The present chapter takes up the discussion of the justification condition as a constituent of knowledge as put forth by philosophers. First of all, we must know under what conditions, a person’s belief may be said to be justified. This certainly is not a quest for the necessary and sufficient conditions of justification, for we think that an epistemic notion can not be measured justifiably in logical terms. Traditionally, this condition must have been added in order to enhance the precision of the concept of knowledge, as lucky guesses do not amount to knowledge. Our concern is to investigate whether justification precludes the uncertainty which a lucky guess is subject to.

In the analysis of a knowledge situation, according to the justification requirement, a person’s belief depends upon the reasons for which he possess the belief. In our second chapter, we have discussed in short the specifications of the justification conditions, its classification on various basis and the metajustification theories. Our present concern is to emphasize the relation of justification to knowledge and belief.

Post-Gettier literature contains a bewildering variety of viewpoints concerning how the third condition is to be understood. A few of those have not accepted this third condition. An immediate reaction against the Gettier counter examples has been, as we observed in our last chapter, the
detection of falsity of the propositions like ‘Jones owns a Ford’ and ‘Jones will get the job’. It is the falsity of the premises which impedes it to become a counter example against justified ‘true’ belief analysis. A second response has been against the inferential nature of examples. Accordingly, either it has been denied that one can have a true belief under these circumstances, i.e., by deriving the seemingly true proposition from a false one, or it has been admitted that the examples are genuine and there is a need to repair the tripartite definition. The repair has been in the form of the fourth condition.

Philosophers like Crispin Sartwell have not only denied the possibility of any fourth condition, but rather have abandoned the third condition as well. The other rejectionists are Goldman, Swain, Carrier and a few other philosophers. According to these philosophers, the responses to Gettier rest on the mistaken assumption that justification has to be a part of the analysis of propositional knowledge. Sartwell holds that justification is not and ‘cannot’ become a part of the analysis of knowledge. She rules out a logical necessity of justification in the explication of the concept of knowledge. The goal of epistemic inquiry is knowledge and not justification. “Knowledge is our epistemic goal in the generation of particular beliefs.”

Moreover, in the acquisition of the goal, the role of justification is merely instrumental. If at all, justification is to be directed towards truth, it is a criterion for knowledge. So, the role of justification in the epistemic inquiry is two fold. Sartwell writes it as:
"Justification on the present view is, first of all, a means by which we achieve knowledge, that is, by which we arrive at true beliefs, and, second, it provides a test of whether someone has knowledge, that is, whether her beliefs are true."  

Sartwell, however, positively asserts that merely truth and belief are sufficient for knowledge, justification is not even a necessary condition for it. If knowledge is the objective of epistemic inquiry then since justification is instrumental in arriving at truth, it cannot be a necessary condition. For the sake of being consistent, Sartwell concludes that it cannot be maintained that knowledge is justified true belief. If, on the contrary, justification is not taken as instrumental and it has its intrinsic value, there cannot be a coherent concept of knowledge.

"If we describe justification as of merely instrumental value with regard to arriving at truth, we can no longer maintain both the knowledge in the teleos of inquiry and that justification is a necessary condition of knowledge. It is incoherent to build a specification of something regarded merely as a means of achieving some goal into the description of the goal itself; in such circumstances, the goal can be described independently of the means. So, if justification is demanded because it is instrumental to true belief, it cannot also be maintained that knowledge is justified true belief."

A rejection of justification as a part of analysis of knowledge is also suggested by Plato in *Theaetetus* as a dilemma. It says that if knowledge requires justification, then this justification is in the form of a belief which either does not amount to knowledge or does amount to knowledge. If the former, then this belief itself needs justification and there is an endless regress. If the latter, knowledge is based on the known and the account of knowledge becomes circular.

An explicit presentation of the justification condition is not found in the theories of Goldman, Armstrong and Swain. These philosophers
are labelled as ‘rejectionists’\textsuperscript{5}. They support a reliability theory of knowledge. According to Goldman\textsuperscript{6}, the mechanism responsible for a belief to count as knowledge is the belief’s being ‘reliable’. In order to qualify the property of being reliable, the mechanism must enable a person to discriminate between incompatible states of affair, for instance, an object’s being red vs. its being yellow. He suggests: “I suggest that a person is said to know that $p$ just in case he distinguishes or discriminates the truth of $p$ from relevant alternatives.”\textsuperscript{7}

His barn-facade case explains his stand. In this example, the element of justification in both the cases of facsimiles of barns and real barns is the same. Even the causal analysis cannot help in such a situation. Indefeasibility could handle the problem to some extent; but the indefeasibility analysis, being too strong because of the presence of misleading defeaters, fails to solve the problem. In such a situation only the ‘actual state of affairs’ in which $p$ is true is distinguishable or discriminable by the agent from a relevant possible state of affairs in which $p$ is false. When Henry is confronted with the facsimiles, a relevant state of affairs is introduced which can be discriminated from the actual state of affairs.

Goldman’s theory does not demand any kind of justification in the traditional sense, i.e., in the sense of a set of self-warranting propositions. In case, justification is taken to mean a process which causes true beliefs and rules out false ones and is suitably caused, then, his theory also requires justification.

“My theory requires no justification for external world propositions that derives entirely from self-warranting propositions. It requires only, in effect, that beliefs in the
external world be suitably caused, where ‘suitably’ comprehends a process or mechanism that not only produces true beliefs in actual situations, but would not produce false beliefs in relevant counterfactual situations. If one wishes, one can so employ the term ‘justification’ that belief causation of this kind counts as justification. In this sense, of course, my theory does require justification. But this is entirely different from the sort of justification demanded by Cartesianism.8

Factual knowledge is caused only when a person’s belief is formed as a result of a reliable cognitive mechanism. Armstrong holds that one has belief only if he has a completely reliable truth of the proposition. His definition of knowledge also does not include a justification condition9.

