CHAPTER 6

WHITHER PUNJAB-VIOLENCE, PARTITION AND FREEDOM (1946-1947)

The political see-saw game between the Congress - Akali - Unionist and the League had deep effects on the communal relations in the province. The rejection of the Interim Government plan by the League and their decision to resort to Direct Action for the attainment of their good intensified communal tension all over the country but especially in the Muslim majority areas as the Interim Government was formed without the League. The Working Committee of the League called upon the Muslim throughout India to observe 16 August as Direct Action Day' by holding meetings to explain the object of the resolution. Jinnah's outburst immediately caught by the provincial League leaders which created a grave communal situation at several places in the country. He said, "We have taken a most historic decision. Never before in the whole life history of the Muslims did we do anything except by constitutional methods and by constitutional talks. We are today forced into this position by a move in which both the Congress and Britain have participated. We have been attacked on two fronts- the British and the Hindu front. Today we have said good bye to constitution and
constitutional methods. Recalling his experience of negotiations for transfer of power, he said, "... throughout the painful negotiations the two parties with whom we bargained held a pistol at us, one with power and machine guns behind it, and the other with non cooperation and the threat to launch Mass Civil Disobedience. This situation must be met. We also have a pistol."

Consequently, in Bengal where the League ministry under the leadership of Suhrawardy was in power, the Direct Action Day resulted in Hindu/Muslim riot on an unprecedented scale. In Calcutta, a large number of lives were lost and a property worth millions was looted or burnt which could be prevented if the League ministry had taken precautionary measures. The Provincial League becomes more intransigent. There was an increasing threat of Jihad. The defection of Daud Ghaznavi who until was its President, to Muslim League, eroded the faith of non-Muslims in the Nationalist Muslims. On the other hand, it raised the morale of the League leadership of the province who acclaimed his advent to the league as a good omen for the future intentions of Nationalist Muslims. The League's move were calculated for an unprecedented holocaust that began in Calcutta. On 16 August

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675 *Home Department Political*, 18.7.1946.
only took 5,000 lives, injuring 15,000 persons are rendering about 1,00,000 people homeless.\textsuperscript{676} Circumstances became grave while the number of National Guards a para military body of the League multiplied by leaps and bounds. The provincial intelligence reports said that the number of National Guards rose to 22,000 and that of R.S.S. to 45,000 by the end of December, 1946.\textsuperscript{677} The agitation caused a serious concern not only to Khizr but also to the Viceroy and the Secretary of State who felt that further escalation of the situation in the Punjab would create more complications in the all India politics. On 11th September, 1946 Jinnah offered to the Hindus the choice between Pakistan or Civil War. On 15\textsuperscript{th} October the Muslim League decided to join the Interim Government, not on the basis of an understanding with the Congress but to form a rival bloc. The Muslim League's five representatives joined the Interim Government. It was not liked by either the Congress or the Unionist. Their anger was of course directed primarily against Wavell who had engineered the Muslim League's entry in the Interim Government.

\textsuperscript{676} J.S. Grewal, \textit{The Akalis- a Short History}, p. 104.
\textsuperscript{677} \textit{Home Department Political}, 16.12.1946.
The circumstances suggested immediate exchange of population to avoid communal riots. Administration broke down throughout the country. Lord Wavell failed to master the situation. Jinnah's slogan 'Pakistan or Civil War' gave impetus to Pakistan movement and it started in Punjab on 26th January 1947. Trouble kept simmering in Punjab. The existence of a Coalition Government in the province, regarded by the League as the cornerstone of Pakistan, was an eyesore to it. During this phase the Sikhs and Hindus were coming closer with emotional slogan Roti - Bete ka Nata. They were considering the Muslims as foreign race. The Sikhs were perplexed and not having answer to many of their queries. They became much and more dependent on a few so called Sikh leaders for legal arguments.

Meanwhile, Sir Joginder Singh one of the senior most trio leaders died on 3rd December, 1946. The British Government always made statements in their private papers that the Sikhs could not make clear their views. Frustrations and the phase of confusion made them suspicious. When the proposals came up in Nov. 1946, the British Government supported the Muslims League's interpretation that the provinces must enter the groups

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679 Harcharan Singh Bajwa, Fifty Years of Punjab Politics, p. 71.
and do so on the basis of a simple majority vote. The Congress felt constrained to accept this interpretation. This angered the Akalis who were cooperating with the Congress at that time. Master Tara Singh and Giani Kartar Singh were furious because the Sikhs would now have to go into Muslim majority groups. Mangal Singh Gill remarked that the Congress had made another dangerous slip towards Pakistan. The worst fears of the Akalis had come true. The Sikh interests were going to be sacrificed at the alter of appeasement for the Muslim League.680

The League on the other hand was becoming a major problem for Khizr and its Coalition ministry. The League leaders were itching for a fight and were on the look out for an opportunity to make the functioning of the Coalition Government difficult through some extra constitutional action they had failed to force the fall of Khizr Government on the floor of the house. The agitation caused a serious concern not only to Khizr but also to the Viceroy and the Secretary of State who felt that further escalation of the situation into the Punjab would create more complications in the all India Politics. The later even gave credence to the suspicion that the action was deliberately designed to inflame Muslim feeling in order

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to prevent the League from entering the Constituent Assembly.\footnote{681 Mansergh and Moon, *The Transfer of Power*, Vol. IX, p. 573.} The involvement of the All India League leaders and the members of the Interim Government, in the agitation against the Khizr Government, strengthen this impression. The inaugural meeting of the Constituent Assembly began on 9 December, 1946. By January 1947 political unrest was clearly visible in Punjab politics. As directed by Jinnah, none of the Muslim League members attended the inaugural meeting of the Assembly. Baldev Singh pointed out to Jawaharlal Nehru that the Akalis might withdraw from the Constituent Assembly.\footnote{682 J.S. Grewal, *The Akali's-a Short History*, p. 104.} The Governor and the Premier were under pressure from all sides to defuse the situation.\footnote{683 S.L. Malhotra, *Gandhi and Partition*, p. 160.} After the riot's news in Punjab, Khizr consulted the situation, with his colleagues. To pacify the League, Khizr withdrew the ban on both the organizations i.e. the Leagues and RSS on 28th January 1947 which was imposed by the Punjab Government on 25 January 1947, though ban on procession and meetings continued. It was only after the statement of Jinnah on 26 January 1947,'to launch an agitation ostensibly for safeguarding civil liberties in Punjab,
but actually to force the Government to resign, sixteen League MLA's courted arrest.\textsuperscript{684}

The agitation spread and became more and more violent. The lifting of ban was taken as League's victory and they demanded the resignation of Coalition ministry. Everyday processions were taken out; veiled Muslim women also took out processions daily in Lahore and raised the Secretariat. Shaukat was reported to have said, "Khizr ministry must be made to go no matter what cost to Muslim League. They would put out 15 million Muslims to break law." As a result the programme of Direct Action was taken up with greater zeal which led to communal and political disturbances all over the province.

The police which was preponderantly Muslim, remained a silent spectator. The League’s venom was vented on Premier Khizr Hayat Khan and his Muslim colleagues in the Cabinet. Important League leaders including Nawab of Mamdot, Mumtaz Daultana and Iftikhar were arrested under ordinance. The police seized 1,000 hatches, swords, pistols and daggers.\textsuperscript{685} All India League Working Committee passed a resolution in its meeting at Karachi on 1\textsuperscript{st} February, 1947 condemning the action of Khizr declaring the

\textsuperscript{684} The Tribune, January 26, 1947.
Muslim National Guards as an unlawful association. The agitation now spread to different parts of the province.

The League leaders were vocal to make claims of non violent, disciplined, firm and dignified attitude in their protest against repression. They adopted the Gandhian technique of Satyagraha. Hartals, unlawful processions, and meetings were the main programmes of the agitation. Processions were taken out in the main streets of the cities especially Lahore and Amritsar, led by volunteers offering themselves for arrest. After the middle of February 1947, the agitation took a more violent turn. There were several train holdups at Ludhiana, Gujranwala and other places. The Governor of the Punjab reported to the Secretary of State on 25 February 1947 that the celebration of marking completion of the month of agitation by the demonstrators of 24 February was to be accompanied by violence in several districts, especially, Amritsar where situation was controlled with great difficulty.

On 26th February, the Panthic Assembly Party appealed the League to stop these unlawful activities which were bound to have serious repercussions if continued any further and asked the Punjab Government to be firm in dealings with the menace to the

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peace of the province." The Sikh leader S. Baldev Singh complained in a letter to the Viceroy that during demonstrations, the police and the administrations stood aside and things were allowed to drift to force and collapse of the ministry. At times he had appealed the Viceroy to take steps to see that the Punjab Government was not embarrassed by the members of Interim Government. So far as the Sikhs in particular concerned they never wanted a partition of the country as they were spreaded in the whole of India. Particularly, in the western districts of Punjab where they not only owned fertile canal lands developed with their hard labour but had also set up lucrative business in urban areas. Subsequently when Lord Mountbatten was sent to India after the return of Cabinet Mission to work out the partition of India, the Sikhs did not realize that the division of India was almost a settled fact and Lord Mountbatten was negotiating with the Congress and the Muslim League for a smooth settlement of Partition.

It was after the announcement of Prime Minister of Great Britain, Clement Attlee on 20th February, 1947, to hand over power to Indians by June, 1948, the Western districts of the Punjab witnessed a scene of brutal violence, murdered and arson.

