CHAPTER-II

REVIEW OF LITERATURE
The present chapter is devoted to a review of literature on agrarian class relations in India and around India. The purpose of this chapter is to attempt a selective coverage of agrarian class relations and mode of production. The present chapter deals with the following four types of studies, namely:

1. Conceptual Background.

2. Agrarian Class Relations and mode of production.

3. Agrarian relations during their pre-independence and the post-independence periods in different countries.

4. Empirical studies on agrarian relations in India during the pre-independence and the post-independence periods.

CONCEPTUAL BACKGROUND

Rudra Ashok and Pranab Bardhan made two surveys on agrarian relations in West Bengal. Their surveys were on labour, land and credit markets operating in an interlocked manner as features of agrarian relations. They are dissatisfied with the conceptual models of feudalism and semi-feudalism developed in the Indian context because the models do not take into account the complexity of the land lord-tenants share cropper relations and the labourer-employer relations.

The agrarian relations are broadly divided into three types, namely: a) Labourer-employer relations, b) Land owner-tenant relations, c) Money lender-peasant relations.
A) LABOURER EMPLOYER RELATIONS

The nature of labourer – employer relation exhibits a wide variation with respect to various aspects, for example, the duration of contract, mode and frequency of payment etc.

Correspondingly, there are intermediate segments between unattached and fully attached labourers, with varying degrees of dependence on the land owner. Consumption loans are usually interest free. However, for the creditor-employer, the recovery of loans is far easier from his own attached labourers, than from others. The loan helps to concretize the labour-tying relationship.

B) LAND OWNER – TENANT RELATIONS

Share-cropping is the predominant form of tenancy in the West Bengal state, but it is in decline giving way to cultivation through hired labour. The share shows much variation, 50:50 being the most common one. Evidence shows that when costs are shared, modern inputs are used by the share cropper and production loans are advanced to the tenants and the share tends to be lower than the normative one.

Money lending is not observed as a principal occupation of land owners, although they combine usury to a great extent with the extraction of rent. Moreover, landlords do exhibit a strong interest in productive investment. So the models which suggest that usury acts as a fetter on productive forces are not always empirically valid.
C) **MONEY LENDER – PEASANT RELATIONS**

The poor (Labourer and share – Croppers) do not have any access to the organized credit market for they are without land and other resources – which can be offered as security against the loans. Hence, they rely on specialised credit markets, involving money – lenders, land owners and grain traders. Exploitation in this context does not necessarily take the form of repayment based on high interest rates. Interest-free loans are used to bind poor farmers and labourers to rich land owner and result in dependence dominance relationships.

**Alexander, K.C.** argued that agrarian relations are primarily the relations among different sections of society created in the process of agricultural production. In a country like India, where almost three-fourths of the work-force is engaged in agriculture, agrarian relations become the dominant element of social relations. Even though, agriculture is characterized by a low possession of land in a predominantly peasant society like India, it became one of the main avenues of investment in recent years, though it is confined to limited areas. This leads the higher non-agrarian sections of society like the kings, priests, administrators, etc. to acquire land, particularly fertile and irrigated land, and get it cultivated through tenants and hired labourers. This had led to the emergence of three important components in the agrarian social structure, namely land owners, tenants and agricultural labourers. Each of these categories consisted of a number of classes, such as land-owners with different rights to land, tenants varying in terms relating to tenure and agricultural labourers varying in their relations with their employees.
Sunil Sen argues that by agrarian structure we mean the institutional framework of agricultural production which includes land tenure system, distribution of ownership of land between large land owners and small peasants, tenancy system, the burden imposed on the peasants by the government and the land owners. Similarly in the opinion of Ashok Rudra and Pranab Bardhan, agrarian relations constitute a very large subject touching directly or indirectly most of the aspects of the structure of village society.

Meghanad Desai argues that the basic categories, such as land lords, tenants, share croppers and landless labourers described a variety of economic and social relationships relating to the basic inputs, namely land and labour.

There are other groups in the rural economy who may not be exclusively concerned with agriculture, such as the money lenders. Further, he argues that the economic activities of these people have an impact on the agrarian economy, comprising production, consumption exchange and accumulation.

These activities are carried out against a background of non-agricultural activity in the rest of the economy and there are also traditional and kinship networks, besides economic exchange relationships which form the set of social relationships.

Pathak, S.N. states that the economy of the rural society is based primarily on agriculture, since it is the main source of its income. Although the traditional village economy is to a certain extent related to some caste occupations and services too, yet agriculture is found to be generally the main
occupation of the entire rural population. Further, he argues that the position regarding the present agrarian structure in relation to a number of criteria, like occupational structure and occupational mobility, castes, size of incomes and standard of living, material possession etc., has been laid bare.

Vasant Desai argued that since the structure of land ownership had failed to meet the ends of social justice, ceilings were imposed on larger holdings and surplus land was sought to be distributed among small and marginal farmers. The emerging agrarian structure has perpetuated the iniquitous distribution of resources. The qualitative changes taking place in the mode of operation, irrigation, marketing commercialization and introduction of new technology have worsened the position of the rural poor.

Joshi, V.R. and others argued that agricultural labour as a distinct class of workers existed even during the pre-nineteenth century period. They also argued that in pre-British India, land owning classes belonged generally to the upper castes, tenants to the intermediate castes and landless labourers belonged to the lower castes.

Ranjit Kumar Sau in a study on "Agrarian relations in India" examined about semi-feudalism, which exists still in Indian agriculture. He examined several aspects of the agrarian relations in order to find an answer to the penetration of capitalism and its development in Indian agriculture.

They are like:

1. The size distribution of land holding;
2. The extent of tenancy and share cropping;
3. The degree of exploitation through high rent;
4. The role of usurious money lenders.
5. The pattern of utilization of surplus.
6. The process of agricultural proletarianisation and
7. The magnitude of commodity production.

The average size of operational holding went down from 7.6 acres in 1953-54 to 6.5 acres in 1960-61. The incidence of tenancy is higher in the more fertile wet areas than in dry areas. Sharecropping appears to be more widespread in wet areas than in dry areas. The rent extracted from tenants is very high, usually as much as 50 percent of the produce. In income terms, it goes up to even 60 to 65 percent. Thus, it seems that the rent paid by the tenant is essentially feudal or semi-feudal in nature rather than capitalist ground rent.

Sau also found from his studies that the rural economy of India is still under the way of semi-feudal exploitation. Capitalism has penetrated into Indian agriculture, but the movement and the trend of the capitalist development yet remain to be ascertained in precise terms. However, there are indications that the grip of semi-feudalism is in the process of weakening to some extent. But agricultural capitalism cannot completely dissolve the existing semi-feudal mode. Capitalist farms are likely to continue to be surrounded by a large number of impoverished tiny farms, oppressed as they are under semi-feudal exploitation.
Utsa Patnaik\textsuperscript{9} in her study was aimed at formulation and applying to farm economics data a more direct index for capturing the economic class status of households engaged in agriculture than what has been attempted hitherto in the literature. Patnaik study on irrigation, fertility, capital investment or size of family deals with aggregate farm economic data, average size of holdings, economic classes and groups and it also deals with small and marginal farmers. Patnaik made a study on agricultural labourers and also farm households in Haryana. Green Revolution technology is found to be much concentrated with the labour hirers than conventional analysis has suggested so far. Patnaik study relating to share cropping also throws light on Indian feudal relationships.

Sudha Pai\textsuperscript{10} has made an attempt to investigate the nature of change in agrarian relations in the north-eastern area of Uttar Pradesh. Agrarian relations in the narrowest sense, would mean the relationship among various classes and persons working on and associated with agriculture. Social Classes and social stratification are based on land. Caste is also an important factor as it unites or divides the village life. Sudha Pai study on agrarian relations is broadly divided into two main divisions namely (a) the village agrarian system, which deals with mode of production and the system of land holding and (b) caste relations in land.

She has conducted field surveys in four purposively selected villages, Nandapar and Nagar belonging to Gorakhpur and Basti districts respectively in the north of the Ganga river and Sunbhidili and Sakha belonging to Azamgarh district in the south of the Ganga river.
The traditional agrarian structure in U.P. was not feudal but an authoritarian-cum-paternal system. The head of the village was a Zamindar who was also a local potentate responsible for law and order. He was powerful in both economic and political fields. Below him, came the tenants who were the hereditary and traditional occupants and cultivators of land over the generations. They paid a fixed share of the produce to the landlord. Then came the share croppers who had no permanent rights of cultivation, but could take land on lease. Finally, at the bottom of the system were landless labourers who were employed by cultivators during the busy seasons.

After Independence, the advent of land reform legislation further broke up the old system. Landlords who were afraid of losing their lands evicted hereditary tenants and took over land for self-cultivation. Though the institution of absentee landlordism was destroyed, a new class of land owners arose. The occupancy tenants in some cases were benefited as the lands they had cultivated earlier became theirs and they took to self-cultivation. Owing to land reform law, small tenants were evicted.

In his "Agrarian structure and agrarian relations" Dantwala¹¹ pleads for more pragmatic approach to the problem. Analysing the N.S.S. and Agricultural Census data, he concluded that since the available surplus land will be inadequate and its distribution cannot conceivably reduce inequality significantly, other ways and means should be explored for reducing inequality. The most sensible way is to make the meagre assets of the poor more productive. This would involve both positive and preventive action. The study concludes that owing to limited extension of modern inputs, the growth of Indian agriculture is constrained.
It suggests the need for speedily evolving and diffusing an alternative system of development, so as to break the productivity bottle-necks and to modernize the production process.

Bandhudas Sen\textsuperscript{12} sheds light on several aspects of countryside distribution of benefits from the new technology. According to Sen, since the irrigated land operated by small farms is greater than that of large farms, the share of the benefits flowing to the small farms should be distinctly greater than that is accruing to large farms. He states that the expectations of a staggering increase in peasants on one hand and of polarization on the other seems to have been based mainly on the currently iniquitous distribution of land. There is no denying the fact that the operated land is unequally distributed. However, in relation to the question of sharing benefits from green revolution, it is not the distribution of operated land, but the distribution of irrigated land operated by the medium-sized farm that is the largest. The share of benefits flowing from these farms is likely to be the greatest.

Sen comments that widespread adoption of modern technology by small and medium-sized farms is predominating, which is not so much to scale neutrality of the high yielding varieties, but partly to the inherited pattern of distribution of irrigated land and partly to the government and to the economic and social factors.

He found that in the case of farmers, small or big, extension contract and availability of irrigation were two important factors, but the size of holdings, tenancy, total value of assets, and the age of levels of education did not have significant relationship with the degree of progressiveness. The
same analysis carried out for the owner and the tenants showed extension contract and size of holding to be important in both the cases, but in the case of tenants, irrigation was an additional influencing factor.

Hanumantha Rao\(^3\) has discussed the emerging pattern of income distribution in the process of agricultural growth in India which is characterized by technical changes, such as the use of high yielding varieties of seeds and the use of tractors. The study reveals that technological changes have contributed to the widening of income disparities between (1) different regions (2) small and large farmers (3) land owners on the one hand and tenants and agricultural labourers on the other. In absolute terms, however, the gains from the technological changes have been shared by all sections. He suggests that the biggest prospect for increasing output and generating employment in the next two to three decades for improving the distribution of income horizontally as well as vertically lies in the public investment in irrigation and the exploitation of ground water.

