Chapter 3

Theorizing ‘Space’

The present epoch will perhaps be above all the epoch of space. We are in the epoch of simultaneity: we are in the epoch of juxtaposition, the epoch of the near and far, of the side-by-side, of the dispersed.

- Of Other Spaces, Foucault

A search for the alternative words other than ‘representation’ while talking about literature is certainly not an easy pursuit, there is always the danger of missing out something, consciously or unconsciously eliminating one or the other social category (e.g. race, gender, caste, class, etc.). There are traditional metaphors, especially in the time of postmodernism and postcolonialism or even post-theory world for that matter, that keep on recurring in the entire academic discourse.

One of the ways of dealing with these issues is to rigorously look back at philosophical promises; what if we have missed an essential thread of the fabric that we are trying to unravel now. We are assuming the time when literature and philosophy were hardly different. Essentially, we want to interpret the world of human experience (through the medium of language, art, literature etc.), and that is why we have been evolving numerous ways of doing it. Here come into the picture a few philosophical categories like reality, substance, possibility to account for human experience.

There are very particular ways in which we as human beings interact with the ‘space’. Undoubtedly, the notion of space brings with it the tripartite problematic of existence, perception and language. Three very distinct and complex philosophical structures to understand space,
and the argument here is ‘space’ communicates, or gets communicated, through/by/into these structures.

3.1 Conceptualizing ‘Space’:

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‘Space’. How frequently do we use this word? What is space? How do we make sense of ‘space’? These are the few questions we would try to take a close look at. Perhaps, the simplest way to understand ‘space’ is to look prepositions in English language like at, over, in, out, into, behind, next to, within, before, to etc. Don’t they represent the spatio-temporal conditions? But then is ‘space’ just that? The Oxford Dictionary of English defines ‘space’ as, “continuous expanse in which things exists and move, amount of this taken by a thing, available, interval between points or objects, empty area, freedom to think, to be oneself”. This definition explains that ‘space’ has to be understood in relation to two inseparable entities (i) time and (ii) substance. However, philosophically, the difficulty in conceptualising ‘space’ are in its perplex disciplinary origins and development; each discipline looks at ‘space’ quite differently. Let’s take a brief survey of disciplinary origins and conceptualization of ‘space’. Space is ‘where’ of everything that we know and don’t know; it is where our consciousness lies.

Physics:

‘Space’ happens to be one of the basic entities of rigorous study in physics which says space cannot be understood by other entities, as nothing more elemental is known than ‘space’. As Newton seems to believe that physics does not study ‘space’ per se but it assumes it. On the
other hand, ‘space’ can be related to other fundamental quantities-entities. Consequently, like other primary quantities (e.g. time and mass), ‘space’ can be studied-examined-understood by experimentation and measurable variables.

**Mathematics:**
In mathematics ‘spaces’ are examined and explored with different numbers of dimensions and with different underlying structures. In modern mathematics, spaces are defined as sets with some added structure. They are frequently described as different types of manifolds and where the properties are defined largely on local connectedness of points that lie on the manifold. There are however, many diverse mathematical objects that are called ‘spaces’.

**Geography:**
Geography as the branch of science concerned with identifying and utilizing spatial awareness and it tries to understand why and, specifically, how things exist in specific locations. ‘Location’ is the word geography offers to speak of spatial things. Within geography Cartography is the mapping of spaces to allow better navigation, for visualization purposes and to act as a locational device. Geographical space is often considered as land, and can have relation to ownership usage (in which space is seen as property or territory). This issue of spatial ownership is the key point in our discussion of social and communal space. (See ‘Social’ and ‘Communal Space’ below).

**Cosmology:**
At a very larger level, the notion of relativity leads to the cosmological question of what shapes the universe, and where does space come from? It seems that space was created in the Big Bang, 13.7 billion years ago and has been expanding ever since. Is there any relation between Cosmic
and Human spaces? The overall shape of space is not known (can it be known?), but space is known to be expanding (and thus affecting all substances) very rapidly due to the Cosmic Inflation. Well, this indeed opens up a new sphere of study i.e. what is the relationship between cosmological space and human experience of space?

**Psychology:**

It was during the middle of the 19th century that psychologists first began to study the way space is perceived. Those analyzing the perception of space are concerned with how recognition of an object’s physical appearance or its interactions is perceived. The perception of surroundings is important due to its necessary relevance to survival, especially with regard to self-protection. It is related simply to one’s idea of personal-space. There are several space-related phobias which have been identified, including *agoraphobia* (the fear of open spaces), *astrophobia* (the fear of celestial space) and *claustrophobia* (the fear of enclosed spaces). We will try to discuss what happens to the psychological spaces in a literary text and explore how they affect external spaces and the vice versa.

**Anthropology:**

It was very late that anthropology started studying space properly, to be very precise with Otto Friedrich Bollnow and his seminal book *Man and Space* (1963). Possibly, because till then, ‘space’ was considered to be exclusively in the territory of geography. However, plainly, we rarely find it discussed from cultural and anthropological viewpoint.

Anthropology argues that ‘space’ can no longer be conceived as an infinite emptiness/void in its primary conception but it has to be looked as a human and ecological place what we usually call *homogenous space*. This notion clearly states that primarily ‘space’ becomes pluralistic and
qualitatively restricted to human environments. From an anthropological perspective, its structure can now be studied inductively, as closely related to human experience and behaviour in cultural history with the evolution of the human habitat. If this anthropological theory of space were to be used and understood on larger scale i.e. in prehistory, history, and ethnography, perhaps most of what our intellectual sciences and humanities had thought over centuries would have to be written and examined anew.

**Philosophy:**

Philosophy discusses whether space is (a) itself an entity, (b) a relationship between/among entities, or (c) a conceptual framework.  

When we study the philosophy of space, we come to know that it was the thinking of Descartes that radically changed notion of ‘space’ because he put an end to the Aristotelian tradition which held that ‘space’ and ‘time’ were among those categories which facilitated the naming and classifying of the evidence of the senses. Kant’s arrival, again gave a new turn to the thinking about ‘space’; he not only revived but revised it too and called it *a priori* form of consciousness. The gap between philosophy and practical world was visible but philosophers unlike mathematicians kept on rekindling basic issues of ‘space’ and finally they could claim it to be a philosophical category.

**Culture Studies:**

Finally, we have come to an interesting branch of knowledge dealing with ‘space’ in the modern world. As we know culture studies is the analysis of a culture’s systems of meaning production and consumption. Culture studies look at space in terms of home as property, location, spaces of imagination, media urbanism, fashion and style family etc. On methodological note, it positions
space along with representation, identity, production, consumption and regulation of culture. Further, it looks at how a place is socially constructed through social relations and what are the spatial influences on social relations and cultural practices.

Isn’t it strange then, due to this disciplinary problematic of ‘space’, ‘space’ couldn’t get properly conceptualized in the larger intellectual and philosophical history? Is everything part of its own make up in proportions or is space part of everything in the similar fashion? In the former case, there are reasons to ask, is ‘space’ a container? Or a territorial sphere? Is there space outside this territory? And in the latter case, let’s ask, is space containable entity? Doesn’t it then go against its nature: absence-gap-emptiness? Visibly, these are some of really important issues left out in the main-stream intellectual discourse which could mean whatever we know about things might change after understanding the concept of ‘space’.

**Epistemology:**

Epistemology, as a field of inquiry, had inherited the notion of ‘space’ as a proportion of ‘mental-thing’ or ‘mental place’. What is this ‘mental thing/place’? Because there is no possible limit of what can be or cannot be part of the expansion of the ‘mental-space’. It could be almost anything and everything under/beyond the sun. Do we have knowledge of such mental space (how do we think of mental space by remaining outside it)? Foucault aptly mentions that “knowledge is also the space in which the subject may take up a position and speak of the objects with which he deals with in his discourse” (Foucault: 1972). Surprisingly, Foucault does not mention the nature of the ‘space’ he is referring to, and that complicates it even more because it does not answer, how it bridges the gap between mental and social, between the theoretical realm and the practical one, between the “space” of philosophers and that of the people who deal with
the materiality of space (without ever knowing it). Well, there are no simplistic explanations to these profound speculative questions. Lefebvre argues in his seminal work *Production of Social Space*:

The application of epistemological thinking to the acquired knowledge is assumed to be structurally linked to the spatial sphere; that is how perhaps knowledge as a space disseminates itself and steps into infinite *motion* of space. In an inevitable circular manner, such mental space then becomes the locus of a ‘theoretical practice’ which is separated from social practices and which sets itself as the central reference point to knowledge (123).

Highly philosophical in nature, this epistemological thinking about ‘space’ has consistently failed to give birth to the science—or would be science-of space! With a few exceptions, till date the research in the area of ‘space’ (as distinct philosophical category) has produced only descriptions that never achieve analytical justification. Though we need to mention here recent development in anthropology is treating ‘space’ seriously but its inception in humanities and literatures awaits primary research and rigorous debate. The concept of ‘space’ can be better understood by synthesizing (a) what exists in/outside ‘space’, (b) discourse and knowledge of ‘space’ and (c) practices of ‘space’.

![Figure-1](image-url)
A. What is there in/outside the ‘Space’?

The very use of preposition “in/outside” assumes ‘space’ to be a container; a territorial boundary consisting of various sub-categories of space on one hand and the modes in which they interact, get encroached and manipulated on the other. Such relation can be structurally classified and analyzed. Traditionally, we are habituated to perceive various objects located within the primary framework that may or may not be physical in a relational order.

B. Discourse and Knowledge of Space:

The (hi)story of writing about ‘space’ as a philosophical entity underwent very vague vicissitudes hence we neither have any proper developmental track nor do we have a set of schools debating the nature and function of spaces. What could be the possible reason for such a disciplinary negligence? Does this suggest the inherent abstract nature of ‘space’ leading rationalists turning blind eye to talk, discuss and write about it? Or space did not play very vital role in the active politics in early feudal and monarchic society? Or is it because philosophers (like Aristotle) discussed ‘space’ in relation to other entities and not in specialized fashion? Therefore, what we have as discourse on space is in bits and pieces scattered across various branches of knowledge.

