CHAPTER SIX

Āgama or Śabda Pramāṇa (Verbal Testimony)

To the Advaitin, as to some other philosophers, Āgama or Śabdapramāṇa is a very potent source of valid knowledge. Among the six pramāṇas or means of knowledge traditionally accepted by the Bhaṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas, the priority in terms of inference is clearly with verbal testimony (Āgama or Śabda), which, for the Advaitins, mainly means śruti, i.e. scripture. Dharmarājādhvarīndra in his philosophic manual the Vedānta Paribhāṣā of Advaita treat Āgama or Śabda (verbal testimony) as the most important source of valid knowledge.

The sentences we have heard or read are nearly infinite in number, and many of them would require years of investigation before their validity would be ascertained. Therefore, we take on authority the vast majority of the claims to validity that comes in our way, otherwise our empirical usages are not possible. Such is the case with scripture (śruti). Either in common parlance or the Vedic sentence, every assertion we make must be in some way testable. The knowledge arising out of the empirical and the
Vedic sentences must make some difference to our perceptual and inferential ones. In this way, we are led into another criterion or means of knowledge which is called Śabda (Verbal testimony or Verbal authority).

Śabda or Āgama (Verbal testimony or Verbal authority) has been accepted as an independent source of knowledge by all Indian philosophical schools except the Cārvāka, the Buddhist and the Vaiśeṣika. The Cārvāka refutes the validity of Śabda (verbal testimony), since they are opposed to believe anything on others' statement because, in that case, the Cārvākas think that they would have to believe the utterances of any fool. Even if the authority is restricted to the statement of a reliable person, it would be, in their opinion, at the most included Anumāna which also they do not accept on account of the fault of regressus as infinitum in the evidence that the logicians propose for the ascertaining of concomitance.

The Buddhists opine that Śabda may be accepted as an independent means of knowledge if it agrees with the external object without any other relation. They reduce Śabda to Anumāna if it is based upon the statement of a reliable person and to Pratyakṣa if it is used to prove that there are actual facts corresponding to a statement.
The Vaiśeṣikas reject Śabda as a distinct means of knowledge on the ground that it is nothing but Anumāna since in both the cases one has to know an unperceived object from the Pratyakṣa of some related object.

Gautama defines Śabda, the fourth means in the Naiyāyikas' list, as the assertion of a trustworthy person. According to him, Śabda is the 'upadeśa' (instruction) of an 'āpta' (reliable person). The authority is not restricted to noble men, so the meaning of the sentence is grasped by the authority. Here the validity of the knowledge derived from this depends upon mainly the reliability of the person concerned. Any statement made by a person is liable to error and as such a human utterance cannot be relied upon as legitimate testimony. On the other hand, the Naiyāyika believes that Vedic Testimony is valid inasmuch as it is uttered by the omniscient (sarvajña) and therefore in it there can be no error. The Sāṅkhyaśas hold the same opinion as the Naiyāyika.

The Mīmāṃsaka view is that 'bhrama' and 'pramāda' etc. are possibilities of human utterence, and hence Mīmāṃsaka argues that the Testimony of a being other than a human being is valid. Kumārila Bhaṭṭa rejects the Nyāya view and defines Ver-

1. āptopadeśeḥ śabdaḥ. NS., I.1.7
Testimony as a statement which produces in the mind of the hearer, who knows the meaning of words, a knowledge of facts that lie beyond the range of his perception. They state that it is the verbal knowledge which is brought about from the known words through the operation of the meaning of the words. The instrument of such a knowledge is named as verbal testimony or merely testimony or authority in philosophical term and therefore the verbal knowledge is an indirect one. It is explained by Pārthasārathy Miśra as the knowledge obtained through the statement depending on the meaning of the words, and this knowledge must be a new one.

