accepted, is there any other relation on the basis of which words would convey the Anvitārtha? The eye, the smoke and the others are observed as generating cognitions of such objects as invariably associated with them, through the relation such as their contact with the objects in vision and the invariance concomitance. If it is said that even without a relation there may arise the cognitions of ideas, through śakti, the existence of this is inferred from the time honoured usage, which may be said here also.

Hence, the capacity of words to convey the ideas cannot be satisfactorily explained if we follow Anvitābhidhānahāda. It is hence apt to say that on the ground of lāghava, Vākyārtha is known from words from their secondary significative potency in that it is generated by the padārthās recollected by the means of words co-uttered and associated with accessories like expectancy.
It is rightly said, 'words convey their ideas and refrain from any other functioning, and then the padārthās being cognised produce the cognition of the Vākyārtha'.

Vācaspati Miśra's Contribution:

Thus, Vācaspati Miśra establishes Abhīhitānvayavāda as explaining properly the efficient cause of Śābdabodha. He has analysed each of the objections raised by the Anvītabhidhānavādins and answered it from the point of view of the Abhīhitānvayavāda. As shown by him, the basic stand of the Anvītabhidhānavādin is that the words convey their meanings as well as their mutual relation through Abhidhāna. This basic stand is rejected on the ground that one will have to assume two Abhidhānasaktis for the words, one to convey their meanings and another to convey their mutual relation. This is an undesirable position in as much as it assumes more than what one sakti can give rise to. Therefore, the Abhīhitānvayavādin, as clarified by Vācaspati Miśra, has accepted Abhidhāna in the case of words for conveying their individual meanings and lakṣanā in the case of Anvītartha (Vākyārtha), on the basis of the conditions of ākankṣā etc. The words in the sentence first convey their meanings and then through the conditions of expectancy etc., the anvaya is established and through that anvaya the Visistārtha of the words is conveyed by lakṣanā.
The contribution of Vācaspāti Miśra lies in the analysis of the objections and formulation of the answers. The objections are from the point of view of Anvitābhidhānāvādins and the answers are from the point of view of Abhīhitānvāyadvādins.

Finally, Abhīhitānvāyavāda has been established as the most satisfactory theory among the theories that are advanced by the different schools of thought in respect of the efficient cause for Śābdabodha.

Nyāyakaṇika

As already noted above, Nyāyakaṇika is a learned commentary on the Vidhiviveka of Mandana Miśra. The original work of Mandana Miśra, Vidhiviveka is an exposition of one of the aspects of Mīmāṃsā school pertaining to the nature of Vidhi. It is a learned exposition of Vidhivāda in a concise Sāstra style. The work by itself is difficult to follow. Unless one is well grounded in the history of Vidhivāda delving into the discussion about it in the Bhāṣya of Sabara and the commentaries of Kumarila and Prabhakara. This necessity is fulfilled by Vācaspāti Miśra in his commentary Nyāyakaṇika. Vācaspāti Miśra brings in his versatile knowledge of not only the above mentioned works on Mīmāṃsā but also of the works belonging to other Darsanās, orthodox as well as heterodox. The commentary is a detailed elucidation of the different points
made in the Vidhiviveka. In the course of this elucidation, he contributes his points in support of the main thesis of Mandana Misra on the significance of Vidhi. It is divided into two parts as Purvakaṇika and Uttarakaṇika. The first one is on the Purvapakṣa section of Vidhiviveka and the second one pertains to its Siddhanta section.

A full and exhaustive study of Nyāyakaṇika is not possible in the present thesis. Thus, keeping in mind the scope of the present thesis, an attempt is made to bring out the main points of contribution of Vācaspati Misra to this important question on Vidhi.

1. The purpose of a work like Vidhiviveka

At the commencement of his Nyāyakaṇika, Vācaspati Misra raises an anticipated objection from the point of view of opponents questioning the purpose served by the Vidhiviveka. When something is without a useful purpose, it cannot attract the minds of the learned persons. As for instance, the enquiry into the crow's teeth:

Yadaprayojana viśāyam na tat prekṣāvat pravṛttigoçarah yatha kakadantaparikṣā.¹

¹ Vidhiviveka with Nyāyakaṇika, edited by Mahaprabhulal Goswami, Pracyabharathi Series No. 8, Banaras, 1984.
The form of the objection is the same as that which is raised in the beginning of Bhamati. The question here pertains to a work on Mīmāṃsā. The purpose of Mīmāṃsā, as far as the concept of Vidhi is concerned may be any one of the following:

1) The establishment of the authority of Veda on the basis of nature of Vidhi (Vidheḥ vedaprāmaṇya-siddhiḥ).

2) The knowledge of the relation among the Padārthas through Vidhi (Padārthasamsarga-pratitiḥ).

3) The understanding of Vidhi as the means of achieving what is salutary and averting what is not salutary (Hitāhitasādhanatāvagamah).

The objections on all these points are raised by the Purvapakṣa as anticipated by Vācaspati Mīra. It may be said that the validity of Veda would become questionable because without Vidhi there cannot be any action and therefore the knowledge of the already existing things are possible through other means of valid knowledge. This point is questioned by the Purvapakṣa on the ground that the knowledge of the existing objects is not exclusively based on other means of valid knowledge. It is asked - Is it so urged on the ground that they are existing objects or that they are known through the human intellect.

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2 Ibid., p.2.
In the former case, the means of valid knowledge such as Pratyakṣa would become invalid because they are also the existing things. The second point is also objected on the ground that the knowledge of the relation of Padārthas, as for instance in 'Sthālyām odanam paçati' arises even without a Vidhi. The third point is also questioned on the ground that the understanding of Hitāhitasādhana is possible through other means such as Pratyakṣa, etc., as for instance in 'Santāpam apanayati taptasya salilāvasekah'.

Having anticipated these objections Vācaspāti Miśra draws our attention to the first Karika of Vidyāviveka as an answer to all the objections against this work on Vidhi:

Sādhane puruṣārthasya sangirante trayi vidhāḥ.

The explanation of the first stanza of Vidyāviveka is intended to show that the knowledge of the means to the aim of man depends upon Vidhi. For instance, a man without a Vidhi like 'Svargakāmoyajeta'. Svarga does not occur as the object of Bhāvana. Bhāvana aims at what is to be attained:

Puruṣārthasadhanatāvabodhastu vidhi nibandhanaḥ. Nahi 'Svargakāmoyajeta' iti vidhou asati svargo- bhāvanaya bhāvyah sambhavati. Sa hi bhāvyamātrā- pekṣāni.

