Upamāna, in Indian Philosophy, is the means of valid knowledge, denotative relation between a word and certain class of objects through the intermediary knowledge of similarity, dissimilarity or particular characteristics conveyed by the authoritative statement. When we see a certain object and recall another, this knowledge that we have of the similarity of the recalled object to the seen one is said to be due the the Upamāna. The stock case of the knowledge of Upamāna arises when a citydweller familiar with the cow but unfamiliar with the object denoted by the word ‘gavaya’(or ‘gayal’) hears from a reliable forest-born person that the ‘gavaya’ is an animal resembling a cow. Sure enough, he happens to go to the forest and comes across such an animal which is similar to a cow. Then he recollects the sense of the statement of the forest-born person and comes to know that the object before him is denoted by the word ‘gavaya’.

The two factors are involved in such argument by Upamāna, viz., (i) the knowledge of the object (=gavaya) to be known and
(ii) the perception of similarity. As such, Upamāṇa involves the following steps- (a) A person hears an authoritative statement, e.g. 'the gavaya is like cow'. (b) He observes similarity of a gavaya with a cow. (c) He remembers the statement received from the reliable person. (d) He argues by comparison that this kind of object is denoted by the word 'gavaya'.

Upamāṇa is derived from the words 'Upa' and 'Māna'; here 'Upa' means contiguity (sāmipya) or similarity, i.e. 'sādṛśya' and 'Māna' means cognition. Etymologically, Upamāṇa=Upa-√Mā+(bhāve) 'iyut', here 'Upa' means contiguous and 'Māna' means knowledge and therefore 'Upamāna' is the knowledge of contiguity (sāmipya) or the knowledge of the similarity between two things. Contiguity or 'sāmīpya' means the possession of common characteristics (cf. sāmānyā => samānānāṁ bhābaḥ). Derivatively it is the knowledge gained by comparison. This derivative meaning, however, requires certain qualifications in order to give a complete definition of Upamāṇa. Though the word Upamāṇa has been variously translated as Analogy, Comparison, Indetification, knowledge by similarity and knowledge by assimilation, yet its derivative meaning suggests, that Comparison is proper substitute. In general sense, Upamāna is the standard of comparison, that with which anything is compared,
just opposite of Upameya (comparable with).

The Advaita Vedānta, the Mīmāṃsā and the Nyāya system agree in adopting Upamāṇa as an independent source of valid knowledge, but the other system reject Upamāṇa as an independent source of knowledge. While going through its details in the texts, we find that the conceptions of different schools or of the same school in different works do not absolutely concide. The upholderes of Upamāṇa as an independent source of valid knowledge also differ in details.

Gautama aphorises that Upamāṇa is way of proving what is to be proved through a thing's sharing qualities with what is already known\(^1\). According to him, there are quite a few different theories about precisely what kind of knowledge this resulting knowledge is. He argues that it is exceptional, being neither a Pratyakṣa (perception) nor an Anumāṇa (inference). The reason for its not being perceptual is that its content includes a reference to linguistic usage of the word 'gavaya', and usage can not be perceived. Gautama states that it is not Anumāṇa since Anumāṇa gives us knowledge about things which can be verified through Pratyakṣa.

\(^1\) prasiddha-sādharmyāt sādhya-sādhanaṁ
upamānam. NS., I. 1.6, p. 424.
In the Nyāya system, we have divergence of view regarding instrumentality in Upamāna. Guatama equates Upamāna with the well known similarity, Vātsyāyana accepts it as the authoritative statement conveying similarity, whereas Uddyotakāra takes it as the knowledge of the well known similarity.

Jayantabhaṭṭa defends Vātsyāyana and attacks Uddyotakāra. He finds a divergence of opinion among his predecessors regarding the nature of Upamāna. According to him, we cannot perceive similarity since both ex-hypotheses of the things whose similarity is supposed to be perceived are not present. The similarity is grasped directly from the verbal authority, and as Vātsyāyana believes, it is the memory of this similarity which is the first of the two conditions. According to Vācaspati, the word ‘prasiddhasādharmāt’ forms the essential part of the definition of Upamāna. According to him, the term sādharmya is used elliptically for the properties in general. He suggests that the word ‘yataḥ’ should be inserted in the sūtra forming the definition of Upamāna, so that it should without doubt be applicable to the karaṇa (instrument) only.

