CHAPTER VI

Every person has a tendency to listen to such words which are useful and have a meaning and is disinterested in what does not signify any meaning. Sāṃkhya Philosophy is glaringly concerned with the day to day life in so far as the knowledge of Prakṛti and Puruṣa is concerned. Misery in life is a truth. This very sorrowful truth has given birth to great Philosophies and such Philosophies have made research as to how to liberate from misery. Īśvarakṛṣṇa has tried to find out the cause of sorrow in his first kāraṇaka and that is why Īśvarakṛṣṇa is both practical in approach and is a Scholar complete in himself.

Different scholars have different opinions about the origin of Sāṃkhya Philosophy. Some date it back to Aryan Civilization and a few others attribute it to the period of Vedas. Almost all the scholars agree that the germs of Sāṃkhya were there in a developed form in the Upanisads. It will not be exaggerating if some may be called it Upaniṣadic Sāṃkhya. In his critical study of the Sāṃkhya V.V. Sovani holds that the Upaniṣadic Sāṃkhya is theistic and the dividing line between the Sāṃkhya and the Yoga is not
clear. In the Upanisads we do not find the present State form of the Samkhya. The number of the tattvas, their order and their conception remain to be made definite and uniform. Keith in his work "A history of the Samkhya Philosophy" opines that the doctrine which first adumbrated in the Kaṭha Upaniṣad may be taken to be the precursor of the Samkhya in its derivation in detail of empiric existence from the absolute. According to Jacobi, there can not be two opinions to accept the fact that Samkhya Philosophy came into being between the period of oldest Upaniṣads and the latter Upaniṣads.

In his work, 'The Indian Philosophy' Dr. Umesh Misra opines that roots of later philosophical works were in the Upaniṣads. According to Johnston more systematic form of Samkhya come into being between Kaṭha-upaniṣad and the Svetasvatara-upaniṣad - in all probability the school of Varsaganya. Though it is a fact, according to the definite opinions of different scholars that the germs of Samkhya existed in the upaniṣads. Through the course of my study the principles of Samkhya which existed in upaniṣads are the following and with regard to this there cannot be two opinions.

The monistic tone is pre-dominant and the basic interest lies upon the Atman in the upaniṣadic speculations. The Samkhya School professes two distinct principles, the Frakrti
and the Puruṣa. In the ancient prose Upaniṣads viz. Brhad
Upaniṣad (1.11.5) the germ of this dualistic tendency can
be traced in its monistic speculations. Another distinct
achievement of Śāmkhya, which in all probability it adopted
from the tripartite scheme of the Chāndogya Upaniṣad is
the Guna theory. We find hints of Śāmkhya theory of cause-
tion in Chāndogya Upaniṣad (VI.2.1.2). The theory of
existent coming out of non-existent and the doctrine of one
absolute real existing at the start is maintained therein.
Evolution is possible through Prakṛti in Śāmkhya. In
Brhad Upaniṣad it is held that the universe was unevolved
in the beginning. This idea in Brhad Upaniṣad has similarity
to the Prakṛti of Śāmkhya. In the ancient Upaniṣads buddhi
in the evolution has been termed as Vijnana. In the ancient
upaniṣads manas and Saṅkalpa are explained as two separate
principles, while Śāmkhya holds Saṅkalpa to be the function
of the mind. We thus find that evolution of Śāmkhya is
present in the various ancient upaniṣads.

The term aja in the Śvetāsvatara Upaniṣad IV.5 stands
for Prakṛti as is clear from the context it stands for.
This is not a subject matter of discussion anywhere. As is
well known Prakṛti is constituted of three gunas and the
gunas are referred in verse as three colours - red, white
and black. Many offsprings of its own farm is said to be
produced by the unborn Prakṛti. In the second hemistich,
the he-goat is the purusa, for it is also held to be aja (Unborn). The expression उजो ह्स्को जुजपाणोऽनुिते speaks of the Purusa who is not yet liberated from the yoke of the Prakṛti.