The Prābhākaras, like the Vaiśeṣikas, believe that the statement of a non-Vedic authority produces knowledge through inference based upon the reliability of the authority. Verbal Testimony is of two types, viz. (i) personal or human, i.e. the knowledge arising from the words of a reliable person and (ii) impersonal or transhuman, i.e. the knowledge arising from words of

2. śāstram (= śabdam jñānam ) śabda-vijñānānāt
   asannikṛṣṭetarthe vijñānam. MMB., p.12 (1.1.5 )

3. vijñātācchabdāt padarthabhidhānadvāreṇa yadvā
tyārthavijñānam tacchabdam nāma pramāṇam.
   SD., p.51
impersonal origin (apauruṣeya). The Prābhākaras accept only the validity of impersonal or transhuman authority but not human because there is possibility of infinite defect in human authority.

The Advaita Vedānta gives an independent status to Śabda (verbal testimony) pramāṇa. Though the Paribhāṣākāra does not state this verbatim, he treat Āgama(Śabda) as the most important pramāṇa. Now let us observe how our author is interested in establishing a separate Śabdapramāṇa. In the final view of the Advaitin, even the entire holy text comes under the domain of unreality since Brahman is the only real existent for them. Then how could it be that he favours Verbal Testimony as a means of valid knowledge.

Dharmarājādhvarīndra defines Śabda (verbal testimony) in the ‘Āgamapariccheda’ of his Vedānta Paribhāṣā as follows :-

‘That sentence is a means of valid knowledge whose syntactical connection is arrived at by its import and which is not stultified by another means of valid knowledge’

In this definition, the word ‘abādhitā’ or ‘na bādhyate’ (not

4. yasya vākyasya tātparyyāvishayībhūtasamsargom
   mānāntarēṇa nabādhyate tadvākyam pramāṇam.
   VP. p.86.
stultified) is used to avoid overlapping of the definition in case of sentence like 'vahnīnā sīṃcāti' (he drenches with fire) where fire (vahni) is stultified as the cause of drenching (sīṃcāti). The word 'tātparyāviṣayābūta' has been used in the definition in order to avoid inapplicability in the case of sentences like 'Prajāpati has taken out his own omentum' (c.f. 'sa prajāpatiratmano vāpāmudakhidat') where there is stultification even the 'vyāvahārika' (conventional) level. Here in order to avoid this stultification of Prajāpati taking out his own omentum it has to be explained in accordance with the 'tātparyāviṣayābūta saṃsarga' (the relation that is the object of import) by stating that the taking out of the omentum of 'yajamāna' in the holy text has its import in taking out of the momentum of the 'tuvara' (a cow without horns) animal which is possible to be removed by the sacrificer.

In the definition, the word 'by another means' (mānāntara) has been used as an adjective of relation (c.f. 'saṃsarga') since, otherwise the syntactical connection of sentences like 'jyotistomena svargakāma' etc. would be stultified (bādhita) by sentences like 'neha nānasti kiṃcana'. Here it may not be questioned how then the syntactical connection between 'yāga' and 'svarga' is not stultified by sentences which speak of the reality of one su-

5. vide EVPD., pp.57-58
preme Brahman, for, the author replies that 'by another means' in the definition means only one of its own kind. That is to say a sentence giving a meaning at the vyāvahārika level etc. If it is stultified by a sentence at the pāramārthika level it does not matter, e.g. in the above objection the (sādhyasādhanabhāva) nature of probandum and probans between the sacrifice and Heaven (svarga) at the conventional level is stultified only by a sentence at the absolute level which speaks of the truth of one Brahman but not by an another means of the same type (sajātiya pramāṇāntara) at the conventional level (vyāvahārika) level.

The author of the Vedānta Paribhāṣā then states that the knowledge arising from a sentence has four causes, namely,(i) Ākāṅkṣā(expectancy), (ii) Yogyatā (compatibility or consistency), (iii) Āsatti (proximity or contiguity) and (iv) Tātparya (import or purport or intention). The Advaitin refutes the theory of the Vaiśeṣika by arguing that these four causes are the necessary antecedents of a knowledge of sentence-meaning, i.e. 'vākyārthajñāna'. Here Dharmarāja probably intends to say that these four causes of 'śābdabodha' distinguish Śabda (verbal testimony) from inferential knowledge. Because these causes are not present in the case of inference(anumāna).