2. sādhyasādhanaṃityucyamāne pratyakṣādisā
dhaneṣu sukhaḍuḥkhasādhaneṣu prasaṅgaḥ.
ataḥ uktam prasiddhasādharmyāditi. NVTT.,I.1.6
Thus, according to the Naiyāyikas, Upamāṇa is the source of knowledge of relation either between name (saṁjñā) and a thing (saṁjñin) or between word and its denotation.

The Mīmāṁsakas also accept Upamāṇa as an independent source of knowledge, but it is fundamentally differs from the Naiyāyikas. It is remarkable that Jaimini, the author of the Mīmāṁsā-sūtra does not speak of Upamāṇa. It is Śabara who discusses the nature of Upamāṇa. The Prābhākara and the Bhāṭṭa school of Mīmāṁsa commented upon Śabara’s exposition.

Śabararsvāmin defines Upamāṇa as knowledge of an unperceived object as being similar to some known objects. He uses the same term for the means of knowledge and the resultant knowledge. The definition leaves the nature of resultant knowledge unexplained.

He has expressed it with the help of an example - 'just as

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3. 'yathā gaur evam gavayaḥ' ityupamāne prayukte
gavā samāna-dharmamartham indriyārtha-sanni
karṣād upalabhamānaḥ asya gavaya-śabdaḥ
saṁjñā iti saṁjñā-saṁjñī-sambandham
pratipadyate. NB., pp. 169-170 (I.1.6)

4. upamāṇam api sādṛṣṭyam asannikṛṣṭerthe
buddhim upādayati. SB., I. 1.5.
the perception of the gavaya is the cause of the remembrance of
the cow. Kumarila Bhaṭṭa rejects his interpretation on the ground
that it would amount to remembrance.

The Prabhākara also understands similarity as the means
of Upamāṇa. He construes the term ‘gosmaraṇa’, from the ex­
ample of Śabara, in the sense of the agent in Upamāṇa and ren­
ders it as in the case of pratyakṣa (perception) of one who has
already seen a cow.

The Vaiśeṣika system accepts two pramāṇas, viz. (i)
Pratyakṣa and (ii) Anumāṇa. This system reduce Upamāṇa to
Anumāṇa. They refuse to accept Upamāṇa as an independent
source of knowledge. The Vaiśeṣika-sūtra does not refer to
Upamāṇa. Praśastapāda says that it is the means of conveying
the knowledge of ‘gavaya’ by an authoritative person through
the similarity to the cow to a man who does not know it earlier.
However, it is nothing other than Śabda (verbal testimony). On

5. yathā gavayadarśanam gosmaraṇasya. ibid.
6. sadṛśadupajāyeta yā matih sadṛśāntare /
dhyānādismṛtitulyatvāt sā narāṇāṁ katham
bhavet // ŚV., (upamāṇa 4)., p. 308.
7. gosmaraṇasyeti, anubhūtagoḥ puruṣasya.
    Brh., p. 107.
the other hand, verbal testimony is also a case of Anumāna (inference), and hence, Upamāna (comparison) is also a case of inference. The Paribhāṣākāra question the Vaiśeṣika as to what the knowledge of the mark (liṅga) is in arriving at similarity to gavaya (gavayāsadṛśya) in the cow. The author argues that even if such inference (anumāna) is made deliberately, the knowledge of similarity of ‘gavaya’ which exists in the cow (goniṣṭagavayāsadṛśyayajñāna) is arrived at by ordinary experience. Therefore, that should be a vyabhicārī liṅga. In addition to this Dharmarāja argues that there is the apperception ‘I am comparing’ (upaminomī) in such cases and as such it is only a case of Analogical knowledge. So Upamāna, i.e. Comparison cannot be replaced by inference.

The Sāṁkhya-Yoga system explains Upamāna as a form of Anumāna and therefore, neither accept Upamāna as a distinct type of knowledge nor as an independent way of knowing. The Sāṁkhyaakārikā states that the additional means postulated by other systematists are included under Pratyakṣa, Anumāna, and Śabda only. As ‘gavaya is like the cow’, thus Upamāna has been illustrated by means of Śabda (verbal testimony). This is purely

8. upaminomi ityanuvyavasāyācca.tasmādupamānam mānantaram. VP.,p.84
verbal when it is uttered by an elderly-experienced person (vrddhavyāvahāra) to cognise an unexperienced people about
the unknown beast 'gavaya'. The Yuktidīpikā takes notice the
view of the Nyāya on Upama only and includes Upamāna under
verbal testimony(śabda). It is the valid statement which lead one
to the knowledge arrived at through Upamāna

