Chapter – 3
TERRORISM
Introduction

Terrorism may be described as a strategy of violence designed to instill terror and fear within a particular segment of a given society (Bassiouni 1979b: 745-752). Commonly associated with acts committed by ideologically and politically motivated individuals, in order to achieve power (Bassiouni 1979b: 745-752), terrorism is also committed by individuals who are not so motivated, and by individuals acting on behalf of states in time of war and peace (Bassiouni, 1979a: 207).

The dramatic nature of so-called "terrorist" acts, committed by ideologically motivated individuals, in the last decade, has caused worldwide concern. Nevertheless, current research has not sufficiently probed this complex phenomenon (Friedlander 1977: 383-384). Above all, there is no agreed upon analytical methodology for the appraisal of such conduct, with a view to formulating appropriate measures for its effective prevention and control (McDougal and Chen 1969: 237). The pervasive and indiscriminate use of such convenient labels as terrorism continues to obscure the field of inquiry (Lubet and Czaczkes 1980: 193). Generally speaking, attention often seems to focus only on individually perpetrated and ideologically motivated acts of terror-violence, while other terror-inspiring common crimes and brutal acts of state-sponsored terror violence go unnoticed (McDougal and Chen 1969: 237).

The overt fears inspired in the public by terrorist acts, in the absence of conclusive scientific data, are attributable to the impact of media coverage. The general public seems to perceive individual terrorism, as opposed to state-sponsored terrorism, as a dangerous phenomenon affecting society in a manner warranting exceptional action. The relatively limited social harm resulting from acts commonly denominated terrorism, when compared to the social harm caused by common crimes, indicates that this psychological impact is more significant than
the acts of violence committed; and that this impact may be more media-created
than intrinsic to the acts. The role of the media, likewise, would explain in part
the terrorist's choice of target and the manner of affecting the act; the terrorist
aims to ensure media dissemination of both the act and the underlying message to
achieve terror-inspiring effect.

However, the death, destruction, and economic impacts resulting from the four
hijackings on September 11, 2001 (henceforth 9/11) and the collapse of the World
Trade Centre twin towers, made policymakers and the public acutely aware of the
threat posed by terrorism to liberal democracies in the Western world. The sheer
magnitude of 9/11 had repercussions that have touched most countries through
economic spillovers, collateral damage or security expenditures. As the public
learned about the global reach of the Al-Qaida network, the true threat of
terrorism became clearly visible. Terrorism is the premeditated use, or threat of
use of extra-normal violence or brutality by sub-national groups or individuals to
obtain a political objective through intimidation or fear directed at a large
audience. Terrorist acts are purposely brutal to create an atmosphere of fear, while
publicizing the terrorists' cause. As the public becomes numb to their acts of
violence, terrorists ratchet up the carnage to maintain media interest (Enders
2004).

An essential ingredient in defining terrorism is the presence of a political
objective, which may be related to getting a country out of an international
organization, the formation of an Islamic state, the United States ending its
support of Israel, or other objectives. A crucial factor of modern-day terrorism is
the transnational implications of many terrorist attacks. When a terror incident in
one country involves victims, perpetrators or audiences in two or more countries,
terrorism takes on a transnational character. A terrorist act may be transnational
owing to its impact, planning and execution, perpetrators (if known), or targets
and resulting damage. A skyjacking of a plane with passengers from multiple
countries is a transnational terrorist event, as is a skyjacking of a domestic flight originating in one country but terminating in another country. The skyjackings on 9/11 were transnational terrorist acts, as were the near-simultaneous bombings of the U.S. embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, on August 7, 1998. We focus on transnational terrorism because of its importance in the post-9/11 world and data availability. Although transnational terror attacks have decreased in the post-Cold War period, the lethality of these attacks has increased, with each incident; almost 17 percentage points are more likely to result in death or injuries (Enders and Sandler 2000: 307-32). The casualties time series, involving one or more deaths or injuries, displays predictable factors, unlike the non-casualties series, which is largely random following de-trending. In a subsequent study, Enders and Sandler (2002: 145-165) use a Threshold Auto Regression (TAR) model applied to just the death series to identify nonlinearities following shocks. When terrorism is in a low-intensity regime with attacks below a data-determined threshold, shocks that raise the level of events are sustainable. In contrast, shocks during a high-intensity regime of terrorism (i.e., attacks above a data-determined threshold) are episodic with series returning rapidly to the mean number of events. The primary purpose of the current study is to apply TAR analysis to additional transnational terrorist time series, including important subcomponents of the overall all-incident series. In particular, we analyze the death and casualties time series for nonlinearities as well as the component series of bombings with one or more deaths. Additionally, we apply a TAR model to series involving assassinations, hostage-taking, and threats and hoaxes. A wide variety of nonlinearities are uncovered for component series (e.g., shocks to the assassinations series display some persistence in both the low and high intensity regime; shocks to the threats and hoaxes series result in persistence in only the high-intensity regime). An important finding is that the response to an external shock depends on current activity levels, which may vary among different kinds
of terrorist events; therefore, policy prescriptions must be tailored to the kind of event.

As far as the problem of terrorism is concerned in contemporary international relations, East and South East Asia are not free from this problem. Both South East and East Asian nations have provided valuable services for international terrorist groups and organized crime groups. These countries have functioned as safe havens, training grounds, meeting places, money-laundering centers and centers for trafficking in arms, humans, and narcotics. The area is ripe for this kind of activity because of its large populations of Muslim minorities (excepting predominantly Muslim Indonesia), poor banking transparency, weak border controls and geographic proximity to the Golden Triangle a region that includes parts of western Burma, northwestern Thailand, and China's Yunnan province, and is the origin of most of the region's drug supply. Slow economic development and governmental instability add to the mix, as do the bustling tourist markets and lax visa laws that lead to relatively unimpeded transnational movement. These discontented Muslim groups provide a friendly environment for terrorist activity. Governmental corruption, which manifests itself in various ways in the region, plays a role in promoting criminal activity and international terrorism in all the Southeast and East Asian countries. In this chapter, we attempt to understand the problem of defining terrorism, a bit of the history of terrorism, the problem of terrorism in East and South-East Asia with special reference to China, Burma and Indonesia and its connection towards international terrorism, and lastly, terrorism as non-traditional security threats.

The Problem of Definition

There are a number of definitions related to terrorism. There are certain agreed criteria to the term terrorism. It is a premeditated, politically motivated use of violence or threat to intimidate or coerce a government or general public. It is a strategy of violence designed to achieve desired outcomes by instilling fear and
insecurity. There is unlawful use of threat to force through a sustained campaigning or sporadic incident. There is calculated use of violence against civilians, non-combatant targets. Power is intrinsically at the root of political violence, its acquisition, its manipulation and employment to effect changes.

Researchers have found that most of them have common ground – adversely, there are equally differing points of view. Academics, psychologists, criminologists, and journalists are particularly concerned in these definitions with what they regard as the cause of political activism becoming violent and terrorist intimidation, making for increased public vulnerability (Whittaker 2004: 1-2).

Terrorism is revolutionary in nature aiming at bringing about a complete change within a state; a political change without getting rid of the political system. Generally, terrorist activities are clandestine in nature and are carefully planned with regard to its goals, means, and targets access. The goals in question may be understood generally as political, social, ideological, or religious; otherwise terrorist would be thought of as delinquent criminals. Terrorism is usually carried out by sub-national groups, occasionally led by dedicated lone individuals. Maximum publicity is normally an important objective for terrorists. Zones of action, hitherto a specific country or locality or segment of society, are fast becoming transnational and their effects reach beyond national boundaries.

There is another question that arises, why is terrorism so difficult to define? Not surprisingly, as the meaning and uses of the word have changed over time to accommodate changing political scenario and discourse of each successive era. The term terrorism has increasingly been elusive, in the face of various attempts to construct one constant definition. The early practitioners didn't mince their words or ride behind the semantic camouflage of labels, such as 'freedom fighter' or urban guerilla. The 19th century anarchists, for example, unabashedly proclaimed themselves to be terrorists and frankly proclaimed their tactics to be 'terrorist'.
In contrast to its contemporary usage, the term terrorism had a decidedly positive connotation. From the chronological point of view, the word "terrorism" was first popularized during the French revolution. The system or regime de la terreur of 1793 to 1799 from which the English word came - was adopted as a means to establish order during the transient anarchical period of turmoil and upheaval that followed the uprisings of 1789, as it was followed in the wake of many other revolutions (Hoffman 1999).

Ironically, the word terrorism was associated with the virtue of Democracy in its original form. Maximilien Robespierre (Revolutionary leader), firmly believed that virtue was the mainspring of a popular government at peace, but that, during the time of revolution, it must be allied with terror in order for democracy to triumph. He appealed famously to virtue, without which terror is evil and terror, without which virtue is helpless and proclaimed, terror is nothing but justice, prompt, severe and inflexible; it is therefore an emanation of virtue. From this point of view, we came to know that there is vast difference between revolutionary terrorism and the modern terrorism. At least two key characteristics are common between them. First, the Régime de la terreur was neither random nor indiscriminate, as terrorism is often portrayed today, but was organized, deliberate and systematic. Second, its goal and its very justification like that of contemporary terrorism was the creation of a 'few better society' in place of a fundamentally corrupt and undemocratic political system.

Defining the Terms: A Theoretical Perspective

Over time, academicians and 'theorists' have suggested literally multiple use as well as definitions for the word terror (Malik 2001). Though many of these definitions are similar, they are subtly different, often projecting an agenda for the author. For example, Martha Crenshaw has written that terrorism is a conspiratorial style of violence, calculated to alter the attitudes and behavior of multitude audiences. It targets the few in a way that claims the attention of the
many. Terrorism is not mass or collective violence, but rather the direct activity of small groups (Crenshaw 1955). Though Crenshaw's definition recognizes that terrorism is directed to certain audiences, she also limits her definition to small group activity, effectively precluding any discussion of state-sponsored terrorism.

Walter Laqueur, whose book The Age of Terrorism is considered by many to be a classic on the history of terrorism, has suggested that terrorism is the use or the threat of the use of violence, a method of combat, or a strategy to achieve a certain target. It aims to induce a state of fear in the victim that is ruthless and does not conform to humanitarian rules. Publicity is an essential factor in the terrorist strategy (Laqueur 1987: 143). It is instructive to note that both Crenshaw and Laqueur want to stay away from state-sponsored terrorism, although Laqueur acknowledges that states are capable of and have engaged in violence that might indeed be considered as terrorist. He distinguishes them, however, by suggesting they do not employ terror on a systematic basis. Laqueur's definition, here, also raises the suggestion that there is some normative standard (which he calls "humanitarian rules") against which it is to be judged what is normal and acceptable and what is unacceptable, abnormal—and terrorist.

By contrast, Annamarie Olivero, in her work The State of Terror, has argued that terrorism contains its own rhetoric, which has been transformed throughout history by different states. By claiming to be defining a type of violence, i.e., one that threatened the site of legitimate violence (the state), it is clear that this term is reserved for the art of statecraft (Olivero 1998: 142). From Olivero's perspective, defining terrorism is something in which states and their agents (including those in the academy) engage to distinguish illegitimate violence and dissent (practiced by those in opposition to the state) from legitimate violence and repression practiced by the state itself. In this way, terrorism is whatever violence is practiced against the state. Olivero, unlike Crenshaw and Laqueur, is quite clear that defining terrorism should and does include state-sponsored form of terrorism.
Defining Terrorism: Perspective from the Nation-state

Nation-states perceive the phenomenon of terrorism from different standpoints. For example, U.S. law defines terrorism as “premeditated, politically motivated violence against non-combatant targets by sub-national groups or clandestine agents (Bassiouni, 1979a: 207). Notice how the official legal version of this definition focuses on activity that is premeditated (intentional) political violence by sub-national groups or clandestine agents; this definition focuses on violence that is done intentionally by groups at a sub-state level.

By contrast, the U.S. Department of Defence (DOD) has defined terrorism as “the calculated use of violence or the threat of violence against individuals or property, to inculcate fear, intended to coerce or to intimidate government or societies in the pursuit of goals that are political, ideological or religious” (US Department of Defense Report, 1986). In this connection, it is instructive to note that different parts of the federal government define this term differently. Probably, this was one of the factors that led President George W. Bush, to urge reorganization of homeland security to coordinate the flow of information between departments and agencies in 2002.

Both definitions tend to limit terrorism to threat emanating from below. It is worth noting that the Department of Defence (DOD) suggests that terrorism is designed to inculcate fear in the public, with the purpose of intimidating or coercing the state. The definition suggests that terrorism creates political leverage from the frightened public to influence government or state policy. It also suggests that terrorism involves violence and destruction (against people or property) or the threat of the same.

But, as suggested, not all parts of the federal government are in agreement with the above view of terrorism. In summer 2002, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) defined terrorism as “the unlawful use of force or violence against persons or
property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives”.

**Definitions of Terrorism: An International Organizational Perspective**

Globally, the community of nation-states is no closer to consensus on this definition than that provided by the United States of America. For example, the United Nations has endeavoured to define the concept of terrorism in the past few decades. In 1937, the League of Nations (the predecessor to the United Nations) drafted a definition of terrorism as “all criminal acts directed against a State and intended or calculated to create a state of terror in the minds of particular persons or a group of persons or the general public” (Malik 2001). However, the convention never came into being. And to this day, the UN has no single agreed-upon definition of the word, although there has continued to be considerable debate on the topic.

An example of the kind of language the international community has considered can be seen in a draft resolution from a 1999 session of the UN. The resolution stated that the UN strongly condemns all acts, methods and practices of terrorism as criminal and unjustifiable, wherever and whosoever commits, reiterates that criminal acts, intended or calculated to provoke a state of terror in the general public, a group of persons or particular persons for political purposes are in any circumstance unjustifiable, whatever the considerations of a political, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or other nature that may be invoked to justify them (UN General Assembly Resolution, 2002).

As the large UN body continued to struggle for a definition of terrorism, it cobbled together twelve different piecemeal conventions and protocols. In 1992, a recommendation was made to the UN Crime Branch that terrorism be simply defined as the “peacetime equivalent of war crimes” (Schmid and Ronald 1993: 336). The European Union (henceforth EU), which initially seemed to take its cue
from a desire to build an economic power to rival the United States, has found that with economic concerns come political questions. The EU, which is often the target for terrorist attacks in the past and which sometimes had been the hiding place for groups that practiced terrorism, has itself struggled with a definition for the word. A recently proposed language for a framework on fighting terrorism defined the term as intentional acts, by their nature and context, which may be seriously damaging to a country or to an international organization, as defined under national law, where terrorism are committed with the aim of (i) seriously intimidating a population, or (ii) unduly compelling a government or international organization to perform or abstain from performing an act, or (iii) destabilizing or destroying the fundamental political, constitutional, economic or social structures of a country or international organization (Report of European Union 2001).