If we try to understand the relationship between space and its utility, we come across a paradoxical situation wherein on hand discourse on space does not guarantee the knowledge of it, and on the other if equipped with the discourse of space, it becomes “knowable” (and so subject to manipulation). For example, a person has knowledge of existing large green field (space) and he uses it for either playing football or as battle field or for constructing homes etc.
C. Practices of Space:

Hypothetically, practices of ‘space’ refer to the active i.e. operational and functional role of ‘space’ in making things/events happen using spatial devices within the larger space affecting what is initially not part of that ‘space’. These practices have been governing the world; social order, politics, economy, etc. and all those things that make us what we are today. It is really fascinating to study historically what kinds of spaces did people practice? Why those spaces only? How did they do it? What were the results? Who, then, had access to such spaces? For example, what if we study the rise and fall of Roman/Mughal Empire/British Colonies in relation the spatial-practices they used for their imperial rationale? What kind of history will that be? Certainly it will unravel so many facets of an untold story which might tell us, if at all similar patterns are being practiced today. That is why there are reasons to hypothesize manufacturing and manipulation of ‘communal space’ Or what are the modes in which spaces are used for constructive purposes? In that sense, particularly, space as a perspective is credibly useful.

There are two issues explicitly coming out: (1) Is space a passive locus of human perception and social relations? (2) What is the active-the operational-instrumental role of ‘space’ in making sense of the social relations and conflicts? Besides, it is high time to recognize ‘space’ as a system and technology of giving birth to and controlling social strife.

3.2 History of Philosophy of Space:

One of the most vital questions determining our views on the nature of space, time and motion is whether or not a cent per cent emptiness is possible, i.e., a place devoid of substance of any sort including air. Even if it is possible how would we measure it? Roughly, the discussion-description of ‘space’ started with the pre-Socratic philosopher Democritus (5th century, B. C.)
who believed that emptiness is not only possible, but in fact exists among the interstices of the smallest, indivisible parts of matter and extends without bound infinitely\(^4\). Later on following Plato, Aristotle rejected the possibility of such an emptiness-void, claiming that, by definition, a void is nothing, and what is nothing cannot exist. But the question isn’t *nothingness* a space where things do not exist?

Contrary views have been recurring from antiquity to the present day denying space and time being real entities. They tried hard to convince that the world is nothing but material construct. As discussed above, they held that the idea of empty space is a conceptual impossibility. However, whether we know it or not we do *use* ‘space’ in order to compare various arrangements of the substances consisting of the real/unreal construct of world.

**Aristotle:**

Aristotle seemed to anticipate the possibility of a philosophy of space though without naming it, he said:

> If there is something which is eternal and immovable and separable [from matter], clearly the knowledge of it belongs to a theoretical science, not, however, to physics (for physics deals with certain movable things) nor to mathematics, but to a science prior to both…If there is no substance other than those…formed by nature, natural science will be the first science; but if there is an immovable substance, the science of this must be prior and must be first philosophy… (*Metaphysics*, p. 1026, 11. 10-13, 27-30).

Perhaps what Aristotle had in mind was the possibility of the philosophy of space (one may call it the first philosophy), he has, nonetheless, defined it here.

Aristotle viewed the entire universe as (a set of) material construct, finite in extent, bounded by the outermost sphere of the fixed stars beyond that there is no void, i.e., empty places. Theories have radical arguments against this view of Aristotle. However, there is a point when he defines
‘place’, the place of something is the outermost of “the innermost motionless boundary of what contains it.” (*Metaphysics*, p. 1030) Therefore, since there are no boundaries outside the outermost celestial sphere, there are no places or space outside of it. This clearly means ‘space’ is limited to finite boundaries.

Understanding of ‘space’ is impossible without considering ‘time’. Aristotle defines time as ‘just the measure of motion’, where by ‘motion’ he means ‘change of any sort, including qualitative change’. Motion is the most important notion that helps us understanding space and time in parallel manner. Motion is also defined as change of place (space) and which is actualization of potentiality as it corresponds to time. But this sounds either useless or meaningless in the sense that it is pretty difficult to see motion per se as an actualizing potentiality.

Earth, air, fire, and water are, according to Aristotle elementary substances in the sub-lunar realm that move on their own either up or down, i.e., toward the centre or away from the centre by their very nature. Interestingly enough, for Aristotle the celestial realm (the universal space), is composed of a fifth element space (kosmos) which also resembles Indian concept of *Panch Mahabhut* (set of five elements; earth, air, fire, water and space). Such a categorical view does not take into consideration the possibility of the human-social spaces on the earth.

Thus Aristotelian space is more of motion-based view placing ‘space’ something *above* the human reach. However, his views are significant not for pushing an argument but for their foundational hypotheses of the very existence of ‘space’ per se and as the science of study.

**Descartes:**
The next very influential philosopher after Aristotle is René Descartes not because there were no philosophers who talked about space after Aristotle but Descartes took ‘space’ to a different level of understanding. While René Descartes is well-known as one of the founders of modern philosophy, his influential role in the development of modern physics has been, until the latter half of the twentieth century, generally under-appreciated and under-investigated by both historians and philosophers of science. Descartes’ many hypotheses concerning space and body are best appreciated when viewed as a continuation of a long debate within Medieval/Renaissance philosophy centred upon the Aristotelian dictum that whatever possessed dimensionality was body.

Rejecting all anti-Aristotelian ideas of empty space-total vacuum, Descartes equated the defining property, or “essence”, of material substance with three-dimensional spatial extension: “the extension in length, breadth, and depth which constitutes the space occupied by a body, is exactly the same as that which constitutes the body” (*Principle*, 10). This structure presumes that two or more bodies (substances) would decide the nature of space. The important conclusive remarks that he comes up with is *there cannot exist a space separate from body* (*Principles*, 16), since all spatial extension simply is body (and he rejects the possibility of a vacuum that is not extended). Here, we see the physicist Descartes is overlapping Descartes the philosopher. The concept of ‘space’ can be regarded as a sort of conceptual abstraction from this bodily spatial extension, (this certainly supports the above mentioned dictionary meaning of space) which he also dubs “internal place”:

We attribute a generic unity to the extension of the space [of a body], so that when the body which fills the space has been changed, the extension of the space itself is not considered to have been changed or transported but to remain one and the same; as long as it remains of the
same size and shape and maintains the same situation among certain external bodies by means of which we specify that space.  

Descartes’ *Principles of Philosophy* too gives a detailed account of the phenomena of motion in relation to ‘space’, which is defined as “the transfer of one piece of matter or of one body, from the neighbourhood of those bodies immediately contiguous to it and considered at rest, into the neighbourhood of others”. As binary to “internal space”, he suggests “external space” meaning the surface of these containing bodies (that border the contained body). While elaborating this, he cites a beautiful example of a passenger in the ship. When he/she is a sitting passenger on a ship views himself/herself as at rest relative to the parts of the ship, but not at rest relative to the shore. However, when motion is taken as a transformation of the adjoining neighbourhood, a body can participate only in one motion, which dismisses the apparent contradiction. (since the body must either be at rest, or in transformation away from, its adjoining neighbourhood).

As per the “relational” theory, space, time, and motion are just relations among bodies, and not separately existing entities or properties that are in any way independent of material bodies. However, at a given point, one of these three entities might take upper hand to the rest two.

**Newton:**

Isaac Newton set foundational principles on the view that *space* is discrete from body and that *time* passes homogeneously regardless of whether anything happens in the world. Such concept argues for the supremacy of ‘space’ over its dichotomous relationship with body. Justifiably, he paves two very prominent ideas: ‘*absolute space*’ and ‘*absolute time*’, so as to differentiate these notions from the various ways by which we measure them (which he called ‘*relative spaces*’ and ‘*relative times*’).
Arguably, he defends the thesis of the immobility of absolute space, which against the backdrop of Descartes, clearly means that the parts of space, just as the parts of time, do not change their relation with respect to one another. Newton argues that the parts of space are their own places, and for a place to be moved out of itself is absurd. His discussion states that, since in common life these quantities are conceived of in terms of their relations to substances and bodies. It is hard to distinguish them on the one hand and the relative perception and interpretation, appearances, common conception of them, on the other the absolute, true, mathematical quantities themselves. To paraphrase:

a) Absolute, true, and mathematical **time**, from its own nature, passes equably without relation to anything external, and thus without reference to any change or way of measuring of time (e.g., the hour, day, month, or year).

b) Absolute, true, and mathematical **space** remains similar and immovable without relation to anything external. (The specific meaning of this becomes clearer from the way it contrasts with Descartes’ concept of space.) Relative spaces are measures of absolute space defined with reference to some system of bodies or another, and thus a relative space may, and likely will, be in motion.

c) The **place** of a body is the space which it occupies, and may be absolute or relative according to whether the space is absolute or relative.

d) Absolute **motion** is the translation of a body from one absolute place to another; relative motion the translation from one relative place to another.
In his entire discussion, Newton devotes the volume of the *Scholium* to argue that the difference between the true quantities and their relative measures is not only expected but necessary and justified. Therefore, according to Newton “space is something distinct from body and exists independently of the existence of bodies” (*Principia*, 23). Though this view is subject to contestation as it tries to materialise ‘space’ in the absence of substantial bodies. Or what Descartes would say ‘merging of internal and external spaces’.

However, there is a problem concerning the nature of absolute space. Newton differs from Descartes’ views; his notion of absolute space’s rigidity counters with Descartes’ ‘hydrodynamical’ space. As a result *absolute space* is certainly not material matter-plenum. Further, it is assumed that it is supposed to be one of the parts of the physical substances, not mental sphere. Newton explains the relation between space and substance:

> Absolute space is not a substance for it lacks actual powers and does not have a fully independent existence, and yet not an attribute since it would exist even in a vacuum, which by definition is a place where there are no bodies in which it might inhere. Newton proposes that space is what we might call a ‘pseudo-substance’, more like a substance than property, yet not quite a substance (*Principia*, 56).