The Sāṁkhya system objects that Upamāna is not a sepa­
rate means of valid knowledge, i.e. pramāṇa but say it is a case
of perception (pratyakṣa). The Sāṁkhya thinkers argue that the
features from which a statement of similarity between the ‘gavaya’
and the cow is obtained are identical in the cow and the ‘gavaya’.
So they hold that just like the knowledge of similarity to the cow
(gosādṛśyajñāna) present in the‘gavaya’ due to ‘sannikarṣa’, so
also in the recollected cow also (gavayasadṛśyajñāna) is
(pratyakṣa) perceptible. Therefore, Upamāna cannot be a sepa­
rate pramāṇa. The Advaita Vedāntin rejects the view of the
Sāṁkhya on the ground that the cow is not in proximity with the
sense organ when the resulting knowledge (jñāna) is produced
and hence it cannot be a case of pratyakṣa.

9. yathā gaurevarh gavayaiti captopadesabalāt
pratipatta aprasiddham gavayamupalabhate na
sādṛśyamātrāt. tasmāt na śabdāt prthagupamā.
YD., 4.
The Cārvākas contend that Upamāna is not a source of knowledge, if knowledge at all; since Upamāna can not give us any true or valid knowledge about the denotation of words.

The Baudha recognise Upamāna as a form of valid knowledge, but do not admit Upamāna to be an independent source of valid knowledge. The Buddhist logicians include it within Pratyakṣa or Šabda.

The Jain system reduces Upamāna to ‘pratyabhijñā’ (recognition). According to the Jains pratyabhijñā is a kind of synthetic judgement of perception and remembrance. As for example, ‘the cow is like the gavaya’. This is the example of judgement arising out of similarity.

The Advaita Vedānta like the Mīmāṁsā gives an independent status to Upamāna, but the other schools of Vedānta disagree in this matter.

The Viśiṣṭādvaita school of Vedānta accepts Pratyakṣa (perception), Anumāna (inference) and Šabda (verbal testimony) only as the independent source of knowledge, and includes the additional sources postulated by other systematists under these

10. tāni pramāṇāni pratyakṣānumānasabdākhyānī
trīni. YMD., p. 8
three only. Regarding sources of knowledge or epistemology, Rāmānuja states that valid knowledge is the knowledge which apprehends an objects as it really exists. Śrīnivās and some other post-Rāmānuja Viśiṣṭādvaita philosophers have admitted one more source of valid knowledge and that is Upamāṇa.

According to the Viśiṣṭādvaita school, Upamāṇa can be included under any of the perception, inference and verbal testimony in accordance with the stress upon a particular aspect of Upamāṇa.

The Dvaita school of Vedānta also admits Pratyakṣa, Anumāna and Śabda only as independent source of knowledge, any other sources are included under one or the other of these three. Madhvācārya states that like Arthāpatti, Upamāṇa is the particular forms of inference 11. Specially, Jayatīrthā, a famous commentator on the Pramāṇas Prakāraṇa of Madhvācārya discusses the inclusion of Upamāṇa under other source of knowledge more elaborately.

Vallabhācārya, the founder of the pure non-daulistic school or Śuddhādvaita and Nimbārka, the founder of the Dvaitādvaita (dualistic monism) of the Vedānta also accept only above men-

11. arthāpattiyupame anumānaviśeṣa. PPR., p. 44
tioned three sources of valid knowledge, viz. (i) perception, (ii) inference and (iii) verbal testimony. According to them, Upamāna is included under these three.

The Advaita Vedānta is one of the upholders of Upamāna as an independent sources of knowledge or pramanās. However, the Advaita Vedānta account of Upamāna fundamentally differs from that of the Naiyāyikas. There is the divergence of opinion regarding the nature of resultant knowledge through Upamāna. According to Naiyāyikas the resultant knowledge is the knowledge that a certain word denotes a certain class of objects. But, according to the Advaita Vedāntins, like the Mīmāṃsakas, the resultant knowledge pertains to the similarity which the remembered object bears to the directly perceived one.