The long felt desire among some EU member nations to be quite clear about what specific activity would qualify under this definition, have rather proved to be controversial. Additional language suggested that the above destruction or destabilization could be a result of “causing extensive damage to a Government or public facility, including an information system, a fixed platform located on a continental shelf [or] a public place or private property likely to put in danger human lives or produce considerable economic loss” (Report of European Union 2001).

The inclusion of extra language such as the reference to “a fixed platform located on a continental shelf” was a direct reference to environmental group’s occupation protests on oil platforms in the North Sea—such as Green peace’s occupation of the Brent Spa oil platform. Equally, the earlier references to “intentional acts” that seriously damaged the work of “an international organization” was seen by some as an attempt to prevent trade unionists from demonstrating violently (as they had, for example, for 3 days in Genoa 2001) at meetings of organizations such as the G-7, or now the G-8, or even the EU itself.
Critics were quick to point out that this degree of specificity in defining terrorism was nothing more than an overbroad attempt to censor political dissent and free expression of ideas. It proved just as vexing for the EU, as the various attempts at defining terrorism had been for the UN. From the above discussion, it emerges that the most confounding problem in the study of terrorism is arriving at a definition of terrorism acceptable to all.

History of Terrorism

Before attempting an in-depth examination of the nature of terrorism, a brief history of terrorism is outlined here. The term 'terrorism' has their roots in the French revolution. Since that time, terrorism had been widely used to define almost every form of violent behaviour. Even though the term is relevantly recent, but the act of terrorism is not.

French Revolution

The word 'terrorism' is associated with the days of the French Revolution. The original use of the word in English is often believed to have its origin from the Latin word terror, meaning “To tremble”. When combined with the French suffix -isme, referencing to practice, it becomes more like “to practice the trembling or to cause or to create the trembling”, trembling here is another word for fear, panic, and anxiety – what we today call as the terror. During the French revolution a group of revolutionaries called Jacobin started agitation against the aristocratic form of government of France in the banner of “The regime de la terror”. It was designed to consolidate the new government power by intimidating counter revolutionaries, subversives and all other dissidents whom the new regime regarded as 'enemies' of the people. The committee of general security and the revolutionary tribunal (people court in the modern terminology) were accorded wide powers of arrest and judgment, publicly putting death by guillotine persons convicted of treasonous (i.e. reactionary) crimes. In this manner, a powerful lesson
was conveyed to any and all, who might oppose the revolution or grow nostalgic for the ancient regime (Hoffman 1998: 94)

**Sicarii and Zealots**

Terrorism as a strategy to produce panic or fear for the purpose of accomplishing premeditated political objectives was first introduced by the Jewish Sicarii and Zealot movements of ancient Palestine. The Sicarii and the Zealots, through acts of hysterical terror, successfully influenced a massive revolt against their colonial Roman rulers. However, the revolt ended after the Romans had encircled the Sicarii at Masada. Fearing retaliation by the Romans in the form of torture and death, the Sicarii refused to surrender and ended the siege of Masada by engaging in a dramatic mass suicide. Nearly a thousand Sicarii, including women and children, committed suicide rather than becoming Roman prisoners (Smaallwood 1976: 133-138). The Sicarii were Jewish religious zealots who fomented popular uprising in Palestine between A.D. 66 and 70.

The Romans had abolished the Jewish monarchy and imposed direct rule over the Jewish community of Palestine. This action, along with the desecration of Jewish religious symbols, and the arrest of important religious leaders, led to an escalation of the conflict. Roman soldiers began to use excessive force to break up demonstrations. This led to unorganized Jewish retaliation. At first, a more moderate faction attempted to induce the Jewish community to reject the use of retaliatory violence. But several atrocities were committed by Roman soldiers that resulted in the more radical Sicarii, emerging as the dominant influence in the Jewish community. The Sicarii quickly went into action against the oppressive rule of the Romans, adopting a strategy of "pure terror." Rapoport notes that the Sicarii struck in broad daylight when the victim, either a Jewish moderate or a Roman soldier or a government official, was usually surrounded by witnesses and supporters (Rapoport and Alexander 1983: 16-23). The intention of such high-risk assaults was to demonstrate that no circumstance could provide immunity from
attack; and if the soldiers could not protect themselves, how could they provide security for citizens or government officials? This tactic, therefore, caused a situation of total uncertainty for the potential victim and certainly caused a sense of profound fear. No religious terrorist movement has ever been so successful. The Sicarii used a wide range of tactics designed to influence the Jewish community and to provoke, escalate, and inspire hatred between Jews and Romans. All efforts to find an acceptable political solution were frustrated by the terror tactics of the Sicarii. The primary purpose of Sicarii terrorist strategy, like so many terrorist groups today, seems to be the provocation of indiscriminate countermeasures by the established political system, and to deliberately provoke repression, reprisals and counterterrorism. To this end the Sicarii were successful. Not only did a mass suicide occur at Masada, but the Jewish community in Judea was decimated by Roman soldiers; and with a vengeance the Second Temple was destroyed in Jerusalem and the Jews were scattered to the four corners of the earth. The Diaspora had begun and would continue for 2000 years, ending with the creation of Israel and the fulfillment of an ancient biblical prophecy (Brandon 1967).

The Assassins

A similar mixture of religious zeal and political extremism was the feature of a better-known religious sect called the Assassins (Hodgson 1955: 338-84; Franztus 1969). The Assassins were a division of the Shi'ite Ismaili Muslim sect that appeared in the eleventh century and were finally extinguished in the thirteenth century by conquering Mongols. A religious despot referred to as the "Old Man of the Mountains" was the acknowledged leader and founder of the Assassins. The Assassins gained widespread notoriety when the crusaders returned to Europe with stories of the murderers who killed their victims with golden daggers, while under the influence of hashish. The hashish was to induce visions of paradise before the terrorists set out on their missions of assassination and terror. The name Assassin is derived from the Arabic hashashin, or "hashish-eaters." The Assassins
practiced the secret murder of their enemies from bases in Persia, Iraq, and Syria, where a corps of devoted followers directed the activities of dedicated terrorists. The Assassins realized that the success of their organization depended on secrecy and a small number of dedicated followers to prevent detection from rival religious and political groups: So, they planned a long-term campaign of terror, often striking their victims at night while they slept. This program of terror by a small religious sect to maintain its religious autonomy succeeded in terrorizing between the middle of the eleventh and thirteenth centuries (Hodgson 1955: 338-84; Franztus 1969).

Thugs

The Thugs were a well-organized society of professional assassins who terrorized India for over 300 years. Originally, they were a cult of fanatics, spreading terror throughout central and northern India for almost 1,200 years until the British Raj marked them down with expeditionary forces in the middle of eighteenth century. Their cause, if one can describe it so, was partly religious and partly banditry. Their specialty was sacrificial strangulation to placate the bloodthirsty Hindu goddess Kali. Sometimes disguised as market traders, the thugs seem to have selected many thousands of victims indiscriminately. The practice of thuggee petrified white residents in India and led to much sensational discussion back in imperial Britain. This particular viciousness has gone but it is disconcerting that a long-held readiness to associate terrorists with a mysterious east resonates today among those quick to point to lands, east of Gibraltar, as harbouring murder and deceit.

Unlike the Sicarii and the Assassins who killed their victims with daggers, the Thugs strangled their victims with a silk handkerchief. The choice of victims was random and indiscriminate; as a result, they were feared throughout India. They traced their origin to the religious dogma and practices of Kali, the Hindu goddess of destruction. The Thugs had complete contempt for death. Their political goals
were not easily understandable, and seldom did they terrorize members of the British Raj or Indian Rajah. Sporadic efforts were made to suppress the Thugs, but it was not until about 1837, through the cooperative efforts of the British military and various princely states, that the Thugs were driven underground. By 1852 the Thug religious cult had become extinct (Bruse 1969).

Fenian Brotherhood

The interest of the Fenian Brotherhood in revolutionary politics was probably more obvious, but it was still not a serious threat to the security of the United States or Ireland. The Fenians were an Irish-American nationalist revolutionary secret society, active during the 1860s. They derived their name from a legendary band of warriors in Ireland led by Finn MacCumhaill. Fenianism had, as its major political objective, the starting of a popular uprising in Ireland against colonial British rule. Irish communities in the United States as well as Australia, Canada and South America supported the Fenians and revolution in Ireland. Their greatest opportunity came at the close of the U.S. Civil War when the Irish who fought for both the Union and the Confederacy were influenced by the Fenians to return to Ireland and prepare for the uprising that would finally defeat the British. The Fenians began a campaign of terror and assassination against the ruling British administration, and Irish collaborators who supported the British. The British reacted quickly and suspended many civil liberties, including the enactment of the Habeas Corpus Act. A considerable number of rebels and potential rebels were arrested, thus destroying the planned uprising. The movement came to an end in both the United States and Ireland with the death of its founder, John O'Mahony, in 1877 (Neldhardt 1975; D'Arcy 1947).

The Ku Klux Klan

The Ku Klux Klan may not have been organized like an army, but its rhetoric has incited many Americans to join the most nefarious secret society in the United States. Its origin is somewhat sketchy, but historians seem to agree that the
original Klan was organized by southern Civil War veterans in Pulaski, Tennessee, in 1865. The name apparently is derived from the Greek word *kyklos*, from which comes the English *circle*. Klan was added for the sake of versification, and the Ku Klux Klan emerged. Laqueur reminds us that there are three Klans" (Laqueur 1977: 143). The first, a product of the Reconstruction period (1865-1876), was a secret, violent society organized to intimidate and spread fear among blacks and carpet beggars. It was set up as the "Invisible Empire of the South" with a definable organizational structure. It was divided into state Realms, county Provinces, and individual Dens. The empire was presided over by a Grand Wizard with a descending hierarchy of Grand Dragons, Grand Titans, and Grand Cyclopes. There were also some minor functionaries known as giants, genii, hydrors, furies, goblins, and nighthawks. They adopted intimidating symbols: wearing white hoods and robes, and burning crosses. Symbolic threats gave substance to the power of terrorism and elevated the level of fear created by indiscriminate acts of violence (Randel 1965).

**Anarchists**

However, for all the historical examples of political violence one can identify, it is the anarchists of the late nineteenth century, with their 'propaganda by deed', who have most shaped modern thinking and the fear of terrorism. The experience crucially detached terrorism from its historically accurate linkage with state, rather than non-state policy. The anarchists sought to invoke fear and repression as a means to revolutionary change, and were very successful in assassinating heads of state—one head of state per year was killed in the 1890s, including US President William McKinley. One of the best-known of these groups was the Russian revolutionary Narodnaya Volya (People's Will), which adopted selective targeting and political assassination, killing Tsar Alexander II in 1881. While the attack was in itself apparently successful, once again the result was vigorous...
repression by the state and the group's destruction; when revolution came to
Russia it was the Bolsheviks, not People's Will, who claimed power.

The anarchists also introduced the idea of cell organisation and distributed
manuals on how to be anarchists—notably the *Anarchist's Cookbook*, a forbearer
of today's focus on the internet as a source of terrorist information-sharing and the
fear of the internationalisation of terrorism by Bin Laden. Indeed, the *Anarchist's
Cookbook* has for some time itself been available on the internet (Gunaratana
2000).

**Modern Terrorism**

The 1970s and 1980s saw revolutionary terrorist groups defeated one after another
around the world. International terrorism came to be identified through the
activities of various groups associated with the struggle against Israel, and a spat of
aircraft hijackings and hostage-takings, and the alleged use of terrorist
organizations by certain state sponsors as tools of foreign policy. The 1986
bombing of a disco in Berlin frequented by US forces was attributed to Libya, and
the United States responded by bombing Tripoli. Libya became quiet, but the
bombing of PanAm Flight 103 over Lockerbie in Scotland followed in 1988, as did
an increase in arms supplies to the IRA by Colonel Qadhafi's regime. Meanwhile,
the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan in 1979 led to a US-based insurgent
movement, including a number of international volunteers, defeating the Red
Army. The Iranian Revolution of 1978-9 had led to a revival in Shiite terrorism,
now backed by Iran; and the emergence of suicide terrorism in Lebanon following
the Israeli invasion of 1982. This campaign, which eventually led to the
withdrawal of foreign peacekeeping forces from Lebanon after the suicide
bombing of a US Marine Corps base in Beirut, and the simultaneous attack on a
French paratroop base in the city, appeared to validate the tactic. It was thereafter
emulated, and taken to new and unprecedented lengths, by the Liberation Tigers
of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in Sri Lanka. This separatist movement adopted the tactic
of martyrdom to devastating effect, to revive its campaign, eventually assassinating the former Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi in 1991, and used such tactics to assassinate leaders more often than any group before.

Suicide terrorism has been seen in many contexts, including Chechnya, Sri Lanka, Yemen, Lebanon and Israel. The LTTE's Black Tigers, who launched their first attack in July 1987, offer significant evidence that suicide terrorism is not merely a religious phenomenon and that under certain extreme political and psychological circumstances, secular volunteers are fully capable of martyrdom (Hoffman 1999). But whether the individual perpetrators of such attacks were lone zealots or simply pawns in psychological operations often remained unclear. Is suicide terrorism a tactic of opportunity or an institutionalized strategy? Out of over 270 suicide attacks between 1980 and 2000, the LTTE carried out 168, Hizbollah 52, Hamas 22 and PKK 15s. It also suggested three main types of suicide terrorism - groups that neither practice suicide terrorism on a regular basis nor approve of its use as a tactic, but which may initiate it on occasion for specific reasons; groups that formally adopt suicide terrorism as a temporary tactic, with the leadership obtaining (or granting) ideological or theological legitimacy for its use - recruiting and training volunteers, and then sending them into action, with a specific objective in mind; and finally groups that use suicide terrorism as a permanent strategy.

The events of 11 September suggested that al-Qaeda might fit into this final category of terrorism as a permanent strategy, but the argument for inclusion in the second category of suicide terrorism with specific objectives in mind appears more compelling. An increased willingness to engage in suicide terrorism was not the only change during this period; there was noticeable change in the evolution of the traditional structures of the groups concerned. Flatter and less hierarchical organizations began to emerge; that were to find ultimate expression in the description of Al-Qaeda as a loose network, analogous in some ways to a modern...
business school model of a responsive business organization. In the United States, the return of domestic terrorism and the unprecedented attack on a building in Oklahoma in 1995, resulting in mass casualties, by a reportedly right-wing conspiracy of just two people brought to prominence the concept of 'leaderless resistance'—the idea that individuals with little or no institutional affiliation or relationship with any command element might 'buy into' the doctrine and objectives of other more traditional groupings, but would undertake operations individually and independently.

