I. PRATYAKŠA AS A MEANS OF VALID KNOWLEDGE:

Pratyakša (Perception) is the primary source of human knowledge. It gives direct or immediate knowledge of reality of an object and therefore, is the root of all other pramāṇas. All the schools of Indian philosophy both āstika (orthodox) and nāstika (heterodox) are unanimous about Pratyakša pramāṇa as the first and foremost of the pramāṇas. In the foregoing chapter we dealt with the Vedāntic views on the most important problems of epistemology, viz., the nature of knowledge, validity of knowledge or truth and error etc. The present chapter and the succeeding ones will be concerned with the pramāṇas, i.e., the sources or means of valid knowledge (pramā). According to the Advaita Vedānta, ‘pramāṇa’, i.e., means or source stands for ‘karaṇa’, i.e., the instrument of ‘pramā’, i.e., valid knowledge; cf. ‘pramākaraṇam pramāṇam’. We have already discussed about karaṇa (instrument) that a thing is produced by a number of causes and only the extraordinary cause is called karaṇa or the instrument. Pramā or valid knowledge would

1. pratyakṣasya pramāṇeṣu jyeṣṭhatvāditi. V.P., p.6
mean, if recollection is excluded from it, that knowledge which has for its object something that is not already known and is un-contradicted. On the other hand, if recollection is included in it, then it would mean that knowledge which has for its object something that is uncontradicted. And hence, according to the Advaita Vedānta, by the term ‘pramāṇa’ we mean the means by which a person attains right or valid knowledge. The Advaita Vedānta recognizes six pramāṇas, namely, Pratyakṣa (perception), Anumāṇa (inference), Śabda or Āgama (verbal testimony), Upamāṇa (comparison), Arthāpatti (presumption) and Anupalabdhi or Abhāva (non-apprehension).

Pratyakṣa (perception) as the primary source of valid knowledge (pramāṇa) is universally recognized, most probable reason is that Pratyakṣa (perception) is independent or direct cognition of reality. Because in it, we face the reality whereas all other pramāṇas more or less depend upon Pratyakṣa and give only an indirect knowledge. But, some have questioned its claim to give valid knowledge (pramāṇa). The Nyāya-sūtra refers to an objector who is represented as questioning the validity of all the pramāṇas including

2. tāni ca pramāṇāni śat-pratyakṣānumāṇopamāṇa-gamārthāpattī anupalabdhibhedāt. ibid., p.8
3. NS., 2.1.8-19
Pratyakṣa. In spite of this objection, the validity of Pratyakṣa is defended by the Nyāya-sūtra and it is said that Pratyakṣa is presupposed by inference which is next to it in primacy⁴.

Etymologically the word Pratyakṣa indicates the functioning or operation of the sense-organs in relation to its particular object⁵. Hence the operation of the senses is involved in the very meaning of the word Pratyakṣa. Pratyakṣa is defined as Direct awareness. It is highly doubtful if the English term perception is a suitable substitute for the Sanskrit word Pratyakṣa. In Sanskrit, the term Pratyakṣa denotes not merely a type of cognition as a result but also the object and the special means(karaṇa) of that cognition. But the resulting knowledge can also, in introspection be distinguished from other types of knowledge, and this distinguishing mark so revealed in introspection, places it in a unique class. So that even apart from any consideration of the object or the means of perception as a type of knowledge can be distinguished from other types. Thus it is quite possible to define perception as a unique class of knowledge, without reference to the object or this type of means.

⁴. tatpūrvakatvāt trividhamanumānam. ibid., I.1.4
⁵. akṣasyākṣasya prativiṣayam vṛttih pratyakṣam.

NB., (I.1.3) p.86
In the Advaita Vedānta, as a means, i.e., pramāṇa, Pratyakṣa (Perception) is the unique operative cause, i.e., karaṇa of right knowledge. In this sense, the sense organs constitute the karaṇa or the unique cause of perceptual knowledge. Thus the Pratyakṣa pramā is defined as immediate and timeless knowledge (caitanya).

According to the Advaita Vedānta, Pratyakṣa is nothing but pure consciousness which refers to the instrument of valid perceptual knowledge. This type of immediate knowledge is the self itself, because it is only in the self that there is pure immediacy of knowledge. The senses are the karaṇa, i.e., the unique cause of Pratyakṣa as immediate knowledge in so far as the mental modification, i.e., antaḥ-karaṇavṛtti; which manifests it (caitanya), is due to the function of the sense organs. The antaḥkaraṇa (mind) goes out through the sense organ which is in contact with a present perceptible object and becomes so modified as to assume the form of the object itself. This mind being a material principle, it is quite possible for it to move and attain the dimension of the object of perception. Thus, it is defined as direct awareness. It is said that perception is the head of and superior to all ‘means of cognition’ or pramāṇas. This superiority of perception over other means consists in that it gives a first-hand and detailed information about

6. pratyakṣapramā cātra caitanyameva. VP., p.8
reality. Therefore, it is said that all the other methods of knowledge presuppose perception and must be based on knowledge derived from perception. Pratyakṣa means that which is present in our senses towards suitable objects. The object of immediate knowledge must be something existing (sat), so that the perception is the means of justifying our belief in the existence of the physical objects such as books, pens, which are perceived with the assistance of our senses when such an object is related to any of the sense organs, there arises in the soul an immediate knowledge about it. This type of knowledge is called Pratyakṣa (perception).

The Cārvāka system regards Pratyakṣa as the only means of valid knowledge. They have criticised the possibility of the other sources of knowledge in order to establish Pratyakṣa as the only source of valid knowledge. The world of perception is the only reality, anything beyond the range of perception is not real. Hence the Cārvākas reject the reality of heaven and hell, as they are not objects of perception.

