CHAPTER II
THE CONCEPTUAL FOUNDATIONS AND THE HISTORY OF CBMs BETWEEN INDIA AND PAKISTAN
2.1 THE DEFINITIONS OF CBMs

Defining confidence building measures (CBMs) is not simple. Different states implementing CBMs and the authors commenting on them offer diverse definitions, causing confusion and contradictions in academic writings. Not just the definitions, even the objectives of CBMs are interpreted in dissimilar ways by scholars. Moreover, as these measures are largely practice-driven, their understandings and definitions have been evolving and altering with the changes in their practice. As new dimensions are added to the existing measures, or some new measure is conceived and executed, the existing view of CBMs is also modified. In this sense, any definition of CBMs is bound to remain somewhat incremental in nature.¹

The concept of CBMs is underdeveloped and vague. Though considerable work on CBMs relating to various regions exists, substantive theoretical analysis in academic literature is lacking. Indeed, the bulk of the writings on CBMs are intellectually located in the disciplinary concerns of defence and strategic studies. They have remained somewhat insulated from the theoretical ferment in the larger discipline of International Relations. Mirroring the conceptual confusion surrounding CBMs, one commentator writes that,
"CBMs are what one imagines them to be and its nature and content lie largely in the eyes of the beholder."\(^2\)

CBMs have been traditionally defined as “agreements between countries to increase openness, mutual understanding and communication.... designed to reduce the possibility of conflict through accident, miscalculation, or failure of communications and to inhibit opportunities for surprise attack or political intimidation, thereby increasing stability in time of calm as well as crisis."\(^3\) According to this definition, confidence building measures are concerned mainly with military activities and procedures for transparency and openness. John Borawski also considers the main function of CBMs as war avoidance through steps like information exchange, inspection of military manoeuvres, and constrains on military operations.\(^4\) Many other experts on CBMs also adopt a military and technical view of CBMs, and regard these measures as concomitant of arms control and deterrence. A military and technical understanding of CBMs, mainly rooted in the realist paradigm of international relations, emphasizes clarification of the role and use of power to an adversary as critical to the CBM process.

Some other definitions, drawing inspiration from non-realist frameworks, expand the meaning of CBMs beyond military actions to political, social, economic and psychological spheres. They do not restrict CBMs to actions of governments and armed forces only. Rather, greater stress is laid on actions by non-governmental actors and forces. In such broad sense, even friendly statements by political leaders and goodwill gestures aimed at generating trust in the adversary can be considered as a kind of CBMs. For instance, the Egyptian President Anwar Sadat’s handshake with the Israeli officials during his historic visit to Jerusalem as a part of rapprochement with Israel after Egypt-Israel war was considered a confidence building effort.
Jonathan Alford defines CBMs in a comprehensive sense. According to him, “almost anything that increases mutual confidence among potential adversaries could be called a CBM. A trade agreement sustained over time builds confidence; an arms-control treaty adhered to builds confidence; even an apparent willingness to negotiate seriously over an outstanding issue can build confidence.” Samina Yasmeen and Aabha Dixit also define CBMs as “mutually agreed actions taken by states, or group of states, that set processes in motion that move parties from a condition of mutual hostility to one of reduced hostility or increased accommodation. These actions can be military-strategic or nonmilitary, and include political, cultural or social measures.

Such an expansive definition carries the risk of diluting the concept of CBMs so much that it would lose its salience. As Brahma Chellaney comments, “…to increase their importance, CBMs are getting so loosely defined that they go far beyond confidence building to encompass virtually everything from war prevention to peace building. Almost every declaration, agreement or measure between rival states is being portrayed as a CBM.” Amitabh Matto also believes that “including virtually all forms of cooperation within the rubric of CBMs may destroy the analytical value of the term without necessarily enhancing its political utility.”

There are thus two contending perspectives on the role and definition of CBMs. One perspective takes a somewhat restricted view of such measures and speaks of their applicability and relevance predominantly in the military sphere. The other perspective adopts an inclusive view and extends the scope of CBMs to non-military, i.e. political, economic, social, educational and cultural spheres too. The theoretical and normative assumptions underpinning these two perspectives are dissimilar and at times contradictory.
There is also an eclectic approach to confidence building, which seeks to bridge the gap between these two definitions and balances them. James MacIntosh is one adherent of this view. He views CBMs primarily in procedural and psychological terms. The procedural aspects focus on “the true nature of potentially threatening military activities”, while the psychological aspects focus on the need to reduce “misperceptions and suspicions.”

2.2 THE OBJECTIVES AND BENEFITS OF CBMs

Mutual confidence is essential for reducing the likelihood of conflict between states. When two states are involved in a long-standing dispute, when armed hostilities between them seems probable, or when any one state has an incentive to strike first, confidence building can be a useful mechanism of preventing war. CBMs are basically security-oriented instruments. They enhance security for a state by reducing the threat of war. Arnold Wolfers states that, “...security, in an objective sense, measures the absence of threats to acquired values, in a subjective sense, the absence of fear that such values will be attacked.” CBMs seek to remove this fear from the mindset of the states engaged in a conflict.

