CHAPTER TWO

Nature of Knowledge:

In the context of philosophical investigations, knowledge may be roughly called convictions regarding reality. It is the basis of all practical activities. Knowledge is termed as Buddhi (understanding or Convictions), Upalabdhi (apprehension), Pratyaya (concepts), judgement, awareness and cognizance or cognizance which are synonymous to each other. In general, these convictions again may be brought under the broad heading of 'Jñāna' which denotes all kinds of knowledge -- true or false.

In Indian theory of knowledge or 'Epistemology', the term 'Jñāna' has a wide range of application, viz. sensation, perception, self-awareness, inference, argument from etymology, verbal cognition, doubt, illusion, memory -- all these internal phenomena fall within 'Jñāna'. The epistemology is a branch of critical philosophy; it is investigating the nature and criteria of knowledge and manner with regard to episteme or knowledge. The term epistemology, thus, means the science or theory of knowledge. Epistemology, therefore, may be called as that nature, conditions and factors, the limits and
validity of knowledge. All philosophy must include epistemology as its integral part. In simple, epistemology is criticism of knowledge and hence knowledge is one for the main objects of philosophy. In the contemporary epistemology, the concept of knowledge is defined as justified true belief.

Etymologically the term ‘jñāna’ captures the sense of knowledge. The term jñāna comes from the root jña (to know). It is synonymous with pramā (valid knowledge). That is to say that jñāna as pramā implies ‘yathārthānubhava’. Knowledge, in the Upaniṣadic age, was not only metaphysical but also of many other kinds. Knowledge of the material universe is not enough, one may across rebirth only by exploring the actual identity of one’s Self or Ātman and realizing that the individual self is no ther than the Supreme Self. In Advaita Vedānta, ‘jñāna’ is used to mean both absolute knowledge (svarūp-jñāna) and relative or empirical, pragmatic (vṛtti-jñāna) knowledge. The Advaita declares that the so called vṛtti-jñāna (mental knowledge) is not eligible for the title jñāna unless it is illumined by the principle of consciousness, viz. Brahman.¹ Both knowledge(jñāna) and true belief i.e.truth(satyam) play the cardinal role for the ultimate reality is characterised in terms of truth and knowledge. According to Śaṅkara, knowledge

¹ satyam jñānam anantam brahma. Tai.U., II.1.1
in its narrower sense stands for pure awareness i.e. self-knowledge.

Gautama refers to knowledge through the term 'buddhi' (understanding or convictions), and says that the terms Upalabdhi (apprehension), and jñāna are its synonyms.² Kaṇāda enlists the term 'buddhi' amongst the qualities.³ Praśastapāda adds Pratyaya in the list of synonyms of 'buddhi' as stated by Gautama.⁴

We may show here to put the definition of knowledge in a technical way as follows 'S' knows that 'H' is true = If 'H' is true, 'S' accepts 'H' and 'H' is evident for 'S'. In short, knowledge is nothing but a justified or evident true belief. It being thus necessarily attended with truth, there is little sense in calling a knowledge true or false. There is no false knowledge as there is no false fact. Every knowledge is propositional and that proposition must true. The proposition is one that is evident for that person.⁵

As regard the conception of knowledge there is divergence

2. buddhirupalabdhirjñānamityanarthāntaram. NS.,I.1.15
3. VS., I.1.6
4. buddhirupalabdhirjñānam pratyaya iti paryāyāḥ.
   NK.,p.171; PB., p.410; VP.,p.136
5. TOK.,p.90
among the different systems of philosophy. The Nyāya holds that knowledge is a product of the contact of mind with the self, while according to the Vedānta, knowledge is eternal pure consciousness (caitanya), only it is manifested through mental states (vṛtti). The Naiyāyika says, knowledge is a property of self or ātman. Udayana defines knowledge in his Kiranavai as knowledge is that on the presence of which there is an anuvyavasāya in self like 'I know'. In the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system, knowledge or buddhi (cognition) is taken to mean the same thing as upalabdhi (apprehension), jñāna (knowledge) and pratyaya (cognisance).

Jayanta Bhaṭṭa up holds like his fellow Naiyāyikas that knowledge is the quality of self and refers to jñāna as guṇa. So, we say that knowledge means apprehension or awareness of objects. He considers Gautama's use of the terms 'jñāna' and 'upalabdhi' as definitive synonyms of buddhi sufficient for understanding the nature of knowledge.  

According to the Bhaṭṭarian also the words 'cetanā', 'buddhi', 'jñāna' and 'samvit' are used as synonyms in common

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6. yasmin satyatmani jānamītyanuvyavasāyo bhavati sā buddhiḥ. Ki.,p.510
7. paryāyaprayogasyaiva lakṣaṇakṣamatvāt. NM.,II-58
The Sāmkhya and the Yoga system looks upon cognition as substantive mode or modification (vṛtti) of the material principle called 'buddhi', as it reflects the light or consciousness of the self in it.

With regard to the essential nature of knowledge, we may ask question: 'Is Knowledge a substance or an attributes? ' 'Is it a mode or an activity? ' 'Is knowledge concrete or abstract? ' The important problem of epistemology faces us here. Self-conscious evidence speaks for the concrete as well as abstract aspect of knowledge, but is more in favour of the concrete aspect. The distinction of nirvikalpa and savikalpa has found a place in the Bauddha, Naiyāyika, Sāmkhya, Mīmāṃsā and the Vedānta system. Actually, it is an all-absorbing topic in Indian philosophy and the chief tendency has been amongst a class of philosophers to lend their support to abstract knowledge. That knowledge has got a concrete expression is accepted by everybody, but when we come to logically examine the concrete aspect of knowledge we meet with certain difficulties.

Knowledge indeed is known like other things. Yet the knowledge that is known is knowledge of a particular thing. No other

8. cetanā buddhiḥ jñānam samvidityanarthāntaramiti loukikā buddhyante. KK., Part II., p.106
things is necessarily of another thing. So far it is fundamentally different from other things.

Śaṅkara has accepted the concrete stage of knowledge has not categorically denied it. The Dvaita, the Viśiṣṭādvaita school and some others have noticed only the concrete expression of knowledge and have denied the constant tendency of cognitive experience to pass from the abstract to the concrete stage.

Śaṅkara criticises the concrete knowledge as: (i) in its logical character and (ii) in its epistemological import. He is anxious to establish the point that knowledge as judgment is involved in fallacies. Judgment is relational consciousness which is two-fold as (a) relation of subject and object, (b) relation of subject and predicate. These are the most potent forms of relations. This relation of subject and object is the essence of empiric epistemology and the ground of concrete knowledge. There is no proof that other than the evidence of consciousness but the evidence of consciousness is not always true, specially in empiric knowledge. The suppose relation may be nothing more than an appearance and a false creation of the pragmatic consciousness. Logically there are difficulties. The subject is subject, the object is object.

10. SPŚD., pp. 8-9
How the object is related to the subject is not explained. The relation is a term between the subject and object. There is a meaning to the subject, but not the object. Meaning is a psychological implication and the relation is relation to the subject.

As regard the nature of knowledge there are three main theories, viz. (i) act-theory,

(ii) relation theory and

(iii) quality theory.

The Bauddha and the Mīmāṁsā systems uphold the act-theory. For the Bauddha, to exist is to act and so to change. Knowledge as an existent fact consists in the act of showing and leading to an object. For the Mīmāṁsā, the act of knowing (jñānakriyā) refers to an object. The second theory is that it is a relation between certain entities. According to the Nyāya, knowledge may be said to arise ultimately out of the relation between the soul and the body. According to the third theory, knowledge is a quality. The Sāṁkhya and Yoga system look upon knowledge as a modification of buddhi or the intellect which is its substratum. The Nyāya, the

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11. nahi jñānam jñeyasambaddameva prakāśakam atiprasaṅgat, nāpi svasambaddham, ātmasvarūpasya tadguṇasya vā jñānasya jñeyena sambadhasyā bhāvāt. Ad. S., pp. 453-54
Vaiśeṣika and the Viśiṣṭādvaita school are the main systems of Indian philosophy that seem to favour the quality theory of knowledge. The Rāmānuja school of the Vedānta takes it as an essential quality of the self. But the Advaitins say that knowledge is not the essence of the self, it is an attribute owned by the self.