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7. sarvapramāṇānāṁ pratyakṣapūrva-katvāt. NVTT.,1.2.5
8. pratyakṣāme kām cārvākāḥ.. TKR.,as quoted in the Muktāvalīsamgraha, vide BP.,p.260
9. na svargo nāpavargo vā naivātmā paralaukikāḥ. SDS., p.16
According to Buddhists, Pratyakṣa is the unerring cognition of a given sensum in complete isolation from all idea. A famous Buddhist logician Dharmakīrti, defines Pratyakṣa as a non-erroneous presentation devoid of all determinations or conceptual constructions (kalpanā). As stated by him, Pratyakṣa is such knowledge as is free from such construction when it is not affected by an illusion produced by colour blindness, rapid motion, travelling on board a ship, sickness or other causes. Another greatest Buddhist logician Diṅnāga defines Pratyakṣa as a cognition which is not at all subjectively determined and is not modified by ideas or kalpanā (concepts). According to him, it is different from imagination and has no connection with names, genus etc.

According to the Jainas, Pratyakṣa is the immediate and direct knowledge of objects. It is of two types: the primary (mukhya) and the practical (saṃvyavahārika). The primary perception is quite independent of the mind and the senses, and the origin of the practical is conditioned by the mind and the senses; its essence lies in the direct cognition of some object. Therefore, perception is in its essential nature a direct knowledge of objects.
The Nyāya school of philosophy defines Pratyakṣa (perception) as the non-erroneous cognition produced by the intercourse of the sense organs with the objects, not associated with any name and well defined\textsuperscript{13}. Thus the old school of Nyāya defines Pratyakṣa in terms of sense-object contact, i.e. indriyārthasannikarṣa. Pratyakṣa is also defined as that cognition which is produced by the contact of the sense organs with the objects\textsuperscript{14}. There are some demerits attached to it. As for example, an objection is raised that cognition of the self and pleasure, pain etc. are not covered in the definition of perception as mind is not counted as a sense organ by Gautama\textsuperscript{15}, the founder of the Nyāya school. The Navya-Naiyāyika defined Pratyakṣa as the knowledge of which no other knowledge is an instrument or efficient cause\textsuperscript{16}. It excludes inferential knowledge etc. because inferential knowledge is produced through the instrumentality of knowledge of universal

\begin{align*}
\text{13. } & \text{indriyārthasannikarṣotpannam jñānam avyapade-}\nonumber \\
& \text{śyam avyabhicāri vyavasāyātmikam pratyakṣam.}\nonumber \\
& \text{NS., I.1.4} \\
\text{14. } & \text{indriyārthasannikarṣajanyam jñānam pratyakṣam.}\nonumber \\
& \text{TS., 42} \\
\text{15. } & \text{NS., I.1.12} \\
\text{16. } & \text{jñānākaraṇakarṣam jñānam pratyakṣam...}\nonumber \\
& \text{TCM.,(pratyakṣalakṣaṇavāda)}
\end{align*}
concomitance. It applies both to God’s perception and human perception. Gaṅgeśa, the great exponent of the Navya Nyāya school, in his Tatvacintāmaṇi defines Pratyakṣa in this manner. Pratyakṣa is direct or immediate knowledge. So, it is right to say that Pratyakṣa as right knowledge is not derived through the instrumentality of some other knowledge.\textsuperscript{17}

In the Vaiśeṣika system Pratyakṣa is described as knowledge which is conditioned by the senses.\textsuperscript{18} The Sāmkhya-Yoga system also defines Pratyakṣa in terms of sense-stimulation. In the Sāmkhya-Sūtra, Pratyakṣa is defined as cognition which describes the form of an object as related to it.\textsuperscript{19} Īsvarakṛṣṇa considers perception as determinate cognition of an object.\textsuperscript{20} He used the term Drṣṭa instead of Pratyakṣa. According to the Sāmkhya, Pratyakṣa is the direct cognition of an object by a sense when the two come in contact with each other. The Yoga system holds the same view like the Sāmkhya while emphasising that Pratyakṣa is especially a cognition of the particularity of an object.\textsuperscript{21}

\textsuperscript{17} pratyakṣasya sākṣātkāritvam lakṣaṇam.
\textsuperscript{ibid.},(sannikarśa vādaraḥasyam).
\textsuperscript{18} aksamaksam pratityotpadyate pratyakṣam. PDS., p.94
\textsuperscript{19} yatsambandhasiddha tadākārolekhi vijnānam tat pratyakṣam. SSū., 1.89
\textsuperscript{20} prativisayādhyavasāyo dṛṣṭam. SK., Kā. 5
\textsuperscript{21} VB., on YS., 1.7
In the Mīmāṃsā system Jaimini defines Pratyakṣa as 'the cognition which is produced by the efficient contact of the sense with their objects'\(^\text{22}\). The Bhāṭṭa school of Mīmāṃsā also defines Pratyakṣa in this way\(^\text{23}\). The Bhāṭṭas and the commentators of Kumārila were undecided as to the definition of Pratyakṣa in spite of the fact that they recognized immediacy of perception and its character of being born of sense-contact.

According to the Prābhākara school also, Pratyakṣa is the direct cognition of an object. Pratyakṣa is the intuitive knowledge that we may have of the subject and object of knowledge and of knowledge itself\(^\text{24}\). Every act of Pratyakṣa or perception consists of three aspects of consciousness, viz., the perception of the knowing self, the known object and knowledge itself. This is designated the Triputi Pratyakṣavāda of Prabhākara.

The direct apprehension of objects in Pratyakṣa is better explained by the Vedānta. According to Śaṅkara Vedānta also Pratyakṣa or perception is immediate. The Advaita school think

\begin{align*}
22. & \text{satsaṃprayoge puruṣasyendriyāṇāṃ buddhijanma} \\
   & \text{tat pratyakṣam.} \quad \text{JS, I.1.4.} \\
23. & \text{ŚV, 4.84} \\
24. & \text{sākṣātpratītiḥ pratyakṣam meyamātṛpramāsu sā.} \\
   & \text{PP., pp. 51-52}
\end{align*}
that there is no necessary connection between perceptual knowledge and sense activity. Despite the fact that God has no senses, He has immediate knowledge of things. Some thinkers amongst Advaitins, i.e., Vivaraṇa followers do not regard mind to be a sense organ, hold that internal perception is a case of immediate knowledge independent of sense activity. They opine that pleasure, pain etc. are cognised by the witness self-consciousness (sākṣībhāṣya). Systematic treatment of the pramāṇa, the theory of perception with details is evolved by Prakāśatman, the author of the Vivaraṇa25, i.e., Pañcapāḍikāvivaraṇa, the great commentary on Pañcapāḍikā of Padmapāda. The Pañcapāḍikāvivaraṇa enjoys a very great reputation and the work influenced the Advaitins in its dialectical literature. Our author Dharmarājādhirāṇḍra is influenced by this work. Adhirāṇḍra on a close study of all these views has explained this theory in a systematic way applying logical grounds. In the words of Prof. S.N. Dasgupta ‘Dharmarāja and his son, Rāmkrṣṇa worked out a complete scheme of the theory of Vedāntic perception and inference. This is in complete agreement with the general Vedānta metaphysics’26.