In this Sruti two types of Puruṣas have been explained - one is Puruṣa and the other is the Puruṣa which is a captive of the Prakṛti is the enjoyer. The idea of the Sāṃkhya is that the word Puruṣas refers to Jīvātmā. Sāṃkhya has neither referred to Brahm by name nor has accepted it as a separate element but the motive is the same. It is therefore verbatim correct that the germs of Sāṃkhya were available in the Upanisads in a complete form.

According to Garbe there can be no doubt about Sāṃkhya being one of the Oldest philosophy of the Indian tradition. Existence of striking similarities between the Sāṃkhya and Buddhism indicate that they have influence of one upon the other. According to Garbe these similarities indicate Sāṃkhya to be prior to Buddhism. How and when precisely the Sāṃkhya system was formulated is not possible to determine according to Keith. He however accepts that Sāṃkhya quite evidently originated from Vedic-Upanisadic epic heritage.

According to Dasgupta the major ideas and terms of the
Sāmkhya clearly come from the Vedic-Upaniṣadic heritage. Emphasis by Edgerton that ancient Sāmkhya was a method of salvation by knowing and that it grew from the early speculations existing in the Vedas and Upaniṣads.

Keeping in view the opinions of above writers we come to the conclusion that Sāmkhya philosophy definitely originated in the Vedas and these views are confirmed by Puruṣa-Sūkta to the Sāmkhya system. Dr. Radhakrishnan holds, "The hymn is not, however, inconsistent with the theory of creation from the one Absolute described above. The whole world according to it is due to the self-deception of the Absolute into subject and object, Puruṣa and Prakṛti. Only the idea is crudely allegorized." To conform this proof the following hymn of Rigveda is referred. The idea of this version is that the learned persons see Jīvatman in this body. This Jīvatman deserves knowledge and tries to reach the Īsvara in the antarikṣa. From this, it is very clear that Kapila grasped the knowledge of Sāmkhya which was almost the size of a seed and developed it into a full work named Sāmkhya.


2. पत्तां गमकं पुरस्य मायया,पश्यान्त नात्सा निरपिनित्वं।
   समुद्र जलं कवयो विचलतेऽमोहीनः पदमिच्छन्नित्वं-बेक्षा।।
   Rigveda. 10.177.1.
There did exist other and older works on the Samkhya but these are not available to us. In the present times three works namely Tattva Samasa, Samkhya-karika and Samkhya-Sutra are available. As my present work, on which I have exhaustively made research is related to a critical study of the Samkhya schools, henceforth I shall confine myself mainly to the Samkhya which is pioneer amongst the systems, having the view point that the body is subject to decay and death and with it all bodily sufferings will end. Since Yoga is also closely related to Samkhya-Yoga will also be referred wherever necessary. Samkhya is sorrowful, whichever side one see misery in seen. If however there is a little bit of pleasure, it is also an admixture of sorrow. Sorrows are of three kinds and its basic cause is ignorance is possible through the knowledge contained in the Samkhya Philosophy. Samkhya is a dualistic philosophy and Vedanta is monistic philosophy. Samkhya is tattva-pradhana, twenty-five elements of Samkhya are categories as under:

1. From them only one tattva primordial nature is only Prakṛti.
2. Mahat, ahāṃkāra and five tanmātras are Prakṛti-vikṛtayāḥ.
3. Eleven senses and five mahābhūtas are only vikṛtayāḥ.
4. Only one tattva puruṣa na Prakṛti na vikṛtayāḥ.
Since Sāmkhya School is dualistic and Vedānta is monistic, the famous prominent commentator of Vedānta is Śaṅkara. He criticises the dualistic form of Sāmkhya in the Brahma Sūtra. Śaṅkara really never accepts the doctrine of Puruṣa along with the Pradhāna, Parinama and Puruṣa bahutvam. Various reasons were there for its rejection by him. Two reasons are discussed here. First Śaṅkara was both idealist and extreme monistic. To him the self was the ultimate reality, was one and its oneness was absolutely unique. Contrary, plurality of the Puruṣas constitute a necessary feature of basic Sāmkhya and surrender fully was not possible by even the author of the Karikā. In the second place as for the Vedānta, this self or the Puruṣa alone being real, the empirical manifold was unreal, the product of ignorance or avidyā. The causation of the phenomenal world from the Puruṣa was fictitious which matched a magical show by the magician on the stage. The Sāmkhya view, on the other hand was that the Pradhāna being real and world which can be seen being a real effect of the Pradhāna, for the causation of the world the Puruṣa had no hand in it. The view of Puruṣa by the author of Karikā was not acceptable to Śaṅkara. Since the universe process was ultimately unreal as a whole, the Puruṣa alone seems to have supreme reality. There exists basically one question which is different in Sāmkhya and
Vedānta i.e. whether the experienced universe be taken as real or not.