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3 Ibid., p.2.  
4 Ibid., p.2.  
5 Ibid., p.2.  
6 Ibid., p.1.  
7 Ibid., p.3.
Another point that is raised here is that Vidhiviveka is not necessary because the nature of Vidhi is already explained by the authors of the Vartika (Kumarila), etc. Here Vācaspāti Miśra answers the objection by saying that the elucidations given by the earlier writers are as good as not given because they have used such confusing terminology as Abhidhābhāvanāmāhuḥ:

Nanvasya vivekopī vārtikākṛṭ prabhṛtibhiḥ akāri iti sopi vyartha eva, ityata aha - Pravivicyate. Krto pi tāh viveko akṛtakalpa, eva. 'Abhidhābhāvanāmāhuḥ' ityādi sankirna śabdaprayogat. Ihatu kartaristābhhyupāya iti nīkṛṣya abhidhānāt.

Thus Vācaspāti Miśra establishes that the exposition of the significance of Vidhi is so specific as to deserve a special place in view of the confusion about the significance of Vidhi created by the earlier writers.

2. What is Vidhi? Three alternatives:

Mandana Miśra raises the question as to what is Vidhi. Three alternatives are first examined in this connection: (i) a unique type of Sabda is Vidhi, (ii) a special function of the Sabda is Vidhi, and (iii) a unique type of sense is Vidhi.

Sakhalu śabdabhedāva tadvyāpāratisayo vā arthabheda vā. ⁹

⁸ Ibid., pp.3,4. ⁹ Ibid., p.4.
He adduces several arguments to show that none of the three alternatives can be Vidhi. Each of these alternatives and its refutation is given here in order to point out the special points made by Vācaspati Miśra in the case of each alternative.

(i) The view that Vidhi is of the nature of Sabda is rejected on five grounds:

1. **Pramāṇatvād, aniyamātpravṛttēḥ, samvidāśrayāt, Samabhivyāḥṛteḥ, sabdo na vidhiḥ kāryakalpanāt.**

2. **Pramāṇatvāt:** Sabda is considered as a Pramāṇa and it can be so only when it conveys some special meaning which happens to be the cause of Pravṛtti (action).

3. **Aniyamātpravṛttēḥ:** If Sabda itself were to be Vidhi, there can be no definiteness about action and the rule 'Akurvan-vihitām karma' would be without scope.

4. **Samvidāśrayāt:** If Līnādiśabda is itself Vidhi, it would mean that it is the Karaka of action and hence even a person who does not have the knowledge (Samvit) of the matter connected with action in its proper form would be taking to action.

5. **Samabhivyāḥṛāt:** Prakṛti and Pratyaya convey the meaning together and due to its conveying the meaning together the

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Pratyayaa (suffix) deserves Samabhivyahara, i.e., association with the Prakri but not otherwise. Hence Linadiabhada cannot be Vidhi without reference to its meaning.

Karyakalpanata: In the case of some actions such as Pindapitryajna, the fruit of which is not stated in Srti, the fruit in the form of Svarga, etc. has to be understood through Adhyahara. Even in the case of others, the fruit of which is stated in the Srti, the fruits such as Svarga should be determined as an attribute to the Purusa. Since such a Karyakalpana is necessary Sabda, by itself cannot be Vidhi.

As regards the above alternative, Vacaaspati Misa contributes the following points by way of elucidation and additional information. When Sabdabheda is said to be Vidhi, he explains that Ling, Lot, etc. differ from other Sabdas (Lat, Lang, etc.). Hence, Sabdabheda is proposed to be Vidhi. It is to be noted that Ling, Lot, etc. prompt a sentient being to action through the inborn special quality just as the magnet creates movement in an iron piece through its inborn special quality.

Linadih sabdanaataraa bhidyate iti bhedaah. Tasya khalu bhedaah linadeh ayaskantamanariva vastuusvabhavo atisaayo yena lohamiva cetoanam pravartayati. 11

Explaining the argument Pramanatvat he adds that in the opinion of the advocates of Vidhi in the form of Sabda, it is to be noted that Sabda ceases to be a Pramaana because it becomes

11 Ibid., p.4.
the Kāraṇaheti of action. It is only Jñāpakaheti that can be the Pramāṇa as such a thing is found in the case of Indriya etc. Sabda can be Pramāṇa only when it creates the knowledge which is unsublated, which is not known before and which is free from doubt. When Sabda is by itself were to be the cause of Prayāti it amounts to saying that it is the Kāraṇaheti of what is not known. Thus Sabda ceases to be Pramāṇa.

Bodhāpanca-pramāṇam abadhita anadhigata asandigdhartham pramājanakam. Tatra ca Prayātihetum kānça arthāti-sayam avagamayan sabdasādānatvena pramanatām aśnute. Sabdasvarupavidhivādinam mate svayamevatu prayātih apramāyah kāraṇastam pramanatām apajahyata.12

It may be said that it is not a defect because the matter is known through Liñādisabda. Taking the example of Čaitraḥ Paṭati, Vācaspati Miśra elucidates this point by saying that in such a situation also, the matter is grasped and the statement like that also should be taken as Vidhi, because it is the same Liñāndividadhi. There cannot be any Bhāvana without understanding it. What is considered as Codana becomes authoritative in such a way as conveying some special meaning as the cause of action. This is not possible by a mere Sabda constituting a Bhāvana. This is because such a Bhāvana is caused by elsewhere as for instance Čaitraḥ Paṭati. Therefore, the Codana is not through that in which it becomes authoritative and

12 Ibid., p.4.
authoritiveness is not by that which is just a Çodana because it would amount to kārakahetu towards action:

Pravartakatvam çodanātvam pravṛttiḥetum kaṇcana arthātisāyam avagamayan anena rupeṇa prāmāṇyam asṇute, na bhāvanāmatra vacanatvena. Tasya anyatrapīt tulyatvat. Tasmād yena rupeṇa prāmāṇyam na tena çodana, yena çodana na tena prāmāṇyam, tasya pravṛttiṃprati, kārakat- vādityarthaḥ.13

As regards Samvidāśrayat, Vācaspāti Miśra draws in the idea that Samvidāśrayatva in one's action is through the Jñāpakatva of Sabda but not through its kārakatva because Samvidāśrayatva is concomitant with Jñāpakatva. For instance, such Jñāpakatva is found in Dhūma, etc. but not in Bija, etc.

Etaduktam bhavati - Svakāryesamvidāśrayatvam jñāpakatvena vyaptam, dhumadou tatha darśanat, bijadou ča anupalabhdheḥ.14

Thus, as regards the first alternative, Vācaspāti Miśra contributes his point by way of elucidation and by way of bringing about Sangati among the statements of Mandana Miśra.