R.M. Chisholm began with the elimination of the defectively evident but later developed his views on the subject. Finally he was able to present an articulated set of epistemic levels10. His final verdict again emphasized the clearance of the defectively evident. Keith Lehrer presented a defeasibility analysis having the belief to be indefeasibly justified as one of the conditions of knowledge. Marshall Swain manages to amplify the specifications of the justification condition by drawing a distinction between the reasons upon which a person’s belief that h is based and other reasons which a person may have and still these reasons are not relevant to justifiably believing that h.11 When it is the second alternative (i.e., when a person’s belief is not ‘based’ upon the reasons) his belief is not justified and he does not have knowledge.

Swain supports the reliability theory of justification put forth by Goldman. For Swain, ‘The ascriptions of reliability are evidential claims’, that is, claims that these facts about the subject constitute good
evidence for the truth of the proposition believed. He defines the concept of justified belief in terms of reliable belief.\textsuperscript{12}

The reasons which are related to a belief, yet not sufficient enough to convert it into a case of knowledge, cannot become a part of justification. There may be number of facts related to a particular proposition, some of them even causally related, still insufficient to be called an evidence for it. It is not even necessary that the agent is aware of them all. The issue of justification becomes irrelevant in such a case.

According to the present conception of evidence as justification, the proposition on which the ‘belief’ is based has to be true. If one uses false propositions as evidence, it does not follow that they become evidence. The other view, that a false proposition can become an evidence and be used as justification, is only a way to adjust one’s beliefs to the truth.\textsuperscript{13} It requires more than mere internal coherence of one’s belief system because it has to cohere with the truth also. This view raises a question as to what is the evidence for the truth itself. Consequently the problem takes a new form – Is it knowledge of the evidence that justifies the belief? Does knowledge of the evidence and the whole phenomenon become circular?

An epistemic agent can be justified in making a false claim. The best example available to support this view is that astronomers before Copernicus had a justified belief that the earth is the centre of the universe. It is quite reasonable to suppose that a proposition which has been claimed to be known by a person, is supposedly regarded as true till it is proved to be false or is replaced by some contrary proposition proved to be true. In a court, a lawyer can prove even a false statement to be true.
by the force of the evidence in its support. In the ordinary discourse also, we believe many false propositions just because we look only at one side of the coin. We even claim to know these ‘facts’. But the truth of these false knowledge claims comes to an end when the real fact is revealed. For instance, while measuring the weight of a piece of metal, I find that it is 5 kilograms. ‘This piece of metal weights 5 kg’ is a claim. This claim is not only regarding the truth of the proposition but also regarding my knowledge about it. Later, it is observed by some one else that the machine is showing 1 kg more than the actual weight of the object because of some defect. After the removal of the zero-defect, the weight of the piece of the metal is measured to be 4 kilograms only. This is another proposition which I claim to know. The earlier proposition is just a false knowledge claim whereas the later one is true knowledge claim as well as a knowledge-situation.

Hereby it is not implied that one is always in a process of continually discarding the earlier claims and making new ones. The first situation in the above case was not a knowledge situation for the agent, although he thought it to be one. The ‘fact’ that the weight of the object was not equal to 5 kg prevented it from being a case of knowledge. Moreover, because of his formation of the claim, it was possible to correct him. It was equally quite possible that he had always mistaken himself as a knower.

Such corrections are not always possible simply because human beings generally do not always declare what they think they know. It is widely admitted that on any good account of justification, a proposition, if it is based on that account, is likely to be true, although a possibility is always there of its being turning out to be false as well. One of the
reasons for the aforesaid is that although justification is directed towards truth, but there is never a guarantee that it successfully meets the end, i.e., the truth and thus ultimately yields knowledge.

Justification is a matter of coherence of a given proposition either with the accepted or unfalsified propositions. One proves the consistency of the given proposition with the already existing propositions within a given system. What is, however, difficult to prove is coherence amongst the propositions of various systems. One can comfortably add a situation of fantasy to an already written consistent fairy tale. But it is not plausible to create a network of such stories together and at the same time establish their coherence with the observed facts.

Most philosophers are inclined to think that our epistemic goal is the achievement of true beliefs. P. Moser suggests that “Epistemic justification is essentially related to the so-called cognitive goal of truth, in so far as an individual belief is epistemically justified only if it is appropriately directed towards the goal of truth.”

The credible point is that Moser makes a conceptual distinction between knowledge on the one hand and rationally accepted or justified belief on the other hand. Justification is related to empirical knowledge. In the Gettier cases, justified true belief is not sufficient for being a case of knowledge. He separates the concept of epistemic justification from the related concepts of truth, probability, knowledge and showing evidence. He criticizes the reliability theory of knowledge held by Goldman and others. According to Moser, the criterion for the objectivity of reliability in a sense in which it leads to the level of truth producing in not available, so no link can be established between a
justified belief and reliable belief. He concludes that there is no conceptual connection between the two. He states his conclusion as follows:

"Epistemic reliabilism fails to state an acceptable conceptual connection between epistemically justified belief and reliable belief producing mechanism."15

L. Banjour endorses P. Moser’s position by saying:

“It is only if we have some reasons to think that epistemic justification constitutes a path to truth that we as cognitive human beings have any motive for preferring epistemically justified beliefs to epistemically unjustified ones.”16

He fortifies Moser’s views in so far as the epistemic goal is concerned with the attainment of true beliefs. The defining goal of epistemic inquiry is essentially truth and if a particular view of justification is not directed towards truth, it would be irrelevant from the epistemic viewpoint.

Lehrer’s ideal situation is the corrected doxastic system ascribed to a person who is a ‘veracious inquirer’ i.e., an impartial and disinterested seeker. A particular person would arrive at a set of statements not with the help of the actual system of beliefs he holds, but rather by deleting the statements observed by him as a veracious observer. Bonjours’ view, however, is that since we cannot attain the truth directly, we have to seek truth from within the justified beliefs.

“The whole rationale for the concept of epistemic justification is that we have no direct, unproblematic access to the truth, and so must seek truth indirectly by seeking beliefs which are justified – so that assessing our standards of justification by a direct appeal to the truth of their output would be either impossible or immediately circular.”17

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In spite of sharing a common contextualist background with Lehrer, Bonjour alleges him to have an idiosyncratic views regarding justification.  