According to the Nyāya and the Vaiśeṣika system also, knowledge is an attribute which inheres in the soul substance which however, is separable it.

According to the Naiyāyikas, knowledge is an attribute of the self. It is not a substance, since it can not be the stuff or the constitutive cause of anything, nor is it the permanent substratum of certain recognised and variant properties. According to Sāmkhya-Yoga, it is generally believed that knowledge is neither a mode nor a substance but a kind of activity or function (kriyā). The Mīmāṁsakas and the Buddhist agree in describing knowledge as an activity, a transitive process.¹²

The Nyāya, however, emphatically repudiates the conception of knowledge as an activity. Jayanta Bhaṭṭa traces the act theory of knowledge. To the Naiyāyikas, it appears as the result of a relation between the soul and the body, which in themselves are not knowledge.

¹². jñānakriyā hi sakarmikā. SD.,p.56 cf.NBT.,Chap.1
To the Advaita Vedānta, knowledge or consciousness is just the self, the very stuff of it. According to Prābhākara and also to Nyāya, the self is essentially a pure substance and cognition is one of its adventitious qualities which come and go without affecting its essential nature. On the other hand, according to Bhāṭṭa school, sentience is the very essence of the self-substance, which can not be taken away without at the same time taking away its selfhood. According to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, the object of apprehension may be a quality or a thing, an act or an emotion, the existent as well as the non-existent. Knowledge consists simply in the manifestation of objects.\(^{13}\)

Knowledge is of the nature of light or illumination according to the Advaita-Vedānta, the Prābhākara school and also of the Vijñānavādins (Buddhists). Knowledge as the nature of light does not require anything to manifest it. In the Advaita-Vedānta, knowledge is held to be self-luminous (svayam-prakāṣa) and self-valid. It is self-luminous because it reveals its own existence as soon as it is born. It may be conceived to consist in the union of existence and illumination.\(^{14}\)

Śaṅkara holds that consciousness is self-luminous but de-

\(^{13}\) arthaprakāśo buddhiḥ. TK., p.6
\(^{14}\) svaścāsau prakāśaśca svaprakāśaḥ. Cit., p.3
void of relation to objects. But Rāmānuja lays down that to think of consciousness as unrelated to objects is inconceivable, Madhvites agree with Rāmānuja as regard the nature of knowledge. Both have held the synthetic and dynamic character of knowledge.

To the Naiyāyika, the Vaiśeṣika and the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas, knowledge is not self-luminous i.e., it is other-illumined (parapraṅkaśa). According to them, knowledge is like the eyes which illumine everything but itself remain in curtain. Kumārila Bhāṭṭa admits independent existence of external objects. Bhāṭṭa says that it is not directly known, but is inferred from the knowledge (jñāta) of the object produced by knowledge.

According to the Prabhākaras, knowledge illuminates three things, viz. the objects, its knowledge and the self or knower, just as a lamp lights the things around it, itself and its wick. In every knowledge, according to them, three-fold (trīpuṭa) features, viz. the object, the form of knowledge and the knower, are experienced. It is called triple perception (trīpuṭi pratyakṣa/samvit).

15. sākṣāt-pratītiḥ pratyakṣaṁ meya-maṭṛ-pramāśu sā / meyesvindriya-yogotthā dravya-jātiguneśu sā //

PP., 5.4, p.104
According to the Naiyāyikas, knowledge is cognised by introspection (anuvyavasāya), do not deny the fact that knowledge has its own existence as well as illumination though not caused by itself. To be explicit, we should regard that alone to be self-luminous, the illumination of which is caused by its own self and not by an alter-illumination (paraprakāśatva)\(^{16}\).

The Advaitins further modified their conception of self-luminosity as: what does not form the object of knowledge is called self-luminous\(^{17}\). Pleasure, pain and such feelings, the lamp, the sun and all other physical illuminations being objects of empiric knowledge can not be characterised as jñānaviṣaya and claimed to be self-luminous.

Vācaspati's view on knowledge is that the self is, by nature, inactive. All activity belongs to prakṛti. Yet the self due to this proximity, is reflected in buddhi and through non-discrimination identifies itself with the modes of buddhi and thinks itself to be the knower and the experienced. When an object comes into contact with the sense-organ, it produces certain modifications in the sense-organ. These modifications are analysed and synthesised by the mind and are presented to buddhi which becomes modi-
fied or transformed into the form of the object. Buddhi, being unconsciousness in nature, can not by itself know the object. But as buddhi possesses an excess of sattva in it, it reflects the consciousness of the self and appears as if conscious. With the reflection of consciousness of the self in buddhi, the unconscious modification of buddhi into the form of the object becomes illumined into a conscious state of perception which is called knowledge.

Finally the Advaita-Vedānta defines the self-illuminative character of knowledge as: 'though incapable of being an object of knowledge, yet possessing competence for perceptual use'.

Śaṅkara has emphasized indeterminateness in cognition, but Rāmānuja and Madhva have both denied indeterminateness in cognition. Though Śaṅkara has not gone like the Buddhists to the extreme of reducing all relations of subject and object to nothing. He has in transcendental intuition the denial of the subject and object theory of knowledge. He has drawn a distinction between apprehension and knowledge, and so far as knowledge is concerned he does not differ much from the theistic teachers. Therefore, we find in Śaṅkara's system implications of

18. avedyatve sati aparokṣa-vyavahārayogyatvam svaprakāśatvam. ibid., p. 9
relative consciousness and of the value and progress of such a life. It is more or less a pragmatic demand and satisfaction which requires a pragmatic theory of knowledge.

The Advaitins advance their syllogism that 'consciousness is self-luminous because it possesses the characteristic 'anubhutitva'. And what does not possess this characteristic 'anubhutiva' is not characterised as self-luminous or 'svaprakāśa', e.g., the pot.\textsuperscript{19}

According to Vijñānabhikṣu, however, when an object comes into contact with the sense-organ, the buddhi becomes modified into the form of the object. Next, buddhi which is modified into the form of the object is reflected back in the self and the modification becomes manifested. Without this mutual reflection, the apparent experiences of pleasure and pain in the self, which is pure consciousness and free from pleasure and pains, can not be explained.

Knowledge is a definite form of consciousness. Definiteness strictly is the differentia of knowledge and so long as knowledge but simple apprehension. Nobody doubts whether he has a particular knowledge or not when that knowledge originates. In the

\textsuperscript{19} anubhūtiḥ svayamprakāśa anubhūtitvāt yannaiyam tannaivam yathā ghaṭāḥ ityanumānam. Op.cit.,p.11
case of such objects of knowledge as pot and like the fact of their experience is liable to doubt or misconception. So, the absence of this contingency puts knowledge in an altogether different category from these material objects which depend for the revelation of their existence upon their relevant knowledge.  

Śaṅkara's logic has two forms: (i) empirical and (ii) transcendental. When the transcendental consciousness drawn upon us the reality of empiric consciousness assumes an ideal character. Philosophy in its final judgment must abide by the intuition of transcendent consciousness. Śaṅkara holds that in the minimum the relational consciousness is neither explicit nor implicit. He makes a distinction between the expression of intuition and judgement construction and does not find the link between them.

In Indian philosophy, divergent views are held regarding the nature of the object conceived through knowledge, viz. (i) the view of absolute permanence (kevala nityavāda), (ii) the view of absolute change (kevala anityavāda), (iii) the view of permanence which yet undergoes transformation (pariṇāminityavāda) and (iv) the view of both change and permanence (nitya-anitya ubhayavāda).

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20. ghatādivyavahāre jñānānvaya-vyatirekādastu tadapekṣā. TC Mp. 784
21. SP SD., p. 41
I. Classification of Knowledge:

In Indian epistemology, two terms are used to mean knowledge, namely, jñāna and pramā. Actually, jñāna means all kinds of knowledge: true or false. But, when reality reveals true knowledge, it is termed pramā (valid knowledge). Thus, we have two main classes of knowledge, viz. (i) Valid knowledge and (ii) Invalid knowledge.