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690 *Oral Interview of Sardar Ujjal Singh* (Who was then a member of Constituent Assembly)
This scenario resulted to make many Sikhs of rural area homeless. They had a refuge in East Punjab.\textsuperscript{691} According to Sardar Ujjal Singh, who was then a member of the Constituent Assembly "The Governor of Punjab admitted that Khizr was pushed towards the Muslim League as a result of the statement of 20th February by Attlee".\textsuperscript{692}

On 21 February, 1947 Baldev Singh told Wavell that in case League was to stick to its decision of continuing the Constituent Assembly even now and boycott after Attlee's declaration he would request the Congress, not to demand the removal of the Muslim League nominees from the Interim Government and to request the Congress to demand the division of the Punjab on the lines suggested and asked in its Memorandum to the Punjab Assembly sent to Cabinet Mission, ten months earlier on 5 April, 1946, which amounted to ask for carrying out of existing Punjab or an additional provincial unit in the United India of the future in such a way that all important Sikhs Gurudwaras and shrines may be

\textsuperscript{691} Oral Interview of Sardar Ujjal Singh.
\textsuperscript{692} Mansergh and Moon, \textit{The Transfer of Power}, Vol. X, p. 831.
included in it as also a substantial majority of Sikh population in the existing province of the Punjab.\textsuperscript{693}

While the Congress and a few Sikh leaders including Sardar Baldev Singh welcomed the Prime Minister's announcement, on the other hand was criticized by the Panthic Party in Punjab. The question of formation of Sikh state became the central point for Panthic Sikhs during negotiations. Sikhs were worried about their share and Unionist Khizr Hayat Khan felt thoroughly unnerved,\textsuperscript{694} for he could no longer depend upon the support of the British for carrying on fight against the League which had established its hold over Muslims of the province.\textsuperscript{695} Jinnah had now a little more than a year to consolidate his position in Punjab and North-West Frontier Province as the League leader decided to celebrate 2nd March as Victory Day.\textsuperscript{696}

In the speeches delivered on the occasion, \textit{the agitation was described as a first step in the struggle for achievement of Pakistan}. Khizr Hayat Khan could not look forward to the continued support of his Hindu and Sikh colleagues as events were widening the gulf between the Muslims and non Muslims. Realizing that he could not


\textsuperscript{694} Ian Talbot, \textit{Punjab and the Raj}, p. 227.

\textsuperscript{695} S.L. Malhotra, \textit{Gandhi and Partition}, p. 162.

\textsuperscript{696} K.C. Gulati, \textit{The Akalis Past and Present}, p. 133.
exercise influence on the course of events, Khizr Hayat Khan resigned on 2 March.

On 3 March, 1947, the Governor Evan Jenkins invited League to form a ministry as it was the largest party in the Assembly. The Nawab of Mamdot, the leader of the Punjab Muslim League Legislative party accepted the offer. With this change of Government the situation in Punjab changed completely. The Muslim League rent the air with Pakistan slogans in every street, every town and in every village. A wave of resentment spread through the Akali and the Congress circles. The turmoil was due to fact of Coalition Ministry, as Khizr Hayat Khan resigned without consulting any of his colleagues which included Bhim Sen Sachar and Swaran Singh of Indian National Congress and the Panthic Party respectively. On the same day a joint meeting of Congress and Akali Dal was being held in the Assembly Chamber in Lahore to discuss the situation. Outside, a large Muslim crowd kept up a continuous barrage of provocative slogans like: "We will take Pakistan by force." These provocative slogans could not stop Master Tara Singh. He appeared outside the Assembly brandishing

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701 Le Ke Rahenge Pakistan.
a sword and shouted "Kat Ke Denge Apni Jaan, Magar Na Denge Pakistan" (We may be cut to pieces but we will never concede Pakistan) and 'Pakistan Murdabad'.

If the police had not intervened Master ji could not have escaped alive that day. The same evening a big public meeting was held in Lahore in which Congress and Akali leaders delivered powerful speeches. This incident brought the Panthic leaders and Congress leaders closer though with different political perspective. While the Congress leaders laid stress on peace and non-violence and the speeches of Master Tara Singh and Giani Kartar Singh made the blood of the audience boiled Master Tara Singh roared: Hindus and Sikhs! Get ready to drink the peg of martyrdom. The motherland is demanding our blood... I have sounded a bugle, destroy Muslim League.

Giani Kartar Singh said, “The saffron flag had been flying on the Lahore fort and it will fly there again.” On the following day an anti Pakistan demonstration by non-Muslim students especially Sikhs in the Anarkali Bazaar, Lahore sparked off. In the clash of Police and processionists, firing was resorted to in which 13

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703 Civil and Military Gazette, 16 March, 1947, also see Ian Talbot, Punjab and the Raj, p. 227.
processionists were killed and 108 injured. The riots spread to Amritsar, Rawalpindi, Jalandhar, Sialkot, and Multan and threatened to engulf the whole province in an orgy of violence, bloodshed and arson. Governor had to assume the direct charge of the province and he dismissed the League Government on 5th March, under Section 93. Muslim raids on larger centers of Hindu and Sikh population such as of Murree were organized and in some instances led by retired army officers.

The League leaders delivered inflammatory speeches thus provoking even those Muslims who used to sit and eat with Hindus and Sikhs, sang the Heer (a folk song) till late at night and performed Bhangra (folk dance). The low morale of the predominantly Muslim police force and the unreliability of some of the officers and men of Indian 7th Division, which had been sent to the disturbed region, hampered British efforts to halt the attacks. They claimed nearly 3000 Hindus and Sikhs victims. Another 40,000 mainly Sikhs had to take refuge in hurriedly established refugee camps, rehabilitation soon started in eastern districts of Amritsar, Ludhiana and Sikh Princely States. The vicious circle set the entire province ablaze.

704 The Tribune, March 5, 1947.
705 Jenkins to Wavell, 17 March 1947, R/3/1/176, IOR.
Meanwhile S.B. Ujjal Singh and Giani Kartar Singh met Jenkins on 6th March. Ujjal Singh suggested Jenkins to mediate and provide general views about a settlement. Sir Jenkins agreed to S.B. Ujjal Singh that civil war and partition both were unthinkable, and that they should go in for a United Punjab under some Government acceptable to a large proportion of Punjabis.\textsuperscript{706} At the suggestion of the Ujjal Singh, E, Jenkins prepared a draft about the terms of a possible settlement on the basis of Punjab population Census of 1941. The draft suggested two peaceful solutions while rejecting civil war:

i) an agreed partition of the Punjab between Muslims and non-Muslims; or

ii) a United Punjab with its present boundaries under a constitution and a Government that all communities will accept\textsuperscript{707}

When Punjab was burning in communal violence, Sardar Baldev Singh joined Nehru in going to London and returned back with him. At the same time he was hoping for an alternative for Sikhs. He told Abell that in his view, His Majesty’s Government ought to tell both parties that they insert on group B, but will

\textsuperscript{706} Sir E. Jenkins to Lord Wavell, 7 March, 1947, Mountbatten Paper, IOR, R/3/1/89.
\textsuperscript{707} Further details see. E. Jenkins \textit{Draft on the Punjab Problem}, 7th March 1947, Mountbatten Paper, IOR.
divide the Punjab into two provinces one predominantly Muslim and one predominantly non-Muslim.

After six weeks of communal riots, the Punjab situation was becoming serious for all and sundry. Sardar Baldev Singh was still hoping for constitutional machinery to work and he wanted to draw the special attention of the Government regarding certain members of the Interim Government who actively participated in the Punjab agitation and encouraged the attempts to upset the Coalition Government there. To check the communal problem in Punjab the Government imposed the Punjab Disturbed Areas act, 1947, and the Punjab Disturbed Areas Act (Special Powers of Armed Forces) Ordinance, 1947. The two Acts gave authority to the Magistrates, the Police and its officers of the Armed Forces respectively to use extreme force, with or without warning, against persons who in a disturbed area disobey orders, prohibiting gatherings of five or more persons or carrying weapons or articles capable of being used as weapons.

The Rawalpindi Division and the Multan District were seriously disturbed. The Muslims of this division were dead set against the Sikhs and the Sikh leaders were prepared for

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retaliation. The strained relations between the Muslims and non-Muslims in the Punjab were furthered by the tragic happenings in North-Western Punjab and the confidence of the Hindus and the Sikh minorities was rudely shaken.\textsuperscript{709} There was a wave of resentment in the Congress and Akali circles. Both parties held a joint meeting in the Assembly chamber to discuss the situation. Mac Donald, Home Secretary to the Punjab Government, reported on that by midday of 19 March 1947, the campaign launched by the Muslim League had resulted in 2,049 Hindus and Sikhs killed or seriously wounded. These figures were considered as under estimated.\textsuperscript{710} The Sikh leader, Master Tara Singh standing on the stairs of the Legislative Assembly building, dramatically unsheathed his sword and shouted- \textit{The time has come when the might of the sword alone shall rule, The Sikhs are ready, we have to bring the Muslims to their senses.}\textsuperscript{711} 

Similar statement was made by Giani Kartar Singh on 15th March, 1947. He said, \textit{“This day crusade starts”}.\textsuperscript{712} The draft of the resolution to divide the Punjab, prepared by Nehru, on 8 March, 1947, was taken up the Congress Working Committee. On 11


\textsuperscript{710} K.C. Gulati, \textit{The Akalis Past and Present}, p. 135.