If such people proved capable of sophisticated planning and execution, and gained access to advanced technology, the implications for counterterrorism and law enforcement seems to be grim. The Oklahoma bomber, Timothy McVeigh, proved that an individual using 'old terrorist' techniques, but determined to kill hundreds of people, found few barriers to entry into the terrorist profession. His capture and subsequent prosecution demonstrated the inability of such individuals to pose a strategic threat, but his descendant in terrorist terms, Richard Colvin Reid, who was caught trying to ignite his shoes on a flight from Paris to Miami after 11 September, revealed just how dangerous such leaderless terrorist could be, and how the technique had spread. Indeed, it has proved to be much more difficult to assess al-Qaeda since the fall of the Taliban regime (and before it, for that matter) due to its amorphous structure. It may in fact embrace various types of terrorist operatives, from the cell-structured trained professionals to the leaderless opportunists, further complicating effective analysis and counter measures. Further we can exhibit substantial difference between old and new terrorism as under:

**Characteristics of Old Terrorism**

**Restraint**

Representative of the early modern terrorist groups is *Narodnaya Volya* (People's Will) that was active in Russia. Founded in 1878, it consisted of a group of
constitutionalists that opposed tsarist rule. Albeit a terrorist organization mainly using bombs as their weapon against targets of symbolic value for their cause, the People's Will had established in their code of conduct that not one drop of superfluous blood should be spent in the accomplishment of their goals. An example of the obedience to this self-established moral code was the 1905 assassination attempt on the Grand Duke Serge Alexandrovich.

When the appointed assassin realised that the Grand Duke was accompanied by his children the mission was aborted. However, this exclusive form of restraint was compromised by the eve of international terrorism seen to commence with the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) hijacking of an Israeli El Al commercial flight in 1968. Due to this operation, which forced the otherwise hard line state of Israel to communicate with the terrorists, organizations discovered the enormous attention they received by attacking innocent civilians and especially foreign civilians that had nothing to do with the conflict. Even so, despite the possession of capabilities creating mass casualties, traditional terrorists tend as a rule to refrain from using it (Simon 1999: 261).

Constituency

The traditional terrorists, although brutal, were generally cautious of being responsible for too many casualties. This was because being too ruthless had the potential of backfiring; repelling the constituency they were trying to influence and subsequently loosing popular support for their cause. Traditional terrorists have or perceive themselves to have an actual constituency that is Old Terrorism made up of real or potential supporters, whose attitudes they are attempting to influence. (Hoffman and Gollancz 1998: 94) Terrorist organizations that in this way perceive themselves to represent something larger than themselves are hence more likely to use terrorism in a more limited, instrumental fashion (Pillar 2001: 132).
Legitimacy and clear objectives

Traditional terrorists tend to draw their legitimacy from an attempt to rectify unjust policy, such as the banning of a language that is part of the agenda for the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), or bringing to light issues that have been neglected like in the case with the PLO. Also most of these organizations aspired to become legitimate political parties. (Pillar 2001:132) The old form of terrorists also have mostly clear and identifiable goals. Admittedly of varying character encompassing political, economical, social and cultural issues, but nonetheless framed in a comprehensive ideology and intentions (Hoffman and Gollancz 1998: 128).

World-view

The traditional terrorists, although discontent with certain parts of the world system in which they are living, on the whole accepted that system as agreeable. (Hoffman and Gollancz 1998: 95) The appeal for help in the United Nations by both the Ethniki Organosis Kyprion Agoniston (EOKA) and the Front de Libération Nationale (FNL) can exemplify this point. Also the PLO chairman Yassir Arafat was invited and accepted to address the UN over the Palestinian cause. Subsequently the PLO was given observatory status and by the end of the 1970s the organization had developed more diplomatic ties with other states (86) than the Israeli state had (72) (Hoffman and Gollancz 1998: 75).

Secular

The main characteristic that unifies the traditional terrorists is that even though religion plays a significant role in the organizations such as the Catholic Irish Republican Army and its Protestant counterparts like the Ulster Freedom Fighters, the predominantly Muslim PLO or the Jewish Irgun, it is not the main motive behind the organizations operations. (Hoffman and Gollancz 1998: 87) The dominant feature of old forms of terrorism is the political motivation and this has contributed to the distinction between secular and religious terrorism. The
absence of a dominant religious character in old terrorism or its presence in the 
new form has become a main distinguishing feature of the two categories. This is 
how it is presented in the literature and several authors tend to equate new 
terrorism with religious terrorism (Hoffman and Gollancz 1998: 75; Pillar 2001: 
132).

However, it seems that as of yet there has been no thorough research conducted to 
determine if religion is the distinguishing feature and how much influence the 
religion has to have on the motivation of the group to be classified as new 
terrorism.

New Terrorism

In 1968 there were eleven active identifiable international terrorist groups and 
none of these could be categorised as religious, i.e., none had a dominant religious 
influence on its aims and motives. In 1980, the registered number of international 
terrorist organizations had increased to 64 out of which 32 were ethno 
national/separatist and only 2 could be classified as religious (these being the 
Iranian backed Shi'a organization al-Dawa and the Committee for Safeguarding 
the Islamic Revolution.) Twelve years later, in 1992, there were 11 religious 
terrorist groups representing major world religions as well as smaller sects and 
cults. During the decade the number increased further and by 1995 they 
accounted for almost half (26 or 46%) of the total 56 known international terrorist 
organizations. (Hoffman and Gollancz 1998: 90-91) Of the religions represented in 
the group of new terrorism Islam is seen as the dominant one. (Laqueur 1999: 80) 
both as the religion most closely identified with the characteristics of new 
terrorism. (Hoffman and Gollancz 1998: 95) and as the groups presenting the 
greatest threat in terms of the scale of terrorist acts possible for them to conduct 
due to their capabilities and the expected high lethality of committed terrorist 
acts. (Pillar 2001: 45) On a structural level the end of the Cold War provides an 
explanation for the upsurge of Islamic terrorism. The discrediting of left-wing
ideologies and the lack of manifestation of the expectant benefits from capitalism provided a political and spiritual vacuum that needed to be filled. (Hoge and Rose, 2001: 76) This ideological void has also to been seen in conjunction with the earlier decrease in regard for Nasserite Pan-Arabism throughout the Arab world, (Netanyahu, 1995: 87-88) which further explains why political Islam has become the main instrument for expression of dissent, sometimes of a violent nature. Two specific incidents indicated to Islamic terrorists that they were fighting a winning battle: first, the Iranian revolution in 1979 demonstrated that it was possible to create an genuine Islamic state based on the Shari'a; second, the retreat of the Soviet Union in 1989 after a decade of fighting in Afghanistan proved to Afghan-Arabs that militant Islam could defeat a superpower. (Pillar 2001: 445-465)

Characteristics of New Terrorism

Restraint

Terrorist acts perpetrated by religiously motivated terrorist groups are responsible for more severe acts of violence with a higher number of fatalities in comparison with the terrorist acts committed by secular terrorists. Despite the fact that only 25 per cent of the terrorist acts recorded in 1995 were attributed to religious terrorism they was responsible for 58 per cent of the fatalities. Subsequently, all the attacks claiming the greatest numbers of deaths (eight or more) were ascribed to religious terrorists. (Hoffman and Gollancz 1998: 93-94) The reason for this increase in lethality can be found in a value system, legitimization mechanism and world-view that is radically different from the old form of terrorism (Pillar 2001: 94).

Constituency

Whereas the traditional terrorists had a real or self-proclaimed political constituency the new terrorists do not. The constituency and the followers of the religion is one and the same, they represent nothing larger than themselves. Thus no restraint needs to be felt on behalf of a political constituency that has to be

Their constituency are themselves and God. As expressed by Yigal Amir, the Jewish extremist responsible for the assassination of Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin in 1995, I have no regrets. I acted alone and on orders from God (Hoffman and Gollançz 1998: 87). Moreover the potential group of victims is increased due to the exclusiveness of the terrorist organizations. All that are not members of the specific form of religion practiced by the terrorists are considered legitimate targets. This is how Islamic fundamentalists can sanctify the killing of other Muslims since they are stigmatised as not righteous (Hoffman and Gollançz 1998: 95).

**Legitimacy and Clear Objectives**

Religion as a base provides the legitimization of the struggle for a cause, including a violent struggle through interpretations of religious texts. As one example from the Qur'an demonstrates; Fight them and God will punish them at your hands, humiliate them and aid you against them and bring healing to the breasts of people who are believers. (The Qur'an 9:14 cited in ed. Michael Sthol, *The Politics of Terrorism*, Marcel Dakker, IN, New York, 1979 p.110) The same message can be found in the Bible; The LORD said to Moses, Take all the leaders of these people, kill them and expose them in broad daylight before the LORD, so that the LORD's fierce anger may turn away from Israel. (The Bible Numbers 25: 4) The gaining of legitimacy through religious sources also explains why it is important to receive a clerical blessing before the commitment of an act of terror.

It is advocated in the literature that as opposed to secular terrorist that have intelligible and clearly defined political, social or economic objectives, the religious terrorists lack these comprehensible goals. Rather than perceiving the target in the traditional sense, as an instrument or a mean employed to achieve the true goal, new terrorism seem to perceive the instrumental target not as a mean
but as an end in itself. Thus no concession or demands are aspired to or outspoken, only the accomplishment of maximal destruction.

World-view

The world-view of the new terrorists is also remarkably different from that of old terrorists in that they do not subscribe to the basic goodness of society or the system that they are part of, but rather see themselves as outside a system that is not worth preserving. In the words of Ayatollah Baqer al-Sadr; "The world as it is today is how others have shaped it. We have two choices: either accept it with submission, which means letting Islam die, or to destroy it, so we can construct the world as Islam requires (Hoffman and Gollancz 1998: 96). Thus placing the new terrorists on a path of fundamental systemic change rather than adjustments or reforms (Hoffman and Gollancz 1998: 95).

However the bombing of 9/11, 2001 has changed the face of terrorism as it entered into another phase in international relation. This major incident resulted in a limited war i.e. the US intervention in Afghanistan, or which could also lead to intervention into other countries. Modern weapons generally have a limited time-span on account of totality of coverage and the horrendous nature of destruction that can be caused by the ultimate weapons, should any of the adversaries possess them or decide to use them. As far as the terrorism is problematic in present international relations, South and South East Asia also will not be free from this problem. The Southeast and East Asian nations of Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand, Burma, and China have provided valuable services for international terrorist groups and organized crime groups. These countries have functioned as safe havens, training grounds, meeting places, money-laundering centres, and centres for trafficking in arms, humans, and narcotics. The area is ripe for this kind of activity because of its large populations of Muslim minorities (excepting predominantly Muslim Indonesia), poor banking transparency, weak border controls, and geographic proximity to the Golden Triangle, a region that
includes parts of western Burma, northwestern Thailand, and China's Yunnan Province and is the origin of most of the region's drug supply. Slow economic development and governmental instability add to the mix, as do the bustling tourist markets and lax visa laws that lead to relatively unimpeded translational movement. In Burma, Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines, discontented Muslim groups provide a friendly environment for terrorist activity. Government and corruption, which manifests itself in various ways in the region, plays a role in promoting criminal activity in all the Southeast and East Asian countries.

For the purpose of this research, I propose to undertake three affected countries of these regions as my case study, viz., Burma, China and Indonesia. In following segment of chapter, I shall discuss the problem of terrorism while also highlighting on the historical fact, and its connection towards international terrorism. Lastly, I shall discuss how such activities affect the security of concern states.

**Indonesia**

Since Suharto's fall in May 1998, political and sectarian sub-state actors have racked the country with violence (Douglas 2005). The causes of this are numerous, and include the breakdown of the overly centralized and authoritarian New Order regime, decentralization, as well as the abolition of the *dwi fungsi* (dual function) role of the military (Tentara National Indonesia, TNI), which previously played a direct part in politics and civil administration. This increase in violence has been exacerbated by competition between the Indonesian National Police (INP) and the TNI, which split in 1999 as a result of disputes over scarce resources. (Kevin 2002: 395-97) The increase in political violence in post-Suharto Indonesia is increasingly associated with the rise of political and radical Islam. The burgeoning of civil society is positive, but the loosening of political constraints on it has allowed "uncivil" society to flourish as well. The fall of President Suharto was accompanied by a wave of violence against Indonesia's ethnic Chinese communities, and within
months there was a major upsurge in sectarian violence between Muslim and Christian communities in Maluku. Indonesia has now been the victim of four major terrorist attacks since October 2002, perpetrated by Jemaah Islamiyah (JI)—not only a homegrown terrorist network but also the regional affiliate of Al Qaeda. Jemaah Islamiyah, have been classified as terrorist organisations of late. There has now been indications that Southeast Asia and Indonesia, as the largest state in the region and the state with the largest number of Muslims in the world, has become a focus of attention for many Islamic terrorist groups, particularly after the instigation of the 'war on terror'. The prevailing situation in Indonesia makes both a suitable state from which to select cases as well as an interesting one due to the general lack of attention it has received in relation to these issues in the past.

In the past decade particularly post 1990s, Indonesia has been a significant target of terrorist acts, and the base for terrorist groups. A major factor contributing to the terrorist activities has been the laxness of the Indonesian government in controlling indigenous and foreign terrorist groups, which have found adequate shelter in the country's predominantly Muslim population. Constituting about 87 percent of Indonesia's 212 million people, Indonesia has the largest Muslim population in any country of the world (Mc Beth 2002). Adding to the problem is the consistently unstable government and growing dissatisfaction amongst Muslim over the political rule which contribute directly to the ease with which Islamic terrorist organizations are capable of permeating Indonesia's borders. Indonesia's primary problems have been maintaining internal stability and control, in the face of separatist movements and direct challenges to its military authority by local militias.