(i) Valid Knowledge:

The word pramā is used only in the sense of true or valid knowledge (yathārthajñāna) which is distinct from false knowledge. According to the Advaita-Vedānta, pramā is synonymous with jñāna.22 Since pramāṇa is the instrumental cause of pramā. According to the Naiyāyikas, valid knowledge is the certain (asañ-digdha) and true (yathārtha)23 presentation (upasthiti) of an object. Valid knowledge is experience of things as they really are (yathārtha).24 The Vaiśeṣikas consider certainty non-contradictoriness and definiteness as the marks of valid knowledge.

The Sāṁkhya defines valid knowledge as the mode of

22. vide chap.1,VP.,p.4 (cf. pramā karaṇam pramāṇam.)
23. yathārthānubhavaḥ pramā. TB.,p.28 ; TRK.,p.8
24. tadvati tat-prakārako 'nubhavo yathārthaḥ. TS.,p.24
‘buddhi’ which apprehends on object, undoubted, real and not known before. The Sāṁkhya-Yoga definition, like that of Bhāṭṭa, one recognizes novelty but unlike the Bhāṭṭa, they offer an alternative solution of the difficulty.

According to the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṁsā valid knowledge is the knowledge of an unknown real object. The word ‘unknown,’ as told in the definition, excludes memory and reinoculation. On the other hand, the Naiyāyikas do not accept the invalidity of reinoculation. The Prābhakara Mīmāṁsā says that all knowledge is valid. According to this school experience is valid knowledge and knowledge other memory is experience.

The Vedānta definition of valid knowledge has more disagreement points. The followers of the Advaita Vedānta define pramā (valid knowledge) as the uncontradicted knowledge of an object, i.e. according to them the validity of knowledge consists in non-contradictoriness. They do not accept novelty as an essential factor for pramā, Nor do they oppose the view of considering

25. asaṇḍigdha-bi-pari-tan-a-dhigata viṣayā cittavṛttiḥ/ bodhaśca pauruṣeyāḥ phalam pramā. STK., Kā.4
26. pramā ca jñāta-tattvārtha-jñānam. MM., p.2
27. anubhūti pramāṇam sā smṛter anyā... PP. 5.1 p.104
28. pramātvamana-dhigata-bādhita-viṣayajñāna-vatvam. VP., p.4
novelty as a mark of pramā. Dharmarājādhi Varindra gives two alternative definitions of pramā with and without novelty as a mark of pramā. The first definition excludes memory from valid knowledge while the second includes it. Vācaspati defines valid knowledge as knowledge which not previously known and is also not contradicted.

The Bauddha defines valid knowledge as that is capable of successful volition in revealing an object. According to the Jaina logicians definiteness is the mark of valid knowledge.

Thus, we may say as: (i) pramā or valid knowledge is a true and definite knowledge of some new fact, (ii) valid knowledge is the apprenhension (anubhava) which agrees with the real character of the object apprenhension (anubhava) which agrees with the real character of the object apprehended, (iii) valid knowledge is the certain an unerring presentation of the object and (iv)

29. tatra smṛtivyāvṛttam pramātvamanadhitabhādhita viṣayajñānatvam, smṛtisadhāraṇam tvabādhita viṣayajñānatvam. VP., p.4
30. abādhita anadhigata asaṅdigaha bodhajanakatvam hi pramāṇatvam pramāṇānām. Bhā. 1/1/4
31. prāpakam jñānam pramā. NBT., p.4
32. svaparavyavasāyi jñānam pramāṇam. PNT., 1.2
valid knowledge is the knowledge of an object as endowed with qualities which really exists in the object.

Pramāṇa is a term designation a means of pramā or valid knowledge. It is said that pramāṇa is the unique operative cause of Pramā. Dharmarājādhvarindradhvarindra holds that the efficient means of pramā is what is called pramāṇa and quite to the point, as a knowledge of the pramāṇa presupposes a knowledge of pramā (as its constituent). The number of the pramanās accepted by the different systems of Indian philosophy differ from one to nine. Most of schools of Indian philosophy admit two kinds of valid knowledge that is immediate (aparokṣa) and mediate (parokṣa). According to the Naiyāyikas, pramā is not any cognition nor any true cognition as such; it is a valid presentational knowledge of object and it includes four kinds of such presention, viz., Pratyakṣa, Anumāna, Upamāna and Śabda. The Vedāntins and the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṁsakas accept six pramanās, namely, (i) Pratyakṣa (perception), (ii) Anumāna (inference), (iii) Śabda or Āgama (verbal testimony), (iv) Upamāna (comparison or analogy), (v) Arthāpatti (postulation or presumption) and (vi) Anupalabdhi or Abhāva (non-apprehension or negation).

33. pramā karāṇam pramāṇam. VP., p.4
34. tattvānubhavaḥ pramā. SP., p.140
(ii) Invalid Knowledge:

Invalid knowledge is the knowledge of something as being located there where it (really) is not, or it is the knowledge having a predicative correlate in relation to something where it (really) is not. In other words, if any knowledge lacks in definiteness or certitude or does not convey any new information or does not represent things as they really are, it is invalid. When we perceive a snake in a rope, we apprehend a quality, i.e., snakeness which does not actually exist in the rope, that knowledge is invalid.

Invalid knowledge may be classified into that which is false and that which is true. There are some cases of presentational (anubhava) knowledge which are not valid. These constitute the type of apramā or non-valid presentation (ayathārthānubhava). This includes all cognitions that are either false or not true but not false.

Thus, we have different types of invalid knowledge, namely, memory (smṛti), dream (svapna), error or illusion (mithyājñāna, viparyaya or bhrama), doubt (sarpāṣaya), hypothetical argument or reasoning (tarka) etc.

35. yatra yan nāsti tatra tasya jñānam tadabhāvavati
tatprakārakajñānam vā apramā/
TCM., (pratyakṣa khaṇḍa), p.401
According to the Nyāya, the knowledge may be classified as follows:

Knowledge (Buddhi)

- anubhava (presentation)
  - pramā (valid)
    - pratyakṣa (perception)
    - anumāna (inference)
  - apramā (invalid or non-valid)
    - sāṁsaya (doubt)
    - viparyyaya (error)
    - tarka (hypothetical argument)
- smṛti (memory)
  - yathārtha (true)
  - ayathārtha (false)
  - aprama (invalid or non-valid)
- sarvasya (comparison)
- upamāna (comparison)
- śabda (verbal testimony)

The Naiyāyikas proceed to distinguish between its different forms as regard the differences in the nature and validity of knowledge, it is first divided into two classes, e.g.- (i) anubhava (presentation or experience) and (ii) smṛti (memory)36. Each of these two has been further divided into valid (yathārtha) and invalid or non-valid (ayathārtha) forms. Under anubhava, there are two kinds of

36. sā dvividhā smṛtiranubhavasaṃca. TS. & TD., p.82
presentations: valid and non-valid. The former is called pramā and it includes four kinds of such presentation, viz, pratyakṣa, anumāna, upamāna and śabda; the latter is called apramā and it includes samśaya, viparyyaya, tarka etc.

According to the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas, we may represent the classification of knowledge in the following table:

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Knowledge

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>yathārtha (true)</th>
<th>ayathārtha (false)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>anubhava (experience)</td>
<td>smṛti (memory)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>pramā (valid)</td>
<td>apramā (invalid)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sarhsya (doubt)</td>
<td>bhrama (error)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>svapna (dream)</td>
<td>tarka (hypothetical argument)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>pratyakṣa (perception)</td>
<td>anumiti (inference)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>upamiti (comparison)</td>
<td>śabda (verbal testimony)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>arthāpatti (presumption)</td>
<td>abhāva (negation)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

37. ayathārthānubhavastrividhaḥ samśayaviparyyaya-tarkabhedāt. ibid.
II. Forms of Invalid Knowledge:

There are divergence of views regarding the forms of invalid knowledge in the systematists. The Nyāya system, under invalid knowledge, includes doubt (saṁśaya) with its varieties of conjecture (ūha) and indefinite cognition (anadhyavasāya), as well as error (viparyaya) and hypothetical argument (tarka). According to them, memory (smṛti) is not valid knowledge, since it does not refer to presented object.

