CHAPTER - 2

KNOWLEDGE

AS

JUSTIFIED TRUE BELIEF

Epistemologists have always engaged themselves in a search for conditions which must be satisfied for a cognitive state to constitute a genuine case of propositional knowledge. Propositional knowledge or knowledge of the form 'S knows that p' has always been one of the most controversial phrases. Philosophers since the times of Plato have been busy in finding out the defining characteristics under which a person can be said to ‘know’ a proposition. Although, there have been various shades of opinions among these philosophers, yet all of these arrive at almost the same conclusion by finding out three such characteristics of knowledge. The first of these has to do with the truth of the proposition in question. The second is concerned with the knower – the knower’s belief or acceptance of the proposition. The third characteristic includes an external\(^1\) factor, i.e. verification, justification or evidence for the belief. The tradition to define knowledge in these three terms is supposed to be established by Plato as ‘Justified True Belief’ and has been accepted by a number of philosophers, who have either nodded for or enunciated a definition of knowledge which shares the common characteristics of truth, belief and justification and is stated to be the ‘traditional definition’.

For Plato, the main purpose of philosophy was to encourage right conduct and to be virtuous. He convinced people that they should be good
and not only this, he showed them the right way to be good. Plato regarded the desire to be good as a part of the nature of human beings.

Knowledge and virtue were intimately connected in his philosophy. He did not regard knowledge as separate from ethics. Virtue depended upon knowledge since any failure in virtue was due to ignorance. The present concept of virtue is based on the ideas from the Christian heritage, from the Bible, from Roman Catholic and from Protestant interpretation. The term 'virtue' is not used by Plato in the same sense as it is used by later ethical thinkers. For him, to be virtuous or to be good was to be virtuous in respect of something or to be good at something. Plato talked of governing virtue (arete) meaning good at governing, or of a military arete (good at military affairs); he even talked of arete of dogs and horses, i.e., their ability to perform their special functions as horses or dogs. Plato explained that there must be a human arete shown by a man, who was good at being a man as performing especially human functions. Virtue depended on knowledge because one had to know how to be a good man, or at least had to have a true belief.

Although Plato ascribed knowledge to what was indubitably and necessarily true, and what was a contingent truth could only be an object of opinion; but as a practical guide to conduct, true belief was as good as knowledge.

"Then true opinion is no worse guide than wisdom, for rightness of action, and this is what we failed to see just now while we were inquiring what sort of a thing virtue is. We said then that wisdom alone guides to right action; but, really, true opinion does the same."
Plato bestowed knowledge to what was indubitably and necessarily true. What was a contingent rather than a necessary truth could only be an object of opinion and at best, a true belief but not as knowledge. Since knowledge had to be indubitable, the object of knowledge had to be permanent and unchanged. For example ‘2 + 2 = 4’ is true, has always been true and will always be true. Likewise ‘The angles of a triangle sum to 180°’ and ‘All unicorns have one horn’ are examples of necessary truths.

Moreover, the knowledge of their truths is not arrived at by observation, but by thought. Thus the objects of knowledge in Plato’s scheme had to be necessary truth, and they had to be apprehended by the mind, not by the senses. They were known by mental intuition or ratiocination. By contrast, the objects which are perceived by senses (i.e., shadows, rainbows, houses, mountains or people) did not have any permanent properties or permanent existence. As a result, any proposition about their properties could not be indubitable for, even if true, it could not be necessarily true, it might have been false. We could only claim to have opinion about them, and at best these opinions, would be but true beliefs.

In this way Plato distinguished two main modes of apprehension. These were firstly, opinion – the objects of opinion were objects which could be apprehended by sense-perception and secondly, knowledge – the objects of knowledge were objects accessible only to the mind.

The world could be divided into the world of sight and the world of mind. The world of sight is to be associated with the mode of opinion and the world of mind with the mode of knowledge. Plato’s scheme of
knowledge as related to the objects can be harmoniously presented as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Opinion</th>
<th>Knowledge</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Images such as shadows / reflections</td>
<td>Objects such as animals, bees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conjecture</td>
<td>Thought images</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ideas such as cubes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belief</td>
<td>Ideas of Ideals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>such as perfect beauty, justice etc.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The world of sight and of things seen

The world of mind and of things thought

The Forms or Ideas, like mathematical entities are not accessible to sense perception. Just like we are not able to find a perfect straight line, a perfectly just act or a perfectly beautiful statue can also not be found. The ‘idea’ as used by us in the sense of mind-dependent mental activity is quite different from Plato’s Ideas or Forms. For Plato, they were the permanent objective reality. The Universals (Ideas or Forms) were immaterial and their world was the ultimate and independent reality. The particulars perceived by us, for instance, particular beautiful things, exist as beautiful things in virtue of their participation in the universal beauty. It is not possible to have knowledge of the particular because its qualities are ever changing. On the contrary, we can know the Universal because it has permanent and unchanging attributes as its essential nature.

Plato held that by thought, we are able to remember the world of Universals, which the soul inhabited before the life begun. So, Plato’s theory of knowledge was based on his doctrine of Universals which in turn depended upon his concept of the immortality of soul. Plato’s views
of metaphysics support his epistemological thoughts. Moreover, the ‘traditional’ definition was proposed by Plato and thereafter abandoned himself as being ‘silly’.

“Socrates : And it is absolutely silly, when we are looking for knowledge, to say that it is correct belief together with knowledge, whether of difference or of anything else. So, Theaetetus, knowledge is neither perception, nor true belief, nor an account in addition to true belief. Theaetetus : It seems not.”

Although Plato sharply distinguished knowledge (episteme) from opinion, belief or judgment (doxa), but he moved from knowledge to practical skills (technai) or to acquaintance (gnosis) without mentioning a change in the subject. So, it seems controversial that his concept of knowledge applied to ‘propositions’.

The following passages from *Theaetetus* indicate that his concept of knowledge is applicable to all types of knowledge, which include propositional knowledge, knowledge of skills and other types.

“Theaetetus : Then it seems to me that both what one may learn from Theodoras is knowledge, geometry and other things you mentioned just now, and also shoemaking and the skills of other craftsmen, all and every one of these are knowledge.

Socrates : Asked for one thing, my friend, you are nobly and generously offering many, and a variety instead of a single thing. Theaetetus : What do you mean by that, Socrates ?

Socrates : Possibly nothing, but I’ll tell you what I think. When you speak of shoemaking, you are talking simply of knowledge of making shoes, aren’t you?” (146d).

“Socrates : ....just as you collected all these many cases into one class, try in the same way to find one account applicable to the many kinds of knowledge.” (148d).

13
We may be accused of committing the fallacy of 'Argumentum ad Hominem' on the ground that our thesis which aims at an examination of the justified true belief definition of knowledge in the context of propositional knowledge, is arguing fallaciously. But we wish to make it clear that in order to examine a thesis, we must first understand the thesis itself along with its roots. Plato's concern does not seem to be exclusively with propositions as is obvious by the above mentioned references. The object of knowledge for him were the Forms, the Ideas and not their representations in language or as propositions.