These philosophers have committed themselves to the view that justification is a means by which we arrive either at true beliefs or at knowledge. From this point of view, justification provides us techniques to gain knowledge. In previous chapters, we noted that a number of contemporary philosophers including foundationalists like Chisholm and coherentists like Lehrer suggest that the notion of justification must be redefined to be remained as a part of the definition of knowledge. They offer a fourth condition which is an expansion of the third one. This improved definition is supposed to cover all the remaining cases of knowledge which had not been covered by the ‘Justified True Belief’ definition. Other Gettier-style counter examples have been used by philosophers in order to illustrate it. But the problem rotates around the notion of justification only. 

In all Gettier style counterexamples, it is assumed that there is a possibility of supposing a person to be completely justified in believing what is false. R. Almender attempts to falsify the assumption that all counterexamples to the classical definition rest on the presupposition that evidence does not entail truth. His own view is that necessarily if a proposition is justified, then it is true. He tries to prove the assumption to be false. He openly fuses the truth condition with the evidence condition by saying that the former is superfluous. 

This view is similar to the one adopted by the advocates of social epistemology who doubt the viability of individual epistemology and
Goldman feels that need of a social counterpart of the traditional epistemology which is individualistic in nature. The epistemology which focuses on social routes to knowledge is called social epistemology. A social epistemologist is one who repudiates truth as a criterion of epistemic phenomena. The question of truth or falsity is bracketed out; the concept of true belief is replaced by institutionalised belief. The individual is replaced by a team of knowing agents, sharing the beliefs interpersonally. The doxological goal is not the achievement of knowledge, but the system of belief—true or false. He holds that an agent reasons from the reports, testimony and arguments of others in the field of social epistemology. Gettier, however, has attacked only the individualistic aspect of traditional epistemology.

The traditional approach has also been criticized by Popper and Wittgenstein. The difference is not just of style but of substance also. Whereas Gettier has declared it as inadequate, Wittgenstein’s view is that such a definition is not possible. For Popper, the question of the demand of a definition of knowledge is misguided because the individual is concentrated in it. The problem of individual justification should be replaced by a recognition of the social nature of scientific inquiry. He takes epistemology to be the theory of scientific knowledge. Looked at from this standpoint, we are lead to think of propositions rather than the beliefs of individuals. They are considered, tested and then rejected or accepted by anyone who understands them. Propositions and social activity take the place of mental states and private reasoning.

The Wittgensteinian attack an the traditional epistemology shares with Popper the idea that knowing is necessarily a social activity. Wittgenstein argued that a private language was a logical impossibility,
for using words presuppose the existence of public rules and the possibility of error. The epistemological corollary of this view is that knowledge presuppose the possibility of being mistaken and making false claims. Unless it is possible for someone who claims to know something to be wrong and for someone else to be in a position to correct him, he cannot properly be said to know. And someone else can correct him only if there are publicly accepted rules or criteria for assessing claims to knowledge.²⁴

Walsh in ‘Knowing In Its Social Setting’ also recognizes the social nature of knowledge by acknowledging the fact that the definition of knowledge as ‘Justified True Belief’ presupposes the existence of publicly accepted criterion. Walsh argues in connection with Ayer’s account of knowledge as having the right to be sure. His suggestion is that the notion of right is a social one, implying the existence of an authority qualified to confer the right in accordance with the rules for adjudicating such cases.

“It seems clear that rights exist only in social situations.
(1) Nobody has a right unless someone else is in a position to concede him that right;
(2) Nobody has a right unless there is a rule or body of rules, whose validity is inter-subjectively recognized, under which the right is exercised;
(3) Nobody has a right unless there is some sort of authority to adjudicate on claims to rights.
The notion of a purely personal right, a claim which is not merely put forward by an individual, but in regard to whose success the individual is himself the final judge, is really an absurdity.”²⁵

The concept of claim is also social, one cannot be said to have a claim unless there is an institution comprising someone with the authority to dispense decisions about the granting or refusing of claim and rules for
the guidance of the authority. In the case of scientific knowledge as is enunciated by Popper and bolstered by Wittgenstein, the institute is an open one. What is at issue for Popper is, whether the proposition which A claims to know is to be accepted as a member of the body of knowledge. Attention is focussed on the proposition rather than on the knower. Popper\textsuperscript{26} does not take much interest in the description of knowledge as known by a person, and prefers to emphasize a sense of the noun ‘knowledge’ that refers to the combination of propositions organized into explanatory systems by groups of inquirers in a co-operative effort to achieve their epistemic goals.

“Subjective knowledge is a kind of disposition which the organism sometimes may become conscious in the form of a belief or an opinion or a state of mind.”\textsuperscript{27}

Social epistemology, which is objective in nature, however, relegates the importance of truth with which the problem of knowledge in question is intimately related. Our present concern is the analysis of propositional knowledge of the form ‘S knows that P’ which has traditionally been defined in terms of true belief plus something else.

Linda Zagzebski holds that knowledge, if all defined in terms of true belief plus something else is always inviting Gettier examples. She insists rather that the difference between the notion of knowledge and the notion of justification is responsible for the creation of Gettier problems. She discusses a lot regarding the gap in different components of knowledge in ‘The Inescapability of Gettier Problems’ as well as in ‘What is knowledge’. The relation between justification and truth, according to her, is close, but not inviolable.\textsuperscript{28} If one wants to go with the justified true belief analysis, he has either to redefine the notion of
justification so as to suit the definition or some extra element must be added to these three constituent elements in order to make them sufficient to define knowledge. Her point of focus is the relation of truth to justification. Justification does not guarantee truth and as a result, there is a gap between them. If however, the two are connected by chance, it is mistakenly taken as a case of knowledge. Gettier’s case arises because of the combination of two accidental features of the cognitive situation. An accident of bad luck is cancelled by an accident of good luck. The relation between truth and justification is broken and regained by chance resulting in apparent knowledge situation. Linda Zagzebski leaves open the possibility that knowledge can be defined even in terms of truth and justification but in such a way that there is no degree of independence between them.