According to the Vaiśeṣika system, invalid knowledge is of four kinds. Śaṅkaramiśra, in his Upaskāra on the Vaiśeṣika sūtra, says that knowledge is of two kind, viz. (i) Vidyā (valid) and (ii) Avidyā (invalid). Avidyā is divided into four sub-classes as saṁśaya (doubt), viparyaya (illusion), svapna (dream) and anadhyavasāya (indefinite knowledge). An invalid knowledge as opposed to a valid one is often attended by an amount of uncertainty (sambhāvanā). Śaṅkaramiśra goes to identify uncertainty or Aniścayatva as the fault of many a fullacious knowledge. Saṁśaya and Anadhayavaśaya on the other hand undoubtedly involve an amount of uncertainty.

38. avidyāpi caturvidhā saṁśaya-viparyayasvapna-anadhyavasāya. Upaskāra on VS., VIII.1.1.
39. Anv., Vol. XIII., p.27
According to Kumārila Bhāṭṭa, there are three kinds of invalid knowledge, namely, (i) error or illusion (mithyājñāna), (ii) non-cognition or ignorance (ajñāna) and (iii) doubt (saṃśaya). According to Kumārila, memory is definitely invalid. Sucaritamiśra, a Bhāṭṭarian, has divided invalid knowledge into illusion, doubt, memory and saṃvāda which together with valid knowledge make up the five forms of knowledge⁴⁰.

(i) Memory (smṛti) : According to the Nyāya and both the Mīmāṃsā schools of the Bhāṭṭas and the Prābhākaras, memory (smṛti) is not valid knowledge, because in it the rememberd object is not directly presented since it is past. But only represented or recalled by the similarity and therefore it is not a means of valid knowledge⁴¹. The basis of memory is some impression (saṃskāra) left on the soul by an experience. It does not give us any new knowledge. Jayanta Bhāṭṭa expresses that memory is not to be counted as valid knowledge because its content is not among its casual factors. Memory, unlike inference represents rather than

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⁴⁰. pramāṇam bhramaḥ saṃśayaḥ smaraṇam saṃvāda iti pañcadhā jñānam vibhājamahe.
   KK on ŚV., 2.20

⁴¹. na pramāṇam smṛtiḥ pūrva-pratipatter apekṣanāt.
   PP., 5.2, p.104.
Memory is of two kinds, e.g., true (yathārtha) and false (ayathārtha). Dreams illustrate what is intrinsically false memory. The Naiyāyikas say that dream cognitions are all memory-cognitions and untrue in character. Memory proves the existence of inner sense-organ. The inner sense-organ that is operative in causing memory in the manas.

(ii) Dream (svapna): Sometimes a past experience is revived without the consciousness of its previous character. Dream is an instance of that. According to the Naiyāyika, dream-cognitions are all memory-cognitions and untrue in character.

Kumārila Bhaṭṭa explains dream as the reflection of real objects seen before elsewhere. The objects may be seen either in the same life or in the other life. The Prabhākara says that dream is a distinct type of memory. Such type of knowledge cannot arise, unless its object is previously known.

The Advaita Vedānta finds in dream a phenomenon of some

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42. tasmād anarthajatven smṛti-prāmāṇya-varaṇād. NM. (I), p.21.
43. mano hi smṛtyutpattau kāraṇam. KK on Sv., 4. 166
44. svapnadi tu sarvameva jñānam smaraṇamā-yathārtham ca. TB., p.30
philosophical significance. In dream, there is the mental creation of a world under the influence of Avidyā as aided by the impressions of waking experiences.

(iii) Doubt (samsāya): Doubt (samsāya) is a knowledge produced by inner sense-organ, i.e. mind. Doubt is an indefinite knowledge (cf. anavadha-raṇātmaka pratyakṣa).

For instance, philosophers used to illustrate doubt with the knowledge, 'whether it is a pillar or a man'\textsuperscript{45}. Herein two mutually exclusive properties, 'pillar-ness' and 'man-ness' are predicated of a single subject (i.e. the object concerned) which, in really, cannot possess the both. Thus, doubt is marked by a lack of assurance or belief.

Kumarila Bhaṭṭa mentions three causes of doubt, viz., (i) the existence of some common quality in some things, (ii) the existence of an uncommon quality and (iii) the existence of two apparently contradictory qualities. Kanāda also traces and analysis of doubt as stemming from agreeing in three conditions\textsuperscript{46}.

(iv) Illusion or Error (bhrama or viparyaya): Illusion or error

\textsuperscript{45.} NR.on ŚV., 2.54.

\textsuperscript{46.} sāmāṇya-pratyakṣād viśeṣāpratyakṣād viśeṣa-smṛteśca samsāyaḥ. VS., 2.2.17., p.172
is undoubted knowledge indeed, which does not agree with the true nature of the object. We sometimes do not perceive the object as it really is. This type of knowledge is analogous to illusory perception. In it we do not make any claim of truth nor does it lead to any definite assertion or desired result. Therefore, illusion or error (bhrama or viparyaya) is a sort of invalid knowledge like doubt. And what is set aside by real knowledge is the wrong apprehension. If to take a familiar example, a rope looks at the same time snake to one person and from a different angle, garland to another. It follows that it is to one of them presenting a deceptive appearance. The illusion is caused by a two-fold defects; viz, the subjective feeling of thirst and the semblance of water due to heat. The sand and the water are real, but their connection is unreal. These are instances of illusion which persist so long as the real character of the object is not recognised.

In the illusion of a rope as a snake or of nacre as silver the eye is actually in contact with a piece of a rope or nacre, but the

47. (a) mithyājñānam viparyaya.
   TS., (śabdakhaṇḍa), Kā. 15, p.447
   (b) avadhāraṇa-rūpātattva-jñānam viparyayaḥ.
   SP., p.72
48. tattva-jñānena ca mithyopalabdhir nivarttyate.
   NB., IV.2.35., p.1087
appearance is of a piece of a snake or silver. The nacre represented by 'this' is real and the silver too is real as existing elsewhere, but their identity is false. The silver is the form of cognition, which is super imposed on the perceived 'this', and this super-imposition is not detected till one is prompted to pick it up and is disappointed.

It is Advaita alone which is found to have given maximum importance to the discussion of error for the construction of its own philosophical position. Māyā, the popular expression for error, has been so elaborately analysed and discussed in the entire Advaita literature that the whole system is called by many as Māyāvāda. Māyā in the usual sense of take term, stands for cosmic illusion. It is very often taken for granted that the Advaita, by the very discussion of error, comes to the conclusion that the whole cosmic existence is Māyā or illusory in essence.

In Indian philosophical literature the typical theories of illusion have been discussed. The technical term they use is known as the theory of apprehension or Khyātivāda. The wrong apprehension has been explained in different terms and different ways by different schools of Indian philosophy. For instance, the Advaita

49. yādṛśam hi jñānasya svarūpam tadṛśamevārthe' dhyāropayatīti yāvat. KK on ŚV, 2.85
Vedāntins accept the Anirvacanīyakhyāti theory about error. According to the Advaita Vedāntins, error is explained as follows: there is superimposition of inclination, non-perennial and fraught with ignorance, on the external object in the form of knowledge. There are five theories of error, viz., Ātmakhyāti, Asatkhyāti, Akhyāti, Anyathākhyāti and Anirvacanīya-khyāti.50

(v) Hypothetical Argument (tarka):

Hypothetical argument (tarka) is also another type of invalid knowledge according to the Naiyāyikas. It is invalid in so far as it does not give us any definite knowledge of objects. If one sees a mass of smoke and says that there is fire and he is contradicted by somebody, he may argue that 'if there were no fire, there would be no smoke'; This argument beginning with an 'if' and lying bare the absurdity of the opponent's own stand is called 'tarka'.51 Tarka is a distinct type of reasoning. Tarka is of five kinds, viz., ātmāśraya, anyonyāśraya, cakra, anavasthā and tadanyabādhitāparāṣāṅga.52