In the present era, philosophers talk of propositional knowledge in the sense of 'knowing that' where what is known is a proposition. But Plato talks simply of 'knowing a thing'. The assumption that the central focus of a philosopher's concern should be about knowledge that something is so rather than other forms of knowledge (practical knowledge or object knowledge) is peculiar only to recent history of philosophy.

A reflection upon the various uses of the term 'to know' suggest that they can be broadly classified in three categories. It is relevant here to mention a distinction, which philosophers commonly draw between three kinds of knowledge. The first, which is called practical knowledge is said to be the knowledge expressed by someone who knows how to do something or the other thing. This kind of knowledge, which is also known as ability knowledge consists in knowing how to perform a certain action or to have special form of competence. It is taken by philosophers as a very important kind of knowing and is judged by overt performance. For example, if a person claims to know how to ride a bicycle or how to play chess, the claim is justified by his or her performance.
A.D. Woozley makes a distinction between various kinds of practical knowledge. 'Knowing how' for Woozley, is riddled with ambiguities. Two of the examples of ambiguities considered by him are:

1. (a) Knowing how = (roughly) being able as a result of having learnt, as opposed to.
   (b) Knowing how = (roughly) known what is required to be done, but being unable, through some defect or deficiency to do it. For example, knowing how to thread a needle, but being unable to do so through poor eyesight or an unsteady hand to do it.

2. (a) Knowing how as in the sense (a) above as opposed to knowing not merely of being able, but of being able to do well, with great skill. This use commonly called as 'qualified emphatically'. For example, 'If you want to find a man who really knows how to tune your car, go to Jones'.

Secondly, there is what may be called 'object knowledge' – one's knowledge of persons, places or things. This knowledge consists of a first hand acquaintance with a person, a place or an event and so on. We gain acquaintance knowledge of people by meeting them, and of places by going there.

Finally, there is the propositional knowledge, or knowledge that something is the case. Knowledge in this propositional sense is supposed to be fundamental to human cognition by most of the thinkers who contend that this kind of knowledge is required both for theoretical
speculation and practical investigation. Scott Sturgeon\textsuperscript{11} calls propositional knowledge as ‘knowledge of situations’ because situations are described by true propositions. For him, a true proposition is a special relationship between a person and a proposition.

In recent philosophy, the distinction between propositional knowledge by description and non-propositional knowledge by acquaintance has been advanced by B. Russell\textsuperscript{12}. According to Russell, however, we must distinguish between knowledge of truths (true proposition) and knowledge of things. Furthermore, knowledge of things by acquaintance and knowledge by description are also to be distinguished. Knowledge by description always involves some knowledge of truths; i.e., knowledge that something is the case. Knowledge by acquaintance, on other hand, is based on direct non-propositional awareness of something and does not involve knowledge of truths. The familiar notion of knowing a person, on this explanation, essentially involves an acquaintance with someone as well as truths about that person.

According to some philosophers, all these forms of knowledge are reducible to ‘knowing that’, but identifying the notion of ‘knowing how’ with ‘knowing that’ is an instance of a category mistake which Ryle points out. Knowing how to do a certain thing is to know the truth of certain principles and applying them to an activity, is wrongly assumed by philosophers, for a person may know how to perform a certain action or an activity without even knowing what its rules and its applications are\textsuperscript{13}. So, to know a thing that it is so is not to say that it is the case.\textsuperscript{14}
We should not oversimplify the difference between these various notions of knowledge, as Woozley suggests, for the reasons that firstly, these kinds can be further divided into sub kinds and consequently making the distinction more perplexed, and secondly, at least some of the cases of knowledge of one kind have some characteristics common with others. In an explication of the various components of the traditional analysis of knowledge, the question whether some of the alleged kinds of knowledge are reducible to more basic kinds (e.g., that 'knowing how' is reducible to 'knowing that') and the questions regarding further sub classification of knowledge are the questions which are not very significant in the context of our research and can easily be looked over.

Recently philosophers have also developed a concern with the defining characteristics of knowledge. The trend starts with A.J. Ayer in his 'Problem of Knowledge.'

"I conclude then that the necessary and sufficient conditions for knowing that something is the case are first that what one is said to know be true, secondly that one be sure of it and thirdly that one should have the right to be sure".15

The first condition, explained by Ayer is a simple requirement and probably the only requirement that has been agreed upon by almost all philosophers. We cannot know what is not true. One can know something only if what he knows is true. For example, 'this pen is black' can be known only if this pen 'is' black. A statement is true if and only if it describes the situation as the situation is. In other words, he subscribes to the correspondence theory of truth. Regarding the second condition, Ayer contends that one must be sure of what he knows. In this manner, knowledge can be contrasted with belief. One can believe something about what he is not completely sure of, but to know something and not
being sure of it is self contradictory. Further, merely being sure does not suffice for Ayer. The process of reasoning by which the subject has arrived at a particular belief has to be ‘reliable’ in Ayer’s words\textsuperscript{16}, for instance, a superstitious person who had inadvertently walked under a ladder might be convinced as a result that he was about to suffer some misfortune and he might in fact be right. But the problem is that of having a right to make the knowledge claim. Ayer holds that the right may be earned in various ways, although it is not possible to provide a list of such ways.

Following Ayer’s footsteps, R.M. Chisholm, defines a case of knowledge of the form ‘S knows that p’ in the following way.

‘S knows that h’ is true means : (i) S accepts h, (ii) S has adequate evidence for h, and (iii) h is true.’\textsuperscript{17}

Chisholm prefers ‘accepts’ over ‘believes’ and defines acceptance in terms of ‘reasonable’ which he considers as a primitive and undefined concept. “The propositional acceptance is more or less ‘de dicto belief’ where we can say that one proposition is more or less reasonable that accepting another”\textsuperscript{18}.

But in preferring ‘acceptance’ over ‘belief’, Chisholm does not mean that the believer finds it to be acceptable. He means something more objective, that is, that it is not unacceptable. No doubt, in ordinary life also, we often accept what we believe and believe what we accept. But certain differences between the two are undeniable. One of the major differences is that the reasons for accepting a proposition need not always be epistemic; they might be epistemic or prudential or so on. For example, Sohan does not want to hurt his friend and accepts a proposition
about a superstition just out of solidarity with his friend even though in the privacy of his mind, he does not believe it. Similarly, there may be circumstances where a person believes a proposition without accepting it. An old lady, whose only son lives far away sensibly believes the truth of the contents of a letter written by her son’s employer stating that he is no more, but from the core of her heart, she is not ready to accept it and thinks that one day, her son would come back to her.

Chisholm has not used the term ‘evident’ as synonymous with ‘justified’ for the third condition, for the definite reason that they do not mean the same for him. In the *Foundations of Knowing*¹⁹, he enunciates his point by saying:

“According to one traditional view, knowledge may be defined as follows: S knows that p = Df p; S believes that p; and S is justified in believing that p. If in this definition, we take ‘S is justified in believing that p’ as many of us have done, to mean the same as ‘It is evident for S that p’, then the definition is not adequate.”