“The conclusion is that as long as the concept of knowledge closely connects the justification component and the truth component, but permits ‘some’ degree of independence between them, justified true beliefs will never be sufficient for them.”

It seems highly disagreeable for us to hold that there is no gap between truth and justification and that both are one and the same thing or even one entails the other.

The three conditions of truth, belief and justification, according to the traditional definition, have to be independent. If however, the two conditions of truth and justification become identical, the definition loses its originality with only two conditions. Our intention is not to defend the traditional definition. It is, rather, to save it from being discarded for the wrong reasons.
R.C. Pradhan holds that justification is in a sense relative in which truth is not. He writes: "Justification is a method of supplying reasons or evidences to maximize the reasonableness of beliefs." But at the same time, it is not to deny that one can never reach the goal of truth by means of justification. Justification is not merely instrumental in guiding us in our efforts to maximize the reasonableness of belief, it also provides us a test in order to check our beliefs. It is circular to claim that it is a logically necessary condition for knowledge, for it would demand metajustification by another set of propositions. This circularity can be avoided if knowledge is exonerated from being the goal of justification. "Justification is to be barred from being a condition of knowledge."32

In a doxastic system, where knowledge is defined in terms of justified beliefs, the importance of truth is undermined. The applause of justification overshadows the significance of truth in a knowledge situation. To know is to realize or cognize the truth of the proposition. For instance, I know that I have two pens in my pocket. It is a case of knowledge for me. By no means do I need to declare the statement in order to make it a case of knowledge. Nor do I need to get it checked by some authority. If p is known to be true then it is known and that is all about it. Knowing is unique in this sense. It is only in this sense that it 'deserves an independent status.'33

The truth condition as laid down in the various forms of the traditional definition is such that it depends upon the justified definition to secure knowledge. But even the most strengthened justified belief cannot amount to truth. It can, however, coincide with the later. In spite of the efforts to reach the goal of truth by means of justification, one may or may not be successful. Achievement of truth makes him the knower.
and he no more remains a believer. In this way, we are not denying that justified true belief can amount to knowledge. The case of knowledge or a 'knowledge-situation' may or may not coincide with a case of 'justified true belief'. But the point is that there is no necessary relation between the two.

The relation of truth to knowledge does not make the truth an infallible Cartesian character. Cartesian conception of truth is quite tempting. Descartes ascribes to the knower the truth, which is essentially infallible in nature. Knowledge for him precludes error so we cannot ever know what can be false. The paradigm of knowledge for him is where the proof is issuing the necessary truth, namely logic and mathematics. He founds all knowledge on the cogito argument in order to find an escape from skepticism.

In the past period of the development of philosophical thought, Descartes' position has substantially been relegated with regard to his notion of truth as being strictly infallible. In spite of this, every new student of philosophy is influenced by Cartesian epistemological view and is prejudiced for further rational thinking with a view that only the necessary and infallible truths can be knowable. Descartes ascribed the status of infallibility to 'cogito ergo sum' for it is clear and distinct. Mathematical truths are equally at the same level. These are analytic a-priori. However, it remains dubious whether their infallibility owes to their being analytic or their being a-priori. We can, at this stage, conceptually distinguish the two. Kant has successfully proved the non-analyticity of mathematical truths. The two features of being an analytic judgement are commonly supposed to be:
(i) The subject is contained in the predicate, and
(ii) Their denial is a contradiction.

But a careful study reveals that the second condition is a part of the first condition. In the *Critique of Pure Reason*, Kant asserts hypothetically that 'if' a judgement is analytic, then its denial will involve a contradiction 'because' the predicate is contained in the subject.

"For, if the judgement is analytic, whether affirmative or negative, its truth can always be known in accordance with the principle of contradiction."\(^{34}\)

In a synthetic judgment, the predicate amplifies the subject and by virtue of this feature, it is called a synthetic judgment. Its denial does not involve a contradiction since the predicate is not merely a repetition of the subject.

Kant further holds that our knowledge begins with experience, but it may not restrict itself to experience in its origin. Our faculty of reason may transcend the limits of experience. The knowledge which is independent to experience is called 'A-priori and is different from the empirical and yet has its sources in experience, i.e., a a-posteriori\(^{35}\). The law of causation which says that 'Everything has a cause' is such a kind of proposition which is a-priori, for an existence preceded by a time is unthinkable, yet the concept of cause is different from 'that which happens' and is synthetic accordingly. Kant has ascribed a priority to all mathematical propositions in that they are not empirical, but at the same time, they are synthetic, for the predicate is not contained in the subject. In the mathematical proposition 'The straight line between two points is shortest', the concept of 'shortest' does not contain, nor is derived from the concept of 'straight line'.\(^{36}\)
Looking back to Descartes' concept of necessity of mathematics because of its propositions being analytic, the paradox arises. Can Cartesian analytic propositions afford to be synthetic as enunciated by Kant. Where do they stand, as their resting point is uprooted by Kant by proving all mathematical judgements to be synthetic in nature.

As footnoted in our third chapter, the identification of truth with 'necessary truth' makes one to be guilty of committing the ignoratio elenchii. Our observations is that even if there is a proposition which is necessarily true, it does not mean that it precludes error. In other words, in saying that a proposition is necessary, it nowhere is concluded that it is always infallibly known to human beings, for fallibility as a general tendency is a part of human nature. Moreover, the two concepts of necessity and infallibility are not to be confused. Necessity is an ontological notion pertaining to propositions whereas infallibility connotes a knower's epistemological relation to a proposition. A possibility of being mistaken in the knowledge of a mathematical truth can not be ruled out.

To have a truth value does not mean necessarily being a necessary truth. We can never rule out the future possibility of a true statement being false, especially in the case of empirical propositions. We do not possess a power to make the world according to our wishes. At best, we can make the statements in accordance with it. For S. Read, even mathematics and logic can be open to question firstly because of the stipulated axioms and secondly the presence of more than one system in these disciplines.
Read holds that necessity is a matter of convention. He writes.