On October 12, 2002, a terrorist bombing in Bali prompted the Indonesian government to arrest Abu Bakar Basyir, leader of the radical Islamic Jemaah Islamiya (JI) group. The arrest was an implicit recognition that the country had
pursued a dangerous and unwise policy by turning a blind eye to radical organizations. After the overthrowing of President Suharto in May 1998, JI leaders had taken advantage of lax anti-terrorist policies, by Suharto's successors to re-establish regional operations in Java and the island of Sulawesi, north of Java (Burton 2002). After the Bali bombing, the Indonesian government identified the increased intervention of militant international organizations in Indonesian domestic politics as a major threat to national security (Madanir and Tjandraningsih 2002). Leaders of the government, which “realized that it lacked the legal basis to deal with terrorism,” issued an emergency anti-terrorism decree, immediately after the bombing, pending passage of permanent legislation (Nakashima 2002). As of December 2002, evidence in the Bali case pointed either to direct involvement of al-Qaeda operatives in setting the bomb, or to al-Qaeda direction of JI terrorists, who set the bomb. JI’s operations chief, Riduan Isamuddin (also known as Hambali), reportedly is an elite member of al-Qaeda, with responsibility for recruiting in Indonesia, and arranging Indonesian recruit training in the Philippines and Afghanistan (McBeth 2002). In June 2003, a senior member of JI testified that al-Qaeda had planned a series of church bombings that were carried out in Indonesia by JI in Christmas of 2000. This was the first direct acknowledgment of ties between JI and al-Qaeda (Sipress 2003). In addition to its two operational divisions in Indonesia, the loosely structured JI had established two other territorial divisions: one in peninsular Malaysia and Singapore, the other in Australia and Papua New Guinea. In recent years, Indonesian cells have been involved in a war against Christians in Sulawesi and the Moluccas Islands, and in attacks on Christian civilians in several other locations within Indonesia (Pomonti 2002).

History of Jemaah Islamiyah

The origins of the Jemaah Islamiyah network stretch back to the 1960s, when its co-founders, clerics Abu Bakar Baashir and Abdullah Sungkar, began demanding
the establishment of _sharia_ law in Indonesia. The two considered themselves the ideological heirs of the founder of the Darul Islam movement, the Muslim guerilla force that, during the 1940s, fought both imperial Dutch troops and the secularist Indonesian forces of Sukarno; Indonesia's founding President who ruled from 1950-65. In the 1970s, the two men established Al Mukmin, a boarding school in Solo, on the main island of Java, that preached the puritanical Wahhabi interpretation of Islam, founded and propagated in Saudi Arabia. Many suspected that JI activists who have been arrested are Al Mukmin alums.

In 1985, Baasyir and Sungkar fled to Malaysia, where they set up a base of operations and helped send Indonesians and Malaysians to Afghanistan, first to fight the Soviets, and later to train in al-Qaeda camps. Sungkar and Baasyir formed JI in 1993 or 1994, and steadily began setting up a sophisticated organizational structure, and actively planning and recruiting for terrorism in Southeast Asia. Sometime in the mid-1990s, Sungkar and Baasyir apparently began to actively coordinate with al-Qaeda. The fall of Indonesia's Suharto regime in 1998 provided a major boost to JI. Almost overnight, the formerly restricted Muslim groups from across the spectrum were able to operate. Baasyir and Sungkar returned to Solo, preaching and organizing in relative openness there. Simultaneously, Jakarta's ability to maintain order in Indonesia's outer islands decreased dramatically, and long-repressed tensions between Muslims and Christians began to erupt.

In 1999 and 2000, the outbreak of sectarian violence in Ambon (in the Malukus) and Poso (on Sulawesi) provided JI with the opportunity to recruit, train, and fund local Mujahadeen fighters to participate in the sectarian conflict, in which hundreds died (Jones 2004). After the violence ebbed, many of these jihadis became active members in Baasyir's network. In 2000, the network carried out bombings in Jakarta, Manila, and Thailand. In this way the terrorist group of JI became one of the leading terrorist groups in Southeast Asia.
Jemaah Islamiyah's International Connection

There has been considerable debate over the relationship between Jemaah Islamiyah and al-Qaeda. Although many analysts at first assumed that JI is al-Qaeda's Southeast Asian affiliate, and recent reporting — including leaks from interrogations of captured JI and al-Qaeda operatives — have shown that the two groups are discrete organizations with differing, though often overlapping, agendas (Abuza 2003: 119). Whereas al-Qaeda's focus is global, and definitively targets Westerners and Western institutions, Jemaah Islamiyah is focused on radicalizing Muslim in Southeast Asia (starting with Indonesia); and some JI leaders are said to feel that attacking Western targets, as Osama bin Laden has urged, will undermine this goal. That said, the two networks have developed a highly symbiotic relationship. There is some overlapping in membership. They have shared training camps in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Mindanao. Though most of JI's funding appears to have come from local sources, al-Qaeda has provided JI with financial support (The 9/11 Commission Report: 115). They shared personnel, such as when JI sent an operative with scientific expertise to Afghanistan to try to develop an anthrax program for Al Qaeda (The 9/11 Commission Report: 115). The two networks have jointly planned operations — including the September 11 attacks — and reportedly have conducted attacks in Southeast Asia jointly (The 9/11 Commission Report: 115). Often, these operations took the form of January 2000 in Kuala Lumpur, during which plans for the attack on the USS Cole and the September 11 hijackings were discussed. The other occurred in Bangkok in January 2002, during which an Al Qaeda representative reportedly sat in on the planning of the Bali bombings.

Al Qaeda is providing funding and technical expertise, while JI procured local materials (such as bomb-making materials) and located operatives (Ratnesar 2002). Riduan Isamuddin (also known as Hambali), appears to have been a critical coordinator in these joint operations, and his arrest in 2003 may have curtailed JI-
Al Qaeda cooperation. Finally, terrorist attacks in 2003 and 2004 in Morocco, Turkey, and Spain may indicate that Al Qaeda’s anti-Western ideology is simply inspiring individuals and local groups — such as JI and its affiliates — to undertake terrorist acts.

**Major Plots and Attacks**

Jemaah Islamiyah first came to public attention in December 2001, when Singapore’s Internal Security Department (ISD) raided two Singapore cells for plotting bombing attacks against American, Australian, British, and Israeli installations and citizens in Singapore. A video tape subsequently found by U.S. forces in Afghanistan confirmed the Al Qaeda connection with the plot. Follow-on arrests netted plotters in Malaysia and the Philippines. Reportedly, the JI cell in Malaysia coordinated the plot, including the procurement of bomb-making materials, preparing forged travel documents, and communications with Al Qaeda. Subsequent investigation and arrests led the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) to link Jemaah Islamiyah to the September 11 attack on the United States. Two of the September 11 hijackers and Zacarias Moussaoui, who is under U.S. indictment for his alleged involvement in the September 11 plot, apparently visited Malaysia and met with cell members in 2000. Additionally, the FBI claims that Malaysian cell members provided Moussaoui with $35,000 and a business reference.

In June 2002, the Indonesian police arrested a suspected Al Qaeda leader, Kuwaiti national Omar al-Farouq, at the request of the Central Investigative Agency (CIA) and turned him over to the U.S. military. After three months of interrogation, al-Farouq reportedly confessed that he was Al Qaeda’s senior representative in Southeast Asia, and disclosed plans for other terrorist attacks against U.S. interests in the region. These included a joint Al Qaeda/JI plan to conduct simultaneous car/truck bomb attacks against U.S. interests in Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, the Philippines, Thailand, Taiwan, Vietnam, and Cambodia around the one-year anniversary of the September 11 attacks (Ratnesar 2002). On the basis of this, and
other information, in September 2002, the Bush Administration closed U.S. embassies in several countries for several days and raised the overall U.S. threat level from “elevated” (yellow) to “high” (orange). Under interrogation, Al-Farouq reportedly identified Baasyir as the spiritual leader of JI, and one of the organizers of the planned September 2002 attacks. For months, Malaysia and Singapore had also accused Baasyir of being a leader of JI, and had joined with the United States in asking Indonesia to arrest him.

The Bali Bombings

The danger posed by Jemaah Islamiyah and Al Qaeda was underscored by the October 12, 2002 bombings in a nightclub district in Bali frequented by western tourists. Synchronized bomb blasts, and subsequent fires in a nightclub district, popular with young tourists and backpackers killed approximately 200 and injured some 300 — mainly Australians and Indonesians, but also including several Americans as well as Canadians, Europeans, and Japanese. The bombings, the most deadly since the September 11, 2001 attacks in the United States, appeared to mark a shift in JI's strategy. The FBI has reported that in early 2002, senior JI leaders — meeting in Thailand — decided to attack “softer targets” in Asia such as tourist sites frequented by Westerners (Solomon and Hookway 2002). The Bali bombing spurred the Indonesian government to reverse its previous reluctance to investigate JI. In the days after the blasts, senior Indonesian officials acknowledged for the first time that Al Qaeda was operating in Indonesia and was cooperating with JI (Nakashima and Sipress 2003: 24). With the substantial aid of Australian and U.S. investigators, Indonesian police have arrested several suspects, including Ali Gufron (also known as Mukhlas), who is thought to be a senior JI commander and an associate of Baasyir. Trials began in the spring and summer of 2003. On August 7, 2003, Islamic militant Amrozi was sentenced to death by an Indonesian court for his involvement in the Bali bombings. The government also announced a
series of decrees that strengthen the hand of the government in dealing with terrorism.

Factors Responsible for Problem of Terrorism in Indonesia

Indonesia's attractiveness to Islamic terrorist groups can be linked to factors such as a weak central government marked by considerable social and political instability, and its overwhelmingly Muslim population. Following 1997-99 Asian financial crises the Central government control in Indonesia has further declined. Furthermore, the authoritarian regime of President Suharto in 1998, which had been in power since 1965, is being replaced by a more democratic but weaker central government. Indonesia's President Megawati, who was under pressure from Islamic political parties, has condemned anti-American violence and pledged to protect U.S. assets and citizens, but also publicly opposed the U.S.-led military campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq (Paddock 2001). Muslim-Christian strife in the country's remote regions has attracted the involvement of thousands of foreign Islamic radicals, apparently also those with some Al Qaeda connections.

Although the overwhelming majority of Muslim Indonesians follow a moderate form of Islam, fundamentalist Islamic theology is growing in popularity in Indonesia, and radical groups have grown in its influence, by taking advantage of the country's many internal problems. These include separatist movements in several provinces, a severe economic recession, the ongoing power struggle among the Indonesian elite for control of the government, and the clashes between Christians and Muslims in small islands such as Malaku that have been on the receiving end of forced "transmigration" from Java and other more densely populated islands. Radical groups such as Laskar Jihad and the Islamic Defenders Front have also reportedly received assistance from elements within the Indonesian military (TNI) in organizing, securing arms, and in transporting to locales throughout the Indonesian archipelago. Even the extreme groups, traditionally have been concerned primarily with domestic issues such as
promoting the adoption of Islamic law (*sharia*). In the 1999 national elections, only a small minority of the Muslim parties favoured radical Islamic agendas, which is clearly indicated by the election-result where overall the Muslim parties drew less than one-fifth of the vote. More recently, however, the U.S.-led campaign against terrorism and war in Iraq has had negative political resonance with a variety of groups currently jockeying for power and influence in Indonesia. Megawati was threatened that cooperating too closely with U.S. demands for arrests and other measures could leave her vulnerable to attack not only by radical Islamists, but perhaps more importantly, by secular nationalists (CNN Sunday Night 2002). Among other factors, Megawati's policies were influenced by the political threat posed to her position by Vice President Hamzah Haz, leader of the largest Muslim party, who had personal ties with leaders of militant Muslim groups and espouses a fundamentalist Islamic doctrine, and also by the chairman of the upper house, Amien Rais.

**Contributing Factors**

Analysts cite lack of political will as the primary reason for the proliferation and strength of al Qaeda and other terrorist groups in Indonesia. Prior to the Bali bombing, Indonesian officials had been unwilling to crack down on either domestic or international Islamic terrorist organizations. The Indonesian government lacked professionalism and adequate resources necessary to effectively eliminate threat thrown up by the terrorist organizations. The Indonesian military and police do not have the technological tools and training to detect and track down insurgent groups (McBeth 2002). Military morale and ethics are also accompanied by chronically low wages. According to a government report, even senior enlisted personnel earn only about US$100 per month (Laksamana 2002). In addition, Indonesia's civilian government has not been able to curb corruption and the sale of arms and explosives by the army (Bali Bombing: Rift Emerges within Jemaah Islamiyah 2002). The International Crisis Group had reported possible
links between Indonesian military intelligence groups and the JI, and recommended that anti-terrorist measures be enforced by the police rather than by the military. Much of the domestic threat has been limited by Indonesia’s policy of suppression of the dissident groups. However, The Free Aceh Movement (Gerakin Aceh Merdeka, GAM) is a domestic insurgent organization that has committed some terrorist acts in the name of regional autonomy is based near one of the key international shipping lane on the western end of Sumatra.

Located in Indonesia’s most profoundly Muslim province, the GAM has survived since its establishment in the 1970s, despite several years of occupation and harsh counter-insurgency operations by Indonesia’s military (Robinson 2002). Although the GAM has not presented a threat to Indonesia’s national security, or engaged in significant transnational activity, its continued presence suggests that Indonesia lacks an effective policy for dealing with dissident groups. In mid 2002, Indonesian authorities identified an extensive arms-trafficking network within the military that was selling arms to the GAM (Manggut 2002). The GAM also has purchased arms from transnational traffickers based in Thailand (Chaiviwan 2002). In December 2002, the GAM, which reportedly opposed the JI strongly in Sumatra, signed a peace agreement with the government of Indonesia. Complicating governance by Indonesia’s civilian leaders is the strength of the state’s regional military forces. After the removal of Suharto, the Indonesian military was forced to enlist the help of local militias to maintain control of the country and quell separatist factions. Since that time, the militias have built up formidable pockets of regional authority that challenge state control. Fearing that such organizations could become fully free of civilian control, and realign themselves with non-indigenous terrorist forces such as al Qaeda, the Indonesian military has called for these militias to disband (Indonesia: Bali Bombing Forcing Military to Address Militia Dilemma, 2002). One such militia is the Laskar Jihad, which reportedly has received training from al Qaeda and other international terrorist organizations in Afghanistan.
Burma

Burma was once known as the 'Golden Peninsula', due to its large areas of uncrowned land, mostly mountains and jungles, as well as its abundant minerals and gems. With a population of about 50 million, Burma today is the most ethnically diverse state in mainland Southeast Asia. Majority of the population lives in the rural areas and work as farmers. The ethnic Burmans (referred to the main ethnic group while Burmese refers to the citizens of Myanmar which belong to any ethnic origin), comprise about 68 percent of the population, besides the existence of more than one hundred other ethnic groups. These other groups have long resisted the domination of Burmans and over the time that resistance has deepened the divisions in today's Myanmar society.

Myanmar (then known as Burma) gained its political independence from the British in 1948 and practiced parliamentary democracy. The road to independence was partly led by General Aung San and General Ne Win as well as Burmese Communist Party (Silverstein 1990). Aung San however, did not live long. Almost immediately after independence, revolts from various ethnic and political factions began. The BCP was among the first to revolt, seeking to replace the constitutional government ruled by Prime Minister U Nu. Several ethnic minority groups followed suit, fighting for outright independence from the new state of Burma, as promised under the constitutions of Burma. Later, these groups turned into armed guerrilla insurgents, pursuing their goals from the remote hills situated in the border areas.