50. ātmakhyātirasatkhyātih satkhyātiranyathā / tathā anirvacanīyakhyātir ityetat khyātipañcakam// VSS., 170, cf. ITE. & TC.
51. vyāpyāropeṇā vyapakāropastarkaḥ. TS., p.447
52. NSV., 1.1.40
Validity or Pramāṇya is the absolute characteristic of valid knowledge or pramā. It inheres in pramā. It may be explained as thus: In the case of valid logical experience it is valid because it is the result of the causal categories which bring forth the correspondence of ideas to objects. Experience belonging to God is taken as valid because god himself who is endowed with the absence of false knowledge is the substratum of such experience. This explanation avoids the narrowness of pramāṇa. The quest for validity of knowledge has played a considerable role in Indian epistemology. It is admitted in Indian philosophy that pramā is the true or valid knowledge. We derive knowledge every day from different sources, e.g., perception, inference, verbal authority etc., but in these matters validity constitutes the main problem. Knowledge may be true or false, i.e., valid or invalid. However, it begs a question regarding the test or the peculiar characteristic of validity, i.e., Pramāṇya or Pramātva itself. The word Pramāṇya signifies ‘yathārtha-jñāna’ (true cognition) and implies the instrumental character such that by virtue of the function of that instrument-

53. sādhanāśrayayoranyataratve sati pramāvyāptam
pramāṇam, tataśca iśvarasyāpi pramāśrayatayā
pramāṇyasiddher nāvyāptirīti. TR., p. 7
tal cause, pramā or pramiti is obtained, cf. ‘pramīyate anena iti pramāṇam’. Accordingly ‘prāmāṇya’ stands for pramātva (yathārtha-jñāna) or pramā-karaṇatva, i.e. pramāṇatva. Since pramā is caused by pramāṇa.

Validity is the universal property shared by Pramā or valid knowledge. In the Nyāyā school, valid knowledge is called Pramā and validity is called Pramātva. The latter Mīmāṁsakas adopt these terms, but Kumārila Bhaṭṭa have used the terms Pramāṇa and Prāmāṇya for valid knowledge and validity respectively and Apramāṇa and Aprāmāṇya to express the invalid knowledge and invalidity. Frequently, Pramātva is referred to by another term Prāmāṇya. Prāmāṇya and yāthārthya are almost synonymous.

There is an subtle difference between them when truth and validity are subtly differentiated. However, we may render Prāmāṇya into validity and aprāmāṇya into invalidity. The Nyāya school holds that by the validity is meant that nature of knowledge where in ‘that’ is the attribute in the locus of ‘that’. That is to say when we cognise the substantive or ‘dharma’ pot-hood in the substratum of pot-hood, then there is validity in that piece of knowledge, otherwise that knowledge is invalid.

54. tadvatī tat-prakāraka jñānatvam. TS., p.33
55. tadabhāvavati tatprakārakam jñānam. ibid., p.344
Gangesa gives very simple but meaningful definition of prama and aprama as ‘yatra yadasti tatra tasyānubhavaḥ pramaḥ’ and ‘yatra yan nāsti tatra tasyānubhavaḥ apramaḥ’. These two definitions concentrate upon the fact that validity or invilidity of a knowledge is determined by the criterion-- whether a property figuring in cognition belongs to the concerned substrantive-substratum in fact or not. The former case speaks for the validity of knowledge and the latter for its invalidity.

The Advaitin refutes Naiyāyika’s view. They observe, on the lines suggested by the Mīmāṃsaka, that knowledge is valid when it has for its object something which is not contradicted. The validity of any knowledge is testified to by its practical efficiency in the production of the purpose expected to be served by it (arthakriyā jñāna).

With regards to the problem of validity, there are two principal theories in Indian philosophy, namely, (i) Svataḥ-prāmāṇya-vāda (intrinsic validity) and (ii) Parataḥ-prāmāṇyavāda (extrinsic validity).

(i) Svataḥ Prāmāṇya-vāda : Svataḥ Prāmāṇya-vāda is the

56. TCM. (Pratyakṣa-khaṇḍa), p.401
theory which advocates that the validity of knowledge as self-evident and self-constituted. It includes the Advaita school of Vedānta, the Bhātīyas, the Prābhākaras, the Murāri Miśra school of Mīmāṁsā. The meaning of the term 'svata' as implied by the statement 'the apprehension of truth be from itself'\. When we claim the right to be sure of the validity of knowledge, the basis of the claim must be either that it is self-evident or that its truth is directly warranted by our experience along with the knowledge. In the presence of sufficient conditions knowledge arises with belief in its validity. According to the Mīmāṁsakas, the validity of a knowledge is believed in or known as soon as the knowledge happens to take place, belief does not await the verification of the knowledge by some other knowledge, for instance, an inference\.

(ii) Prataḥ-Prāmāṇya-vāda : It is the theory which maintains that the validity of knowledge is borrowed or imported from without. The Naiyāyikas represent this type of validity. This type is said to support the indirectness of the origin and apprehension of the validity for knowledge which is called extrinsic (paratah)

58. svataḥ evāstu tannirūpanam. TCM., pp.114-286
59. tat (=prāmāṇyam) svataḥ evotpadyate jñāyate ca? svataḥ eva. PR., p.21(1.4-5)
validity. According to the Naiyāyika it cognition itself does not assume the certainty of validity, then the inevitable implication is that validity is not self-apprehended 60.

The Naiyāyikas argue that prama depends upon some causes (e.g. absence of defect, etc) other than common constituents of knowledge and is an effect just as false or wrong knowledge is, by common admission, an effect originated by causes other than the elements giving rise to the cognition 61.

According to the Naiyāyikas knowledge is simply knowledge, it is neither valid nor invalid. Both validity and invalidity are, in the opinion of Sāmkhya, inherent in the cognition itself; what is valid is always valid, what is invalid is always invalid. The Buddhists hold that invalidity inheres in all cognitions, but validity is established by something else viz., the capacity to lead to fruitful activity. On the other hand, the Mīmāṁsakas and the Vedāntins maintain that validity is self-evident and it is only invalidity that is determined by extraneous causes.

60. prāmāṇyasya svato grahe anabhyaśadaśot-
panna jñāne tatsamśayo na syat. jñāna grahe
prāmāṇya niścayāt, aniścaye vā na
svataḥ prāmāṇya grahaḥ. TCM,.p.184

61. pramājñānahetvatirikta-hetvadhinā kāryatve sati
tadviśeṣatvāt apramāvat. Ku,.p. 59
According to Prābhākara Mīmāṃsaka knowledge is grasped by knowledge itself, and validity is self-produced because the causal conditions of cognition themselves produced it, knowledge being the lacus of validity. The Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas argue that knowledge is beyond the cognizance of the senses, knownness is produced by knowledge perceptible and knowledge is inferred by knownness. The validity of knowledge is also to be inferred from the cognisedness (jñātatā) to the object. According to Murāri Miśra, knowledge is grasped by an anuvyavasāya (after-cognition). However, according to all of them, intrinsic validity belongs to all sources of right knowledge.

As opposed to the extrinsic validity, the intrinsic validity holds that validity of knowledge is prior to verification. In verification truth is discovered, not invented. Although both the versions of prāmāṇyavāda subscribe to the same characterisation of truth as the correspondence with fact the difference between the two theories is due to the difference in their metaphysical standpoints.

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62. prāmāṇya svatastvam nāma yāvatsvāśraya-viśayaka-jñānagrāhyatvam. Māthurī on TCM., p.126

63. jñānasyātindriyatayā pratyakṣasambhavena svajanyajñātatā liṅgakānumitīsamagrī svanīṣṭha prāmāṇya-niścayikā iti bhāṭṭah. TCR., p.126
Regarding the validity and invalidity four views are outlined as follows---

(i) Knowledge is known to be valid or invalid by inspection, i.e. intrinsically. The Sāmkhya system maintains both validity and invalidity, proof and disproof, are inherent in the cognition itself.

(ii) Validity is extrinsically justified, but invalidity is intrinsically. This view is of the Bauddhas. They are of opinion that invalidity inheres in cognitions but validity is established by something else.

(iii) Both validity and invalidity depend upon testing a knowledge against some external standard or source. The Naiyāyikas hold that both are proved by something else, i.e. by extraneous causes as inference, etc.

(iv) Validity is svataḥ (intrinsic) and invalidity is paraṁtaḥ (extrinsic): this view is of the Vedāntins and the Mīmāṁsakas. They believe that validity is self-evident and invalidity is determined by extraneous causes.