"What is necessary is what we decide, at any given time, not to give up come and why.........we formulate our abstract theory (as in the theory of groups), we connect axioms and thesis by proof, and so on. But this can all change. In deriving empirical predictions from physical laws, mathematics and logic are auxiliary hypothesis. If their revision can provide a better account of recalcitrant experience, then they should be open to question, like any field of knowledge."39

Richard Feldman emphasized upon the fallibility of knowledge by saying that most of what we commonly take as knowledge can be termed as ‘fallible knowledge’. As he writes,

"Most of the things we commonly take ourselves to know are known as the basis of non-deductive arguments (i.e., inductive, perceptual or testimonial evidence that does not entail what it is evidence for)".40

To talk of truth is not always to talk of infallible truth. What is significant here is a realization of a pluralistic theory of truth. The adherence to this theory presupposes a conglomeration of the multitude of propositions. It is not advisable to ascribe a particular notion of truth to a particular proposition without a consideration of the type of proposition in question. As is stated earlier in this thesis, without a specification of what kind of truth the seeker is concerned with, one cannot hold a particular theory of truth. The existing theories of truth are not rivals to each other. We contend that each theory taken in isolation enlighten only one type of propositions and when taken together, they can serve as ingredients of the pluralistic account of truth. In the light of this view, all true propositions are not infallible and at the same time, not all that are not necessarily true, fallible.
Our epistemic goal is not to acquire a true belief about a proposition but to approach and realize the truth (of the proposition). It is undeniable that belief like knowledge is also an epistemic attitude and that most of the times both have propositions as their objects. But the scope of belief can be found to be different from that of knowledge. Belief is intended to be directed towards the goal of truth. A statement expressing belief, if seriously made, is not irrational. A justification can be provided in support of a belief. A discussion of the concept of belief is generally and mostly included in an epistemological discussion. But belief is an attitude towards uncertainty whereas knowledge is an attitude towards certainty. Knowing that p means that p is true. Believing that p means that it is possible that p may be false. It is a feeling of the epistemic agent that p is true, but accompanied with probability and vagueness. Knowledge is related to truth. Belief, on the other hand, has nothing to do with the truth function of the state of affairs in question.

In the case of a claim, one presupposes that the proposition which is claimed is true. For instance, when one says, “I know that Punjab has 12 districts”, it is presupposed by him that it is true that Punjab has 12 districts. In such a situation, the falsity of the proposition claimed creates a truth-value gap because the claim becomes meaningless if one says “I know that Punjab has 12 districts” when in fact Punjab has 13 districts. If presupposition is to be taken in the sense of a logical implication as held by D. Odegard, a knowledge situation presupposes a truth condition, but a justified beliefs does not.

Odegard discussed an example of a hypothetical situation when someone asserts: ‘The number 5 is red’. This assertion is neither true nor false because it presupposes that number 5 is coloured; it is rather,
absurd. The truth of the proposition hence, is a logical presupposition in a case of knowledge. The same is not with the case of a justified belief. ‘S knows that p’ presupposes p whereas ‘S justifiably believes p’ does not.

Knowledge entails belief, the analysis of knowledge must include a belief condition, knowledge is true belief plus something else. Philosophers have averred over these statements even in the post Gettier period. But it does not seem reasonable, in the light of the present discussion, to restrict the term ‘knowledge’ to any kind of belief. Rather, ‘belief has no natural connection with its object’.43 H.H. Price and H.A. Prichard, throughout their works have maintained that there is a logical gap between knowledge and belief in so far as belief would not have the truth completeness of knowledge, hence cannot replace knowledge.

Prichard ascribes the knower a special faculty of reflection by which he knows that he knows.

“When we know something we either do, or by reflecting can, know that our condition is one of knowing that thing, while when we believe something, we either or can know that our condition is one of believing and not of knowing so that we cannot mistake belief for knowledge and vice versa.”44

This view of Prichard is disagreeable. One may know that he believes a proposition and does not have knowledge of it; but certainly one cannot know that he knows by reflection. He thinks that he knows but whether this is really a case of knowledge depends upon the truth of the proposition. The truth of the proposition is independent of a person’s claim to knowledge. ‘To think that one knows’ if often confused with knowing. The former is expressed into a knowledge claim when expressed. It is the highest degree of belief. The latter is unexpressed.
The only distinction between a knowledge situation and a claim situation is the truth of the proposition.

A claim can be taken as the highest degree of belief. It does seem quite consistent to say: (a) 'I know that today is Saturday' and later: (b) 'I thought I know that today is Saturday, but I was mistaken'. The claim (a) may be a knowledge-situation if 'actually' today is Saturday. It, however, remains only a knowledge claim till it is not ascertained whether today is Saturday or not. Thus (a) may be both a knowledge-situation as well as a knowledge claim.

H.H. Price intelligibly refers to different sorts of beliefs which take the place of knowledge in its absence. These are not irrational in the sense of being held without any ground. These are, rather, 'reasonable beliefs', that is, beliefs, which are held on good evidences. These reasonable beliefs are called 'mere beliefs' by Price. Though contrasted with knowledge, these may be 'the second best position in the absence of knowledge.'

An unreasonable belief is mostly rooted in faith. The faith may be in a person, in authority or in an unexplained phenomenon. A person, who believes that his lost son is in Chandigarh on the basis of the saying of a sadhu has an unreasonable belief which is caused as a result of his faith in the sadhu. It may happen to be correct accidentally. A reasonable belief, on the other hand, may happen to be incorrect accidentally.

Based on the number of evidences, there can be degrees of beliefs. The word 'more' can be prefixed to belief but not to knowledge. The
more evidences there are in the support of a belief, the more strengthened is the belief. And the most strengthened belief is generally equated with knowledge.

We are now in a position to hold that belief and knowledge differ in kind and not in degree. At the same time, their style is different in not being in different states – for knowledge, when one is incapable of being erroneous, that is infallible, whereas for belief, it is corrigible irrespective of the degree of its strength. The man who knows is sure of it, the man who claims to know also is in a state of providing evidence in support of his surety. The man who believes something may also be sure of it in that he may have the highest degree of belief.