However, in the third edition of *Theory of Knowledge* Chisholm draws a clear-cut distinction between the idea of an evident proposition & that of a justified one. “An evident proposition is one that is justified. But there are many justified propositions that are not evident. Indeed many propositions that may be said to have a very high degree of justification are not evident”²⁰. He defines an evident proposition as

“p is evident for S = Df For every proposition q, believing p is at least as justified for S as is withholding q”²¹.

Chisholm presents example of a man who has walked today, yesterday and day before yesterday. He may have good grounds for
accepting the proposition that he will walk tomorrow and the day after
that. The justification is provided by the law of induction. But it is not
evident for anyone that he will walk tomorrow, for no one knows that he
will walk tomorrow. He lists seven senses of 'justification' which may
not lead to knowledge. An evident proposition however, is beyond
reasonable doubt.

It was this trend of definitions which is termed as 'traditional'
definition by Gettier. As the tradition is supposed to come from Plato,
virtually all philosophers either confirmed to this definition or did not
question its authenticity. Gettier, however, was the first philosopher to
question the adequacy of the definition who single-handedly changed the
trend of the epistemologists. Gettier repudiated the trend and his
influence is reflected upon the later epistemological scene.

Gettier took these three conditions to be individually necessary and
jointly sufficient for a case of propositional knowledge as against all of
them to be 'necessary and sufficient'. Logically speaking, necessary
conditions are those conditions in the absence of which a phenomenon
cannot occur and sufficient conditions are those in the presence of which
the phenomenon must take place. On this precept, if knowledge implies
Justified True Belief (K ⊃ JTB), then JTB is a necessary condition for
knowledge. If, on the other hand, Justified True Belief implies
knowledge (JTB ⊃ K), then JTB is a sufficient condition of Knowledge.
Necessary and sufficient conditions taken together are
K ⊃ JTB, and JTB ⊃ K
which can be represented logically as $K = JTB$,
(since $(p ⊃ q) \cdot (q ⊃ p) = (p = q)$ [Material Equivalence])$^{24}$. 

20
Gettier never objected so far as the justification, truth and belief conditions are considered individually to be necessary for knowledge. It is, rather, the three conditions taken together which is the object of his attack. But in order to get the gist of Gettier’s criticisms, it is necessary to understand what exactly these conditions are and what is their relation to knowledge.

The Truth Condition

Fortunately the greatest agreement among philosophers has concerned the relation between knowledge and truth. According to the traditional conception of knowledge, knowledge without truth is impossible. The proposition ‘All crows are black’ could be known to be true if and only if all crows are black. Therefore knowledge must adhere to the truth condition. The question arises, if this is so, can one reject the claim that astronomers before Copernicus knew that the earth was flat? The problem is not that they believed, or could provide justification, but whether belief or justified belief requires truth as one of the conditions to become a case of knowledge?

The decision regarding truth or falsity of the proposition could not be entertained unless and until we know it. Lehrer provides an answer by saying:

“The answer is that such a condition of knowledge is not one that we must find to be satisfied before we find out that we know. It is rather part of an analysis of knowledge and hence a condition that must be satisfied when we know. These conditions do not constitute a recipe for a case of knowledge.”25
In the case of propositional knowledge ‘S knows that p’, the class of propositions for which the variable ‘p’ has been abbreviated is the class of ‘propositions of fact’ and not of ‘factual propositions’. The terms ‘true’ and ‘false’ can, in this sense be prefixed to the later and not to the former, namely, a proposition of fact. It is tautologous to talk of a ‘true proposition of fact’ and similarly, a ‘false proposition of fact’ is self-contradictory. The logical superfluity and the redundancy theories put forward by Ayer and Ramsey also present a similar approach. “To say that a proposition is true is just to assert it, and to say that it is false is just to assert its contradictory. And this indicates that the terms ‘true’ and ‘false’ connote nothing.”

The concept of truth as a condition has not attended any serious challenge. Controversy has focused instead on the question, ‘what is truth?’ This question concerns what truth consists in, and not our ways to find out what is true.

A similar, useful and valid distinction can be seen implicit in the writings of Russell, Rescher and Mackie, namely, the distinction between definitions and criteria of truth. The idea behind such a distinction is that whereas a definition gives the meaning of the word ‘true’, a criterion supplies us with a test by means of which we are able to tell whether a sentence (or a proposition) is true or false. Susan Haack illustrates such a distinction with the help of the word ‘feverish’ which is having a temperature higher than some given point, and, on the other hand, specifies procedures for deciding whether someone is feverish determines its criterion. This distinction, Haack holds is the basis of the disagreement between theories of truth counted as definitional and criterial. For instance, Tarski contends that his definition is not criterial.
Mackie counts Tarski’s semantical definition to be supplying a criterion. Pragmatists, however, hold that the meaning of a term is correctly and precisely given by supplying the criterion for its application. Russell accused the pragmatists of having confused the definition and criterion of truth. Pragmatists, however, hold that the meaning of a term is correctly and precisely given by supplying the criterion for its application.

In fact, it is the question of criterion, which is important from an epistemological point of view, for it is concerned with the accessibility of truth. The search for a criterion of truth is a manifestation of this concern. Rescher distinguishes further between guaranteeing (infallible) and authorising (fallible) criterion, by arguing that in the case of guaranteeing criteria, there is a connection between a criterion and what it is a criterion of whereas Paul Moser distinguishes between a guaranteeing and warranting criterion of truth. A guaranteeing criterion of truth is infallible and warranting criterion, in contrast, is fallible.

"A guaranteeing criterion of truth is an infallible criterion of truth. That is, if C is a guaranteeing criterion of truth, then necessarily if a proposition, p satisfies C, then C is true. A warranting criterion of truth, in contrast, is fallible. It is not necessarily the case that if p satisfies a warranting criterion, then p is true. But obviously our warranting criteria for truth should be such that if a proposition satisfies them, then it would likely to be true."

As regards the definition of the concept of truth is concerned, influential answers have come from three major approaches. These approaches are: truth as (i) correspondence, (ii) coherence and, (iii) cognitive usefulness.

1. Truth as correspondence, that is, truth considered as an agreement of some special sort between a proposition and an actual state of
affairs. Whether the agreement is in the form of an isomorphism as supposed by Russell and Wittgenstein or it is in the form of conventional relations between word and world as held by Austin are issues which are not within the scope of this research work. Our main concern would be to discuss the relation between knowledge and truth and not an analysis of the nature of truth which itself is a very broad issue.

Trivial observations like the fact that one has never come across a non-black crow makes one to form the belief that all crows are black. Since such empirical observations are one of the main routes to gain knowledge, the correspondence theory of truth has become the most popular account of the nature of truth. Traditionally also, much importance is given to truth as correspondence between the world and words. The history of correspondence theory can be traced back to the famous statement of Aristotle's theory “To say of what is that it is not, and of what is not that it is, is false; while to say of what is that it is, and of what is not that it is not, is true.”

