The Advaita Vedānta and the Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā establish Arthāpatti (Presumption or Postulation) to be a separate source of valid knowledge as different from Anumāṇa (inference). According to the Naiyāyikas, if we comprise Arthāpatti within Anumāṇa, it is rather rendered into Anumāṇa from circumstances or disjunctive hypothetical syllogism. While the Advaita Vedānta and both the Bhāṭṭa and Prābhākara Mīmāṃsakas accept Arthāpatti (presumption) as an independent source of valid knowledge and do not reduce to any other source; the Naiyāyikas, the Sāṁkhya, the Buddhists and the others object to this view of Arthāpatti as a separate means of valid knowledge.

The word ‘arthāpatti’ goes under various translation as presumption, postulation, supposition, implication and assumption. It is a process of assuming some unknown fact in order to account for a well-known fact which is otherwise inexplicable. Knowledge thus obtained is distinctive, since it is not to be reduce to Pratyakṣa (perception) or Anumāṇa (inference), and it is not of
course, a case of Āgama (verbal authority) or Upamāna (comparison).

‘Arthāpatti’ derivatively means imagination of something in a different way. When something is otherwise unintelligible, the assumption of what will make it intelligible is designed ‘Arthāpatti’. As for instance, ‘there is rain when there are clouds’ is known from the fact that there is no rain when there are no clouds. One may object that this Arthāpatti is invalid because when clouds are present there is no rain. It is not acceptable. The argument in the objection runs from the observation of the coherence of lack of rain with lack of clouds to the conclusion that clouds are necessary but not sufficient condition for rain.

The Naiyāyikas refuse to acknowledge Arthāpatti as a separate pramāṇa. According to the Naiyāyikas, Arthāpatti may be reduced to an Anumāna (of the ‘vyatireki’ type). Those, who hold Arthāpatti to be a form of Anumāna put forth the stock example, i.e., ‘The living Caitra is not present in his house’, in the form of

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\text{arthād āpattirarthāpattih. āpattih prāpatiḥ prasaṅgaḥ yatrābhidihiyamāne`rthe yo`rthaḥ prasajyate so`rth-āpattih. yathā meghesvasatsu vrṣṭir na bhavatīti. kim atra prasajyate? satsu bhavatīti.}
\]

NB., pp. 573-574 (II.2.1)
the following syllogism:

(a) The living Caitra exists outside the house,
(b) because he is living and is not found in the house,
(c) like myself.

Here, 'living Caitra' is the minor term; 'exists outside' is the major term and 'non-existence in the house' is the middle term.

Jayanta Bhaṭṭa, however, holds that Anumāṇa and Arthāpatti are identical; but, he is in favour of reducing Arthāpatti to Anumāṇa. It is not indeed an 'anvayi' type of Anumāṇa in which the major premise expresses a positive relation of agreement in presence between the middle and major term. For example, 'whenever there is fatness, there is eating at night'. On the other hand, it is a 'vyatireki Anumāṇa' in which the major premise expresses a universal relation between the absence of the major and the absence of the middle. As Arthāpatti may in this way be reduce to vyatireki Anumāṇa.

As such, the Sāṁkhyaśas explain Arthāpatti as a form of Anumāṇa. Taking the following example of it, Vācaspati points

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2. vide ITK., p.266
3. śrutārthapattirapi varākī nānumāṇād bhidyate.

 NM., 1-42
out that it can be reduced to Anumāna: if a living individual is absent somewhere, he is present elsewhere; Devadatta who is living is absent from home; so, he is somewhere outside his home. Here, a man’s existence outside his home is inferred from ‘his absence from home’ as the liṅga or the middle term. There is a relation of vyāpti or universal concomitance between a man’s presence somewhere and his absence elsewhere. Therefore, when we know the one from the other we simply infer it from its liṅga or universal concomitant, just as we infer fire from smoke⁴.

However, the Vaiśeṣikas hold that Arthāpatti is Anumāna to which it is contrary, whether based on perception or on verbal authority⁵. The Vaiśeṣikas point out that in either case presumption is a variety of Anumāna, since in one case the reasoning depends on invariable coherence between being alive and not being in the house and being outside the house. The Mīmāṁsakas argue that such knowledge is not Anumāna, for here we have an apparent contradiction in the premise, viz., ‘Caitra is in this world which includes this room too and he is not in this room’. The

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4. evamarthāpattirapi na pramāṇāntaram...yadā khalva-vyāpakaḥ sannekatra nāsti tadānyatṛasti...TK.,p.46
5. darśanārthāḥ arthāpattir virodhyeva śravanād anumi-tānumānam. PB.,p.534
Naiyāyikas and the Vaiśeṣikas object that one part speaks of an undistinguished presence of Caitra while the other part speaks of a distinguished absence of him. In this way there is no contradiction. Hence, it is a case of Anumāna with a negative premise according to them and other opponents also.