In the Advaita Vedānta, valid perception (Pratyakṣa) is only

25. STOK., p.96
26. HOIP, Vol.1., p.470
consciousness (caitanya) 27. Though this caitanya is one, it is modalized in three ways, viz., (i) viṣaya caitanya (object consciousness), (ii) pramāṇa caitanya (knowledge consciousness) and (iii) pramāṭṛ caitanya (subject consciousness). The sense organs produce the mental mode (vṛtti), which serves to modalize the eternal (light of) consciousness. The activity of the internal organ is said to be jñāna (cognition) in a secondary sense since it determines the knowledge concerned 28. It has been said in the Vivaraṇa in this way.

The Vedāntin holds that actual knowledge is produced after the production of vṛtti, may be noted here, it is very significant. Because, the Logician believes that the sense-object contact itself produces a knowledge of the object. The Vedāntin observes that the sense-object contact is just for the sake of producing mental mode or mental state, i.e., vṛtti 29. Thus, according to them, in Pratyakṣa, the function (vṛtti) of internal organ is involved. The internal organ which is of the nature of light (tejas) goes out to the object through a process that the channels of the sense organs, reaches the object and gets modified into its form. It may be com-

28. antaḥkaraṇavṛtttau jñānatvopacārāt. ibid., p.8
pared to the process of water flowing through the channels occupying the land, being modified into the form of the object. This is known as vṛtti and it apprehends the object. The object of Pratyakṣa (perception) and vṛtti come to be in the same locus outside when Pratyakṣa is produced.\textsuperscript{30}

Dharmarājādhyāntindra has been defined Pratyakṣa or perception as that which is the distinctive cause of valid perceptual knowledge.\textsuperscript{31} In brief, it may be said that in respect of pratyakṣa- ‘pramā’ (jñāna), ‘pramāṇa’ (karaṇa of jñāna) and ‘prameya’ (jñeya-violaya) -- these three are known as pratyakṣa. According to the Vedānta, this knowledge is nothing but Pure Consciousness.

The process of vṛtti going out through the sense organs occur only in perception, and hence it is Pratyakṣa, i.e., immediate knowledge. On the other hand, in inference etc. the vṛtti does not go outside. Therefore, inference etc. are designated as Parokṣa, i.e., mediate knowledge. In Pratyakṣa, the consciousness determined by the apprehending mental mode becomes identified with the consciousness determined by the object, as the determinants of the two consciousness stand in the same locus. In the percep-

\vspace{1cm}
\textsuperscript{30} bahirekatra deśe samavadhānāt...VP., p.14
\textsuperscript{31} pratyakṣapramāyāḥ karaṇam pratyakṣapramāṇam. ibid., p.8
tion of a jar, ghaṭāvaccinna caitanya is identified with the consciousness determined by the mental mode which is modified into the form of the jar (ghaṭākāravṛtyavaccinnacaitanya). Thus there is an identification of the apprehending mental mode, i.e., (pramāṇa-caitanya) with the object consciousness (viṣayacaitanya). Therefore it may be note that by 'identification' is meant 'standing in the same locus'.

In the case of pratyakṣa the vṛtti and the object should not only occupy the same place but also the same time. The perceptual process and the object must have the same time moment, otherwise there arises a contingency that perception of pleasure and pain would be similar to those of the recollection of pleasure etc. In the pratyakṣa of pleasure, the mental state (vṛtti) and the object (pleasure) occupy the same place-- when the present time is also accepted to be a requisite. However, in the case of recollection of pleasure, the mode in the form of recollection exists at the present time whereas the object (pleasure) relates to the past time. Therefore they are not present at the same time. So there is no overlapping of the definition of perception on recollection. Such as, 'I was happy before', (c.f. aham pūrvam sukhī) the object must be qualified by the idea of presence. It may also be

32. vartamānatvam viṣayaviśeṣaṇam deyam. ibid., p. 17
noted that in the case of Anumāna (inference), though there is Abheda between the vṛtti and the object, both of them are not present at the same time. So the definition of pratyakṣa does not apply in the case of anumāna (inference).

After that in order to avoid the difficulty of a 'śabdajñāna' by which supersensuous objects like one’s own merit and demerit coming under the scope of pratyakṣa, a qualification in the form of ‘yogya’ (fit to be perceived) is necessary to be include in the definition as an adjective to the word object, i.e., ‘viṣaya’ of pratyakṣa concerned. The only way to judge which object is competent for pratyakṣa and which not, is to be known only by the result of our attempt to perceive them as the Vṛdāntin states. If the word ‘yogya’ is not included as an adjective in the definition of Pratyakṣa there arises a contingency of merit, i.e., ‘dharma’ and demerit, i.e., ‘adharma’ coming under the scope of pratyakṣa since ‘dharma’ and ‘adharma’ both are non-different. To get rid of the difficulty Dharmarāja suggests that the word ‘yogya’ should also be added. It may be noted here that merit (dharma) is not an object which is fit for

33. yogyatvasyāpi viṣayaviśeṣanatvat...ibid., p.18
34. kiṁcit yogyam kiṁcidayogyamityatra phalabalakalpyaḥ svabhāva eva śaraṇam. ibid., p.18
pratyakṣa (yogya). As 'dharma' (merit) is something that can be known only through verbal testimony (śabda).