The correspondence theory of truth has found the maximum number of adherents till date. John Locke in the seventeenth century endorsed this theory with a metaphysical background of empiricism. In the twentieth century, Moore and Russell, among others have bolstered it under the shadow of empiricism.

As correspondence theory is mainly concerned and deals with the facts based on experience, it in confined to only one kind of truth, that is, factual truth. The factual truths are contingent and
are known most of the times empirically. The two categories ‘contingent’ and ‘empirical’ are conceptually distinct although they may be found to be coexistent. ‘Contingent’ is an ontological notion pertaining to propositions whereas ‘empirical’ is an epistemological one.

The distinction between ‘corresponds with’ and ‘corresponds to’ is an important distinction which cannot be oversighted for philosophical purpose. “A key, for example, may correspond with a key hole and one half of a stamp with the other half33, while ‘The rank of a General in army corresponds to that of an Admiral in Navy”34. The former depicts comparison within the same set as represented by early Wittgenstein where he holds that there is a pictorial relation or correspondence between states of affairs and propositions. If this correspondence occurs, then the proposition is true. The later view is adopted by Austin which seems more reasonable. There really can only be a ‘correspondence to’ relation between things of two different sets, i.e., language and fact. Accordingly true propositions correspond to the facts.

Opponents of the correspondence theory complaint that it is presented as a mysterious metaphysical relation between facts and their linguistic expressions. There always remains a gap between the two. As a result, it makes the truth a remote objective. Secondly, the correspondence theory of truth does not explain the validity of analytic truths which cover a large part of human inquiry. Truths of mathematics and logic, for instance, can not be explained in the light of the correspondence theory.
The recent versions of the correspondence theory have made it philosophically substantial and it no more remains colloquial. Alfred Tarski offers the semantic theory of truth as a version of the correspondence theory\textsuperscript{35}. Ramsey tries to dissolve the problem of truth by his famous dictum: ‘There is no separate problem of truth but merely a linguistic muddle\textsuperscript{36}. For Ayer also, the terms, ‘True’ and ‘False’ do not give any information, so they do not have any connotation\textsuperscript{37}. Strawson studies in detail the ordinary uses of the phrase ‘is true’ and contends that ‘true’ and ‘not true’ “have jobs of their own to do”\textsuperscript{38}. Austin calls these uses of the phrase as ‘purely performatory’\textsuperscript{39}.

An amplified and analytical account of correspondence is presented by the most genius philosophers till date and no doubt it is the most comprehensive theory of truth, still a serious problem would abrogate the cogency of all arguments favouring correspondence theory. How can one decide the validity of correspondence relation? One has to look forward for some other theory in order to sanction the truth which is being established. Secondly, the correspondence theory cannot be applied successfully to all type of propositions, for instance, hypothetical propositions, disjunctive propositions, mathematical propositions and the like. It seems most likely that in the quest to get a satisfactory theory of truth, one cannot confine himself to the notion of correspondence. It needs to be supplemented with some other theory.

(2) The theory which presents itself as the major rival against correspondence is the coherence theory of truth. This theory does
not define truth in terms of a relation between words and the world, but rather in terms of the relation amongst propositions themselves. In the history of philosophy, this mode of thinking has been associated with the rationalist school of thought. Leibnitz, Spinoza, Hegel, Bradley and Blanshard are the main advocates of this theory. It holds truth to be a systematic coherence among propositions. In other words, in a system of propositions, all the propositions are interconnected in a coherent manner. According to Bradley "Judgements based on experience are fallible and that the test of the truth is the 'system'". Reality, for him, itself was a coherent whole. He adds further that all the propositions are partly true. Truth as such can be grasped by understanding the entire system. Anything less than the whole truth express falsity. The rationalists supporting coherence theory of truth think that if a proposition is divorced from its relation to others, it will cease to be what it is. This applies to both thought and reality.

In the twentieth century, a few logical positivists like Neurath and Hampel have also shown interest in the coherence theory of truth. These philosophers, however, adopted the theory not for the same reasons for which rationalists with their particular metaphysical background had adopted it, but for the reason that if a proposition is to be accepted as a member of the already existing set of propositions, it has to be coherent with them.

The major objection to the theory of truth as coherence is that it defines truth in terms of coherence and coherence can be understood in terms of the truth of the proposition. One has to presuppose the concept of truth in order to define it. Secondly, if
truth is defined in terms of coherence among propositions only, the ontological outlook is exonerated from the concept of truth itself, which was the starting point of inquiry. So, it underplays the role of reality itself. It has been associated with the rationalist philosophers for whom the facts are there in the mind and not out there in the world. Moreover, if the truth of one statement is conditioned by the truth of the entire system, then to know one proposition, one has to know the complete system, which is practically not possible. To know anything, we must know everything.

Inspite of all oddity, one cannot undermine the importance of coherence. Inconsistency in any form cannot become a part of rational inquiry. Any system of propositions has necessarily to be consistent and the propositions must necessarily cohere with each other.

But again, the point is that it is not sufficient to be coherent. Within a story, statements can cohere with each other, similarly, within a given set of propositions, or a body of knowledge, one can seek consistency; when the question is regarding factual truth, one has to go behind the circle of propositions and check them. No set of coherent propositions can be complete. For the terms cannot be defined within the same system.

(3) The Pragmatic theory of Truth combines the correspondence and coherence views but still stands as rivals to both of them. The understanding of the pragmatic notion of truth is obscured by the confounding variety of the views of its proponents. It was
developed by American philosophers-William James, John Dewey, C.S. Peirce. Other members of this school are C.I. Lewis, F.P. Ramsey and W.V. Quine. Of course, these philosophers hold different versions of the theory, but they all agree in so far as considering truth as a pragmatic cognitive value, i.e., 'they equate truth with success. A proposition is true if it 'works in practice'. Here, usefulness is not taken in the colloquial sense, Rather it is taken in the sense of cognitive usefulness. A proposition is cognitively useful if it integrates our experiences of the world. James prefers to use 'instrumental utility' in place of cognitive usefulness and tries to concatenate truth with instrumental utility. Dewey, however, uses the expression 'warranted assertibility'. Pierce holds that all search and inquiry is settled as truth is gained. So, truth can rightly be equated with success. For Dewey, Peirce's definition of truth is 'the best definition of truth'. Dummett identifies truth of a proposition with the existence of evidence or justification for that proposition. Only when one has good reasons or a proper justification, he affirms truth. So truth can easily be equated with justification.

The pragmatic approach denotes only one though significant aspect of truth, i.e., usefulness and ultimate success. But again, this feature is not sufficient enough to be converted into a definition. A proposition may be useful for one subject, thus true for him; yet false for someone else for it may not be useful for him. As a result, this account of truth leads to being relativistic or individualistic, which is not true even in the ordinary sense of the term. It amounts to not more than being a personal opinion. Moreover, how can one discover whether a proposition is cognitively useful or not? For
this, he has to depend on another set of propositions and this leads to infinite regress. Again, a true proposition may be cognitively useless for someone and a cognitively useful proposition may not be true. So, there is no necessary link between truth and cognitive usefulness. In short, a purely pragmatic theory of truth, which lays emphasis on success, does not work successfully.

