Although disagreement is a necessary feature of philosophy, yet, since the post-Plato period till Gettier, it has been taken for granted that knowledge is justified true belief. Gettier denied the equivalence between the two, but the problem arises, who constructed the equivalence? No doubt, the echo of the modern analysis of knowledge as 'Justified True Belief' has got inspiration from Plato, but Plato himself did not accept this as the final definition of propositional knowledge. Plato did bring out the problem of knowledge which is still with the present day philosophers.

Although the focus of Plato in the early and middle dialogues is on knowledge of Forms as recollection, in the *Theaetetus*, the focus shifts to the definition of knowledge. In Plato's scheme, the soul eternally possesses knowledge and it has to be recollected. We find a development in Plato's thought from *Meno* to *Theaetetus* via *Phaedo*, *Republic* and *Timeaus*. *Theaetetus* states that belief is incompatible with and falls short of knowledge. It may be a state one must pass through in order to arrive at knowledge, but the two are different and distinct capacities. Knowledge is distinct from opinion – both cannot be the same faculty because it would lead to the identification of the infallible with the fallible. Plato clearly ascribes infallibility to knowledge whereas belief is fallible. Interpretation of Plato's account of knowledge in terms of belief is alleging Plato to be defending the incompatibility Thesis.
A.J. Ayer, rejuvenated the triune thesis in terms of justification, belief and truth which had long been approved silently by almost all philosophers in the history of philosophy. He specified the necessary and sufficient conditions in terms of truth, being sure and a right to be sure. Chisholm, likewise also presented the definiendum in terms of truth, acceptance and adequate evidence. One of our contentions in this research work is the exoneration of the concept of knowledge from the combination of these three components.

An important feature of knowledge which distinguishes it from other epistemic activities is its inseparable association with truth. This can also be expressed by saying that knowledge entails truth. So, truth is a presupposition for knowledge. To know is to know the truth of a proposition. A brief survey of the various theories of truth becomes important as it is a part of a complete analysis of the concept of propositional knowledge. Correspondence theory, Coherence theory and Pragmatism are the main theories of truth. We intend to propose the view that taken together, these theories can serve as ingredients of a pluralistic account of truth.

The second condition, the doxa, which is mostly translated as the belief condition, has been the most controversial condition owing to its nature. There have been problems concerning the relation between knowledge and belief because the term ‘belief’ like ‘knowledge’ has more than one senses. The controversy needs to be met over by a classification of the concept of belief. I shall be referring to a few distinctions drawn by philosophers as to the nature of belief. Knowledge has traditionally been regarded as a special kind of true belief. This thesis is called entailment thesis since the notion of belief is entailed by the
notion of knowledge. The thesis is supported by most of the philosophers. For Lehrer, to say ‘I don’t believe that, I know it’ or ‘He doesn’t believe that, he knows it’ hardly show that the entailment thesis is false; it is rather, an emphatic way of saying ‘I don’t only believe it, I know it’. A person may believe without knowing but he cannot know without believing.

Philosophers like Prichard and C. Black, by refuting the entailment thesis, make us realize the nature of fundamental difference between knowing and believing. According to this view, one can know without believing and believe without knowing.

The third condition or the justification condition is the most perplexing condition. One is confronted with serious questions regarding the specifications of the nature of justification. Theoretically absolute and complete justification is a never-ending task. It leads either to circularity or to a regress. By explication of knowledge in terms of justification, the concept of knowledge is threatened with vicious regress of justified beliefs leading to the skeptical conclusion that there is no knowledge. A brief survey of meta-justification theories would help in facing these perplexities.

One of the solutions to this problem is foundationalism. It is the view that certain beliefs known as basic or foundational are justified in a way which does not depend on inference from further epistemic beliefs, thus discontinuing the regress. The non-skeptical alternative to foundationalism is coherentism, the view that beliefs may be justified in relation to each other rather than being justified in relation to a few basic beliefs. There is a third metajustification theory called contextualism.
which combines both foundationalism and contextualism. On this view, a few beliefs are the starting point of inquiry and other beliefs are evidenced coherently on the basis of such beliefs.

On these lines, in our second chapter, the general characteristics of the tripartite thesis will be examined which include the truth condition, the belief condition and the justification condition.

E.L. Gettier challenged the adequacy of this universally accepted classical definition with the help of two counterexamples. Prior to the construction of his counterexamples, he presented two assumptions explicitly which were the strength of his arguments. These assumptions were, firstly regarding justification, that is, a false proposition can be justified and secondly, as stipulated by Gettier, that justification is preserved in valid reasoning. By assuming the possibility of the justification of a false proposition, Gettier has refuted the relation between truth and justification in the sense that justification does not guarantee truth. The three conditions, according to the 'Justified True Belief' thesis, though independent, have certain relation with one another. A proposition is true, is believed to be true, and the agent is justified in holding the belief as a true belief. These conditions are independent in the sense that one condition can be fulfilled while other remaining unfulfilled.

Justification condition is not taken in the same sense by Gettier, as understood to be a part of the 'justified true belief' thesis, because although it is independent of the truth condition, but is not directed towards truth. A discussion of the views of post-Gettier epistemologists like R. Chisholm, K. Lehrer, R. Almender, J.Margolis, I.M. Thaleberg
and others has helped to understand the viability of Gettier’s presuppositions.

Along with these discussions, exploring the distinction between a case of knowledge and a case of knowledge claim becomes an essential part of our third chapter. The nature of our colloquial language is such that we don’t hesitate to make the strongest epistemic claims even if it is less than knowledge. It is exactly what J. Olen has named as ‘an educated guess’ and something like Cook Wilson’s ‘reasonable assurance’, H.H. Price’s ‘apprehension’ or Meyers and Stren’s ‘well-takenness’. These terms can be counted as equivocations of ‘knowing that’ in ordinary language. This is what happens in our ordinary claims to knowledge. The term ‘knowledge’ in a technical sense has been associated with high expectations of certainty, infallibility and indubitability. We, as social human beings use the trivial sense of knowledge when it is not very well calculated. This discussion draws our attention towards a distinction between knowledge at ordinary level and knowledge at philosophical level.

In the post-Gettier period, epistemologists were highly influenced by the attack on the classical definition which resulted in a drastic change in the course of epistemology. The change is reflected through a credential growth in the literature. Especially during the past two decades, interest in the study of Gettier problem has grown enormously. Very soon after the publication of Gettier’s article, it was detected that perhaps Gettier’s aim behind the construction of the counterexamples was a demand for a fourth condition. This thought has inspired the team of post-Gettier philosophers to supplement the third condition with the addition of a specification i.e., the fourth condition. Chisholm, Lehrer, Sosa, Klein
are philosophers who have not straightaway rejected the traditional thesis. Rather, they have tried to retain the thesis by redefining or restructuring the condition of justification in such a manner that Gettier examples are thought to be ruled out and the Gettier effect is neutralized. These philosophers are known as revisionists.

Another group of philosophers, are traditionalists who opine that Gettier examples don’t work because the traditional definition as used in these examples has lost its originality. These philosophers, for example, Pailthorp have great respect for the justified true belief analysis. They take justification in terms of conclusive justification and truth in terms of infallible truth. Gettier is also found to be guilty for trapping the tradition with the help of the inference which was found to be there in between the false basis and the true belief.

A modern group of philosophers, whom we may call as rejectionists discard the definition by finding out new terms and conditions to an analysis of knowledge. A. Goldman, for example, began as the trend saver by adding a casual element to the justification condition, but very soon he began to realize that an analysis based on casual principle would satisfy only one type of propositions and in his later works, he bolstered the reliability approach.

With their epistemological presuppositions, post-Gettier philosophers have also formulated examples which are constructed in a Gettier-fashion, namely, cases of justified true belief which are not cases of knowledge and vice versa. Our fourth chapter concerns itself with the examples proffered by these contemporary epistemologists influenced by their different philosophical backgrounds. It is this background which
has caused idiosyncrasy in their interpretations. A discussion of these Gettier-style counterexamples reveal the fact that even the discovery of a fourth condition does not suffice.

Gettier has used the term justification in such a sense in which it is possible for an epistemic agent to be justified in believing a false proposition. Moreover, he has used the term in a subjective sense as opposed to the objective sense. One can be justified in a subjective sense if he thinks that the proposition is justified. A proposition is justified objectively if the evidence available are such that they indicate towards the truth of the proposition. The distinction between subjective and objective justification is supported by Catherine Lowy, Sosa and a few other philosophers. It is especially when the subjective sense is considered, the concept of justification becomes more perplexed.

If justification is regarded as a condition of knowledge, it would demand justification by another set of propositions. So, the argument becomes circular as it bags the same question. We can comfortably exonerate justification from the concept of knowledge merely on the basis of the argument from petitio-principii. Linda Zagzebski observes that knowledge can never be defined in terms of justification. There always remains a gap between truth and justification, and as knowledge is intimately related to truth, there remains a gap between knowledge and justification. We observe that knowledge and belief can also be found to be coexistent but no necessary connection is found between them because we can find cases of knowledge without belief and belief without knowledge. The fifth chapter of our thesis is focused on a discussion of the relation of knowledge to justification, belief and justified belief.
The chief concern of our sixth chapter is with the propositions. A knower is able to relate himself to the object of knowledge only through a proposition. There has been disagreement among philosophers over the issues regarding the nature of propositions, whether it is linguistic or non-linguistic. The notion of proposition also presupposes a context under which it is made. The proposition is apprehended by an agent within a particular context. The knower is also influenced by his own capacities and surroundings. This results in the multiplicity of propositions. Since an analysis of propositional knowledge requires a clarity of the concept of propositions, a brief survey of the classification, as presented by earlier philosophers, would help us to organize the variety in propositions. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the social aspect of knowledge which cannot be ignored. In the socialization of knowledge, justified beliefs in a collected form externalize the knowledge-situations.