Here, the Paribhāṣākāra uses the word 'tattadindriyayogya', i.e., perceptible with the help of that particular organ. Because there may arise another difficulty of the pot being perceived when the sound (śabda) is heard, for in sound also there is as much of perceptibility (yogyatva) through the sense organ, e.g. ear as in the pot which has perceptibility through the sense organ, e.g. eye. Then there will be no difficulty in the definition of pratyakṣa. Because both the objects, e.g. śabda and pot can be perceived by the sense organ in general; both of them are not capable of being perceived by one and the same individual sense organ. Therefore it may not be urged that, as happiness (sukha), misery etc. are not capable of being perceived by the sense organ (not indriyayogya) and they cannot come under the scope of pratyakṣa as they legitimately should. Even if there is non-difference of the object with the vṛttī or mental mode there is the contingency of the colour of the pot being cognised when the pot itself is intended to be cognised as the vṛttī is present in both the cases. In order to avoid this difficulty, Dharmarāja cleverly includes the term svākāra, as an adjectival vṛttī in the definition \(^{35}\). That is to say, in pratyakṣa the

35. svākāra-vṛttīvacchinnacaitanya. ibid., p.18
vṛtti should be of the form of the object, e.g. of the pot form when the pot is perceived, of the colour form when the colour is perceived etc.

Dharmarājādhyaṅkīndra, the Paribhāśākāra finally defines Pratyakṣa in a particular aspect and deftly concluding as follows; 'the sameness of locus between the consciousness limited by the vṛtti of a particular form and the consciousness limited by the object which is present and is competent to be apprehended by the particular sense organ' 36. In other words, it may be called 'jñānagata pratyakṣatva'.

After defining jñānagata pratyakṣatva, Dharmarāja defines 'viṣayagata pratyakṣatva'. Hereby non-difference (abhinna) between the two consciousness is not meant actual identity as may be expected, in which case the resulting perception should be of the form 'aham ghatah' ('I am the pot' etc.) and not 'ahamidaṁ paśyāmi' ('I am perceiving the pot'). So the Paribhāśākāra interprets that by non-difference here is meant 'ekadeśasthatva', i.e., 'occupying the same place'. Indeed perception is produced when both the consciousness limited by the internal organ and the con-

36. tattadindryayogyavartamānaviṣayāvacchinnacaitanyabhinnatvaṁ tattadākāravṛtyavacchinnajñānasya tattadamśe pratyakṣatvam. ibid.,p.24
sciousness limited by the object coexist in the same place. Even in the opinions of the philosophers we know that the object and the sense organ should be in contact with each other.

According to the above definition, as the Paribhāṣākāra puts it, anumiti (inference) is not brought under the scope of Pratyakṣa (perception), since the internal organ does not go out through any sense organ. Here a question has been raised in the commentaries as to whether the internal organ assumes the form of the object and then goes to the object or whether reaching the object, it assumes the form of the object. Obviously, the second view is acceptable to our author as he defined vr̥tti as the mode of the internal organ assuming the form of the object as it can do so only on reaching it. Hence vr̥tti going out (the word vr̥ttinirgaman) generally used in certain places is to mean going out of internal organ (antahkaraṇanirgamanah). It may be noted that the above definition of Pratyakṣa is intended to define Pratyakṣa in general whether valid or invalid. That is why probably our author includes the epithet abādhita (not sublated) as adjectival to viśaya (the object).

Another interesting point is here in this connection as well as in connection with all knowledge whether all parts of the antah...
karāṇa' go out, only certain parts of it. The question also arises what the 'antahkarāṇa' actually is? If only a part of it is subjected to reach the object of Pratyakṣa, what particular constituent of internal organ does so is to be stated. There is also another point whether, the cognition is the reflection of the concerned vṛtti in the consciousness. The Sāmkhya admits this point. All these points have not been specifically raised by our author, they will have to be inferred probably from the text wherever possible.

The 'viṣayapratyakṣatva' or perceptibility of the object has been defined by our author, Dharmarāja as the non-difference of the consciousness delimited by the internal organ (pramātā) and the consciousness delimited by the object (viṣaya). All the epithets used in the former definition 'jñānagatapratyakṣatva' prayojaka except 'abādhita' unsublated are to be understood here also. The only difference is that non-difference (abheda) here (in the case of viṣayapratyakṣa) does not signify the meaning of being in the same locus as in 'jñānagatapratyakṣatvaprayojaka' but signifies 'not having a reality different from the reality of the pramātā'.

38. pramāṭravacchinna (antaḥkaraṇāvacchinna) caitanya sya viṣayacaitanyakasyābhedaḥ. ibid.,p.25
39. pramāṭṛṣattātiriktasattākatvaśūnyatvam. ibid.,p.25
parsimony (lāghava) in this stand taken by him. The view of the philosopher in this respect is that pratyakṣatva in the object is being the object of perception, in which case if all the vṛttis, the pramātā and the prameya are to become objects of knowledge, then there is the prolixity (gaurava) of accepting pramāṭrabheda to effect pratyaksaviśayatva. In order to avoid this prolixity, the Paribhāṣākāra originally suggests non-difference of the pramatr (pramāṭrabheda) as the cause of object of perception, i.e., (viṣayapratyakṣa). That is why the entire definition of pratyakṣa holds good even in the case of an invalid knowledge like 'idam rajatam' (this is silver) in the case of 'sukti' (nacre) as the same type of reality does not exist between the pramātā and the object -- one has 'prātibhāṣikasattā', i.e., hallucinational existence and the other has a 'vyāvahārikasattā', i.e., pragmatic existence. Hence the gist of the matter is this: an object is said to be cognised by pratyakṣa when it is capable and is devoid of any existence apart from that of the consciousness associated with the subject, which has for its limiting adjunct a mental state in the form of that object. Most of the arguments of the Paribhāṣākāra appear to have sprung up from the great originality.