The Bhāṭṭas and the Prābhākaras Mīmāṃsakas both regard Arthāpatti as an independent source of valid knowledge, but both the schools differ in the details regarding some aspects, as the nature and the range of Arthāpatti. Both the schools depend upon Śabara’ Bhāṣya regarding this problem. Both the schools interpret it in their own different ways.

Śabara Svāmin defines Arthāpatti as the supposition or presumption of an unperceived object on the ground that a fact already seen or heard cannot be explained without that presumption. For instance, Devadatta who is alive is not found at home, then there arises an assumption that Devadatta is outside the house. Unless this is assumed, the fact of his being alive, stands unexplained.

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6. arthāpattirapi dṛṣṭaḥ śrutovārthonyathā nopapadyate ityarthakaḷpanā yathājīvati devadatte gṛhābhāvadarsanena bahirbhāvasyādṛṣṭasya parikālpanā. ŚB.,1.1.5, p.38
According to the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṁsakas, as a pramāṇa, Arthāpatti consists in the assumption of an unperceived fact in order to explain two apparently inconsistent things⁷. Kumārila Bhaṭṭa, unlike Prabhākara, does not change the sequence of words in Śabara’s definition but elaborates them in his own way. According to Bhaṭṭa, the concept of Arthāpatti lies not in doubt but in mental irreconcilability between two established facts. That inconsistency is removed by the cognition of a third fact and it is this last cognition that settles Arthāpatti. In the previous example, if the man’s existence is doubtful then it is not treated as the basis for the Arthāpatti. If the person’s living is certain then only the Arthāpatti operates. Hence there cannot be any doubt about the life of Devadatta. Only the certainty of his life associated with the cognition of the absence from the house, gives us the Arthāpatti that, he is outside the house. Kumārila illustrates several kinds of Arthāpatti in his Śloka Vārtika⁸.

Prabhākara explains Arthāpatti as follows: We observe some fact and if that fact is to be proved, another thing is to be as-

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7. pramāṇa-śatka-vijñāto yatārtho nānyathā bhavet/
   adṛśtaṁ kalpayed anyam sārthāpattir udāhṛtā//
   ŚV., p.320

8. ibid., p.390
Prabhākara holds that there must be an element of doubt as to the truth of the two inconsistent facts perceived. The element of doubts is removed by the Arthāpatti. This is the fact which distinguishes Arthāpatti from inference. The person Devadatta is alive and his absence from the house is perceived. By this perception, a doubt as to whether the person is alive or not strikes the mind. This doubt will exist till it is assumed that he is outside. Hence his existence outside removes the doubt. This is the function of the presumptive cognition. But this is not acceptable to Kumārila Bhaṭṭa.

According to Advaita Vedānta, Arthāpatti which is to be accomplished is effected through the knowledge which has already been accomplished⁹. It is the assumption of an explanatory fact, i.e., ‘upapādaka’ from a knowledge of the thing to be explained, i.e., ‘upapādyā’. When a given phenomenon in such that we cannot understand it in any way without supposition of other fact, we have to presume this fact by way of explaining the phenomenon. This process of explaining an otherwise, inexplicable phenomenon by the affirmation of explaining fact is

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⁹. upapādyā-jñānenopapādaka-kalpanam arthāpattih. VP., p. 117
Arthāpatti. A stock example that this stoutness of a man who does not eat at day-time is inexplicable unless we assume his eating at night; so, such stoutness is the thing to be explained. And in the absence of eating at night such stoutness is inexplicable; so, eating at night is the explanatory fact.

Dharmarājādhyātindra explains Arthāpatti following the view of the Māmāṁsakas. Arthāpatti is the presumption of a fact to account for an (otherwise) unintelligible fact. A person is known to be stout, though he fasts during the day. Then the stoutness becomes unintelligible without the assumption of his eating at night. Therefore, eating at night makes the fact ‘stoutness’ intelligible. It may be observed here that ‘upapādyajñāna’ should be taken as ‘upapādyajñāna’ only when we consider this point. Otherwise, there will be overlapping on the apperception, i.e. ‘anuvyavasāya’ of the ‘upapādyajñāna’ which is produced from the ‘upapādyajñāna’ itself. According to the Paribhāṣākāra, Arthāpatti does not overlap on the ‘vyatirekyānumāna’ for, the later has been rejected by the Advaitin.

10. rātribhojanena vinā divā abhuñjānasya pīnatvam upapannam, iti tādṛṣṭyam pīnatvam upapādyam; yathā vā rātribhojanasyābhāve tādṛṣṭyapīnatvasyānupapattih; iti rātribhojanam upapādakam. Op.Cit.