6. vide SM., p.241
Dharmarājādhvarīndra now tries to define the four causes of the knowledge of sentence-meaning (vākyārthajñāna) in detail. According to him by ‘Ākāṁkṣā’ (expectancy) is meant the competence of being the object, for a mutual knowledge of the desire for the objects signified by the words. The word ‘yogyatva’ has been used by Dharmarāja in the definition in order to make it applicable even in the case of a person who has no desire to know. Though there is no desire on the part of the listener, still there is the competency in such syntactically connected words and that is what is called Ākāṁkṣā. He speaks of the ‘avacchedaka’ (determinant) of ‘yogyatā’ mentioned above without which it is incomprehensible. The determinant of such a competence is ‘kriyātvam’ (action) ‘kārakatvam’, ‘itikartavyatātvam’; etc. and it is also because of this expectancy of the determinant that there is no overlapping on statements like ‘Gauḥ’ ‘Asvah’ etc. In these cases since after ‘Gau’, there is no agreement with action, i.e. kriyā, the definition of Ākāṁkṣā does not apply here and therefore there is no overlapping in these cases. In cases of sentences like ‘Tattvamasi’, where there is relation by identity, there is no overlapping since in apposition (abhedānvaya) 

7. padārthānāṁ parasparajñāsāviśayatvayogyatvam ākāṁkṣā. VP., p.86
determinance of competence (yogyatvāvacchedaka) is 'being signified by a word having a same case ending'. So our author accepts the fact of 'being signified by words having the same case ending' also as the determinant of 'yogyatā'. In support of his arguments Dharmarāja tries to show that the Naiyāyika definitions of Ākāṅkṣā are not acceptable to him.

The Paribhāṣākāra agrees with the Mīmāṃsakas that it is not the words that have Ākāṅkṣā but the objects denoted by the words. Here in the light of his knowledge of Mīmāṃsāśāstra, the author discusses in detail the Vedic sentence 'Vaiśvadevyāmikṣā', 'vājibhyo vājinam' (those curds belong to the 'Vaiśvadevas' and the whey is for the vājins) where he argues that the Vaiśvadeva sacrifice is not connected syntactically with 'vājina'. In the first part of the sentence the word 'Vaiśvadevi' is a 'taddhita' and by 'Sruti pramāṇa' it argues with 'āmikṣā' and becomes a simple sentence. But in the next part the word 'vājibhyah' is in the dative case and here in the case of dative the agreement in a single sentence is with 'vājina' and of these two the 'Sruti' and the 'vākya', there is controversy, and 'Sruti' gains precedence over vākya and hence the āmikṣā vākya fits in with the 'Viśvadeva' deities but not with 'vājina'.

The second condition of the combination of words in a statement is their mutual or semantical fitness, in short, 'Yogyatā' (compatibility or consistency). Dharmarāja defines 'Yogyatā' as non-contradiction of the relation (between one thing and another signified by two words) that is intended. In a sentence like 'vahninā siṅcatī' (he drenches with fire) there is stultification since fire is not an implement in drenching.

'Āsatti' (contiguity) is the third condition of Verbal testimony. The author defines 'Āsatti' as: contiguity is the apprehension (recollection by association), without an interval, of the meanings (the things signified by them) of words that is produced by those words. The word 'produced by these words' is inserted in order to exclude objects secured by pratyakṣa etc. and for the same reason he accepts that in cases like 'pidhehi' (shut/close) the particular word 'dvāram' (door) etc. (but not the object door) that is to be supplied. In this regard he agrees with the Naiyāyika who holds the same view. If the word is not supplied then the meaning of the sentence cannot come under the scope of

9. yogyā tātparyaviṣayībhūtāsamsargābādhaḥ. VP., p.90

10. āsattiścāvyavadhānena padajanyapadārthopas thitiḥ. ibid., p.91
'śābdabodha'. So the Naiyāyika accepts that the word should be supplied. The Mīmāṁsakas are, however, of the opinion that it is enough that the meaning is supplied. In support of his argument Dharmarājādharindra states that in the variant sacrifices when 'sūryāya juṣṭam nirvāpami' is to be sacrificed he supplies the word 'suryāya' ('for the Sun') in the case of 'sūryāya juṣṭam' on the lines of 'to agni' (agnaye), 'I offer these so as to please him'. Thus in the 'vikṛti' in, the place of 'Agni', with the help of 'uha' the word 'Sūrya' is to be used.