Sivarama Krishna Rao\(^4\) in his study on “Changing agrarian relations in India with reference to A.P.” deals with land system, mode of production, size of holdings, productive resources and wealth.

Land relations have implications for production, productivity and distribution of income and wealth in agriculture. Sivarama Krishna Rao discussed the mode of production in Indian agriculture as an important aspect in economic structure. The basic structure of any society was based on production and it was this which determined the pattern of distribution of income among different agrarian classes. He studied many aspects with
regard to the mode of production in Indian agriculture. Indian agriculture is undergoing a change towards the capitalistic mode of production. He made a great attempt to study the mode of production in different states explained by different authors especially Rudra and Utsa Patnaik who analytically discussed in their surveys the mode of production in Indian agriculture, the peasant structure and also made a classification of peasantry.

**AGRARIAN CLASS RELATIONS—MODE OF PRODUCTION**

The study of Rudra Ashok on "class relations" defined class contradiction in various ways. Class relations are relations of production, but not all relations of production define classes. They define various social groups, but only some social groups are classes. It is the nature of the contradictions that distinguish classes from social groups and it is the contradiction in the points that define the boundaries of classes.

In other words, men who are in the social production enter into definite relations that are indispensable and independent of their will, define various social groups, but only such social groups that constitute classes are subject to contradictions of interests arising from the way they are related to the means of production. It seems to us that this approach is of special importance in defining classes in agriculture, where the distinction between such classes as, say, poor peasants and rich peasants is not clear-cut in the same way as in the case of, say, industrial capitalists and industrial proletariat.

Keith griffin in his study on the political economy of agrarian change discussed the assessment of technical change in agriculture resulting in
greater income inequality and polarization of social classes. Changes in status and class alignments have been accompanied by changes in the distribution of income. Profits and rent have increased absolutely and relatively. The share of wages has declined. This has occurred most notably when the introduction of high yielding varieties has been accompanied by labour displacing mechanization, but it has also occurred when the rise in employment has been less than the increase in the labour-force attributable to demographic expansion and migration. In other words, inequality has increased in most areas and poverty in some areas.

The question of the character of the mode of production in Indian agriculture represents one specific instance of the wider problems of comprehending the phenomena of development and under-development and understanding the dynamics of capitalism as a world system, whilst also grasping the international specificity of its parts with which the protagonists of dependency and underdevelopment theory and their critics are engaged.

(A) CAPITALIST MODE OF PRODUCTION

Utsa Patnaik in her study found that the development of capitalism must be looked at as an historical process and that since capitalistic agriculture develops from within the pre-existing non-capitalistic structure could not necessarily expect to find a class of pure capitalist in the context of Indian Agriculture. Rudra and his associates carried out a sample survey on big farmers in Punjab and attempted to isolate the capitalists from sample by testing the strength of the associations between five variables.
They are:

1. Cash outlays on wage per acre.
2. Percentage of the total produce marketed.
3. Value of modern capital equipment per acre.
4. Cash profits per acre.
5. Value of output per acre.

Arguing that capitalist farmers would be expected to show high value for each of these variables, Patnaik argued that the Marxian definition of class is in terms of production relations. "The conditions of ownership of means of production of employment of labour and appropriation of the product" could be accepted, though she also proposed an empirical method of defining peasant classes using the data of labour exploitation.

According to Utsa Patnaik, some understanding of the colonial agrarian structure is absolutely essential to an understanding of what is taking place today. Her own conception of that agrarian structure is in terms of a "complex interaction of developing capitalism with pre-capitalist organization".

The wage-labour criterion has been used by Sulekh Chand Gupta to assess the extent of capitalist farming during 1953-54. He noted that in the state of U.P. the element of hired labour exceeded that of family labour on farms with 20 or more acres. Extrapolating in a conservative fashion to India as a whole, in parts of which the size of holding operated mainly with the year-round farm servants was as low as 7.5 acres. He proposed to take the number of households operating 20 acres or more as a rough approximation.
to the number of capitalist farms. According to his estimates, less than 6 to 7 percent of all operational holdings amounting to about one third of the total area under cultivation is considered to be under capitalist farms, where the operational holding being large scale units using hired labour.

According to Ashok Rudra, a capitalist farmer would

a) Tend to cultivate the land himself rather than to give it out on lease.

b) Tend to use hired labour in much greater proportion than family labour.

c) Tend to use farm machinery.

It may be emphasized that Rudra Ashok proposes these criteria for identifying capitalist mode of production. He also suggested some variables in empirical investigations.

They are:

a) Percentage of land rented out to total land owned.

b) Wage payment per acre of farm size.

c) Percentage of the produce marketed to total produce.

d) Profit per acre.

(B) FEUDALIST MODE OF PRODUCTION

According to Rudra Ashok, the common denomination among the essential and characteristic features of feudalism which have been recognised by different scholars is the extra-economic coercion that it involves: a typical
expression of the legal power to serve the landlord in many other ways curtailing thereby the peasants individual liberty. A second characteristic of feudalism which has not been much disputed is the fact of the direct producer retaining possession of means of production.

Petty production, localized production, circulation and appropriation, non-monetization, production for use rather than for exchange investment of capital in trade and industry, absolute rent rather than ground rent, rent in kind rather than rent in money, low pace of technical progress etc., are, of course, the features of all pro-capitalist modes of production.

Feudalism and serfdom are equivalents by which token feudalism properly understood is rushed out every where other than in western Europe and Japan. A typical expression of feudalistic relation between a land lord and his tenant is unpaid or underpaid labour services that the tenant might have to provide for the land lord. Incidentally, this is a feature that was characteristic of European feudalism. As is well known in the early stages of West European feudalism, feudalism rent was paid neither in kind nor in cash. It was paid in labour. There was a sharing arrangement though not of crops, but of labour time. In India, labour services have often been associated with tenancy arrangements. Tenants have been obliged to do all kinds of farm as well as domestic work. However, this is a far-from-universal practice. In many parts of the country, the system has become extremely rare.

(C) SEMI-FEUDAL MODE OF PRODUCTION

The basic features of Semi feudalism are:

1) An extensive non-legalized share cropping system.
2) Perpetual indebtedness of small tenants.

3) Operating both as land owners and lenders to the small tenants.

4) Tenant / Tenants having incomplete access to the market.

According to Charless Bettelheim\textsuperscript{22}, semi-feudal production relations are characterised by the rent paid in labour or kind or in money by a personal producer and not by a capitalist farmer. He also observes that semi-feudal conditions are still prevalent in the large sector of Indian agriculture which means that the cultivator has little interest in land improvement because his profits from such operations would be little. Another observation of Bettelheim is that rural market cannot expand rapidly because semi-feudal production relationships are still predominant in most parts of the country. The market expands slowly in those places where these relations are disappearing, because the villages are still dominated by a few merchants and rich peasants who often have local monopolies and can therefore, acquire a large amount of the economic surplus from agriculture. Much of this surplus is diverted away from productive investment.

Bhaduri\textsuperscript{23} developed his concept of semi-feudalism with reference to an area in West Bengal in which rural exploiters frequently come in the roles of land lord, money lender and merchant and appropriate surplus from the landless or semi-landless Kissans in the form of rents, usurious interest and speculative trading profits. As land owners, they give out land to the landless for sharecropping. Because of their poverty, these tenants require loans for production and for consumption purposes and these are supplied by the land owners. The rate of interest that the tenants pay is high and they are
requested to repay the loans at harvest time when prices are low so that the land owners are able to garner altogether a very large proportion of the market surplus to make speculative trading profits in addition to appropriating surplus directly through rent and usury. Bhaduri concludes, therefore, that "semi-feudal relations act as fetters on the release of the productive forces". Utsa Patnaik and Ashok Rudra studies found that agriculture is neither clearly capitalistic nor feudal. Both agree that there have been tendencies of capitalistic development, especially for the last thirty years, but Patnaik study in particular argues that these tendencies have been held back by monopolistic control of land and the concomitant pauperization of the mass of dwellers.

Rudra disproves the hypothesis of share-cropping as an indicator of the semi-feudal relations of production in agriculture as he notes from his field study. According to him, cost-sharing between the owner and the tenant has been observed in recent times and hence the sharecropping need not be termed as a semi-feudal relation. But Rudra also argues that if from the labour and tenant point of view, his being bound to debt and obligations to a particular landowner means that he cannot sell his labour power freely and if it is termed feudalistic, "then such feudalistic features continue to exist in various forms cultivated by tenants and farms cultivated by hired labourers". Therefore, he is of the opinion that while capitalist relations are growing, for example, in a state like Bengal, some of the feudal relations still persists.

Though Rudra explicitly rejects the semi-feudalism thesis, he identifies a hybrid class, partly capitalist and partly feudal-of big land owners, who constitute a single class of rural exploiters.
Amit Bhaduri²⁶ in his study conducted in 26 West Bengal villages in 1970 found that the dominant character of existing production relations could be described as semi-feudalism in that they have more in common with classical feudalism of the master-serf type than with industrial capitalism. He listed four prominent features of these semi-feudal relations.

They are:

a) Share cropping

b) Perpetual indebtedness of the small tenants

c) Concentration of two modes of exploitation namely usury and land ownership in the hands of the same class.

d) Lack of accessibility to the market for the small tenant.

Amit Bhaduri concludes that semi-feudal relations operated as a barrier to the introduction of improved technology, since it results in a higher output. He suggests two possibilities, wherein these semi-feudal relations will either gradually give way to capitalist production, based on wage labourer or will be simply overthrown by the desperate poor, unless a radical land reform is carried out by the state.

Erich H. Jacoby²⁶ in his study on Agrarian unrest in South-East Asia found that the problems faced by peasants of South-East Asia are still persisting and are the victims of poverty and indebtedness. The dramatic post-war developments did not change the economic and social structures which determine the way of life of the peasants and agrarian dissatisfaction and
latent unrest have remained the fundamental problems of the countries in the area.

Java is an area of predominantly small, often too small, owner-cultivated farms. Holdings of more than 12 acres are only common in West Java, the main plantation area of the island. The achievement of political independence could not halt the progressing concentration of land-ownership which is in the undiversified economy of Java is the result of increasing population pressure, rising rentals and a constantly declining average size of holdings. When farms became economically undersigned and no supplemental employment is available, the peasants' only alternative is to sell out to the larger land owners, who thereby increase their economic and political influence.

The economic development of Burma has been different in many aspects from that of Java. While the Dutch in Java protected the peasants' property rights to the soil to a certain extent, the British in Burma observed a policy of laissez-faire that finally resulted in an unparallel concentration of ownership in land. While Java's development is marked by increasing population pressure, Burma is still a country with vast areas of agricultural waste land. Mechanization of agriculture in Burma is still far off and cattle and buffaloes remain the working animals in the delta. The agrarian reform has been closely associated with a gradual expansion of the agricultural area, and with an overall educational campaign to awaken the people to their economic and social responsibilities.
Jacoby in his study of "Agrarian Unrest in South East Asia" focused on the issues of Agrarian relations in Malaysia. According to the data collected in 1957, a total of 5.4 million acres were under cultivation of which 69 percent were planted with rubber, 17 percent paddy and 9.4 percent with coconut. Half of the cultivated land is planted with rubber and in some areas mainly in Perak, Selangor and Negri Samblan, there is a land problem. The insufficient paddy production constitutes one of the side effects of Malaysia's rubber economy. The Government supported the paddy cultivators through the expansion of irrigation facilities which improved the conditions of cultivated lands. New paddy lands were put under irrigation.