Madhavacārya in his Sarva Darsāna Samgraha closely following Sāṅkara poses the question as to how Vedānta view related to doctrine of illusory emanation can be accepted, when the development system as propounded by the Śāmkhya is there in opposition.

In the Brahma-sūtra and its commentaries, the controversy between Śāmkhya and the Vedānta is between Parināmavāda and Vivartavāda. Though both the systems admit about the world being of the nature of an effect and that the effect was potentially contained within the cause, but as to the reality of the effect, there exists differences. The Śāmkhya accepts the effect being real and accordingly the world is also real, but according to Vedānta, the effect could not have been real and cannot have ultimate claim to reality. The very proof of existence of the Pradhāna in the Śāmkhya is based on empirical universe being a reality. According to the Western Philosophers, "If we do not believe in the truth of the Law of Causation namely, that everything, which

has a beginning has a cause and that in the same circumstances the same things invariably happen, all the sciences would at once crumble to dust."

It is only through natural laws and not any spiritual principle that the primeval matter modified itself with the universe of nature is evidently the viewpoint of the Sāmkhya philosophers. Its internal controversy with the materialistic outlook confirms the standpoint of original Sāmkhya. If we accept that originally Sāmkhya was the doctrine of Pradhāna, it has also to be the Svabhava, because former is logically not complete without the latter while interpreting Sāmkhya, inspite of idealistic twists, Gaudapāda had to admit reluctantly that according to Sāmkhya Philosophers there exists a cause named Svabhava. We find the evidence of early Sāmkhya really maintaining the doctrine of natural law in the Brahma-sūtra i.e. the Pradhāna cannot modify itself spontaneously like grass etc. which may turn into milk for milk exists in female animals and nowhere else.

Saṅkara while commenting on it, holds, that Sāmkhya

1. Krishankant Tripathi, Sāmkhya-Kārikā, p.31.
2. Colebrooke, Kārikā-27.
3. Brahma-Sūtra, ii. 2.5.
philosophers have presented their case that grass, herbs, water etc. independently transform themselves by their own nature into milk, so is the case with the Pradhāna which transforms itself into the Great Principle (mahat) etc.

To the question as to how grass transforms itself independently of any instrumental cause, the reply would be that no such cause is observed. If such cause is perceived, we could apply it to the grass and make it produce milk. But the fact is that we do not do any such thing. It is due to its own nature that transformation of grass takes place and an inference can be drawn there-from that the transformation of the Pradhāna is of the same type.

Again Śaṅkara refutes the view of the Śāmkhya that the Purusā is though perfectly passive, initiates and guides the world process indirectly. The same way as the magnet activises the iron without being active itself. Such defence put up by the Śāmkhya would in fact amount to a surrender of the fundamentals of philosophy; according to which the Pradhāna is moving itself and the soul possesses no such power. The example is that the lame man make the blind man move by means of words etc. cannot be equated with the soul, because the soul is devoid of any action and qualities and as such cannot put forth any moving energy. Likewise, the

fact that the Pradhāna is moved by its proximity as the iron is moved by the magnet also does not hold good because the proximity of the magnet, its adjustment in a certain position may move the iron but as such this cannot be taken to be permanent. The instances of lame man and the magnet cannot be equated as parallel instances. The Pradhāna, non-intelligent, the puruṣa indifferent cannot have any connections as there is no third principle to connect them. Since the instances of the lame, blind and the magnet iron appear in the Kārika, there can be no doubt whatsoever that Śaṅkara was criticising the Kārika-version of the philosophy. The following is meant by the fundamentals of the system:

(1) The doctrine of the Pradhāna viz. primeval matter is the ultimate cause of the visible world.