\textsuperscript{712} \textit{The Dawn}, 16 March, 1947.
March, Sardar Baldev Singh wrote a strong worded letter to Viceroy Wavell informing him about the widespread feeling in Punjab that the administration and police have shown a marked discrimination against Hindus and Sikh demonstrators... non Muslims have well nigh lost all faith in the administration and fear that the worst may yet happen. The British in Punjab were well aware of this widespread feeling. In fact, Governor Jenkins himself noted how non Muslim 'is vehemently bitter against particularly in the Police.\footnote{Mansergh and Moon, \textit{The Transfer of Power}, Vol. IX, 521, 1947, p. 968.} A delegation led by Sardar Ujjal Singh comprising Rai Bahadur Janaki Das and Capt. A.N. Bali met the Inspector General of Punjab Police and apprised him of the difficulty being faced by Hindu and Sikh youth in Police recruitments.\footnote{Civil and Military Gazette, 15 April 1947.} In a meeting with Mountbatten, Master Tara Singh, Giani Kartar Singh and Sardar Baldev Singh also raised the same issue. They said "The Punjab Government was planning to add 6,000 more people to Punjab police's existing strength of 32,000. The three Sikh leaders wanted all these 6,000 positions to be filled by non-Muslims.\footnote{Mansergh and Moon, \textit{The Transfer of Power}, Vol. X, (173), Record of Meeting with Mountbatten, 18 April, 1947, p. 320.}

To make their views more clear, the non-Muslim delegates under the leadership of Ujjal Singh included in memorandum that

\begin{footnotes}
\item Mansergh and Moon, \textit{The Transfer of Power}, Vol. IX, 521, 1947, p. 968.
\item Civil and Military Gazette, 15 April 1947.
\item Mansergh and Moon, \textit{The Transfer of Power}, Vol. X, (173), Record of Meeting with Mountbatten, 18 April, 1947, p. 320.
\end{footnotes}
another fact which had to be borne in mind is that Punjab is the province of peasant proprietors. The economy of the province is mainly agricultural and in any scheme of partition of the Punjab, the main economy of the provinces has to be preserved in intact. He made a mention of Coupland’s observation, "The Sikh form about 15 percent of aggregate population of the province and the state and there is not a single district of the province in which the Sikhs are in a clear majority. But the peasant proprietor of the Central Punjab where he owns most of the best land his energy...."716

Events in the Punjab accelerated. Lord Mountbatten became Viceroy of India and to overtook the constitutional deliberations in New Delhi, he reached Delhi on 24 March, 1947 with the Mandate to try first to bring round all the parties to the plan of Cabinet Mission of creating a United India through the medium of Constituent Assembly.

Inter Communal conflict, was at its height and Mountbatten was meeting with Indian leaders to understand his new task in depth. The riots left a legacy of hatred and distrust. The Muslim police claimed 3,000 Hindu and Sikh victim. One of the important

716 Kirpal Singh, The Partition of Punjab, p. 60.
problems that confronted ordinary citizens in Punjab in the months leading to its partition was the dearth of reliable news. On 23 March, the day when Delhi witnessed much fan fare in the course of the conference's inauguration. The Tribune had carried a story of 4,000 Hindus and Sikhs killed in the March disturbances.\textsuperscript{717}

Master Tara Singh, in particular, raised the issue of police partiality. Addressing a press conference in Delhi, he said, that \textit{while Hindus and Sikhs looted Muslim property only when the police was not present, the Muslims looted even in presence of the police. He also referred the Deputy Commissioner of Rawalpindi's complaint that in one case even policeman raised Pakistan Zindabad' slogans.}\textsuperscript{718}

The events in March 1947, when the scattered Sikh communities of West Punjab were attached by Muslim tribes men, the British found them hopelessly isolated. By the times they rushed in troop, it was too late to prevent a massacre which set off a chain reaction of retaliatory killings, wrenching the region out of British control.\textsuperscript{719}

\textsuperscript{718} Hindustan Times, 22 March, 1947.
\textsuperscript{719} Ian Talbot, \textit{Punjab and the Raj}, p. 229.
But by 1st October, he felt that there was no prospect of reaching settlement between the two major parties on the basis of unitary Government; he was to report to the British Government on the steps he considered should be taken for rendering over of power on the due date. After his departure from India Viceroy Lord Mountbatten worked out a compromise, after long discussion with the leaders of Congress and Muslim League.

Sardar Baldev Singh and Sardar Ujjal Singh in company of many other Sikh leaders attended the meetings. Sardar Baldev Singh, in the capacity of member of Council, at a conference in Lahore, on April 3, 1947, in company of Sikh leaders and other legislators, unanimously declared that the division was the only solution of this problem. Viceroy also viewed that the only alternative to a Union Government is partition of the Punjab, this is recommended by Congress but could, in Jenkins view probably only be imposed by force, which would require a lot of troops, and spell economic ruin for the province. After Jenkins recommendations, he asked Sardar Baldev Singh to invite Master

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722 Viceroy’s Personal Report No. 2 stated 9th April, 1947 L/P/0/6/23; L/Pol 433 (i) and also see Kirpal Singh, *Partition of Punjab*, 1988, Chandigarh p. 41.
Tara Singh and Gyani Kartar Singh in Delhi. Sardar Baldev Singh started pursuing the two and invited them Delhi. Meanwhile the Shiromani Akali Dal on 16th April 1947, adopted a resolution which said- "Shiromani Akali Dal demands that before the transfer of Power to the Indian hands in June, 1948, the Punjab should be divided into two provinces and for redistribution of the provincial boundaries a Boundary Commission should be set up." The resolution further stressed, to demonstrate the provincial boundaries keeping in view:

a) Population  
b) Landed Property  
c) Land Revenue, and  
d) Historical Places and Traditions of the various communities.

Nationalist Hindus and Sikhs of the Punjab had fully agreed to the partition of the Punjab. Almost without exception, leaders cutting across political lines, both in Punjab and in Delhi appeared tired and exhausted, in a hurry to get on no matter what the price. Viceroy Mountbatten had six meetings, with Jinnah till 17 April 1947. He made it totally clear that the Muslim League, would not in

any circumstances, reconsider the Cabinet Plan, and he was intended on having Pakistan. For him Jinnah was a 'Psychopathic case; and 'a man with... complete lack of administrative knowledge or a sense of responsibility'... or hold down so powerful a position.\textsuperscript{725}

On 18th April 1947 after the initiative of Sardar Baldev Singh, Master Tara Singh, Giani Kartar Singh held an interview with the Viceroy, Lord Mountbatten. The three leaders were ready to give up their insistence on partition... they obtained adequate safeguards from being dominated by Muslims. The three asked for the choice of joining either Pakistan or Hindustan, so that they might have some bargaining power to gain the best terms. They told the viceroy that Punjab should be partitioned to avoid communal strife and blood shed.\textsuperscript{726} Sardar Baldev Singh and the other two Sikhs leaders, handed over the Viceroy, the papers entitled "Notes for the talk with H.E. 18.4.1947". Viceroy discussed their suggestions:

i) ... early announcement of the creation of two separate ministries for the Eastern and Western parts of the Punjab to carry on with Interim period.

(ii) The question of police recruitment.

\textsuperscript{725} Viceroy's Personal Report No. 3, Dated 17th April, 14, 1947, Top Secret, IOR/L/PO/23: 26/PO/433..

\textsuperscript{726} H.N. Mitra (ed.), Indian Annual Register, 1920-47, p. 244.
The British authorities were also convinced that the issue of partition of the Punjab mostly rested with the attitude of the Sikhs. The Viceroy stated in his personal reports on 24 April, 1947 that any hopes that he entertained of being able to avoid the partition of the Punjab if Pakistan was forced on them, was shattered after the meeting of 18 April 1947, with the Sikh leaders Master Tara Singh, Giani Kartar Singh and Sardar Baldev Singh, as all of them made it quite clear that they would fight to the last man if put under the Muslim domination.\(^\text{727}\) The Secretary of the State Lord Pethick Lawrence had observed earlier that partition would become necessary as Sikhs could not otherwise be satisfied.\(^\text{728}\)

On 19th April 1947, S. Ujjal Singh met Lord Ismay and Mr. Mievelle along with Master Tara Singh and Giani Kartar Singh. On 22nd April 1947, S. B. Ujjal Singh sent a copy of proposals to Lord Ismay. The Sikhs considered the proposals of May 16th injurious to their interests. S. Ujjal Singh suggested three provisions to be included in the scheme of May 16, 1946.\(^\text{729}\) If, May 16th scheme is abandoned, the Sikhs along with the Hindus would demand a division of the Punjab into two independent autonomous units. In such a division, besides the population strength of various communities, S. Ujjal Singh was asking for ‘economic position and

\(^{729}\) for Details see Kirpal Singh, *The Partition of Punjab* p. 47.
vital interests of the respective communities to facilitate exchange of population and property'. On the other hand, same day G.E.B. Abell informed Lord Ismay that the same proposals were made by S. Baldev Singh regarding the partition of Punjab. He said while deciding on the boundary line, account must be taken of property as well as population, which meant that ... in which they have not got a majority of population but have got a large amount of land.730

The complex tangle, in which the political situation of Punjab had fallen, was explained by Jenkins, in a meeting on 14 April with Lord Ismay. Jenkins noted the Muslims aim in Punjab was to dominate the whole province; the Sikhs were committed even more vehemently to ensure that Muslims could not achieve their desired goal. Another important point which Jenkins noted was that the problem in Punjab would require outside troops as Punjab troops would not carry out the task. He also had no doubt the Sikhs would fight at stage. Jenkins said that 'he doubted whether there was any possibility of an announcement of partition without it being followed by an immediate blow up.731 As the Muslim - Sikh entangle got further strained, Baldev Singh wrote a letter to Mountbatten stating why the Sikhs could have no truck with the

Muslim League and that the percentage of the Muslim population had been grossly exaggerated by the Census of 1941. Also, of the total revenue of Rs. 4,38,13,977, the non Muslims were contributing Rs. 2,18,44,193. The letter also dealt with the contribution of the Sikhs in setting the Canal Colonies.732 Mountbatten showed this letter to Jenkins. Two days after Jenkins had minute comments on Baldev Singh’s letter to Mountbatten; he once again, re-emphasized the complex and unsolvable nature of the Punjab situation. In the same letter Baldev Singh informed Mountbatten that Daultana was going around spreading the word in the Attock region that all the officers who had acted against the rioters will soon not only be transferred but given a 'hot time.' Once again Jenkins noted how he thought the Sikhs were preparing for Civil War, adding that possibly they would wait to British to leave and would act only after July 1948.733 Both Jenkins and Mountbatten, of course, took the Akali leaders seriously.734