The Civil War: Stage One

On 28 March 1948, less than three months after the declaration of independence, the BCP went into open revolt. It was followed by units of the AFPFL paramilitary force, the People's Volunteer Organization (PVO), and by the year end, the Karens. In addition, a Mon force rose, as did an Arakanese and a Muslim group living in Arakan. In the face of this, Burma's young army was weakened by defections; first, by the 1st and then the 3rd Burma Rifles all Burman units to the
BCP; and second, by the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Karen Rifles all Karen units to the Karens. At this point, Ne Win, a Burman, replaced General Kya Doe as the army's head and reorganized it with Burman officers and men dominating all units, regardless of their ethnic names (Tinker 1961).

The new army, under officers personally loyal to Ne Win, became the vehicle which drove the insurrectionary forces out of the Irrawaddy Valley, and in doing so, gained a reputation for brutality and lawlessness, while occupying minority areas under martial law.

During the 1950s, the insurrections diminished as supporters of the various groups in revolt drifted home under government amnesty programs, and the nation began to make some economic progress. However, in 1958, a split occurred in the governing party which threatened to rekindle the civil war. U Nu turned to the army to form a caretaker government and create conditions for an election by which the two factions could peacefully resolve their differences (Win 1959; Nu, 1975: 323-29).

In the same year, there were growing demands amongst some of the Shans and Karenni to exercise their rights of secession. Others in the two communities began to call for modifications in the constitution, which would give them greater autonomy in their areas and equality with the Burmans in national Affairs. Resistance to these changes provoked some of the younger members among the Shans and Kachins to form resistance groups and revolt. The caretaker government forced the Shan and Karenni princes to surrender their historic rights to their states, and appealed to the concern parties to end feudalism and establish democracy in its place. While the army gained some support for its objectives, it neither won popular approval nor ended the threat of secession. The caretaker government made no overtures to the Communists; believing that their threat had diminished to an extent that it was not necessary to make any concessions. When
U Nu returned to power, following an election in 1960, he sought to address the minority concerns and demands, first by meeting with individual leaders and groups, and later by promising to hold a "federal seminar", where all would be invited, and hopefully a lasting solution would be found. But the seminar, which was held (Tinker, 1961) in mid-February 1962, never concluded; the military seized power on 2 March 1960, and arrested all government members and minority leaders attending the meeting, displaced the democratic system with a Revolutionary Council and ruled by decree (Silverstein 1964: 75-95).

The Civil War: Stage Two — Failed Negotiations and the Emergence of the National Democratic Front (NDF)

In 1963, the military rulers of Burma attempted to end the civil war through negotiations. Ne Win invited all in revolt to come to Rangoon and seek lasting solutions. The Communists, Karens, Mons, Kayahs and Kachins participated, but only a small fraction of the Karens accepted the government offer and the civil war resumed. Six years later, U Nu, following his release from jail, launched a revolution from the Thai border. Allied with the Mons and the Karens, he formed the United National Liberation Front, but the effort failed and his revolt collapsed.

In 1975, the army launched a major attack against the BCP and drove it from the Burma heartland to the China border, where it remained in power until 1989. In 1980-81, the government again tried to negotiate for an end to the civil war by meeting independently with the BCP and the Kachin Independence Organization (KIO). Nothing came out of the meetings, as the one sided terms offered by the military rulers were rejected.

A new phase in the civil war began in 1976 when eight minority groups in revolt joined together to form the NDF. Headed by Bo Mya, the leader of the Karen National Union (KNU) - the successor to the Karen National Defence Organization (KNDO) - it united groups in revolt, amongst the Arakanese, Kachins, Karennis, Lahus, Palaungs, Shans and Pa-Os (Silverstein, 1987). Later, it added groups from
the Was, Mons and Chins. The military goal of the NDF was to unite all who were fighting against the government (Lintner B. May 2002: 12–3). While, each group remained in control of its own armed force and was responsible for its own security, they agreed to assist one another, if they come under government’s attack.

At the outset, the NDF had no precise political goal, as many of its members were divided on the issue - some wanted independence while others were willing to accept an autonomous state in a weak union. However, by 1984, the NDF adopted a common stand - to remain a part of Burma in a new federation based on the principles of equality, autonomy, liberty and self-determination. All those who previously wanted independent states renounced that goal.

The BCP never sought membership in the NDF, even though it attempted to unite some of the minorities under its leadership. Bo Mya strongly opposed its ideology and it, in turn, rejected the principles and goals of the NDF. Despite the differences with the NDF, the BCP cooperated with individual minority groups in its area, providing them with weapons and leadership in order to win and hold their support.

The government in Rangoon refused to recognize the NDF and persisted in referring to its members as bandits and opium traders who either could surrender or be eliminated through battle. Repeatedly, the leader of the Kachins, Brang Seng, is referred to as an "assassin" or as the "devil incarnate" while Bo Mya is always identified as "Nga" Mya. As far as the government was concerned, the issue of federalism was settled in the 1974 constitution and was no longer debatable (Silverstein 1987: 75-95).

Until 1984, the army’s military strategy was to launch a series of campaigns during the dry season and retreat when the rains began, in order to keep the minority armies out of the Burma heartland. But in that year, it adopted a new policy.
Beginning with a sustained campaign against the Karens - the strongest group in the NDF - it used heavy artillery and reinforced ground troops to mount attacks which lasted all year. Although it only captured one Karen strongpoint on the Moei River - the Burma-Thai boundary in that area - it succeeded in disrupting the black-market trade which, for years, passed through the area and provided the KNU with a sizeable income from taxation. In addition, it launched other campaigns against NDF members; however, while it could inflict punishment the army could not permanently defeat any of its foes.

Two years later (1986), the civil war took a new turn. The NDF entered into an agreement with the BCP to cooperate militarily against the Burma army, while keeping their political activities separate. This agreement, worked out by Brang Seng, was opposed by Bo Mya. However, the members of the NDF voted to support it. In 1987, the Burma army scored major successes by capturing an important BCP stronghold on the Burma-China border and seizing the headquarters of the Kachins. Although these victories were important psychologically, the BCP held the rest of the Burma-China border and the areas east of the Salween River, while the Kachins continued to hold most of their territory the armed forces of both remained intact. The fighting between the army and the NDF was marked by serious violations of human rights. The army forced villagers to serve as porters and walk through mine fields ahead of troops; it raped, looted and burned villages suspected of aiding its enemies. In April 1988, Amnesty International issued two long reports documenting these violations and published bulletins of further crimes, which the military rulers of Burma either ignored or dismissed as interference in its internal affairs (Amnesty International 1988).

The NDF held its Second Congress in May 1987. Although it met against the background of disagreement over the previous decision to cooperate with the BCP, its members remained united and chose a new leader, Saw Maw Reh, a Karenni. The Congress reaffirmed its support for the creation of a true federal union in
Burma and called for cooperation with any group in opposition to the army, so long as it did not oppose the NDF program and organization: "It is the firm conviction of the NDF that true unity of all the nationalities and genuine peace can be gained only by solving political problems by political means and giving democratic freedom to the people" (KNU Bulletin 1987: 1-2).

In the beginning of 1988, the minorities were more closely united than ever, while the government had little to show for its casualties and cost of war. It continued its propaganda campaign in the press against its enemies and with no independent sources of news, the Burman population in the heartland had no real knowledge of the civil war and why it persisted. Many people in the heartland believed that the minorities posed a threat to the safety and security of the nation. With no counter information from the minorities who were without a press or radio transmitter, the majority of Burmans accepted the descriptions and analysis offered by the government, and the gap between the majority and minorities indeed remained wide and deep.

**Burma Communist Party and the Civil War**

As the first group to go into revolt and remain in power until 1989, the goals of the BCP differed with those of the minorities. From the outset, it was intent upon creating a Marxist government in Burma. As a Stalinist party, initially it became Maoist in the early 1950s and never deviated. It drew its original leaders and followers from the Burman population, and until it was driven from the Burma heartland, it offered the most direct challenge to both the civilian and military governments.

Unlike the minorities, the BCP wanted a united and centrally controlled Burma, and not an ethnically divided federal union. Early in the civil war, the BCP fought against the minorities as well as with them against the army, making its true objectives toward the minorities difficult to discern. When, in 1967, the BCP
began to receive direct aid from China, it used its largesse of weapons as a means of attracting the minorities to unite with it and accept its leadership. For a while, the BCP succeeded in winning the support of elements from the Shans, Kachins and Karens living close-by. But its alliances with minority groups were never permanent, as the latter would not give up their ethnic causes.

It was not until 1978 that the BCP dropped its stand on a Marxist unitary state in favour of a federation, and called for a grand coalition of opposition groups under its leadership (Silverstein 1990: 114-134). It promised to allow each group to have its own state or autonomous area in its version of federalism. The BCP leaders reasoned that at this stage of the revolution, while agriculture formed the basis of the economy, local loyalties and identities were dominant, and that a coalition of opposition groups seeking a multiparty democratic state was the way to unite the peoples of Burma and regain the leadership of the revolution. Later, as the base of the economy changed and the people became more aware of the true nature of the struggle - as the Marxists saw it - they would move toward and support the BCP revolutionary goals.

When the BCP was driven from its base in the Pegu Yoma to the China border, it became isolated from the Burman population. With an aging Burman leadership devoted to Maoist ideas, and rejecting the changes taking place in China and elsewhere in the world, the BCP came to depend upon the local minorities, amongst whom it lived, to fill its ranks and waited impatiently to reunite with the Burman population and win its war against the military rulers of Burma.

In 1979-80, the People's Republic of China cut off the funds and weapons it formerly gave to the BCP as it abandoned its revolutionary line, and sought to strengthen its relations with Burma on the basis of "peaceful coexistence". This forced the BCP to turn to opium sale and taxation to make up for the loss. The border area it controlled, especially east of the Salween River, produced nearly 50
per cent of all the opium grown in Burma and provided the party with ample revenues to continue its struggle. While China cut off its direct aid to the BCP, it took no steps to dislodge it from the border area or close its territories to members of Burma party, a situation that continued until March 1989.

Muslim Minority and International Terrorist Links

Only a small number of Muslim groups in Burma advocate armed struggle, and few actively look for international assistance. Even fewer Burmese Muslims favour links with extremist pan-Islamic groups. Over the past decade, however, at least one Rohingya insurgent group is reported to have developed connections with Muslim extremist organizations in places like Bangladesh, Pakistan, and Afghanistan. This group is the RSO. The RSO was established to represent the interests of the refugees around Chittagong and Cox's Bazaar, but its formal aim is now the creation of an autonomous state uniting the Rohingyas of Burma and Bangladesh. Little hard information is available about the RSO, but it reportedly has several hundred active members. It is not known, however, how many of these guerrillas support the RSO's radical faction, or its foreign links. RSO insurgents are usually armed with Chinese-made AK-47, automatic rifles, light machine guns, RPG-2 grenade launchers, landmines and explosives. However, the RSO has not conducted serious military operations in Burma since the early 1990s. The RSO gains most of its finances through criminal activity, particularly through the smuggling of arms and ammunition and drugs between Bangladesh and Arakan state. It has reportedly received funds from sympathetic charities in Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, such as the Rabitaal-Alam-I-Islami. According to open sources, from the mid-1980s, the RSO also began to receive assistance from Islamic groups in Bangladesh, like Jamaat-e-Islami and its radical violent student wing, the Islami Chhatra Shibir. It is believed that, since establishing itself in Bangladesh, at least one faction of the RSO has fallen under the influence of the much larger and more radical Sunni Muslim organisation Harakat-ul-Jihad-ul-Islami (HuJI).
Founded in 1992 to assist Bangladeshi veterans of the Afghan war, HuJI "shares the hardline Wahabist and Deobandist, teachings of Al-Qaeda and the Taliban," with which it reportedly developed strong links. It would appear that HuJI has drawn recruits from among Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh, and established close links with the RSO. It has even taken over some of the RSO's facilities, including a camp at Ukhia (http://www.rohingya.com/rohingya.htm.). There have been claims by the Burmese government that the RSO has also been sponsored by Muammar Qhaddafi, and in 1994, eight RSO members attended terrorist training camps in Libya (Steinberg, 2003). According to Jane's publications, the RSO "was also given assistance as early as the 1980s by Kashmiri/Pakistani organisations such as the Harakut-ul-Ansar (HuA)," now known as Harakat-ul-Mujahideen (HuM). The radical Islamist Afghan warlord, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar's Hizb-e-Islami movement was another early sponsor of the RSO, a connection that seems to have helped some Rohingyas to develop links with other organizations in Pakistan and Afghanistan (http://www.rohingya.com/rohingya.htm.).

There are about 350,000 Rohingyas in Pakistan, where a large number have attended madrassahs (Islam 2002). During the 1990s, some of these exiles found their way into the ranks of the Taliban. Other Rohingyas were recruited directly from Bangladesh, and were trained in Pakistan before being passed on to the Taliban, probably through the HuM network. In Afghanistan, they were reportedly sponsored by the Jamiya-I-Islami of President Burhanuddin Rabbani, and the Ittehad-I-Islami of Abdur Rab Rasool Sayyaf (Afghans training Burmese freedom fighters 1993: 85). Also, more than 100 members of the RSO are believed to have been trained at Hizb-e-Islami facilities in Khost (http://www.rohingya.com/rohingya.htm.). According to one unconfirmed report, about 5,000 members of the Burma's Muslims and the War on Terror, 115 RSO had received some kind of training by the mid-1990s (Afghans training Burmese freedom fighters 1993: 85). A Burma expert, Bertil Lintner has written that they were given religious instruction and trained as foot soldiers, mine clearance
specialists, and porters. However, they did not enjoy the same status, as the Taliban's Pakistani and Arab recruits were essentially considered "cannon fodder." (Lintner 2001: 26; http://www.rohingya.com/rohingya.htm.). There were still Burmese mujahideen fighting with the Taliban when the United States opened its military campaign against Afghanistan in October 2001. Some of those subsequently captured by the Northern Alliance and U.S.-led coalition stated that, they were trying to gain military experience before returning to free Burma and implement Sharia law in that country. This group has included a few Pakistanis of Burmese descent that had never been to Burma (Rohde 2001). Even before the Taliban was defeated, however, there had been reports in the news media that mujahideen who had fought in Afghanistan had turned up in insurgent training camps inside the Bangladesh border, and were instructing groups like the RSO in basic military techniques (Afghans training Burmese freedom fighters 1993: 85). During the 1990s, there was speculation that the ABMU's jihad against Rangoon might be joined by Arab and Pakistani mujahideen with experience in Afghanistan (http://www.rohingya.com/rohingya.htm.). Also, the Pakistan/Kashmir groups Hizb-ul Mujahideen and HuA reportedly sent advisors into the Arakan mountains to train Muslim guerrillas, before they were expelled to Bangladesh (http://www.rohingya.com/rohingya.htm.).