64. pramāṇatvāpramāṇatve svataḥ sāmkhyāḥ
samāśritāḥ / naiyāyikāste paraṁtaḥ saugataḥ
ścaramam svataḥ // prathamaṁ paraṁtaḥ prāhuḥ
prāmāṇyam vedavādinaḥ/ pramāṇatvam svataḥ
prāhuḥ paraṭaścāpramāṇatām // SDS., p.279
The Vedāntic definition of Validity has more points of disagreement. The Vedāntins, however, differs from the Mīmāṁsakas in their conception of valid cognition.

The Viśiṣṭādvaita school of the Vedānta system holds that the validity of knowledge consists in both the faithfulness to the object and prompting to the fruitful activity. The Dvaita school of the Vedānta system has discussed about the problem of validity and he has said that it is intrinsic with reference to origin and ascertainment. Knowledge and its validity or prāmāṇya are cognised by the witness-consciousness (sākṣīcaitanya).

The Advaitin argues that the validity of cognition is self-evident. According to them, cognition and its validity are produced at one and the same time and also cognised from the same causes. The Advaitins explain self-validity as that which is originated by the common conditions of knowledge and by any additional elements other than those common conditions\(^\text{65}\).

According to the Advaita school of the Vedānta system, the validity of knowledge consists in non-contradictoriness. Dharmarājādhvindra tries to define validity which is common to

\[ \text{āhurvijñāna-sāmgrī-} \]
\[ \text{janyate satyajanyatātadanyatā pramāyāyāstat svastastvamititavidaḥ. } \]
\[ \text{Cit., p.122} \]

\(\text{65.} \)
both recollection (smṛti) and experience (anubhava). The definition runs as follows: Validity (of knowledge) is that nature of knowledge which has 'that' as the attributive in the locus of the 'that'. As for example, a knowledge in which potness is attributive to its substratum (pot) is valid. And this validity is produced from the common causes of knowledge. This is what is called 'svatāstvam' (intrinsicity) in the productional aspect. The very causes of knowledge which produce the knowledge produce validity also. This is the theory of the Vedāntins. However, both the Vedāntin and the Bhāṭṭa mention 'abādhitatva' (non-contradiction) as mark of validity.

There is a more outstanding difference between the Vedāntin and the Bhāṭṭa in that the Vedāntin distinguishes between relative and absolute truth, while for the Bhāṭṭa all truth is absolute and all that is not absolute truth is false. The Paribhāṣākāra says: The epithet 'abādhita' (not contradicted) means not contradicted during the transmigratory state. The Vedāntin opines that all empirical knowledge are true only so long as the ultimate truth, the identity of all existence, is not realized.

66. sṛtyanubhavasaḍhāraṇam sambādipravṛtttynu kūlam tadvati tat prakāraka jñānatvam prāmāṇyam. VP., p.333
67. ibid., p.7
The Vedántins believe that validity is self-evident and invalidity is determined by extraneous causes. Vācaspati Miśra had to make the admission that validity of inferential knowledge is self-evident.\(^{68}\)

The Advaitin rejects the view of the Naiyāyikas according to which holds that guṇa (merit) in the form of frequent contact between the sense-organ and the object, correct reason etc. are the guṇas in the knowledge that produce validity. According to the Advaitin there is no common guṇa that can be traced in all the different pieces of knowledge. Nor is it possible to hold that a frequent contact of the sense-organ and the parts of the objects produces validity for there is no such possibility in the case of the perception of colour or Ātman since colour and Ātman both do not have parts.

It should not, however, be urged that in the Vedántins view even invalid knowledge (apramā) becomes valid (pramā) because there is no difference in the case of the two as the totality of the causes of knowledge are the same. To this the Vedāntin replies

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68. anumānasya svataḥ pramāṇatayā anvayasyā pi sambhāvat, tathā anumānasyat  parito nirastasa- masta- vidhramāśaṅkasya svata eva prāmāṇyam anumeyā vyabhicāriliṅgasamuttho tvāt. NVTT.,III
that the absence of defect is an additional cause in the case of invalidity.

According to the Vedāntin, all empirical cognitions are true only so long as the ultimate truth, the identity of all existence, is not realized. In other words, the illusory cognition and dream cognition are true so long as they last. On the other hand, the Bhāṭṭa is definitely opposed to the truth of illusions and dreams and to the falsehood of empirical cognitions. According to Vācaspati, truth is abiding, eternal and non-contradictory. Thus he excludes false knowledge from the conception of validity.

As regards cogniscibility of pramāṇa, the Advaitins closely following the Mīmāṃsakas argue that it is apprehended by the same common elements generating knowledge. In this matter the Advaitin say that for the consciousness of any defect in the causal conditions and awareness of contradiction which give rise to two kinds of invalid knowledge, doubt and falsity stand as a bar to the notion of validity. The critic might here argue that it means that the absence of the awareness of defect in the causal condition and the negation of the notion of contradiction should then

69. ŚV, Nirālambana, 6,10
70. abādhita svayam prakāśitaivasattā sa ca svarūpa-meva cidātmanaḥ. Bhā. 25
be regarded as causes of pramā which is tantamount to the ad-
mission of the Naiyāyika-position that valid knowledge is due to
absence of defects, etc.

The Advaitins point out that it is not as such, for the ab-
sence of defects (doṣābhāva) cannot be regarded as the cause
of pramā; for what does the absence mean? Does this not mean
that as soon as the absence is there, notion of validity shines
forth of itself.71

According to the Vedāntins, validity is already present in
knowledge. It is constitutive of knowledge itself and is not the
result of extraneous elements or conditions.72 The Vedāntins
agree in taking validity to be known through the very elements of
knowledge themselves. Thus to the Vedāntin, validity is from in-
ternal sources and invalidity from external sources in both the
aspects productional as well as cognitional.

Moreover, the conclusion is that according to the Advaitins,
the validity of knowledge consists in non-contradictoriness.

71. na ca jñāna jñāpakādeva prāmāṇya grahaṇe
mithyārajata buddhiṣu prāmāṇya grahaṇa
prasaṅgaḥ,.......doṣabādha-bodhayoranudaya
mātreṇa prāmāṇyasphuraṇarasvīkaraṇāt. Cit.,p.125

72. PPV., p.102
IV. Pramā and Pramāṇa:
(Valid Knowledge and Its Sources)

All the philosophical schools in ancient India sprang up out of an urge for enquiry into the real state of things (tattva-jijñāsā). Because of such an approach, Indian epistemology involves four basic factors, viz.

(i) Pramātṛ (pramātṛ): Pramātṛ means one who being guided by the desire or seek or shun the object, is led to activity. It is the knower or the cognizer of valid knowledge.

(ii) Pramāṇa: Pramāṇa is the instrument or means by which the known (pramātṛ) rightly knows the object.

(iii) Prameya: Prameya is the object rightly known, the knowable, the object of valid knowledge.

(iv) Pramā or Pramiti: Pramā or Pramiti is the right or valid knowledge of the object.

With these four factors, tattva reaches its fulfilment. As to the pramātā, it has been said that every knowledge involves a subject or knower, in which knowledge inheres as an attribute. The person who observes or ascerts a valid knowledge, is called a pramātṛ (pramātā). Next, pramā, i.e. pramiti implies some prameya or object (an object grasped by a means of valid knowledge is called a prameya), to which the proces of knowledge re-

73. pramāṇam pramātā prameyam pramitirīti caturvargenaiva vyayahāraḥ parisamāpyate. NVTT., p.3
fers or to which it is directed. The object of knowledge may be either existent or non-existent. Lastly, all valid knowledge must be connected with some method of knowledge. In addition to the three, the Nyāya system recognises the special cause of knowledge or Pramāṇa as an important factor. The Nyāya system rightly considers the subject, object, method and resulting state of knowledge or pramātā, prameya, pramāṇa and pramā as mutually implicated aspects of the whole truth.

We have seen that all the four technical terms derived from the common root ‘√mā’ preceded by prefix ‘pra’, meaning ‘to measure out’ or ‘to determine excellently’. The prefix ‘pra’ means ‘excellence’, i.e., to the exclusion of doubt, error etc., ‘√mā’ means ‘to determine’ and the suffix ‘lyut’ an ‘instrument’ or ‘means’. Thus, Pramā is a term denoting a valid knowledge itself and Pramāṇa is a term designating a means of valid knowledge.