While the minorities in Punjab were bleeding, the Governor could do little. Even the helplessness of the Central Government was clearly evident. The Muslim League policy in the Interim

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Government was one of vowed obstruction. It openly maintained that League had joined the Government merely fight for Pakistan.735

Sardar Baldev Singh, being a Punjabi, was intimately connected with provincial politics. Naturally he was more affected by these developments. He many a times shared his views with Pt. Nehru, Lord Wavell and Jenkins regarding irresponsible attitude of League towards Interim Government. The Interim Government lacked unity of purpose and cohesion with its departments subject to conflicting pulls and pressures. The result was country wide unrest and lawlessness.736 March ‘riots’ and April ‘resolutions’ made it clear that Punjab has to be partitioned. On 30th April, Giani Kartar Singh, Harnam Singh and Sardar Ujjal Singh had a meeting with Lord Ismay. The three were in high state of excitement about the partition of Punjab. They pleaded for that partition should not be done merely on basis of counting of heads, landed property and particularly ancient shrines were factors which must be borne in mind.737

The three Sikh leaders admitted that the Muslims were in majority but it was a matter of life and death for the Sikhs, that the

737 Lord Ismay to Mountbatten, Kirpal Singh, IOR M.B.121 30th April, 1947.
Lahore division should not be handed over to them, even as an interim arrangement. They would far sooner all die fighting.\textsuperscript{738} Their proposal to Lord Ismay regarding partition was; Rawalpindi and Multan Divisions to go to the Muslims; Ambala and Jullundur Divisions to go to the non Muslims; the Lahore Division to be under a joint Council until such time as Boundary Commission had been able to report on frontiers and transfer of populations.\textsuperscript{739}

Being members of the Constituent Assembly for Punjab, Harnam Singh, Tek Chand, Ujjal Singh, Prithvi Singh Azad, Kartar Singh, Harbhaj Ram (MLA), Partap Singh, (MLA) Suraj Mal (MLA), Siri Ram and Diwan Chaman Lal, they prepared a Memorandum on behalf of the Sikhs and the Hindus. On Ist May 1947 they submitted the memorandum to Lord Ismay to place it before the Viceroy and the Government. The members pleaded the case of non Muslims or minorities on the basis of demographical, language and urban immovable features of Punjab owned by non Muslims in the Punjab. The total area of the British Punjab inclusive of what are present ‘partially exclusive areas in Kangra district and Dera Ghazi Khan district, was 99089 square miles.\textsuperscript{740} The suggestion was made to divide the province in such a way that each part comprised

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\textsuperscript{738} Kirpal Singh. \textit{The Partition of Punjab}, p.40.  \\
\textsuperscript{739} Kirpal Singh. \textit{The Partition of Punjab}, p. 40.  \\
\end{flushleft}
nearly one half of the area and the dividing line to be along the river Chenab where it entered British territory in Sialkot district. The part of the East and South of the proposed dividing line would comprise the Ambala, Jullundar and Lahore divisions with one of the Colony districts of Lyallpur or Montgomery.\textsuperscript{741}

The phase of Correspondence, Suggestion, Memorandum and Resolution became a routine matter in the days of turmoil i.e. four months before partition in Punjab. The idea of 'notional division' fetched the attraction of Punjab politics. Master Tara Singh, Baldev Singh (Defence Member) Ujjal Singh, MLA, Lahore, Swaran Singh, Development Minister, Punjab, Master Sujan Singh, Harnam Singh, Advocate, Lahore, Giani Kartar Singh, MLA, Lyallpur, Prithvi Singh Azad, MLA, Ambala, Sardar Partap Singh, MLA, Amritsar, Sardar Harbans Singh Advocate, Rawalpindi, were to plead the case of Sikh community at times. For the Government partition business of Punjab seemed 'out of control'. E.M. Jenkins wrote to Rear Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma on 3 May, 1947. "... In the Punjab we are going to be faced with a complete refusal of the communities to cooperate on any basis at all. It would be clearly futile to announce a partition of Punjab which no

\textsuperscript{741} Kirpal Singh, \textit{The Partition of Punjab}, p. 54.
community would accept... I think we must begin to reconsider very seriously what adhoc arrangement can be made for the transfer of power.\textsuperscript{742} Maharaja of Patiala was totally against the ‘notional division’ of Punjab for voting purposes by Muslim majority districts and non Muslim majority districts. In an interview with Viceroy he also pleaded for the several district division should be added to the eastern Punjab in order to provide ‘a compact homeland for Sikhs,’\textsuperscript{743} which was cast off by Mountbatten. Congress had already honored the principle of partition on 1st May, 1947 through a letter from Jawaharlal Nehru. Viceroy started pursuing Sikh leader for the same. The Muslim League made little efforts to improve relations with the Sikhs.\textsuperscript{744}

Mountbatten advised the League leader Ghazanfar Ali Khan to seek the support of the Sikhs if the League wanted to have the whole of the Punjab in Pakistan.\textsuperscript{745} Viceroy's meeting with Jinnah during negotiation period made it clear that Jinnah was very adamant and Viceroy told Liaquat Ali that their leader (Jinnah) was ‘completely impractical.’\textsuperscript{746} Ismay recorded in his Memoirs, "No one liked the idea of partition but no one could suggest how it could be

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{742} Kirpal Singh, \textit{The Partition of Punjab}, pp. 62-63.
\item \textsuperscript{743} Mounbatten papers, I.O.R. MB 121, NMML, New Delhi.
\item \textsuperscript{744} Ian Talbot, \textit{Punjab and the Raj}, p. 228.
\item \textsuperscript{745} Mansergh and Moon, \textit{The Transfer of Power}, Vol. X, p. 621.
\item \textsuperscript{746} Mansergh and Moon, \textit{The Transfer of Power}, p. 332.
\end{itemize}
avoided.” Baba Kharak Singh said, "I am a staunch advocate of Akhand Hindustan (United India), should, however partition become inevitable and be unfortunately thrust upon us, I would plead for adequate safeguards for non-Muslim minorities."  

On 22 April, Bhimsen Sachar and Swaran Singh, the leaders of the Congress and Panthic parties in the Punjab Assembly, stated in their representation to Nehru, Vice President of the Interim Government, that as an Interim and transitional arrangement, the Governor General should install immediately two or three regional administrations with separate ministries under one Governor for the two or three zones of Punjab. Even Gandhi had not lost hope of preventing the partition. He started showing his resentment. He viewed the Partition Plan "would ultimately lead to conflict and the disintegration of India for which generations to come would have to pay a price." When Mr. Jinnah saw there was no way out for him or his party (in spite of all the killings his League had committed to terrify the Hindus and Sikhs) he accepted ‘the maimed and vivisected’ Punjab and Bengal which he had resisted for so long with all his might. Only a month before, on April 30, 1947, Jinnah

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accepted the partition of the Punjab. He had warned, "The proposal for partition of Bengal and Punjab was a sinister move actuated by spite and bitterness... If Punjab and Bengal were partitioned, all the other provinces would have to be cut up in similar way."  

Pressure from the Sikhs leaders especially Tara Singh was increasing on British authorities in Punjab. Jenkins, the Governor of the Punjab, had always been against the partition of the province. While replying a letter, he writes to Mountbatten on 5 May, 1947, "Baldev Singh like other Sikhs seems quite unable to understand that the Sikhs are not only people to be considered. ... It is very well to say that we must exclude from Muslim areas as large a percentage of Sikhs population as possible... Baldev Singh's demands are rather less extreme than those of Tara Singh, Kartar Singh and some others." He further writes, "Partition is Justifiable as a means of reconciling irreconcilable people. It will destroy the work of a century and ruin the Punjab." The Sikhs, on the other hand, were perturbed by the proposal to formulate only twelve eastern districts as homeland for Sikhs and Punjabi Hindus. Master Tara Singh, Baldev Singh and Swaran Singh sent cables to Mr. Attlee, Sir S. Cripps and Mr. Woodrow Wyatt to show their

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resentment and considered the plan 'a heaviest blow to the Sikhs'. On 7th May, 1947 Sardar Baldev Singh wrote a letter to British Cabinet Committee emphasizing on two alternatives:

a) To take the basis of landed property into account held respectively non Muslims and Muslims in the Punjab as a whole.

b) To take the basis of the population strength to latest available statistics.

The Secretary of State for India, S. Cripps was not happy with the Sikhs. He was of the view that the Sikhs had an exaggerated idea of their proper status. His antagonism was sound and clear towards Sikhs in the private correspondence. Cripps responded the plea of the three Sikhs leaders on 7th May and wrote to Mountbatten." ... their historical position as rulers of the Punjab partly to the rather flattering treatment they have received from us as one of the great martial races of India and partly to the fact they consider that they have contributed out of proportion to their numbers to the economic wealth of the Punjab." Cripps outwardly rejected the proposals made by three and at the same time warned the Governor, "That the Sikhs are a very dangerous element in the

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situation." "But if you are satisfied that a Boundary Commission will help to keep the Sikhs quiet until the transfer of power, can be set up without provoking the hostility of the two major communities...."755

Meanwhile the political situation deteriorated and its gravity was reflected in the communal frenzy and bitterness that attaining increasing proportions. The administrative machinery itself was affected by the canker and it looked on as a mere spectator.756 Baldev Singh continued to plead the case of the Sikh community. The attitude of the British Government was also becoming harsh towards him. At times Mountbatten spoke strongly to Baldev Singh.757 On 18 May, 1947, the Governor General left for London with a draft approved by the Indian leaders. Throughout May (1947), there was hectic activity in London on the 'question of early transfer of power.