The Paribhāṣākāra along with some later Naiyāyikas and pseudo-Mīmāṁsakas adds a fourth requirement, that a string of words must be uttered with intent to communicate a proposition and that it is the nature of this intention or purport, i.e. 'Tātparya' which unequivocally identifies the meanings of the constituent words. Dharmarāja states that 'Tātparya' is the capacity to produce cognition of a particular thing. As for example, the sentence, 'gehe ghaṭaḥ' (there is a jar in the house), is capable of producing a cognition of the relation of a jar, and not that of a cloth, to the house. Therefore, that sentence is said to mean the relation of a jar, and that of a cloth. Thus he defines 'Tātparya' by modifying the statement of the Naiyāyika. He criticises their stand

11. tatpratītijananayogyatvam tātparyam. ibid.,p.106
point that ‘Tātparya’ is meant being pronounced, with the desire of producing a particular knowledge. Here, the idea is that a person who has no knowledge of meaning also pronounces words (like the Vedic words) but we find that there is meaning comprehended, though the man who utters the word does not know the meaning. Since there is the knowledge that the meaning is not understood by the pronouncer even ‘tātparyabhrama’ cannot be said to be present. Nor can it be urged that the knowledge of import of God is responsible for ‘tātparya’, for even one who does not accept God gets at the meaning of the sentence.

He raises an objection that in case of words having more than one meaning, there is possibility of the other meaning relevant, e.g. ‘saindhavamānaya’ (bring the saindhava). In Sanskrit ‘saindhava’ means salt or horse. Saindhava is a product of Sindhu which, among other things, means a sea as also the territory called Sindh; so the word means both salt and a species of horse. It is possible to read the meaning even horse to be brought at the time of eating since there is potentiality by its own nature (‘svaruayogatā’) for the word (in that sense). The understanding of a statement depends upon the understanding of its intended meaning. Our author cleverly meets this objection by add-

12. tatpratītīcchayoccaritatvamāntātparyam. TSD., p.330
ing another phrase in the definition 'while not being pronounced with the desire of producing a different knowledge'. At present, there is no 'avyapti' for this definition in a sentence uttered by a person who does not know its meaning or in the word uttered by a parrot since the word 'Tatpratītīcchā' has been avoided. Dharmarāja raises another objection that in sentence where a knowledge of two things is desired to be expressed in a sentence there is 'avyāpti', since here, the idea is that the phrase used in the definition, signifies not being uttered with the desire of producing only one knowledge which is different from that. Next an essential issue is raised by our author regarding whether 'tātparya' is one of the causes of 'śābdabodha' at all. This has arisen on account of a fact that in the fourth 'varṇaka'(chapter), the Vivaraṇakāra,i.e.Prakāśātman has rejected the view that 'tātparya' is a cause of 'śābdabodha'. Therefore, the Paribhāṣākāra explains the refutation of Intention or Purport (by Prakāśātman) as defined by the Naiyāyika.

Dharmarāja also gives some other views that the refutation in the Vivaraṇagrantha aims only at refuting the knowledge of import as a cause of 'śābdabodha' itself. In case of the under-