We should remember that Samuel Clarke, in his *Correspondence* with Leibniz, advocates the property view, and notes further that when Leibniz objects because of the vacuum problem, Clarke suggests that there might be non-material beings in the vacuum. In fact, Newton accepted the principle that everything that exists, exists somewhere - i.e. in ‘absolute space’. Thus, he viewed ‘absolute space’ as a necessary prerequisite consequence of the existence of anything.

**Leibniz:**

Newton had argued, in his *Principia*, that the ‘absolute motion’ of bodies is to be defined and examined relative to ‘absolute space’ and time in orders to be exposed by its properties and
cause. Leibniz opposed this view, suggesting that “true motions are to be defined with respect to
the active forces that he took to be inherent in truly moving bodies.” This disagreement between
Newton and Leibniz over the nature of true motion surfaced more explicitly in their
disagreement over the nature of ‘space’ and time in the Leibniz-Claire correspondence.¹¹

We can deduce:

(1) Firstly, space and time logically and metaphysically pre-exists physical bodies and events. This
simply means although even if there were no physical bodies or events, space and time could
exist, the existence of things like planets and galaxies is not possible without space and time.
(2) Secondly, physical bodies and events exist within space and time for example actors and
actresses perform within definite(!) space and time.
(3) Although we may distinguish regions, or “parts,” of space and time, neither space nor time
strictly speaking are divisible. Simply because no region/slot of space or time could be detached,
or “pulled apart,” from any other region/slot.
(4) Ontologically speaking, space and time may be identified with attributes of God: infinite space
just is the attribute of God’s Immensity, while infinite time just is the attribute of
God’s Eternity.¹²

According to Leibniz, space and time are not mere things, as espoused by many, in which bodies
are located and move as systems of relations holding. He thus famously tells Clarke in his Third
Paper: “As for my own opinion, I have said more than once, that I hold space to be something
merely relative, as time is, that I hold it to be an order of coexistences, as time is an order of
successions” (The Leibniz-Claire Correspondence, 118).
Taking into consideration the rational view, Leibniz claims that though bodies may be placed within the spatio-temporal fabric to one another, space and time themselves must be measured as abstractions (thought to be) with respect to those relations. On one hand we see relations amongst those bodies and events are essentially fickle and consistently changing, the relations (makers of) space and time must be viewed as “determinate”, “fixed”, and “ideal”.

Kant:

Undoubtedly ‘Kantian space’, of course relative, a tool of knowledge and a means of classifying phenomenon, was yet quite plainly separated (along with time) from empirical sphere. ‘Space’, here, belonged to *a priori* realm of consciousness (i.e. subject), and partook of that realm’s internal, ideal (hence transcendental and) essentially ungraspable-structure. Here he is strictly dealing with “philosophers’ space”. He writes, “Space is not something objective and real, nor a substance, nor an accident, nor a relation; instead, it is subjective and ideal, and originates from the mind’s nature in accord with a stable law as a scheme, as it were, for coordinating everything sensed externally (*Critique of Pure Reason*, pp. 403).

This definition attempts to answer various basic questions regarding space. For instance, is ‘space’ “real,” or is it “ideal”? How? Is it a self-sufficient substance, or only a content of some larger entity/substance? How do space and the mind interact with each other? Is it somehow dependent on the relations among objects, or independent of those relations? And lastly, how do these various notions overlap one another? Kant believes:

> Space is a necessary *a priori* representation that underlies all outer intuitions. One can never forge a representation of the absence of space, though one can quite well think that no things are to be met within it. It must therefore be regarded as the condition of the possibility of appearances, and not as a determination dependent upon them, and it is an *a priori* representation that necessarily underlies outer appearances.\(^{13}\)

Though Kant seems to claim that we can represent ‘space’ as empty all right but then we cannot represent to ourselves the absence of space. Such a view would certainly challenge “relationalism” of Leibniz which espouses that “space is not independent of objects is, at least in part, founded on the claim that the very idea of space existing independently of objects is incoherent”. If at all we believe this idea to be true, we can still ask, along with Kant to
“relationalism’’ that can we conceive space to be devoid of objects? Because it is impossible for ‘space’ to be solely devoid of objects as space cannot exist independently of object.

Kant dejects the Newtonians’ notion of ‘space’ as a kind of quasi-object. He seems to return here to the classical discussion of the ontology of space mentioned at the outset of this entry. He emphasizes that on the Newtonian view, space and time are akin to substances-in that they are independent of all objects and relations, on the one hand, and independent of the mind (and of intuition), on the other-and yet lack causal relations. They are also indiscernible, and certainly in the case of space, infinite. Kant adds that the Newtonian view seems to conflict with what he calls “the principles of experience”.

Fredrick Otto: See below in Fredrick Otto’s Man and Space.

Foucault:

Foucault’s elaborations on ‘space’-heterotopias were published in an article entitled Des espaces autres (Of Other Spaces). His firm belief in ‘space’ being the most powerful and/or problematic entity is very well expressed when he said, “in any case I believe that the anxiety of our era has to do fundamentally with space, no doubt a great deal more than with time. Time probably appears to us only as one of the various distributive operations that are possible for the elements that are spread out in space.”

He has a straight and philosophically very powerful argument to offer through his concept of ‘Heterotopia’. Heterotopia denotes to places and spaces that function in non-hegemonic conditions. These are spaces of otherness, which are neither here nor there, that are simultaneously physical and mental, such as the space of a phone call or the moment when you
see yourself in the mirror. However, heterotopia also juxtaposes the binaries “neither here nor there” / “either here or there”.

As we know, utopia is an idea or an image that is not real but represents a perfected version of society. Foucault manipulates the term ‘heterotopia’ in order to suggest (describe) a different range of spaces having multitude of meaning or complicated relationships to other spaces and places than just what we perceive through the eye. In general, a heterotopia is a physical representation or approximation of a utopia, or a parallel space that contains undesirable bodies to make a real utopian space possible (like a prison). By using the metaphor of a mirror for the duality and contradictions, Foucault deconstructs reality and the unreality of utopian projects. Interestingly, on one hand a mirror is metaphor for utopia as the image one sees in it does not really exist, on the other it is also a heterotopia because the mirror is a real object that shapes the way you relate to your own image. Foucault articulates several possible types of heterotopia or spaces that exhibit dual meanings:

a) Heterotopia can be a single real place that juxtaposes several spaces. A garden is a heterotopia because it is a real space meant to be a microcosm of different environments with plants from around the world.

b) A ‘crisis heterotopia’ is a separate space like a boarding school or a motel room where activities like coming of age or a honeymoon take place out of sight.

c) ‘Heterotopias of deviation’ are institutions where we place individuals whose behaviour is outside the norm (hospitals, asylums, prisons, rest homes, cemetery).
d) ‘Heterotopias of time’ such as museums enclose in one place objects from all times and styles. They exist in time but also exist outside of time because they are built and preserved to be physically insusceptible to time’s ravages.

e) ‘Heterotopias of ritual or purification’ are spaces that are isolated and penetrable yet not freely accessible like a public place. To get in one must have permission and make certain gestures such as behaviour in Church and Temples.

f) Heterotopia has a function in relation to all of the remaining spaces. The two functions are: heterotopia of illusion creates a space of illusion that exposes every real space, and the heterotopia of compensation is to create a real space-a space that is other (Of Other Spaces, pp 7).

Human geographers, often related to the postmodernist school, have been using the term (and the author’s propositions) to help understand the contemporary emergence of (cultural, social, political, economic) difference and identity as a central issue in larger multicultural cities. The idea of place (more often related to ethnicity and gender and less often to the social class issue) as a heterotopic entity has been gaining attention in the current context of postmodern, post-structuralist theoretical discussion (and political practice) in Geography and other spatial-social sciences. Giving new turn to all the philosophical speculations so far, Foucault shows the socio-political dimension to the nature and scope of ‘space’, he says:

Despite all the techniques for appropriating space, despite the whole network of knowledge that enables us to delimit or to formalize it, contemporary space is perhaps still not entirely desanctified (apparently unlike time, it would seem, which was detached from the sacred in the nineteenth century). To be sure a certain theoretical desanctification of space (the one signaled by Galileo’s work) has occurred, but we may still not have reached the point of a practical desanctification of space. And perhaps our life is still governed by a certain number of oppositions that remain inviolable, that our institutions and practices have not yet dared to break down. These are oppositions that we regard as simple givens: for example between private space and public space, between family space and social space, between cultural space and
useful space, between the space of leisure and that of work. All these are still nurtured by the hidden presence of the sacred (The Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy: 2011).

In our discussion on communal space and the literary(fictional) spaces, we will come to this issue of desanctification of space during the high-time of communalism and its representations. Not only the space, but time too is inseparably woven here, as Foucault rightly puts it, “space itself has a history in Western experience and it is not possible to disregard the fatal intersection of time with space” (Of Other Space, 15).

3.3 Taxonomy of Space:
We are confronted by an infinite multitude of spaces, each is piled upon or perhaps contained within the other; geographical, economic, demographic, social, political, commercial, national, continental, global spaces etc. Not to mention nature’s physical space, the space of energy, so on and so forth. One can confidently say that there are as many sub-categories of space possible as there are adjectives to the noun space (personal, emotional, intellectual, castist, racial, communal etc.). However, we are more concerned with the social spaces and their political genealogies as well as their functional modes. There is always danger of the reduction of larger entity called the space to fragmented, separated, disintegrated aspects of space at the level analysis. The more we categorize space, clearer would be our idea the operational value of space.

Many philosophers and human geographers have told us that we do not live in a homogeneous and empty space, but on the contrary in a space thoroughly imbued with quantities i.e. there is always multiplicity of spaces. We need to talk about a kind of typology and categories of spaces related to particular forms of human behaviour (‘hodological space’, ‘action space’, ‘present or momentary space’, ‘human space for living together’) or more related to environmental conditions (‘day space’ and ‘night space’) or between both (‘space of good or bad moods’).
Further, if we talk about our internal and highly private spaces we can categorise them as the space of perception, dreams and our passions. On the similar note, the same internal space interacts with the surrounding spaces like water, air, land, transportation, bazaar, etc. We will take a close look these taxonomic variations of space when we investigate characters of the post 1970 Indian novels on Communal Riots.