A telegram dated 12 May even suggests that Attlee was keen for 3rd June plan to be announced on 17 May, that is, before British Parliament went into recess.758 Mountbatten answered that

758 IOR/POL/0/12(i)
it was impossible. In the meantime Maharaja of Patiala met the Viceroy. The minutes of this meeting were recorded by Mountbatten in 'Top Secret' personal report No. 8 on 23rd May. Patiala was rather worried, for he said, "in that case I greatly fear the Sikhs will fight." I replied, If they do, Maharaja Sahib, they will have to fight the Central Government, for I and My Government are determined, to put down any attempt at communal war with a ruthless Iron hand: they will be oppressed not only by tanks and armored cars and artillery, but they will be bombed and machine gunned from the air. You can tell your Sikhs that if they start a war they will not be fighting the Muslim League, but the whole might of the armed forces." The Maharaja was visibly shaken.

Mountbatten started pressurize Sikhs. Next day in the Cabinet he emphatically looked across at the Defence Member, Baldev Singh, for a reply to a question," In case of further aggression by Muslims, Sikhs or Hindus in any part of India, to the hilt in putting down the first signs of communal war ... should also bomb and machine guns from air?" He asked Baldev Singh, if he

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759 IOR/POL/0/12(i)
was with him in that policy, Baldev Singh replied most emphatically," Yes." 761

The Muslim League and the Sikhs made little efforts to improve their relations. Jinnah issued a statement on 21 May saying that the demand for Punjab's partition had come from a 'section of vocal Sikhs' and went on to say that not only would it have disastrous results, but that the idea was thoughtless and reckless' and was bound to 'weakens Pakistan'. 762 Mountbatten was successful in getting the consent of both Attlee and Winston Churchill to his plan by the end of the third week of May 1947. 763 He flew back to Delhi from London on 1 June bringing with him his Government's plan to transfer by 15 August, 1947. 764 The Viceroy had, already shown the draft to the leaders of major political parties and sought their consent before going to London for securing the approval. As he believed that in the circumstances the best policy was to secure the all India leadership agreement to partition. A copy of the plan was given to Sardar Baldev Singh on 2nd June, 765 where a conference of Indian leaders was convened by

762 Dawn, 22 May, 1947.
764 IOR 1/POL/6 120- (i) and (ii) Transfer of Power, Viceroy's Plans, Proceedings of Meetings, IB 21, 23, 24, of 5,8,14 May, 1947.
the Viceroy. It was attended by seven leaders Nehru, Patel and Kriplani, represented the Congress and Baldev Singh represented the Sikhs, to discuss the Mountbatten Plan. The Viceroy pleaded the plan for voting on partition.\textsuperscript{766} Sikh leaders were in constant consultation with each other.

The Akali Dal working committee met in Delhi on June 2, 1947. The meeting was attended by Gyani Kartar Singh (President), Master Tara Singh, Amar Singh Dosanjh, Pritam Singh Gojran, Mangal Singh Gill, Swaran Singh, Ujjal Singh and Baldev Singh. Baldev Singh reported Mountbatten that he had discussed the plan with his friends.\textsuperscript{767} The Sikh leaders resolve to press for a partition of the Punjab but to maintain integrity of the community by demanding that boundary be drawn at Chenab.\textsuperscript{768} In the same evening of 2nd June Baldev Singh wrote a 'historical' and much 'controversial' letter to Mountbatten in which he writes... Finally, my Sikhs friends and I accept the principle of division as laid down in the plan with the hope that in order to make it fully acceptable to my community..." he further writes... care will be taken to meet the views expressed in the letter when framing the terms of

\textsuperscript{767} Khushwant Singh, \textit{A History of the Sikhs}, F.N. p. 275.
\textsuperscript{768} \textit{Hindustan Times}, June 3, 1947.
reference for the Boundary Commission." He brought a few matters in that connection -

i) Para 9 of the last sentence of which reads, "Until the report of a Boundary Commission has been put into effect, the provisional boundaries indicated in the appendix will be used." It is not clear what this refers to and in what respect this boundary is to be used. In this connection you will remember that in my previous letters, I have insisted that nothing should be done to prejudice our case before the Boundary Commission. My fear was that the proposed notional division would prejudice the final partition of the province. I, now see, it has been made clear that the notional division is purely a temporary arrangement. If, however, it is used for setting up of Interim ministries, functioning at the time when the Boundary commission is also making its enquiries will make a fair examination of our case impossible...

ii) ... Boundary commission will take 'other factors' into consideration when making the enquiries. This is far too vague. It should be made clear that these other factors include exchange of population with property and on the
basis of land revenue paid by non-Muslims. Special note should also be taken of the religious and cultural institutions of the Sikhs and the historic role played by them in the Punjab.

iii) As the partition of the province had been necessitated to meet the demand clear instructions should be given to boundary commission to ensure that as large percentage of Sikh population as possible is included in the Eastern Punjab.

There is no doubt that Baldev Singh accepted the Mountbatten Plan but the entire letter was based on 'if', not with fully 'yes'. He tried to make it empathetically clear that his community had accepted the Cabinet Delegation Plan of May 16, 1946, on some conditions and joined the Constitution Assembly. He further cleared Mountbatten, if the major parties now revert to this plan; the Sikhs will be prepared to accept it only if they are given the same right in communal matters as has been accorded to other community’s.769 The Sikh leaders and S. Baldev Singh generally joined hands with the Congress at meeting of the leaders

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for the transfer of power, as they had faith in the Congress as leadership.

Leonard Mosley had made some uncharitable remarks about the role played by him as the representative of Sikhs during these meetings. He writes:

“The only delegate who might possibly have had something of genuine moment to say at the meeting of 2nd June - other than the words, I agree, was Baldev Singh the Sikh. For in the plan the partition was implicit. Baldev Singh, was never one of the most brilliant minds produced by the people, did not seem to realize what this was to mean. The Sikhs were spread all over the Punjab. They had been there for generations. They owned and tilled the land. They had built the great system of canals. Their shrines and places of pilgrimage were in western rather than in eastern Punjab. It might have seemed likely that any far reaching Sikh realizing the situation which would probably result from the partition, would have cut his throat or gone to war rather than accept it.”

Baldev Singh was acting under the instructions from his community, who were obviously astigmatic as he was. But he kept silent during the all important meeting, except to agree to the plan
that would cut the Jugular vein of his people.\footnote{Leonard Mosley, \textit{The Last Days of the British Raj}, London, 1960, pp. 132-133.} Mosley forgot the so called proverb... \textit{only the wearer knows where the shoe pinches.}

Evident picture of events was different from but was happening behind the scene. The Sikhs were compelled to demand the partition of Punjab by the circumstances. Baldev Singh, as Mosley himself admits, had a mandate from his community to this effect, which forced the British to yield to it, leaving Jinnah fretting and funning.

As already noted, the Sikh leadership prepared several schemes earlier from the protection of their rights and claims but all these fell through because of their inherent weakness and lack of support either from the British, Muslim or the Hindus. Historically, they were closer to the Congress and so they decided to cast their lot with it. This was the best course for them in the situation in which they were placed. It is true that partition would leave some of their holy shrines in Pakistan, but they, totally relied on Boundary Commission, to protect their religious interest, at the time of delimitation of boundaries. At this juncture Baldev Singh and his community leaders wanted instructions to the Boundary Commission included in the printed plan to take Sikh interests
more fully into consideration. But the Viceroy rejected it.\textsuperscript{771} Mosley himself does not suggest as to what was other course open to the Sikhs at that time.

The main provisions were added in the revised plan which was popularly known as Mountbatten Plan. The plan made following provisions:\textsuperscript{772}

i) It provided a procedure to ascertain the will of people living in those areas claimed for Pakistan in Punjab, Bengal and Sind. The decision was to be taken by the Legislative Assembly of each province. The procedure clearly envisaged the division of two provinces. For, it was provided that the Legislative Assemblies of these two provinces would divide into two sections, one for the members belonging to the Muslim majority and the other for the rest of province. If they opted for the partition of the province, each section would join the Constituent Assembly of its choice.

ii) The Legislative Assembly of Sind would decide which Constituent Assembly the province would join. In the

\textsuperscript{771} S.L. Malhotra, \textit{Gandhi and Partition}, p. 192.
\textsuperscript{772} Tara Chand, Vol IV, pp. 576-77, also see \textit{Indian Annual Register, Vol. I}, pp. 145-146.
N.W.F. P. and in the Sylhet district of Assam the decision was to be taken through referendum.

iii) The Governor General was to prescribe the method of ascertaining the will of people of Blauchistan.

iv) There would be election in the parts of the Punjab and Bengal and in Sylhet for choosing the representatives to the Constituent Assembly. Initially, there was a proposal of deciding the fate of the Punjab through referendum. But it was abandoned because of the opposition of Mievelle, the Principal Secretary to the Viceroy, and the Governor of Punjab. Some of the objections raised by Mievelle were:773

i) A referendum to electors required a simple straightforward issue like that in N.W.F.P., where the question is of joining Pakistan or Hindustan. But in the Punjab the issue of partition would first have to be decided.

ii) If the whole Punjab is asked to vote on partition without defining the areas, nearly all Muslims will vote against it, and nearly all Hindus and Sikhs for it.

iii) If the two half provinces of the Punjab are asked to vote on partition according to the District wise division adopted in

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the present plan, Muslims and the rest are both likely to vote against it, because neither will like the demarcation, Hindus and Sikhs may boycott the referendum.

iv) A referendum in the Punjab would create a dangerous situation in the prevailing political atmosphere.

Already in May, 1947, Sardar Baldev Singh raised questions on this proposed plan in a letter to Jawaharlal Nehru, he wrote, "Paragraph seventh of the revised draft announcement implied that on the demand even from a single member of Punjab Legislature, the entire Legislative Assembly would meet and decide, whether Punjab would remain united and which Constituent Assembly, the province would join as a whole. This amounted to give a veto to the Muslim majority in the legislature. On 21st May, 1947, Mieville admitted the ambiguity and claimed the paragraph (6) provide a safeguard where by the members of the two parties of the Legislative Assembly sitting separately are to vote on whether or not. The province should be permitted, if a simple majority of either party voted for partition, then division will take place." Sardar Baldev Singh's doubts were that the Muslim majority in the Punjab Legislative in pursuance of the provision in Paragraph "may refuse to sit in any partitioned house as provided for in paragraph (6)."
Mievelle without captivating time telegraphed Baldev Singh’s letter to Mountbatten, who was at that time in London. On 26th May, 1947 Mievelle informed Nehru about the action taken by him. Mountbatten replied that Paragraph in question is being redrafted so as to remain any possible apprehension as to what is meant."