Misunderstanding, mistrust or misperception is a basic cause of aggravation of conflict between antagonists. Actions that reduce chances of such misperception and mistrust, soften attitudes and promote atmosphere conducive to conflict settlement are essential. This becomes possible by confidence building between states, especially among those agencies and sections of the states concerned with the making and execution of foreign and security policies.
In an anarchic world devoid of supranational authority structures, a state normally imagines and anticipates the worst intentions and behaviour on the part of its adversary. Any unexplained action of the adversary is interpreted as hostile, compelling it to undertake counter-measures to ward off the perceived or real threat from the enemy. Such counter-measures in turn generate further hostility and adverse activity in the other state. An endless cycle of insecurity and preparation for security begins. This action-reaction cycle is largely a result of lack of trust or confidence, inadequate or no communication among adversaries, and misperception or negative perception about the 'enemy'. CBMs seek to moderate perceptions about each other and promote communication even during a period of hostility. By themselves, CBMs do not provide security. However, they address the problems generated by the "insecurity dilemma" of states and help promote strategic stability.

CBMs are important for removing the most unwarranted incentives for initiating a military conflict, viz. accident, miscalculation, and misperception. CBMs increase predictability about the actions of the other side by constraining the actual or potential use of weapons in three ways: by communications and information exchanges, by observation and inspection of defence-related activities and establishments, and by restraints on operations and deployment of armed forces. CBMs can thus help remove the element of surprise from the military activities of two adversaries. They provide means of reassurance that "two or more adversaries will not attempt to surprise one another and carry out a disabling military strike against the other." CBMs also aim at warding off the threat of accidental outbreak of nuclear war or unintended use of nuclear weapons due to misinformation about the enemy's activities or maneuvers. CBMs help decelerate arms race and create an atmosphere where cooperation and respect for mutually agreed terms could develop.
Thus, in their negative connotation, CBMs are meant to achieve the goals of avoiding war and managing crisis situations. Some commentators argue that their utility is probably the biggest in this negative sense.\textsuperscript{12} Even if the two states are not immediately interested in building trust between them, a minimal agreement to avoid a mutually destructive war can exist. CBMs are advantageous in attaining and sustaining this minimal goal. If a war occurs despite CBMs, their role will be to limit the war and bring it to an end at the earliest. Thus war prevention, war limitation and war termination are regarded as the main objectives of CBMs who subscribe to their military and technical sense.\textsuperscript{13}

However, as the notion of CBMs extends beyond a negative military-related view, they are also expected to perform some additional functions apart from war prevention. Only war-preventing measures are today better known as conflict avoidance measures (CAMs) than as CBMs. In addition to prevention of war, CBMs also help bring about relaxation of tensions and encourage positive and accommodative behaviour on the part of adversary states and their peoples. In their most comprehensive understanding, they alter the attitudes and perceptions of the conflicting parties towards each other. CBMs may be unlike conflict resolution techniques, but they are not unrelated with or unhelpful to conflict resolution efforts.

CBMs can also be applied in domestic settings. They may be useful in mitigating violent ethnic conflicts within a state or a conflict between two states arising from domestic issues like the refugee problems, disputes over boundaries of economic zones; problems regarding transit by citizens of one country through another; conflicts over minority rights etc. In the domestic context, CBMs can act as a link between state and non-state actors like ethnic minorities.
Many scholars advise against exaggerating the benefits of CBMs, and looking upon them as 'cure-all' solution to all security problems. They do not deserve to be given such a lofty status. Kanti Bajpai, for instance, cautions: "(CBMs) cannot prevent war if someone is determined to make war, nor are they thoroughgoing peace agreements (though, if they are successful, they may be the basis for an enduring peace; and they do not imply letting one's military guard down."14 F. Stephen Larrabee and Allen Lynch also argue in favour of adopting a restricted view of CBMs. They write, "CBMs cannot create confidence or trust among nations, especially among adversaries, where deeply rooted suspicions exist. Nor can they change the basic framework of international politics. Rather, the purpose of CBMs is much more modest and specific: they are designed to stabilize relations between states by providing tangible and verifiable assurances regarding the purpose and character of military activities."15

2.3 DIFFERENT CATEGORIES OF CBMs

As stated above, CBMs are applied in both military and non-military (economic, cultural, educational and social) sectors. They can be general or specific, formal or informal. Implementation of CBMs largely involves the governments, but the true realisation of its intent is not possible without the participation of non-governmental actors in parallel non-military measures. Even statements indicating good intentions about another country or expressions of friendliness can be regarded as kinds of confidence-building measures.

In the military context, there are four primary categories of CBMs: communication, constraint, transparency, and verification measures. These measures help make the behaviour of states and their military forces more predictable, facilitate communication among states and provide means of verifying compliance with the
agreements it may have signed. Communication and transparency measures are aimed at building political confidence while constraint and verification measures are meant to enhance military security.