40. svākāravṛttyapahitapramāṭrcaitanyasattatātiriktasa ttākatvaśūnyatve sati yogyatvam viṣayasya pratyakṣatvam. ibid.,p.29
II. THREE KINDS OF CAITANYA (CONSCIOUSNESS):

According to the Advaita Vedanta, valid perception is only Consciousness (Caitanya), cf. 'pratyakṣapramāṇa caitanyam eva.' In other words, the means known as Pratyakṣa refers to the instrument of valid perceptual knowledge which knowledge is nothing but Pure Consciousness. According to the Advaitin Caitanya is an independent and eternally existing Reality it is pure contentless knowledge and it is neither produced nor destroyed. Caitanya manifests everything else but is itself not manifested by any other entity, cf. 'svayamprakāśa'. This type of knowledge identical with the Reality, in other words Brahman itself. The consciousness, i.e. Caitanya that is apparent in the usual distinction of knower, known and knowledge is not real but is only empirical, i.e. vyāvahārika. It is the psychosis of the inner organ, cf. 'antahkaraṇa vṛtti' and is regarded as knowledge because of its being a determinant of consciousness⁴¹. Although Consciousness is without a beginning, yet that mental state which reveals it arises through the contact of the organs, etc. Therefore Consciousness qualified by the mental state is spoken of as having a beginning. According to the tenets of the Vedānta, the criterion (prayojaka) of

⁴¹. VP., p. 8
perceptuality is the unity of the Consciousness limited by the object. Though the Consciousness is one, it is modalised in three ways. The threefold consciousness is:

(i) Viṣaya Caitanya (object consciousness),
(ii) Pramāṇa Caitanya (knowledge consciousness) and
(iii) Pramātr Caitanya (subject consciousness).

The consciousness is modalised by different objects, in other words, it is limited by a jar etc. is the consciousness associated with the object and called Viṣaya Caitanya (object consciousness). When the consciousness is determined by the mental mode, i.e., vṛtti it is said to be Pramāṇa Caitanya (knowledge consciousness) and that limited by the mental state is the consciousness associated with the means of knowledge. When the same consciousness is modalised by the internal organ (mind) it is known as Pramātr Caitanya (subject consciousness), and that limited by the mind is the consciousness associated with the subject. The sense organs produce the mental mode, which serves to modalise the eternal (light of) consciousness. The activity of the internal organ is said to be cognition, i.e., jñāna in a secondary sense since it determines the knowledge concerned. It is remarkable that whereas the

42. tathāhi trividham caitanyam. VP., p.13
Vedāntin holds that actual knowledge is produced after the production of vṛtti, the Logician believes that the sense-object contact itself produces a knowledge of the object. The Vedāntin observes that the sense-object is just for the sake of producing mental state, and from the standpoint of consciousness, there remain no difference among them. This word and same consciousness is the pointer (nirdesaka) of the Divine Brahman-consciousness. From the standpoint of one and the same consciousness in three categories, the Cit or consciousness manifests as one without a second, but it can be said that the same consciousness manifests as three principles, when limited by ‘ajñāna’ (nescience). Again, it is seen that one and same consciousness (śuddha-cit) appears as two forms, caitanya (pure consciousness) and vṛtti-caitanya (modal consciousness). A vṛtti is a product of ‘cit’ and ‘ajñāna’, i.e. a consciousness and ‘antaḥkaraṇa’ or mind, which is a product of nescience (ajñāna).

It is said to be modalised consciousness (vṛtti-jñāna) cit or pure consciousness is self-shining (svayam-jyoti), self revealing (svayam-prakāśa) and undivided (akhaṇḍa) but when it manifests through the medium of the internal organ (antaḥkaraṇa) or mind, it assumes the form of vṛtti-jñāna.
III. FOUR KINDS OF Vṛtti (MENTAL MODE):

In Pratyakṣa, the function (vṛtti) of internal organ is involved. The internal organ which is of the nature of light, i.e. 'tejas' goes out to the object through the channels of the sense organs, reaches the object and gets modified into its form. The process may be compared to the process of water flowing through the channels occupying the land, being modified into the form of the object. This modification of the internal organ in the form of the object (to be) cognised is known as vṛtti. Therefore, vṛtti is that which apprehends the object. The object of Pratyakṣa and vṛtti come to be in the same locus outside when Pratyakṣa is produced.

The process of vṛtti going out through the sense organs occurs only in Pratyakṣa. Hence it is immediate knowledge. In Anumāna etc. the vṛtti does not go outside. So Anumāna etc. are designated as mediate knowledge, i.e. Parokṣa. In Pratyakṣa the consciousness determined by the apprehending mental mode becomes identified with the consciousness determined by the object, as the determinants of the two consciousness stand in the

44. yathā taḍāgodakam chidrānnirgatyā kulyātmanā kedārān praviśya tadvadeva .... ghaṭādiviśayā kāreṇa pariñamate. VP., p. 14.
45. sa eva pariñāmo vṛttirityucyate. ibid.
same locus. In the perception of a jar, i.e. 'ghaṭāvaccinna caitanya' is identified with the consciousness determined by the mental mode which is modified into the form of the jar. Thus there is an identification of the apprehending mental mode (pramāṇacaitanya) with the object consciousness (viśayacaitanya). Hence it may be noted that by Identification is meant standing in the same locus.

In the case of Pratyakṣa the vṛtti and the object should not only occupy the same place but also the same time. The perceptual process and the object must have the same time moment, otherwise there arises a contingency that perception of pleasure and pain would be similar to those of the recollection of pleasure etc. In the perception of pleasure, the vṛtti (mental mode) and the object, i.e. pleasure occupy the same place-- when the present time is also accepted to be a requisite. On the other hand, in the case of recollection of pleasure, however, the mode in the form of recollection exists at the present time whereas the object (pleasure) relates to the past time. So they are not present at the same time, and hence there is no overlapping of the definition of per-

46. ghaṭākāravṛtyavaccinna Caitanyaśya
tadvṛttyavachinnacaitanyaśya cabhinnataya
tatra ghatajnanasya ghatanse pratyaksatvam.

ibid., p. 15.
ception on recollection. It may be noted here that in the case of Anumāṇa, though there is Abheda between the vṛtti and the object, both of them are not present at the same time.

According to the Vedānta-Paribhāṣā the Vṛtti, i.e. the mental state is of four kinds:-(i) Samśaya (doubt), (ii) Niścaya (certitude) (iii) Garva (egoism) and (iv) Smaraṇa (recollection).