Before September 2001, these sorts of links were not viewed either by Washington, D.C. or Rangoon as particularly dangerous, or to have any real importance beyond Burma and Bangladesh. As far as it can be determined, there was no significant increase in Muslim insurgent operations, nor any noticeable surge in terrorist activity in Burma as a result of the RSO's international links. However, after the attacks in New York and Washington D.C., the significance of these connections has grown dramatically. In particular, fears have been expressed that Muslims from Burma are being drawn into the Al Qaeda international terrorist network, led by Osama bin Laden. Indeed, one U.S. academic has made the highly unlikely claim that "the largest Al Qaeda cell in Southeast Asia is said to
be in Myanmar" (Abuza 2002). These claims cannot be justified, but there have been some indications that direct links exist between Al Qaeda, and at least one faction of the Rohingya Solidarity Organisation. According to Jane's publications, the recruiters from Pakistan who travelled around Bangladesh in the 1990s, trying to find Rohingya volunteers for military service in Afghanistan, were from Al Qaeda (http://www.rohingya.com/rohingya.htm.). Also, in public statements and videotaped speeches shown on Arabic language television stations, Osama bin Laden has referred to the massacres of Muslims in Burma (Gunaratna 2002). For example, in a September 2001 interview, he praised his supporters there, in what was seen as an oblique reference to the RSO (MSA News 1996; Lintner 2002: 42-13; http://www.rohingya.com/rohingya.htm.).

Al Qaeda videotapes and notebooks later seized in Afghanistan by the U.S.-led coalition referred to the struggle in Burma, and listed Burma among a group of countries that had Al Qaeda sympathizers (Kelley 2001; Richburg 2001). In addition, a reporter from the CNN network on assignment in Afghanistan managed to obtain a library of videotapes apparently belonging to Al Qaeda. The library included a tape made by an un-named Burmese insurgent group. Although it was suggested that this tape showed "al Qaeda members during operations in Burma," it appears only to show the kind of basic guerrilla training that the group was undertaking around 1990 (CNN Talkback Live 2002; CNN Sunday Night 2002; Priest 2002). According to Bertil Lintner, the tape was almost certainly filmed at RSO camps located in Bangladesh, not inside Burma, where the RSO does not have any permanent presence (http://www.rohingya.com/rohingya.htm.). From time to time, other reports have emerged in the academic literature and media of links between Burma and extremist Muslim groups, including Al Qaeda. These reports are of varying credibility. Few are supported by hard evidence. A Selth a news media report has suggested that the RSO had joined with eight other radical Islamist groups, including HuJI and the Muslim Liberation Tigers of Assam, to form a new fundamentalist umbrella organization known as the Bangladesh
Islamic Association (Manch) (Bangladesh Muslims Join Forces 2002). This organization is reputed to have ties with Osama bin Laden through the HuJI network. There were reports in 2001 that two Pakistani nuclear scientists under investigation by the United States for their links with Al Qaeda had sought refuge in Burma. These reports, however, were later proven to be incorrect (Gunaratna 2000; Lintner 2002: 42-13; Nuclear Burma, 2002). In early 2002, a ship sailing from Karachi to Chittagong was believed to have smuggled Al Qaeda and Taliban guerrillas who had escaped from Afghanistan to Bangladesh, where they reportedly joined the RSO and HuJI militants (Rohingya Solidarity Organisation, 2009). Later that year, bin Laden’s chief lieutenant, the Egyptian Ayman al-Zawahiri, was mistakenly reported to have sought refuge with Rohingya rebels in Burma (Perry, 2002). A Burmese caught smuggling arms in Pakistan in 2003, was accused of being a member of Al Qaeda (Lahore Daily Times 2003).

The United Kingdom-based academic, Rohan Gunaratna, has claimed that a small Burma branch of The Islamic Party (Mahaz-e-Islami) has connections with Al Qaeda (Gunaratna 2000; Watson 2002). According to other press reports, Muslim extremists linked to Al Qaeda have established a "league of holy warriors" in Southeast Asia to launch strikes against governments in the region. Burma is said to have been represented at meetings of the league held in 1999 and 2000 (Baltimore Sun 2002). Also, Burma has reportedly been a target for the Al Qaeda associated terrorist group known as Jemaah Islamiah (JI), which is believed to be responsible for the October 2002 bombings in Bali. The U.S. scholar Zachary Abuza has written that "the senior-most Al Qaeda leader in Southeast Asia, Omar Al-Faruq, has admitted in interrogation that the Jemaah Islamiah had tried to establish links with Muslim militants in Myanmar." (Philippine Star 2002). Abuza did not say, however, whether these efforts were successful; nor has any evidence been provided to support later statements to the news media, purportedly by U.S. counterterrorism officials, that JI had "cells" in Burma (Lumpkin 2002). There is no credible evidence to support the assertion in a U.S. newspaper that a radical
network of “al-Qaeda-related Muslim insurgents” is “methodically spreading south along the Thai border towards indigenous Muslim areas in the Malay Peninsula,” assisted by Rangoon’s allies, the ethnic insurgent United Wa State Army (UWSA) (Santoli, 2003). The Indian news media has published several reports linking Burma with international terrorist groups. For example, one article expressed concern about the activities of the Tabliq, which was characterized as a radical organization supported by Islamabad (Washington and McCart 2001). Yet the Tabliq is a worldwide Sunni Muslim reform group that promotes Islamic teachings.

It has some adherents in Burma, but they operate quite openly, holding study meetings and encouraging mosque attendance. Although some Tabliq adherents around the world may support extremist groups, directly or indirectly, the sect itself does not have a philosophy of violence. Another Indian newspaper has claimed that the extremist group Lashkar-e-Taiba (LET), “responsible for 60 per cent of terrorist killings in India,” has acquired a global network rivaling Al Qaeda. The Times of India reported that “Intelligence inputs also indicate that LET is trying to spread its network in Asian countries like Myanmar (Burma) and Bangladesh.” No further information was given to justify this statement, beyond the claim that the group was secretly supported by Pakistan’s Inter Services Intelligence Directorate.

The Use of Child Soldiers

In the military campaign between the government and ethnic rebels, both sides are reportedly recruiting child soldiers. The SPDC strongly denies the use of child soldiers. At the 2004 UN Commission on Human Rights it claimed that: “Myanmar armed forces are an all volunteer force, and those entering military service do so of their own free will. A person can enlist in the armed forces only on attainment of the age of 18” (UN 2004). The junta’s sensitivities came in light of the Human Rights Watch (HRW)’s 2002 report (HRW 2002), which alleges that
Myanmar/Burma's Tatmadaw has more child soldiers than any other country in the world with as many as 70,000 soldiers under the age of 18. HRW's investigation found that the overwhelming majority of Myanmar/Burma's child soldiers are in the national army, the Tatmadaw Kyi, which forcibly recruits children as young as eleven. Once deployed, they are expected to "engage in combat, participate in human rights abuses against civilians, and are frequently beaten and abused by their commanders." (HRW 2002) Children are also found in rebel groups, although in far smaller numbers. While some children were forcibly conscripted, others joined rebel groups to avenge past abuses by the government against members of their families or community. In a report to the Security Council made under resolution 1379, the UN Secretary General notes that "testimonies received by UNICEF [UN Children's Fund] confirm [HRW's allegations] (UN Report 2002). Pinheiro similarly reports that he was able to collect some information during the 2002 mission "reflecting the existence of child soldiers in Myanmar", but was hesitant to speculate on the extent of the problem.

While the international community remains focused on the conflict between the government and its opposition, over the 1990 election, the problem of ethnic separatism represents an equally pressing challenge for Myanmar/Burma's move towards democracy and respect of human rights (ICG 2003). While a series of ceasefire agreements have brought some relief to the junta, fighting still continues. The need to unify the country remains a powerful argument for the generals in their hold on power, while armed conflict between the junta and ethnic rebels remains a principal cause of human rights abuse in Myanmar/Burma.

Most human rights NGOs continue to report violations and widespread discriminatory practices in the context of the Tatmadaw's counter-insurgency activities directed against ethnic and religious minorities. Pinheiro's report in 2003 notes, "Serious human rights violations have undoubtedly occurred and continue to occur in the areas where armed groups operate." One of the most serious
reports, *License to Rape* released in May 2002 by the Shan Human Rights Action Network (SWAN), alleges systematic and widespread use of rape and sexual violence as a weapon, by the Tatmadaw against the Shan ethnic minority. The central government continues to deny such allegations as fabrications, but concedes that out of the 173 allegations raised in the report, 5 were found to be true (Statement by the Myanmar Observer Delegation, 2004). Pinheiro had previously questioned the objectivity and methodology by which the junta had investigated the allegations.

The Use of Forced Labour

In 1930 the ILO established the *Forced Labour Convention* (ILO Convention 29). In 1957, this convention was reinforced with Convention 109, the *Abolition of Forced Labour Convention*. Myanmar/Burma is a signatory to this convention. An enquiry carried out by the ILO released in early July 1998 found “abundant evidence” of pervasive use of forced civilian labour for portering, logging, agriculture and construction and other work in support of the military (ILO 1930). The ILO report also notes that the *Towns Act* (1907) and *Villages Act* (1908) introduced under British colonial rule made it legal for the army and police to force people to work. As a result of international pressures however, Order No.1/99 was issued under the directive of the SPDC banning forced labour (UN 2001). Bowing again to international pressure, the junta agreed, in May 2003, on a joint “plan of action” with the ILO to eliminate forced labor. That initiative, which was to have commenced the following month, was aborted following the delay in incident. The ILO had repeatedly warned the junta over its tardiness in delivering on the pledge to stop using, what the ILO estimates, more than 800,000 conscripted labor.

China

China’s security environment can in general be described as relatively good. However, taking a general look at the great powers in the world today, with
Russia is its only rival, the country is facing a complex and fragile peripheral security environment emanating from it neighbours; from Kashmir and Afghanistan in the west to the Korean peninsula in the east, and then to the South China Sea and Taiwan strait, all the states are being characterized by problems which is not only hard to be resolved over a long period but also by the possibility of breaking out at any time. What particularly merits attention is that “the American factor” is behind all these problems; of course, the existence of the American factor is not completely negative, and in many circumstances the American factor may be the constraining force preventing these crises from exploding (Fangxiao 2003).

Most of the security problems China is facing are due to its close connectedness to the regions’ most fragile states. Most of which has arisen since the end of the Cold War and during China’s era of reform. First, China’s security situation is more complex and unpredictable than at any time in its history. While there is relative peace and “more factors for stability than instability,” there also are a number of complicated, intractable problems on its periphery and a new interdependence with the rest of the world that makes China wary (Sui 2002: 2-4). China has 15 neighboring countries, many of which are still undeveloped. China’s relations with them include a “complex interweaving of border disputes; cross-border ethnic and religious problems, which are sure invitations to terrorism, extremism, and separatism; and the collusions among drug-trafficking, arms-trafficking, and transnational crimes” (Xintian 2004). East Asia is considered a region fraught with “hot spots”—including a nuclear crisis on the Korean peninsula, simmering tensions in Kashmir, fragile political stability in Central Asia, and a Japan seeking ‘normalcy’ as it is trying to come back from the traumatic conditions of nuclear holocaust and free from USA’s security umbrella. Almost all the members of the world nuclear club are present in the region, not to mention those countries that strive to possess nuclear weapons, thus forming a “concentrated nuclear circle” around China (Guangqian and Youzhi 2005: 434).
Another characteristic of China's security situation is a growing appreciation for the interconnectedness of internal and external security. The two influence, constrain, and permeate each other. "The factors that seriously may threaten China's national security are those problems that are capable of turning 'external worries' into 'internal troubles.'" Prior to China's opening, the country was relatively insulated from the world's geopolitical fluctuations and did not have to consider international opinion when formulating domestic policy. As it continues to open, however, internal issues have increasing international consequences and vice versa. There is an "internationalization of China's domestic security" (Xiangqing 2005) and a "domestication of international security" China's domestic policies (including its development strategy, military strategy, nationalities policy, religious policy, and even social system and human rights policy) will be even more closely watched by the international community. At the same time, certain domestic security issues not only affect domestic security and stability but also directly impact China's security relations with other countries and regions involved. Examples are the Taiwan question, the Falungong issue, religious and ethnic contradictions, and the adjustment of the national economic structure, political reform, strategic petroleum reserve, large projects with environmental impact, and the development of oil and natural gas resources in the East Asia Sea. No longer are these issues merely domestic issues, but they also significantly constraining the development of China's relations with a number of countries (Xiangqing 2005).

Further, there is a growing number of factors that pose a threat to the existence and development of China other than traditional military threats from other nations. It is very much evident that China's traditional military conflict has decreased and has been successfully managed through military deterrence. It is the non-traditional threats such as energy insecurity, environmental degradation, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), terrorism, transnational crime, drug-trafficking, piracy, and the spread of disease that are increasingly
threatening China due to their potential to impede progress during China's period of strategic opportunity. Non-traditional security threats are of much concern, if not more, than traditional ones, in China's new security environment. Perhaps the most worrisome characteristic of China's current security environment is the possibility for a confluence of traditional and non-traditional threats. Liu Jianfei, assert that, "there is an oft-stated concern that traditional and non-traditional threats will coincide or enable one another. In particular, we should be on guard against the possibility that non-traditional security threats, having built up over a long period of time and lacking an effective resolution, may lead to military, political, and diplomatic conflicts of the traditional variety, thus jeopardizing overall national security. The mishandling of traditional security, in turn, will enable unstable factors that are domestic in nature or that exist between two countries to cross national borders and become magnified through globalization, becoming a non-traditional security issue for the entire international community (Xiangqing 2005).

China's White Paper on arms control has also warned of the intersection of traditional and non-traditional threats. The world is far from tranquil as traditional security issues persist, local wars and violent conflicts crop up time and again, and hot-spot issues keep emerging. Nontraditional security threats such as terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), transnational crimes, and infectious diseases are on the rise. The intertwined traditional and nontraditional threats pose severe challenges to international security.