(ii) The second alternative viz., 'Tadvyāparōva vidhiḥ' i.e., the function of the Sabda is Vidhi, is rejected by Mandana Miśra with six arguments:

Naprayogānurupyatvād, vayyarthyāt, pūrvadosataḥ Apravṛtteḥ, phalāyogad, rūpokteḥ vyapṛtiḥ śrteḥ.15

13 Ibid., p.5.  14 Ibid., pp. 5,6.  15 Ibid., p.12.
This view of Sabdavyapara as Vidhi is based on the statement of Kumarila viz., 'Abhidhābhāvanāmānuḥ anyāmeva linādayāh'.

The arguments against this view are as follows:

Prayogānurupyatvat: The usage of the word which pertains to its function in the form of Pṛesāna (direction), Adhyāśāna (causing one to action) and Abhyanujñā (permission to action) is not ascertained or determined because it is not the attribute of Sabda but an attribute of Purusa.

Vayyarthyat: Ling, Lot, etc. are by their very nature Prerakās to action even when the Vyapara is not known. Thus, the Vyapara in the form of Abhidhāna is without any purpose.

Pūrvadosātah: If Vyapara is not grasped, it amounts to saying that Sabda irrespective of Vyapara is Vidhi. Then, all the Doṣās pointed out in the previous alternative are understood here also.

Apravṛttees: We may tell about Sadaprayoga by approaching a person, but the person may not take to action, because wise people are not prompted to action with regard to everything but only with regard to those which ordain the attainment of what is good and removal of what is not good.

Phalāyogād: When Sabdapravṛtta should prompt one to action, the fruit of action is not associated with it.
When the Vyapara itself is Vidhi, there arises the occasion of expressing the meaning by Ling, etc. because otherwise the special Vyapara associated with the Sabda is not grasped.

As regards the above alternative refuted by Mandana Misra, the following interesting points are contributed by Vācaspati Miṣra.

The Slokavartika statement 'Abhidhābhāvanāmāhuh' etc. is explained as:

Abhidhāyaḥ, sabdasya bhāvanām pravartanāmāhuh.16

It means that Ling, Lot, etc. state the Bhāvana of the Sabda in the form of Abhidhāvyapāra. Thus it is presumed that the ground by which the absence of authoritativeness is associated with Sabda is removed by saying that the Vyapara of Sabda acts as the Jnāpaka for prompting one to action. Thus showing the ground of the present Pūrvapakṣa view Vācaspati Miṣra turns to the refutation of the view. As regards the argument Prayogānurūpyatvāt, he adds that Sabda having been heard would convey the idea of Presāna etc. but it is not the attribute of Sabda because of the presence of different opinions. Presāna being Acetana is not compatible in Sabda, etc. This is the explanation of the statement 'Tasya puruṣadharma-tvāt':

16 Ibid., p.12.
Satyam sabdavijnanantaram upalabhyate. Natvasou sābdasya (dharmaḥ) abhiprayabhōdatvat. Praśanaṇadeh acetanatvona sābde asambhavat ityarthaḥ. 17

It may be argued that the Vyapara may not arise through other Pramāṇas but through the Sābda itself. On this objection, Mandana Miśra says that such a thing is not proper 'Tataevopalahdhir asamicina' because it becomes necessary to grasp the relation (Sambandhagrahanāpekṣanat). This point is explained by Vācaspati Miśra clearly. A Sābda conveys its meaning only through a relation. The knowledge of relation depends upon the knowledge of the relata. If one tries to understand the meaning as well as the relata through Sābda itself, then it would result in Itarētaranārayadoṣa which is difficult to remove. Sābda conveys its meaning only when its Sambandha is known. When the Artha is known, the Sambandha becomes known:

Ayam Arthāḥ grhitasambandhah khalu sābdah svārtham avabodhayati. Sambandha bodhasca sambandhi samvedanā- dhīnaḥ. Sābdādeva ced arthāḥ sambandhi pratipattavyah duruttaram, itarētaranārayatvam prasajyeta; sambandha-bōdhe sābdah artham avabodhayati, tadāvabodhe ca sambandha bodha iti. 18

Thus, Vācaspati Miśra adds some important points in clarifying some of the arguments of Mandana Miśra against Sābda-vyāparavidhiśāda.

17 Ibid., p.13. 18 Ibid., p.13.
In this connection itself it is to be noted that the above view is on the ground that Vidhi consists in Abhidheyaabhāvana or the Vyapāra in the form of Abhidhēyatva. There is a reference to another view that:

Abhidha eva bhāvanā vidhiḥ līnādyartha iti.\(^{19}\)

In other words, this view is that the meaning of Lin, etc. is the Vidhi in the form of Abhidhābhāvana i.e., Abhidhāvyāpara. This view of Kumarila Bhatta is also refuted by Mandana Misra on five grounds:

\[\text{Pravṛttteḥ sarvatoṣrte vā prasangāt karyatōgateḥ} \]
\[\text{Asthānanniyaterhetorabhāvaçcābhidhānaiva na.}\(^{20}\)

\[\text{Pravṛttteḥ sarvataḥ prasangāt: If Abhidha were to be the Vidhi, all words in their own senses have that idea of Abhidhāvyāpara in them and thus the words such as Ghata, etc. also would give rise to Pravṛtti.} \]

\[\text{Arthevaprasangāt: If it is argued that there is the special sense of Abhidha depending upon the special Abhidheyaśs, although there may not be difference so far as the sense of Abhidhāvyāpara is concerned. It means that there is no difficulty if Arthabheda is taken into account. This objection is answered with the contention that in that case the special Abhidha is the cause of Pravṛtti but not Abhidha itself.}\]

\(^{19}\) Ibid., p.16.\(^{20}\) Ibid., p.16.
Kāryatogateḥ: There is a rule that what is not obtained by another means is the meaning of the word. Then Abhidha which is assumed on the basis of the Karya of the nature of Arthapratīti cannot be the meaning of the word because it is obtained through other means.

Asthānāt: If Abhidha were to be assumed for Abhidha which is the meaning of a Sabda then there would be the contingency of Anavastha in assuming Abhidha for grasping each of the preceding Abhidha.

Niyaterhetorabhāvāt: If it is urged that Abhidha requires another Abhidha, then so many alternatives arise and there will be no determination as to which is the cause of which.