11. ibid., pp.117-122
Here Rāmakṛṣṇa, the author of the Śikhāmaṇi with a soft corner for the Naiyāyika’s point of view suggests that, in the alternative of ‘vyatirekyānumāna’ (as stated by the Naiyāyika) being admitted, it is possible to arrive at the ‘anvayavyāptijñāna’ from the ‘vyatirekisahacārijñāna’. Whatever is unintelligible when some other fact is not known, that particular fact is the ‘upapādaka’. In the present example unless eating at night is assumed the fact of being fat in the case of a man who does not eat by day is not intelligible and as such to make the statement intelligible eating at night should be assumed. Here eating at night is the fruit of the presumption and the cognition of what is to be made intelligible ‘stoutness’ is the special cause.

With regard to the (resulting) valid knowledge, viz., the assumption of eating night, the word ‘arthāpatti’ is a compound of the class known as ‘ṣaṣṭhi-tatpuruṣa’, meaning the assumption (āpatti) of a thing (artha). When the result is intended to be stated it should be viewed as a genitive compound\(^\text{12}\) as ‘the assumption of a thing’ (eating at night). Here the meaning of the word ‘āpatti’ is Kalpanā. When the special cause is intended we have to consider it as a compound of Bahuvrīhi\(^\text{13}\), meaning that from which

\(^{12}\) cf. arthasya āpattiḥ kalpanā. (genitive compound).
\(^{13}\) cf. arthasyāpattiḥ yasyāḥ sā.(bahubrīhi compound)
a thing is assumed. Here the word means that by which Kalpanā is made. With the regard to the instrument of the assumption, his the knowledge of stoutness etc., the word is a bahuvrīhi compound, meaning 'that from which a thing is assumed'. Therefore, the word Arthāpati applies both to the result and the instrument.

The Paribhāṣākāra described that this Arthāpati (presumption) is of two types, namely:

1) Dr̥ṣṭārthāpati (presumption from what is seen) and
2) Śrutārthāpati (presumption from what is hand).

The former type of Arthāpati is the assumption of a third fact to explain the apparent incongruity contained in the two perceived facts. Dr̥ṣṭārthāpati can be illustrated from the example of illusory silver. A person first apprehends something else as silver (sic. 'idam rajatam'). Afterwards he denies that it is not silver (sic. 'nedam rajatam'). Discarding the silver, he assumes that the silver appearing as such is false.

The other type of Arthāpati is the assumption of a sense on

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14. rātribhojanakalpanārūpāyāṁ pramitau 'arthasya āpattih' kalpanā iti ṣaṭhisamāsena 'arthāpatti' śabdo vartate.... VP., p. 118

15. sā cārthāpattirdvidhā-dr̥ṣṭārthāpattih śrutārthā pattiśceti. ibid., p.118
account of the unintelligibility in the sense. For instance, in support of his stand Dharmarāja quotes from the Chāndogya Upaniṣad; as it is stated : ‘Taratī śokam ātmavit’\textsuperscript{16}(the knower of the self transcends grief). This is unintelligible since the bonds represented by the word (śoka), ‘grief cannot be thrown out by knowing the self’. Hence the sense of falsehood (of the bond) is to be presumed in order to make it intelligible.

According to our author, the Śrutārthāpatti is again of two types\textsuperscript{17} : (i) Abhidhānānapāpatti (non-intelligibility due to incompleteness of verbal expression) and (ii) Abhihitānapāpatti (that due to the incompleteness of the meaning). Of these, the first case occurs where on hearing part of the sentence, in order to get at the intention of the speaker. The word ‘dvāram’ (door) when uttered does not have any syntactical relation. Therefore we have to supplement the word ‘pidhehi’(shut) in order to make it intelligible ; or as with the words : ‘viśvajitā yajeta’ (one should perform viśvajit sacrifice), the words, one who desires heaven are supplied. This is a Vedic example as the other is a conventional one.

It is an accepted principle with the Mīmāṁsakas\textsuperscript{18}.

\textsuperscript{16} cf. foot note (6) Chā.U., VII.1.3, chapter one
\textsuperscript{17} śrutārthāpattiśca dvidhā-abhidhānānapāpattih abhihitānapāpattiśca. VP., p.120
\textsuperscript{18} vide MS., IV.1.15
The second type of śrutārthāpatti is the Abhihita type which is explained as: When it is stated ‘He, who desires Heaven, should perform Jyotiṣṭoma’, then there is a doubt as to how a momentary sacrificial rite leads one to heaven which is after life. There we have to assume the existence of the unseen, i.e. ‘aprūva’ between the present act and the ultimate result.