B. Russell holds that knowledge is a matter of degree. He presents a full-fledged hierarchy of the various steps in the possession of knowledge. For him:

"The highest degree is found in facts of perception, and in the cogency of every simple arguments. The next highest degree is vivid memories. When a number of beliefs are each severally in some degree credible, they become more so if they are found to cohere as a logical whole. General principles of inference, whether deductive or inductive, are usually less obvious than many of their instances, and are psychological derivative from apprehension of their instances."

The status of knowledge as a special kind of belief has been accepted as an unsupported postulate by most of the philosophers. It may be because of the fact that the term 'know' is a complex notion. In the ordinary discourse, it is mostly used incompletely with greater extension. Ordinarily, we often talk about the firmness and strength of a belief. 'I strongly believe that' is used to show the higher degree of belief. If there
is a comparison between two beliefs, and one is to be given priority over the other, one with a more degree of strength is preferred over the other. The strength of the belief is measured in terms of the number and magnitude of the justificatory evidences that one has, though not necessarily explicitly in one's mind. The justification may be in the form of an appeal to reason as well as to faith. Instances from our every day life would illustrate this view. A few of them are:

Sita has read in the books and also has been told by a number of people that Yogic Asanas are good for health. She is practicing yoga for quite a long period of time. But suppose again, that her teacher, in whom she has immense faith, explains her that in fact, yoga is harmful for health and causes backache. Then onwards Sita's conviction is changed merely as a result of the faith in her teacher, without even noticing any affect on her own health, she starts believing that yogic asanas are harmful. She has a firm belief in the words of her teacher as a result of her faith in the teacher.

Further, suppose Mita sees someone watering a plant in the morning. For the last 90 days, she is observing it. The person who waters the plants wants to have 90 days old root of the plant for preparing a herbal medicine. On the 91st day, Mita believes that the plant will be watered. She forms the belief on the basis of her past experience. Her belief, unfortunately, does not come true and man uproots the plant. Her belief which did not come true was strong for her.48

Nita believes that Dr. Sharma is a very intelligent doctor. She has met his patients and they are highly satisfied with Dr. Sharma's treatment. She has formed her belief on the basis of other's opinions and
also after seeing his overt behaviour in social meetings. One day, she herself suffers a health problem and visits Dr. Sharma’s clinic. Her ailment is recovered. She had a true belief.\textsuperscript{49}

We can find cases of knowledge where belief is absent from around us only. The case of the old lady who has lost her son but believes that he would return back illustrates a case of knowledge without belief.\textsuperscript{50}

Colin Radford attempts to show that knowledge does not always involve belief.\textsuperscript{51} According to him, we are not always in the dark about what we believe. Beliefs may be both casually produced and to a greater or less extent justified by sensory evidences, by good reasons or by sound reasoning.\textsuperscript{52} We can undoubtedly accept Colin Radford’s views upto the level of construction of our beliefs. The strength and authenticity of the evidence on which our belief is based is an issue which takes us far from the scope of this limited research work.

What is objectionable in Radford’s views is that knowledge does not always involve belief. We argue for the view that knowledge never involves belief. Knowledge and belief are talked together not only by virtue of their being in the same epistemological territory, but also because they are negatively related. If S knows that p, he does not disbelieve it. The negative import of the concept of belief relates it to the concept of knowledge. In no positive way, are the two related. The ultimate goal of epistemic enquiry is not to gain any kind of specified or even true belief. It is rather to help the agent conduce towards the truth and finally to achieve it.
As suggested that there is no sub-alteration relation between knowledge and belief, the only compatibility that is found between them is that we do not disbelieve what we know. So knowledge is not any kind of belief. The two are rather, conceptually distinct from each other. Both appear to be of the same kind because sometimes they coincide. History of epistemology is flooded with a discussion of justified beliefs and there remains hardly only scope for a concept of knowledge which is non-doxic in nature.

For a knower, even the question of justification does not arise. I know, for instance, that I have a white handkerchief in my pocket. This is a case of knowledge for me. ‘I know that....’ in this case does not demand any justification. I may not give a justification before or after knowing that I have a white handkerchief. One may raise a question here, I know ‘because’ I have seen the object, or I myself have put the object in my pocket. But these reasons connect the state of affairs to my knowledge only casually. Casual link, which is universal in character cannot and really is not a part of the definition of the concept under consideration.

It is only after making a claim, that one is asked to justify it. A claim is said to be justified if appropriate evidence can be provided. The claim may be justified even if it is false. So, whether a claim is true is in fact independent of whether one is justified in making it. In other words, whether the claim is justified is a question of how good the evidence is, not whether the claim is true. Justification plays the role of confirmation of the proposition or to convince others of the truth of the proposition. In this sense, it can be regarded as a criterion for a claim.
Only when there arises a doubt from the authority, one does present a justification.

As is with the belief condition, a number of philosophers do not agree that the justification condition is necessarily required for knowledge. The condition which alone turns the set of necessary conditions into sufficient conditions needs to have an infallible source of information. The requirement for an infallible source of justification or the 'conclusive justification' takes philosophers far from the condition as given by the justified true belief analysis and they reject the traditional definition. The arguments presented by Colin Radford against the belief condition also work against justification condition.

With the help of three examples, C. Radford doubted the viability of justification. His first example is about a person who is making conflicting statements about his memory. He remembers to have locked his car, claims to have knowledge, is sure about it and can 'bet money' on it. Still, he is doubtful about it and wants to check in order to be 'absolutely sure'. In the second example, the new librarian asks the old one regarding copies of a particular book. She does not claim surety, and doubts that the books have been sold out. But just because the record of her memory has been excellent, one comes to a conclusion that they have been sold out. In the third example, Tom is helping Jean to recollect dates from history. At times Jean answers correctly, a few times she is not able to recollect.