It seems reasonable to believe that the three theories are treated as theories concerning the criteria we use for deciding whether a proposition is true, rather than theories about the nature of the truth itself and enlighten only one part of the totality of truth makers. They, however fit quite nicely to the different areas of inquiry. The propositions of logic and mathematics have nothing to do with the correspondence to the external world. Here, only coherence theory is sufficient since truth is judged in terms of their consistence with other propositions. Trivial statements about our everyday life must correspond to the outer world, but not of course, at the cost of being inconsistent to each other. Statements of history can be valued only by their coherence with other given facts. Scientific inventions are for making human life easier. So a pragmatic value of truth is partially attached to these statements. Scientific propositions, in a sense, takes into account the correspondence for observation, coherence for internal consistency and pragmatism for utility.

After a brief discussion of these three prominent approaches to truth, one can maintain that knowledge requires truth, but is difficult to decide whether truth is only correspondence, coherence, cognitive usefulness or something else. These so-called rival theories of truth do not contradict each other, rather they complement each other in order to
make a complete theory of truth. It seems right that for various types of propositions (for example, empirical, mathematical, scientific etc.) different theories can be supplemented.

The Belief Condition

The belief condition has always been a battleground of controversies because of the vagueness of the meaning of the term. Various attempts have been made by the philosophers to meet over this difficulty by classifying the concept of belief and explaining its relation to knowledge. Most of the dictionaries of English language maintain that there can be two senses of the word 'belief'. One which is compatible with knowledge while the other is incompatible with it. The idea is illustrated in a question asked by Moore in *The Commonplace Book*.

> "There certainly is a common use of belief in which 'I believe' entails 'I don't know for certain'. Is there another in which 'I know for certain' entails 'I believe'? One reason why it seemed so is because 'I though I knew' entails 'I believed'."41

A knower must be psychologically related somehow to a proposition, that is, that which is an object of knowledge for him. Proponents of the standard analysis hold that only the belief condition can provide the needed psychological relation. Philosophers don't share a common account of the relation between belief and knowledge, but some considerations provide a common ground. And the most common factor which one can find is that they all hold that there is a relation between knowledge and belief, and that both knowledge and belief operate in the same epistemological territory. Some philosophers, however, conjoin the concepts of knowing and believing while others contrast it. Accordingly, the relation between the two concepts is either that of degree or that of kind.
According to the Platonic tradition, knowledge and belief are mental faculties, each sui-generis (different genus), not to be defined in terms of other. Plato made an absolute distinction between knowledge and belief in that it was only possible to have knowledge of necessary truths. The sole object of knowledge were the Universals whose necessary and essential attributes were apprehended through recollection and ratiocination. Our cognitive activities can sharply be divided into two kinds, which are fundamentally different from each other – knowing on the one hand and believing on the other.

There is an attempt to give criterion for making a distinction between knowledge and belief in Plato’s writings. In the *Meno*, it is stated that knowledge and belief should be distinguished by their objects and by the different faculties employed. We perceive and can have belief about pairs of equal sticks, but although helped in our ‘recollection’ by such particulars, it is by using the mind above that we have knowledge. In the *Phaedo*, there is discussion on the view that what known is unchanging and cannot be otherwise; what is believed is, by contrast, is in flux and allows of contradictory possibilities. In the *Phaedo*, there is some discussion on the view that knowledge and belief could be distinguished by their objects and by different faculties employed. In the *Republic*, there is further development of the view put forward in the *Phaedo* that knowledge is distinguishable from belief by reference to their different objects and that knowledge is necessarily true. In the *Timaeus*, Plato lists a number of differences between knowledge and belief. Knowledge is produced by instruction, belief by persuasion; knowledge can always give a true account of itself, belief cannot; knowledge cannot be shaken by persuasion, belief can be won over; belief is common to all, knowledge is
possessed only by gods and a few men. In the *Theaeteus*, it is held that belief is incompatible and falls short of knowledge. The two are different and distinct capacities.

A.J. Ayer, in *The Problem of Knowledge* also followed the Platonic view. But unfortunately, he has dealt with 'propositions' as object of knowledge while the conditions remained on Platonic track only. A philosopher's epistemology is conditioned by his peculiar metaphysics. The tradition established by Plato could be acceptable, if at all, within his own metaphysical framework only.

Keith Lehrer, a more recent epistemologist suggests the entailment thesis. According to this thesis, a person knows that p only if he believes that p. For him, one who implies something not implied by what he said creates confusions as a result of certain facts of linguistic usage. For him, it makes sense to say, 'I do not believe that, I know it' and from saying so, it hardly follows that the entailment thesis is false. The well known metaphor of house and mansion illustrates his views.

"It makes sense to say, "I do not believe that, I know it", not because it is logically inconsistent to say that a man believes what he knows, but rather because this is an emphatic way of saying "I do not only believe that, I know it.... An exact analogy of these cases is one in which it makes sense to say, "This is not a house, it is a mansion," and the reason it makes sense is not because of any logical inconsistency in saying, "that is to only a house, it is a mansion. Indeed, the something is a mansion entails that it is a house." 

Further, with the help of a contraposition, Lehrer tries to prove the entailment thesis. This augment is as follows:
“(1) If S does not believe that p, then S does not believe that he knows that p.
(2) If S does not believe that he knows that p, then, even though S correctly says that p and knows that he said that p, S does not know that he correctly says that p.
(3) If, even though S correctly says that p and knows he has said that p, S does not know that he correctly says that p, then S does not know that p.
(4) If S does not believe that p, then S does not know that p.” 34

According to Woozley, the traditional insistence on a difference in kind between knowing and believing is closely connected with the traditional distinction between a priori and empirical propositions, the first being held to be knowable but the second only believable. Belief is bound by the ties of contingency and probability and knowledge firmly closed within the circle of certainty. But he refutes this distinction as it rests on confusion.

“The a-priori empirical view of the anti-thesis between knowledge and belief is liable to be confused with another, by which all propositions are divided into corrigible and incorrigible.” 45

On the other hand, Prichard propounds the possibility of the knowledge and belief to be entirely different in the sense that both differ in their species.

“Knowing and believing differ in kind as do desiring and feeling, as do a red colour and a blue colour. Their difference is not that of a species and genus, like that of a red colour and a colour.... Their difference in kind is not that of species and genus, like that of a red colour and a colour. To know is not to have a belief of a special kind, differing from beliefs of other kinds; and no improvement in a belief and no increase in the feeling of conviction which it implies will convert it into knowledge. Nor is their difference that of being two species of a common genus. It is not that there is a general kind of activity, the better of which is knowing and the worse believing, nor is knowing something

34
called thinking as its best, thinking not at its best being believing. Their relatedness consists in the facts (a) that believing presupposes knowing, though, of course knowing something other than what we believe, and (b) that believing is a stage we sometimes reach in the endeavour to attain knowledge.”