13. taditarpititichchayānuccaritatvasyāpi tātparyam. 
VP., p.107
standing the hymns of the Vedas, we are to take the assistance of the logical rules of interpretation systematised by the Mīmāṁsakas\textsuperscript{14}. On this view a knowledge of ‘tātparya’ is a cause of ‘śābdabodha’ viśeṣa consequent on a doubt about the ‘tātparya’ or an illusion about the ‘tātparya’. In such cases only they hold that ‘tātparyajñāna’ is a hetu. This ‘tātparya’ is ascertained with the help of maxims enunciated by the Mīmāṁsaka on the other hand, in daily life it is done with the help of ‘prakaraṇa’ (context) etc. The difference is that sentences spoken are simply translations of what is already known through other means of valid knowledge, but in the Holy text the meaning is something novel but not a mere translation. Context is the accumulation of the text or the subject. Then an important question raised by the Paribhāṣākāra is whether injunctive sentence (cf.‘kāryaparāṇī vākyāni’) alone are valid, since they produce ‘vyuṭpatti’ or whether assertive sentences (cf.‘siddhāparavākyas’) also are valid though they do not help activity. Our author is of the opinion that even ‘siddhāparavākyas’ have a valid import. He agrees with the Bhaṭṭa Mīmāṁsaka view that assertive sentence have an import of their own. As a matter of fact, we find that the statement : ‘putraste

\textsuperscript{14}tacca tātparyam vedemīmāṁsāpariśodhitanyāyād evāvadhāryate. loke tu prakaraṇādinā. ibid., p.111
jātaḥ’ (a son is born to you) definitely produces some import; otherwise, we cannot account for the bloom in the face of the father, Caitra on hearing the birth of the child. Hence Vedāntic sentences like ‘Tattvamasi’ and others prove the import in Brahman.

The next question is whether the Holy text is eternal or not. According to the Naiyāyikas, the Holy text, i.e. the Vedas are means of valid knowledge because they are produced by God, who is eternal and omniscient. According to the Mīmāṁsakas the Vedas are means of valid knowledge because they are eternal and as such free from all human error. In our author’s view, however, the Vedas are not eternal, for they have an origin, which is proved by such Śruti texts as ‘The Rg-Veda, Yayur-Veda, Sama-Veda, Atharva-Veda are the breath of this infinite Reality’. The Vedāntin does not admit a momentary nature for Vedas. Nor on this account can it be said that the Veda being created by God becomes connected with a person (pauruṣeya) and the theory of not connected with a person. Even Dharmarāja clearly points out, ‘pauruṣeyatva’ does not mean being uttered by a person. He defines ‘pauruṣeyatva’ (connection with a person) as ‘being the object of utterance that is independent of any utterance of the same kind’.

15. sajātiyoccāraṇānapekṣoccāraṇviṣayatvam. ibid., p. 111
In this way, according to Dharmarājādhvarīndra, words mutually having the link of these above mentioned four conditions or causes express their meaning. It is said that these four attributes have been regarded as accessory or auxiliary causes in Verbal knowledge. The Paribhāṣākāra also like most other schools of philosophy and the Mīmāṃsā school in particular, admits only potentialities for 'word-śakti'. Here, 'śakti' (significance) means the direct reference (relation) of words to their meanings.16

According to our author, the meaning of words are of two kinds, viz. (i) Śakya (primary) and (ii) Laksya (implied). As for example, the word jar refers to a particular thing of form having a large bottom and body etc. According to the Vedānta, that significance is a distinct category, for, any power in a cause tending to produce an effect comes under a distinct category. According to Dharmarāja, 'śakti' is not of the form of desire of God (cf. Īśvara-recchā) as the Naiyāyikas hold. Therefore, the Vedāntin accepts śakti as a separate substance, i.e. 'padārtha'. In all causes we can infer the existence of 'śakti' by the effect produced. Similarly from the words used we can infer the 'śakti' present in them from the verbal knowledge produced. Scholars of different philoso-

16. tatra śaktināma padānāmartheṣu mukhyā vṛttih. ibid., p.93
phies are very much at variance whether 'jāti' (generic attribute) or 'vyakti' (individual) is the meaning signified by a word. Our author takes up the hotly debated on this point. 'Jāti' means the common property of a class which characterises all the individuals comprised in that class. As for example, 'jar-­hood', which is found in all jars.