Upamāna has been defined by Dharmarājādhvarīndra in the Vedānta Paribhāṣā as the instrument, i.e. karaṇa of Upamiti which in turn is the resultant knowledge in the form of similarity. The stock case of the knowledge of Upamāna arises when a man perceives a cow in the city and comes across a ‘gavaya’ in the forest, he comes to understand that object perceived is like the cow. Sure enough, ‘my cow is like the object perceived’ and as-

12. tatra sādṛṣyapramākaraṇam upamānam. VP., p.83
serts and knowledge of cow as qualified by its similarity to the ‘gavaya’.\textsuperscript{13}

The Paribhāṣākāra is of opinion that the instrumentality is the knowledge of the similarity which the gavaya bears to the cow and the resultant knowledge is the knowledge of similarity which the cow bears to the ‘gavaya’.\textsuperscript{14} Here, the psychological process involves four steps: first, there is the knowledge or perception of points of similarity in the ‘gavaya’. Secondly, through the similarity is revived the memory of the cow seen earlier in the city. Thirdly, there arises the knowledge that the perceptible ‘gavaya’ is like the cow and lastly there is the consequent knowledge that the cow seen earlier is similar to the ‘gavaya’ seen at present, or, in other words, the cow seen earlier is qualified by the similarity to the ‘gavaya’ seen at present.

\textit{Ānandapūrṇa Munīndra also called Ānandapūrṇa Vidyā-

13. tathāhi...nagareṣu dṛṣṭa-gopinḍasya puruṣasya vanam gatasya gavayendriyasannikarṣe sati bhavati pratītiḥ- ‘ayam pīndo gosadṛśaḥ’ iti. tadanantaram ca bhavati niścayaḥ- ‘anena sadṛṣī madiyā gauḥ’ iti. ibid., p. 83.

14. tatrānvaṇyavatirekābhhyām gavayaniṣṭa-gosādṛ- śyaṁājaṁ karaṇam, goniṣṭagavayasaḍṛśyaṁānaṁ phalam. ibid., p. 83.
sāgara in his Nyāyacandrikā defines Upamiti as the knowledge of similarity which the object situated at a distance bears to that present near the observer\(^\text{15}\). He explains the position with the help of the example containing the psychological process in Upamāna that the resultant knowledge through it refers to the cow qualified by the similarity to ‘gavaya’\(^\text{16}\).

The Advaita Vedāntins try to establish the independent position of Upamāna. Accordingly, they opine that the knowledge of cow qualified by its similarity to the gavaya cannot be a case of Pratyakṣa or others. This can be accepted that the similarity is perceived through sense-object contact which makes it a case of Pratyakṣa, but still, it cannot be a case of Pratyakṣa. Because, the knowledge of cow as qualified by its similarity to gavaya is not perceived at the time of knowing it. Hence, it remains to be classed apart\(^\text{17}\).

Keeping in view the independent status to Upamāna, the Advaitins state that Upamāna cannot be a case of Anumāna as

\(^{15}\) sannikrṣṭenāsannikrṣṭasya sādṛṣyamiti upamiti. NC., p. 279.

\(^{16}\) sādṛṣyaviśiṣṭagojñānamupamiti. Ibid., p. 279

\(^{17}\) na cedaṁ pratyakṣeṇa sambhavati, gopiṇḍasya tadendriyāsannikarṣāt. VP., p. 84.
well. To put it more clearly, the Advaita Vedanta argues that the resultant knowledge supposed to be acquired through Upamāṇa is acquired through Anumāṇa also. This cow bears the similarity to that gavaya, because of having same quality etc., as that gavaya. Dharmarājādhvarīndra further says that the knowledge of similarity cannot be acquired through Anumāṇa, because the similarity which the gavaya bears to the cow can not serve as a mark or probans in Anumāṇa. It can not be acquired from anumāṇa, for similarity existing in a wild cow with a cow cannot serve as a mark of anumāṇa as follows: My cow is similar to this wild cow (gavaya), because she is the correlate of similarity existing is this wild cow, whatever is the correlate (pratiyogī) of similarity with another thing is similar to it, as Caitra, the correlate of similarity existing in Maitra, is similar to Maitra.

The Advaitins and the Mīmāṃsakas consider Upamāṇa as a distinct means of mediate knowledge, which is different from Anumāṇa or inference. According to the Vedāntin who follows the Mīmāṃsaka, knowledge obtained through Upamāṇa is as: A person who has the knowledge of the cow goes to a forest and sees a gavaya, then he cognises the similarity that the gavaya is  

18. nāpyanumāṇena, gavayaniṣṭa-gosādṛśyasya atā līṅgatvāt. ibid., p.84
like his own cow. At that moment the person forms the judgement that his cow is like that gavaya. This perception of the similarity to the cow present in the gavaya is the special cause of the upamiti, the cognition of the similarity in the cow to that of the ‘gavaya’ is the result. This type of knowledge by comparison is neither perception nor inference.