Not only Prichard, but most of the contemporary philosophers have realized the conventional nature of language, i.e., in many circumstances, we make the strongest epistemic claims of which we are capable. Moore implicitly supports the view that knowledge does not comprise belief. If one says that he does believe a thing, of which he is not quite sure, he is correctly using the word. Moore applies the term belief to a state of mind different from that of absolute certainty.

Norman Malcom’s difference between strong and weak sense of knowing is also similar to Prichard’s distinction between knowledge and belief. Malcolm thinks that we use the term ‘know’ in a strong sense when a person’s claim implies that there can be no such evidence which would render the claim false. He makes it clear that not all mathematical propositions are known in the strong sense. For example, one cannot rapidly calculate 92 x 16 and may mistake 1372 in place of 1472 whenever he is not sure, or needs confirmation, and thinks there is a possibility of a refutation, he is using ‘know’ in a weak sense.

“When I use ‘know’ in the weak sense I am prepared to let an investigation (demonstration, calculation) determine whether the something that I claim to know is true or false. When I use ‘know’ in the strong sense, I am not prepared to look upon anything as an investigation; I do not concede that anything whatsoever could prove me mistaken; I do not regard the matter as open to any question; I do not admit that my proposition could turn out to be false, that any future investigation could refuse it or cast doubt on it.”
Classification of Belief

Some philosophers draw a significant distinction between occurant beliefs and standing beliefs. Occurant beliefs require one's current assent to the proposition believed. Further, if the assent is conscious, the belief is an overt or explicit occurant belief whereas if the assent is unconscious, it is an implicit occurant. Thus when we can consciously consider whether the book before us is ours and conclude that it is, we have an overt belief that the book before us is ours whereas when we are reading a book intently and reflexively reach to turn the page, we have an implicit occurant belief that there is additional material to be read on the next page.

The body of standing beliefs is very large. These beliefs do not involve current assent, either implicit or explicit. The example of this kind of belief are ‘2 + 2 = 4’, ‘The Earth is round’ and the like. Standing beliefs include all that one has learnt since birth.

Paul K. Moser and Arnold V. Nat mention one more distinction with regard to the nature of belief on the basis of the question – what are beliefs? There are two main views: the first one is called the dispositional view and the second is the state-object view.

According to the dispositional view, beliefs are ‘dispositions to behave in a certain way’ and nothing more. This view is propounded by pragmatists like Peirce, Gilbert Ryle and Wittgenstein. To believe that the drink before me is poisoned is just to dispose to act in a manner appropriate to its being disposed, i.e., to avoid drinking it, and to prevent others from drinking it.
The state-object view concerning beliefs is that there is a special relation between a person and an object of belief. On the one hand of the relationship, there is a person’s state of believing and on the other, an object of belief.

Another important distinction is found in R.M. Chisholm’s works between ‘belief de re’ and ‘belief de dicto’. “To have a belief de dicto is to accept a state of affairs. And to have a belief de re is to attribute a certain property to something”.

On this explanation, if someone believes de dicto that the tallest man is wise, then the state of affairs which is the tallest man being wise is one that he attributes to the man. And he believes de dicto; that the tallest man is wise even if there were no tallest man. Believing de re, on the other hand, that the tallest man is wise is one which one attributes to the tallest man. Being wise is one of the properties that can be attributed to the tallest man. Believing ‘him’ to be a wise man is believing ‘de re’ irrespective of knowing that he is the tallest man.

There is a further difference of opinion among philosophers as regards what the object of belief is, and what is the character of this special relation. Philosophers like Descartes, Locke, Hume, Kant and others hold that the objects of beliefs are mental propositions. But serious difficulties may arise as to what exactly these mental propositions are. Modern philosophers like Frege, Russell and Moore hold that the objects of belief are abstract propositions but again, a physicist may find this non-physical abstract world to be mysterious. An alternative view which is held by Carnap and Quine is that objects of
belief are sentences. Quine further distinguishes between a sentence type and sentence token and clarifies that the object of belief is sentence type.\textsuperscript{52}

Turning back to our discussion on the relation between knowledge and belief, we find that in the first person claims like, 'I know I have two pens in my purse', knowledge excludes belief in the sense that there is no point in claiming both knowledge and belief in such first person knowledge claims. For 'I have a headache', it seems absurd to ask, 'Do you believe you have a headache?'

We are not trying to say that in knowledge situations, one can never have a belief. Rather, in most of the cases, knowledge and belief are found to coexist. The point is that there cannot be a necessary relation between the two as it is possible to find a case where knowledge is present but belief is absent.

The Justification Condition

The justification condition of the standard analysis is that knowledge requires the satisfaction of its belief condition to be appropriately related to the satisfaction of its truth condition. It is widely held that knowledge is not simply true belief; some true beliefs are supported by lucky guesswork and hence do not qualify as knowledge, because lucky guesses do not constitute knowledge. In situations in which a lucky guess is made, the very fact that it is a guess precludes our saying that it is an instance of knowledge. A groundless conjecture might be true, believed by a person, but still would not constitute knowledge. In contemporary epistemology, controversy is focused on the meaning of
justification, on metajustification theories as well as on the substantive conditions for a beliefs' being justified in a way appropriate to knowledge.

The most widely accepted reasons for the justification condition for knowledge holds that true beliefs qualifying as knowledge must be based on good (justifying) reasons or evidences. This view was first suggested by Plato in *Meno*. Since the times of Plato's *Theaetetus*, many philosophers have held that a justification condition is needed for a plausible distinction between knowledge and mere true belief. A common understanding of this condition has been that it is what makes a proposition likely to be true for a person. But philosophers disagree over precisely what sort of likelihood is relevant. They commonly think of epistemic justification as evidence or warrant for a proposition, although again there is disagreement over exactly what qualifies as justifying evidence.

Epistemic justification is the kind of justification which is taken by the contemporary epistemologists as the central concept in the theory of knowledge and as the most appropriate for attaining propositional knowledge. Naturally, there have to be other sorts of justification. There are other possible species of justification and it is necessary to distinguish epistemic justification from these species.

One such possible kind of justification may be 'moral' justification. At many occasions, people tend to justify morally the actions of someone, although the evidence is evident for the contrary results. Suppose my best friend is charged with an attempt to murder, and the evidence is against him; but I know him as a very kind hearted person.
and I have never witnessed him being even rude to anybody. I believe that he is innocent and my belief, though lacking epistemic justification, is morally justified.

'Legal' justification can be thought of as an independent sort of justification, for to justify legally means to be in accordance with a given set of rules. At times, we may have legal justification for a proposition and we are made to believe it on the basis of the evidence given, although we may be convinced by some other kind of justification, say, moral.

'Prudential' or pragmatic justification is still another kind of justification which is non-epistemic in nature. Many of our beliefs are called prudential because they are likely to have prudential consequences and they play an important role in bringing about what is in our best prudential interest. The people, the thinking of whom is mainly dominated by reason, sometimes believe in God for the prudential reason that if there is really a God, they will be rewarded by their belief in Him.