The plan worked out that the country was to be free but not united. India was to be partitioned and a new state of Pakistan was to be created along with a free India. Mountbatten believed that in these circumstances the best policy was to secure the all Indian leadership agreement to partition. This was finally obtained on 3 June 1947 and the formation of the two dominions was decided i.e. India and Pakistan, on August 15, 1947. Nehru and Patel had accepted the proposals on behalf of the Congress because they did not want the Pakistan issue to delay independence any further.

Gandhi agreed with a heavy heart to the vivisection' of the subcontinent, as it repudiated his life time works and aims. He called partition a 'wooden loaf', Jinnah was also unhappy. He had been claiming the whole of Bengal and the Punjab for Pakistan, but all received from the 3rd June plan was a 'moth eaten' Pakistan. Both regions were to be partitioned the exact lines of demarcation
to be drawn by a Boundary Commission under the chairmanship of the British legal experts, Sir Cyril Radcliffe.

A Punjab Boundary Force was also to be established to maintain law and order during partition. In his broadcast on the night of June 3, the Viceroy also spoke feelingly of the fate that awaited the Sikhs. He said, "We have given careful consideration to the position of the Sikhs. The valiant community forms about one eighth of the population of the Punjab, but they are so distributed that any partition of this province will inevitably divide them. All of us, who have good of the Sikh community at heart are very sorry to think that the partition of Punjab, which they themselves desire, cannot avoid, splitting them to a greater or lesser extent. The exact degree of spoils will be left to the Boundary Commission, which they will, of course, be representing."

The statement of 3rd June was greeted in the province with brooding fatalism... It did nothing to improve communal relations. With in a day of its acceptance, on the behalf of Sikh community by Baldev Singh, local Sikh leaders were urging him to repudiate it, as it increasingly drawn on them that partition could leave the Sikh's

774 Lord Mountbatten’s Broadcast at All India Radio, June 3, 1947, See for details, The Tribune, June 4, 1947.
Canal Colony holdings and major shrines stood in Pakistan.\(^{775}\) Apparently, the Akali Dal had been unsuccessful in getting a separate dominion for the Sikh,\(^{776}\) on the other hand, they were so divided, and that the British did not take them seriously.\(^{777}\)

On 4 June, 1947, Mountbatten, in a press conference, was being asked a question -how to keep the integrity of the Sikh community intact? What is the provision that you have made in the plan to keep the integrity of the Sikh people intact? In a reply, he said, "I must point out the people who asked for the partition were the Sikhs. The Congress took up their request and framed the resolution in the form they wanted. They wanted the Punjab to be divided into predominantly Muslim and non Muslim areas. I have done exactly what the Sikhs requested me to do through Congress. The request came to me as a tremendous shock as I like the Sikhs, I am fond of them and I wish them well. I started thinking out a formula to them but I am not a magician. I am an ordinary human being. I believe that it the Indians who have got to find out a solution. You cannot expect the British to solve all your problems. I can only help you to arrive at the correct solution. A lot can be done by a Chairman but he cannot impose a decision on anyone. It is up to the


Sikhs who are represented on the committee to take up the case. It is not I who is responsible for asking for partition.\footnote{Kirpal Singh, *The Partition of Punjab*, p. 101.}

The Mountbatten was cleverly getting out of whole deal after the acceptance of Plan by various political parties. The Sikh leader of West Punjab viz. Kartar Singh, urged Baldev Singh to publish the letter in which he had accepted the plan of 3rd June and made it clear that although the Sikhs agreed to the principle of Partition, they would not accept a decision arrived at strictly on population basis.\footnote{Jenkins to Mountbatten, 10 July, 1947, Report of an Interview with Giani Kartar Singh, R/3/1/176, IOR., *Mountbatten Paper*.} The Akali Party under Master Tara Singh’s leadership criticized the Mountbatten plan and described it as ‘unsatisfactory’ and ‘disappointing’. They criticized the plan on the ground that there was no positive provision for giving the Sikhs a ‘homeland’ and their ‘deserved status’ or ‘political power,’ nor they had been armed with means to safeguard their rights in constitution making.

Akali Dal in a joint conference of Shiromani Akali Dal and Panthic Pratinidhi Board on June 12, 1947 disapproved of the scheme for division of India into two sovereign states.\footnote{The Tribune, June 13, 1947.} While the provincial Government machinery was busy in consultation with leaders and making arrangement and modifications for the
successful implementations of plan, the Sikhs were becoming more vocal, aggressive and united than before.

On 26 June 1947, at a Joint preliminary meeting of Punjab Assembly, 91 voted to join the new Constituent Assembly, while 77 voted to stay in the existing Constituent Assembly.\(^781\) The members from the non-Muslim majority areas of East Punjab decided by 50 votes to 22 that the province should be partitioned and the East Punjab should join the existing Indian Constituent Assembly.\(^782\) The Sikhs were between the ‘devil and the deep sea’.\(^783\) On 27th June, Mountbatten called a meeting with Nehru, Jinnah, Liaquat Ali Khan and Baldev Singh.

Boundary Commission was appointed with Sir Cyril Radcliffe as Chairman. Each commission included four judges, two Muslims and two others. The Sikh member of the Punjab Commission was Teja Singh, a Judge of the Punjab High Court. The terms of reference of the commissions were to demarcate contiguous Muslim majority areas and in so doing to take into account other factors.\(^784\) The other three members were Justice Din Muhammad, Justice Mehar Chand Mahajan and Justice Munir Muhammad. The


appointment of Boundary Commission shook the west Punjab and the colonists of Lyallpur and Montgomery, whose hearts and homes were in danger.785

West Punjab Sikh leaders’ viz. Sampuran Singh, Kartar Singh Dewana and Buta Singh had never asked for partition as enthusiastically as Tara Singh and Baldev Singh. When the partition plan was in being, many schemes and formulas were put forth before the British Government by all party Sikh leaders and national leadership to find a solution of the Sikh problem but had been unsuccessful in getting a separate Sikh state and they accepted the partition of Punjab as a lesser evil than the Muslim domination of the whole community in Pakistan. Now the eyes of all Sikhs leaders were set on Boundary Award. On 21 June 1947, a group of Akali Dal met in Lahore and rejected the partition plan. Meanwhile, Sir Penedral Moon tried to find out a solution of the Sikh problem. He wrote to Lord Ismay, the Chief of Viceroy’s staff, “without a Sikh-Muslim pact there will be chaos in the northern India.”786 Due to his initiative the leaders of two communities met. Throughout the discussion with the Muslim League leaders, the

785 Harcharan Singh Bajwa, *Fifty Years of Punjab Politics*, p. 65.
Sikh leaders insisted on some constitutional rights, which Mr. Jinnah did not acknowledge.

Master Tara Singh and other Akali’s insisted on the proposed ‘Sikh State’ in Pakistan having the ‘right to opt out Pakistan after some years.’\(^787\) The talks were a futile after the denial of Mr. Jinnah. Baldev Singh was very right when he said, "The attitude of Mr. Jinnah is that of a salesman who wanted to sell his horse without convincing the customer of its good quality by trial and always asserted that the horse was a good one."\(^788\) While Kartar Singh was emotionally pointing out to Jenkins that the Sikhs would be obliged to fight if the Boundary Award went against them\(^789\) and Kharak Singh was calling the Sikhs to ‘muster strong under the banner of the Guru’ and organize themselves and get ready for the fight to defend their legitimate rights.\(^790\)

Punjab started smoldering- Lahore, Amritsar and Gurgaon were dangerously disturbed.\(^791\) The violent behavior and hubbub in Gurgaon alarmed all. Nehru, Baldev Singh and Patel on 3rd June 1947 appealed against Brendon, the Deputy Commissioner of

\(^789\) Jenkins to Mountbatten, 10 July 1947, Report of an Interview with Giani Kartar Singh, R/3/1/176/IOR
\(^790\) *Dawn*, 6 June, 1947.
Gurgaon, to Governor but was not taken seriously.\footnote{Lionel Carter, *Punjab Politics 1 June 1947-14 August 1947 Tragedy Governors Fortnightly Reports and Other Key Documents*, Jenkins to Mountbatten June 13 1947, p. 73.} Mountbatten in his covering letter of 11 June 1947 told Jenkins that the question of Gurgaon come up in the Indian Cabinet the previous week. Pandit Nehru, Sardar Baldev Singh and others spoke with vehemence against the incompetence, rudeness and uselessness of Mr. Brendon and even the League members complained the district was out of hand.\footnote{R/3/1/90: ff. 150, 154.}

Sikhs in the western part of the Punjab where large scale massacre of non Muslims was still going, knew that they could do nothing but plan that the Punjab Boundary Commission fix the dividing line as far as West possible. They knew that only Radcliffe could do so. On 1 July, 1947, Sardar Baldev Singh and Giani Kartar Singh met the Governor General. Radcliffe reached India on 7 July 1947. The four members committee representing each community did preliminary work to fix the exact boundaries of the two dominions between 27 June and 7 July.

The 'other factors' gave some mental relief to the minorities of Punjab; Sikhs knew that on the basis of population alone their case could not be strong. They, therefore, based their case for including most of the areas which could remain on the Eastern side on the
strength of the valuable properties both urban and rural owned by the Sikhs and Hindus as well as their shrines, as they thought that these could be the 'other factors' which in the terms of reference to the Boundary Commission could have considered.