The production of Paddy increased. Malaysia has continued to produce mainly for subsistence and not for marketing. In Malaya, the complexity of the population problem with its impact on land utilization, the difference in the approach to life and values of the various population groups and the magnitude of the emergency are some agrarian issues.

The size of farms and the form of land tenure differ in various parts of Indo-China, which is but natural in a country with such an unequally distributed population. While the peasants in the densely populated areas of Tonkin, Annan and Cambodia still own their plots, Cochin-China is a country of large estates; where the land is tilled by tenants and farm labourers. Almost 99 percent in Cambodia, 90 percent in Annan and 95 percent in Cambodia are owner – cultivators, while the figure for Cochin-China is only 64.5 percent.

The general features of the landlord-tenant relationship do not differ much in other countries of South Asia. The plot of leased land average is 3
hectares. As a rule, the tenant has to pay the landlord 40 percent of the crop, but considering the expenses for cultivators, he seldom gets more than 50 percent for himself. Hardly ever is the tenant allowed to dispose freely of his own share of the crop as the landlord claims the control of the entire produce. The additional claim weakens the marketing position of the tenant. The landlord-tenant relationship is generally combined with the traditional feudal customs, precisely stipulating onerous gifts and services in favour of land lords. If he is lucky, the tenant can supply the rice for his family, but he is at the mercy of the land owner for additional needs, especially in case of emergency.

The landlord is the main source of credit for the tenant. He furnishes the needed capital and rice to the tenant cultivator. In Indo-China, the landlord-money lender has the worst influence on general agricultural development. The landlords depend for more on the interest from the loans they take than on the production of their rice fields. That explains why owners of large estates prefer to divide their lands into small farms and lease them to tenant for primitive traditional cultivation. A system of land utilization based on money interest and not on agricultural production must finally reduce the productivity of the entire economy.

The great majority of farms in Philippines are small in nature. According to the 1948 census, only 0.6 percent of the farms are over 30 hectares, while almost 50 percent under 2 hectares of which 19 percent are under 1 hectare. While the average size of owner-operated farms is 4.09 hectares and that of farms cultivated by the previous past owner is 3.01 hectares, the average size of the tenant farms is only 2.54 hectares. The
smallest of all are the share-tenant farms representing about 95 percent of the total number of tenant farms with an average of only 2.38 hectares. The smallest farms and highest percentage of tenancy are found in the sugar provinces. Rice and maize are the most important food crops in the Philippines. As in other countries of the area, tenant farming is still on a low level of cultivation practices and in spite of considerable efforts of the government, indebtedness and usury still block the way of agricultural progress for the majority of peasants.

The average yield of rice per hectare has increased from 23 to 26 cabbuns (1 cab. = 44 kgs.). It is more than 20 percent lower than the average yield in Burma and 60 percent below that in Japan. Only in some provinces it is somewhat lesser, as, for example, in Nueva Ecija and Bulacan, where 39 and 33 Cabbuns respectively are obtained per hectare.

In the densely populated and highly tenanted area of Central Luzon, however, the average yield seldom reaches even to 20 Cabbuns per hectare. This relatively modest output is less due to unfavourable natural conditions than to the poor selection of seed, insufficient irrigation and obsolete cultivation methods—all of which are closely associated with inequitable tenure conditions which do not provide incentives for the increased efforts of the cultivators.

For centuries, large estates have played an important role in the economy of Philippines. When the Spaniards had firmly established the colonial rule in the beginning of the seventeenth century, they governed the islands by colonial officials who in the sphere of politics took the place of the
datos, the village chiefs of the pre-Spanish days. As compensation, the datos and other leading families of the community were favoured with special economic and social privileges with the right to tax collecting which gave them an opportunity to acquire more land and the actual power to change free holders into tenants. In this way, a Fillippino established a tenure system which held the whip hand over a dependent and miserable tenant population (Taos).

The tenure system in the Philippines is not much different from that is generally encountered in South-East Asia. Large land owners operate their estates by dividing them into small farms which are cultivated by tenants. Among the various forms of tenancy the Kasana (share tenancy) system is the most commonly used especially in the rice regions. In 1948 almost 4,25,000 tenants worked under this system in which the land lord provides land, seed and the capital needed for cultivation, while the tenant supplies the labour and frequently working animals. The tenant theoretically gets 50 percent of the crop after his half of the expenses for cultivation has been paid or deducted in kind. However, his share is often far less, because of interest and charges less common is the inquility (cash tenancy) system in which the tenants have to pay a fixed annual rent for the land usually in cash. This system is highly speculative as the tenant alone has the risk of failure or the chance for a bumper crop, but it makes him more independent of the land lord, and he is usually allowed to market the crop himself. The relatively smaller number of cash tenants, less than 3000 in 1948 is most frequently encountered in regions with heavy population pressure, where land is scarce
and where the mere fact of occupancy is an asset highly in demand and often
paid in advance.

The tenancy system in the Philippines is the cause of constant friction
between landlords and tenants. The most serious are the conflicts with the
share tenant who is devoid of cash and credit and depends entirely on the
landlord from the moment he enters into the contract. He has to borrow not
only cash but also rice to carry him and his family to the next harvest.

The study of Jeremias U. Montemayor on the agrarian problem of
the Philippines found that the problems concerning land area are among the
oldest problems of the human race. The earliest periods of the Philippine-
recorded history are actually characterized by agrarian problems. It is difficult
to say in what specific denomination economic, social, political cultural or
religious, the agrarian problems of the Philippines first started.

The agrarian problem started with the physical and economic fact that
a relatively few landlords had the ownership and control of the tillable lands in
the Philippines and that the landless farmers tilled lands of the land owners on
the condition that the farmer would either share the harvest with or pay rentals
to the latter. In that situation, the landlord became richer and richer, while his
tenant became relatively poorer and poorer.

The tenant had to spend all his energy and resources in order to make
both ends meet. When the yield increased, the landlord immediately wanted
to increase his share of the rental. When the tenant took the initiative to plant
auxiliary crops, the landlord again demanded a share of the harvest there
from and when from a sense of justice, the tenant resisted the additional
demands of the landlord, or was willing to meet the landlord's demands only partially, he was subjected to lot of threats and harassment and was finally ejected from the land holding.

Many of the peasants found it difficult to make both ends meet under the tenancy system. They tried to go elsewhere to make a living. Some went to the mountains to make clearings and to plant crops and fruit trees. Because of their ignorance and the greed of some landlords as well as the corruption of some public officials, that tenant-turned settlers were driven cut of their clearings before they could enjoy the fruits of their labour. The great masses of discontented peasants were made the targets of communist agitation infiltration. There were the communist agitators and organizers in the 1920's and later. They appealed to the workers and peasants. They advocated agrarian reform for the peasants. They gained a lot of following among the peasantry and on several occasions constituted a serious and imminent threat to the peace and security of the entire country.


Thailand has a special place in this study, since it is the only country in Southeast Asia which has remained politically independent throughout centuries.

The Thai farmer generally works on his own soil. According to the agricultural Census of 1950, 83 percent of all farmers (17,46,000) are owner-operators cultivating 90 percent of the total agricultural area (34,32,000 hectares). In certain districts of the Central Plain, however, especially in the
highly commercialized areas around Bangkok and Klong Rancsit, where land values and consequently landlordism had increased with the growing production of rice for export and improved transport facilities. Landless peasants worked as tenants and labourers on big estates. Though the total number of tenants and actually tenanted area is comparatively small (3,66,000 tenants on 9,44,000 hectares).

It is significant that in the Central Plain, where the cost of living is the highest and the farm household balance is the most unfavourable, 34 percent of the farms comprising only 22.1 percent of the agricultural area are operated by tenants while 65.7 percent of the holdings covering 77.3 percent of the total area are cultivated by owners. But no investigation has yet been made in order to determine the extent to which the partial owners listed as owners in the census are actually tenants with only small self-owned plots. It may, however, be assumed that a large number of partially-owned farms are tenant farms from all practical points of view and this would increase the tenant percentage in the central plains considerably.

Jean Yoong Deok30 studied in detail the effects of agricultural land reforms on economy in Korea. He referred to the socio-economic causes of land reform and its effects on income redistribution and rice production. He points out that land reforms have led to reduction in transaction costs in Korea. High transaction costs would prevent the efficient functioning of the system of tenancy since most of the tenants got political power with the help of the landlords. After the Agricultural Land Reform Amendment Act, came into force, new institutional arrangements were established. The land reforms also led to a redistribution of income from landlords to other economic groups.
such as tenants and general public. The economic growth was positively affected by the abolition of the tenancy system since it increased agricultural production.

Anwarullah Chowdhary$^{31}$ in his study on agrarian relations and mode of production with special reference to Bangladesh discussed the inter-relationship of agrarian classes and categories in Bangladesh.

Bangladesh is predominantly rural country with about 65,000 villages and 95 percent of her population living in rural areas.

The main economy is agricultural and almost all the rural population is directly or indirectly associated with agriculture, except the occupational groups who live by their traditional occupations.

In Bangladesh, the principal means of production is cultivation of land and therefore, the agrarian population is divided into classes on the basis of ownership and non-ownership of land. The land-owning class is divided into two categories namely rent payers and owner cultivators. The entire sections of the land owners do not work in the field and they rent out their land wholly or partly. Those who rent out their land partly engage wage-labour for cultivating their land under their own supervision. The owner-cultivator section organize production mainly through family labour. The main incomes of the share-croppers come from the land they lease in. They also own and cultivate small holdings. The landless labourers do not own any land, but contribute their labour in the process of production. At a small village in Dacca district, it was found that the production was mainly organized through “Tenancy and wage labourer”. Out of the 177 agricultural households in the village, there
were 84 land owners, 43 sharecroppers and 45 landless households in the village. Wood studied a village in Comilla district which he called Bandokgram. In his sample of 76 households, 14 were landless 13 owned less than an acre 20 owned between 1 to 249 acres 19 households 2.5 acres.

Two of the most important aspects of the economic life of the villages, as he mentioned were petty leasing and usury.

Arens and Beurden³² studied a village in Kushtia district and named it Jhagrapur. They classified the agricultural populations of the village into (a) poor peasants (b) middle peasants (c) rich peasants (d) landlords.

In an agrarian society, where the majority of the agrarian population belongs to the owner-operator category, we can call the agricultural production a peasant mode of production, provided those owner-operators are traditional subsistence peasants who organise production in their farms or workshops mainly with family labour, and also provided they do not employ labourers or sell their labour to others, they are not in debt, they don’t lend money and they are not involved in share cropping. The mode of production in Bangladesh agriculture is the peasant mode of production. None of the micro studies or the national level surveys proves that there is growth of capitalism in Bangladesh agriculture.

Janmuz³³ in his study had examined the impact of agrarian reforms on the agriculture structure of Bangladesh in the seventies by using mainly the data from its National Sample Surveys during 1977 and 1978.

He examined the evolution of the land system of Bangladesh since the permanent settlement of 1973. The relation of Zamindar and tenant relatively
remained unchanged since the nineteenth Century, despite the legislations enacted since partition and independence from West Pakistan. In all the Tenancy Acts, including that of 1971, the rights of the share croppers were neglected.