(2) The view of causality known as Pariṇāma-vāda, i.e. the effect is a real modification of the cause, and

(3) The doctrine of the plurality of the Puruṣas.

While going through the Brahma-Sūtra, we find that there were really the fundamentals of the system because the Sāmkhya which has been refuted by Brahma-Sūtra, is actually the refutatio

1. S.B.E. 34, p.370.
of these fundamentals of Śāmkhya. Further it was not possible for the author of the Kārikā to deny all these to the Śāmkhya viewpoint. By failing to do so, means that these could be reconciled to the conceptions.

To prove that the concept of Purusa of Kārikā was almost the same as was held by the Vedantic views of the self, no elaborated arguments are necessary. As Sakti in Vedānta, so is the Purusa in the Kārikā is merely a witness. Like the Vijnata of the Upanisads, it is the pure knower. It is contrast in nature to that of primeval matter and its evolutes and accordingly it is solely the principle of consciousness which though appears to be belonging to certain objects of the visible world is in fact nothing except the consciousness of the Purusa reflecting in them. Such a view of the Purusa is the same as that of concept of self in Vedānta. Isvarakrsna when introduced this Vedantic-view into Śāmkhya as being Purusa, the fundamentals of the system became irreconcilable. For proof that the Purusa existed, we can start with the proofs pointed by the Kārikā.

2. Ibid., S.K. 2.
3. Ibid., S.K. 11.
The Prakṛti is real and the visible universe as it is a real modification of this very Pradhāna. It was in fact the reality of the visible world which gave rise to inference of the Śāṃkhya to the reality of the Pradhāna. 'Karyatah tat upalabdhiḥ' according to Kāriki. It is of interest to note that this same visible world's existence was taken to be a proof that Puruṣa existed:

"Since the assemblage of sensible objects is for another's use; since the converse of that which has the three gunas with other properties (before mentioned) must exist, since there must be Superintendence (adhisthana); since there must be one to enjoy; since there is a tendency to abstraction (Kaivalyartham pravriltehca; since also there is the desire to be detached from the world); therefore, Puruṣa is." For the existence of the Puruṣa, the Kārika offers these proofs. Kārika also offers proofs in the existence of Pradhāna and causality also. Hence it was the principle of the Prakṛti, i.e. the principle of a material first cause, that gave original Śāṃkhya a unique position in the history of Indian philosophy. Let proto Śāṃkhya to

1. Colebrook's, trans, S.K., 8.
2. Ibid., S.K. 17.
give our philosophical tradition with the basic ideas of the positive sciences. About the Sāmkhya doctrine Albert says "The Sāmkhya doctrine is a wonderful achievement. Rarely in human thought has a theoretical problem been so clearly recognised; rarely has a solution been undertaken and achieved with such clear judgement. It was only through the teaching of Sāmkhya that Jainism and Buddhism became possible. They are new verities of it in which ethics attains a greater importance."

There appears further critical and comparative study on the Sāmkhya tattvas in precise manner among Cēraka Gītā, Mahābhārata, Kapila, Sāmkhya, Karikā of Īśvarakṛṣṇa, Vācaspati Misra, Vijnānabhikṣu and the Pāṭalijala School (Sesvara Sāmkhya) of Yoga.

In the Īśvarakṛṣṇa Sāmkhyakārikā Prakṛti or Avyakta is designated Mūla or Pradhāna and Avyaktam as neuter gender. The Kapila in Sāmkhya-darsana-sūtra (1.6.67) Mūla being deficient of Mūla, Mūleprakṛti is that which is the cause of others, but it is devoid of any cause. At many places Prakṛti has been designated as Avyaktam or unmanifest in the Mahābhārata.

"Avyaktamahuh prakrtim param prakrtivadinah"
   (Santi Parva - 306-27)
"Sarga pralya dharmattādavyaktam prāhuraksaram."
   (Ibid.307-13)

In the Gītā the word Avyakta has been used in the sense of disappearance which in general refers to the principle out of which the universe comes into being.