In the meantime, on 5th July, Baldev Singh wrote to Major J.M. Short to 'engage an eminent King's Counsel to represent their case before the Boundary Commission.'\textsuperscript{794} After Baldev Singh's and Sant Singh's telegraphic invitations to J.M. Short; British authorities diplomatically tried to placate the Sikhs. Lord Ismay secretly wrote to Lord Mountbatten, \textit{"My strong hunch is that of he (Mr. Major Short) might be of help in keeping Sikhs quiet and my idea is that he should be attached to my staff as a temporary measure for 2 months ... Cripps entirely agrees with his and Prime Ministers approved subject to your content."}\textsuperscript{795}

Baldev Singh had also asked Major Short to engage a K.C. to represent Sikh case before Boundary Commission and Cripps recommended Holmes.\textsuperscript{796} On 12 July, Lord Mountbatten refused Ismay's proposal to attach Major Short to Ismay's staff. He writes, "why not let him come out as Baldev Singh's guest since he invited

\textsuperscript{794} Sardar Baldev Singh to Major J.M. Short, IOR, MSS EUR F./189/18-19; also see Kirpal Singh, \textit{The Partition of Punjab} , p. 143.
\textsuperscript{795} IOR, R/2/1/163.
\textsuperscript{796} Lord Ismay to Lord Mountbatten 10 July, 1947, \textit{Mountbatten Paper}, IOR, R/2/1/163.
him. You could give him a lift in York and maintain formal contact.\textsuperscript{797}

In the period between, no agreement could be reached between the Akali Dal and the Muslim League, for "If the Sikhs were lukewarm about a settlement, the Muslims were icy cold, Moon found however, Jinnah was unwilling to make any concessions to the Sikhs.\textsuperscript{798}

In Lahore, there were several poisoning scores. The first had occurred in Supplies Department near the Secretariat, where water was being poisoned. There was a wide spread panic. Looting was going in Gurgaon. Meo raid on village Tikli became the centre of reports and press. Allegations were that a platoon of the Punjab additional Police stationed in village sided with the raiders, fired on villagers and took part in burning and looting of the village. Baldev Singh visited Tikli to pacify the situation. Jenkins reported Mountbatten."... Baldev Singh sponsored some rather aggressive communal propaganda about the raiding. I have appointed an enquiry committee consisting of Eustace, the Commissioner of Ambala, Sant Parkash Singh, the D.I.G. of Police, Ambala Range, and Lieut. Col. Isaac, the Commanding officer of 2nd/6th

\textsuperscript{797} Mountbatten to Ismay 12 July, 1947, Mountbatten Paper, IOR/2/1/163, Telegram Grade, Harbans Singh, \textit{Sikh Political Parties}, New Delhi, p. 11.
Rajputana Rifles...\textsuperscript{799} “These arrangement on the part of Lord Ismay were just to pacify Sikhs, not to find a solution to their problem. By July communal feeling was unbelievably bad.\textsuperscript{800} In the Ambala Division, outside Gurgaon, the Muslim resigned to this fate, and same was true of non Muslims in the Rawalpindi Division and in Dera Ghazi Khan, Muzaffargarh, Multan and Jhang. Tension was at its height in the Lyallpur, Montgomery (districts), Lahore and Jullundur (Division).

As Jenkins apprehensions were, "Partition goes very slowly indeed, meetings of Partition committee resembles a peace conference. With a new war in sight ... If the Commission does report by 15 August, there will in all possibility be a row because the Sikhs do not like the "notional boundary."\textsuperscript{801} Giani Kartar Singh and Sardar Baldev Singh were frank about the intention of the Sikhs. Baldev Singh was publicly ‘taking the same line’\textsuperscript{802} which seem odd in view of his acceptance of Plan.”\textsuperscript{803} It was in the fury against Muslim League and the Congress not making any concessions to Sikhs, Baldev Singh in company with Kartar Singh

\textsuperscript{799} Lionel Carter., 1st June, 1947- 14 August, 1947, p. 133.
\textsuperscript{800} Viceroy Conference Papers, 128, Mountbatten Paper, IOR, 127, Annexure I, Document No. 91.
\textsuperscript{801} Viceroy Conference Papers, 128, Mountbatten Paper, IOR, 127, Annexure I, Document No. 91.
\textsuperscript{802} Jenkins to Mountbatten, Mountbatten Paper,IOR, 127.
\textsuperscript{803} Jenkins to Mountbatten, Mountbatten Paper,IOR, 127.
started to pursue for a suitable boundary between the East and West Punjab.

While addressing a large gathering at Gurudwara Sishgunj, Sardar Baldev Singh said that the Sikhs had accepted the 3 June plan only in principle and the proposed division was not acceptable. He pointed out that the Sikhs had in fact sought Sikh province, even in 1942, but then ‘the Congress and the Lahore newspapers had opposed it.’ If they had not opposed the Sikh demand, there would have no Pakistan today.

Sardar Baldev Singh asked the Sikh leaders to ensure peace but if the Award went against then, they were to be prepared to vindicate their honour with all sacrifice.”

Baldev Singh's speech at Gurudwara attracted attention in high quarters of New Delhi, and under Government’s pressure, on 11 July he issued another statement that he had not said the Sikhs should fight for their rights or resist if the Award was not in their favour. The Sikhs, it was said, should not acquiesce in decision which threatened their very existence. Giani Kartar Singh asked the Sikhs to pledge on 8 July, to make all sacrifices for a suitable boundary line between the East and west Punjab.

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804 The Tribune, 10 July, 1942, also see Civil and Military Gazette, 10 July, 1947.
On 10 July 1947, in the capacity of President, the Akali Dal, Giani Kartar Singh met E. Jenkins and on 15 July, he issued a public statement, "The Sikhs will not rest contended till the boundary line is demarcated in such a way that it leaves at least 8.5 percent Sikhs in India, was observed all over the province". He described the Muslim League demand ... "The Sutlej be made the dividing line in the Punjab, "which is unreasonable... He strongly argued that the district Sheikhupur, Lyallpur and Gujranwala had large non-Muslim majority tract..."806

During this critical phase, J.M. Short reached Delhi on 22 July, 1947 to work as his personal assistant.807 Major Short lived at the residence of Sardar Baldev Singh. He observed that Sikhs did not like the Plan, they had only agreed to it to meet them more than half way and to make easier for them to go out their way to meet their wish for some sort of Sikhistan. J.M. Short reported the matter to authority in Delhi.808 His efforts to facilitate a deal were fizzled out because of Rawalpindi massacres.

On 23 July, Giani Kartar Singh publicly announced that Sikh political Conference would be held on 27 July at Nankana Sahib in Sheikhupura district. Giani Kartar Singh was the chief organizer of

806 Governor of Punjab to Lord Mountbatten, Governor General of India in Kirpal Singh, The Partition of Punjab, p. 164.
the Conference. He announced that the large Jatha should covering on Nankana from Lyallpur and Sheikhupura villages in their protest would follow and if the Punjab Government were to take repressive action to prevent the holding of the Conference and Morcha ...was to be started at Nankana.\textsuperscript{809} V.P. Menon suggested that Mr. Jinnah should be approached and persuaded to declare Nankana Sahib, ‘a sort of Vatican.’\textsuperscript{810}

The formation of the Punjab Boundary Force was announced in a joint declaration on 24 July. The announcement also said that with effect from 1st August 1947, twelve districts - seven of west and five of east Punjab - would be placed under the overall command of Major General Rees, who was to report directly to joint Defence Council\textsuperscript{811} Punjab Governor declared the Panthic Conference of 27 July, 1947 at Nankana Sahib as "illegal", Intelligence reports were that "the Sikhs intended to start trouble on a big scale if Nankana Sahib was not included by the Award of the Boundary Commission in East Punjab.\textsuperscript{812}

The Governor felt on 27 July, when this meeting was successfully held that "we were in for a civil war." Giani Kartar

\textsuperscript{811} \textit{The Tribune}, 26 July, 1947.
Singh along with 150 Sikhs was arrested. The Governor considered it 'ridiculous' on the part of Sikhs as 'that having agreed to commission and Baldev Singh having further agreed on their behalf to accept Award. Jenkins advised Swaran Singh to get in touch with Baldev Singh. He even suggested Mountbatten to ask Baldev Singh to put all possible pressure on Giani Kartar Singh to make statement accepting Award. Nankana Sahib demonstration fizzled out. On 30th July, 1947, Giani Kartar Singh met Jenkins and handed him a copy of the Sikh Memorandum to the Boundary Commission and a copy of document entitled ‘The Hindu- Sikh case for Nankana Sahib Tract’ and a map.

During meeting Giani Kartar Singh emphasized that Sardar Baldev Singh had no authority to make any statement as he had not consulted the party before doing so. The Viceroy had simply sent for him to get his thumb impression and Sardar Baldev Singh would soon find out that he had made a mistake. Sikh demonstrations were proving futile. The Government and public eyes were set on 5th August, which was a proposed hartal (strike)

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day. A civil war ambiance was at this stage developing throughout Punjab, and all communities were arming for a struggle.