2.3.1 Communication Measures

Communication measures help keep channels of communication open between conflict-prone states and defuse tensions during crisis. One of the most important communication CBMs is the ‘hotline’ (or direct communication link) between heads of government and military commanders for providing reliable direct channels of communication. In Europe a regional communication center was set up to assist states in conflict and crisis management. Regularly scheduled consultations, like the annual meetings between U.S. and Soviet/Russian navies under the 1972 Incidents at Sea Agreement or those between chiefs of staff of the armed forces of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay, and Uruguay are also an important communication measure providing opportunity for direct military-to-military contact for understanding each other and voicing concerns and grievances.16

2.3.2 Constraint Measures

Constraint measures are meant to keep certain types and levels of military forces at a distance from one another along borders. This is achieved by requiring advance notice (from 2 weeks to 1 year in some cases) of certain levels of troop movements and mobilization. The compulsion of advance notice constrains states' abilities to move the troops and equipment for large-scale offensive. Many conflictual parties have signed agreements for pre-notification of troop movements. Carving out 'thin-out zones', or limited force deployment zones help restrict the type and number of weapons and troops
permitted in a certain territory. The 1975 agreement between Syria and Israel establishing a demilitarized zone and a ‘thin-out’ area prohibited for forces and weapons on each side of the demilitarized zone was an important CBM in the diffusion of post-war situation in the Middle East.

2.3.3 Transparency Measures

Transparency measures are such actions that “states engage in to foster greater "openness" of their military capabilities and activities." Pre-notification of military exercises, for instance, helps make a state's intent more transparent, and alleviate fear that a military exercise may be conducted in preparations for war. Such notification mechanisms are also applied to ballistic missile tests. Transparency agreements are in place in the Middle East, Europe, and South Asia. In order to reduce uncertainty, the states also exchange data on existing arsenals and planned purchases, military personnel and defence budgets. For stable deterrence it is necessary that no state acquired inordinately large quantity of arms. If it does, by providing advance information to the adversary, it should clarify projected capabilities. An example of multilateral data exchanges is the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms established in 1991 in which participating states report imports and exports of weapons. To promote transparency about intentions, a state may also permit observations of its military exercises by another state. The Stockholm accord of the CSCE provided for such observations of military exercises.

2.3.4 Verification Measures

Verification measures are designed to provide first hand access in order to confirm or verify a state's compliance with a particular treaty or agreement. Verification measures consist of aerial inspections, on-site inspections and sensors. Aerial inspections
are a reliable method of monitoring compliance with force deployments in restricted zones and providing early signals of potentially destabilizing activities. Electronic sensors are also meant to verify states' compliance with agreements on troop movements. Such sensors played a key role in monitoring the peace agreements between Israel and Syria and Israel and Egypt. Recently, to verify Pakistan's claims of having stopped the infiltration of terrorists to Jammu and Kashmir, the US has offered to install an electronic sensor system at the Line of Control between India and Pakistan. On-site inspections also help verify if a state's compliance with agreements. The US On-Site Inspection Agency (OSIA) verifies Russia's compliance with the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, which calls for the destruction of nine weapons systems. Third parties may also carry out such inspections, if there is deep distrust among the conflicting parties.

2.4 THE HISTORY OF CBMs AT GLOBAL LEVEL

At an informal level, confidence-building measures might have been in use for long. Some writers trace the origins of CBMs to the Versailles Peace Treaty, which contained provisions for demilitarization of Rhineland and on-site inspections. However, the East-West CBMs in Europe during the Cold War provide a point of reference for most other CBM processes. The initial suggestions for confidence building were made right from the time of the Cuban missile crisis in 1962. In view of a large number of sophisticated nuclear weapons and delivery systems with both the power blocs, the imperative of avoiding the use of nuclear weapons as a result of accident or misperception began to be acknowledged seriously by policy makers after this standoff in America's neighbourhood. Communication, transparency, predictability and stability in strategic and political relations between the Soviet and American blocs were considered necessary for their own survival. Among the first of the East-West CBMs established was the 'hotline' or direct communication link set up in 1963.
The idea of CBMs was formalized at the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) in 1975 at Helsinki where 35 European states met. The Helsinki Final Act contained a number of CBMs aimed at openness and transparency in military affairs. Measures such as advance notice (more than 21 days) of military maneuvers involving more than 25000 troops and invitation to observers from other side at military exercises were agreed upon. These measures were voluntary in character. The formalization of CBMs at this conference was facilitated by relaxation of tensions as a result of détente between Super Powers after 1969.

The CSCE process later embraced militarily more ambitious measures. With the new policy of glasnost and perestroika by the Soviet President Michael Gorbachev, it became easier to expand the scope of CBMs. This shift was also reflected in the new nomenclature. The new procedures adopted at the CSCE conference at Stockholm in 1986 came to be called confidence and security building measures (CSBMs). The 1986 Stockholm Agreement expanded the kinds of military activities requiring advance notice, extended the notification period, required all signatories to be invited to observe military exercises of a certain magnitude and established compliance procedures. A new accord on confidence and security building measures was signed at Vienna in 1990. The Vienna Document included several constraint measures and provisions on information exchange, improved on-site inspections and communications links. It also set up a conflict prevention centre, among other things. The Vienna Document was further enhanced in 1992 and 1994.