The distinguishing characteristics of epistemic justification is its essential and internal relation to the cognitive goal of truth. One accepts only those beliefs for which he has reasons for being true. The reasons on the basis of which his beliefs are justified are treated as evidences. Epistemic justification is the kind of justification which is appropriate to knowledge. It indicates towards the facts and doesn't depends upon someone's destining that belief to be true. One who accepts a belief in the absence of good reason can be called epistemically irresponsible, so it is this essential relation of justification to truth that epistemic justification is regarded as different from other sorts of justification.
In his *Foundations of Knowing*, Chisholm lists seven senses of ‘justification’ which are not epistemic justification. These are:

(1) Sometimes a belief is justified if and only if it is arrived by a reliable method. So, a simply ‘reliable’ method does not justify a belief which enables one to distinguish knowledge from merely true belief.

(2) Justification may also refer to a decision method. But this sense presupposes an evidence and the regress problem arises.

(3) Sometimes justification is taken to mean in the sense of a reference in ‘science’, that is, it has as its objects one of the statements of science. But this faces the same problems as with the reliable method.

(4) Justification is also taken in terms of coherence of a belief with certain other beliefs. It presupposes some other sense of justification.

(5) Justification has been characterized by reference to probability in the sense of having a chance of being true. It may result in the accidentally correct beliefs.

(6) Recently justification has been taken in terms of a certain explanatory power. But again explanation presupposes some other sense of justification.

(7) Justification is also understood in a strict ethical sense. But this sense is not relevant in the epistemic context and knowledge and true belief that is not knowledge cannot be distinguished on the basis of this sense of justification.
Still another distinction is found in the works of P.K. Moser between doxastic justification and propositional justification, that is, a person's being justified in believing some proposition and proposition's being justified for a person. For example, S is justified in believing that there is a blue book on his desk and evidences also indicate that there is a blue book on his desk. This is the case of proposition's being justified for him. The person may or may not believe the proposition but for the wrong reasons. So he can have propositional justification even though he lacks doxastic justification for it. But for having doxastic justification, he needs to have propositional justification. Thus if a person is justified in believing a proposition it is justified for him. “Doxastic justification, roughly speaking, depends on the manner in which a person’s beliefs are related to the conditions for propositional justification.”

**Metajustification Theories**

Serious questions emerge when anything is specified about the nature of epistemic justification. Is theoretically absolute and complete justification possible? What justifies one belief must itself be justified before it can serve as a justificatory premise. This chain of questions may or may not terminate with some proposition in the series. It might continue infinitely or form a circle. However, the evidence chain might terminate either in some unjustified belief or some immediately justified belief. There can be, at least four possible accounts of inferential justification.

1. inferential justification via infinite regress,
2. via justificatory circle,
3. via the unjustified propositions, and
4. via the immediate justification.56
Besides the infinite justificatory regress, the other three accounts represent coherentism, contextualism and foundationalism.

Foundationalism is represented in various ways by Aristotle, Descartes, Russell, C.I. Lewis, R. Chisholm and others. According to foundationalists, inferential justification terminates with beliefs that are immediately justified, beliefs that do not depend on any other beliefs for their justification. The foundationalist’s position takes various forms, but the central thesis of epistemic foundationalists is two fold: (1) The empirical justification of some beliefs is immediate in the sense that they are not dependent on the epistemic justification of other beliefs, and (2) those ‘immediately justified’ basic beliefs are the ultimate source of justification for ‘all’ empirical knowledge. The first set of beliefs is called foundational and the other set is called non-foundational. According to this view, the structure of justified thought is like a building. The foundation of the building consists of foundational beliefs. All other beliefs rest on foundational beliefs.

This raises two new questions: ‘what is the nature of foundational beliefs?’ and ‘how do non-foundational beliefs ‘rest on’ foundational beliefs?’ There have been three different kinds of answers to these questions which enable us to draw a distinction between radical foundationalism, modest foundationalism and weak foundationalism. According to radical foundationalism, the beliefs that are foundational for a person have to be infallible and indubitable. The modest foundationalism gives a node to only sufficient immediate justification for justifying a belief whereas weak foundationalism advocates only a low degree of indubitable justification.
Unfortunately, foundationalists do not have a consensus on either problem. Moreover, foundational beliefs are thought to be justified because of their intrinsic nature. It means that these beliefs have some ‘intrinsically justification making property’. Some foundationalists may and in fact do claim that these beliefs are something like ‘self-evident’, ‘indubitable’, ‘infallible’. But these notions do not seem to be very convincing. Most of the beliefs could turn out to be false. If we have a few infallible beliefs “they are so few in number that they are not able to provide a foundation for the rest of the beliefs”. L. Bonjour has shown in a reasonably conclusive way that no account of the supposed foundational beliefs is finally tenable and foundationalism despite its historical hegemony, is fundamentally a dead end.

“There is no way for the foundationalist’s allegedly basic empirical beliefs to be genuinely justified for the believer in question without that justification itself depending on further empirical beliefs which are themselves in need of justification. Foundationalism is thus a dead end.”

The traditional competitor against foundationalism is coherentism. According to coherentism, all justification is, in a sense, interfential and systematic. Philosophers who defend coherence theory of justification have argued that there need not be any basic beliefs, that all beliefs may be justified in relation to each other. Recent proponents of this approach are Wilfred Sellars, Gilbert Harman, Nicholas Rescher, Keith Lehrer and L. Bonjour among others.

Epistemic coherentism is not the same as the coherence theory of truth. The coherence theory of truth simply identifies truth with coherence (among the propositions of a system). It is a theory of nature or
meaning of truth. A coherence theory of justification, on the other hand holds that beliefs can be justified only by an appeal to other justified empirical beliefs, and that a system of justified beliefs can only be justified from within, by virtue of the relation of its component beliefs to each other. It is the view that the justification of any belief depends on the beliefs’ having evidential support from some other belief via coherence relation such as entailment or explanatory relations. In other words, a finite system of justified beliefs can only be justified from within by virtue of the relation of its component beliefs to each other.

Coherentism recognizes only one sort of justified beliefs. This view has no room for foundational beliefs. It maintains that all beliefs are justified through coherence with other beliefs. But, again, the question may arise, what is it for a belief to cohere with the rest of what one believes. Ultimately, one is lead to the conclusion that justification is not a local matter, but a global matter as well. Moreover, this theory excludes perceptual state from contributing to justification which seems wrong. Coherence of beliefs must be appropriately related to the way things are. Proponents of coherence theory of justification have not yet arrived at a uniform solution to this problem.

Some contemporary epistemologists like Dewey, Thomas Kuhn, Wittgenstien and other endorse contextualism regarding epistemic justification. Contextualism maintains that inferential justification terminates in an unjustified belief, or in a set of beliefs which needs no further justification. In the context of an enquiry or discussion, people simply assume some propositions as starting point of enquiry and these contextually basic propositions, though lacking evidential support, serve as evidential support for other propositions. The propositions that are
taken for granted may vary from context to context. Thus what functions as unjustified justifier in one case may not be in another.

Contextualist philosophers like the foundationalists propose that the evidence chain terminates, but unlike the foundationalists, they propose that the foundation of justification are themselves unjustified.