The Punjab Public Safety Ordinance which was promulgated in November 1946 was altogether proving a failure. A number of indents regarding incendiaries, stabbing, bombing, village raiding were at rise during the communal war, which high deemed as ‘War of Succession,’ Amritsar, Lahore, Ferozepur, Jullundar, Hoshiarpur and Gurgaon were the worst affected areas. The casualties on Government records were reported till 2nd August, 1947 were:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th><strong>Urban</strong></th>
<th><strong>Killed</strong></th>
<th>** Seriously Injured**</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lahore</td>
<td>382</td>
<td>823</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amritsar</td>
<td>315</td>
<td>666</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multan</td>
<td>131</td>
<td>133</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rawalpindi</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>230</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Cities</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>171</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th><strong>Rural</strong></th>
<th><strong>Killed</strong></th>
<th>** Seriously Injured**</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rawalpindi</td>
<td>2164</td>
<td>167</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attock</td>
<td>620</td>
<td>30</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jhelum</td>
<td>210</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multan</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>50</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gurgaon</td>
<td>284</td>
<td>125</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amritsar</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>70</td>
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<tr>
<td>District</td>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>Serious</td>
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<td>---------------</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>522</td>
<td>1011</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non Muslims</td>
<td>522</td>
<td>1012</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rural</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>357</td>
<td>201</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non Muslims</td>
<td>3231</td>
<td>349</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>879</td>
<td>1212</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non Muslims</td>
<td>3753</td>
<td>1361</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

C) Total Urban and Rural Killed and Injured respectively 4,632 and 2,573.\(^{816}\)

Jenkins reported that the figures are clearly incomplete, especially for Gurgaon, where the dead and wounded are usually removed by their own party. In my opinion not less than 5,000 (and

probably not more than 5,200) people have been killed in all and not more than 3,000 seriously injured."\(^8\)\(^1\)\(^7\)

In 1942, attacks were concentrated on the Government property and Government servants, in other words on points that were largely known. In 1947 little attention was paid to Government property and Government servants - the ‘two nations’ fought one another in the streets, in the markets, in the fields, and in the villages. When it was found that rioting could be checked, the fighting took the form of mass terrorism.\(^8\)\(^1\)\(^8\) Congress Government was successful in suppressing disturbances which occurred in:

*Bombay under a Congress Government.*

*Calcutta and Naokhali under a Muslim League Government.*

*Bihar under a Congress Government.*

*The N.W.F.P. under a Congress Government.*

*The United provinces under a Congress Government.*\(^8\)\(^1\)\(^9\)

The worst provinces of all had been the Punjab which was still under British rule, British rule in law and order ceased in 1947, and was not restored same, in a very technical sense by a

\(^8\)\(^1\)\(^7\) Lionel Carter, *Punjab Politics 1 June 1947-14 August 1947 Tragedy Governors Fortnightly Reports and Other Key Documents*, Jenkins to Mountbatten, June 13, 1947, p. 203

\(^8\)\(^1\)\(^8\) Lionel Carter, *Punjab Politics 1 June, 1947-14 August, 1947 Tragedy Governors Fortnightly Reports and Other Key Documents*, Jenkins to Mountbatten June 13, 1947, p. 203

transient section 93 administration. It was perturbed Jenkins view that what remains of "British rule"… “Is now ending”.\(^{820}\) The upgraded intelligence reports were in fact filtering through to the Punjab Governor linking the neighbouring Princely States with plans for a terror campaign in East Punjab.\(^{821}\) The Muslims were more violent and well organized during attacks. The numbers of causalities were approximately as follow:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Urban</th>
<th>Killed</th>
<th>Seriously Killed</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>522</td>
<td></td>
<td>1011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non Muslims</td>
<td>522</td>
<td></td>
<td>1012</td>
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B) Rural

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</table>

C) Total

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<th></th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Muslims</td>
<td>879</td>
<td>1212</td>
</tr>
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<td>Non Muslims</td>
<td>3753</td>
<td>1361</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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4632 2573

In the cities of Muslims and non Muslims causalities were approximately equal. Almost all the causalities in rural areas of Rawalpindi, Attock, Jhelam and Multan were non Muslims.\(^{822}\) By

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\(^{821}\) Abell to Brockman, ungraded, Intelligence Reports, R/3/1/145, IOR, also see Ian Talbot, Ian Talbot, *Punjab and the Raj.*, p. 233.

June 1947, the RSS had over 58,000 members, the Muslims League National Guards 39,000 and Sikh Akali Fauj 8,000 member. Large Sikh Jathas were also formed in the country side. Under the Act Central Provinces Legislation, Baldev Singh succeeded to create a force known as Home guards.

Baldev Singh in the capacity of Defenec Member of India was successful enough to provide Home Guards, arms and ammunition to bring peace in different parts of country. He exercised moderating influence whenever political agitations disturbed any state. Baldev Singh led many discussions with leaders like Jawaharlal Nehru, V.B. Patel, Tara Singh, Giani Kartar Singh and British Officers, viz. Lord Wavell, Lord Mountbatten, Panthic Lawrence, Attlee, Jenkins, Abell, etc. 823 With the assistance and guidance of Indian leaders and British Officers, he was able to manage above said provinces.

These Home guards were well trained and well armed and were supplied to U.P., East Punjab, Kashmir and Jammu. They were trained by drills, drills with Rifles, with Bayonets and Frogs as

well as with service rifles.\textsuperscript{824} The British politician became very active and made hasty preparations to divide India and quit India.

Mr. Radcliffe, did not participate in the commission’s proceedings and remained at Delhi under a heavy guard and day to day proceedings were sent to him by post.\textsuperscript{825} He prepared the Award on 9th August. The point of views of the Muslim and non Muslim judges on the location of the line of partition were completely at variance; the decision was in fact, solely that of Sir Radcliffe.\textsuperscript{826} Trust and goodwill were conspicuously lacking at all levels of Punjabi society as the British rule drew to a close. While Muslims got arms from the tribal areas of North West Frontier Province and Bahawalpur, Sikhs obtained them from the Sikh states, chiefly Patiala, Kapurthala and Faridkot. The real build up of Sikh militarisms was the formation of Jathas in villages armed with the traditional kirpan and spear.\textsuperscript{827}

A partition committee at the provincial level was set up in Lahore under the chairmanship of Sir Evan Jenkins. Its task was to ensure smooth transfer of power by determining the division of assets, personal and liabilities before partition. A Boundary Force

\textsuperscript{824} The Tribune, Oct. 23, 1947; also see Rekha Sood, \textit{Sardar Baldev Singh and the Punjab Politics 1937-47}, p. 98.
\textsuperscript{826} Khushwant Singh, \textit{A History of the Sikhs}, p. 277.
\textsuperscript{827} Khushwant Singh, \textit{A History of the Sikhs}, p. 279.
under Major General Rees assisted by Brigadier Digamber Singh Brar (India) and Colonel Ayub Khan (later President of Pakistan) consisting of two and a half divisions was entrusted with the control of movements of population in districts of Sialkot, Lyallpur, Montgomery, Lahore, Amritsar, Gurdaspur, Hoshiarpur, Jullunder, Ferozepur, and Ludhiana.828

Sir Cyril Radcliff’s partition line between the two Punjabs, as spelled out in his Award dated 12 August, move from the point, where the west point of the Ujh river left Kashmir and entered Punjab to the point where it entered Ravi as latter's tributary. While doing that his partition line separated three of the four thesis of the then districts- Batala, Gurdaspur, and Pathankot from the fourth, Shakarganj which laid along the right bank of Ujh river. From the point where Ujh became a part of Ravi river to the point where the latter met the river Sutlej it ran along the course followed by it. Radcliffs partition line excluded the whole of the Canal Colony of Montgomery districts from East Punjab which Mahajan in his report and suggested be better given to the East Punjab.829

Mountbatten followed his decision announced in his 69th council meeting on 9 August... Instead he sent his men to Radcliff

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that the later do so on the 13th, by which date, he would be proceedings to Karachi to participate in the celebrations of establishment of Pakistan in forenoon of 14th and return in time at Delhi to accept the offer already conveyed to him to become the Governor General of India in the midnight of 14-15 August of an independent state as a dominion of British Commonwealth of Nations.830

Sardar Ujjal Singh reached Karachi on 13th of August 1947, to attend a meeting of the Pakistan Constituent Assembly after the Pakistan Independence celebrations on the 14th. As Ujjal Singh puts, "It may be recalled that I was elected to the Indian Constituent Assembly along with Giani Kartar Singh and S. Harnam Singh but on the partition of Punjab, Giani Kartar Singh and myself were automatically considered to be members of the Pakistan Constituent Assembly as both of us came from the Western districts.831 Mountbatten's delay of five days in publishing the Radcliff Award resulted into in continuation, if not increase in the inter communal Hindus and the Sikhs riots on the other of dividing line proposed by Radcliff in his award still not known to

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the public and the leaders of any political party.832 On 13 August, radio news created panic when a passenger train was attacked, which was going from western side to east and "most of them killed at the Lahore railway station."833 Ujjal Singh could not attend the Karachi procession for the celebration of Independence of Pakistan as he says, "I did not move out of the hotel...”

The British divided and quit India on 15 August, 1947. Independence was inaugurated at midnight 14-15 August, 1947. While celebrations were going in Delhi, all the defence of Punjab had been put out of gear and division migrants were migrating Punjab in millions of numbers834. As a result of Boundary settlement, Sikhs felt themselves frustrated, betrayed and truncated as they found their community, some four millions in Punjab, neatly divided down at middle. No where the Sikhs were in majority and they spilled almost in equal proportions on both sides of the lines.835

The Sikhs had already been in conflict with the Muslims. With this effect, riots started in the Punjab, killings were widespread, in Punjab, only Calcutta remained silent because

833 Sardar Ujjal Singh, Oral Interview, p. 20, Punjab Historical Studies, Punjabi University, Patiala.
835 Percinal Spear, The Oxford History of Modern India, Delhi, 1979, p. 404.
Gandhi Ji was present there, Punjab did not remain silent. Police and armed forces which were mainly manned by Muslims had given to Pakistan. Due to chaos in the province murders, looting rape and dacoities were ruling everywhere. It was difficult to reorganise the armed forces, Punjab was left almost ruined. Jawaharlal Nehru regarded Baldev Singh an able, organised and an influential personality not only of Punjab but also of Indians. The Congress High Command felt that Baldev Singh could organize military as he had rich political understanding and has remained Indian defence Member in 1946-47. Hence he was declared 1st Defence Minister of Independent India. Sardar Ujjal Singh had lost all his factories and landed estates which were in Pakistan. He had already joined Congress and was close to Pandit Nehru. With the change in Government, a new type of political scenario came into being but the politics of loyalism remained the powerful weapon of the Indian Government.

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