The potential for economic warfare to lead to military warfare, or for external instability to fuel internal instability, or for any other convergence of traditional and nontraditional crises, is one of the biggest threats perceived by China's influential elite. Such a storm would threaten not only territorial integrity and sovereignty, it would also push back economic and democratic reforms, diminish China's international stature, and threaten the very survival of the Communist
regime. Several of the biggest traditional and non-traditional threats are examined one at a time, but it is important to keep in mind that it is the potential for them to feed one another and thus snowball that is of utmost concern. The development of China's new security concept can be traced back to the Asian financial crisis of 1997, a seemingly internal problem that had wide-reaching international repercussions. It was at this time that China began to redefine its national security concept to include economic and financial security. The 2000 White Paper on Defence advanced the policy of "mutual trust, mutual benefit, and mutual cooperation," recognizing that common interests and cooperation were the only defence against such events in the future. The security concept was defined further in a policy statement to an Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) forum in 2002, again emphasizing "dialogue and cooperation as its main characteristics." In addition to the concept of mutual benefit and common development, the policy now elevated the importance of non-traditional security: "Apart from the traditional security fields of preventing invasion by external enemies and safeguarding territorial sovereignty and integrity, attention must be paid to focusing on striking at terrorism, transnational crime, and other non-traditional security fields." The 2004 Defence White Paper elevated nontraditional issues even further, stating that "traditional and non-traditional security issues are intertwined, with the latter posing a growing threat." An entire section of the White Paper was dedicated to highlighting cooperation China has undertaken in the non-traditional security field. Thus, China's "new" security concept has evolved in response to its increasingly complex, interconnected security environment. China's policymakers have determined that the only way to address such wide-ranging and unpredictable panoply of traditional and non-traditional threats is through increased international interaction. After all, these are issues that China cannot resolve alone or through the tried and true method of military deterrence. This is why China's foreign policies focus on trust, engagement, and cooperation to an extent never seen before.
The insurgency and terrorism confronting China in Xinjiang stems from an historic political process of the state asserting and consolidating its control over territory and society. This political history impacts the decision-making of the local population as to the best paths, tactics, and strategies available. Insurgencies arise when an element within society perceives the state as weak, vulnerable to the strategy of insurgency, and take action to capitalize on a unique political opportunity. Commonly states under threat attribute a hostile insurgency to the work of elements foreign to indigenous society. Often this attribution of cause is incorrect and is articulated because of poor intelligence, wishful thinking by government forces, or the government's attempt to discredit the insurgency in society's eyes (i.e. claiming that the insurgency is an external imposition and the state is the sole legitimate political representative and leader of society).

China too seeks to cast the insurgency in Xinjiang as the work of external instigators. In the mid-1990s western elements were blamed; later, and especially after September 11, 2001, Islamist forces are a focal point. In reality, the insurgency in Xinjiang is primarily an indigenous affair. Uyghur have pursued the assistance of powerful external actors, Islamist and western, yet this effort does not negate their primary intent of fighting the Chinese in Xinjiang.

While insurgency has been endemic in Xinjiang throughout the region's modern history (including variously termed revolts, rebellions, revolutions, and jihads), the present insurgency is historically contingent, connected, and unique. Where some scholars currently assert the primacy of China's disingenuous policies of ethnic "autonomy" in Xinjiang in triggering revolts (Xinhua 2003) and others assert that violence has erupted as a result of security forces' excesses. Various studies assert that these are important pieces of a larger picture. An insurgency need not seem logical or connected at the micro-levels; insurgency is a social process which is most visible at macro-levels.
An insurgency is a violent social movement. To view events or groups in isolation is to miss the phenomenon’s rich interplay and evolution. Individuals have multiple motivations for action just as individuals have multiple components of their identity, and identity is often oppositional. While groups are composed of individuals, they become an entity. Violence in Xinjiang may have spiked because the Chinese authority’s ethnic policies have dramatically increased both ethnic and liberal nationalists; indeed, these nationalisms are challenges to the Communist Party and to the Chinese state. In response to these threats, perceived or real, security services have at times been brutal and spurred retribution. Yet we must not ignore its connections to the international ideational phenomenon of our time: the evolving norms of political violence, insurgency and terrorism (both approved and disapproved) in support of independence from colonial powers or invaders, assertion of human rights, or establishment of a new Islamic caliphate.

Each generation which becomes insurgents must find ideas, a dream, and an absolute truth worth fighting for anew. The present insurgency in Xinjiang has roots in the Soviet–Afghan war of the 1980s, and has evolved since this grand spark. The Soviet–Afghan war provided not only training, and perhaps munitions, but also inspiration; Islamic insurgents were seen to have defeated an invading superpower. Since the Soviet defeat this model of insurgency has fanned embers around the world, at times with the direct involvement of experienced veterans and at times simply stirred by the idea of the victorious fighter against seemingly overwhelming power.

**Terrorist Challenge to the Chinese State**

China asserts that terrorists have killed over 160 people and injured 440 in more than 200 incidents between 1990 and 2001 (Millard and Collins 2006; Alms 2006). Since 1949 liberation unrest in Xinjiang has been episodic and has had numerous proximate causes. Rather than the single narrative, historian James Millward depicts a Xinjiang troubled by sporadic and geographically disperse violence;
Islamic and Uyghur nationalisms mix with security forces' heavy handedness in engendering eruptions. While an extensive list of violence in Xinjiang is available from Jane's Terrorism and Insurgency Centre the sourcing on some of the attacks listed are of questionable integrity; thus, the book charts a minimalist track, turning instead to the discussion of attacks and groups analyzed by historian Millward. Beyond the social noise of a traditional society living under an imposing authoritarian system, Millward writes that three clusters of attacks are at the core of PRC fears - extremism, splittism, and terrorism: The first was an armed uprising in Baren (near Kashgar) in April 1990 whose planners employed religious rhetoric and used mosques to disseminate a call to arms. Some 200 men were apparently involved in the initial uprising; a Chinese dragnet and crackdown on the religious establishment later detained many others (Kilcullen and David, 2006-2007).

"Counter-Insurgency Redux" Survival provides a similar discussion while Xinjiang scholars uniformly assert that the Baren incident was a local affair, perhaps organized by veterans of the Soviet-Afghan war. On the other hand, senior diplomatic and counter-terrorism sources assert that there was direct intervention from Afghan militias, including a force lead by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar. This push was repulsed not only with Chinese military force but also with American and international diplomatic efforts (Jintao 2005; Faren et al. 1994; Ghoja 2004). Millward further states that, the second incident was a series of explosions and attempted bombings in 1992-3 involving civilian targets (buses, stores, and cinema halls) though some of the bombs were defused; several casualties resulted from these unclaimed attacks, including a few fatalities.

The third cluster, from spring 1996 until February 1997, corresponds chronologically with the inauguration of the “Shanghai Five” organization and a high-profile “Strike Hard” campaign to round up suspected separatists. Chinese reports indicate a wave of protests, explosions, and assassinations of ethnic Uyghur officials around this time, and large numbers of arrests were logged. The Ghulja
(Yining) incident of early February, 1997 began as a large-scale demonstration probably in response to Strike Hard arrests, which developed into clashes with police and attacks on Chinese civilians. After the repression of the unrest in Ghulja and a further wave of arrests, three bombs exploded on Urumqi buses later in February (Interview China, 2005). These three bombs on rumqi buses exploded simultaneously (Laitin 2003: 76), showing a significant level of expertise (simultaneous explosions were, in this period, a hallmark of al Qaeda internationally). Jane's tabulation includes a March 1997 suicide bombing of a government building in Urumqi (Tyler 2003: 207).

Importantly, attacks since 1997 have been small affairs including the murders of local officials, one or two at a time (Orwell and George 1946). Animal Farm, New York: Signet Classics International incidents listed by Millward include only three successful attacks which seem credible to the present author.

May 31 and June 1, 1998: Osh Bus Bombings: Two explosions, one on a bus and one in a piece of luggage that had been removed from a bus, killed five people in Osh oblast, Kyrgyzstan. Kyrgyz authorities apprehended and sentenced a Turk, a Russian, and two Uyghurs for the bombing.

1999: Series of Attacks on Chinese in Turkey. In October, Turkish police detained ten individuals, said to be members of ETLO, in connection with assaults on Chinese nationals.

March 2000: Involvement with Chechens. Russia arrested two Uyghurs whom it charged with fighting for the Chechen terrorists. Extradited to the PRC for trial, they confessed to smuggling ammunition but denied joining the fighting (Xinhua 2006).

Other attacks abroad are claimed by the Chinese government to have been conducted by “East Turkistan” forces; however, no creditable details about the per-
petrator's affiliations or motivations were available. While the minimalist case presented above seems to depict relatively little threat, this study turns briefly to two additional types of evidence: an examination of fighters training in Afghanistan and presence of terrorist and separatist groups. First, let us turn briefly to a maximalist view of the “fighters” problem. Graham Fuller and Jonathan Lipman write: As early as 1999, a Chinese academic specialist on Xinjiang had estimated that as many as 10,000 Uyghurs had travelled to Pakistan for religious schooling and “military training.” In May 2002, the Chinese government claimed that over 1,000 Uyghurs had been trained in Taliban camps and that many of them had returned to Xinjiang to participate in the separatist struggle. Beijing also claimed that approximately 20 Uyghurs were killed by U.S. forces in Afghanistan and that some 300 Uyghurs had been captured. In June 2002, the Chinese military attaché in Washington reported that his government had identified some 400 Uyghurs as fighters in Afghanistan (Report of People’s Republic of China 2005). With the United States moving into Afghanistan, Fuller and Lipman assert, hundreds of Uyghurs fled the Afghan battlefield in search of refuge in northern Pakistan.

China's knowledge of the Afghan battlefield, numbers of Uyghurs killed, captured, or even trained, come from only a few possible sources; two seem most likely: either Chinese officials have invented the numbers or American officials have shared information with the Chinese (Millward 2004: 15). Yet even if China received information from the United States, this study lacks the information necessary to assess the veracity of the numbers claimed, neither methodology of collection of the information nor the integrity of the information's chain of custody. Explicitly, without this knowledge it is impossible to assess whether the numbers have been altered for political purposes at any step, from collection through analysis, dissemination, and eventual publication by Chinese authorities. Let us now examine associated and implicated groups.
East Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM)

The US State Department's *Patterns of Global Terrorism 2003* lists only one terrorist organization in Xinjiang with links to al Qaeda (recognized as such by the United States): the East Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM; aka SHAT) (Jay 2004; Fredrick 2004).

Accused of plotting an attack against the United States embassy in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, the ETIM today is an unknown outfit. Whereas a January 2002 Chinese document, the first official systematic discussion of terrorism in Xinjiang, claims that about a dozen ETIM bases were established in Xinjiang, a *People's Daily* report from September of the same year asserts that: "Chinese police have damaged 44 ETIM bases and confiscated a substantial amount of weapons and ammunition, including 4,500 grenades." (Millward 2004: 15). Evaluating the PRC's 2002 report on terrorism in Xinjiang, Millward writes: "In February 1998 [ETIM leader] Hasan Mahsum sent 'scores of terrorists' into China" establishing bases and training more than 150 terrorists. The ETIM also established "large numbers of 'training stations' in scattered areas, each consisting of three to five members, and workshops producing weapons, ammunition, and explosives." Police reportedly also recovered detonators, grenades, and anti-tank grenades from these workshops (Dautcher 2004). On January 5, 2007, China reportedly destroyed a terrorist camp, killing eighteen suspects and capturing seventeen, a stockpile of improvised explosive devices, material, and an unknown number of guns (Tyler 2004: 202). The ETIM has not been credibly and publicly linked to any large-scale attack or series of attacks. In December of 2003 Hasan Mahsum was reportedly killed in Pakistan.

Contrasting Millward's circumscribed assessment; other reputable Xinjiang scholars depict the ETIM in more certain terms. Justin Rudelson and William Jankowiak observed that since the ETIM was listed by China, the United States, and the United Nations as an international terrorist group (August 26, 2002) a
credible knowledge-base has emerged. Rudelson and Jankowiak argued that ETIM Uyghur resistance began after the 1990 Baren uprising. Seeing the government's readiness to use force against apparently peaceful students, Uyghur activists from the south of Xinjiang fled to a base at a religious school (madrassah) in Pakistan and founded the ETIM there. The ETIM's leadership is purported to have had close links to Osama bin Laden and to have sent agents and weapons into Xinjiang beginning in 1998. At least two of the Al-Qaeda fighters captured in Afghanistan and sent to Guantanamo, Cuba, were Uyghurs from the ETIM (Blasko, 2006: 23).

Rudelson and Jankowiak's final claim is problematic; their intended meaning is that of the fighters captured in Afghanistan (of whom the majority were simple insurgents, not core al Qaeda terrorists and warriors), at least two were members of the ETIM. Alternately, perhaps these ETIM members belonged to al Qaeda's "055 Brigade," al Qaeda's guerilla force. While the information's original source is unclear, the story fits plausibly with more overtly sourced material. The ETIM highlights several key features of China's war on terrorism: even where a link between Uyghur groups and al Qaeda may exist, the information China released is contradictory, and some seem to be obviously inconsistent, incorrect, or falsified, which weakens the case China is trying to put forth.

**East Turkistan Liberation Organization (ETLO)**

According to Chinese authorities, the ETLO has ties with the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), an ally of al Qaeda, and has links to training camps in Afghanistan and Chechnya (Michael 2004; Millward 2004). Of the accusations levied against this group, those most credible include fifteen arsons in Urumqi, "a poisoning in Kashgar, a series of attacks on Chinese nationals in Turkey, arms smuggling, [and] shootouts with Chinese border guards. One source also credits ETLO with the ransom kidnapping of a Chinese businessman and bombing in Osh." (Dillon 2004). The researcher do admit that the present study lacks evidence
to either confirm or challenge these assertions; importantly, Millward too presents these charges in uncertain and qualified terminology indicating his similar lack of substantive information on the ETLO and its actions. Millward includes in his assessment a number of attacks in Central Asia which is attributed to this group. However, the researcher feel that these attacks are more easily linked to causes other than terrorism or Uyghur's separatism. It is consequence of corruption and crime which is endemic in Central Asia. As of present status it is difficult to discern whether the ETLO even exists.

**United Revolutionary Front of East Turkistan (URFET)**

URFET, also known as the United National Revolutionary Front of East Turkistan, this group began in the mid-1970s (and perhaps has roots in early resistance against the Chinese during the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution). The URFET's leader, Yusupbek Mukhlisi, in the mid-1990s issued a series of press releases from Almaty characterized by wild claims regarding the "real" size of the Uyghur population, the rate of Chinese immigration to Xinjiang, the number of uprisings and executions ongoing in Xinjiang, and his own supposedly vast organization of secret armed cells in China. These releases alone were largely responsible for creating the impression of an active, organized, violent resistance to Chinese rule in Xinjiang in the 1990s (Nicolas 2004: 41).