Dharmarāja is in agreement with the Mīmāṁsā point of view as usual. According to the Mīmāṁsaka generic attribute alone is the meaning signified. He argues along with them that there is great prolixity if individual be the meaning signified. Therefore, 'jāti' alone has a rightful signification. In this matter, the Naiyāyika is of the opinion that, though a word a like 'gau' may mean an individual cow, he argues that there is no prolixity (of each cow being signified separately) since the word cow signifies that which is determined by cowhood. Dharmarāja rejects this view of the Naiyāyika as it is too prolix. Our author is obliged to argue that implication may be accepted in the case of the individual meaning of a word on the strength of the statement the meaning of a word is to be obtained from no other source (but from the word itself). Therefore, the individual is secured by taking recourse to implication17.

17. ananyalabhyah śabdārthaḥ. ibid., p.95
Now Dharmarāja turns his attention to the capacity of implication (lakṣaṇā) by which the implied meaning is made known. An implied meaning is the object implied by a word. Lakṣaṇā\(^{18}\) is of two types, viz. (i) kevalalakṣaṇā (pure) and (ii) laksitalakṣaṇā (double). He divides Laksana (kevala and laksita) on the lines of the Navya Naiyāyika theory. He is of the opinion that a direct relation with the 'śakyārtha' is what is called Kevalalakṣaṇā\(^{19}\), e.g. ‘a cowherd colony (hamlet) on the Gaṅges’ (‘gaṅgāyām ghoṣaḥ’) where the word ‘Gaṅgā’ has its implication in the bank which is connected with the word ‘Gaṅgā’. On the other hand, where a different meaning is known by an indirect relation with the primary or denoted meaning, there is Laksitalakṣaṇā\(^{20}\), e.g. the word ‘dvirepha’ has connection with a word having two ‘repha’s (i.e. Bhramara) and this word ‘Bhramara’ is again connected with its meaning bee and as such the word ‘dvirepha’ is said to signify by indirect implication a bee. What is called figurative use is also nothing but Laksitalakṣaṇā. As for example, ‘sīṁha mānavakah’ (‘the boy is a lion’), here the boy is known through his relation to

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18. jātvācakasya tadviśiṣṭe lakṣaṇā. ibid., p.95
19. śakyasākṣātsambandhaḥ kevalalakṣaṇā. ibid., p.96
20. śakyaparamparāsambandhenārthāntaratraspratītistara laksitalakṣaṇā. ibid., p.96
ferocity etc., which are associated with what is primarily meant by the word 'lion'. Dharmarāja does not accept 'gauṇī' as a separate type of lakṣaṇā as is done by the Mīmāṁsaka. He includes it under the comprehensive group, lakṣitalakṣaṇā since the relation here is indirect, e.g. in the sentence 'the boy is a lion'.

Next the Paribhāṣākāra divides Lakṣaṇā from a different point of view into three types, namely, (i) Jahallakṣaṇā (exclusive implication) : where the denoted meaning of the word is excluded and a different meaning is known there is the jahallakṣaṇā type of implication, e.g. the statement 'take poision'; here the meaning is you should not eat in your enemy's house.(ii) Ajahallakṣaṇā (non-exclusive implication) : where the denoted meanings as well as another meaning are known; similar is the case with the statement 'a white jar'. and (iii) Jahadajahallakṣaṇā (exclusive-non-exclusive implication) : where a word excludes a part of its denoted meaning and retains the other part, e.g. 'this is that Devadatta'. The author observes that here, the identity between Devadatta as qualified by the present time and as qualified by

21. śakyamanantarabhāvyā yatṛarthāntarapraṭītiḥ
   tatra jahallakṣaṇā. ibid.,p.97
22. yatra śakyārthamantarbhāvyāivṛthāntarapraṭītiḥ,
the past time cannot be established with the help of the denoted meaning since they are contradictory. So, both the words by implication retain the substantive part (cf. viśeṣyamātra) only and not their adjective part. This type\textsuperscript{23} of Lakṣaṇā has much to do in Advaita Vedānta especially in explaining the meaning of the Mahāvākya as ‘Tattvamasi’ etc. Here he has a very solid contribution to the explanation of the Mahāvākya where he tries to remove the contradiction in the denoted meaning signified by the words by not taking recourse to Lakṣaṇā and by explaining it successfully otherwise. He does not accept that Lakṣaṇā is necessitated in such cases while fully agreeing that these words denote only a part of their meaning. His confirmed opinion is that when there is no possibility of agreement by identity between two qualified objects denoted by words there is not difficulty in establishing identity between the two substantive parts (omitting the attributes) denoted by the word\textsuperscript{24}. In support of his argument he cites the sentence ‘ghaṭo anityah’ (the pot is transitory) where the transistoriness is in agreement only with the individual pot