The author examined the limitations and costs of relying on technology for rural development. In Bangladesh, the agrarian structure is the principal impediment to the dissemination of new technology in agriculture. The agrarian structure in Bangladesh characterized by highly skewed land-distribution would frustrate any effort of agricultural development strategy, based solely on dissemination of new technology.

Arens Jenneka34 spent several years in Bangladesh and lived in the village of Jharggapur for one year to conduct a study on the conditions of women and poor peasant families and made certain observations in the first part of his work on the village life in Bangladesh, the situation of women and the economic exploitation, sexual misuse of women and their social oppression.

The study of Mahmood Hasan Khan35 on land tax system and land tenure system and land reforms in Pakistan analyzed the relationship of agrarian structure to agricultural development in Pakistan. He tested the hypothesis on relative efficiency of large and small farms. He observed that with a highly differentiated structure of land ownership and the forms of tenancy that existed in Pakistan, the extent to which farm population could participate in the process of production process and share its fruits was determined in the main by their position in the hierarchy of interests on land.
Like the Government of India, the Government of Pakistan is also reluctant to tax the agricultural sector and the incidence of land tax fell from 8/6 of National Revenue in 1969-70 to 2 percent in 1976-77. With regard to land tenure and land reforms, there are some interesting findings. First, the most striking information is that 68 percent of the total area of the country is reporting area. Secondly, confidentiality is maintained about the land ownership data in Pakistan. Land-ownership data in Pakistan exists in revenue records and they have not been made public at anytime. Thirdly, land concentration is very high in India’s basin. Fourthly, as in the case of India, in Pakistan also state legislatures were dominated by peasant lobbies. 80 percent of the seats in the Punjab assembly and 90 percent in Sindh were captured by large land owners. Fifthly, the position of landless tenants weakened, because peasant organizations could not grow in strength in a political climate in which land lords dominated. There was no legal or police protection to tenants. Sixthly, the ownership of land passed on to the hands of money lenders from Zamindars.

The relative efficiency between farms their division by size into small and large categories created two problems. First, the concept of the farm-size by its nature was quite arbitrary and therefore, not universal. Secondly, the division of farms into small and large does not reveal anything about the person who controls and cultivates these farms.

Agriculture in Pakistan remains in many ways the most dominant economic activity and it has made uneven progress. It provided a way of life to almost three quarters of the country’s population. Over 55 percent of the total labour force was engaged in this sector in 1975. In 1979, about 30
percent of GDP and 32 percent of exports were contributed directly by agriculture. Agricultural output grew from Rs. 7.7 billion in 1960-61 to 12.5 billion in 1969-70 at rate of over 5.5 percent.

However, it increased from Rs. 12.2 billion in 1970-71 to Rs. 14.9 in 1973-79 at a growth rate of about 2.6 percent.

The author argues that the Green Revolution strengthened the emerging capitalist agriculture of the sixties and seventies.

The agrarian problem of Pakistan has been the high concentration of land-ownership in the hands of non-cultivating land lords with large number of share croppers. The 1972 Land Reform Law did not make a dent in the concentration of land-owners in the Indus Province. According to the author, there was a simultaneous and contradictory interaction between high-ground rent and capitalist agriculture in the absence of significant reduction in the concentration of land-ownership. The land system in the Indus basin is in a state of transition from a predominantly feudal to capitalist agriculture, increasingly assuming a market-oriented character. Feudal tenancy has been replaced by commercialized agriculture, based on the use of hired labour and machines in many irrigated districts of the Punjab.

The land tenure system which Pakistan inherited in 1947 was characterized by a highly differentiated structure of interest on land. Most of the land was owned by a proportionately small number of land-owners, about 7 percent owned 51 percent of all lands with the top one percentage owning 30 percentage of land with no ceiling on individual holding. Many possessed large areas. Much of this area was uncultivated. The cultivated area was
parceled out to share croppers who were mainly tenants at will, with at best a very tenuous right to cultivate land and were subject to almost limitless demands of land owners. In the Indus basin, this land lord-tenant system was dominant in the most areas of Sindh and in some areas of the Punjab. The other system consisted of farmers who owned and operated small holdings with family labour. Among other things, these holdings were highly fragmented the owner-operator system existed mostly in the Punjab.

His study also revealed that in the Indus basin, particularly in the Punjab, a new type of commercial tenancy is emerging under which land is leased out by small and marginal owners to rich peasants and large land owners. The author has made a case for land reforms in Pakistan on grounds of high concentration of land ownership absentee-land lordship and landlessness. The author makes a case for cash-sharing; instead of kind-sharing in which the shares of tenants and landlords reflect a fair return to both.

Johnston and Cownie\textsuperscript{36} studied the seed fertilizers revolution and labour force absorption in West Pakistan. They found that the seed fertilizer revolution offered the hope of rapid and relatively low-cost increase in agricultural output and absorbing a considerable portion of the growing labour-force in to productive employment.

Mazloev\textsuperscript{37} thoroughly studied the agricultural tenancy practice in the U.S.A., Eastern Europe and China. He states that in the U.S.A. 50 percent agricultural land is tenanted. There are also the practices of share-farming
and direct monetary rent. Both the owners and the tenants enter into long-term agreements for their own benefits.

In Poland, there is a practice of establishing tenancy relationships between large enterprises and individuals. All types of ownership of land have been put on an equal footing since 1980’s.

In Hungary, there are tenancy agreements between small specialist groups with large scale enterprises.

In China, there are different forms of tenancy such as individual, collective and inter-farm in which an economically strong enterprise leases to a weaker enterprise. The land-ownership remains in the hands of the State.

The experiences of these countries show that tenancy is an effective mode of organization in agricultural farms.

Paude⁵ in his study on the influence of optimal input cost throws light on the share arrangements which generate an efficient outcome compared with the owner-operators input choices. The income of the tenants above variable cost is higher when the cost share allows the level of fertilizers to reach the efficiency level, at which the optimal fertilizer cost-share is higher than both output share and the cost-share for other inputs. From this arrangement, the owners and tenants benefit through negotiating shares.

Sadoulet⁹ in his study on share cropping contracts indicates that the behaviour of share cropper with a Kinship relationship with their landlord is not affected by the disincentive effects of product and factor-sharing. The kin landlords help their tenants in emergency cases more frequently than other
landlords. They also provide the incentive for co-operative behaviour in share-cropping contracts among their kin.

Scholz⁴⁰ in his study on "Land leasing in France" says that 17.7 m ha. of agricultural land, out of 28.27 m ha. of land in France is leased. The leasing contracts deal with the transfer of farm-meal estates for farm-exploitation. Rents are settled by agreements, but various conditions that are to be observed are also set.

Stockdale⁴¹ has studied the changing land tenure patterns in Britain. He says that the popularity of the traditional agricultural tenancy has declined and that the land owners have become reluctant to enter into long term tenancy arrangements with their tenants in view of the legislative reforms. As a result, short-term leasing became popular there.

In 1995, a farm business tenancy was introduced in England and Wales. This legislative reform gives greater freedom to negotiate individual agreements. In Scotland also, the same changes were introduced. Short term lease (Limited Partnership Tenancy) has become popular there. However, it is facing legal and administrative difficulties. In Scotland, partnership tenancy is not found to be a proper alternative to the traditional agricultural tenancy.

Urrutia⁴² has studied the labour relations and agrarian employment in two important peasant provinces, namely Cajemarca and Chota in Peru. He discussed the economy of the provinces and the transition toward a generalized land market and migration strategies. The labour market there is unstable, as short-term oral lease is predominant there. In some cases long-term duration of lease agreements are also noticed. The other causes for the
instability of the labour market are the low rate of turnover in land-ownership, the local nature of leasing market and gradual changes in production in agriculture. Hence, agricultural land-leasing continues to be an effective means of production-control for farm-tenants and ownership-control for landlords.

Sehoney studied the tenant – landlord share conditions in the Western Prairies of Canada. His study is mainly based on the lease agreements in the traditional two third – one third share arrangements, returns from shares and direct operating inputs and a cash lease. He concludes that in traditional two third – one third lease is unfair and it has led to inefficient allocation of resources. A tenant in a poor economic climate cannot gain profits even with an equitable crop share. The tenants who want to avoid risks in view of the current economic developments should try to encourage landlords to more totally share – operating expenses rather than taking a small part of income from the crops.

Wolf Ladejinsky is known as one of the architects of Japanese land reforms. In his study on “Agrarian Reforms as unfinished Business” he writes about the implementation of land reforms in Japan and Taiwan in the late 1940’s and early 1950’s. In his view, land reforms would accelerate the pace of rural development. He believes that land reforms could be implemented successfully in Japan and Taiwan by the direct and purposeful intervention of those holding political power there.

Riad El Ghonemy in Columbia, market based land distribution scheme is introduced as per Law No. 160 of 1994. Its aim is to reduce high
inequality of land distribution and high poverty of land distribution and high poverty level of 45 percent in rural areas. For the potential buyers of land, 70 percent of land-sale price is supported by the World Bank and the balance 30 percent is obtained at market rates. The lands for sale are located by NGO's. These lands belong to large land-owners. Only 12 percent of the targeted area for property transfers was implemented during the period 1995-1999. However, a study prepared by UN/CEPAL concludes that the programme had only very limited success because of exorbitant prices imposed by land lords and narcotic dealers and tedious bureaucratic methods.

According to Riad El Ghonemy⁴⁸, in South Africa, the agrarian structure and the entire social older were shaped on racial grounds, as apartheid policy was in force in there. In 1995, constitutional reforms were introduced there and at that time 83 percent of agricultural land was owned by the minority white population and the majority of the black population remained poor and landless and they had no grazing rights. The Reconstruction and Development Programme introduced in 1995 provided for (1) Market – assisted property transfers with governmental and international finance to support the beneficiaries, (2) land restitution for the landless blacks and (3) strengthening the lease rights of the tenants and protection of land tenure arrangement. Although the programme was implemented with strong political commitment with the co-operation of N.G.O's, the progress of implementation was very slow because of rigid racial structures and high land-prices demanded by the sellers.
Sunil Sen in his study on, "Agrarian Relations in India from 1793 to 1947, before independence" highlights the agrarian relations in India in the pre-independence period.

The stagnation of Indian agriculture during British rule is a familiar theme whether the stagnation of agriculture could be related to the agrarian structure. By agrarian structure, we mean the institutional framework of agricultural production which includes land tenure system, distribution of ownership of land between large land owners and small peasants, tenancy system the burden imposed on the peasants by the government and land owners.

A rich peasant in most of the studies is identified as one whose farm was often large. Sunil Sen wrote thus:

"The rich peasant was a cultivator who partly sublet his land or employed labour and was primarily interested in selling food grains and cash crops in the market. Being resourceful and ambitious, he was eager to add field to field so that he would improve farming and sell a larger portion of the produce in the market. The size of his farm was often large, which could not be continued with family labour and he had to employ day labourers. Since his neighbours were poor and becoming poorer, he relied on usury as a means of social advancement".