**Pramā (Valid Knowledge):**

The term Pramā is derived from the root ‘√mā’ with prefix ‘pra’ and the suffix ‘tāp’ which means valid knowledge. Pramā is the knowledge of a thing as it is the knowledge of the generic nature as abiding in its own subject, that is, abiding in every one of its individual embodiments. For instance, to know a piece of...

74. NTK., p.71
silver to be as such, is valid knowledge in as much as 'silverness'; which is a generic nature, really abides in the individual silver which is its subject. It is admitted on all hands that prama is the true or valid knowledge (yathārthajñāna).

According to the Bouddhas, the truth of knowledge consists in its practical value (arthakriyākārityam). They define Prama as the knowledge which reveals an object that is capable of successful volition\(^75\) or as the knowledge which makes us reach the object revealed by it.

The Jaina philosophers opine that definiteness is the essential mark of Prama. Vādidevasūri defines valid means of knowledge as a definite knowledge which reveals itself and the other objects. Siddhasena considers non-contradictoriness in place of definiteness as a mark of Prama\(^76\).

The Naiyāyikas define Prama as a certain and faithfull presentation of an object. According to them, Prama is experience of things as they really are (yathārtha)\(^77\). Viśvanatha, a later

\(^{75}\) pramāṇamavisamvādijñānam; avisamvādana śabdaniรuktī. arthakriyāstītiḥ...PV.,p.4

\(^{76}\) pramāṇam svaparābhāsi bādhāvibarjitam. NAV.,1.2

\(^{77}\) tadvati tat-prakāraṁ nubhavo yathārthah, saiva prametūṣyate. TS.,p.113
Naiyāyika, has defined pramā as ‘bhrama- bhinna’, i.e. different from invalid knowledge. The word ‘bhrama’ usually denotes an illusory knowledge, but in the sense of apramā in general, is not to be confined to denoting illusion alone. Gaṅgeśa in his Tattvacintāmaṇi gives a simple but meaningful definition of pramā which is easily understood through common experience of everyday life as: pramā is an experience of a fact as it (really) is. It is true that all are of the same opinion, regarding the real nature of the object and its right apprehension.

According to the Vaiśeṣikas, certainty (lack of doubt), non-contradictoriness and definiteness are the marks of pramā. In the Bhāṣya on the Vaiśeṣikas-sūtra, Prāśastapāda divided knowledge into two kinds, viz., vidyā and avidyā which correspond to the pramā and apramā respectively. Vidyā is defined by Śri-dhara as firm, uncontradicted and definite condition.

In the Śāmkhya and the Yoga system the term pramā carries different meanings than in other schools. The Śāmkhyas define pramā as the cittavṛtti (modification of citta) which appre-

78. bhramabhinnam tu jñānam atrocyate pramā.
BP., Kā. 138
79. yatra yadasti tatra tasyānubhavaḥ pramā. TCM., p.401
80. NK., p.414
hends an object that is undoubted, real and unknown. They define pramā as the mode of buddhi. The Sāmkhya and the Yoga definition, like that of Bhāṭṭa one recognizes novelty but unlike the Bhāṭṭa, they offer an alternative solution of the difficulty.

The Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas define pramā as the knowledge of an unknown real object. Kumārila defines pramā as: valid knowledge is a firm or assured cognition of objects which does not stand in need of confirmation by other cognition. Pārthasārthi Miśra defines pramā as the knowledge which represents the real nature of an object which was not attained earlier and which was not contradicted by subdued knowledge. The Bhāṭṭa school considers knowledge in its relation to our practical needs. The objects of our environment are always changing and we have to make fresh adjustment to the changing circumstances and for this purpose, knowledge must reveal the changing aspects of things. According to the Prabhākaras, conformity of knowledge to the object is a mark of pramā. Śaṅkānātha, a commentator of Prabhākara, gives the definition of pramā as: pramā is experience,

82. tasmāt dṛḍham yadutpannam nāpi samvāda mṛdcchati jñānāntaretā uṣijñānam tath pramāṇam pratyatām // ŚV., 2.80
and is something different from memory which is the name of that cognition arises solely from the impression left by some previous experience. \(^{83}\)

The Vedāntin observes that knowledge is valid when it has for its object something which is not contradicted (abāḍhita). \(^{84}\) As for example, if there is the knowledge of a pot which is not contradicted by any other source of knowledge, this knowledge is considered to be valid. In the Vedānta, pramāṇa is defined as a novel knowledge of an object which is not previously known (anadhigata), and is not contradicted (abāḍhita). \(^{85}\) Pramāṇa gives rise to a pramāṇa.

The Viśiṣṭādvaita school of the Vedānta system defines the valid knowledge or pramāna as that which apprehends an object as it really exists and which prompts fruitful activity. \(^{86}\) The Dvaita school of the Vedānta system, like the Prabhakara school of the

\(^{83}\) anubhūtiḥ pramāṇam sā smṛteranyā smṛtiḥ punah/ pūrvavijñānasamśāramātrajam jñānamucyate//
PP., p.127

\(^{84}\) smṛtisādhāraṇam tu abāḍhitarthaviśayaka jñānav/ tvam.
Op.Cit., p.4

\(^{85}\) pramātvamanadhiṣṭabāḍhitaviśayajñānatvam. ibid.

\(^{86}\) yathāvasthitavyavahārānuguṇam jñānam prameti.
NP., p.38 & YMD., p.9
Mīmāṁsā system, accepts conformity of knowledge to the object as a mark of pramā.

The Advaita Vedānta defines pramā as the uncontradicted knowledge of an object. Dharmarājādhyaṁdrā in his Vedānta-Paribhāṣa has defined pramā (Valid knowledge) as a cognition which is previously not cognised and is not contradicted. As such, Dharmarāja gives two alternative definitions, viz. 'Valid knowledge is that knowledge which apprehends an object that is not already known and which is not contradicted' and 'Valid knowledge is an uncontradicted knowledge'. Thus, he defines pramā with and without novelty as mark of pramā. Here, the Vedāntin is not necessarily opposed to memory and he does not mention certitude as an essential mark of valid knowledge. The epithet 'previously not cognised' (anadhigata) is designed to exclude smṛti (memory) from the scope of pramā (valid knowledge) as smṛti is already known, while the epithet 'not contradicted' (abādhita) is meant to exclude wrong knowledge as it is always contradicted. However, it might be noted that some Advaita-teachers do not

87. anadhigatābhādhitarthavishayaka jñānatvam pramātvaṁ. VP., p.4
exclude smṛti(memory) from the scope of valid knowledge.

The author of the Vedānta-Paribhāṣā himself realises and he says that time enters as an element in all perception and since the successive moments of a continuous perception remain previously unknown and unperceived the perception may be said to be anadhigata (not previously known)⁸⁹.

Hence, the true meaning of the definition of pramā from the Advaitic standpoint is that pramā is that in which there is an absolute negation of all that is due to the elements other than those common elements. That mean pramā is the absolute negation of apramā (wrong notion) might apply both to eternal and non-eternal or finite consciousness⁹⁰.

All philosophers attempted in their own way to analyses valid knowledge or Pramā and the means of attaining it. But, as such, different systems of Indian philosophy have forwarded divergent opinions with regard to the nature of Pramā.

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⁸⁹. nirūpasyāpi kālasya Indriyavedyatvābhypagamena dhārāvāhikabuddherapi pūrva pūrva jñānāviśaya tattat kṣanaviśeṣaviśayakatvena natatrāvyāptih. VP., p.22

⁹⁰. naca ajanyatvādavyāpitrīśvarajñāne tasya ajanyā tvepi jñānasāmagrījanyatve satyatiriktakāraṇajanya tva-lakṣaṇaviśiṣṭa-dharmavattvābhāvāt. Cit., p.122
Pramāṇa (Sources of Valid Knowledge):

Pramāṇa is the instrument or means by which the known (pramātṛ) rightly knows the object. We have already pointed out that Indian philosophers employ a number of technical terms, all derived from the common root ‘√mā’ preceded by prefix ‘pra’, meaning ‘to measure out’ or ‘to determine excellently’. Pramāṇa is thus a term designating a means of valid knowledge or pramā. The term Pramāṇa, thus, consists in the root ‘√mā’ (to determine, to measure out) with the prefix ‘pra’ (means ‘excellence’) and the suffix ‘lyut’ (instrument, means). Successful activity results when the object is cognised by the instrument of valid knowledge. Therefore, the instrument of valid knowledge is invariably connected with the object. The special source of pramā is termed as Pramāṇa. There is, however, divergence of opinion regarding the exact nature of pramāṇa amongst the philosophers 91.