To elaborate the third example of Radford, it can simply be said that it is a combination of Jean's poor memory and lack of confidence.
Rodford’s attack is mainly directed towards Ayer’s conditions of ‘being sure’ and ‘right to be sure’. He writes

“To briefly summarise my negative conclusions: neither believing that p, nor a fortiori, being confident, sure, quite sure, or certain that p is a necessary condition of knowing that p. Nor is it a necessary condition of knowing that p that one should have the right to be, or be justified in being, or have adequate grounds for being sure that p. Nor is it a necessary condition that one should believe that one has the right to be, etc., sure that p. It is, perhaps, rather that being sure that p, and believing that one has the right to be sure that p, are necessary conditions of believing that one knows, and hence of having the prima facie right to say that one knows that p.”56

Keith Lehrer57 opines that Jean does not know the answer even though she is able to give the correct answer at times because she does not believe that her answer is correct and, secondly because she does not know that she is giving the correct answer. These two reasons, according to Lehrer, are sufficient to support the view that she does not have knowledge of the subject (the particular questions) asked.

Swain, a disciple of Lehrer, does not agree with his teacher on this point. For him, this is not a sufficient reason to deny that knowledge implies belief. He believes that because Radford’s example is not an example of factual knowledge since it fails to show either that the belief condition does not hold or that the justification condition does not hold. He considers three kinds of situations where someone does not believe that p. These are:

1. A situation in which a person believes the denial of p. In such a case, knowledge cannot be present, for a person cannot know something and also believe it to be false.
(2) Another situation where S has never thought about p. It is not a case of disbelief or not believing. Since the issue has never entered the agent’s mind; it cannot be a case of knowledge as well.

(3) The third situation is that in which the epistemic agent withholding belief both from the proposition in question as well as its denial. Such a situation is against the view that knowing implies believing. Whether there is a three-ton boulder exactly one mile below the Empire State Building, can be answered only if one has knowledge. It cannot be answered with the help of belief. The question of belief is to be suspended.58

On the basis of the previous discussion held in this chapter, we can comfortably deny that knowledge entails belief as well as justification. Analysis of knowledge does not need either a theory of belief or a theory of justification. We insist that both the notions of belief and justification are conceptually different from that of knowledge. Is it a stipulation of philosophers to include these concepts in the definition? Knowledge is different from ignorance and belief is a kind of ignorance no matter how strongly held. As more evidences are gathered, the skepticism decreases, but still there remains some degree of ignorance. An attempt to define a concept from the skeptic mode is self-defeating. In this way, it is not possible to define knowledge in terms of justified true belief. The relation of knowledge to justification is circular and to belief is negative. This shows that knowledge is conceptually different from justified true belief and needs an exoneration from the combination of the trio-concepts. In the words of Pradhan,

"To strengthen the belief system is one thing and to secure knowledge is another. Knowledge, being a higher order
For him, knowledge is not a function of doxastic system and deserves an independent status.

To say that knowledge is different from justified true belief is not to say that a case of knowledge cannot be a case of justified true belief. Both cases may coincide. This coincidence has been the cause of the misunderstanding and misapprehension of the analysis of a case of knowledge as a case of justified true belief. Gettier has shown that there may be cases of justified true beliefs which are not cases of knowledge. In the same manner, there may be cases of knowledge which are not the cases of justified true beliefs. Let us have a brief look at the literature.

According to Gettier, the definition presented by A.J. Ayer in *The Problem of Knowledge* fits in the model of justified true belief analysis. Accordingly, Ayer has also, on the lines of Plato, along with Chisholm conceded that the necessary and sufficient conditions of knowledge are truth, being sure (representing the belief component) and the right to be sure (representing the justification component). By holding that these are 'necessary and sufficient conditions', he is establishing a two way relation, that is biconditional or equivalence between the two.

A J. Ayer states categorically the three conditions for knowledge. Yet, he keeps a little space for the wider scope of the concept of knowledge by mentioning some cases of knowledge which are not cases of justified true belief. He permits the discussion of the methods like 'intuition' and 'telepathy' even though these are not recognized as
'rational methods' by him. "Words like 'intuition' and 'telepathy' are brought in just to disguise the fact that no explanation has been found."\textsuperscript{61}

Although such methods of knowledge-acquisition give rise to the consideration that the boundaries between knowledge and true belief become obscure, but still for Ayer, the insistence is upon the success gained even at the cost of not having an adequate evidence for it. The right to be sure may be gained through various accredited routes, and in the absence of such a method, mere success can ascribe the knower the right to be sure. Such situations are those where no rule has been established for the usage of the term 'know'. However the problem is shifted to the application of the term instead of meaning or definition of the term.

In a general epistemological discussion, we do not include a discussion on knowledge attained by the methods like 'intuition' and 'telepathy' for the simple reason that we hold discussion within the limits of reason. Any issue beyond the boundaries of reason is excluded for it is not considered as genuine rational discussion. Below the level of reason, it is irrational and above the rational level is the mystic experience. These experiences transcend the intellectual territories covered by ordinary human experiences, by ordinary human beings and by ordinary faculties of understanding.

Knowledge and justified true belief are at times found together. In fact, the two concepts overlap each other and we continue to believe that they are identical. It is this convergence which has allowed the philosophers to analyse the concept of knowledge in terms of justified true belief. We are not trying to define the term 'knowledge'. We are,
rather, trying to analyse a knowledge-situation. What we observe that the situation which is unique in itself and which should not be explained in terms of any kind of justified belief, can at best be explained as a direct or indirect contact with the state of affairs. Knowledge situation is distinct from a justified belief situation. There may be a situation where justification is rightly directed towards the epistemic goal of truth and the agent is successful in achieving it. Such a situation is called a knowledge situation. It is exactly a situation where both situations — knowledge and justified true belief are overlapping each other, giving an impression of the convergence of the two.

What is claimed is subject to authentication. Its validity is tested and there is someone else who is in a position to dispense the decision regarding the claim. The notion of a purely personal claim is an absurdity. So, a claim situation is a belief situation which is expressed publicly and is subject to be a judged socially.