3.4 **Representation and ‘Space’:**

Considering the issue of representation of space, the first thing that occurs to our mind is whether representation is limited to the semantic and linguistic level only. However, we are not at all ignoring the active and explicit representation of space at the time of our being there and then which may not be active agent in pushing things happen but mere a facilitator-a locus.

In the philosophical discourse on space, Kant has a very significant say in representation of space. In his *Critique* he explains what he means by ‘representation’

![Figure 2](http://kant.stanford.edu/archives/fall2009/entries/spacetime-theories/)

Kant regards an intuition as a conscious, objective representation and this is strictly distinct from any sensation, which he regards not as a representation of an object, property, event, etc., but
merely as a state of the subject. Whereas sensations do not represent anything distinct from the sensing subject (including perhaps the state of the subject’s body), intuitions are objective representations.\textsuperscript{17} Kant, further differentiates intuitions and concepts along the following lines: whereas intuitions are singular, immediate representations, concepts are general, mediate ones. Each represents properties, objects, or states of affairs, but they do so distinctly.

He starts by saying that space is not an empirical concept which has been derived from outer experiences. For in order that certain sensations be referred to something outside me (that is, to something in another region of space from that in which I find myself), and similarly in order that I may be able to represent them as outside and alongside one another, and accordingly as not only different but as in different places, the representation of space must already underlie them. Therefore, the representation of space cannot be obtained through experience from the relations of outer appearance; this outer experience is itself possible at all only through that representation.\textsuperscript{18} Space is a necessary \textit{a priori} representation that underlies all outer intuitions. One can never forge a representation of the absence of space, though one can quite well think that no things are to be met within it.

But then, what represents space? Is it possible at all to represent space by separating it from its actual temporal and substantial contexts? No doubt consciousness has a very vital role to play here, for (1) The choice of representational means itself create a new type of space which does not resemble the “original” space but which is not cut off from it either. For example, the way newspapers write about an accident; giving each and every detail of vehicle, passengers etc. but language and photograph do not create proper space of actual accident. (2) If ‘language’ is the representational means, the whole agenda of representation tends to be political practice.
Considering literary representation of space, we are entering to “fictional space” which is multilayered ‘space’: having manifest spaces on one hand and latent spaces on the other. Hence, there are three issues to be discussed; means of representation of space, political nature of language in representing space, and stands of literature as a representational space in communal discourse.

3.5 Fredrick Otto Bollnow’s *Man and Space*:

Published in 1963, *Man and Space* is an anthropological account of space claiming that today’s world is essentially based on the idea of homogenously extending space. This extension is so immense that it may take years for the light of a newly born star to reach us. Such awareness is visible in the miniature representations of all spheres of life. Thinking of space is not an ancient idea but it is a result of profound discoveries made possible only by various ways in which philosophers thought about it. Well, then there are two notions about space available to us today; ‘space’ is so self-evident that is difficult to grasp and it is not possible to make sense of it.

However, there has been absence of the dialogue between conceptualization of ‘space’ and its interpretation. Therefore, cumulatively modern day world has to re-visit ‘space’ not only with weaker historical base but also as a fresh perspective of understanding the world. Many even are not aware about ‘space’ being a gross problem today: space encroachment, problems of territorial space of countries etc.

Therefore, it is a high time to render ‘space’ as a disciplinary agenda so that we can define our social existence-social conflicts and violence. Whenever we talk about ‘knowledge’ in philosophy, we discuss epistemology. Similarly whenever we raise basic issues of art with regard to aesthetics and beauty, or be it in architecture, when houses, settlements, or even cities get
designed, isn’t ‘space’ completely key constituent? How exciting that would be if all mythological stories and legends seen from a spatial perspective which are closely associated with environmental history? We are going to discuss, in the next chapter, how a literary work can be read and interpreted by keeping mind spatial organizations of language, plot, characters, ideas etc.

In *Man and Space*, O.F. Bollnow renders a fresh stance by juxtaposing the physical and anthropological notion of space. Arguing against the idea that “space, in its primary conception can no longer be conceived as an infinite void” (Bollnow: 1963, 54). Bollnow espouses that ‘space’ is in fact “a human and ecological implant into what we nowadays consider homogenous space in physical terms, then space essentially becomes pluralistic and qualitatively bound to human environments” (Bollnow: 1963, 57). Keeping this view in mind we need to take a close look at the structure of space intimately related to human experience and behaviour (especially violent behaviour during communal riots). By that, perhaps, we would bring to earth the metaphysical notions and see it within the humane domain.

Bollnow therefore is advocating a revolution of ‘space’. Certainly it will be a paradigm shift not only in the present notion of ‘space’ but other disciplines also. One wonders what would happen to the primary ideas of knowledge of all disciplines that we claim to know because his notion presupposes ‘space’ as one of the primary aspects of human knowledge system. In this framework. His work can be considered the first of its kind to deal with the ‘anthropology of space’ in a comprehensive manner and terms. This work clearly subsides cosmological or metaphysical spaces in order to set up ‘space’ within human settlements primarily. In this,
‘human-centred’ space tends to be heterogeneous, and offers a range of possibilities to decipher multitude of spaces.

The author takes up from the tradition of the philosophy of space of his time; Bergson, Heidegger, Sartre, and Minkowsky were the people who had discussed the spatial conditions being pre-existing human existence. Besides he is also familiar with psychopathological and psychological studies done in the thirties. Philosophically, therefore, Bollnow places his studies in a wider framework. Often Bollnow’s methodology is closely related to that of phenomenology. Some critics consider his book to be speculative and non-scientific, but they perhaps do not understand that phenomenology does not construct its theories by systematic, logical calculation, but rather cultivates its clear view in a philosophical sense. The very term ‘phenomenology’ suggests that it is concerned with “the description of phenomena, being convinced that, with well-founded reflections, the studied object will reveal its pure essence” (Fontana Dictionary of Modern Thought). That is how, arguably, Bollnow, by describing ‘space’ in close relation to human behaviour and environmental conditions, seems to have discovered the essential humanistic structure of ‘space’ which was ignored before. In his entire discourse, we find human is placed at the centre of his/her environmental space.

Visibly, Bollnow has taken great impulses from the structure of the German language in conceptualizing ‘space’. As a result, significant issues in Bollnow’s discussions are actually based on the history of words, language, and thought as expressed in literature. Particularly in this sense, etymology becomes a vital source for examining concepts and architecture of ‘human space’.

The book is divided into five main chapters entitled:
1. ‘The Elementary Articulation of Space’,
2. ‘The Wide World’,
3. ‘The House and the Feeling of Security’,
4. ‘Aspects of Space’ and
5. ‘The Spatiality of Human Life’.

With a view to understand the basic argument of Bollnow’s space, we will, in the following discussion, outline his most important threads of his argument.

Bollnow tries to show, in the first chapter, how space in its origins, was not a boundless/emptiness concept, on the contrary, it was more or less clearly limited, defined, rather environmental and closely related to the history of human settlements. Space is articulated and not homogeneous as it is believed sometimes. Such a view echoes Aristotle’s bewildering discussion in the fourth book of his ‘Physics’ which is the first treatise on spatial problems in the Western philosophy. Contextualizing it to the four elements i.e. fire, air, water, earth, he assumes the “natural articulation” of ‘space’, that all elements show natural directionality, for fire and light things go upwards and earth or heavy things move downward. Emphatically, Bollnow states:

This concept differs essentially from our modern view of space because what we would understand as “place” (topos, ‘ort’ in German) appears to be hierarchically projected from a local to a cosmic dimension and thus shows extension, which Bollnow compares to a container. This means Aristotle’s view is never one of endless mathematical space but is limited in its utmost extension to the void delimited by the heaven’s vault (Man and Space, pp 33).

Bollnow is one of those philosophers whose ideas heavily depend on the etymological aspects of words of the idea under scrutiny. He explains in detail by citing many examples of everyday use
of words related to space and place. He demonstrates that the roots of the word are closely associated to ‘dwelling’ in general, to the orderly human environment in particular.

Thus, the word “Raum” when used with a definite or indefinite article suggests the rooms of a house, to buildings which is not compatible with open-air locations. And if used with no article, it is also related to the human environment, meaning space for movement between things or objects. It is noticeable here only at the second stage the concept of “Raum” appears with extended meanings. Likewise these words are constantly applied to objects of the human environment, e.g., “Ort” (localization originally alluding to pointed things like spears used as place markers or pointed landforms like cape, etc. or “Stelle” (basically related to some building construction, furniture etc.) or “Fleck” (horizontal extension of land, marketplace, etc.). Bollnow argues for environmental origins of the space rather than metaphysical or cosmological which has far reaching consequences in our whole concept of man and space. In other words, Bollnow advocates a dramatic conversion of “space” being a mental thing to a physical-environmental thing.

Bollnow dedicates following section to deal with directional elements of ‘space’. Here too, he cleverly “deconstructs” established systems, e.g., axiality. Aristotle, too, described directional concepts (e.g. above-below, in front-behind, right-left) which are exponents of heterogeneity as contradictory to that of homogeneity. On one hand they are merely interpreted in terms of abstract linear axial systems but needed to be related to objective reality on the other. Bollnow observes that ground and air are two entirely different “half-spaces”, necessarily complementary to human life. If the ground loses its quality of support, human existence is threatened for sure. May be that is where Bollnow has his say in what we call vulnerability of ‘space’ during
communal affairs. As it brings into picture the essential relationship of ‘space’ ideology and moral values, and get manifested in the pairs like, ‘front and back’ and ‘right and left’. Cultural history becomes ‘dangerous space’ motivating or bearing communalism in relation to the spatial organization of the various environmental elements used.