\textsuperscript{23} yatra hi viśiṣṭavācakaḥ śabda ekadeśam vihāya ekadeśe vartate tatra jahadajahallakṣaṇā. Op.Cit.

\textsuperscript{24} śaktyupasthitaviśiṣṭayoḥ abhedānvyayānupapattau višeṣyayocśaktyu...abhedānvyāvirodhāt.ibid.,p.99
which is a part of the denoted meaning of the pot, but it does not agree with the other part of the meaning 'genus' (ghaṭatvajāti) because jāti cannot said to be transitory. So also in the case of 'Tattvamasi', it can be argued that the substantive part (caitanya) of the denoted meaning of the word 'Tat' agrees with the substantive part of the meaning (caitanya) denoted by the word 'Tvam'. In the case of sentence 'Tattvamasi' even though the substantive parts of the denoted meaning are syntactically connected by non-difference there is no sublation.

In support of the above connection the author cites examples of sentences like 'ghaṭamānaya' (bring the pot) where both the meanings of potness and pot which are the višeṣaṇa and višeṣya respectively cannot syntactically agree by 'karmatvasambandhā' (relation of objecthood) with potness since 'ghaṭatva' cannot be brought separately and as such the Naiyāyika will be oblized to accept Lakṣaṇā in case the above is not accepted, but the Naiyāyika does not actually accept Lakṣaṇā in such cases. Therefore, the cited above of the Advaitin is justified.

Now there is another question which remains to be answered -since lakṣaṇā has not been accepted by our author in cases like

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25. ācāryāṇāṃ lakṣaṇoktirabhhyupagamavādena bodhyā. ibid.,p.99
'Tattvamasi', what could be an illustration for a lakṣaṇā of the jahadajahad type? To this our author replies an instances like 'kākebhyo dadhi rakṣyatām' (protect the curds from the crows) are illustrative of the Jahadajahallakṣaṇā. When we say the curd is to be protected from the crow, it means that the curd is to be protected from all animals that destroy the curd. Our author calls it as jahadajahallakṣaṇā because the denoted meaning crow is completely omitted in his import. Along with the Navya Naiyāyikas Dharmarāja believes that inconsistency of the import (tātparya anupapatti) is the cause of lakṣaṇā and not the unintelligibility of syntactical relation (anvayānupapatti)²⁶.

Next the author takes up the strongly debated point whether lakṣaṇā is only in a word (padavṛtti) or in sentence (vākyavṛtti) also. He cites the stock example: 'gambhirāyām nadyām ghoṣāḥ' (the cowherd colony in the deep river) where he accepts lakṣaṇā for both the words 'gambhirā' and 'nadyā' in 'gambhiranaditīra'. Therefore, he concludes that lakṣaṇā is present in sentences also. This is on the lines of the Mīmāṁsaka view point. The objection is ruled out by Dharmarāja on the ground that though the word meaning is signified by 'śakti', the 'vākyārtha' also like

²⁶ lakṣaṇābījantu tātparyānupapattireva, na tu anvayānupapattiḥ. ibid., p.102
'padārtha' is indirectly signified and since the implied meaning is connected with that, laksāṇā can be accepted in a sentence also. As such, both the varieties of the meanings of words have been determined. Contiguity is the knowledge of these. It is also a cause of verbal comprehension, for we observe just that kind of agreement and difference between them.

Thus, Dharmarājādhvarīndra establishes Āgama or Śabda (authority, verbal testimony) as an independent source of valid knowledge in his Vedānta Paribhāṣā. In this 'Āgama-pariccheda', the Paribhāṣākāra shows a great imagination as well as erudition.