LAND TENURE SYSTEMS

The British ruling class thought it wise to recognize the zamindars and rely on them for revenue collection. Under permanent settlement of 1793, the zamindars became proprietors of their estates, subject to a permanent fixed
payment to the government. The Revenue of the government was fixed at about ten elevenths of what zamindar received as rent from the ryots. The remaining one elevenths was left as the share of zamindars. The permanent settlement was introduced in Bengal, Bihar and some districts of United Provinces and Madras. In the permanently settled areas, the zamindars became proprietors and the cultivating peasants their tenant. Since the government was primarily concerned with the security of land revenue, the landlords were given powers to evict their tenants. The tenants who had no documentary evidence to prove their rights, were rack rented and evicted by the landlords who were mostly absentee rent receivers.

The Ryotwari settlement was first introduced in Baramahar in the year 1790. Under the Ryotwari system, an agreement was made directly between the government and ryots. It has been held that Ryotwari system eliminated intermediaries between the government and the peasants. Recent research, however, indicates that the Ryotwari system represented the high caste elite or leaders of the village. The Ryotwari system was extended to Bombay and Assam. In the Punjab, the Mahalwari or joint village system was introduced. A person of standing was generally selected to undertake the primary liability of paying land revenue.

Sulekh Chandra Gupta in his study on "Agrarian Relations and early British Rule in India" makes an attempt to analyze the socio-economic changes in the agrarian structure of the of ceded and conquered provinces (at present a part of the state of Uttar Pradesh) during the first thirty three years of British rule in the region. In the immediate pre-British period, there existed in the ceded and conquered provinces, a more or less self-sufficient and
stratified agrarian society in which the rights in land and the mutual economic relations of the various classes were inextricably linked with the powers and prerogatives of the sovereign and his agents over the land. It was the most potent factor in the distribution of national income and the most dominant factor in the economic life of the country.

In the earliest years of their rule, the chief concern was the surplus revenue net of the expenses of collection and administration for East India Company's Trade. The Agrarian structure in the independence period or during British Period was a high degree of concentration of land ownership at the top extensive leasing-out and leasing-in was a major mode of production. Land owners acted as absentee-landlords and hardly ever treated their tenants with consideration and justice. Here, Theoder Bergman\(^4\) sums up these features as follows: (1) High agrarian density, (2) growth of the agrarian population without employment alternatives, (3) Random forms of dependence and exploitation, consolidated by Colonial Rural Caste System, (4) Consumption drain of agricultural surplus, (5) relatively slow growth of farm production.

Tripathy and Pradhan\(^5\) tried to explain the agricultural labour in India. They studied the situation of agricultural labour in India. They also observed different types of labourers in various categories, such as (1) attached labourers, (2) contract labourers, (3) seasonal labourers, (4) bonded labourers.

The study made an attempt to trace the genesis of the agricultural labourers in the state of Orissa. To analyze this, the historical perspectives
were taken into consideration. The conditions of the agricultural labourers during pre-independence were discussed. The emergence of landless agricultural labourers and poverty of the labourers were also discussed.

Himadri Benarjee made a study on "Agrarian Society of the Punjab" (1849-1901). He discussed some of the major influences to which the agrarian society of the Punjab was subjected to during the second half of the 19th century. The starting point of this enquiry is the beginning of British rule in the Punjab in 1849 and it ends in 1901, the year of the introduction of the Land Alienation Act. This study covers nearly the whole of the British rule in the Punjab, as it stood prior to the creation of the North-Western Frontier province at the beginning of the present century.

Factors like new forms of landholding, insecurity of tenure, over assessment and the high rental demand opened up a golden age for the money lender. Another important feature of the new order of the things was the cultivation of certain commercial crops which often led to the growth of universal indebtedness among the members of the rural proprietary body and of their gradual ex-proportion from their ancestral holding.

Himadri Benarjee made an attempt to fill some of the gaps in the existing studies on the agrarian society of the Punjab and also to study the rural changes at two levels. In the first place, the study was undertaken to analyze some significant trends in the agrarian economy of the Punjab during the second half of the century and secondly to explain the changes in the social frame work of agriculture. The study was made on production organization and the peasant economy of the Punjab.
British land revenue administration and the development of the settlement policy were also analyzed in this study. During Sikh rule, the state demand was mostly collected in kind, while the British government claimed it in cash. It was also accompanied by a gradual increase in the quantum of the state demand from time to time.

Transfer of holdings did not necessarily mean a change for the worse, with regard to the effective cultivation of land. Sahukars played an important role in providing credit facilities to the farmers in cultivation and marketing of their agricultural products.

The tenants and their relations with the zamindars were analyzed. In Shapur tenants were known as abadkaram or banjar shigatan who often held lands along the banks of the river and enjoyed some concessions regarding rent rates which were denied to the tenants-at-will. In Amritsar, Bhaewals were also entitled to most of these privileges. Their rights were not hereditary, but they could not be ejected except after an adjustment of accounts, in Jhelum, also tenants were generally of two categories muzarian mustakil and muzarian ghairmustakil. These tenants were none but mere tenants at will, with no special rights over land. Latmars and Kumars held the rank of the privileged tenancy. Another deal with the changing status and economic condition of the village servants. Certain significant changes occurred at another level of agrarian relationship that is the relationship of the peasant-proprietors with their village servants. They constituted a considerable section of the rural population who rendered valuable service almost throughout the year and their wages were determined by customary rules.
Mridula Mukharjee in her paper on "Some aspects of Agrarian structure of Punjab 1925-47", studied the agrarian structure of pre-independent Punjab. She focuses her attention on those tendencies and areas within which contained seeds of social tension and conflict. One major source of actual conflict was the government demand on agriculture in the form of land revenue and water rate. In fact, almost all the peasant agitations in the Punjab during this period, the 1907 agitation in the canal colonies, the agitation in 1924 against increase in water rate, the kissan sabha and other movements in the 1930's were all related to this problem.

The question of indebtedness and the resultant tensions between debtors and money lenders attracted a lot of attention. However, for various reasons only the anti-traditional money lender-aspect of this tension was encouraged and the role of the newly emerging agriculturist money lender was ignored.

The paper also examined the existence of stratification within the agrarian society which was further accentuated by the growing differentiation and its impact on relations between different sections of the agricultural community. The growing tendency towards landlordism and cultivation on batai or share cropping had some implications for the dominant contemporary view of Punjab as land of self-sufficient peasant properties. Lastly, the paper looks at the impact of the world depression which seriously threatened a break-up of the whole fabric of the existing agrarian relations.

Manoshi Mitra studied the "Agrarian Social Structure in Bihar" and made an attempt to explain the historical political economy of agriculture in
Bihar during British period. Bihar is a large state with great potential for development not only because of the fertility of its soil but also its mineral resources, both of which can provide the basis for a highly developed agriculture on the one hand, and modern industry on the other.

The backwardness of Bihar's agriculture has its roots in its colonial past. There is plenty of evidence to suggest that it is in the areas of agricultural growth that the most backward and exploitative forms of labour management and land ownership have persisted. Large holdings and capitalist investment in agriculture had been existing side by side with debt bondage since the latter half of the nineteenth century.

He studied the situation in Bihar during British Period dating back to 1765 when land revenue system was the zamindari system. He distinguished well-to-do peasantry during that period and also made an attempt to study the historical raw material regarding production, trade and commerce. The land revenue hunger of the East India Company's government brought the traditional zamindars into a concern so that they lost land either through government auctioning under the Sunset Law which remained in operation until 1799 or through private sales. This resulted in a revolutionary change in the structure of land holdings. Changes took place in the nature of land ownership in the relations of usurers with the zamindars, their lands and their tenants on one hand and on the other hand the crystallisation of certain processes leading to the emergence of substantial peasants and an agricultural labour force not free in the classic Marxian sense of the wage labourer, but subject to various continued pre-capitalist systems of labour control which can be traced to that period.
The author aims at an analysis of the impact of the permanent settlement of 1793 on the rural socio-economic structure of the non-tribal areas of Bihar with particular reference to a few districts namely Patna, Gaya, Tirhut and Purnea.

AGRARIAN RELATIONS IN INDIA AFTER INDEPENDENCE

The study made by Arvind and Nilakant examined how real peasants live and act and how they are bringing about changes. Iniquitous distribution of land and other assets, increasing productivity and agrarian wealth for a few and grueling poverty for the majority make an explosive mixture which may soon shatter the claim of the country's planners, politicians and the people at large. The planners are unable to get out of the tangle of protecting landed interests and simultaneously prescribing land reforms. The politicians are busy nursing their power bases and the academies are busy in statistical jugglery on the one hand and promoting their pet theories of peasant passivity and rural resistance of change on the other. The poor peasants are getting restive and organizing themselves to change their own conditions and the density of the country unconsciously upsetting the applicants of political purity and academic theorists in the process.

The study of Kiran Pandya on "Agrarian Structure - New Technology and Labour Absorption in Indian Agriculture" analyzed the use of labour absorption in Indian agriculture. In most of the South Asian Countries, after a period of four or five decades of industrialization, as one would expect, there has not been a major structural transformation of the labour force despite the reduction in share of agriculture in G.D.P. A large proportion of labour force
continued to rely on agriculture. The farm size has negative impact on labour use and fragmentation of land holding has a positive impact on labour use. The negative impact of farm size on labour use is to a large extent explained by plot size and economic geography of a village.

The study of Laxminarayan and Tyagi examined some aspects of size distribution of holdings. The analysis is larger confined to inter-state variations in the size of holdings and changes in the size distribution of holdings. An attempt has also been made to compare the estimates of the agricultural census and the N.S.S. In 1971-72, the Ministry of Agriculture carried out a comprehensive agricultural census as a part of the world agricultural census. The agricultural census of 1970-71, throws light on the size distribution of holdings, tenural status, land use pattern; irrigated area under principal crops are. While the agricultural census concentrates on agricultural aspects, the 26th round of N.S.S. throws light on investments in agriculture in addition to size distribution of holdings, tenural status etc. According to the 26th round of the N.S.S. in 1971-72, there were nearly 59.3 million agricultural holdings (combined total of rural and urban areas) covering an operated area of nearly 130.1 million hectares, the agricultural census reveals an operated area of nearly 162 million hectares. The average size of holding for the country as a whole is 2.30 hectares in the case of agricultural census and 2.19 hectares in the case of N.S.S. (1971-72). The share of small holdings in total cultivated area has increased from 15.60 percent to 24.16 percent while their share in number of households remains around 68 percent. The increase in area under small holdings may be attributed to three factors. First, there has been considerable sub-division of land due to passing
of the land from one generation to another. Secondly, some notional transfer of land has taken place within the family with a view to evading land ceilings legislation. Thirdly, it is likely that some surplus land occurred owing to the fixation of ceilings might have been distributed to average small holdings.

Lakshminarayana and Tyagi observed that the size of holdings of big farmers is gradually decreasing and the share of the small holding numbers (size) is also gradually increasing. The share of small holding operated area increased from 19.19 percent to 24.16 percent. It appears that India is essentially a country of small holdings as 67.93 percent of holdings are in the size group of below 2.02 hectares (1971-72).