In his humane concept of space, Bollnow introduces a very significant notion of zero or fixed points. These fixed points are the places we depart from or return to. They are temporary zero points (e.g. hotel room in foreign city). Such points are essential references within a subjective system of orientation. It not only echoes Foucault’s concept of heterotopia but also makes it the “centre” of space. Fixed points are starting points to the thinking of space per se; as it could be that philosopher’s space we refer again and again in order to make sense of not so fixed spaces. As he explains, “if we move out of our apartment to a new one, our whole world is newly reorganized from the new one.” (Man and Space, 58) The place for dwelling is the fixed point because ultimately the very act of dwelling remains the same irrespective of the old or new place-space. One wonders about nature of those fixed points that affect in any manner the act of social and communal violence and its repercussions. Nobody is allowed to enter a dwelling without the dweller’s consent. People are very protective about their private space; private spaces get threatened, molested, destroyed etc. during communal turmoil. Houses, societies and temples essentially belong to this type of endangered spaces.

**Hodological Space:**

The term ‘hodological space’ is derived from the Greek word ‘hodos’ meaning path or way. In contrast to the mathematical concept of space as presented on maps, plans, etc. ‘hodological space’ is based on the factual topological, physical, social, and psychological conditions a person
is faced with on the way from point A to point B, whether in an open landscape or within closed or planned conditions. This is opening of a new debate in the communal space; as to what kind of movement take place during motion that takes place in a person’s life when s/he tries to make a move from his/her religious, communal, territorial, individual (gender) space to another set of similar spaces.

**The Space of Action:**

In extension of the hodological concept, Bollnow distinguishes and describes ‘the space of action’ which is a three-dimensional ergological concept of space, structured and organized according to any type of human work (stockroom, warehouse, craft, place of study, library, etc.). His observations on this type of ‘space’ are significant: spatial environments are organized by individuals to only a limited extent. We all are born into them, learn to understand the intrinsic values that govern them and adapt to them in terms of ‘orderly behaviour’. We all know to some extent the requirements of “good upbringing”. The question here is, how does this make sense of communal affairs? Well, if at all we are able to understand, somehow, what the spaces of action that a community, knowingly or unknowingly, teaches to its members, we might be in a position to come to bold conclusion.

**Spatiality of Human Life:**

The fifth chapter gives a theoretical synthesis of what was found during the preceding chapters. There are three sections (‘to be in space and to have space’, ‘types of individual space’, ‘summary and prospect’). Initially, Bollnow questions the concept of perceptional psychology (intentional space) and gives his own definition of space as an ambivalent “medium” which is
dialectically constructed between subject and environment, between human (physical and psychological) disposions and environmental conditions.

The main discussion questions the existentialists’ position (Heidegger, Sartre) of being “thrown” into the world. Bollnow summarizes his own findings, maintains that dwelling implies having roots somewhere, means to be at home and protected at a particular place, and that the spatiality of man in general can be interpreted as “dwelling”. He then presents his own typology of ‘individual space’ consisting of ‘three domains of dwelling’ (‘body’, ‘house,’ and ‘open space’) and finds his standpoint supported by behavioural studies of zoology and animal psychology (animals do not live freely in a homogeneous space, but have fixed points within defined territories from which they depart and to which they return for rest and protection). This is contrasted with the fear of homelessness, which gives the feeling of being lost. This again is countered by the institution of the house to provide protection, but since no protection is absolute, the consciousness of a higher level of security in larger spatial dimensions is of importance.

Obviously, Bollnow’s philosophical standpoint opposes existentialism’s giving priority to “protecting space”.

We have followed the essential lines of Bollnow’s study on ‘Man and Space’, trying to give an impression of his large and profound study. It has been clearly shown that Bollnow’s home is philosophy, in particular phenomenology with its admirable curiosity for the many aspects of this important theme. On the other hand, he does not give the impression that studies of human experience of space are merely a philosophical problem. On the contrary, he extends his research
into psychology, into human behaviour and the conventional domains of architecture: dwelling
in a building, in an apartment, in a house.

3.6 Henri Lefebvre’s Social Space:

‘Space’ is a social construct and social space is always dynamic, constituted by social relations.
It might consist of contradictory, even conflictual spaces, it is never one space but many spaces.
When we look at Indian social space with reference to the communal space, we are interested in
studying whether ‘space’ is about the power to control, to access representation and to use
communalism. After anthropological account of space, we have Lefebvre espousing the concept
of ‘social space’ which he believes:

Social space is not a thing among other things nor a product among other products; rather, it
subsumes things produced, and encompasses their interrelationships in their coexistence and
simultaneity-their (relative) order and/or (relative) disorder. It is the outcome of a sequence
and set of operations, and thus cannot be reduced to the rank of a simple object. At the same
time there is nothing imagined, unreal or ‘ideal’ about it as compared, for example, with
science representations, ideas or dreams but It is itself the outcome of past actions, social
space is what permits fresh actions to occur, while suggesting others prohibiting yet others.
Among these actions, some serve production, others consumption. Social space implies a great
diversity of knowledge (The Production of Social Space, pp. 34).

Further, he adds to it by saying that social space contains a great diversity of objects, both natural
and social, including the networks and pathways which facilitate the exchange of material things
and information. Such objects are not only just things but relations. Keeping these and other
ideas of Lefebvre, we want to see how social spaces interpenetrate one another and/or
superimpose themselves upon one another while producing a set of communal spaces.
Interestingly, we need to take a close look at how communal space affects the space of everyday
life-social spaces. Subsequently, let’s consider mainly how do victims of communal riots react to
a new ‘social space’ produced after riots and the vice versa. Do they still feel the same space of
local area; space of street and home, economic spaces, relational spaces; neighborhood etc.?
Thus, Lefebvre’s concept of space, though based primarily of Marxist ideology, opens up a range of further explorations around social space. Besides, we will study the intricacy of relationship among social, political, historical and psychological spaces.

3.7 Communal Space:

Defining communalism poses a complex problem for historians in contemporary India. On the one hand is the barrier posited by the communal tradition itself, which has endeavoured, with considerable success, to reduce the ‘nation’ to the ‘community’. The partition of India expresses the formidable successes of this tradition. On the other hand, there is a historical (not merely historiographical) confusion between ‘nation’ and ‘community’, which underlies the evolution of the modern nation-state and the subjective reactions to the Industrial Revolution. For instance, Bipan Chandra’s definition:

Simply put, communalism is the belief that because a group of people follow a particular religion, they have, as a result, common social, political and economic interests”- could be rephrased to define the phenomenon of nationalism as well, leaving us none the wiser. Third, the object of our study distorts and challenges our chronological sensibility. 19

‘Communal space’ refers to a set of fluid cultural landscape of laws, customs, and beliefs that form the geographies of our lives. It is a spatio-temporal awareness of belonging and not-belonging to a definite community/sect and belief. Communal space is both container/milieu of a group of people as well as a kind of collective-subjective setting in which communal feelings/ideologies and riots occur. It is something that is innate in a very general sense but it can be taught, forced upon, created, shown etc. in a very narrow sense. The boundaries between one’s community and those who are not part of the community are so sharply drawn and this becomes aggression toward the “other”.

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Locating ‘communal space’ is treacherous act of naming the causes of communal violence which might not be consistent in the subsequent riot. However, it enables us to understand what happens to individual-space, gender-space, community-space, religious-space, socio-political space, geographical-urban-space, virtual-space, art-literary space etc. during communal riots. For example, are they represented through the stereo-types of communal activities-riots; (mis)quoting of history, attacks on women, children and infants, the aim of wiping out the “enemy” and hence physical destruction (of lives, property, tools for work, and standing crops) on a massive scale; gang-rape, the unashamed participation of the police; the hanging of “enemy” people found on trains or buses passing through the affected area etc?

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Violence

Prejudices

Fear
Communal Space

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A. Social Spaces

B. Psychological Spaces

C. Political Spaces

Representation

History

Physical Body

We/They

Memory

Rumours
Social Spaces:

Social space, along with what Lefebvre said, is sum total of all the social institutions (religion, community, business, education, arts etc.) on the one hand and their interactions with one another on the other. This also includes the products and by-products of those interactions like exploitation, violence, space-encroachments, tradition versus modernity dichotomy etc.

1. Religion:

Religion is a maker of group identity and is frequently interwoven with nationalism, ethnicity, culture and politics. Modern India has a considerable history of how religion gets manipulated during communal violence; as it particularly takes shape of a cycle of violence when groups exchange of reciprocal violent acts. Such events have given birth to religious hatred that is, as put by a 19th century American magazine, “the fiercest passion that rages in the breast of man.” However, it is not easy to separate religious hatred from other kinds of hatred. As Sudhir Kakar observes:

The conflict between Hindus and Muslims in the territory that today in India and Pakistan has often been seen by historians as the consequence of competing economic interests or as the negotiations of political power. For the Hindu, nationalist, however, the conflict is squarely religious, indeed theological (Colours of Violence, 13).

Some scholars, though, believe that the way religion absolutizes reality gives birth to the ‘space’ of religious hatred because ultimately that is religious rigidity (in believe the truth maker). Here comes into picture two aspects of the same religion; one being extremist or fanatic and the other stands for more liberal and humanitarian aspects—progressive. The fanatic dictates terms to the people literally by misquoting the scriptures whereas the progressive one rationalizes them and modifies them to suit their needs. Many a times it is not the inter-religious conflict that turn into
violence i.e. between Hindus and Muslims but it is intra-religious i.e. between two aspects of the same religion: fanatic versus progressive.

2. **Community:**

The dictionary of sociology defines ‘community’ as “groups of people who share common interests, beliefs and values and who may interact only in some mediated way”. There may be many social, institutional or organizational merits of community formation, but the very act of ‘community formation’ is the act of violence. Because assuming a group of people -community- separate from the other, is the act of drawing boundaries leading them to territorial consciousness and possession. Consequently, it gives a way to the feeling of protection of the “other-community” which may or may not be aware of the “assumed attack” but experiencing the same feeling of protection. ‘Danger to anybody from my community is a danger to the whole community in general and to me in particular’ gets scribbled in the communal constitution.