Vācaspati Miśra has made very significant elucidatory remarks in this connection. He introduces the question by showing the interpretation of the term Abhidhābhāvāna as found in Kumarila's statement quoted above:

Na abhidha eva bhāvāna abhidhābhāvanetī apitu abhidha eva Arthābhidhāvyāpārāḥ sabdasya bhāvāna. Vidhir linādyarthā itī. 21

The implication of this view is explained by him as: it means that the power in respect of creating Prāyṛtti on the part of that Abhidhāvyāpara which has its existence revealed by the fruit in the form of the experience of Sabda and Artha

21 Ibid., p.16.
should be understood here:

Tasya ca sadārthasamvedanāprathitha sadbhāvasya
prayṛttijananam prati samarthamatram unneyam iti
bhāvah. \(^{22}\)

The objection against the first ground 'Prayṛṭteḥ sarvato
prasangāt' put forward by Mandana Misra is anticipated by
Vācaspati Misra as:

Yadi ucyeta arthābhidhatva matreṇa avīsesepi abhidheya
vīsesat bhedo bhaviṣyat abhidhāyāḥ; tādṛṣaḥ khalu
abhidheya vīseṣo līnādīnām yena līnādyabhidhaiva
pravartayati natu ghatādiśabdabhidhēti. \(^{23}\)

The objection is that Abhidha of different words have the
difference on the basis of the speciality of the Abhidheyaḥ,
although there is uniformity as regards Arthābhidha. That kind
of Abhidheyaśvīsesa belongs to the Līn and others by which they
alone become the cause for Pravṛtti but not the Abhidha of the
words such as Ghata, etc.

The answer is that Pravṛtti follows the understanding of
Abhidheyaśvīsesa in the case of Līn etc., while in the case of
Ghata, etc., there can be no Pravṛtti from them in spite of their
Abhidha because of the absence of that Abhidheyaśvīsesa. There-
fore it cannot be claimed that the Abhidha is the Pravṛttiḥetu:

\(^{22}\) Ibid., p.16. \(^{23}\) Ibid., p.16.
Again, on the statement that Niyāmakahetorabhavat, Vācaspati Miśra gives a clear explanation. He asks a question if it is said that Abhidha is what is conveyed by the Sabda, is it conveyed by itself or by another Abhidha? In the latter case, there would be two alternatives as to whether that Abhidha and the other Abhidha occur simultaneously or in sequence.

If it is maintained that Abhidha is meant by the Sabda by itself, it has to be rejected on the ground that something does not have its function on itself. It cannot be also said that there is simultaneity between Abhidha and another Abhidha because when one is already the fruit another fruit is not compatible with it.

If Krama or sequence between them is accepted, we will have to assume that Lin, etc. convey their Svartha first and then that Svartha is Abhidha. This is not tenable in view of the fact that we cannot take a Vyapara haltingly in the case of the objects of understanding which are not repeated:

\[ \text{Apiça arthābhidhā abhidhiyamāna tayaiva abhidhiyeta, abhidhāntareṇa va? Yada abhidhāntareṇa tada tayor yougapadyam krama vā iti vikalpaiḥ upaplavante. Tatra natavat prathamaḥ kalpaḥ, svātmanī vṛttivirodhena āpāstatvat. Nāpi yougapadyam - phale phalāntanaupapatteḥ ... astu tarhi kramaḥ. Prathamaṁ linādibhiḥ svārthobhidhiyate artha svārtho abhidheyeti. Tanna, } \]

Ibid., p.16.
sandabuddhi karmanām anavṛttānam viramya vyapāraṇupapatteḥ. 25

(iii) The third alternative raised by Mandana Misra is that a special kind of Artha is the Vidhi from Lin, etc. This view is refuted by Vācaspati Misra on two grounds:

Apauruṣeya praisadiṇṇṝdharmo nāvakalpate
Naçā pravartanāmatram avisēsamakartikam. 26

The first ground contained in the first half of the above Karika is that Prēṣaṇa, Adhyēṣana and Abhyanujña which should be taken as the Arthabheda of Lin, etc. are incompatible in Veda because they are attributes of Puruṣa and as such would render Veda Pauruṣeya.

The second ground contained in the second half of the above Karika is that Pravartana being the function of one who prompts to action cannot exist without the prompter. If Puruṣa is said to be the prompter, it is rejected on the ground that there is no Puruṣa at all in Veda. Sabda also cannot be the prompter because it is already shown to be incompatible under the first alternative.

On this alternative, Vācaspati Misra has made the following points:

Mandana Misra alleges that Veda would become Pauruṣeya if

25 Ibid., p.17. 26 Ibid., p.17.
Arthabheda were to be Vidhi. It may be argued that the Upaniṣads which form a part of Veda have accepted Atman as Puruṣa in spite of the fact that Pauruṣeṣyatva of Veda is admitted. He says: 'Vedatmano abhiṣṛṇya iti atisthavāyāh'. On this point, Vacaspati Miśra says by quoting 'Yah sarvesu vedesu pratisthan sarvabhyo vedabhyo anantaro yam sarve veda na viduh ... yesa ta atma antaryami amṛtah' from the Upaniṣads and he connects it with the above statement of Mandana Miśra. He explains by saying that Sarīra (body) is that which is the abode of actions, senses and sense objects. Veda cannot be the abode of the Česta etc. of any Atman. The actions here are not intentional as in the case of the Sarīras of Devadatta etc.:

\[\text{Čestendriyārthaśrayah sarīramitihi tadvidhā. Na ķa kasyaścid atmanāḥ čestādīnām vedarāśīḥ aśrayo bhavitum arhati. Najatu devadattādi sariravadasmin buddhi- purvāhsanti kriyā.}^{27}\]

It is concluded that the Atman referred to here is the greater Atman of the body of Veda which is without any physical body.

\[^{27}\text{Ibid.}, \text{p.18.}\]
3. Niśyogswadarupavidhivada of Prabhabhakara:

The next important view about the significance of Vidhi that is Līnadyartha is that of Prabhākara. This view is stated and refuted at great length by Mandana Misra in his Vidhiviveka. Vācaspati Misra gives a detailed elucidation of the view as stated by Mandana Misra. The various points made during the statement of this view as a Purvapakṣa are explained with objections and answers within the scope of that view. The entire discussion on the statement and refutation of the view takes the bulk of about 40 demi-octave pages in the Nyāyakāṇḍa. Here, the points made by Vācaspati Misra will be brought out after giving a brief account of the Vidhiviveka on this view.