The problem of śrutārthāpatti is much more complex than the general theory of arthāpatti. The Nyāya does not accept arthāpatti as a distinct way of knowing and hence the form of arthāpatti is reducible to anumāna. Kumārila Bhaṭṭa enumerates it as one of the two main types of arthāpatti and tries to establish its distinctness not only from other pramāṇa, but from other types of arthāpatti also. Prabhākara does not find any propriety either in assigning an independent role to it or in considering it a distinct variety of arthāpatti. According to Kumārila, the words ‘drṣṭāḥ śrutovā’ refer to two kinds of arthāpatti, but Prabhākara interprets the words as meaning the same thing. ‘Drṣṭāḥ’ means well-known and ‘śrutāḥ’ is another word meaning the same thing in common usage.

Dharmarāja accepts śrutārthāpatti as a distinct type of

19. svargasādhanatvasya kṣaṇikayāgagatatayā avagatasyānupapatyā madhyavartyapūrvarīk kalpyate.

VP., p.121
Arthāpatti but he goes a step further and propounds two sub-varieties of Śrutārthāpatti and in a way makes a reasonable improvement in the theory of Śrutārthāpatti. Thus, Arthāpatti being proved to be a distinct means of valid knowledge, Inference of the negative form is not a variety of inference.

He argues that in the statement: ‘Earth is different from the other elements’ (for it has smell, i.e. ‘gandhavatva’) the knowledge that the possession of smell is impossible without difference from the other things, is the instrument (of presumption). It is assumed that the earth has (i.e. ‘itarabheda’) difference from (other entities like) the earth. He has also pointed out that the apperception (i.e. ‘anuvyavasāya’) in this case is only of the form (‘prthivyāmitarabhedam kalpayāmi’), ‘I am assuming difference (from other things) in the earth’. The point has been well noted by the Paribhāṣākāra that in the absence of inference based on negative concomitance (i.e. vyatirekyanumāna), in the Advaitin’s point of view, it is quite essential to admit Arthāpatti without which falsehood cannot be established in the case of silver (rajata)²¹

²⁰ ata evānuvyavasāyaḥ prthivyāmitarabhedam kalpayāmi. ibid., p.123
²¹ rajatasya sadbhinnatvam satyatvātyantābhāvavattvam vā mithyātvam kalpayati. ibid., p.118
etc. in Invalid knowledge.

The Vedāntins hold that even if we arrive at the conclusion of an Anumāṇa through Arthāpatti, we have depend for our data on a previous Anumāṇa. So, Anumāṇa cannot be reduced to Arthāpatti. Our author, however, seems to hold that ‘vyatirekyanumāṇa’ is reducible to Arthāpatti and here, at this point, there is a face-to-face conflict between Dharmarājādhrvīndra and Jayanta Bhaṭṭa in particular and the Vedānta and Nyāya in general. The Nyāya does not regard Arthāpatti as a distinct means of valid knowledge. Jayanta, however, holds that Anumāṇa and Arthāpatti are identical; but, he is in favour of reducing Arthāpatti to Anumāṇa. It is not indeed an ‘anvayi’ type of Anumāṇa in which the major premise expresses a positive relation of agreement in presence between the middle and major term.

The Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṁsakas try to establish the distinctiveness of Arthāpatti. Pārthsārathi holds that Anumāṇa would have been reduced to Arthāpatti if by some means other than Anumāṇa it could be understood that all places having smoke have fire. Whereas the fact is that it is only the minor term wherein the association of smoke with fire has been perceived and not in all places. Moreover, in

\[ \text{na ceyamarthāpattiranumāṇeantarbhavitumarhati, anvayavyaptyajñānenānvayinyanantarbhāvāt. ibid., p.122} \]
Anumāna, concomitance is a major factor but in Arthāpatti the emphasis is on apparent contradiction. The Mīmāṃsakas frequently use Arthāpatti for explaining the Vedic texts by presuming missing words and meanings without which the Vedic texts cannot be correctly understood. They also base their beliefs on Arthāpatti in such cases as survival of the self after death.

The Advaita Vedānta regard Arthāpatti as a separate pramāṇa, because in their opinion it provides us with the knowledge of facts which cannot be explained otherwise. The Advaitins hold Arthāpatti useful for explaining the Vedānta texts. For instance, the Upaniṣads sometimes speak of the creation of the world by Brahman and out of Brahman, but sometimes teach that there is no multiplicity and hold that Brahman is the only reality. This conflict is resolved by supposing that creation is not a real transformation (i.e., pariṇāma) of Brahman, but only an apparent change (i.e., vivarta) like the appearance of a rope as a snake. The supposition of māyā as the power of Brahman to create and apparent world is a kind of Arthāpatti.

Dharmarājādhyāṅkīndra, a versatile scholar both in the Nyāya and the Vedānta system, try to establish the distinctiveness of Arthāpatti pramāṇa in the ‘Arthāpattipariccheda’ of his unique work, the Vedānta Paribhāṣā.