3. **Identity:**

One of the most crucial issues today is the threat to ‘identity’. Identity is what we conceive or pretend to conceive and others perceive. There are more psychological basis of identity construction but we will also look at its social manifestations. In fact there are many misnomers prevailing about identity; like it is often considered to be a ‘property’ that one can have and lose, instead, it is, as rightly put by Bidyut Chakrabarty, “it is what we are and mode of our being”. One thing that modernity could not liberate, despite illusionary promises, is sense of safe play of identity, especially communal identity. Pursuits of defining communalism and communal identity have complicated these categories further. However, considering the overall discourse
on formation of communal identity, we have some interesting concepts, as Bidyut Chakrabarty believes:

Communal identity is a constructed category because communities continually recreate themselves. Its extent is however limited. The fluidity of communal identities is not completely free-floating but relates to conceptions of time and space, and the relationship between histories, cultures and biographies. That communal identity is open to change also confirms that identity is no more than relatively stable construction in an on-going process of social activity.\(^\text{20}\)

There is a kind of inherent paradox in the very formation of communal identity, as on one hand it gives sense of self-protection from the supposed threat of the other community but the same assumption is reciprocated by the other group on the other. But real problems occur when some identities are deprived of their rights (legal or otherwise), humiliated, discriminated, harassed, slaughtered etc. Having recognized this, compelling resistance and articulation take place in various forms and activities within a given society. When we look at what one gains or losses by one’s communal identity, we realise that gains are a few (that too in the hands of very few politically powerful) and loss is immeasurable. Apparently, we have religious identities as Hindus, Muslims, Sikhs etc. putting all these communities in direct competition. In the east, we have multidimensional communal identities against western monodimensional one; we have caste identity inevitably woven with religious one and we have professional identities attached to the caste identity.

Gender identity is endangered brutally during communal violence. It is the ‘feminine space’ and the spaces around the females that are targeted first due to their vulnerability and due to psychological factor of spoiling enemy’s mother/sister/wife/daughter etc. and taking sadistic pleasure out of it.

4. **Economics:**
The potentialities of ‘communal’ identities have been exploited by the educated elite from both the communities. If we observe the victims of any communal riot, most of them are from economically backward classes irrespective of their community. Increasingly, in the backdrop of deepening economic debacle, communal riots are engineered with financial support by the rich people of both the communities. There is no doubt that so-called “religion” is the instrumental tool to communalism but the immediate support to it is the economic and business rivalry. As Asghar Ali Engineer cites an interesting example:

In the Jabalpur riot, the apparent cause was the ‘elopement’ of a Hindu girl with a Muslim boy. However, although it brought the powerful religio-cultural prejudices between the two communities into play (the local newspapers, it must be noted, play a very important role by spreading rumours and playing up such prejudices), it was not the real reason. The real reason lies elsewhere. The Muslim boy was the son of a local bidi magnate who had gradually succeeding in establishing control over this development. It was not insignificant that the bidi industry belonging to the Muslims in Jabalpur suffered heavily during the riots (Engineer: 1997, 145).

Economic competition between two communities often leads to the social tension which can easily turn into communal tension by exploiting certain situations on the occasion of religious festivals etc. One of the most significant reasons why Varanasi, Jamshedpur, Allahbad, Moradabad, Aligargh, Bhiwandi, Malegaon, Godhara etc. have been communally very sensitive areas, is that the majority people living in these towns belong to the lower middle classes so their religio-cultural behaviour can easily be polarized by the elites. There is another example of Bhawandi Riots in Maharashtra in 1970 shows how municipal politics had direct bearing on communal violence due to economic support rendered by the upper classes who own power-looms there. Thus, economic imbalance or lack of equal economic opportunity or benefits of being economically powerful do affect ‘communal space’ vitally.

5. **Festivals:**
The celebration of religious festivals is a very powerful occasion in any culture; Indian culture in particular is wholeheartedly devoted to it. However, in recent times we have noticed that these celebrations are most vulnerable spaces for communal conflict because they not only provide an open space to people to attack but also people to be attacked. To add to this, there is so much of “emotionalism” attach to these religious festivals and places that one wonders whether these people are really “spiritual”! The famous example that we will discuss in the next chapter is that of how a communal riot is triggered playing music before a mosque and slaughtering of cows (Tamas).

Religious festivals may manifest religious feeling of the people but simultaneously they also show the sense of insecurity from the “other” community or threat to the vanishing of their religion. That is why perhaps, they try to assert themselves as members of community more and more loudly (sometimes to hit the other’s religious sentiment only). Besides, the space of festivals is more often than not an open space which gives ample opportunities for the engineering and execution of the riots. The psychological factor of “mob-mentality” also affects the process. May be because such festivals are celebrated near religious places (near God, so to say!), the very aim of wiping out enemy and his/her God completely might help to satisfy rioter’s deep psychological urge.

B. Psychological Spaces:

Psychological spaces refer to aspects of mind and behaviour that influence one’s sense of communalism both at individual and collective level. If communal space considered is to be human affair, psychological space is the explanation of why some people behave in particular
ways only. We will take close look at the issues like violence, prejudice, rumour, we/they attitude, memory etc.

1. **Violence:**

Violence has always been a human (animal) instinct to protect primarily, for huger subsequently and for erasing the “other” lastly. Communal space is manifested at its peak during the communal violence. The downside of community is that the strength of social bonds within, it is often matched by ill-feeling to those outside the community. ‘Communal violence’, as defined in the dictionary of sociology, “is often used to denote widespread murderous attacks by one group (usually defined by religion and ethnicity) on its neighbours, where what is at stake are not national boundaries but the relative power and prestige of groups within the state.”

2. **Prejudices:**

Communal prejudice has a vital role in the formation of communal space. Prejudice is an attitude that predisposes a person to think, feel and act in biased ways towards a group and its individual members. Certain negative traits are first associated with members of the other group and all individuals are then presumed to have those objectionable qualities ascribed to that group. Prejudice results in five types of rejective behaviour; talking ill of other group with friends, avoidance, discrimination, physical attack, and its extreme form, it leads to a desire for the extermination of the other group. N.C. Saxena, believes that:

> An average Hindu’s prejudice against the Muslim community is because of his/her misconceived perception of firstly, the attempts made by the Muslim rulers in medieval times to destroy Hindu culture; secondly, the separatist role played by the Muslims in the freedom struggle; thirdly, their refusal to modernise themselves and accept the uniform civil code, family planning etc. and lastly, their having extra-territorial loyalties. After the riots, many Hindu rioters feel that they have avenged the plundering of Somnath temple by Mahmud Ghazni. An incident which had taken place ten centuries before was still fresh in the minds of the Hindus and in their perception, an attack on the present day population of Muslims meant vindicating
themselves against Mahmud of Ghazni (The Nature and Origin of Communal Riots in India, 55).

He argues that our school-text books are themselves full of prejudices and unfortunately encourage anti-Muslim feelings by teaching and admiring culture and value of the majority community. He does not stop just by detailing Hindu prejudices but also discusses Muslim prejudices:

Muslim prejudice against the Government and the majority community is deprived from their heightened sense of discrimination in jobs, from a belief that conscious efforts are being made to wipe out their language and culture, and that the Hindu communal groups are always conspiring to perpetrate genocide on them (ibid, 65).

Thus, prejudices create mind-set that not only helps form communal space but also complicates the existing model of communal space. These reciprocal prejudices of two communities maintain constant ‘fear’; and that fear is responsible for all political decisions. Prejudice has close relation to ‘rumours’ spread during the communal tension.

3. **Rumours:**

Rumours are vehicles by which prejudices travel and get firmly established in the communal mind. Inter-community rumours play very significant roles in the development and sustenance of communal hatred during riots. These rumours have multiple genealogies like purposeful political engineering, experience of the past, basic human nature of assuming certain kinds of behaviour from the enemies, insecurity etc. Besides these “rumours” have, partially or totally, close allies with truth and one is never sure when they are not part of the truth; that triggers importance of rumours. During riots, practically, nobody has guts to verify any rumour with empirical tools. There are some rumours keep recurring during all the riots like: great money is coming from abroad to plan riots against us, Muslims have extra-territorial relations with Pakistan, people in
some areas having weapons hidden in their homes, they are targeting our women etc. Rumours instigate people against one another and language and media have very mean roles to play in this.

4. **“We v/s They”**:  
“We v/s They” is a syndrome that works across communal activities; people start territorizing themselves according to the common distinguishing archetypes of their respective community. One is never sure whether it is something to do with partition but it certainly has connections with the very idea of community formation; protection and elimination of the other. The nature of communal prejudice and violence depends heavily on the extent to which “we” is distanced from “they” and particularly it rapidity.

5. **Memory**:  
The space of memory has great role to play in the full fledged development of communal space or one can say that communal space is based on this memory-space. Communalism is frequently regarded as a part of the medieval heritage. Subsequently partition added fuel to the fire in the sense that collective memory got fractured. India has faced hundreds of riots and each riot is linked with previous riot/s in many ways and sometimes a new riot gets triggered only by recalling bitter experiences of the earlier riots. Thus, very explicitly at times, memory of previous riots is used as stimuli to provoke people. Besides, often memory of personal loss is used to avenge another community by involving one’s entire community. Reason is it takes longer time to forget painful memory and it is vulnerable to any number of accesses; each access rekindles the flame.

C. **Political Spaces:**
Political spaces refer to very essential domains of power-mechanisms: trying to control, manipulate and exploit various spheres of life and society. It is obvious, after Foucault, that no human act is apolitical. However, it is worth studying how the intricate relationship between covert and overt political agendas constantly at work in fostering violence. Communal violence is largely governed by issues like ideology, democracy, secularism, religious organizations, power-play etc.