Mandana Misra stating the view of Prabhakara, says that the meaning of Līn etc. which is characterised by the absence of any association with the three times, the past, the present and the future, which is to be experienced by each person like Sukha, etc. with the notion that 'I am directed by it' which is dependent on Sabda alone and which does not come under the purview of any other Pramāṇa is Vidhi:

Pramāṇāntaratārugocaraḥ, sabdamātrālambana, niyuktosmīti
pratyātmavedaniyāh sukhañādiyat, aparājīṣferkālāratayo
līhādinam artho vidhiriti.28

28 Ibid., p.35.
This is what is known as Niyoga. It is examined whether this Niyoga is the Vākvartha or Padārtha. Since Vākvartha consists in the special meaning brought out by the Padārtha in relation to the other Padārtha, the meaning of Niyoga would be incompatible if it is not a Padārtha. In fact, Niyoga does not constitute that Viṣeṣa because it is not of the nature of a Sambandha. It cannot be also Padārtha because of the condition that it should also depend upon the experience of a Sambandha and that Sambandha being a subject of another Pramāṇa. If it is urged that Sabda itself is the Pramāṇa, it would result in the contingency of Itarētraśraya in as much as the Sambandha is grasped when the meaning of Niyoga is clear from the Sabda and the knowledge in the form of Niyoga from the Sabda arises only when the Sambandha is grasped. Further, Prēṣaṇa, etc. are known in the word itself. Hence, the concerned Sambandha here can be taken on the basis of that knowledge derived from the word. It may be argued here that the knowledge of Praiṣa, etc. is got from the word but the knowledge of Sambandha is not of the Niyoga, which is otherwise known as Apurva. The answer to this objection is that Prēṣaṇa, etc. are only the adjuncts (Upadhis) but not the meaning of words because they are not regularly associated with them. In all those meanings of Prēṣaṇa, etc. there is the element of Pravartakatva implied in them and that is the meaning of the Liṅ, etc. Therefore, according to Prābhakara, Niyoga or Apurva is the meaning of Liṅ, etc. which is not coming under
the purview of any other Pramāṇa.

This view is rejected by Mandana Misra on the following grounds. If one accepts the meanings of Prēṣaṇa, etc. as the adjuncts derived from other Pramāṇas it is not proper to take Niyoga as the one meaning connected with all these. Since these meanings are obtained through other Pramāṇas, the knowledge of the Sambandha involved can be certainly about them only, but not about Niyoga, i.e., Apurva. This is because there is no ground to grasp a Sambandha without knowing its objects. Those meanings are to be taken as the meanings of the word because of the knowledge of the relation. Other meanings do not come into the picture. Further, the function of the Niyoktr is Niyoga. It cannot be postulated without any Niyoktr. The Niyoktr is not found in Veda because it is accepted as Apuruṣeya. It is also to be noted that the characteristic of Aparamśtakālalatrayatva with regard to Niyogā would make one think that it is totally absent like sky-flower.

On all these important points made by Mandana Misra in stating and refuting Prabhakara's view, Vācaspati Misra has made elucidatory remarks and contributed his points. As regards the adjective 'Pramāṇāntara Agocaraḥ', he adds that it should be noted as something which has a Pramāṇa and cannot be considered as Nipramāṇaka. He explains Sabdamatrāvalambanaḥ as 'Sabdamatram ālambanam āśrayah pratipādakataya yasya sa tathoṣktah'.
that is, that which has Sabda alone as its abode in the sense that it is conveying that meaning. Here a question is raised as to how Niyoga can be conveyed by the Sabda? As an answer to this question, he refers to the Viśeṣana 'Niyuktosmiti pratyatmavedaniyāḥ sukhaṇīdivat'. After hearing a sentence, with Lin, etc., one feels that one is directed by what is to be aspired, i.e., Svargakāma, etc. This is the experience of every person who hears such a sentence. It is like the experience of Sukha, etc. Just as a person tormented by heat on being anointed with sandal paste experiences the pleasure which is not derived from any other Pramāṇa, at least mentally with half closed eyes, so is Niyoga experienced after hearing the sentence with Lin, etc.

Katham punarasya sabda pratipādyatvam, ityata aha - Yato linādiyukta vākyaśravana samanantaram svaṛga-kāmādinā niyojyena niyuktosmiti pratyatmavedaniyāḥ sukhaṇīdivat. Yatha hi santāpadūnaḥ candanānulepanā-antaram anantaramapi manōmatra pravedaniyām amālitā-loçanaḥ sukhabhēdam ananya pramāṇakam anubhavati, evam niyogamapi linādivākyasravanānantaram ityarthāh.\(^{29}\)

Vācaspati Miśra discusses the question, how Niyoga does not come within the purview of other Pramāṇās. It is because of the characteristic 'Aparāmṛstakāliatrayāḥ' as stated by Mandana Miśra. Pratyakṣa and other Pramāṇās are meant for

\(^{29}\) Ibid., p.35.
obtaining the knowledge of what exists and what exists is always associated with the divisions of time. Thus, the objects of Pratyakṣa, etc. are associated with the divisions of time. Niyoga, on the other hand, is not connected with the past and the future and the present and as Kṣaṇa does not come within the purview of other Pramāṇas:

Sadupalambhanani hi pratyaksādīni mānāntaranī. Kālabhedasambhedasca satāsambandhasca tadvisayānām; ayaṃ punarniyoga atitāṇāgatavartamānādinām anyatame-nāpi atmana na paramāṣyata iti kāryataya na pramāṇāntaragocaraḥ.30

Regarding the question whether Niyoga is Vākyarthā or Padārthā, it is said that Vākyarthā is the special meaning brought out by the relation of one word with another in a sentence. It is pointed out that Niyoga cannot be regarded as that special meaning because it is not of the nature of a Sambandha (relation). To be a Sambandha it should be qualified by the Sambandhins. If Niyoga is taken as a Sambandhin itself, it can be only a Padārtha but cannot be an Apadārtha, since the Sambandhins in a sentence are Padārthas only:

Tasmād etadviseṣo vākyarthāḥ. Naça niyogastadviseṣah, asambandharūpatvat. Sambandhasca viśeṣyamānāḥ, sambandhibhir viśeṣaniyāḥ... Sambandhinascāsya padārtha iti niyogāpi sambandhināsata padarthenaiva bhavitavyam, na apadārthena.31

30 Ibid., p.36. 31 Ibid., p.36.
Further, it is shown how Niyoja is not a Padarthā at all. A Padarthā depends upon the experience of Sambandha. The experience of Sambandha follows the grasping of the Sambandhins. Then, the grasping of the Sambandhins is not possible without a Pramanā. Grasping of something is the fruit of Pramanā, and hence, it cannot occur without a Pramanā, just as sprout cannot come without a seed:


An objection is anticipated here. It may be argued that there is some such special power in Līkṣa, etc. as can produced the knowledge of some special object without having any relation. This happens when the same thing is heard several times:

Yastu manyate asti khalu līkṣadeh tādṛśeḥ sāmarthyāti- śayah yena agrhita sambandho... janayati vilakṣaṇa- viśayam avabodhum. Katipaya śravana samanantaram tad bhavāt.33