Owing to this diversity of states, the mind is designated as the ‘manas’, the intellect, the ego and the citta. Except the Advaita Vedāntins and the Buddhists, all others systems hold manas as an internal sense organ (indriya). Jayanta Bhaṭṭa refers to ‘manas’ as a sense organ. An indriya is that which is regarded as an instrumental cause (karaṇa) of pratyakṣa. The Vedāntins accept the existence of the knower, i.e., the self but some of them do not regard ‘manas’ as an indriya. The Paribhāṣākāra view of manas is that it is that function of antahkaraṇa which is concerned with the state of doubt. It is not an independent reality; it rather represents one of the function of antahkaraṇa.

47. manobuddhirahamkāraścittam karanamāṇtram/ samśayo niściyo garvaḥ smaraṇam viṣayā ime//

ibid., p. 32.
IV. TWO-FOLD DIVISION OF PRATYAKṢA:

According to the Vedānta-Paribhāṣā, Pratyakṣa (Perception) is of two types:\footnote{pratyakṣaṁ dvividham, savikalpaka \nirvikalpakabhedat. ibid., p. 32.}

(i) Savikalpaka Pratyakṣa (Determinate Perception) and

(ii) Nirvikalpaka Pratyakṣa (Indeterminate Perception).

The Savikalpaka Pratyakṣa (determinate perception) is that knowledge which apprehends relatedness of the substantive and the qualifying attribute, i.e. ‘vaiśistya’. As for example, knowledge such as, ‘I know the jar’ (cf. ‘ghaṭamahāṁ jānāmi’). In this example, the object of the knowledge is the ‘jar’ as related to the subject ‘I’. Therefore it is Savikalpaka Pratyakṣa (determinate perception). When the object is differentiated and attributed through a relation, then it is a Pratyakṣa of the type of savikalpaka.

Whereas Nirvikalpaka Pratyakṣa (indeterminate perception) is that knowledge which does not apprehend this relatedness. As for example, knowledge arising from sentence like, ‘this is that Devadatta’ (cf. ‘soyam devadattaḥ’), or ‘Thou art That’ (cf. ‘tattvamasi’\footnote{Chā. U., VI. viii. 7 -- xvi. 3.}). In these cases the knowledge arises by ignoring the particular features. For example, ‘this’ refers to the present
and 'that' to the past, and these two being contradictory elements, have to be left out of consideration in recognising the person Devadatta. Similarly, in the other example, 'thou' and that referring to something present and absent respectively, these differences have to be ignored before one can grasp the essential unity of the individual self and Brahman. So in such cases the knowledge is indeterminate. By Indeterminate Knowledge is meant that cognition which is devoid of any syntactical connection.

The Naiyāyikas accept the distinction between the Savikalpaka pratyakṣa (determinate perception) and Nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa (indeterminate perception). Gaṅgeśa holds that the Nirvikalpaka is the first stage of Pratyakṣa where the object is not seen in its actual form and not characterised by attributes, relations etc. The pratyakṣa has been divided by the Naiyāyikas into two broad classes, viz., laukika (ordinary) and alaukika (extra ordinary). It is depends upon the nature of the sense object contact that is involved in all perceptions. Laukika pratyakṣa again has been divided into six kinds of olfactory, gustatory, visual, tactual, auditory and mental perceptions. This type of classification of laukika pratyakṣa has reference to the senses concerned in

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50. VPDA., p. 33
perception. According to another classification, laukika pratyakṣa is of two kinds, viz., nirvikalpaka (indeterminate) and savikalpaka (determinate). In this, the principle of classification is the character of the perceptual knowledge which arises from sense-object contact. To these two kinds of pratyakṣa, some philosophers add pratyabhijñā (recognition) as a special form of determinate perception. Thus keeping in view the nature of pratyakṣa, the Naiyāyikas distinguish among three modes of laukika pratyakṣa, namely, the nirvikalpaka, savikalpaka and pratyabhijñā. Alaukika pratyakṣa being explicit and definite knowledge, has but one mode, namely, savikalpaka. The Advaita Vedāntins hold that pratyabhijñā (recognition) is a kind of pratyakṣa. Pratyabhijñā is a pratyakṣa of the nirvikalpaka kind for the Advaitin since there is in it no predication of anything about the perceived object, but an assertion of its identity amidst changing conditions.

The Baudhās admit only nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa as real. To the Sāṁkhya nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa is a single apprehension of the object. Kumārila Bhaṭṭa and other Mīmāṁsakas also established the nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa. They argue that at first sight

51. vide NTK., p. 189.
52. alaukikarāṇ tu .. savikalpakameva. NKO., p. 499.
53. vide VP., Chap. I.
there exists some primary (indeterminate) knowledge of the pure object like the knowledge of a child or a dumb person. The Prabhakara maintains that the indeterminate cognition perceives both the generic and specific characters in an undistinguished mass. It is remarkable that indeterminate knowledge is not recognised by monotheistic Vedanta consisting of the five schools of Vaiśṇavism, viz., Rāmānuja - Viśiṣṭādvaita, Nimbārka - Dvaitādvaita, Vallabhācārya - of Śuddhādvaita, Madhva - Dwaita, Baladeva Vidyābhūṣaṇa.