The word Avyaktam has been used by Caraka to be meaning a unified category of Prakrti and Purusa. Vacaspati-Misra admits Avyakta as unconsciousness but Vijnānabhaikuśu holds Prakṛti as the Sakti of Isvara. Sesvara School of Sāmkhya supports his view and also admits Prakṛti not a independent tattva but a Sakti of Brahman.

Mana, buddhi and ahāmkarā have been referred to mean citta in Yoga. A distinction between mahat and buddhi has been made by Kapila as would be evident from the Bhāgavata Purāṇa 3.26. There can be no doubt that the first evolute is the mahat and within it contains the germs of the whole world. This mahat is not however identical with the buddhi and in a form of the antahkarana having command over the organs and the sense objects. The functions of this category are doubts, errors, memory and determinateness and in nature and function is not cosmic. In the classical Sāmkhya the
buddhi or mahat is accepted in the cosmic sense. Buddhi is the psychological aspect but in cosmic aspect, it is called mahat.

The buddhi in the Bhagavadgītā stands for intellect, the relations of buddhi to ahamkāra is however not clear. In the Bhagavadgītā chapter 3.42, the buddhi has been referred to as higher than manas and the self is higher than the buddhi. It is not definitely stated in the Gītā as to whether individualization is taken out of the intellect or not. Buddhi has been interpreted in different ways in the Mahābhārata. At times it has been accepted as the first great evolute of Prakṛti, but elsewhere it has been mentioned as an organ of the individual as are mind and other sense organs. It has been taken in the ordinary Sāṃkhya sense in chapter 306, 310 and 210 of the Sānti Paravan, which goes to show that it stands for a cosmic principle. In chapter 307, however buddhi has been admitted as an organ which is the cause of the organs of action.

Mahat or Buddhi has been admitted as the first evolute, which gives birth to all other categories in due course by some of the important Purāṇas. The buddhi is taken to be the first evolute of avyakta, out of which ahamkāra comes into being, in the view of, caraka-samhitā. The self, has not been taken to be as pure consciousness the reflection
of which is grasped by the intellect. The self on the other hand makes some sort of contact with the psycho-physical conglomeration, consciousness takes shape in the embodied soul. The real locus standi of consciousness is the embodied soul according to Caraka. The light is radiated to all parts of the body and the internal organs from this centre. This view differs from the classical sāmkhya view, as the buddhi there is the repository of reflected consciousness.

Ahamkāra has been differently interpreted in different contexts in the Epic. It has been referred to be as an evolute from the mahat. The effects of this ahamkāra tattva are generally not the same as in the Sāmkhya kārika of Īśvarakṛṣṇa. Ahamkāra has been mentioned to be a member of the eight-fold Prakṛti having in it the lower nature of God in the Bhagavadgītā. Ahamkāra is spoken to be an evolute of the mahat by Purāṇas. It is that principle which breaks itself into two i.e. specifically subjective and objective. This principle gives rise to the individual ego and the objective world.

Ahamkāra is referred to be a part of the eight-fold Prakṛti constituting the stuff of the psycho-physical universe by the Caraka Samhitā. The buddhi gives rise to this principle and is the source of the five elements and the senses. In
Samkhya-karika-ahamkara has been described such principle which develops on the one hand into rigid sense of individuality and on the other into the elements of the objective universe. In the Bhagavata Purana, dealing with Kapila Samkhya ahamkara has been referred as the second evolute, mahat is however not identified with the buddhi tattva here. Buddhi, here has been spoken of as an inner organ of an individual and evolute of taijasa ahamkara.

The terms Sattva, rajas and tamas seem to have been used by the Mahabharata, for psychic states constituting the experience stuff of human beings. The guṇas are eternally there in Nature. The view about the guṇas are found in the Gita is different in as much as that they are described as the products of Prakṛti (14.5). The pre-karika description of the three guṇas representing three types of psychical states is adopted in the caraka-samhita (78 A.D.). Accumulation of rajas and tamas in the soul preserves in all happiness and misery, but when there is an increase in the Sattva guṇa the tie is unfastened and the self is released from the entanglement of life. (Sarīrasthānam-34)