1. **Ideology:**

Recent past has witnessed tremendous chaos due to assertion and change of certain political ideologies across the world. It is difficult to put ‘ideology’ under a single bottom-line proposition not because of insufficient discourse of ideology but it is likely to be political choice of meaning that one chooses from the varied inherent meanings that the term carries. Terry Eagleton provides a random list of definitions currently in circulation i.e. ideology is:

- the process of production of meanings, signs and values of social life;
- a body of ideas characteristic of a particular social group of class;
- ideas which help to legitimate a dominant political power;
- systematically distorted communication;
- that which offers a position for a subject;
- forms of thought motivated by social interests;
- identity thinking;
- socially necessary illusion;
- the conjuncture of discourse and power;
- the medium in which conscious social actors make sense of their world;
• action-oriented sets of beliefs;
• the confusion of linguistic and phenomenal reality;
• semiotic closure;
• the indispensable medium in which individuals live out their relations to a social structure;
• the process whereby social life is converted to a natural reality.

Ideology as a space of thinking is closely related to philosophy on one hand but differs from it in the sense that it (additionally) polarizes the understanding after describing the world (the function philosophy). Ideology is an inevitable constituent of communal space; post 1970 India has observed meticulously planned and targeted communal violence. For example, after partition ‘nationalist’, ‘separatist’, “secularist” ideologies have been playing malicious roles at various levels of communal space of India.

2. **Secularism:**

Secularism is the dangerous terrain where ‘politics’ and ‘religion’ meet and made separate (intentionally). Since it is believed that communalism originated in the late nineteenth century in India, it is necessary to revisit Gandhi as an early important critic on secularism. Bipan Chandra, explains how Gandhi played key role in the development of thinking on secularism India. Gandhi was basically and fully secular despite being deeply religious is well-known, as also that he wanted India to be a secular democratic state. For example, he said in 1947 that “the state was bound to be wholly secular” and that “state of our conception must be a secular, democratic state.” And he asserted on 9 August 1942: “Free India will be no Hindu Raj, it will be Indian Raj based not on the majority of any religious sect or community but on the representatives of the
whole people without distinction of religion.” Additionally, he wrote in 1940 his vision on free India: “India is a big country, a big nation composed of different cultures, which are tending to blend with one another, each complementing the rest.” And he had already written in 1909 in the Hind Swaraj: “In no part of the world are one nationality and one religion synonymous terms; nor has it ever been so in India.” Gandhiji had, moreover, a holistic, modern understanding of secularism. In India, as elsewhere, secularism has come to be defined in four terms. Bipan Chandra explains Gandhian Secularism:

A. Religion should not intrude into politics; there should be separation of religion from politics, economy, education and large areas of social life and culture; and religion should be treated as a private or personal affair of the individual. To talk of any other, so-called Indian, definition of secularism, which would repudiate this, would be to deny secularism. At the same time, secularism does not, of course, mean removing religion from life itself or antagonism to religion. Nor does a secular state mean a state where religion is discouraged.

B. In a multi-religious society, secularism also means that the state should be neutral towards all faiths or, as many religious persons would put it, the state should show equal regard for all faiths, including atheism.

C. Secularism further means that the state must treat all citizens as equal and must not discriminate in favour of or against citizens on grounds of their religion.

D. Secularism has another feature specific to India. In India, secularism arose as the ideology of uniting all the Indian people vis-a-vis colonialism and as a part of the process of nation-making. Simultaneously, communalism developed as the most divisive social and political force. Consequently, secularism also came to mean a clear-cut opposition to communalism (Chandra: 2004).
Considering the present scenario of secularism and Indian state, above said ideals remained only on paper. Democracy in India could not cope up with ‘secularism’ the way it should be operated within all aspects of political spheres. As Ashish Nandy argues:

One could be secular either by being equally disrespectful towards all religions or by being equally respectful towards them. Indian meaning (of secularism) recognizes that even a state is tolerant of religions, it need not lead to religious tolerance in a society. For tolerance by the state cannot guarantee tolerance in society. State tolerance may ensure, in short run, the survival of a political community.²²

Thus, there is a vast gulf between democratic promises and actual practices of it which, being the important part of political space caters to the development of the communal space.

4. **Religious Organizations:**

When we say ‘religious organizations’, certainly what we have in mind is those organizations having ties with commitment to various political aspirations. They help in maintaining the status quo of communalism; time and again they let themselves manipulated by politicians to fulfil some or the other political agendas. We have seen long history of Babri controversies wherein almost all the major Hindu, Muslim, Buddhist, Jaina organizations started claiming the disputed places. We are going to discuss Tamas with reference to how religious organizations became training schools for communal violence after partition and 1970. Religions organizations are the manifest workers of latent political engineering of communal turmoil; as they help in aroused in people hitherto forgotten or ignored “religiosity”. Many times under the pretext of security also people are made part of the organization and thus vulnerable to other organizations.

5. **Power:**

Is there any political activity which is devoid of ‘power’ and the other way round? It is not that we are trying to blame an invisible-abstract enemy for communal violence but the basic idea of a craving, assertion and exercise of power does make ‘communal space’ even more complex and
gruesome. For example, why is it so that any communal riot of India is found to be closely associated with the local politics? Political space exists because of the inherent element of power-play. One community wants to prove, directly or symbolically, that it is more powerful than the other and so capable of wiping the “other”. As we have discussed above, the very act of community formation is based on this ideology of being more powerful. The change of political party in rule also leads to the change in distribution of communal power. When one feels to have no power of absolute power, one feels frightened or frightening at psychological level.

3.8 Fictional Space:

Fictional space here emphatically refers to the space of literature; space that it shares with (1) history and socio-political context, (2) aesthetics of the time and (3) the intersections of author, text, language and reader. Literature is often considered as social institution; being spectator or a participant and both at the same time (in the case of fiction written on communal riots.) Important questions are: is fictional space an imaginative refuge to the reality? Isn’t it then a creation of another sub-space(!) that might be as cruel as the space of reality? As it really disturbs when we read Riot, Lajja, Tamas etc. not as much as for their narration but for their hinges to the kind of ‘space’ they indicate. If that is the case, it is fascinating to study various gives and takes of responsibility/authority of fictional spaces. It might endanger the “liberal”, “innocent”, “just stories” components of literature-fiction, so be it. Besides, space takes on an altogether different stand when we revisit basic terminology of literature like ‘narrative technique’, ‘plot’, ‘literariness’, ‘metaphors’, ‘characters’ etc.
Primarily, we will try to juxtapose the concept of fictionality with the suggested-denotative world of authors in order to reach up to some kind of basic assumptions of literature about communalism which might lead us to explore a totally fresh dimension: spatial and fictional strategies of communal violence.

3.9 **Space as Category v/s Space as Perspective:**

On the one hand we can say that space has never been a category of studying literature and it was only space that we have studied so far on the other. That is to say looking at space and looking through it. In the chapter that follows we will try to use the spatial perspectives of (a) literary (imagi)nation, (b) heterotopia and riots in the fiction, (c) historical vulnerability, (d) linguistic modes of narrating the violence, (e) communal activities and authorial presence, (f) archetypes of communal violence etc.

3.10 **Space and Literary Narratives:**

Considering the theory of space in various domains, it becomes pertinent now to see how it works in a literary narrative because that is what we ultimately aim at. In his *Toward a Theory of Space in Narrative* Gabriel Zoran gives spatial reading of literary text. Here we have developed a spatial perspective of reading literary narrative based on his model. Zoran classifies three major levels of ‘space’ and textuality of literature:

1. **The Topographical Level**
2. **The Level of Chronotopic Structure**
3. **The Level of Textual Structure**

*1. The Topographical Level:***
The topographical (from *topos*, referring to ‘space’ per se and *graphic* denoting an outline) level accounts for a kind of map based on a range of elements of the whole text. It gives us overall spatial structure of the text, both factual and fictional, connections of the world. Providing horizontal structure of the world: relationships such as inside and outside, far and near, center and periphery, city and village etc. Topographical level contains ‘quality of the locations of things.’ These qualities can be patterns of colours, substances, types of objects, belonging, geographical area, semiotic systems within the plot of the text.

Unlike the topographical maps in reality, this map can structure space ontologically either; that is to say, space can be understood according to the mode of existence of its units. Zoran gives an interesting example and says, “the world of God-sacred-up and the world of man-profane-down. They can be related through virtual space; as in the world of dream and the reality in the text”. Characters in a literary narrative have dual role as far as torpographics is concerned because on one hand they are physical entities and they have their specific functions within the story on the other.

2. *The Level of Chronotopic Structure:*

The level of chronotopic (from *chromos*-time and *topos*-space) structure imposed on space by events and movements i.e. by spacetime. ‘Chronotopos’ is used in literature by Bakhtin to signify the complex of space and time together, including physical objects, events, psychology, history etc. As an effect of chronotopos on the structure of the space: within chronotopos, we can include the synchronic and diachronic relationships:

2.1 *Synchronic Relations: Motion and Rest*
At every point of the narrative, at every synchronic situation, some objects may be found at rest (static) and others in motion (dynamic). Hence, it is really fascinating to read a literary text from a synchronic relations viewpoint wherein one explores the static and dynamic elements, ideas, characters etc. Being in rest (static) is a state of being bound to a particular spatial context by force sometimes whereas being in motion (dynamic) suggests mobility of characters or ideology among various spatial contexts by choice or force. Besides, in a literary text, static and dynamic elements can be replaced with each other for various needs of the plot. So, it is quite possible that character of physical entity is static during a given point in time and becomes active and dynamic in the other. They are complimentary too; dynamic elements are dynamic due to stillness of the static elements and the vice versa.

2.2 Diachronic Relations: Directions, Axes, Powers

Space in its topographical level is all neutral and passive with regard to direction, and one may move in it, from and to any point. It is a movement of motion across the junctures of time and space. Additionally, diachronic relations of space make us aware of the simultaneity of the events happenings on the axes of movements along with their points of departure and arrival, the nature these shifts, reasons for mobility to name a few.