Nadkarni57 in his paper "Tenants from the Dominant Class-A Developing Contradiction in Land Reforms", observed that the tenants are being exploited by non-cultivating owners of land. One of the assumptions of land reforms legislation is that tenants, as a class, belong to the exploited and the weaker sections needing protection from landlords of the dominant class. There seems to be enough evidence in recent years to suggest that the picture is not so simple. While a large number of really weak tenants have lost whatever security they had, the dominant class is extending its operational control on land through leasing in (Even if concentration in ownership declines, concentration in operational holdings need not). The author conducted a survey of six villages and provides an evidence of the developing contradiction in land reforms on the eve of introduction of regular irrigation. It analyses the impact of leasing behaviour on the concentration of operational holdings and studies the class nature of non-cultivating owners of land.
In the large number of cases, however, the really weak tenants who needed more protection lost whatever little security they earlier had. This deprivation of tenants following the land reforms constitutes an important contradiction in itself and is by now, familiar. In a sense, this is only a part of new contradiction emerging. Simultaneously with the weak tenants being pushed down into the ranks of agricultural labour, cultivators from essentially the dominant class in rural society are entering into formal or informal lease agreements with the poor landholders for cultivation by the farmer, particularly in the regions having the prospects of agricultural prosperity. Thus, the small owners surrender their operational control over land, if not ownership itself, in favour of the dominant class. The ceilings legislation and even tenancy reforms intend to canalize more land in the hands of the weaker sections. Even if concentration in formal ownership may show some dilution concentration in the actual operational control on land need not.

A socio-economic survey was carried out on a census basis in six villages of Maratwada in Maharashtra. The names of villages are Sasthe, and Puinpagaan, Apegaon, Pathsarwala khusd, Balegaon, Indegaon and Agarnardur. The total population of all the six villages was 7423 and total households were 1320. Out of the total land households were 687. Cultivating land households were 625. Non-cultivating but land Owning households were 87. Pure tenant households were 25 per capita land-operated averages around 1.32 acres. The land per cultivating household is 15.6 acres.

The best policy for rural India is to promote small peasant holdings, but this was to be achieved by not appropriating large properties. The large land-
owners found it easy to evade ceilings by the transfer of nominal ownership, while retaining operational control, they also found it easy to eject weak tenants and appropriate operational control. While the power of the big owners was hardly affected, it was still hoped that the redistribution of a little land and some special programmes for the small and marginal farmers would achieve the goal of redressal of poverty.

Gail Amved in her article, “Capitalists, Agriculture and Rural Classes in India” discussed the structure and characteristics of the main rural classes, namely, capitalist farmers, middle class peasants and semi-proletarians poor peasants and labourers.

Generally, it did not lend its supports to the hesitant conclusions of most of the participants in the mode of production debate, who stressed the dominance of semi-feudalism and related forces holding back agricultural development rather it stresses the growth of capitalism in Indian agriculture and the growth links between agriculture and industry in the city and the country side.

Indian agriculture at the time of Independence was predominantly feudal in character, though the important elements of capitalism had risen affecting various types of zamindars, talukadars, knots, malgudars, etc., who controlled the land in the areas of zamunidari settlement. Even though tenancy acts under the British had already given substantial protection to the top section of the tenants, some of those tenants themselves were essentially protocapitalist in character and needed only the final blow of zamindar abolition to emerge as kulaks. Others (such as the Bengal Jotidars) were
more feudal in nature in that they sublet the land to share croppers instead of cultivating it themselves or with hired labours. In Ryotwari areas also the majority of land was informally under the control of non-cultivating land lords. There were in some areas merchants or bureaucrats who had purchased it or won rights over it as a result of peasant indebtedness (Western Maharastra).

While in other cases, they were village landlords who were recognised by the law as ryots (Thanjavour) even where the recognised ‘ryots’ were those who came from castes with cultivating tradition and took an entrepreneurial interest in the land. They very often relied heavily on the near slave bonded labour. (Gujars and Bhilas in Dhule district of Maharashtra).

A hundred years of peasant revolts, kissan movements, anti-Brahmin movements and organizations of dalits and agricultural labourers accompanied India’s freedom struggle. Because of the particular caste-form of Indian feudalism, the anti-feudal movement was expressed not only through peasant revolts, but also in the radical anti-caste movements of Phule, Ambedkar, and Periyar; the anti-caste and social reforms movements often contained attacks on moneylenders and landlords, while the most radical peasant revolts and especially, Telangana revolt took up the social issues including the fights against caste system and against untouchbility.

CASTE AND RURAL CLASSES

No analysis of the class structure in rural India can be complete without taking caste into account, for not only did Indian feudalism have the specific feature of being structured and shaped through caste but caste, though in some what different form-remains equally viable and virulent today.
Under colonial rule, the seeds of the capitalist development were laid and the feudal form of caste was given a decisive blow. Still, by and large, a correlation between class and caste continued to exist, with high castes continuing to be lords of the land, money lender-merchants and bureaucrats and professionals and middle and low castes mainly toilers. Today the development of capitalist agriculture in India has broken down this old correlation between class and caste and reconstituted a new and more earlier relationship between the two.

Rich farmers include both the farmers belonging to high castes (Brahmans, Rajputs, Bhumihars, Nairs, Vellas, etc.) and large section of the Shudra status, kisans castes (Marathas, including those who were farmer status Kumbis, Jats, Yadavas, Kammas, Reddys, Kapus, etc.). The landlords who rent out their land tends to be drawn from mainly the non-cultivating high castes (Brahmans, Vysyas, Karnams), while the dominant sections among the capitalist farmers are the kissan castes, who have caste traditions of being cultivating peasants and were often, in fact, farmer tenants and peasants-cultivators. In the more backward and semi-feudal regions, former land lord castes such as the Rajputs, Bhumihars, Brahmans, etc., remain powerful and contend with Kissan caste Kulaks for the control of the countryside. In Bihar, this conflict expressed as the advanced backward caste-conflict is still fiercely raging.

Class and caste are no longer absolutely correlated. Economic differentiation has affected almost every caste. But this differentiation is itself differentially felt. That is, the dalits and adivasis and to a lesser extent, the artisan service castes and other low castes and probably also minorities, such
as Muslims and Christians, remain primarily - proletarianised. Only a small proportion of their members become middle peasants. Almost none are capitalist farmers, who somewhat become socially mobile through urban occupations and service. In contrast, the middle level kissan caste are the most differentiated in class terms and include all classes from capitalist farmers to middle level peasants to landless agricultural labourers.

Debidas Ray in his paper "The Small Lessor and the Big Lessee Evidence from West Bengal" made two assumptions about the changing structure of lease market in India. One is that the ownership of leasable land is increasingly getting distributed among an ever larger number of petty lessor, and the second is that, simultaneously there has also been a tendency for the leased in land getting concentrated in a fewer hands.

In this paper, the data from Hoogly District, West Bengal had been surveyed and it shows that the lease market in the villages of Hoogly confirms to neither a conventional pattern of a low big lessor leasing out land in small parcels to large number of lessees, nor to the new pattern to get concentrated in the hands of a few tenants. This feature of the Hoogly lease market, it is argued, owes its origin to the nature of a distinct economy, the composition of its population and its proximity to metropolitan Calcutta. Leasing in of agricultural land by large number of farmers or entrepreneur entry as Lenin had called it, is known to be a feature of the development of capitalism in agriculture in many Western countries.
In Russia, in the late nineteenth century not less than fifty percent of the leased in land was in the hands of well to do peasants the rural bourgeoisie who are organizing agriculture on capitalist lines.

Several recent investigators have suggested that in many parts of India, the larger farmer was increasingly entering the lease market in the role of a lessee and the petty landholders was being driven by force of circumstances to lease out his land as he is unable to cultivate his land having no seed, no cattle, no implements, and being desperately hard up for money. The result was that it is the poor peasants, who mostly let their land and the largest amount of land is rented by the well to do peasants.

Debidas Ray presented some relevant data from a West Bengal district with the object of furnishing some empirical evidence from a state which is supposed to be lagging behind in respect of development of commercial tenancy. The data were collected by means of complete enumeration of all the lessors, and particularly all the lessors in 13 selected villages of the districts of Hoogly. Nearly 40 percent of lessors in the village are found to own no more than half an hectare of cultivable land each. Those owners who own less than 2 hectares of land constitute about 87 percent of the total number of lessors and account for more than 61 percent of the total area of leased out land. It seems that the relation between leased out land and owned land steadily declines as the size of holding becomes larger. This seems to suggest that a big landowner does not lease out his land readily.

The next most important occupational group of lessor is that of traders and shopkeepers who are, of course, a heterogeneous group. While the
majority of them belong to the non-farmer class, they stand in the same footing as the service holders in respect of motivation and bargaining rower. The few big landowners among them vary very much as a part of the economically dominant sector of the rural community. It is to be noted that all of them are partly lessor and partly owner-cultivators.

The third category of lessor is that of pure lessors though still numerically important, probably, constitutes the weakest section among lessors. The true farmer class among lessors is that of persons who also engage in own cultivation. The hypothesis made about the changing structure of lease market in India has two propositions. The first is that for various reasons ownership of leasable land is increasingly getting distributed among an ever larger number of petty lessors. The second is that simultaneously there has also been a tendency for the leased in land getting concentrated in a fewer hands. In other-words, process of lessors getting smaller and lessees getting bigger is said to have set in.

An analysis of the caste composition of the lessor and lessees however, suggests a tendency on the part of lessor to be free agents. But the opportunities for non-farm employment are not of such magnitude as to make a dent either into the high rural denuent rural unemployment problem of the district.

Sipra Das Gupta in his study on "Class Relations and Technical Change in Indian Agriculture" made an attempt to explain class relations and the choice of techniques. He discussed the existing class relations in the country side in his study. During the colonial administration, the spectrum of technical possibilities remained largely fossilized. There were, however,
changes in the institutional structure i.e., the permanent and Ryotwari settlements. In the absence of the former, the latter had very little, if any, impact on the production techniques.

After Independence, many institutional changes were contemplated and laws were passed to implement them, the Zamindari Abolition Acts, the Ceiling Laws, fixing the maximum size of land holdings and Tenancy Improvement Laws give protection to tenants. Simultaneously, the spectrum of technical possibilities was broadened through public effort and expenditure.

The position of an individual in the structure of class relations in the countryside is meaningfully determined by his relationship to the land cultivated. In this sense, the rural working force in India can be divided into three broad groups.

The first group would be the landless labourers, whose main source of income is the hiring out of their own labour. According to the definition adopted by the Ministry of Food and Agriculture, Government of India, an agricultural labourer is a person whose time is not being wholly occupied or not at all occupied in cultivating land of his own and is willing to work on the land of another for some form of remuneration. The worker may be landless or with a small parcel of land.

Among agricultural labourers the number of landless agricultural labourers has increased rapidly over the decades. According to population census of 1971, the number of landless laborers has increased in many states, in Andhra Pradesh 28 percent, 6 to 37.4 percent in Tamilnadu 18 to
29.1 percent in West Bengal 15.3 percent to 25.7 percent in Uttar Pradesh. 11.3 percent to 19.35 percent in Bihar 23 percent to 38 percent.

The second group is formed by those whose main source of income is the cultivation of leased lands and who could be regarded as tenant-farmers. The most prevalent form of tenancy in India had been share cropping. Under share cropping system, the tenants pay rent as a proportion of the crop produced.

The third group consists of those whose main source of income is cultivation of land owned by them and who could be regarded as owner-cultivators. Owner-cultivators, however, are not a homogenous group. The most important characteristic of this group is the difference in terms of the ownership of productive sources. It is logical to conclude that land ownership is the most crucial element in periods of technical change, which raises the profitability of investments of cultivation.