According to Śaṅkara Advaita Savikalpaka means the pratyakṣa of an object which speaks of relation etc. In the example 'the pot is blue' the pot and the colour blue and their relatedness are clearly noted. Therefore it is a case of determinate knowledge (savikalpaka pratyakṣa). According to Vedānta-Paribhāṣā sentences like 'That thou art' 'Soyam Devadattaḥ' etc. signify cases of indeterminate knowledge in as much as there is no difference between the consciousness delimited by Devadatta and that by the internal organ. So these are cases of pratyakṣa. It may be asked how these cognitions become perceptual when they are not sense-produced, on the other hand they are to be treated as verbal cognitions (śabdajñāna) because they are generated by sentences. In reply to the above Paribhāṣākāra argues that the
perceptual character of a cognition does not lie in its sensuous origin, but the identification of pramäṇa consciousness with the consciousness of the object, i.e. prameya which is fit to be perceived and present at that particular moment. All these conditions are evidently present in the case of 'Soyam Devadattaḥ'. So the knowledge produced by sentences such as 'this is that Devadatta' are only cases of perception. Similarly the knowledge produced by the statements 'That Thou Art' is perceptual in character. Here the cognising self itself is the object and hence the identification of the vṛttti (mental mode) with the object. Still it may be questioned how statements like 'That Thou Art' can be brought under perception. It is not essential, Dharmarājādhvindra replies to bring a relation between the object and the subject in order to get the meaning of a proposition. If the context and the intention of the speaker are clearly known, then the meaning of the sentence is known. According to him, there is only an identity of essence between the subject and the object. In this sentence there is no question of relation etc. So it is known as Akhaṇḍārtha. Akhaṇḍārtha is that meaning of a proposition which is understood without any relation among its parts. It refers only to the identity of the object as an unrelated essence, i.e. as pure being. But while the 'identical' perceived in nirvikalpaka is an abstracts unity of
being, our knowledge of it is a propositional judgement of the non-predicative order (akhaṇḍārtha vākya). The Vedantin further holds that nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa is self-manifest or self-conscious knowledge. This is perceived by itself, i.e. pratyakṣa and thus not require any other knowledge to manifest or perceived it. Thus, it follows that we have first the savikalpaka pratyakṣa of an object as related to certain qualities and then a nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa of it as a unity that remains identical with itself under different conditions. Therefore the meaning of the sentence is indeterminate. Dharmarāja quotes in support of the definition of his akhaṇḍārthatva a verse from Citṣukhācārya 54.

Thus in the view of the Paribhāṣākāra an indeterminate (nirvikalpaka) perception is that in which there is an identification of the vṛttī with the object (being perceived) be it sense-generated or not.

The meaning of sentences like ‘Soyam Devadattaḥ’ according to the Vedāntin cannot be a case of śabdajñāna as it may superficially appear to be, but a case of pratyakṣa since the internal organ of the cogniser assumes the form of Devadatta and

54. samsargāsaṅgisamyaγadhīhetutā yā girāmiyam/
uktākhaṇḍarthatā yadvā tatprātipadikārthatā //
TPD., p. 192., vide VP., p. 35
there is no difficulty in accepting non-difference between the two-cogniser consciousness and the Devadatta consciousness.

According to the Vedānta Paribhāṣā of Dharmarājādhyāṃkīndra we know that Pratyakṣa (perception) is again two-fold55— that due to the witness in the individual self (jīva-sākṣīn) and that due to the witness in God (Īśvarasākṣīn). Now the individual self is Consciousness limited (avacchinna) by the mind, and the witness in that is Consciousness that has the mind as its limiting adjunct (upādhi). The difference between them is that in the first the mind is a qualifying attribute (viṣeṣaṇa) and in the second a limiting adjunct. A qualifying attribute is that which differentiates, is present, and is connected with what is predicated in respect of something related to it; while a limiting adjunct is that which differentiates and is present but is not connected with the predicate in respect of something related to it. For example, in the sentence ‘the coloured jar is transitory’, i.e. ‘rūpaviśiṣṭo ghaṭoanityaḥ’, here, the colour is a qualifying attribute and in the sentence ‘the ether enclosed by the auditory passage is the ear’, cf.‘karnāśaṅkulyavacchinam nabhaḥ śrotram’, here in the example, the auditory passage is a limiting adjunct. It is this limiting

55. tacca pratyakṣaṁ punardvidham- jīva-sākṣī Īśvarasākṣīn ceti. VP., p. 37.
adjunct that is called and indicator (paricāyaka) by the logicians. In the topic under consideration, since the mind is insentient and therefore incapable of revealing objects, it is a limiting adjunct of consciousness, which reveals things. This witness in the individual self is different in each individual. For if it were one, what Caitra has known, Maitra also would recollect\textsuperscript{56}.

Our author differs from the logicians regarding the nature of the sense organ ear. The logicians hold that sound reaches the ear whereas the Advaitins hold that the auditory organ itself goes to the object. The Paribhāṣākāra argues that as the ear is an object of limited dimension like the eye.

In this way, on account of the two-foldness of the witness, perceptual knowledge is two-fold. The character of Pratyakṣa both as regards objects and as regards cognition has been ascertained\textsuperscript{57}. Of these, the general definition of the perceptuality of cognition is that it is just consciousness, for even in example like ‘parvato bahnīmān’ (the hill has fire), the consciousness that has mental states in the form of the fire etc. as limiting adjuncts, being

\textsuperscript{56} \textit{ekatve caitrāvagate maitrasyāpyanusanandhāna prasaṅgaḥ.} \textsuperscript{VP.}, p. 37.

\textsuperscript{57} \textit{pratyakṣatvānca jñeyagatam jñaptigataṁca nirūpitam.} \textit{ibid.}, p. 44
self revealing in respect of itself, is a pratyakṣa. If the pratyakṣa be considered only with regard to the objects, then the fire would be excluded from its scope. On the other hand, if it be considered in respect of the cognition, then all knowledge being perceptual in respect of itself in the Vedānta, the cognition of the fire is a case of pratyakṣa. Therefore, here is the distinction between the perceptuality of the cognition with regard to itself and that with regard to its objects.

In the Advaita Vedānta we seem to have the most abstract view of nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa. According to this, nirvikalpaka is the knowledge of pure being (sanmātrāṇa). It is a cognition of the this or the existent as such but not as determined by anything. To determine a thing is to characterise it by this or that quality and is thus to distinguish it from other things having different quality. All this, however, is the work of vikalpa or discriminative thought. Prior to discrimination there cannot be any cognition of an object as such-and-such, i.e. as a determinate reality. So, nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa must be the cognition of pure indeterminate being. It is in savikalpaka pratyakṣa that an object is determined by certain qualities and is distinguished from different objects. But all objects being ultimately one undifferentiated unity of consciousness or caitnya, their distinction or difference is only an appearance.
Towards the close of this pratyakṣa chapter, the Paribhāṣākāra finds an occasion to discuss the theory of error from the Advaita standpoint. We have already pointed out that the Advaitin hold the Anirvacanīyakhyāti. According to this theory there is superimposition of inclination, non-perennial and fraught with ignorance, on the external object in the form of knowledge; and when we mistake a shell for a piece of silver we are actually aware, for as long as our error persists, of a piece of silver which in some sense exists. Dharmarāja argues that in the case of superimposition of a pot, avidyā as a doṣa is the cause. In superimposition of nacre-silver, however, disease etc. are also considered additional doṣas. That is why the Paribhāṣākāra accepts, as a vedāntin, that the objects in the dream state are also unreal in as much as they are produced with the help of adventitious defects in the form of sleep etc.