Kanti Bajpai points out three specific benefits of CBMs implemented in the East-West setting. First, these CBMs produced trust, friendliness, empathy, sympathy and camaraderie among the political actors involved in the process. Frequent meetings between adversaries were institutionalized. The militaries of the two blocs also got to comprehend the other side better with the evolution of common vocabulary on security
issues. Secondly, as a result of the institutionalization of the CBM process, the civilian and military leaders were forced to clarify and question their own thinking, leading to "a greater degree of self-consciousness and critical self-reflection in respect of strategic choices and behaviour." Thirdly, the CBM process also led to a clearer realization of the truth that "one's security depended vitally and inextricably on the security of one's adversary, (and) that a unilateralist conception of security was both untenable and dangerous."\textsuperscript{21}

Encouraged by the positive experience of CSBMs in Europe, the western powers moved to replicate CBM model in other conflict-ridden regions, especially in the Middle East, Latin America and South East Asia. CBMs played a critical role in the security arrangement between Israel and Egypt after the 1973 Arab-Israeli war. Israel and Egypt signed a US-brokered peace agreement, now known as the Camp David accord, after disengaging their troops. Measures such as demilitarized zones, the interposition of international observer forces, establishing direct communications, and joint consultative commissions to resolve disputes over the interpretation of data have helped to resolve Egyptian and Israeli dilemmas of cooperation.

After the Gulf War of 1990, the US and other western states displayed a keen interest in initiating a peace process in the Middle East. A peace conference between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) was held in Madrid in 1990. A breakthrough was achieved in the form of the PLO-Israel agreement signed in Washington, D.C. in 1993 and Jordan-Israel agreement of 1994. Following the Washington agreement, Israel and Palestine granted implicit recognition to each other. Both these agreements instituted various sorts of CBMs. However, the optimism about confidence building in the Middle East has dampened recently as violence and terrorism have not subsided in Palestine-Israel relations.
2.5 THE EARLY HISTORY OF CONFIDENCE BUILDING BETWEEN INDIA AND PAKISTAN

Though the conflictual aspects of their relationship have received unending attention from politicians and media, the lesser-known truth is that India-Pakistan relationship has never been only conflictual. The two countries have an impressive record of cooperation in various sectors. Also, the highlighting of hostility between the two states should not make one blind to the reality that many of the initial problems between India and Pakistan were settled through negotiations or arbitration.

In their wider sense CBMs include, apart from military measures, declaratory, informal or general actions aimed at generating trust and friendliness. In this context, India and Pakistan have employed CBMs right from independence when their leaders expressed a desire for stable, peaceful and friendly mutual relationship. Indeed, even before the two states came into existence, once the partition became a certainty, serious observers began envisaging the likely shape of relations between the two provinces. Such declarations included proposal for no-war pact and joint defence of the sub-continent. The disputes over the demarcation of boundary between East and West Bengal, the distribution of the waters of Indus and other rivers flowing into Pakistan from India, concerns about the treatment of minorities etc. were settled without the use of force or acrimony.

The pact between the Prime Ministers of India and Pakistan Jawaharlal Nehru and Liaquat Ali Khan respectively in 1951 represents the first serious effort to build bridges between the two states. The pact contained provisions for the treatment of sizeable minorities left in both the countries after partition. A treaty was also concluded between the two countries on the sharing of the waters of Indus Basin in 1960. The treaty, an
outcome of mediation by the World Bank and the US, was a significant landmark in their relationship. The Indus water treaty was further strengthened by the setting up of a joint Indo-Pakistani Permanent Indus Commission in 1978 for regulating the distribution of waters with powers of arbitration. The Tashkent Agreement (1966), which bound the two states not to use force to settle the Kashmir problem, initiated a process of stabilizing military security in the region. The Simla agreement (1972) further strengthened this position by obligating India and Pakistan to respect the line of control (LOC) and not to violate it unilaterally. The agreement also implicitly repudiated the previous UN resolutions on Kashmir by binding the signatories to explore a negotiated and peaceful solution on Kashmir strictly in a bilateral framework. The Rann of Kutch Agreement (1968) and the Agreement on Salal Hydro Electric Project (1978) are also critical steps taken by the two states for building trust and settling their disputes through peaceful methods, even by letting a third party be involved in the conflict management and resolution efforts. The Tashkent agreement, for instance, was a consequence of the Soviet mediation and while the boundary dispute concerning the Rann of Kutch was settled through international arbitration.

Several other agreements signed by India and Pakistan on diverse matters like promotion of trade, commerce and communication, protection of the places of worship, demarcation of borders, regulation of civilian air traffic and avoidance of double taxation on income from international transport etc. represent their striving to manage differences gainfully and build an atmosphere of confidence and trust. In order to promote good-neighbourly relations and cooperation in a range of non-political and non-military areas like trade and investment, travel and tourism, communications, science and technology, health services etc. an India-Pakistan Joint Commission was set up in 1982. This Commission and the subcommittees formed under it to deal with specific areas of cooperation came up with some groundbreaking suggestions on economic and people-to-people ties.
Apart from formal agreements and pacts, even informal confidence building gestures and actions have characterized relations between India and Pakistan. Such gestures have been a product of both countries sharing a civilizational value system that treats even enemies with respect.

The military behaviour of India and Pakistan is not free from self-imposed constraint and communication measures. For instance, following the informal talks between Air Marshal Arjan Singh of India and his Pakistani counterpart Air Marshal Asghar Khan during the military conflict in the Rann of Kutch in 1965, the air forces of both India and Pakistan tacitly agreed not to attack the infantry in the desert of Kutch as it would be deprived of natural cover in such a terrain. Both India and Pakistan have avoided the 'total war' concept and have fought all the three wars as limited wars with limited objectives. During these wars, they avoided directly and deliberately attacking civilian targets, population centres, irrigation dams or economic establishments, resulting in low civilian casualties as compared wars elsewhere.

Despite some reported instances of mutilation and dishonouring of the dead bodies of Indian soldiers killed in action during the 1971 war, India treated all the 1,10,000 Pakistani soldiers taken as prisoners of war (POWs) well and with dignity in full compliance of the provisions of the Geneva Convention.

Suggestions were made by the media, politicians and even by some of her close advisors to the Prime Minister Indira Gandhi to exploit India’s victory in 1971 war and pressurize Pakistan into accepting a final solution of the Kashmir issue on India’s terms. It was also hinted that India should not release the Pakistani POWs, nor vacate the Pakistani territory captured by it until Pakistan’s concurrence with such a solution, which required Pakistan to relinquish claims to the territory of Jammu and Kashmir forever, is obtained. Apart from the fact that the international community, including powers like the
Soviet Union that had backed India during the Bangladesh war, would not have supported such diplomatic raucousness by India, it is also true that this opinion did not carry the consent of a large majority of the political class and opinion makers in India itself. India’s decision to return all the Pakistani POWs unconditionally and withdrawal from territories occupied by it in the war confirms its desire not to hit Pakistan below the belt and act in an unfair and irresponsible manner.

India’s desire for confidence building with Pakistan was also reflected in several other actions. India facilitated the entry of Pakistan in the Non-aligned Movement as well as in the Commonwealth from which it had exited, overlooking the fact that such entry would provide Pakistan with a forum to attack and embarrass India. Immediately after its entry into non-aligned movement, Pakistan demanded from the NAM platform the implementation of the UN resolutions on Kashmir.

Pakistan has also occasionally indulged in confidence building gestures with India. For instance, as a part of his peace initiative in 1981 and 1982, Pakistani President General Zia-ul-Haq agreed to exchange the sailors of captured ships, which had strayed into Pakistani waters during fishing activities. He invited the Indian ambassador to give an address on Pakistani TV on India’s Republic Day in 1981 for the first time in Pakistani history. He allowed performances by several Indian artistes and dancers like Amjad Ali Khan, Asad Ali Khan, Bharati Shivaji etc. in Pakistan and revived sporting ties. The recommendation of the officials of the two countries to participate in trade fairs on each other’s territories was also accepted by him.
### 2.6 THE BACKGROUND OF THE RECENT CBMs BETWEEN INDIA AND PAKISTAN

Confidence building between India and China preceded the introduction of formal CBMs between India-Pakistan. Sino-Indian engagement with a CBM process began after the standoff following border skirmish between their armies in the Sumdorong Chu sector in the late 1986. India also conducted a military exercise along the Sino-Indian border codenamed, ‘Operation Checkerboard’. This prompted Washington and Moscow to impress upon India and China to embark upon CBMs. The two countries agreed to maintain status quo along the line of control and set up a series of transparency measures, mainly relating to pre-notification of military exercises and information exchanges.

Kanti Bajpai lists six circumstances under which the states choose to follow confidence building measures:26

1. When the states are involved in an enduring dispute with high stakes
2. When there is substantial probability that the dispute can lead to hostilities
3. When military technologies and strategy favour offence over defence
4. When the conventional or nuclear weapons make the costs of war disproportionate to any reasonable goals in the dispute
5. When there is a fear that miscommunication, misperception and misinterpretation could lead to inadvertent war, and
6. When neither outright war nor a comprehensive peace seems plausible.

According to Bajpai all these six preconditions are satisfied in case of India-Pakistan conflict, at least from New Delhi’s point of view.27 The enduring dispute of Kashmir, the omnipresent threat of a war over this issue, Pakistan’s avowed strategic doctrine of “offensive defence”, not just high but unbearable costs of a war due to the
threat of use of nuclear weapons, the experience of the 1986 and 1990 military crises, pointing to the high probability of war due to misperception and lack of communication, and the state of drift between war and peace in their bilateral relations make India-Pakistan conflict a ready case for application of CBMs. Hence, the desire for moving ahead in the direction of confidence building measures was concretized in the form of agreements.

2.6.1 The Catalysts: Operation Brasstacks and 1990 Military Crisis

“Operation Brasstacks”, a mammoth exercise by the Indian army undertaken in 1986-87, created a military crisis of dangerous proportions between India and Pakistan. General Krishnaswami Sundarji, the then Chief of the Army Staff, had carried out a programme of modernization, structural rationalization and improved mechanization of the land forces. Operation Brasstacks was designed with a vision to test the operational efficiency of the forces and equipments in this context.28 The Operation was also meant to test the coordination between the army, navy and air force. Pakistan misinterpreted the large concentration and exercise of Indian troops and testing of weapons along the Rajasthan border as India’s preparation for a war and retaliated by mobilizing its own troops, bringing them in forward position and conducting a similar exercise along its side of the border. As Pakistan refused to withdraw its troops from forward positions even after the exercise was over, India also put its forces on high operational alert from 23 January 1987 onwards. This situation was fraught with the risk of escalation into an open military conflict. Though the crisis finally blew over with the intervention of the prime ministers of the two states and subsequent discussions held between the foreign ministers and other high-ranking diplomats and military officials, the whole episode underscored the urgency and value of regular communication between the two militaries to avoid recurrence of such a near-war situation.
Renewal of militancy in Kashmir in 1989 also triggered interest in military CBMs. The fear that the low intensity conflict in Kashmir carried a risk of escalation into a full-scale war came close to reality when in February-March 1990, another military crisis and war-like situation was created by Indian army's mobilization for training and maneuvers in the Mahajan range in Kashmir, and the reported threats of Pakistan to use nuclear weapons to defeat an Indian attack. Though, a steep escalation in the situation was prevented by the application of some transparency and communication CBMs, the crisis added to the prevalent tensions over the rise of militancy in Kashmir. An investigative story by Seymour Hersh in *The New Yorker* in March 1993 revealed that Pakistan evacuated fissionable material from the nuclear plant at Kahuta and allegedly moved nuclear weapons in a truck convoy from their suspected storage facility in Baluchistan to an air base during this crisis. However, serious observers dispute that the threat of a nuclear confrontation was very high or that Pakistan had actually deployed nuclear weapons during the 1990 crisis.29

2.6.2 The International Systemic Context

The change in the South Asian strategic environment after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 forced the US to arm Pakistan as a frontline state to fight the Soviets. The infusion of massive American military and economic assistance including the F-16 aircraft to Pakistan raised Indian apprehensions. Since the acquisition of this aircraft by Pakistan was directed against India rather than the Soviets, India interpreted it as an anti-Indian move and began augmenting its own military equipments and arsenals by purchases from the Soviet Union, France and other states. Washington was worried by the tensions developing in India-Pakistan relations due to the incipient arms race, threatening rhetorical stance of the leaders of the two states and India's accusations of Pakistan's abetment of militancy in Punjab. The need for stability between India and
Pakistan on the military front with the explicit aim of preventing a war became acute and pressing. The US developed an interest in initiating confidence building measures between India and Pakistan, as it could ill-afford a military conflict between them in a region where stability was absolutely required for containing the Soviets in Afghanistan. Interestingly, even as it provided unprecedented assistance to Pakistan, Washington was keen not to alienate India during the same period considering its size and the importance in South Asia and its economic potential. If India and Pakistan go to war, America would be forced to take any one country’s side – a prospect it wanted to avoid right away.

With the end of the Cold War and disintegration of the Soviet Union, the US emerged as the unchallenged leader of a coalition of western powers dominating the economic, security and political affairs in a largely unipolar structure of international system. This reality further encouraged adoption of CBMs between India and Pakistan, in their own interests as well as in the interests of this dominant global coalition of states. The US foreign policy in the post-Cold War era has aimed at stabilizing conflict-prone regions and putting into effect a universal nuclear non-proliferation regime. A military conflict between two undeclared nuclear powers of South Asia was the most unwelcome prospect for it. Therefore, the desire no to precipitate a formal nuclearization of South Asia was another reason for America’s persistent and forceful persuasion for an India-Pakistan CBM regime on the lines of the East-West strategic relations. Hence, after the end of the Cold War, the US began taking a high-profile interest in South Asia and sent some senior functionaries to advocate regional détente and resolution of bilateral disputes through dialogue.

The US ambassadors in India and Pakistan played a conciliatory role during the 1990 crisis. Recognizing the risks involved in not addressing the dangers posed by an unregulated India-Pakistan conflict, the US also dispatched Deputy National Security Advisor Robert Gates to India and Pakistan in 1990 mainly to impress upon the leaders of
both, the countries to halt further development of their nuclear programmes and establish nuclear risk reduction measures to obviate the chances of a nuclear incident due to accident or miscalculation. The Gates mission was helpful in mollifying India and Pakistan. During his visit in November 1990, the US Under Secretary of State for International Security Affairs Barthalemew also suggested and discussed specific models of CBMs between India and Pakistan. These measures aimed at achieving nuclear non-proliferation, reduction of defence budget and strength of the armed forces, accountability and transparency. The changed realities of the post-Cold War era and the inevitable American leadership of the “new world order” enunciated by the American President George Bush had altered perceptions about the US role in South Asia. India and Pakistan also reacted favourably to Washington’s role as a facilitator for confidence building due to genuine realization of the utility of these measures as well as due to the apprehension that rejection of America’s proposals for introduction of CBMs might result in its displeasure. Both the countries could not risk losing America’s goodwill when it controlled, almost unopposed and unchallenged, the global economic institutions and processes, international organizations like the UN, technology transfer regimes and so on. Hence, the intermediary role of the US in the initiation of a CBM process in South Asia was not looked upon as unwelcome or unpleasant.

2.7 AN INVENTORY OF INDIA-PAKISTAN CBMs

2.7.1 Communication Measures

2.7.1.1 Direct Communication Link

A direct communication link, or “hotline” as it is popularly called, was established between the Director Generals of Military Operations (DGMOs) of India and Pakistan after the 1971 war. Following the military crisis of 1990 it was decided to use
this hotline, which was only sparingly used, on a weekly basis to enable the two 
functionaries to talk more frequently and exchange ideas relating to the mutual problems 
of the two militaries in various sectors along the India-Pakistan border. The air wings of 
the two militaries also set up a separate hotline in 1993. At the Male summit of SAARC 
countries in 1990, agreement was also reached to establish a hotline between the Prime 
Ministers of the two states.

2.7.1.2 Military Visits

Occasionally, Indian and Pakistani military delegations have visited each other to 
 promote better communication between the armed forces.

2.7.1.3 Control of Cross Border Crime

The two countries reached an agreement in 1989 to have biannual meetings 
between the officers of the Indian Border Security Force and Pakistani Rangers to review 
border crimes like drug-trafficking, smuggling, illegal crossings etc. and to promote 
interactions between two para-military forces. With the heightening of internal security 
problems in both India and Pakistan, such measures have gained importance.

2.7.2 Constraint Measures

2.7.2.1 Agreement on Violation of Airspace

The two states reached an agreement in April 1991 not to violate each other’s 
airspace, to give advance notification of air exercises and to follow agreed procedures for 
military flights near the border. This CBM prohibits flying of armed, fixed-wing aircraft
within ten nautical miles of the international border, armed rotary aircraft within one nautical mile, and any other kind of aircraft within one thousand meters of the border. It also requires India and Pakistan to notify each other about air exercises or special air activity in the Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ).32

2.7.2.2 Prohibition of Chemical Weapons

India and Pakistan have also reached an agreement in August 1992 to prohibit chemical weapons from the region. India is also a signatory to the Chemical Weapons Convention.

2.7.3 Transparency Measures

2.7.3.1 Non-Attack on Nuclear Installations

An informal understanding on not attacking each other's nuclear installations was reached between Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi and President Zia-ul-Haq in 1985. This was a very significant step since the nuclear preparations of both India and Pakistan were a well-established fact by then, and the associated risk (and even suggestions from some responsible quarters) of a pre-emptive strike on each other's nuclear plants was quite high. A preemptive attack on Iraq's Osirak nuclear plant by Israel added to the perception of risk. The understanding between Rajiv Gandhi and Zia-ul-Haq helped to allay fears of such an attack. However, a formal agreement in this regard was reached between the two Prime Ministers Rajiv Gandhi and Benazir Bhutto when the former visited Islamabad in 1988 for the SAARC summit.

The agreement committed India and Pakistan not to undertake, encourage or participate in any action aimed at causing the destruction of, or damage to, any nuclear...
installation or facility in the other country. The agreement requires an annual exchange of
lists detailing the location of all nuclear-related facilities in each country. The measure
further pledges both sides not to attack the facilities so listed.

2.7.3.2 Advance Notification of Military Exercises

The two states agreed to provide advance notification of certain levels of military
exercises to avoid accidental war or a conflict resulting out of misinformation and
misperception. Pakistan suggested to India after the 1990 military crisis such an
agreement to avoid recurrence of a similar situation. It took nearly one year for India and
Pakistan to conclude an agreement on this issue in 1991. The agreement clearly specifies
the areas covered, the type of military exercises to be notified, the period before which
this notice has to be sent etc. It also provides details about the notification of troops
movement on internal duties.

This confidence building measure binds India and Pakistan to make prior
declarations of major exercises by land, naval and air forces. Information in detail
regarding these exercises and force deployments must be provided within the specified
time frame. Notification is required for exercises comprising two or more divisions in
specified locations. Notification is required for any exercises involving division level or
above near the Line of Control in Kashmir. Troop maneuvers directed toward the
international border are also prohibited. No military activity is permitted within five
kilometers of the international border.

2.7.3.3 Advance Notification of Ballistic Missile Tests

In 1999, India and Pakistan also agreed to notify each other on the ballistic
missile tests they are conducting.
2.7.4 Non-military and Goodwill Measures

Though India and Pakistan have not completely excluded or ignored non-military and goodwill measures, the security threats and political tensions of the 1990s motivated them to shown greater enthusiasm for military-related CBMs than for non-military measures. Among the few CBMs at economic and cultural level, granting of Most Favoured Nation (MFN) status to Pakistan by India in 1993 is particularly relevant. The two states also agreed in August 1992 to follow a “Code of Conduct for Treatment of Diplomatic/Consular Personnel Pakistan and India”.

Perhaps the biggest goodwill CBM of the recent times was the journey by the Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee to Lahore by the newly commissioned Delhi-Lahore bus service in February 1999 and a formal visit at Minar-e-Pakistan where the resolution demanding Pakistan was passed by the Muslim League in 1940. This visit not only signified India’s desire to walk the extra mile for mending fences with Pakistan, but also its interest in its well-being. The Lahore declaration was free from any negative or approving references to past animosities. Unfortunately, the spirit of the rousing words spoken by Vajpayee and his counterpart Nawaz Sharif at Lahore and the hopes of and India-Pakistan rapprochement they generated were soon shattered by the sounds of gunshots and killing of each other by the two armies on the heights of the Kargil sector in the middle of the 1999.

Prior to the Agra summit in July 2001, India also announced many unilateral goodwill measures like the relaxation visa norms for Pakistani citizens, release of Pakistani fishermen arrested for entering Indian maritime area and removal of curbs on items imported from Pakistan.
2.8 THE TRACK II DIPLOMACY

The process of confidence building between India and Pakistan during the 1990s was also facilitated a great deal by formal and informal Track II contacts at the non-governmental levels involving strategic thinkers, scholars, retired military officers and former diplomats of the two states.

2.8.1 The Background of the Track II Diplomacy

A former US diplomat Joseph Montville, who coined the term Track II in 1981, has given an extensive definition of Track II diplomacy:

"Track two diplomacy is unofficial, informal interaction between members of adversary groups of nations which aim to develop strategies, influence public opinion, and organize human and material resources in a way that might help resolve their conflicts. It must be understood that track two diplomacy is in no way a substitute for official, formal, 'track one' government-to-government or leader-to-leader relationship. Rather, track two activity is designed to assist official leaders by compensating for the constraints imposed on them by the psychologically understandable need for leaders to be, or at least to be seen to be, strong, wary and indomitable in the face of the enemy....Track two diplomacy is a process designed to assist official leaders to resolve, or, in the first instance, to manage conflicts by exploring possible solutions out of public view and without the requirement to formally negotiate or bargain for advantage."

Ideally, Track I process (or official diplomacy) should be able to solve disputes between nations. However, in an intractable conflict situation, official diplomacy may
prove to be insufficient or even deficient in certain respects as successful conflict management and resolution depends on alteration of perceptions of the participants in a conflict. Such alteration occurs when contacts take place informally. Track II diplomacy is aimed at bringing about such perceptual changes. It is carried out in an unofficial and flexible setting. Since it is unofficial, it is more likely to be accepted by the people of different orientations.

While Track I and Track II processes run parallel, they are not expected to operate in isolation from or contrary to each other. Track II supplements the negotiations that are carried out between government officials and political leaders. Since the discussions in Track II meetings are held in an informal and cooperative setting, they are less constrained by the rigidity, limitations and compulsions underpinning official dialogues. The role of the participants in such meetings is to define the problem, be innovative about possible solutions and exert pressure on the governments through formal or informal means. It is also desirable that the deliberations of such unofficial or supplementary diplomacy are kept away from the glare of publicity and media attention to give certain latitude to the participants to be honest and frank in their ideas.

One of the earliest examples of Track II diplomacy at international level was the 'Pugwash Conferences' between the former officials of the US and the USSR who met at Pugwash, Canada in the early 1950s to discuss issues of conflict between their countries. Later, such meetings became larger with the participation of scientists, military officers and professionals. Another attempt at unofficial diplomacy between the US and the USSR was the Dartmouth conferences, supported by Kettering Foundation and many other foundations, from 1960 onwards and held at Dartmouth, New Hampshire, US.
2.8.2 Track II between India and Pakistan

Alarmed by the drift towards war in South Asia and the possibility of nuclearization, the US facilitated a Track II dialogue process in the 1990s between India and Pakistan to supplement the efforts it was making at the official level for CBMs around the same time. The US had also organized similar dialogues in the Middle East between Arab and Israeli participants. In 1991 an informal discussion between the retired military officials and diplomats of India and Pakistan was organized at Neemrana, a historical fort located in Rajasthan and bordering Delhi, under the auspices of the United States Information Service (USIS). Subsequent meetings in this series of dialogues were held at other places both in India and Pakistan. However, the whole process came to be known as the Neemrana dialogues to symbolize the initiation of non-governmental involvement in India-Pakistan peace process at the fort of Neemrana.

The twelve rounds of Neemrana dialogues were moderated by a former American diplomat Paul Kreisberg, and co-chaired by A.M.Khusro, a former member of the Planning Commission of India. It was hoped that the discussions would prove beneficial in generating new ideas for managing and resolving the India-Pakistan conflict, and that the participants who were influential persons having close contacts with their respective governments, would transmit the problem-solving ideas discussed at such meetings to the policy makers. The Neemrana process was later converted into a traveling seminar by the USIS to involve people living outside Delhi and younger participants.

Apart from the Neemrana dialogues, there have been several other parallel initiatives for a Track II process between India and Pakistan. Navnita Chadha Behera, Paul Evans and Gowher Rizvi have compiled a useful inventory of non-official dialogues in South Asia. The USIS organized some meetings between Indian and Pakistani
journalists and scholars under its Worldnet programme in Islamabad and elsewhere in the early 1990s. The Centre for Policy Research New Delhi also held some meetings between the scholars of India and Pakistan to promote non-official dialogue for regional peace. The Rajiv Gandhi Foundation and the Institute of Defence Studies and Analyses have also sponsored some dialogues between Indian and Pakistani participants – scholars, diplomats as well as military personnel.

The workshops and conference on military and non-military security issues of South Asia organized by the Regional Centre for Strategic Studies, Colombo, have also been an important link in the growing Track II network in South Asia. Such workshops and conferences have come up with alternative agenda of conflict resolution as a result of brainstorming among Indian and Pakistani participants who are security specialists, academics, journalists and professionals. Since such workshops are held in an informal and non-hierarchical setting, they help increase mutual understanding and sensitivity to the viewpoints of the ‘other’ side.
ENDNOTES


Michael Krepon, "CBM Tools", [www.stimson.org](http://www.stimson.org)

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. See the chronology of cooperation between India and Pakistan compiled by Chetan Kumar in Kanti Bajpai et al, *Brasstacks and Beyond: Perception and Management of Crisis in South Asia* (New Delhi: Manohar, 1995).


Ibid., pp. 32-37.


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