32 Ibid., p.37. 33 Ibid., p.37.
Vâcaspati Mîśra remarks here and says that this is the implied sense. If sambandha is not grasped at the first hearing, then Lîn etc. cannot be taken as giving the knowledge of a special object even when it is heard hundred times:

Ayam abhisandhiḥ - Prathamaśravanaṇādina sambandhagrahe śatasōpi śrītāt iihādeḥ vilaksana 'visāya bodhānupa-patīteḥ...34

In explaining 'Praiśādinām loke pratīteh', etc., he quotes the instance of a boy who picks up the meanings of Preśaṇa, etc. from the context of his teacher directing a boy to bring Samit, etc.:

Idam akutam - Kāryabhidhāyita tāvallinādinām avagata āçaryavākyesu 'mānapaka samidhamāhara' ityadeśah. Tatra hi etad vākyasravanāntaram pravartanānam samidhamaharane mānapakam upalabhya pārśvastho vyuptitsuh evam avadharayati. 'Buddhipurviyam asya pravṛttih, svatantre pravṛttitvāt, madiya pravṛttivāt', yaccāham budhva pravṛttah tadevāyaṃ madaviśeṣāt.35

Further, he explains with his points the statement:

Upadhayaste na śabdārthaḥ vyabhicārāt.36

The Preśaṇa, etc. grasped from the word are the adjuncts but not the meanings of words. These very adjuncts which are neutral render the meaning of the word to its special shade by virtue of their usage just as the idea of an animal is the

34 Ibid., p.37.  
36 Ibid., p.39.
adjunct with regard to the meaning of the word Hari. This idea of the animal is neutral because it does not come as a part of denotation. Yet, restricts the meaning of the word Hari to that of the animal itself. Similarly, the ideas of Prāṣaṇa, etc. which are not included in the denotation render the kārya to its special form and they are not the denotated meanings. Hence, there being the possibility of grasping the relation, Niyoga is the meaning of Liṅ, etc.

Etaduktam bhavati. Upadhe ete natu sabdārthaḥ. Ta eva ca upādhatah ye tatasthāḥ prayoga darsāna maṭrāt sabdārtham viśese vyavasthāpayantī, yathā hari padābhidhēyasya paśūtvam upādhiḥ. Tatha hi-paśūtvam tatastha meva abhidhāna abhiniveśad iti haripadārtha iti haritvam paśāveva niyacchatī. Evam praiṣādayopi abhidhāna aviniveśanaḥ eva kāryam viśese vyavasthāpayanti, napunar abhidhēyaḥ iti sambandha grahāna sambhavāt upapannām niyogābhidhānam liṅādiṇam iti. 37

It is explained here that Prāṣaṇa etc. are not the meanings of Liṅ, because they are not used in responding to a call. It is also used in making an appeal to an elderly person but not only in giving a call. It is not only used in making an appeal but also in directing a subordinate. This is the type of Vyabhicāra:


In answer to this objection, it is said that Kartavyata is one thing that is commonly implied from Præṣana, etc. because otherwise Pravṛtti is not compatible. Therefore, Lin, etc. denote Kartavyata. Thus they are denoting the Apurva which is different from Yaga, etc. that are momentary and which is conducive to what are to be attained such as Svarga that come as the qualities of what is ordained by virtue of the relation with the word Svargakāma. Thus, it is established from the point of view of Prabhakara that Niyoga is the meaning of Lin, etc. which is not brought out by any other Pramanā:

Sarveśe'va praiśādiśu kartavyataika sambhavet. Anyatha svatantra pravṛtteḥ anupapattērityuktam. Tasmāt kartavyataḥbhidhāyino liñadayah svargakāmapada sambandham niyojya viśeṣanibhuta sādhya svargādyanukūlasya ॐsūtara viṁāyāyātiriktasya apurvasya abhidhāyinoḥ. Tadevam pramanāntaragocarata liñādyarthatānuyogasyeti siddham.\[39\]

In refuting the above view of Prābhakara, it is shown by Mandana Miśra that the adjuncts in the form of Præṣana, etc. being got through other Pramanās cannot have Niyoga as the one common meaning connected with them. Explaining this point, Vacaspati Miśra adds that it is true that Lin, etc. convey the meaning of Kartavyata (Niyoga). This Kartavyata is of Kriya (action) only but not of the Apurva because the power of the word is grasped on the basis of worldly usage. Since Kriya

\[39\] Ibid., p.39.
itself is the Karya and since it is the cause for Pravṛtti it should be grasped through the other Pramāṇas. If it is said that Apurva is not known through other Pramāṇas but only through relation with the word Svargakāma in Veda from the words Lin, etc., which are related through the common idea of Kartavyata, then, the answer is that Kartavyata itself being the meaning of Lin, etc., why should it be regarded as related with the action in the word:

Idamatra ākutam - Satyam kartavyatābhidhāyino linādayaḥ, kartavyatātātu kriyāya eva, na apurvasya, lokadhīnava-dhāraṇatvāt śabda śāmarthyasya. Tasya eva ca kṣtyataya pravṛttiḥetutvena svātmanī māntareṇa vidhītātvāt. Nanvaprūvasya tasya mānantaraṇaḥpratvat kartavyatāmātra vidita sangatīnām loke linādīnām svargakāmapada sambandhād vede apuvaviśeṣa pratilambhah iti cet, astu tāvadasyaiva tu kartavyasya linādyarthata napunah kriyaya api laukikya iti kutastyam? ⁴⁰

Next, in elucidation of the point that Niyoga cannot be Aparāmrstakālatraya, Vācaspati Misra says that all that exists other than time is concomitant with time. By removing the relation of Niyoga with the time, the nature of its being Sattva itself is removed. This is intended to show that such a Niyoga is like the sky-flower:

Kālātiriktasya hi sattvam kālāvaççedena vyāptam, sa tadavaççedah kālātmano niyogam nivartamānah sattvam- apyasya nivartayati. ⁴¹

⁴⁰ Ibid., p.40.
⁴¹ Ibid., p.44.
Thus, Vācaspati Mīśra contributes very pertinent points by way of elucidation and illustration of the statements made by Mandana Mīśra in connection with the statement and refutation of Niyogarūpavidhivāda which is otherwise known as Apūrvavidhivāda.