But some thinkers like the Vaiśeṣikas argue that the Vedāntins Upamāna can be reduced to an inference. The Vaiśeṣikas say that is possible to derive Upamāna through a syllogism as: ‘My cow is similar to this gavaya, since it is the correlate (pratiyogī) of similarity present in this’.

In reply to this objection, our author argues that even the form of syllogism is not actually observed in our common life as leading to the knowledge that my cow is similar to the ‘gavaya’ present before. On the other hand, the similarity which the cow bears the gavaya is cognised through common experience and is not deduced through syllogism. However, the ‘anuvyavasāya’ which determines the nature of the source of the knowledge is in the form that ‘I know through similarity’ and not through the function of the syllogism. Upamāna cannot be brought under Śabda

or verbal testimony also. Such knowledge does not obviously arise from verbal testimony, since the person who hears that a gavaya is like a cow is not given any further idea of the gavaya’s attributes and so does not know that gavaya denotes the animal until he sees it. In other words, verbal testimony is not a factor to decide the invariable concomitance.

Dharmarāja suggests to the Vaiśeṣikas two alternatives, viz. Is it that, in arriving at the knowledge of the similarity of gavaya which exists in the cow (goniṣṭa gavaya sādṛśya) the knowledge of similarity of a cow in ‘gavaya’ (gavayaniṣṭa gosādṛśya) is the liṅga in which case, since the similarity to the cow present in the ‘gavaya’ (gavayaniṣṭa gosādṛśya) is not present in the cow, it cannot be held to be present in the subject (pakṣa) as it will be a fallacious reasoning. In the alternative if it be argued that it is ‘gavayaniṣṭa gosādṛśya pratiyogitvam’ that is the liṅga in arriving at (‘goniṣṭa gavaya sādṛśya jñāna’), the knowledge of the similarity of ‘gavaya’ which exists in the cow and therefore, Anumāna (inference) is possible. 20

Our author is of opinion that the instrumentality is the knowledge of the similarity which the gavaya bears to the cow and the

20. VP.,p.84, vide ŚM., pp. 233 - 234
resultant knowledge is the knowledge of similarity which the cow bears to the gavaya\textsuperscript{21}. It is seen here that the psychological process involves four steps, viz.: first, there is the knowledge or perception of points of similarity in the gavaya. Secondly, through the similarity is revived the memory of the cow seen earlier in the city. Thirdly, there arises the knowledge that the perceptible gavaya is like the cow and lastly, there is the consequent knowledge that the cow seen earlier is similar to the gavaya seen at present, or, in other words, the cow seen earlier is qualified by the similarity to the gavaya seen at present.

The Advaitins hold that a knowledge of the relation of the samjn\=a and the samjn\=in is the result of a knowledge of similarity (s\=ad\=rsya). According to them, knowledge of similarity (i.e. upam\=ana) is the instrument (i.e. kara\=na) and recollection of a forester's statement is the activity (vy\=ap\=ara).

As such, it should be noted that the Advaitin accepts the essentials of Upam\=ana as postulated by the M\=im\=arn\=saka, but still, the practical utility of Upam\=ana accepted by the M\=im\=arn\=saka may not be accepted by the Advaita Vedanta. The M\=im\=arn\=saka

\begin{flushright}
21. gavayani\=stag\=osad\=rsya\=j\=an\=am kara\=nam, goni\=\=staga vayasad\=rsya\=j\=an\=an\=am phalam. Op.Cit.
\end{flushright}
hold that Upamāṇa in replacing one object by the other similar to it in the context of the sacrificial rites. It would not be consistent with the spirit of the Advaita Vedānta. They would accept Upamāṇa for the purpose of explaining super natural experience on the analogy of common worldly experience, i.e. to explain the unobserved fact through its similaritym to the observed one. Thus, the sole purpose of the Vedānta unlike the Mīmāṁsā, is not fulfilled with the ritualistic interpretation of the scriptural statement. On the contrary, the Vedānta system aims at providing the correct interpretation of scriptural statement regarding the knowledge of ultimate reality. Therefore, the purpose of the Upamāṇa should be accepted as the explanation of the analogy of the common experience. The Advaita Vedāntins would accept Upamāṇa for explaining the passages speaking of super natural experience of reality which reminds the experience of common life.

Thus Dharmarājādhvarindra who follows the Mīmāṁsaka, in the Upamāṇa-pariccheda of his Vedānta Paribhāṣā try to established Upamāṇa (Comparison) as a distinct means of mediate knowledge.

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