According to the National Sample Survey, 8th and 16th rounds, more than two-thirds of all rural households operate holdings less than 5 acres in size, the proportion goes up when we take into account 7.50 acres of land, which is national average land holding. 70 percent of the owner-cultivators are small farmers. Their decisions as regards what to produce and how to produce affect a very small parcel of total land cultivated. It is the decision of the big farmers, which plays the crucial role in all those aspects of technical changes.

Mishra G.P. made a study on "Some Aspects of Change in Agrarian structure". He tried to explain the land-ownership, agricultural tenancy and
agricultural labour working force. He discussed the agrarian relations and productive relations in Indian agriculture. He made his study on “Agrarian Structure and Weaker Sections in India during 1950-51 to 1970-71”. He explained the conditions of weaker sections. He also observed the patterns of income distribution in the agriculture sector. He discussed the role of capitalistic farming in Indian agriculture. Mishra made an attempt to explain land reforms in India, ceiling on land holdings, tenancy reforms, rent fixation and implementation of land reforms in India.

There has been a rapid change in agrarian development of the Punjab and its agrarian structure itself may have changed during the past four decades under the impact of socio-economic and technological developments.

The study is based on a stratified random sample of 1682 operational holdings from 20 villages representing two agricultural development levels in the post-green revolution in the Punjab during 1985-86.

In their article, Singh and Grewal made an attempt to study different tenure types in the advanced and backward regions of the Punjab. In this study, the pure owner-operators were the most important tenure type, who comprised 66.58 percent of total operators. The next important were the mixed tenants who constitute 30.74 percent of the farms. The pure tenants were the least important tenure type constituting 2.68 percent. In this article, the authors discussed forms of tenancy also. They have divided the tenancy contracts into two major forms, namely crop-share contracts, under which a specified proportion of produce is paid as rent and the fixed rent contract.
which includes both fixed cash and fixed kind contracts. The fixed rent is the practice for 72.41 percent in the advanced regions and 21.17 percent in backward regions. Share rent in advanced regions is 27.59 percent and 78.3 percent in backward regions. Taken together, these results indicate that with agricultural development, crop share contracts have a tendency of getting replaced by fixed rent contracts.

Darling63, tells us that because of prosperity on one hand and the indebtedness of the small peasants, tenants and landless labourers who borrowed out of necessity on the other hand were the two distinct problems in the Punjab. Darling's famous work, "The Punjab Peasant in Prosperity and Debt" proceeds on two basic assumptions. The first one is that the Punjab is prosperous. The second is that the Punjab is a land of peasant proprietors. Obviously, then, the peasant proprietor is prosperous but Darling also knows that the province is deeply in debt and he comes to the conclusion that if the peasant proprietors are prosperous and also heavily indebted, they are in debts because they are prosperous. However, if we find that the Punjab was not a country of peasant proprietors, but it was a highly stratified society with wide variation in income levels then it is possible that the prosperity might be the prosperity of the few, and that there may be many others who borrow not, because they can, but because they must. The self-cultivating small peasant and landless tenants and agricultural labourers, however, had a different problem. Their need was for credit as their precarious position in the production process forced them to borrow. The peasant proprietors and tenants had often to borrow for paying the land revenue and water rate. They might borrow in Barani tracts to sink a new well or repair an old one or for
buying cattle. They might also borrow for the marriage of a daughter or son. The landless agricultural worker was worse off for he often needed loans because his employment was largely seasonal and natural calamities, such as drought, famine etc., hit him the hardest by way of loss of employment. His ability to borrow was very little and he could get loans only by pledging some jewelers at extremely exorbitant rates.

The self-cultivating peasant proprietors' income fell drastically. In some cases land revenue and water rate demand was more than his entire gross income. Tenants were even worse off than owner-cultivators. The value of their half share declined considerably, but they had to continue to pay their half share to government.

Oberai and Manmohan Singh made a survey of migrants into and out of the rural areas of Ludhiana district of the Punjab, which is the heart of the Green Revolution belt in Northern India. Three streams of migrants are studied: (1) out-migrant, (2) in-migrants and (3) return migrants. Out-migrants from the rural area is dominated by the poorest and the richest and information on the reasons for migration confirms the link between migration and economic factors. The rate of out-migration from the rural area is higher than the combined rate of in-migration and return-migration suggesting that some of the shortage or labour reported from the region may be due to migration and not to the new methods of agriculture.

Because of its achievement in agriculture, Ludhiana district is attracting people from other districts of the Punjab and also from the other states. The factors that determine migrants are demographic and related characteristics,
Education, Relationship to household head, distance, trends in different years. However, economic characteristics and household characteristics are some of the reasons for their migration.


During the 1950's, the agrarian structure of the state was dominated by tenancy cultivation, fragmentation of holdings, high land rents, extremely skewed distribution of land and very low productivity. The cultivating landowners and non-cultivating land-owners were the chief suppliers of leased out land, whereas land was leased in by two categories of tenants, namely pure tenants and owner-cum-duty tenants. Crop sharing was the predominant mode of rent payment. The land was leased in predominantly for subsistence purposes and to some extent to increase.

The size of the operational holding increased and all tenants provided services of various kinds their landlords without getting any formal remuneration. The bulk of the supply of leased land was made available by relatively a small number of land-owners. Tenancy was essentially feudal or pre-capitalistic in nature.

The regulation of tenancy, consolidation of holdings, removal of intermediaries and ceilings on ownership have changed the institutional structure and made it more conducive to material advancement in agriculture. Jaswinder Singh Brar and Sucha Singh Gill discussed the existence of
reverse tenancy in agriculture. As opposed to subsistence tenancy, the reverse tenancy in agriculture has been described as commercial tenancy or capitalistic tenancy. The authors discussed the different types of tenants in different areas like Gujarat, Orissa, Maharashtra, Bengal and in the Punjab. There are pure tenants, rich tenants, entrepreneurial tenants. Vyas, Bharadwaj and Das, Nandakasni, Rudra and Patnaik discussed the problem of these tenants in different states.

Singh found that in central region the majority of the tenants were the big cultivators in Ludhiana district. Reverse Tenancy has been examined by Singh (1989) who extended his study and collected the data. The majority of the tenants in the sub-mountainous region were largely landless who operated small areas and cultivated their land with family labour. Singh observed that the reverse tenancy and modern technology were inter-related. The existence of reverse tenancy pre-supposes the existence of the extremely skewed distribution of wealth and other resources in the farming community. Almost all the studies indicate that the more mechanized is the agriculture of an area, the more is incidence of the reverse tenancy.

The region in the central Punjab situated between the Sutlej and the Beas river is called the Doaba. Presently, it consists of four districts Jalandhar, Kapurthala, Hoshiarpur and Nawanshar. Owing to the small size of holdings and high demographic pressure, there has been high incidence of out-migration to some western countries, particularly the U.S.A., U.K. and Canada. Two interesting developments drew their attention to this area. The existence of potato crop on a wider scale and a substantial proportion of the crop being controlled by a few big farmers known as potato kings is a
phenomena found in this area. Singh carried out a survey and found that reverse tenancy has been intensified and accumulation in agriculture has reached an advanced state. The main reason for the reverse tenancy in this area is due to the indivisibility of mechanical inputs like tractors and combines harvesters and other capital equipment required for cultivation.

Mehta & Awadh Prasad⁶⁷, in their study on "Agrarian Relations and Rural Exploitation" discussed the situation in Rajasthan. They discussed the traditional approaches to the problem of poverty and also radical approach. Poverty is treated as a disease rather than a symptom. Poverty lines have been defined and the percentage of the people below poverty line and starvation or semi starvation estimates have been put to serious prolonged discussion and analysis. The radical approach to the problem of poverty of starts from the premise that distribution of means of consumption is a consequence of the condition of production. The author discussed the meaning of exploitation. The approach is thus study to discuss the working of the exploitation system is in all its dimensions, the most important being the ownership of the physical means of production – land, working animals, implements and irrigation constructions. The historical background of Rajasthan shows that Jaipur, Jodhpur, Udaipur, Bikaner and Kota were the bigger Princely states in Rajasthan. Most of the rulers belonged to top caste people Rajputs. But some of the states like Bharatpur and Dholapur were ruled by the middle castes of Jats. In Rajasthan, the nature of exploitation was naturally pre-capitalist.

Rural populations in Rajasthan are of owner-cultivators class. Out of the land owning rich classes in rural Rajasthan, 5-8 percent households lease
out land. It is interesting to note that the household having smaller land holdings lease out a small proportion of their land. The authors discussed the distribution of assets like live stock, machinery and transport means. The description of the assets and liabilities of cultivators, agricultural labourers and other non-cultivations in Rajasthan and other regions reveals that the asset position of the households in relation to liabilities is very weak especially in the case of agricultural labour and artisans. The root cause of poverty in Rajasthan is not low availability of land but is, on the one hand, the concentration of land in the hands of a few and on the other hand, non-availability of tools and equipment required for agricultural activities to the overwhelming majority.

The proportion of agricultural labourers in the population is increasing. Most of them are indebted for meeting out consumption needs. The credit advanced to them is either on personal security or even against no security. It again indicates that increasing proletarian tendencies are seen in rural Rajasthan. However, bondage is still prevalent in backward regions of the state. Development of infrastructure by the state has benefited most of the households having large holdings. Hence class differentiation within castes has begun appearing.

Bliss and Stern in their study on the economy of an Indian village, Palanpur concentrated on the peculiarities within agriculture from the point of theories of economic development. They made a study on rural markets and the behaviour of those involved in them. They also made an observation about the village conditions, population and household relationships in
Palanpur which lies in the Moradabad district of West U.P. 13 KM, north of the town called Chandauri.

In Palanpur, there are 112 agricultural households which includes own-cultivators, and agricultural labourers. Bliss and Stern made a study on the village structure, land-ownership, tenancy and cropping pattern. The land owning households of Palanpur mostly acquired their land as a result of the operation of the zamindari abolition legislation. The origins of the zamindaris are unclear, but they were probably the leaders of quarreling group in the Pre-British Rule. The zamindars were responsible for collecting revenue and administrations of rural areas, under the Moghul and British period. Thus, the zamindars acted as intermediaries between the British and actual cultivators of the soil. The tenants have no right to sell or mortgage their land; So the tenants of the zamindars in Palanpur did not acquire the status. Bhumiar only protected lands while hereditary tenants became sardars. Tenancy in Palanpur usually takes the form of share-cropping. The authors discussed the caste, village politics and institutions, ownership histories of families and their land.

The authors also studied about the land and market system in Palanpur. The authors analysed labour market, the market for the services of bullocks, the market for credit and the market of water sources.

Share-cropping is the major tenancy system in Palanpur. The tenancy in Palanpur has taken into two directions:
1) Institutional aspect of tenancy in the village is the main aspect.

2) The other aspect of tenancy which attracted attention is the quantitative one.

Bliss and Stern made a study on the income and output in the village of Palanpur. They observed the new varieties and practices in Palanpur with regard to the cultivation of agricultural lands. They also examined the productivity and expectations in agriculture of Palanpur. They also made a survey on population growth and future of the village.

Ranjit K. Bhadra made an attempt in his paper "Rural Class structure in Post-Independence Assam" to show how developments in post-independence Assam have brought about changes in agrarian relations, with a view to showing the emerging pattern in rural Assam.