Gunas are not taken to be equivalent to Prakṛti in Ahir-budhnya-samhita. Guṇa represents the unevolved undifferentiated state of pure potentiality and is best identified by the term avyakta. An elaborate description
of these gunas, effecting the life of Jīva in the Manuṣmṛti (Chap. 12.24-52). The doctrine of these three gunas forming the very substance of Prakṛti is the most important topic in the classical ātmākara. The evolution of the world is attributed wholly to the activity of these gunas which work for the interest of the Puruṣas by the classical ātmākara. In Indian thought and Indian Philosophy the conception of the gunas is very popular. The gunas control and influence the world of experience. The guna theory in the Yoga is the same as is Śare Jīva in the ātmākara. Vācaspatimisra is silent on the guna theory while Vijnāna-Bhiṣaku first of all gives the definite names of Sattva, rajas and tamas in a correct form.

In the Kapila ātmākara of the Bhāgavata, time is not taken to be a product of nature. It is in fact the transcendent effort of God through which unmanifest nature gets transformed into this manifest universe of colourful existence. Time has sometimes been named as the external form of God from which the activity of Prakṛti proceeds. Time is of an external character is unreal as a whole. Time means limited time, it does not exist separately from the atoms and their movements. In fact time is the order in which the intellect cognizes its perception of ceaseless changes of atoms. Time as an entity is a creation of our buddhi. The buddhi measures the changes of things as past, present and future.
In the orthodox Samkhya of the classical School the existence of any real time independent of Prakrti is not admitted.

Kāla has been designated as a principle which is responsible for bringing about a synthesis between Puruṣa and Prakṛti in the Purāṇas. The highest reality is God, and Vyakta, avyakta, Puruṣa and Kāla are His four different forms.

In the Sāmkhya Philosophy, time has not been accepted as a tattva, therefore a question may be posed 'Space and time' are known to all and how it is then that they are not included in the tattvas of the Sāmkhya? K.P. Bahadur in his work, 'The wisdom of Sāmkhya' points out that time and space are eternal and absolute and as such are the source of ether and are all pervading. But limiting objects having conditioned there, space and time become limited and they arise from ether. In their limited aspects they are the source of ether and in the limited aspect ether in their source.

There are different views on the Puruṣa tattva of the

Sāmkhya. The Yoga Philosophy accepts the existence of Puruṣa, but it cannot act of its own desire. Its evolution and dissolution is dependant on the Will of the Isvara. Puruṣa as a form or manifestation of Mahesvara is generally admitted by the Purāṇas. Puruṣa according to them cannot therefore be ultimate basis of the universe. It is accepted as one of the three categories (Kāla and Prakṛti being the two others) that are responsible for the creation of this psycho-physical world by the will of God.

One Puruṣa as the all-pervading soul is admitted by the Kapila Sāmkhya of the Bhāgavata Purāṇa. He is the seer of all experiences, the eternal and the ultimate principle that underlies all things of the world. In so far as this aspect is concerned the theistic Sāmkhya of Kapila agrees with the Upanisads which also accept the contention that there exists one eternal and universal Puruṣa which is the basis of the world. Theism was never prominent in the Upanisads in its true sense, but it is so in the Bhāgavata Sāmkhya where-in the word Puruṣa has more been used meaning a personal God than in the sense of Brahman or Ātman.

The word Puruṣa has been used in the Caraka Samhita to be meaning both the forms of the self, i.e., the empirical and the transcendental. The word Puruṣa has been used in a peculiar form in the Ahirbudhnya-Samhita. Puruṣa has been referred to as meaning a collection of cells. The well known...
commentator Vijnāna-Bhikṣu on the Śāmkhya-Pravacana-Sūtra wrote a commentary on the Brahma-Sūtras. The Śāmkhya view about pure dualism of Puruṣa and Prakṛti and to the pluralism of Puruṣas could not be held by him as a Vedāntin. Puruṣas and the Prakṛti are, therefore, treated by him as the Śakti of Isvāra and asserts that there exists no difference, between Śakti and the possessor of Śakti.

The word Puruṣa in the Epic means the individual Puruṣa and the highest spiritual reality both. The word Puruṣa has been used in four different senses in the Bhagavad Gītā one in the sense of God, two in the sense of ordinary person, the third in the sense of Kṣara Puruṣa and the fourth the Aksara Puruṣa. The Aksara Puruṣa is the unchangeable spiritual principle that manifests itself in so many conglomerations as their indwelling souls are Ksetrajnas.