Apparently at the time when these press releases were being originally circulating, the Chinese authorities lacked either the ability to dispel their claims or the will to disseminate information which cast doubt upon the severity of threats in Xinjiang. Alternately, perhaps the self-perceived threat to the Chinese state is less that of bombs per se but the general perception of vulnerability and fragility that stems from separating Xinjiang, along with Taiwan and Tibet, from the motherland. Such movements have provided a boon of nationalism which surges CCP legitimacy, however temporarily.
Uyghur Liberation Organization (ULO)

In 1996 this group’s founder, Hashir Wahidi, claimed “to have over 1 million supporters in Xinjiang and 12,000 more abroad in Central Asian countries” (Dillon 2004). In 1998, at the age of seventy-eight, Hashir Wahidi died following a severe beating by intruders in his home. Among the actions plausibly attributable to the ULO are an attack upon a Chinese delegation and a kidnapping of a Chinese businessman in Kyrgyzstan (Spring 2000 and Dautcher 2004). Millward observes that Ten Uyghurs, including Kyrgyz, Chinese, Uzbek, and Turkish nationals were arrested in connection with these events. They are said to have confessed to membership in ULO, connections with “similar Afghan and Uzbek organizations,” training in terrorist camps, fighting in Chechnya, and engaging in terrorist acts in Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and China. (Millward 2004). Forming the Uyghuristan People’s Party in September of 2001 by merging with the URFET, this group has sought legitimate participation in above-ground Central Asian politics. Importantly, the Uyghuristan People’s Party has equivocated in renouncing violence to achieve its political ends.

Other Groups

Two additional types of groups are listed by the Chinese security authorities; those which are named but no external information is available, and those which are relatively well-known as advocacy groups and information clearinghouses. Analyzing the threat posed by both sets is difficult. China is an authoritarian state, especially in relation to Xinjiang’s problems; China can make wild claims unchallenged by facts, whose collection and transmission is dangerous (clearly illustrated by the case of Rebiya Kadir, a Uyghur businesswoman arrested and imprisoned for bringing local newspaper-clippings to an American Congressional delegation. Today in exile, she too is labeled a terrorist). Alternately, Chinese security services might actually have information regarding secret Uyghur groups. The East Turkistan International Committee; the East Turkistan Islamic Party; the
East Turkistan Islamic Party of Allah (implausibly blamed for the 1997 Gulja/Yining uprising); the East Turkistan Opposition Party; and the Islamic Holy Warriors are all named by the Chinese as terrorist groups (Bovingdon 2004: 22). Two groups added to China's list of enemy groups are the World Uyghur Youth Congress (WUYC) and the East Turkistan Information Center (ETIC). China's Public Security Ministry claims that these groups have ties with al Qaeda, including funding and contacts. The former is an exile-political-action group, the latter issues press releases from Munich and has a spokesman who frequently appears in media reporting (www.uygur.org; Dautcher 2004). The veracity of China's claimed links of these groups to al Qaeda is difficult to authenticate, though it seems at least equally plausible that blanket accusations are meant to smother embarrassing dissent.

International Connection

Since the Soviet-Afghan war began in 1979, China has been effectively confronting an indigenous insurgency with links to the global jihad in its far northwestern Xinjiang region. The government has used political and military tactics, which together turned society against the idea of violence influencing politics. While political violence, including revolts, rebellions, and jihads, has rocked Xinjiang throughout history, the latest unrest flowed directly from the lessons of the Soviet-Afghan war, which included the idea that men with the help of Allah and armed with AK-47s could defeat a superpower. If the Soviet occupiers were expelled from Afghanistan, the struggle elsewhere must also be possible. State power no longer seemed so great, and communism had proven itself bankrupt at governing across China.

In eastern cities, dissent flowed out from the universities or up from families, neighborhoods, villages, and workforces swindled by corrupt and capricious local officials. In Xinjiang, dissent gained additional traction through the mosques and religious social groups. Causes espoused in Xinjiang are many: the search for autonomy promised but never truly delivered; simple ethnic nationalism, whereby the Han
should leave Xinjiang to its “rightful Uyghur owners”; freedom for religious practice beyond that sanctioned by the state as not politically threatening; the hope of self-determination and perhaps even democracy; the goal of Central Asia’s “coloured” revolutions of the mid 2000s and a hope harbored in Xinjiang throughout the previous decade; the search for human rights denied by a repressive and brutal regime; and, in some cases, the desire to use religious identity as a direct challenge to state power. With so many grievances espoused, searching for one all-encompassing explanation may be fruitless. As counter insurgency scholar David Kilcullen argues, contemporary insurgencies are “complex conflict ecosystems” in which multiple actors, groups, and ideologies independently pursue their own agendas without necessarily having a formal or unified organizational structure, or indeed any substantive operational coordination.

Insurgency in Xinjiang has been no different from insurgency elsewhere in some respects. While there were many purported reasons for resistance, perhaps the most important driver of the conflict was state weakness. The greatest threat for China came as its state institutions were found incapable of responding adequately. Because the security forces were the only institutions capable of moving effectively within society, brutality was perceived to be the only option; a recipe for alienating and inflaming society. Xinjiang’s governance, social, educational, and religious institutions similarly were deemed to be infiltrated with separatists and as a counter measure these key institutions were purged and filled with loyal cadres, an increasing number of which were and are Uyghurs.

Xinjiang’s insurgency is not isolated from developments beyond its borders; indeed, while the activities there are carried out by local actors based on local societal and political circumstances, the region fits into the contemporary global jihad that has evolved at least since the Soviet-Afghan war. Explicitly, concerning Xinjiang’s place in the global jihad, the threat today has diminished to quite an extent because of an increasingly effective Chinese government’s counterinsurgency measures.
Al Qaeda was once a group of individuals joined by common beliefs and motivated to violently press their political views and multiply their power through instilling fear and awe. Today it is the vanguard organization of like-minded groups and individuals internationally (Epoch Times 2006). Moreover, it has become an inspirational base upon which a global jihad can emerge. The social movement is likely to shape life for the worse for at least a generation and probably more. Training in Afghanistan and Pakistan, at first against the Soviets and later in camps at home and abroad, has provided tactical knowledge on weapons, intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and small group skills. Two types of training occurred in Afghanistan's camps, terrorist and insurgent. This tactical distinction divides the minority of fighters, who honed the skills to blend into societies either in their home country or abroad and prepare methodically for spectacular attacks. The remaining majority are trained to fight as warriors in irregular battles against security forces. While formal connections to established terrorist organizations (foremost among them being the al Qaeda) were important to the first generations of extremists, a rising generation shows less need for such formality.

Today, terrorists are increasingly able to wrap themselves and their local fights in al Qaeda's banner without formal institutional links, while al Qaeda's leadership takes credit of such successful attacks. While we struggle for the appropriate vocabulary to categorize our current threat, al Qaeda has placed itself at the forefront of a global social movement building on many local insurgencies as well as sympathetic individuals and groups abroad. Insurgencies are primarily indigenous affairs, and the contemporary jihad is no exception but has taken a global dimension. External connections are present in nearly every insurgency, but these fights will have no traction or significance without the support of the local population, solicited through approbation or fear. In Xinjiang, insurgency and counter-insurgency simultaneously evolved; as the insurgency changed character, the counter-insurgency methods also changed. However, the Xinjiang counterinsurgency differs from others in that it evolved along its own trajectory, separated from the influences of the insurgency's
tactical ebb and flow. The official statistics for casualties in Xinjiang between 1990 and 2001 (Millward 2004: 15) have not been amended since 2001. While there are slight fluctuations in particular numbers when recited by different officials, this variation is more easily explained by "misstatement" than by deliberate recalibration. To date, Western scholars have been unable to account for the majority of these figures using open-source reporting or fieldwork. The White Paper intended to explain China's terrorism problems and the government's response did little to reduce the arena's obscurity for the rest of the world.

Beyond attack statistics, the potential for insurgency can be discerned through at least two other measures: the number of fighters receiving training, and the support in society for insurgency as a viable path forward (or the only path, chosen by approbation, fear, or both). China asserts that over 1,000 Chinese Uyghurs were trained in Afghanistan's camps in the 1990s. Additionally, East Turkestan Islamic Movement leader Hasan Mahsum was reportedly killed in a firefight in northwest Pakistan in December of 2003 along with other militant suspected to be member of the al Qaeda. According to press reports, China continues to press Pakistan to eliminate or repatriate Uyghur militants taking refuge across its southern border (Dreyer 2005: 72). While the reliability of this information is difficult to assess from open sources, 22 Chinese Uyghurs were imprisoned at Guantanamo, according to the Congressional Research Service (Millward 2006). Of these, five were reportedly detained to be there by mistake. After lengthy international diplomacy and Chinese condemnation, they were released not to China but to a United Nations refugee camp in Albania. The fear, and not an unreasonable one, was that China would likely torture and execute them if they were repatriated, even though reportedly they were abducted by bounty hunters and sold to American forces as "terrorists" for the equivalent of $5,000. After long denying any training in Afghanistan, the Albanian five now say they went to a Uyghur camp outside of Tora Bora because the food was free. They learned to fire an old assault weapon and did not ask questions (Sautman 2005: 91). Ten of the Chinese Uyghurs at Guantanamo were deemed to be receiving
military training in order to return to China and put their new paramilitary insurgent skills to use. The remaining seven were deemed to be hardcore al Qaeda operatives, willing to fight wherever the next jihad might take them.

Thus 9/11 should not be read as a demarcation or signpost in China’s “war on terror,” but should instead be recognized as an ongoing domestic affair dating back to history. The root cause of violent demonstrations for democracy and terrorist or violent political acts are a manifestation of suppression alone. Also, as with elsewhere, terrorism in China cannot be understood in isolation. It has to be seen in the wider context, since the term “terrorist” is usually applied to separatist and unofficial religious groups in the ethnic autonomous regions of Xinjiang, Tibet, and to a lesser extent, Inner Mongolia. In Beijing’s parlance, terrorism constitutes one of “three evils,” together with separatism and religious fundamentalism, which, in its view, are all inter-connected threats to China’s national security and regional stability. This is because Beijing sees terrorism as a violent expression of the aim of ethnic separatism and the result of zealous religiosity on the part of minorities that threaten to displace the state as an object of adulation. As such, separatist-cum-religious terrorism is closely associated with the fears, grievances and aspirations of certain, though by no means most, ethnic minorities in China, the presence of the “three evils” clearly indicates that the root causes of terrorism are religious freedom and cultural autonomy.

Conclusion

While terrorism is certainly not a new phenomenon on the world scene, the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Centre and Pentagon in September 2001 brought it to the forefront as a major form of challenges not only to the United States but to other countries of the globe. Terrorist activity is no longer confined within the borders of any single nation state but is seen now to be global issue and challenge.
Post September 11, there has been a broad unity amongst nations on the need to respond to terrorism, there has been no ready agreement on what constitutes terrorist acts. Definitions of terrorism continue to be varied and highly contested. Even the UN resolutions calling for action on terrorism fail to provide a definition, as many countries have expressed their sensitivities to the use of the definitions that would seem to include, for example, their own liberation movements. This has been particularly true in African states, where the term “terrorist” was used freely to describe the armed movements that gave rise to their independence from colonial rulers. Governments or “high power” actors are more likely to see terrorism as attacks perpetrated by rogue non-state actors on governments, while “low-power” actors who feel victimized by their own governments are likely to stress that government military attacks and repression are a form of terrorism as well.

Firstly, contemporary terrorism exhibits several significant shifts from the terrorist acts of the past. First of all the terrorism now has a global reach. Earlier terrorist groups tended to have a specific geographical focus for their grievances: the Stern Gang operated in Palestine, Shining Path in Peru, and the Irish Republican Army largely in the British Isles. Other groups widened the area of their operations, but still attacked targets that reflected their political goals rooted in a specific place. For example, Palestinian groups carried out operations all over the world, from the 1972 Munich Olympics siege to the hijacking of planes on international routes, but the targets tended to be Israeli interests. In contrast, the new terrorism makes use of new technology to attack targets anywhere in the world even those that do not reflect their direct interest. The shift to a larger global stage may be seen as an inevitable consequence of globalization.

Secondly, the current strand of terrorism seems to springs from new ideological commitments. Religion is not a new element in terrorism: the operations of Hezbollah in Lebanon during 1980s, for example, had a radical Shia Muslim
outlook, and the Kach movement in Israel during the 1990s had Jewish fundamentalist motivations. However, while the religious aspects of terrorism are not new, the shift to an apocalyptic, fanatical steak is one of the most salient features of the new terrorism. This shift in ideology sees terror, at least in part, as an end in itself rather than just a tactic to achieve a political end.

Today terrorism is often framed as a phenomenon linked to Islam. While many of the current terrorist factions and the perpetrators of recent high-profile attacks identify themselves as Muslim, the current trend of the Western press and the U.S. government to focus only on the link between Islam and terrorism is misleading. It paints a skewed picture that distorts the true diversity of past and present terrorist movements. It also may lead people to believe that Islam is an inherently a violent religion, which in fact is not supported by holy text of the Quran and is also a matter disputed by many Muslims and non-Muslims alike.

Thirdly, contemporary terrorism has a new range of targets. Unlike the old form which was limited in geographical outreach, the current forms' target are often large maximizing destruction attracting large scale media coverage and also global attention as evident from the attacks of September 11 and the activities of Al-Qaeda. They seem to be less concern about alienating supporters and perpetrators of the political movements.

Fourth, with the technological revolution newer means are available to terrorists. Globalisation and the information technology revolution have allowed groups to use the internet, satellite telephones, and other technology to communicate over large distances and with greater anonymity. In addition, there is a possibility of terrorist groups gaining greater access to weapons technology, such as biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons (how). The use of commercial aircraft in the attacks of September 11 demonstrated that even conventional technology can be turned into effective weapons.
Lastly, terrorism now tends to adopt a less hierarchical structure of organisation network. There are fewer chains of command and fewer instructions given from a centralized leader. Old terrorist groups often had identifiable operational leaders, such as Baader and Meinhof for the Red Army Faction, or Abimael Guzman for the Shining Path. Contrary to common perceptions, units now operate with much greater independence from the leadership, as was illustrated by the March 2003 Madrid bombings in Spain, which were perpetrated by a relatively autonomous Al-Qaida cell operating in Europe.

Examples of the new terrorism are more diverse than Al-Qaeda and the terrorism perpetrated by Islamist groups. JI the Indonesian religious cult perpetrated the series of bomb attacks on various tourist and embassy in Bali in 2002. In the United States, the Bali City bombing provided an example of the use of messianic ideology to inflict mass civilian casualties. However, it took the massive scale of the World Trade Center attacks to arouse world attention and shape the way much of the world thinks about security and insecurity in the twenty-first century.

An analysis into the roots and caused of terrorism clearly bring to the fore the changing nature of threats faced by the nation state today. Threats like separatist movement, insurgency, terrorism including global terrorism calls both academicians and practitioners of politics for revisiting the issues of security emanating from sources which cannot be address from the traditionalist standpoint of international relation.
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