Agrarian stratification in Assam is characterized by the landlords at the top and the landless labourers at the bottom. The tenant cultivators occupy the middle position. The social organization of the agrarian system gives rise to various patterns of works and productivity rights, privileges and duties of the different classes. The structure of the agrarian production can be understood on the basis of three types of relations, namely family labour, hired labour and tenant cultivator.

The Assam Adhiai Protection and Regulation Act, 1948 regulated landlord Adhiai relations and promoted the unity of the adhiairs. The Assam Association of Zamindari Act, 1951 and the Assam State Acquisition of Land Belonging to Religions or Charitable Institutions of Public Nature Act, 1959, the tenants' right of self-cultivation and of ownership have been enacted after
Independence. The Assam Fixation of Ceiling of Landholding Act, 1956 fixed a ceiling on landholding by an individual or a family at 150 bighas. These land laws had a greater impact in zamindar areas of Goalpara and Cachar districts where all the zamindars, except a few lost their land but in the ryotwari areas most of the medium and small ryots retained their land.

Land is still a basic productive source in rural Assam, but it is not the only source of livelihood the number of persons engaged in production other than agriculture and salaried jobs has been growing. Absentee-landlords are quite common in rural areas. It has been observed that the number of cultivators has declined in the second generation, compared to the first generation among the higher castes and there is also a concomitant rise in the number of service holders among them.

Though under the present situation, land owners have sold their land they continue to be a landowning class. Their land is bought by the people of other classes especially by the cultivating tenants. Thus, the ownership of land has been transferred to the people of different classes and caste groups. But agricultural labourers have not increased their landholdings and remain in the same position. At present land-owners have lost their uniform class character and have emerged as three types of classes namely:

a) Absentee-landlords who live in the cities and have their land cultivated by the tenants.

b) Non-cultivating land lords who live in the village, but have their land cultivated by others.
c) Pretty landlords who live in the village and cultivate their lands themselves.

The ex-zamindari areas and the ryotwari areas in Assam show different pictures regarding the emergence of these agrarian classes.

In Goalpara district, an ex-zamindar area, the growth of agricultural classes is conspicuous due to the abolition of zamindar system. Hence, the cultivating owners form the largest group constituting 34.03 percent and the rent receivers the smallest group constituting 5.56 percent. But the Sibsagar district ryotwari areas show a different picture where rent receivers are totally absent and the cultivating owners constitute 60.40 percent. Regarding agricultural labourers it is seen that in Goalpara their number is high (9.02 percent), but in Sibsagar it is only 0.23 percent.

Absentee-landlords are a type of landowners who do not enter into any agricultural activities with their tenants. There are three different systems of payment of land taxes by tenants to the land lords:

1) The widely prevalent fixed cash-rent system.

2) The system of share-cropping which itself is of two types "Boka-adhi and Guti-adhi".

3) The system of fixed rent in kind, in which a tenant gives to his landlord a fixed amount of produce irrespective of the out-put.

Pardhan H. Prasad\textsuperscript{70}, in his article attempts to relate the emergence of these middle castes into the position of political power in the state to the continuing process of disintegration of semi-feudal production relations in
Bihar. He argues that the forming of caste passions which on earlier occasions had led to a diffusion of class contradictions may now turn out to be a factor which may, in fact, sharpen and intensify these contradictions. The social and economic roots of the contradiction which has brought about the present situation almost wholly in rural Bihar are related to agriculture and historical in nature. The dominant mode of production in the pre-British India was feudal which has almost completely collapsed by 1857. This marked the beginning of the colonial mode of production in India. The zamindars, the tenants, landlords cultivators and big peasants were mostly upper caste hindus. The poor peasants were mainly from a community, what is today known as scheduled castes and middle castes. The poor-middle peasantry and the middle peasantry were drawn mainly from middle castes. Betelille Andre made his study on "Agrarian Social Structure in Tanjore of Tamil Nadu". His study on agrarian relations deal with the problems and struggles of ownership of land and use of land. The Tanjore district in South India offers certain advantages for the investigation of agrarian relations, as an aspect of the broader problem of social stratification. There are different modes of production in the Tanjore district.

Betelille Andre made his study on the mode of production in the Tanjore district. Share-cropping and cash payment are the important forms of tenancy in the Tanjore district. Waram and Kuttachai are the forms of tenancy. They are also known as share cropping tenancy and cash payment. The author discussed the tenancy system in the Tanjore district.

Siva Kumar made an attempt at understanding the class structure, the constraints imposed by it on production and marketing and its effects on
indebtedness and asset structure of the peasantry in Tamilnadu. The paper is published in three parts. In the first part, he dealt with the class structure and in the second part with marketing and production problems. The third part deals with indebtedness. He tried to explain the different classes of peasants in Tamilnadu, such as big peasants, medium, petty peasants, landless peasants and landlords. He finally tried to explain the situation of the poor peasants in the two villages of Asthapuram and Kanthapuram in Tamilnadu (Chengalpattu district).

Harris John made an attempt at empirical examination of the issue of “Capitalism and Peasant farming” using maximum analytical frame-work. Harris found two major obstacles to the development of capitalism in agriculture. Dependence of the exploited on the appropriators of surplus value for circulating capital has risen and strengthened the depending relationships. Secondly, the rates of returns on capital from agricultural commerce, agricultural wholesaling, agricultural investment goods, trading and usury are higher. The conclusion drawn is that capitalist transformation of agriculture will remain incomplete so long as the merchants and the usurer's capital dominate the rural economy.

Varghese in his study “Agrarian Change and Economic Consequences Land Tenures in Kerala, 1850-1960” helps us to study the land tenures in Kerala. Varghese has used the case study method for his investigation, selecting Kerala for the purpose. Varghese examined in his study the impact of changes in social structure, the land tenures and in taxation policies. He made his studies on Malabar and Cochin during the middle of the eighteenth century. Varghese clearly brings out the difference in
political alignments and compulsions that had important effects on the policies followed with regard to land tenures. He has presented some data relating to sales and purchases of land by different communities. The analysis of Varghese helps to give an insight into the more recent events in Kerala. Though Travancore forged ahead in respect of land reforms in the second half of the nineteenth century creating a broad base of peasant-proprietorship, new forms of land leasing developed in the area in the following decades and eventually resulted in a high proportion of agricultural households holding and leasing land under a variety of tenurial rights.

Krishnaji75 in his study on “Agrarian Change and Demographic Structure” helps us to know the land reforms and their acts in Kerala. His working paper No. 80 “Agrarian Relations and the Left Movement in Kerala” examines recent trends in tenancy system. Tenancy was abolished in Kerala, through the Kerala Land Reforms Amendment Act, 1969. Krishnaji made an attempt to understand recent trends in the left movement in the light of long term changes that have taken place in the agrarian relations. He discussed some aspects of the class structure and struggles in Kerala. Trends in the composition of the working populations show a fall in the proportion of cultivators and a rise in that of agricultural labourers. He examined the conditions of tenants and also agricultural labourers. The standard of living of the peasants of has not increased due to the tenancy legislation and productive conditions. The growth rate of poor peasants also increased from 1961 to 1971 owing to the decline in operation holding to less than one acre.

Saradamani76 in her study on “Women’s status in Changing Agrarian Relations- a Kerala Experience” examines the changes brought about in the
lives and status of women by changes in the agrarian structure. The author examines how the progressive breakdown of landlordism in Palghat and the accompanying socio-cultural exchanges affected women belonging to different strata of the agricultural community, Palghat, a predominantly agricultural region is one of the two main rice growing areas in Kerala, the other being Kuttanad in Alleppey district. She made an observation on "Women and development" which was one of objectives of the study. The authors study on the land and labour relations in selected area gives the data about the cultivators and agricultural labourers. She also examines the educational status of women in this district. Literacy rate in this district had highly increased and the conditions of women were also improved.

Naik in his study on “Agrarian unrest in Karnataka” tries to present the peasant movements in Karnataka to understand the crucial factors which were behind the unrest or agitation among the agrarian groups in Karnataka with special reference to farmers agitation in Shimoga district. The author aims at determining the conditions of the peasants and their agitations. He studied the peasant movements in India. He also tried to explain the peasant and agrarian movements in Shimoga District. His studied the peasant movements in Karnataka, land ceilings, cancellation debts and so on. The abolition of feudal tenancies was the central demand of the peasant movement. The new peasant movements focused on the fair prices for agricultural produce, and on the restriction on the operations of the markets which adversely affect farmers’ control of monopolies and multinational companies and also on the policies of the government with regard to exports and imports.
Joshi in his study on “Agrarian Structure and Tenancy Movements” explains the change in the structure of agrarian relations in a district of Karnataka namely Uttara Kannada. He closely studied the tenant movements in that distinct. He briefly examined the origin, growth and decline of tenant movements in Uttara Kannada. Joshi brings out the fact that to comprehend all the historical, economic and social factors that shape the dynamics of agrarian structure and also to see to what extent the goal of equity is accomplished through tenancy movements and reforms. The tenancy movements in the district exposed the effective contradiction between the landlords and the tenants that gave expression to the urgent need for tenancy reforms and also created necessary climate for its implementation. In the next chapter the changes that had taken place in the agrarian structure of Andhra Pradesh since its formation will be analyzed.
REFERENCE


2. Alexander, K.C. (1981) :“Agrarian Relations and Organization of the rural poor (Rural Development in India some aspects) NIRD, Hyderabad- p. 239


24. Ibid., p. 1996


47. Sunil Sen (1979): "Agrarian Relations in India" before Independence (1793-1947)


Discovery Publishing House, New Delhi, pp.1, 113

Manohar Publications, New Delhi.

52. Mridula Mukherjee (1980): "Some aspects of Agrarian, Structure of
Punjab, 1925-47, EPW Vol. XV, No. 26, Review of Agriculture, 28,
June, pp. A 46-70.

53. Manoshi Mitra (1985): Agrarian Social Structure Continuity and
Change in Bihar, 1788-1820 – Manohar Publications, New Delhi.

54. Arvind Das N & Nilakant. V (1979): Agrarian Relations in India
Manohar Publications, New Delhi.

Labour absorption in Indian Agriculture, Himalya Publishing House,
Bombay.

56. Laxminarayana and Tryagi S.S. (1976): Same aspects of size
Distribution of Agriculture holdings – EPW Vol. XI. No. 41, Oct. 9,
1976., pp. 1637-1640.

57. Nadhkarni M.V. (1976): "Tenants from the Dominant Class: A
Developing Contradiction in Land Reforms". Review of Agriculture

58. Gail Amvedt (1981): Capitalist Agriculture and Rural Classes in India –

from 'West Bengal", EPW Vo. XIII, Dec. Review of Agricultural,
pp. 119-124.

60. Sipra Das Gupta (1980): Class Relations and Technical Change in
Indian Agriculture – The Macmillan Company of India Ltd., Macmillan

Sterling Publishers, New Delhi.

Green Revolution in Punjab" – Land Reforms in India, Volume 6. R.P.
Singh and S.S. Grewal in their article "Tenancy Pattern in Post green revolution in Punjab attempts to study the tenancy pattern in the Punjab in the post green revolution era of the 1980 and the relevance of tenancy in the context of the changed situation, Sucha Singh Gill, Safe publications, New Delhi.


67. Ibid., pp. 220-222.