4. Refutation of Pratipattividhivāda:

In the context of refuting the Niyogarūpavidhivāda of Prabhakara, Mandana Mīśra raises an important point regarding the nature of the Upaniṣadic (Vedanta) statements in the light of what Prabhakara has said. The following is the Purvapakṣa in this connection - It is said that there cannot be any statement which is neither Pravartaka nor Nivartaka because such a statement is useless. The use of a sentence culminates in denoting Kartavyāyata:

Nanu napravartakam anivartakam vā vaçaḥ samasti, vayyarthyāt. Kartavyātā paryavasāyīm hi vākya-pravṛttiḥ.42

As against this view, Mandana Mīśra asks - how about the Vedanta statements or the worldly statements which speak of the objects that are already existing?

Katham tarhi bhūtānvākyāyino vedanta laukika vaçāmsi ça?43

42 Ibid., p.192.  
43 Ibid., p.192.
The answer to this objection from the point of view of Prabhadhakara is that Kartavyāyata is of different kinds and all the statements are the sources of the knowledge of either Prayṛtti or Niyṛtti. Accordingly in Vedanta statements Kartavyāyata consists in Atmapratipatti (knowledge of the Atman). In the world also the statements denote the Kartavyāyata that Vidhi, etc. are to be known. This view is refuted by Mandana Mśra who is arguing here as a Vedantin also. Vācaspati Mśra, who is another Vedantin, takes up the case of Vedanta in the light of Mandana Mśra's points and also the points taken from his Bhāṣya on Vedanta-sūtras. He introduces the topic in a very systematic way at the commencement of refutation of the view and says that we should consider three alternatives in examining the question of Kartavyāyata as connected with the Upaniṣadic statements. The three alternatives to be examined are:

(i) Is that Kartavyāyata in the form of Atmapratipatti, śrtamayī?
(ii) Is it cintāmayī?
(iii) Is it sāksātkārvāvati?

Vācaspati Mśra takes the first statement of Mandana Mśra - 'Sabḍapratipatteḥ utpatteḥ punastatrāvyāpārat' - as an argument against the view that Upaniṣadic statements give rise to Pratipatti of the nature of Śrtamayī. It is said here that Śrtamayaipratipatti cannot be ordained. What is ordained is known from the Sabda and the subsequent Prayṛtti is the purpose
served by Vidhi. The purpose of Vidhi is not merely the knowledge of the Sabda because it would amount to Atmaśrayadoṣa. Just as a statement ordaining action which has the knowledge of the relation of the action with its fruit, does not require another Vidhi for bringing out the relation of the action with its fruit so are the Upaniṣadic statements with regard to the knowledge of Atman, not in need of any Vidhi:


Another statement of Mandana Miśra viz.,

Nakhalu phalamśo vidhigōcaraḥ45

is an argument against the Sāksātkāravatī pravṛtțī. It is said here that the aspect of Phala, for instance, the Sāksātkāra, does not come into the purview of Vidhi at all. This is supported by the following statement attributed to Sage Jaimini:

Tasya lipsārthalaksanā nisprapançatmatattvāvabhāsāsaṣa phalamaya.46

By Nisprapança the absence of all sorrow is meant. The Prapança consists in sorrow. It is through the knowledge of the Tattva one becomes filled with bliss:

Nakhalu phalāmśo vidhigōcarī, yathāha maharśiḥ... nisprapançeti vigalita nikhila duḥkavāmāha. Prapançohi duḥkham. Tattvagrahānāna anandamatam sūçayati. 47

Next, he asks - 'Anyetu sabdajnāna santana vidhanamīçcanti' as referring to Cintāmayprayātta. The view here is that Manana and Nidhidhyāsanā are to be taken as ordained by the Upaniṣadās because they are not of the nature of the fruit, to say that they cannot be ordained but they are of the nature of the means to the realisation of Atma-tattva which is the fruit. This is ordained because Cintā-pratipatti gives rise to clear knowledge which is pure due to the absorption of the entire references to Bheda. The purity here is in the form of the eradication of all doubt; clearness is the realisation.

This contention is halted by the argument that even this does not bring about the knowledge of Atma:


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Finally, an important objection is anticipated from the point of view of Brāhmaṇakara. There are statements in the Upaniṣads such as, 'Tasmāt sānto dāntaḥ samāhitobhūtva ātmanyeva ātmanam naḥvṛt'. These sentences ordain certain qualities to attain the Atmānānā.

As against this, Mandana Miśra says that there are some special Vidhis with reference to certain actions which are already known. Similarly, the atmatattva of the Upaniṣads is known through the statements which do not depend upon any Vidhi at all. Here, Vācaspati Miśra adds a very significant point. He says that the intention here is to say that the Vidhis regarding Guna are meant for the accomplishment of what is implied but not for ordaining anything through them. Just as the Brahmins are restricted from taking gifts when there is the intention of accumulating wealth through attachment, so here also in the case of a person who wants to realise the Atmatattva full of eternal bliss which is totally devoid of all kinds of sorrow, there is the Vidhi in the form of Sāntatva, etc. This is meant for one who is engaged in the meditation on the Atman and who is adept in all the means of meditation:

\[
\text{Idamatra ākūtam - Guṇaavidhayōhi bhāvārthasiddhim apeksato napunastad vidhānamapi tena. Yathāiva rāgataḥ prāpte dravyārjayane brāhmaṇādinam pratigrāhādayo niyamyante sāksāt cikirśoh anvayavyatirekāvagata dhyāna sādhanasya atmādhyāne pravruttasya sāntatvādi vidhiriti.}^{49}
\]

\[^{49}\text{Ibid., pp.200-201.}\]
Thus Vācaspāti Misra concludes the discussion with the following statement:

Tataḥ tiṣṭānāpam pratipattinām vidhāna anarthatvāt atmatattva pratipādana paratvamḥi vedantānam upapāditam. Sarvam caitad brahmaśiddhou kṛtaśramāṇām anayāsām adhigamanīyamiti neha asmābhir upapāditam.50

Thus, according to Vācaspāti Misra, the three kinds of Pratipatti do not deserve to be ordained. Hence, the Vedanta statements are meant for teaching the Atmatattva. This is not dealt with in detail because those who study Brahmaśiddhi can clearly understand this view of the Vedantins as against the view of the Prābhakara.

It is to be noted here that Mandana Misra and Vācaspāti Misra think on the same lines as regards the purpose of the Vedanta statements. Both are Vedantins and hence, even while contributing to the Mīmāṃśa school, they are not carried away by the views of the Mīmāṃsakas like Prābhakara. They establish the special nature of the Vedanta statements with firm arguments. Vācaspāti Misra’s contribution here is significant, in this light.

5. Mandana Misra’s view - Istaśādhanatvam Vidhyarthāḥ:

Mandana Misra is of the opinion that the meaning of Vidhi is Istaśādhanatva i.e., its being the means of what is desired, i.e., since the fact that it is to be attained through action

50 Ibid., p.201.
is known from the world itself, it does not stand in need of a Vidhi. What is to be attained through action is Yaga, etc. It is known through the inference as 'Yago matkriti sadhyah, matkritisadhyya virodhi dhamanadhikarañatvat'. Yaga is to be accomplished through my action because it is not the action which is characterised by what is opposed to that which is to be accomplished through my action. According to the maxim, 'Ananyalabhyyahi sadarthah' the Krtisadhyatva is not the meaning of Vidhi because it is obtained through the inference as shown above. The meaning of Istaadhanatva of Svarga, etc. is not obtained through any other Pramana except from the Vedic statements. Hence, it is accepted that Vidhi has the power to denote that. The words Liti, etc. indicate Pravartana. This Pravartana is through an effort. The effort is always prompted by a desire. Without desire, no wise man will have Pravrtti with regard to any action. Since the desire is not with regard to what brings sorrow, but only with regard to what brings happiness. Hence, the desire is towards happiness or towards the means of happiness. So far as Kriya is concerned, there is no difference of opinion among the wise that it is beset with sorrow. When we say people take to action it is implied necessarily that Kriya is the means to the attainment of happiness. Those who aspire for happiness do not have Pravrtti in Kriya unless they take them for the means to happiness. The actions enjoined in Veda are not directly the means to
happiness and as such no wise person would have taken to them in order to prevent this contingency we should necessarily accept Sukhasādhanatva with regard to the actions that are of the nature of afflictions. If the Sabda would not convey the idea of Sukhasādhanatva, nobody else could prompt a person to action. Pravartana here is a kind of Vyāpara (function), which is the characteristic of the Bhāva in the form of I斯塔sadhanatva as it is conducive to the creation of Prayṛtti. Nobody would be prompted to action unless he understands that it is the means to the attainment of his desired end.

Here it may be observed that in the case of carrying out the royal order, the servant has no idea of I斯塔sadhanatva with regard to his action. Therefore, Pravartana in the form of I斯塔sadhanatva is not universal. Here it should be noted that this contention is true, yet, it should be observed that there should be some kind of the idea of I斯塔sadhanatva even in carrying out an order. In the case of servant who carries the orders of a master, he thinks that if he carried out the order of the king successfully, the king would be pleased and would fulfil my desires and would not subject me to any undesirable punishment. Thus everybody takes to action only with the knowledge of the I斯塔sadhanatva.

It may be objected that I斯塔sadhanatva being a kind of knowledge, it cannot arise without a basis. Therefore the knowledge of Kartavyata should be taken as the basis of I斯塔-
sadhanatva, because the latter alone cannot be the cause of Prayṛtti. Therefore, it must be admitted that the cause of Prayṛtti consists in Istaśadhanatva supported by the idea of Kartavyatva.

But, according to Mandana Miśra, the Istaśadhanatva on the part of the agent is itself Kartavyata and what is opposed to it is not Kartavyata. Therefore, the meaning of Lin, etc., according to this view is Istaśadhanata itself which is connected with the idea of what is to be accomplished:

Tasmāt īpsitasyāpāyāta kartṛpravṛtti hetuh.

Karturistābhyyupāyeti kartavyamiti lokadhiṁ
Viparitetvakartavyam iti tadviśaye tataḥ.

Vācaspata Miśra follows Mandana Miśra very closely and offers his elucidations and special points throughout the course of his discussion. On the main points made above, he has contributed the following points. Explaining the statement 'Tasmād īpsitasya kartṛ pravṛtti hetuh' he adds that Pravṛtti cannot arise merely by the knowledge of Kartavyata because it is without basis and the knowledge cannot be Nirālambana:

Nanu kartavyatavagamāt pravartate. Saiva tathāstu.
Dūṣāyati — kā punariyam kartavyatā? Na nirālambanam jñānam, naca ēreyaḥ sādhanatā tvayeśyata iti bhāvah... kartavyatavagamōhi pramanasya kāryam asati kārane pramāṇe na bhavitum arhati.

On the point 'Karturistabhypayaïhi kartavyamiti lokadhih etc., Vācaspati Miśra adds and says that it is the implica-
tio of the statement. It is true that Kartavyaata consists in
something to be accomplished through action but that alone
cannot be the cause of Pravṛtti. What is desired also amounts
to Kartavyaata. It does not mean that Phala or the fruit
should be taken as Kartavya and Phalasadhanatva can be taken
as the cause of Pravṛtti but the problem is that Kartavyaata of
one thing cannot operate elsewhere. Ṛcarya Mandana establishes
that Istasadhanatva is the Pravṛttihetu but not merely
Kartavyaata. Therefore, by making reference to the term
Kartuh, the Ācarya implies that Istasadhana coupled with the
idea of Kartavyaata is the cause for Pravṛtti:

Idamatra akutam - Satyam kṛtisadhyatamātram kartavyatā.
Natu tanmātram hetuḥ, samihitasāpi kartavyatayā
tadhetutva prasangaḥ. Natu phalam kartavyamiti
pravṛttiśoćarāḥ tad sādhanam tu syāt. Naçānyatra
kartavyaata anyatra pravartayati, atiprasangāt.
Natu tanmātramapitu karturistabhypaïya iti upapāda-
yasyati svayameva ācaryāh. Tasmāt kartuh iti vaçañād
ācāryasya kartarijataikārtha samavayiñi sanñihita
sādhanatā pravṛttihetūḥ kartavyata jñānahālabanam
abhimatah. 54

Here, he anticipates the objection from the angle of
Prābhakara and says that Kartavyaata does not consist in merely

54 Ibid., p.215.
Niyoga. If that alone were the sense, Kartavyata would be lost in the context of Naimittika actions and Nisiddha actions. Therefore, Kartavyata is nothing but Apeksitopayata of the agent. What is opposed to it amounts to Akartavyata:

Tatha ca na niyogamatra kartavyata. Naimittika nisadadikaryayoh tanmatratve ca kartavyatamahanih niyojyabhava iva iti karturapeksitopayata kartavyata. Tad viparita ca akartavyata iti siddham.55

Thus, Vacaspati Misra brings the discussion to the following conclusion drawn by Mandana Misra:

Tasmat kartavyatapi nanaya samihitopayataya.56

Here, the points contributed by Vacaspati Misra on the most important topics in Vidhiviveka of Mandana Misra are given. The contribution of Vacaspati Misra is particularly notable in the context of discussing and refuting the Pratipattividhivada of the Prabhakarasa as regards the Upanisadic statements. As a Vedantin, he supports another Vedantin, i.e., Mandana Misra who has contributed like himself to the Mimasaa school.

Ibid., p.216. 56 Ibid., p.216.