Contextualists hold that the foundations of justification are those beliefs that a certain community of people believes, takes for granted or accepts without reasons. These philosophers can be grouped in two classes, firstly those who explain contextualism for justification of scientific theories. Thomas Kuhn and Harold Brown are the leading proponents of this view. Secondly, Wittgenstein, David Annis and others hold that contextualism can explain the justification of ordinary observation beliefs.

Brown⁵⁸ has argued that scientific presuppositions are basic to the justification of any scientific theory. He calls them ‘paradigmatic propositions’. Kuhn⁵⁹ has also stressed the importance of pre-suppositions in the justification of scientific theory. These presuppositions, according to him form the basis of a paradigm or a ‘disciplinary matrix’. A disciplinary matrix is the complex of the shared beliefs that accounts for general agreement among the scientists in any given scientific community.

Thus Brown and Kuhn hold that scientific presuppositions are basic to all scientific justification, and that these presuppositions are not themselves empirically justified. They emphasize that there is no epistemic standard higher than the consensus of the scientific community.
The shared values of a scientific community provide the best guidance in the community’s decision whether one theory is more reasonable to believe than the other.

Wittgenstein, Williams and Annis argue that contextualism can be contrived even without a scientific community. Justification takes place in a context of inquiry in which the inquirer takes something for granted. There is a set of beliefs which is not open to doubt, and it can change from context to context and from time to time. Consequently justification has no essence. Wittgenstein holds that basic beliefs are unjustified starter beliefs on the basis of which all other beliefs are justified. In *On Certainty*, he writes: “At the foundation of well founded belief lies belief that is not well founded” 60. Annis brings in the concept of social consensus for the epistemic justification of any belief. 61

But an obvious question facing contextualism is, how can an unjustified proposition provide justification for another proposition? In the case of scientific justification, a scientific community can reach a consensus in many ways, and it is doubtful whether all these ways are epistemically significant. Moreover, the various so-called scientific communities do not share a uniform system of scientific values. The social consensus also cannot became a sufficient condition of justification of beliefs for the reason that we can have social consensus for every belief, even for the contradictory beliefs. Contextualism seems to present itself as incomplete as well as uncompromising solution to the epistemic regress problem.

Justification as a component of knowledge has not been questioned by many philosophers. Sartwell62 has proposed the view that
propositional knowledge is merely true belief and that it does not need a theory of justification. Ayer does not deny the presence of knowledge in the cases of intutive or mystic knowledge on the basis of the success gained even, when no justification or ‘explanation’ is found.

The concept of ‘justification’ or that of ‘evidence’ is a vague concept. Its meaning varies from being self-justified (or self-evident) to being conclusively justified. Conclusive justification is obviously not possible for empirical propositions. Moreover, it is possible to provide a justification for a false proposition as well as a true proposition.

Justification is means to strengthen our beliefs. Since it is possible to have knowledge without belief, so justification also can be barred from being a necessary condition of knowledge.

Having looked at several competing approaches to truth, belief and justification, we have observed that there is no widespread agreement on what precisely the key components of knowledge are, even if there is a general agreement that knowledge requires justified true belief. Traditionally, it was ‘proposed’ that justified true belief is knowledge. But the tradition established by Plato had as its object Universals and not propositions. Moreover, the tradition could be acceptable only within his own metaphysical framework. It is this ‘traditional’ definition, which is challenged by Gettier and of which this research is a critique of.
NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. For some philosophers, truth also contains the external element, for, for the explication of truth, one has to go behind the circle of the knower & the proposition known and seek to check them against some thing non-propositional, i.e., the reality itself. Hereby 'justification as external element' we mean that which is other than the knower and the known. The truth is intimately related to the knower and the known.


3. *Meno*, from J. Trusted, p. 27.

4. Ibid, p. 28.

5. *Theaetetus* 210(b), G. Mathew’s Plato’s *Epistemology and Related Logical Problems*.


8. A.D. Woozley: ‘Knowing and Not Knowing’ from Griffith (ed.): *Knowledge and belief*.

9. Woozley is making this discussion to support the fact that being sure is not a necessary condition of knowing.

10. K. Lehrer, *Knowledge*, p. 3, Lehrer with his coherentist background takes propositions only in the information sense.

12. Jane Austin has mentioned such a distinction in 'Sense and Sensibillia' hundred years back. See H.H. Price, *Belief*, p. 63.


14. I. Scheffler, in ‘On Ryle’s Theory of Propositional Knowledge’ tries to cut Ryle’s arguments with his concept of category mistake only. Ryle’s guiding principle is that things belonging to the same category should be subject to the same sort of qualification and accessible to same sorts of questions. Application of this principle leads to a denial that ‘knowing that’ is an activity. To suppose it an activity is indeed, a category mistake. This criticism can be answered with reference to a distinction drawn by Ryle in ‘The concept of Mind’, between task verbs and achievement verbs (p. 152) the feedback of Ryle’s discussion is that ‘knowing that’ is an achievement verb.


21. Ibid, p. 11


24. I. Copi: *Introduction to Logic*.


32. Although Alston feels that metaphysical theories are independent of the theories of truth but the impact of one over the other is undeniable and cannot be ignored see Alston: ‘Two types of Foundationalism’.


34. Ibid, p. 106.


36. See Dharmendra Kumar: ‘Knowledge and Truth’.


38. G. Pitcher (ed.): *Truth*, p. 46

39. Ibid, p. 46

40. F.H. Bradley: *Essays On Truth and Reality*, p. XI and Ch. VII.


43. Ibid, p.492

44. Ibid, p.498


46. H.A. Prichard: ‘Knowing and Believing’, p. 62


48. P.K. Moser and A.V. Nat (ed.): *Human Knowledge: Classical and Contemporary Approaches*, p. 4. This distinction is also found in Woozley; *Theory of Knowledge*, p. 170.


50. R. Chisholm: ‘Knowledge and Belief: ‘De Dicto’ and ‘De Re’.’

51. There is a definite distinction between a mental proposition and an abstract proposition. Mental propositions may be regarded as thoughts of our daily life. We can express them in sentences, but some mental propositions remain unexpressed. So, these are private to the person to whom they belong. Abstract propositions have, as their contents, the concepts or the universals and not the particular concrete things.

52. According to Quine, a sentence token is just the physical sentence resulting from someone’s reading or writing at particular time. A sentence type, in contrast, is the abstract class of all such sentence
utterances or inscriptions that have the same type, see W.V. Quine: *Philosophy of Logic*.

53. Plato's suggestion does not rule out the possibility of justified false beliefs which invite the problem of fallibilism. On this view, the Ptolemaic astronomers before Copernicus and Galileo, were presumably justified in holding the geocentric model of the universe.

54. R. Chisholm: *Foundation of Knowing*, p. 29.


56. Ibid, p. 24


59. T. Kuhn: *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*.


64. R.C. Pradhan: *Truth, Meaning and Understanding*, p. 89.

65. Although Plato declared it as a 'silly' proposal.