In the classical Śāmkhya the soul has been referred to be devoid of all other characteristics except pure consciousness. It is not one but many and its nature is wholly pure consciousness. According to classical Śāmkhya there exists a separate Puruṣa for each individual. Each Puruṣa is eternal, immortal, unconditioned and absolute.

1. P.T. Raju, Idealistic Thought of India, p.173.
This contention of Samkhya is radically different from the Vedanta idealism which accepts the reality of one Atman only. On this point original theistic Samkhya of Kapila as found in the Bhagavata was more in agreement with the Vedanta, because these finite selves were taken to be countless images of one Purusa. The classical School was responsible for the recognition of the plurality of transcendental Purusas in a regular system of thought in the Samkhya Philosophy. The theistic Samkhya of Kapila accepts that the innumerable Purusas are manifestations of the same ultimate reality. The real transcendental Purusas are many number is emphatically held by the classical Samkhya.

Vacaspati Mīśra and Vijnana Bhiksu also accept Purusa the enjoyer but till it lives in the Jīva form. The plurality of Purusa is also accepted by Vacaspati Mīśra and Vijnāna Bhiksu while Purusa exists in the form of bhoga in Jīva, yet in the state of Liberation remains only Purusa and can not be Jīva. So we can say that there can be no doubt that Samkhya is a typical representative of dualism in India as is Cartesianism in the West. The Samkhya regards Prakṛti and Purusa as the two categories of being disparate from each other, the former being conceived to be single and material and the latter being plural and spiritual.

The last point of this school is that the arguments
of Śāṃkhyā against the religion of God are mainly since the existence of the world is attributed to the God but according to Śāṃkha this contention is wholly unnecessary to the extent that neither the material cause nor the efficient cause, to which the world may be cited because its existence is identified with God. According to Śāṃkha, the reason for this is that Prakṛti is the material cause of the world and is taken to be primeval material stuff and merits and demerits of the individual souls (Puruṣas) constitute the efficient cause. As has already been discussed, according to the Śāṃkha, the transcendental influence of the Puruṣas disturb the original state of equilibrium of Prakṛti the result is that Prakṛti is responsible for evolving and bringing into existence all things from mahat to gross elements, viz. earth, water, fire, air and ether which constitute the universe. It is further held by Śāṃkha that it is for the sake of the experience (Bhoga) of the Puruṣas, that Prakṛti evolves in this manner and subsequently its dissolution is for bringing about the Kaivalya of the Puruṣas. The picture presented for the world process by the Śāṃkha does not need divine creativity, but can be attributed wholly to man and nature and the intercourse between them. To the contention that Prakṛti is ex-hypothesis, unintelligent and it needs intelligent guidance for its evolution and there has to be an omniscient being in order to fulfil this need.
The Śāmkhya replies that despite the fact that Prakṛti is unintelligent, it can serve to fulfil the ends of Puruṣas through bringing into existence their experience and Mokṣa as is the case of the unintelligent milk from the udder of the cow which nourishes the calf. This contention is based on an analogy and obviously lacking in cogency, but this defect is removed by the Śāmkhya, by asserting as to what was the motive of God in His creation of the world. Vacaspati-Misra and Aniruddha, the authorities on the Śāmkhya, hold this school of Indian Philosophy to be atheistic, but Vijnānabhaṅgu, notable author of the Śāmkhya-Pravacanaabhaṅga, holds that existence of God is not denied by Śāmkhya but only holds that existence of God is not proved. This does not amount to affirming the existence of God. The outlook of this School of Philosophy is unabiguously atheistic, if the Śāmkhyakarika of Isvarakṛṣṇa be regarded, as it should be regarded as giving an authentic philosophical account of Śāmkhya. In all probability, Vijnānabhaṅgu tried to interpret the teaching of Śāmkhya from the Yoga and Vedānta point of view which are theistic Philosophies and not considered it in its own account. Therefore we can say in this Philosophy mainly two Schools are mentioned i.e. Sesvara-Śāmkhya and Nirīsvara-Śāmkhya.