Axes of movement

A

Point of departure

B

Point of arrival
Space at chronotopic level is structured as a network of axes having definite directions and a
definite character. Axes may or may not be determined by motions which actually take place in
the world of the text. Journey which starts from point A to B can also deviate from point A to C,
D or E and may or may not reach point B; in that case the dynamic nature of chronotopos is to be
understood differently. An actual movement is a result of several factors: power, will,
impediment, ideal, character’s intentions, destiny etc. A character’s journey from one place to
another might be seen as his/her dialogue with the constantly changing spaces around him/her.
So, when we look at a literary text, we are more concerned with a conception of the entire space
in terms of a field f powers rather than focusing an occasional movement on a neutral
topographical situation.

3. The Level of Textual Structure:

The structure is imposed on space by the fact that it is signified within the verbal text. A great
care must be taken here, in the sense that structure under discussion is not the text itself as a
verbal medium nor that of its linguistic materials but rather an organization of the reconstructed
world. This structure is applied to the world though is not derived from it.

3.1 The Selectivity of Language and its Effects

Essentially writers choose to talk about some characters and events in great detail by minimizing
others. Such choice of language within the spatial frame of the text is to be understood in the
light of the effects that it creates on the other characters’ spaces.

3.2 The Linearity of the Text

Here we need to ask, how does a text pass from one unit of space to another? What effects doe
the order of transmission of information have on the image of the space and the way it is
reconstructed? The text supplies information about concrete local items which compare space as well as about the wider global contexts within which these items are structured. When the global information appears at an early stage in description, the concrete items join later on, and the picture takes on a unified characters.

3.3 The Perspectival Structure

‘Here-there’ relationships occur in two ways: between the location of the act of narration and the “world” as a whole; and, within the “world”, between things perceived at a certain instant as in foreground and those perceived as in the background. Those two “here-there” relationships are parallel to two types of coordination system of language; the deictic system whose center-hero is the spatio-temporal location of the speech act, and the intrinsic system whose center is any point in the world chosen for that purpose.

On the basis of what we have discussed on three levels of space of literary narrative, we can deduce the following tabular frame:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Level of Space</th>
<th>Basic unit of space</th>
<th>Narrative Text</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Topographical Level</td>
<td>Places</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Chronotopical Level</td>
<td>A zone of action</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Textual Level</td>
<td>A field of vision</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

[Table is based on Zoran’s layout]

A. Places:
Places are manifestations of topographical patterns like houses, cities, streets, fields, mountains, forests etc. A place is a certain point, plane or volume, spatially continuous and with fairly distinct boundaries or else surrounded by a spatial partition separation it from other spatial units. They serve as the space very much available whereon events and actions occur.

**B. A Zone of Actions:**

A zone of actions is chronotopical layer which allows events and action to take place. It has not only to do with the place where they occur but also, to large extent, this zone of actions deals with the events happening before and after to the given event. Several events may take place in the novel at the same place e.g. a room and the same event take place various places e.g. in hotel, street, temple etc.

**A Field of Vision:**

A field of vision can be seen as a spatial viewpoint, for example during a telephonic conversation taking place in a room can be seen as a space of room as well as space of action-conversation. Field of vision is best understood with regard to events happening “here” and not “there”. Reading of a literary narrative makes us face space directly as the field of vision changes as the reader progresses through the text, and the arrangement of fields of vision within the reconstruction of world itself.

**Concept of Total Space:**

Total space denotes to those spatial elements that no field of vision provides to the readers. In other words, they are not “shown” but “suggested”. That is how total space exists beyond the boundary of the space presented by a text. It is impossible to imagine space as anything other
than total. Naturally, for the purpose of study we may focus on a set of sections of space but at the same time we regard them as parts of a larger space.

*Total Space from the Topographical point of view:*

It answers to the question: where does it happen? It is essential to locate the entire system within some larger space. Moreover, it is also related to the assumptions of the text about the nature of the world in general.

*Total Space from the Chronotopic point of view:*

It can be perceived as the static background against which the plot unfolds itself. For example, *Paradise Lost* covers entire cosmological system of the Renaissance.
Total Space from the Textual point of view:

It refers to how the text constructs the totality of the space with language and other tools of expressions. In other words a text “represents” the “present” of the total space, it talks about “here” elements of the world from “there” as part of the total space.

It is in this light of the spatial theory of literary narrative that we would like to take a close look at some of the thematic aspects of the communal violence in the select Indian novels in English. We will also take a close look at what happens when two spaces collide! For examples, the communal space v/s gender space, religious space v/s democratic-liberal space, space of violence v/s space of peace. In all these, there is one space that is a category and other being a perspective.

Conclusion

In literary studies, there are by and large, few traditional approaches of interpreting a text; biographical, textual, reception etc. catering to the author, text and reader respectively. Spatial analysis of a literary text is a comprehensive method of reading a text by taking all the traditional approaches on one hand and overlooking them at the same time. For, it has potential to be holistic investigation without the burden of unnecessary ideological subscriptions. ‘Space’ is not only the relative physical reality but it is a human experience of relations amongst objects, and, most importantly the manipulations of it. To be very precise, we are trying to understand the dynamic relationship among geography, culture, literature and communal violence; and all these can meet at a common ground i.e. ‘space’.

This chapter has tried to outline various concepts of ‘space’ spread across disciplines, which is a work in progress, there are many ideas tentative in nature or on their way to formulate a theoretical framework. The actualization of this frame can be seen in the next chapter.
End Notes:

1. Kant, in his *Inaugural Dissertation* explains how Kant replied that there are certain conditions governing the way in which anything is representable through the imagination in spatial terms.

2. Language is undoubtedly a vital phenomenon in understanding various nuances of existence; as it is not only the agency for communication but also faculty of thinking enabling us to make sense of what we are. Language functions as an auxiliary in blending perception (sensory and otherwise) to the idea of existence. On the other hand ‘perception’ pushes language in operating itself in a more meaningful manner. Of course, the concept of ‘existence’ works as a sole proprietor of both.


5. While some philosophers, such as Telesio, Campanella, and Bruno, held space to be always filled with matter (i.e., a plenum) yet somehow independent of matter, others, like Patrizi and Gassendi, endorsed a more absolutist notion that allowed spaces totally devoid of matter (i.e., vacuum).

6. *Principles*, II 20: Relative to an arbitrarily chosen set of bodies, it is thus possible to refer to the abstract (generic) spatial extension of a portion of the plenum that different extended bodies successively “occupy”; and, presumably, by this process of abstraction the internal place of the entire plenum can be likewise constructed. Rather, he holds that since any given spatially extended length is divisible in thought, thus God has the power to actually divide it.

7. *Principles of Philosophy* II 25. Descartes attempts to distinguish his “proper” conception of motion, as a change of the “neighborhood” of contiguous bodies, from the common or “vulgar” conception of motion, which is change of internal place (Pr II 10–15, 24–28).

8. VI in *De Gravitatione*, A more expansive antecedent of this argument occurs in *De Gravitatione*, applied specifically to time: if yesterday and tomorrow were to interchange their temporal relations
with respect to the remainder of time, then yesterday would become today, and today yesterday. Thus, Newton held an interestingly holistic identity criterion for the parts of space and time.

9. A “Scholium” at the beginning of the *Principia*, inserted between the “Definitions” and the “Laws of Motion”, lays out Newton’s views on time, space, place, and motion.

10. In the five letters he managed to write before his death, Leibniz succeeded in articulating not only his reasons for opposing what he took to be Newton’s conception of absolute space and time, but also sketching an alternative picture according to which they are to be understood as abstract systems of relations.


13. Ibid, 38-39, the argument is, space could exist independently of objects violates the principle because the homogeneity and uniformity of space prevent there from being any reason for God to place the objects of the universe with one particular orientation within absolute space rather than with any other possible orientation. The very idea that God could place objects within a pre-existing absolute space with one orientation rather than another is evidently not incoherent; rather, God would lack a reason for doing this.

14. In *Of Other Spaces* Michel Foucault (Trans.Jay Miskowiec) *Diacritics*, Vol. 16, No. 1. (Spring, 1986), pp. 22-27. He argues, “the space in which we live, which draws us out of ourselves, in which the erosion of our lives. Our time and our history occurs, the space that claws and gnaws at us, is also, in itself, a heterogeneous space. In other words, we do not live in a kind of void, inside of which we could place individuals and things. We do not live inside a void that could be colored with diverse

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shades of light, we live inside a set of relations that delineates sites which are irreducible to one another and absolutely not superimposable on one another”.

15. *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, the geographer Edward Soja has worked with this concept in dialogue with the works of Henri Lefebvre concerning urban space in the book *Third Space*.

16. All these terms have been discussed in detail by Bollnow in his *Men and Space*.


18. Ibid, pp.23-38: In these arguments, Kant considers, perhaps among other things, the origin of our representation of space, concluding that it is not empirical. It seems, though, that these arguments leave open the question of the content of our representation of space in two important senses. The question is do we represent it, for instance, as finite or infinite, as homogeneous or not? That is, they leave it open that our representation of space could be a concept, rather than an intuition—it could be either a general, mediate representation, or a singular, immediate one. We simply know—if Kant's arguments are successful—that the representation is not empirical. And Kant certainly thinks that a non-empirical representation could be either a concept or an intuition; that is, he thinks that we have both a priori concepts and pure intuition.


20. In his *Communal Identity in India: Its Construction and Articulation in the Twentieth Century*, Bidyut Chakrabarty discusses at length relationship among India’s socio-economic and political contexts provide conducive atmosphere for communal identity. Recent debate, writes Bidyut Chakrabarty, on communal identity revolves around concerns in two complementary directions: first, as community, Indians ‘lack’ or have lost identity or that it has become diluted, eroded, corrupted, or confused. As a corollary to the first, the obvious concern is therefore how to retain, preserve, or strengthen the sense of identity. What is thus emphasised is a ‘belief’ that identity by inter-cultural borrowing, that an
identity is historically fixed, that it is the sole source of political legitimacy; that the state’s primary task is to maintain it and that national identity defines the limits of permissible diversity.

21. Terry Eagleton explains and complicates the concept of ideology as scattered into a number of disciplines like linguistics, sociology, epistemology, communication etc.

22. One can read more on this in “Anit-Secularist Manifesto” published in The Romance of the State and Dissent in the Tropics by Ashish Nandy.

References:


