In the sixth chapter of the Vedānta Paribhāṣā, the author, Dharmarājādhvarindra tries to establish the sixth means of valid knowledge which is accepted by the Advaita Vedāntin as Anupalabdhi (non-apprehension) from the Vedāntic standpoint and as such very often deals with the refutation of other systems of philosophy like the Nyāya etc. In the Nyāya philosophy, Jayanta Bhaṭṭa refers only to the views of Bhāṭṭas, the Prābhākaras and Buddhists and comes to the conclusion that though Anupalabdhi or Abhāva (Non-Apprehension or Negation) is a reality, Anupalabdhi is not a distinct way of knowing. The Advaita Vedāntins accept Anupalabdhi as a distinct source of knowledge.

'In Indian Philosophy, Abhāva (negation) has been discussed in two forms, viz., as an ontological reality and as a way of knowing. In the first form it is mentioned by such words as asat, aṅka, nirūpākhya, niḥsvabhāva, etc., and in the second form it is referred to as Anupalabdhi. A general epistemological notion of the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas regarding negation is that there is some
reality known as Abhāva and there is a way ascertaining it which is known as Anupalabdhi. Here we are primarily concerned with the problem of Abhāva as a means of knowledge.\footnote{1. vide ITK., p.272}

The Advaita Vedāntins and the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas accept Anupalabdhi (Non-Apprehension) as an independent source of knowledge. They hold the view that the absence of an object or its attribute from a locus is known only through the means known as non-apprehension, i.e., 'anupalabdhi' but not by any other means of knowledge like Perception. The non-existence of a thing is apprehended by its non-perception. Non-apprehension of a thing is a means to the apprehension of its non-existence. In this context, the term non-apprehension stands for non-perception.

Different theories of Anupalabdhi are found in oriental epistemology. Some systems deny Anupalabdhi as an additional pramāṇa. There is a difference of opinion between the Naiyāyika and the Vaiśeṣika about the method of cognizing this pramāṇa. The Naiyāyikas maintain that Abhāva is an object of perception (pratyakṣa); on the other hand, in the opinion of the Vaiśeṣikas it is cognized through inference (anumāna). The Naiyāyikas hold that
non-existence of a pot on the ground is not identical with the bare ground, it is rather adjectival to it. Abhāva is the character of the ground and it is perceived in the same ways in which the colour, size, etc., of the ground are perceived with the perception of the ground. To avoid these difficulties, the Naiyāyikas have assumed special type of contact between the sense and Abhāva which they call Viśeṣaṇa-viśeṣya-bhāva. The Naiyāyikas who hold that Abhāva is a reality but it can be cognized through perception and that there is no need of accepting Anupalabdhi as an additional pramāṇa.

The Prābhākaras do not admit Anupalabdhī as a separate pramāṇa. They maintain that though it has no objective reality, it is capable of being cognized through perception. According to Prābhākaras, the non-existence of an object is not different from its actual locus, that it is to say that the absence of a pot on the floor is not different from the floor itself. The knowledge of the sustainer by itself (tanmātradhi) is what replies to Negation. There is no distinctive category to be named as non-existence², hence

2. pramāṇam khalu kasyāpi prameyasyāvabodhakam/
   tatrābhāvasya kim tāvat prameyam iti cintyatāṁ//
   meyābhāve tato mānam abhāvākhyam katham bhavet/
   PP., pp.12,14
there requires no extra-sixth pramāṇa termed Abhāva.

The Sāmkhya view is identical with that of the Prābhākara Mīmāṁsakas. The Yoga also does not accept Anupalabdhī as a distinct means on the same grounds on which the Sāmkhya reject it. The Sāmkhyas maintain that the non-existence of a jar on the ground is nothing but the ground that is devoid of any content and the bare ground is nothing but the ground itself. Thus, the cognition of the non-existence of the jar on the ground is the cognition of the ground. Hence, the Sāmkhyas conclude that the non-existence of the jar on the ground can be cognized through perception.

According to the Buddhists, Anupalabdhī is a kind of either perception or inference, but not an independent means of knowledge. They hold that non-existence is directly perceived by the sense organs and no separate source of knowledge is required to apprehend it. The knowledge, there is no pot on the ground means the apprehension of the ground with the absence of the pot. Therefore, the ground and the absence of the pot is perceived through the sense organs. Thus the Buddhists agree that the negative facts are real, as the Bhāṭṭā Mīmāṁsakas and the Naiyāyikas do, but unlike the former, they do not believe in Negation as an additional source, as it is directly perceive by the
external sense organs.

Kumarila Bhaṭṭa speaks of Anupalabdhī as nothing but the absence of the five previously stated pramāṇas. That is to say that, in a case where the pramāṇas like Pratyakṣa fail to operate efficiently in bringing about the knowledge of the existence of an object, we have the idea of the non-existence of an object and the means is called Anupalabdhī (non-apprehension). Kumarila analysis the metaphysical as well as the epistemological aspects and is largely responsible for formulating the theory of Anupalabdhī as a distinct way of knowing. The basis of Bhaṭṭa’s theory is that in the case of an object where other pramāṇa do not function towards the comprehension of its existence, we have Anupalabdhī as the only means of cognition. The ascertainment of the non-existence of an object depends on the validity of negation as a way of knowing. The Bhaṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas believe that every object has two forms: one of existence and the other of non-existence. The Bhaṭṭa’s hold that existence and non-existence cannot by any means be reduced to non-existence and exist-

3. pramāṇapañcakābhāvoanupalabdhīḥ. pramāṇapañcakam yatra vasturūpeṇa na jāyate. vastu salvāvabo dhārtha tatrābhāvapramāṇatā. ŚV., p.409
4. SWK., p.160
ence respectively. When a pot has existence in a room, it can be
cognized by means of perception or by some other pramāṇa and
when no such means yield any knowledge of the object, the ob-
ject is judged by the very absence of knowledge Anupalabdhi.

Dharmarājādhyāntika defines Anupalabdhi (non-apprehen-
sion) in his Vedānta Paribhāṣā as: The means of valid knowl-
edge known as non-apprehension is the extraordinary cause of
that apprehension of non-existence which is not due to knowl-
edge as an instrument. In this definition, the clause 'which is not
due' etc. is inserted to preclude the definition from unduly ex-
tending to an Anumāna (inference) or the like which causes that
apprehension of the non-existence of imperceptible objects which
is due to Anumāna etc. The word 'extraordinary' is used to pre-
vent a too wide extension to such general causes as merit and
demerit. The qualifying term 'apprehension' is for precluding a
similar unwarranted extension to latent impressions, which are
the extraordinary cause of a recollection of non-existence. That
is to say the simple word 'jnāna' has been used in the definition
since (abhāvāsmṛti) recollection of non-existence which has got
'saṁskāra' for its efficient cause will have to be considered as

5. jñānakaranaṁjanyābhāvānubhavāsādharaṇakārṇam
anupalabdhirūpam pramāṇam. VP., p.125
Anupalabdhi. Anupalabdhi or Abhāva is the means through which we come acquire knowledge about the non-existent. It is remarkable that the Vedānta recognizes Abhāva as a ‘bhāvapadārtha’, as Abhāva does not mean a ‘void’. Actually we know non-existence by non apprehension. For example, we perceive the locus of ground (adhikaraṇa) of a jar, when the jar is removed from its locus, we perceive the locus (adhikaraṇa) of the non-existence (abhāva) of the jar, and not the non-existence itself. Anupalabdhi enables us to know the non-existence of a particular cognition.

As Citsukha states⁶, Anupalabdhi pramāṇa itself is to be cognised by another Anupalabdhi and so on ad infinitum. He also clarifies that if ‘anupalambha’ by itself is the cause of a knowledge of the non-existence even in deep sleep there should be a knowledge of non-existence. In order to avoid this contingency if we include the phrase ‘yogya’ as an epithet of Anupalabdhi, it does not save the situation for from ‘yogyānupalabdhi’, it must be stated the knowledge of non-existence is produced as fire from smoke. A second valid objection raised by Citsukha is that Anupalabdhi cannot be an efficient means of valid knowledge because its intermediate activity is not stated: neither the recollection of the counterpositive (pratiyogī-smarāṇa) nor cognition

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⁶. TPD., p.435
of its locus (adhikaraṇa-grahaṇaṁ) cannot be considered to be its 'vyāpara', and hence cannot be generated from 'anupalambha', a negative object.

In this context, a question naturally arises whether Anupalabdhi is a separate pramāṇa. According to the Naiyāyikas non-existence is cognised only with the help of the sense organ and comes under the scope of Pratyakṣa. They hold that where Anupalabdhi is not cognised the cause it is a case of Pratyakṣa where it is cognised, it is a case of Anumāṇa.

The author of the Vedānta Paribhāṣā holds along with the other theorists that competent, i.e. 'yogya-anupalabdhi' non-cognition is the efficient means. Here a interesting question has been raised by the author as to the formation of the term 'yogya-anupalabdhi'-whether this term is a : (a) genitive compound, cf. 'yogyasya anupalabdhiḥ' of the non-cognition of the competent or (b) locative compound, cf. 'yogye(adhikaraṇe) anupalabdhiḥ'. Our author is of the view neither of these alternatives serves the purpose for, on the first alternative there is the contingency of the difference from the demon existing in the post (stambha) becoming non-perceptual. Nor is the second alternative valid since

7. yogyasya pratiyogino anupalbdhiḥ? VP., p.126
there is the unwelcome contingency of the negation of merit (dharmabhāva) etc. existing in the soul becoming perceptual. In this way, Dharmarāja scores out the possibility of either the genitive compound or the locative compound and resorts to the karmadhārāya\(^9\) compound when he speaks of ‘yogyānupalabdhī’. The idea is that the means of valid cognition of non-existence is only a competent non-cognition (‘yogyānupalabdhī’ but not any ‘anupalabdhī’). So much so a definition of ‘yogyatā’ in the ‘anupalabdhī’ concerned has to be carefully defined. The Paribhāṣākāra accepts the Naiyāyika definition of ‘yogyatā’ of ‘anupalabdhī’ as: ‘being possessed of a cognition of a counterpositive which has been imposed by the existence of the posited countepositive’\(^10\).

The idea is that when we apprehend the non-existence of the pot, there is the possibility of supposition (āpādana) that the pot would have been perceived had it been on the floor (of course when there is the aid of light etc.) and so there is ‘yogyatā’ present in the ‘anupalabdhī’. As a result of this, the absence of the pot is

\[9. \text{yogyā cāśāvanupalabdhīḥ ceti. } \text{ibid., p.127}\]

\[10. \text{yah pratiyogī tasyasattvenādhikaraṇe tarkitena prā-}
\text{saṃjanayogyamāpādanayaogyam pratiyogyupalab-
\text{dhisvarūpam yasyānupalambhasya tattvam tadan-
\text{upalabdheryogyatvam. } \text{ibid., p.127}\]
cognised. On the other hand, it is not possible to make such a supposition because of the absence of light. Similarly in the non-existence of a demon (piśāca) in the pillar; there is the competent non-cognition and thus the absence of a demon in the post is arrived at by non-cognition. In the case of the absence of merit, and the absence of demerit in the soul, since these two are supersensuous and the concerned supposition is not rendered possible, it cannot be stated the absence of merit and demerit etc. (dharmādhammādyabhāva) is arrived at through non-cognition. Thus the supposition (āpādana) of the cognition of the counterpositive is different in different places, sometimes due to the subject being incompetent (ayogya), sometimes due to the absence of necessary perceptual causes and other reasons.

The Naiyāyika’s view is that the sense organ be taken as the already established means and ‘anupalabdhi’ as its aiding cause (sahakārlkāraṇa). To this the Advaitin replies that, though the presence of the established sense organ is a condition precedent in cognising non-existence, it should not be taken that it is the efficient means even in the case of mental mode in the form of non-existence. The reason ¹¹ given by them is that, since

¹¹. indriyānvayavyatirekayoradhibhikaraṇajñānādyupalaksinatvenānyathāsiddheḥ. ibid., p.130
non-cognition also is an established reason, it is considered by him to be the instrument (karaṇa), for this reason that the sense organ has no contact with the negation; even the activity of the sense organ which the opponent speaks of as inevitable ceases with the perception of the locus of the negation (abhāvādhi-karaṇa) and therefore the sense organ becomes a superfluous, i.e. 'anyathā-siddha'. Anyathā-siddha is an attendant circumstance not to be confounded with a cause, which must be a necessary invariable antecedent, e.g. a potter's father with regard to a jar made by the former.

In this connection, another subtle point has been raised by our author. He states prima facie that the opponent may hold that, as the resulting knowledge of abhāva (e.g. there is no pot on the floor) is a sense percept according to both; it may be argued that consciousness limited by the non-existence of the pot (ghaṭābhāvāvacchinna caitanya) has become non-different from the pramātā as with the consciousness limited by the floor (bhūtalāvacchinna caitanya) and as such knowledge of the absence of the pot (ghaṭābhāvajñāna) should be a case of perception. Dharmarāja finally rejects the view by stating that though

12.nahi phalībhūta jñānasya pratyakṣatve tatkaraṇasya
pratyakṣapramāṇatāniyatatvatvamasti. ibid., p.132
knowledge of abhāva is pratyakṣa there is no rule that its instrument (karaṇa) also should be Pratyakṣa. For example, Dharmarāja quotes the well known instance of ‘dasamastvamasi’(you are the tenth man), where its knowledge though perceptual, its ‘karaṇa’ happens to be Verbal testimony which is different from the means of Perception. It should not be urged that a particular knowledge should result from one particular efficient instrument (karaṇa) only. A different mental mode (vṛtti) is enough to deem something to be a pramāṇa. Thus according to the Paribhāṣākāra, a knowledge of the absence of the jar is not produced from the sense organ as there is no contact but it is produced from the non-cognition of the pot (ghaṭānupalambha) which is a different pramāṇa.

The author raises another question here that, even in the case of non-cognition being a different pramāṇa, since the cognition of non-existence is Pratyakṣa, there is the strange contingency of indescribable non-existence of the jar (anirvacaṇīya ghaṭābhāva), where in a particular spot there is a pot, the invalid knowledge of non-existence of the pot also becomes Pratyakṣa. The objection here states\(^\text{13}\) that this position cannot be accepted

\(^{13}\) tasya māyopādānarakatveabhāvatvānupapatteḥ. ibid., p.134
by the Vedāntin for, if this indescribable non-existence of the pot be considered to be produced from Māyā (cosmic illusion), the efficient cause, it cannot be a non-existence. If it is not produced from Māyā, then there is the contingency that all products are not produced from Māyā which stand the Vedāntin cannot take.

To this Dharmarāja replies here that the invalid knowledge of the absence of pot (ghatābhāva) does not relate to the absence of pot which is produced at that particular moment, but it is a phenomenal non-existence of pot (laukikaghatābhāva) which is superimposed on the floor. In this case, Dharmarāja accepts 'anyathākhyāti' alone and not 'anirvacaniyakhyāti'. This is the case in all places where there is sense contact (sannikarṣa) of the superimposed object¹⁴.

This is a major divergence from the Advaitic point of view. Even accepting that, in such cases, the non-existence of pot etc. is considered 'anirvacaniya' (indescribable), he argues that maya alone is the efficient cause (upadana karana). The author boldly asserts that there is no necessary for entire similarity (sājātya) between the material cause and its products as the threadhood (tantutva) and clothhood (paṭatva). If it is insisted that some

¹⁴. vide ŚM., p.324
similarity should be there then between Māyā and 'anirvacanīya', there is similarity in the form of falsehood\(^{15}\).

In this connection, another doubt is raised. As if the Advaitin accepts the objects of two different classes (jātis) could be material cause (upādāna) and effect (upādeya), then he is forced to accept that Brahman is the material cause of the World. To this doubt, Dharmarāja replies that this is acceptable to him for Brahman can be the upādāna kāraṇa (material cause) of the World, as it is the substratum of the false knowledge of the World. Though he does not accept Brahman to be the material cause by the process of evolution as Brahman has no parts\(^{16}\).

Rāmakṛṣṇa, the author of the commentary Śikhāmaṇi gives ample argument to contradict the Paribhāṣākāra on non-cognition being advocated as a separate\(^{17}\). He raises a question why Anupalabdhi is considered as a separate pramāṇa. According to him, as without a sound obstacle the same sense organ can pro-

\(^{15}\) yatkiṇcitsājātyasya māyayā anirvacanīyaghaṭābhāvasya ca mithyātvadharmasya vidyamānatvāl. 

VP., p.135

\(^{16}\) tathāca prapañcasya pariṇāmyupādānam māyā, na brahma, iti siddhānta ityalamatipras ūṇgena. Op.CII.

\(^{17}\) vide ŚM., p.331
duce a knowledge of non-existence, and hence non-cognition cannot be a separate pramāṇa. On other hand, Amaradāsa, the author of the Maṇiprabhā (the sub-commentary of the Śikhāmaṇi) tries to etablish the author's view in his commentary¹⁸.

Four Kinds of Anupalabdhi or Abhāva:

The Paribhāṣākāra accepts the fourfold division of Abhāva or Anupalabdhi as follows:

(i) Pragabhāva (previous non-existence),
(ii) Pradhvarṇsābhāva (destructional non-existence),
(iii) Atyntābhāva (absolute non-existence),
(iv) Anyonyābhāva (mutual non-existence).

Of these, the absence of an effect (e.g. a jar) in its cause (clay etc.) before the effect is produced, is known as previous non-existence, i.e. Pragabhāva. This is cognised by a statement such as 'there will be a pot'¹⁹. It is the object of a cognition that the thing will come into being. Rāmakṛṣṇa gives a more comprehensive definition of this absence²⁰. Unless this type of ab is accepted the same pot should be produced again again.

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¹⁸. vide MP., p.332
¹⁹. sa ca bhaviṣyatīti pratītiṣayaḥ. VP., p.137
²⁰. kāryasamavaiyakālānyāvṛttitva sati kāryotpatti pūrva-kālīnā bhāvatvam. ŚM., p.325
Pradhvarṣābhāva (destructional non-existence) is the absence of a thing. For example: a pot is cognised by statements like 'the pot is destroyed'. According to the Naiyāyika due to destruction of the 'asamavāyikāraṇa' in an object a thing is destroyed. Dharmarāja is of the opinion that Pradhvarṣābhāva itself a destruction, is destroyed when its locus (kapāla) is destroyed. Here the view of the Naiyāyika is that the absence of an absence is of the form of the counterpositive and as such the Naiyāyika cannot accept destruction in the case of Pradhvarṣābhāva or Dhvarṣābhāva, for, in that case the destroyed pot should be produced again. On the other hand, the Advaitin is of the opinion that even the destruction of the pot should be destroyed since both Pradhvarṣābhāva and Pragabhāva are, as a rule, present in the locus of the counterpositive and thus as the kapāla also becomes the locus of destruction. The idea is that this destruction (of the pot) is destroyed by having no locus when the kapālas are destroyed. It is an established fact in Advaita Vedānta that the destruction of any particular thing produced is nothing but one remaining in the form of its substratum. Similarly, the destruction of silver appearing in a nacre is nothing but Caitanya

21. adhiṣṭhānāvaśeṣo hi nāśaḥ kalpavitavastunāḥ.

VP., p.137
limited by 'this'. As such the Advaitin argues that even the destruction of the destruction of the pot is a destruction whose counterpositive is the pot. If this be not accepted, when the pot which is of the form of the destruction of the previous non-existence should reappear. The author further questions how, when the locus of the destruction happens to be permanent (nitya), the destruction connected with it can be destroyed. To the question he replies that if such a locus be different from consciousness, then it is not 'nitya', for in the Advaitin's opinion all that is different from Brahmān ceases to exist, when Brahmajñāna²² dawns.

That whose non-existence in a particular substratum is for all time---past, present and future---in a place, has Atyantābhāva (absolute non-existence); e.g. there is absolute non-existence of colour in air. The Advaitin accepts this non-existence also as the counterpositive of destruction. The Naiyāyika thinks that Atyantābhāva is nitya. Here the idea is that Atyantābhāva is destroyed at the time of annihilation though it is long standing like ether etc. But our author differs from the Naiyāyika point of view.

Anyonyābhāva (mutual non-existence) popularly called

²².brahmāvyatiriktaśya sarvasya brahmajñānanivart-tyatāyā bakṣyamānatvāt. VP., p.137
'Bheda' (difference) is the object of cognitions, like 'idam idam na' (this is not that). So far he agrees with the Naiyāyika but he differs from him in holding the view that 'vibhāga' (disjunction) and 'prthaktva' (separateness) are not different from Anyonyābhāva whereas the Naiyāyika views that 'vibhāga' and 'prthaktva' are two different 'guṇas' and Anyonyābhāva is a substance coming under the Abhāva category. The Paribhāṣākāra holds that there is no proof to hold that these two are different from Anyonyābhāva. It is all the same whether he says that is different from that or this is other than that etc.

The Advaitin divides Anyonyābhāva (mutual non-existence) or 'Bheda' (difference) into two types, viz., (i) one with a beginning and (ii) the other without a beginning. The examples respectively are (i) the absence of cloth in pot, and (ii) the difference of Brahmān from Jīva. In the view of our author, both these differences are the counterpositives of the destruction. When the nescience (ajñāna) is removed this consequential difference is also removed.

The Advaitin speaks of another division of Anyonyābhāva or 'Bheda' into two varieties, viz., (i) Sopādhika (conditioned) and (ii) Nirupādhika (unconditioned).

\[\text{punarapi bheda dvividhah - sopādhiko nirupādhikaśceti. ibid., p.140}\]
Of these, Sopādhika (conditioned) difference is that the existence of which is the subordinate concomitant, i.e. vyāpya of the existence of its limiting adjunct, i.e. upādhi. As an example of this type is: one and the same ether is differentiated by different limiting adjuncts such as a jar. The one ether on account of the upādhi gets the difference as room-defined ether and pot defined ether. Or as the one Sun is manifold according to different water vessels. Similarly one and the same Brahman appears as different owing to different minds. Nirupādhika (unconditioned) difference is that which has not this kind of existence. An example of this type is the difference of a pot from a pieces of cloth etc. According to the Advaitin, it does not admit a real difference between the two-just as ether limited by pot is not different from the ether limited by the room because both are ether. Thus the World is only superimposed on Brahman, the One without a second. In support of this the author quotes Sureśvarācārya’s Vārtika passages.  

The cognition of the above four kinds of non-existence is through non-apprehension that is possessed of capacity. There-

24. akṣamā bhavataḥ keyam sādhakatvaprakalpane/
   kim na paśyasi samsāram tatraivājñānakalpitam//
Br.U.Vā.,I.IV.1279 as quoted in VP.,p.142
Therefore, Anupalabdhi is a separate pramāṇa. From the above discussion and also from the clear expression in the Vedānta Paribhāṣā, it is explicit that according to the Advaita Vedāntins Anupalabdhi (non-apprehension) or Abhāva (negation) is a separate pramāṇa and is not included in other pramāṇas.

The Paribhāṣākāra concludes the chapter on non-cognition by accepting the ontological category Abhāva in the Advaita Vedānta. After the pramāṇa have been discussed there arises a question whether the knowledge obtained by these pramāṇas is valid intrinsically or extrinsically. The question of the definition of prāṃṇya (validity) also arises. The validity of knowledge generated by the above-discussed pramāṇas originates by itself and is self-evident. The invalidity of knowledge is not due to totality of causes of knowledge in general. It is perhaps keeping in view these status to pramāṇas, Dharmarājādhyāntīndra discusses in brief these points along with the pramāṇa. We have already discussed the validity of knowledge and the Vedānta view on validity in a preceding chapter (cf. chapter two). Therefore, we also just mention here the topic in a nutshell.