By dream state is meant a state in which there is an internalorgan-mode of the immediate type which has for its objects which are not perceived, by the senses. Here the word not generated from the senses is included in order to exclude the walking state. The word internal organ has been included in the

58. indriyājanyaviṣayagocarāparokṣāntah karaṇa
vṛttyavasthā svapnāvasthā. VP., p. 394
definition in order to avoid deep sleep state when there is only the mode of avidya present but not the mode of internal organ.

After that Dharmarāja turns his attention to the objects of dream state and discusses whether they are objects actually produced or are only objects recollected. Not so, for if only the recollection of the chariot etc. be assumed, it would contradict such experiences as, ‘ratham paśyāmi’ (cf. I see a chariot), or ‘svapne rathamdrākṣam’ (cf. I saw a chariot in a dream). Such experience is stultified in case the objector’s stand is taken. Again, there is also the contradiction of the śrutivakya where it is stated that in the dream state objects are created. So, Dharmarājādhvṛindra concludes through experience and Šabda (verbal testimony) that the dream objects like ‘śuktirajata’, i.e. nacre-silver are unreal (hallucinational).

As to the question how the dream-objects like the nacre-silver exist only as long as they are experienced, it may be noted that in case such objects are considered effects of primary nescience (avidyā) then hallucination is produced from avidyā aided by some adventitious defect. In this way both of them, i.e. the avidyā as well as the defect are required to produce prātibhāṣikatva. The Paribhāṣākāra then quotes scriptural texts establishing the
creation of chariots etc., such as ‘but he creates the chariot, the animals to be yoked to them, and the roads’\textsuperscript{59}. Therefore, like the silver appearing in the nacre, the chariot etc. experienced in a dream are also illusory, and stay as long as the illusion lasts. Here the author raises a further question that in a dream, the particular spot which is experience as the support of the chariot etc. not being also connected with the eyes at the time, and indescribable illusory spot has to be assumed. Hence where does the superimposition of the chairot etc. take place? To this the Paribhāṣākāra gives reply that the objection is not valid, for consciousness, which is self-effulgent, is the substratum of the chariot etc. Because the chariot etc. that are experienced, in the dream, are experienced as but existent, as it is consciousness manifesting as existence that is the substratum. The particular spot also is superimposed on the consciousness and is illusory.

Our author raises a further question why the dream objects do not persist even after waking up since these objects have been superimposed on pure caitanya and even after waking up there is no śuddha caitanya sākṣātkāra for the person. It is possible only at the time of release. And it is so because the hallucinational silver

\textsuperscript{59. atha rathān rathayogān pathaḥ srjate.}

\textit{Br.U., IV.iii. 10.}
which is the product of avidyā superimposed on nacre-consciousness is destroyed by the pratyakṣa of the real nacre. To this Dharmarāja gives reply based upon the way in which the products are destroyed. One way is destruction along with the material cause which is known as ‘bādha’, i.e. nullification but the other is the destruction caused even when the material cause is ‘nivṛtti’, i.e. present. That is why the entire world is ‘bādhita’, i.e. stultified only when avidyā is removed. Therefore, in the present case the dream state objects may not have the ‘bādha’ type of destruction because there is no Brahmasākṣātkāra. It is seen that there is no difficulty whatever in maintaining that there is the ‘nivṛtti’, i.e. cessation type of destruction because of a different vṛtti in the mind or because of the defect in the form of sleep etc. being removed. The Paribhāṣākāra explains the same in detail how in nacre-silver it is a case of ‘bādha’ if ‘suktirajata’ be considered to be a product of the subsidiary avidyā present in the nacre-consciousness.

Dharmarājādhvīṇḍra criticises the Naiyāyika point of view of khyātīvāda mostly whereas the Vivaraṇa deals with the refutation of several khyātīvādas of some other schools. He follows closely on the lines of thought presented in the Vivaraṇa school while dealing with indefinable khyāti, i.e. anirvacanīyakhyāti. He does not refer to any other khyāti theory and criticise it but simply
states the Vedāntin point of anirvacanīyakhyāti, raises the possible objections and tries to vindicate the Vedāntins point of view. Dharmarāja accepts impression aided by similarity by which the avidyā in the nacre transforms itself by vivarta into silver and the avidyā pertaining to the mode also aided by the impression of the vr̥tti which cognises the silver, transforms itself by vivarta into the form of the vr̥tti.

In a dream the particular spot which is experienced as the support of the chariot etc. not being also connected with the eye at the time, an indescribable illusory spot has to be assumed. This is an objection, but according to Dharmarājādhyāṅdra this objection is not valid. Here, it is fact that the chariot etc. being cognised by the organ is illusory, for then all organs are at rest. In this way, the Paribhāṣākāra defines Pratyakṣa as pure consciousness which is direct and immediate.

In the ‘viṣaya pariccheda’ of his Vedānta Paribhāṣā, the author states about dream. Here the author seems to differ from the general view that in dreams there are no mental modifications, but only modifications of nescience. The dream condition is that in

60. indriyājanyaviṣayagocarāparokṣāntaḥkarāṇa vr̥ttyavasthā svapnāvasthā. VP., p. 192
which illusory objects are immediately cognised by a mental state that is not caused by the organs. While discussing the mental mode of the internal organ the Paribhāṣākāra speaks of three states, viz, one is the waking state, the second is the dream state and the third is the profound sleep state (suṣupti). The author defines the dream state as the state of the mental mode which produces an immediate knowledge which has for its objects something and which is not produced from the sense organs.

Thus, the entire 'Pratyakṣa pariccheda' appears to be a product of the author's own ingenuity and he has shown a great originality where he speaks 'jñānagata pratyakṣatva pryojaka' and 'viṣayagatapratyakṣatva pryojaka' lucidly, the justification of the different epithets included in the definition of Pratyakṣa.