A knowledge-claim is a belief which is subject to justification and is thought to be true by the claimant. A person who claims to know that \( p \) must justify his statement. Hence a claim can be defeated because justification is a defeasible concept. Knowledge situation, as we have clarified does not require justification and is conceptually distinct from a knowledge claim which is only a justified belief thought to be true by the claimant.

Gettier problem reveals the distinction between a 'knowledge-situation' and a 'knowledge claim-situation'. With the help of his examples, he clearly shows that the cases of justified true belief can at best be the cases of a knowledge claim. Agreeing and accepting the
position of Pradhan, we can not adequately own the premises of the classical definition without considering the type of proposition in question which is a conjunction of justification, truth and belief. Disowning the ascription of these characteristics to the concept of knowledge, does not mean, what Gettier implicitly meant by 'insufficient', i.e., a demand for a fourth condition. It is the exoneration of the concept of knowledge from its traditional constituent parts and reflection over the problem of knowledge from an independent and novel perspective.
NOTES & REFERENCES

1. C. Sartwell: 'Why knowledge is Merely True Belief?', p. 169.


4. *Theaetetus*, 291 (b-d), see J. Trusted, *An Introduction to The Philosophy of Knowledge*.

5. S.L. Singh: *Knowledge and Justification*.

6. A.I. Goldman: 'Discrimination and Perceptual Knowledge'.


9. Marshall Swain in *Reasons and Knowledge* comments that these philosophers are not anti-justification, rather their epistemological program includes different shade of the third condition, see p. 42.


13. T. Williamson: 'Is Knowing a State of Mind?'.


20. Almender is careful enough in not proclaiming the truth condition to be ‘logically superfluous’ for any analysis of knowing. In a footnote in the same article, he explains that the truth condition is logically superfluous only if there is a strict equivalence between truth and evidence. For him, it is an entailment relation which is one way. Justification entails truth, but not vice versa. (See R. Almender: *Truth and Evidence*, p. 368 footnote). This view reminds us of Dummett’s position in his famous dictum ‘Truth is Justification’. Putnam tries to reform Dummett’s views by suggesting that truth is to be identified with justification only in the sense of ‘idealized justification’ (H. Putnam: *Realism and Reason*, vol.3, page xviii). Regarding a gap between justification and truth, Putnam reacts that if one accepts this account of truth, the status of the principle of bivalence is in question. The principle of bivalence states that every statement is determinably true or false. Dummett identifies knowing when a sentence is assertible with knowing when it would be justified.

21. ‘Doxology’ is the term used by Alvin Goldman, but a similar term ‘Philodoxy’ has been used by Immanuel Kant in the introduction to *Critique of Pure Reason*. The term denotes for territory of
opinions or beliefs and not the ‘knowledge’ in the sense of the absolute knowledge where one can only know the absolute truth.


23. The idea is implicit in the works of K. Popper and L. Wittgenstein (Later).


30. Ibid, p. 69.


32. Ibid, p. 91.

33. Ibid, p. 91.

34. I. Kant : *Critique of Pure Reason*, B. 190.

35. Ibid, p. 25.

36. Frege and Russell have aimed at to refute the existence of synthetic a priori. Quine has attacked Kant’s notion of analyticity. He states
that a statement is analytic when it is true by virtue of its meaning. He considers the concept of meaning along with the concepts of reference, extension, definition, explanation and synonymity (both cognitive synonymity and interchangeability). Finally he comes to the conclusion that the notion of analyticity is circular, hence redundant. Ordinary language gives an idea of the existence of synthetic judgements but when the vagueness of the ordinary language is cleared with a precise and artificial language with explicit semantic rules, no confusion remains. His holistic theory of meaning relates meaning to the entire system. Hilary Putnam in *Realism and Reason* abandons Quine in that he allows himself to have a transcendental standpoint which is different from a naïve standpoint.

40. R. Feldman: ‘Fallibilism And Knowing That One Knows.’
41. The scope of belief is ‘different’ from that of knowledge and not ‘bigger’. We hold this view because we are prepared to accept that knowledge is not a sub-class of belief.
44. Prichard: ‘Knowing and Believing’ in Griffith (ed.) *Knowledge and Belief*, p. 63.
46. Sometimes, belief is an outcome of faith. We believe the statements spoken by a person whom we have faith in. For such beliefs, we do not have any rational justification, for faith transcends reason. Our belief in the authority of books is also one of the highest degree of belief.

47. B. Russell: *Human Knowledge, Its Scope and Limits*, p. 158.

48. This instance is inspired by Russell’s chicken which is fed for a certain period of time and then hatched. see B. Russell: *The Problems of Philosophy*, p. 35.

49. The beliefs, regarding the qualities of a person, for e.g.:
'S is intelligent', 'S is beautiful' and so on should not be considered in an epistemological discussion. These are the issues to be discussed in an evaluative study. The Ideals of beauty, intelligence etc. are to be chased and these qualities cannot be measured categorically. We have chosen this illustration as an example of a true belief only. We don’t intend to challenge any ethical issue.

50. This thesis, 3rd Chapter.

51. C. Radford: 'Knowledge – By Examples’ and *Belief, Acceptance and Knowledge*.

52. Radford is discussing Cohen’s distinction between belief and acceptance. Indeed he himself accepts the distinction. He agrees with Cohen who in turn agrees with Popper that to accept a scientific theory is not the same as to believe it.

53. R.M. Chisholm makes a distinction between ‘being justified’ and ‘being evident’ as discussed in our previous chapters.
54. As an after effect of Gettier's counterexamples, philosophers can be grouped under three heads. They can be (1) traditionalists who consider the Gettier examples to be wrongly formed and based on either falsity or not properly justified. (2) Revisionists accept Gettier counterexamples to be genuine but try to repair the traditional definition to make it Gettier resistant, and (3) Rejectionists who discard the traditional definition. See Manmohan Singh: 'Definition of Propositional Knowledge: Post Gettier Scenario.'

55. C. Radford: 'Knowledge: By examples.'

56. Ibid, p. 11.


60. A.J. Ayer: *The Problem of Knowledge*, p. 34.

61. Ibid, p. 31.