Successful activity only occurs when an object is known by dint of an instrument or means of knowledge. When a means

91. abisambādi bijñānam pramāṇamiti sougataḥ/ anubhutiḥ pramāṇam sā śrūteranyeti kecana// ajñātacaratattvārthaniścāyakamathāpare/ prameyavyāptamapare pramāṇamiti manvate// pramāniyatasāmagriṃ pramāṇam kecidūcire/ TR.,5-7
of knowledge has its object, the knower, the object known and the resulting assertion, namely, knowledge, the matter is complete. A thing is produced by a number of causes, but, only the extra-ordinary cause is called the means or instrument i.e. karaṇa. Therefore, we may say that pramāṇa is the means or source of right knowledge. Pramāṇa is defined as the karaṇa (the extra ordinary cause) of a pramā (right knowledge). There is, however, divergence of opinion about the exact nature of the karaṇa (instrument) of pramā (valid knowledge).

It has been said in the Sarvadarśana-saṁgraha on the Nyāya philosophy chapter that: ‘Pramāṇa is that which is invariably related to pramā or to be pramāṇa is never to be disconnected from a knower possessing right knowledge.’

Now a question arises: what is karaṇa and how is it constituted? In order to answer the first part of the question, we should follow the distinction between ‘kāraṇa’ and ‘karaṇa’—cause and means. A cause (karaṇa) has been defined as the invariable and unconditional antecedent of an effect.

92. SDS., Kā. 4-5
93. (i) kāryaniyaya-pūrvavṛtti kāraṇam. TS., p.36
   (ii) anyathāsiddhiśūnyasya niyatā-pūrvavartita kāraṇatvam. KV., 16
versely, an effect is the invariable and unconditional consequent. By the term 'karaṇa' is meant the special cause which has an activity of its own. By the term 'Pramāṇa' we mean the instrument or means by which a person attains valid knowledge, as such, by the term 'Pramā' is meant valid knowledge.

All the schools of Indian philosophy agree in respect of literal meaning as well as the function or the purpose of pramāṇa that pramāṇa is conducive to the valid knowledge. But, there is, however, a large divergence of opinion regarding the definition and the number of the pramāṇas.

The epistemological doctrine of the Cārvāka school is that perception (pratyakṣa) is the only means of valid knowledge (pramāṇa). According to them, the validity even of inference (anumāṇa) is rejected. The Bauddhas and the Jainas opine that pramāṇa is the nature of knowledge. The Bauddhas define pramāṇa as the knowledge which is not contradicted. The Jainas

94. दृष्टाणि मुर्तिलाब्धां कार्यम् YD., p.27
95. व्यापरवादसद्धारणां मृत्युर्णां कारणाम् कारणम् TS., p.19
96. प्रामियते अनेना इति प्रामाण्यम् कारणे र्युतः VTS., p.36
97. (i) प्रामाणम् अबिसम्बादिज्ञानम्; अबिसम्बादाना-शब्दानुरुक्तिः arthakriyāsthitiḥ...PV., 1.2
    (ii) प्रापकाम् ज्ञानां अध्ययनां प्रामाणम् Op.Cit.
define pramāṇa as that it reveals itself as well as its object\textsuperscript{98}.

The viewpoint of the Nyāya system is realistic. It does neither negate the phenomenal reality of anything like the non-dualistic Vedānta, nor does it try to prove that ideas (thought or vijñāna) are only real and the outward manifestation or representations are unreal. According to this system pramāṇa is the instrument or means by which we gain different kinds of valid knowledge, or it can be said that pramāṇa is the collection of conditions and it is the immediate antecedent of the production of valid knowledge\textsuperscript{99}. Among the modern Naiyāyikas, Jayantabhaṭṭa defines pramāṇa as the totality of causal conditions. According to Jayantabhaṭṭa, pramāṇa is the totality of all the sentient and non-sentient factors which lead to the knowledge of an object which is in turn different from illusion and doubt\textsuperscript{100}.

The Vaiśeṣika system describes pramāṇa as the unique operative cause of both true presentational knowledge and memory\textsuperscript{101}. Kaṇāda who occupies the first place in the traceable

\textsuperscript{98} svaparavyavasāyi jñānam pramāṇam. Op.Cit.
\textsuperscript{99} pramātā yenārtham pramīṇotitapramāṇam. VBh., I/1/2
\textsuperscript{100} avyabhicāriṇīmasandigdhārthopalabdhim vidadhatī bodhābodhasvabhāvā sāmagrī pramāṇam. NM., 1-12
\textsuperscript{101} smṛtyanubhavasādhāraṇam pramākaraṇam pramāṇam. TK., cf. NTK., p. 55
history of the epistemological tradition, states the general definition of pramāṇa should be free from defects\textsuperscript{102}.

The Sāṃkhya-Yoga concept pramāṇa is different from other systems. In the Sāṃkhya system, pramāṇa the function of the intellect (buddhivṛtti) that is regarded as pramāṇa or the specific cause of true knowledge. Īśvarakṛṣṇa does not define pramāṇa explicitly in his Sāṃkhya-kārika though he uses the pramāṇa. He defines 'buddhi' as ascertainment of an object\textsuperscript{103}. Patañjali holds that pramāṇa is the function of citta (cittavṛtti)\textsuperscript{104}.

According to the Mīmāṃsā pramāṇa is the knowledge itself. According to the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsaka, pramāṇa is a definite and assured cognition of objects which does not require confirmation by other cognitions\textsuperscript{105}. The Prabhakaras define pramāṇa as immediate experience, i.e. anubhūti\textsuperscript{106}.

In the Vedānta system, pramāṇa, as ordinarily understood,

\begin{flushleft}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{102} aduṣṭam vidyā. VS.,IX.2.12
\item \textsuperscript{103} adhyavasāyo buddhiḥ. SK., Kā. 23
\item \textsuperscript{104} pramāṇaviparyayavikalpanidrāsmṛtayaḥ. YS.,1.6
\item \textsuperscript{105} tasmād dṛṣṭham yadutpannam nāpi samvāda mṛcchati / jñānāntareṇa vijñānam tatpramāṇam pramāṇaḥ / / ŚV., II-80
\item \textsuperscript{106} anubhūtiḥ pramāṇam sā smṛteranyā... PP., p.127
\end{itemize}
\end{flushleft}
is a means or guarantor of valid knowledge (pramā), cf. 'pramā karaṇaṁ pramāṇam'. By the term Pramā is meant valid knowledge and by the term karaṇa is meant the special cause which has an activity of its own. For instance, with regard to a Pramā (valid knowledge) of pratyakṣa (perception) the sense-organ, 'eye' etc. is a pramāṇa.

As regards the means of knowledge, there is divergence of opinions among the different schools of the Vedānta system. According to the Dvaita school of the Vedānta, pramāṇa has a wider and a higher denotation also, viz., the core of reality itself. Madhva maintains pramāṇa as valid knowledge or pramā, which according to him, is of two kinds: (i) direct and immediate knowledge of objects (kevala-pramāṇa) and (ii) the means of valid knowledge (anu-pramāṇa).

Rāmānuja says, regarding sources or means of valid knowledge, i.e. pramāṇa that valid knowledge is the knowledge which apprehends an object as it really exists. Vātsyā Śrīnivāsa, a successor of Veṅkaṭanātha of the Rāmānuja school,

107. yathārtham pramāṇam. PL. under DP.
108. pramā-karaṇaṁ pramāṇam iti uktam ācāryaiḥ siddhānta-sāmacāryaiḥ sāmagrī-madhya yad atiśa-yena pramā-guṇakam tat tasyāḥ karaṇam. atiśaya śca vyāpāraḥ... RSS., Govt. Oriental M S. No. 4988.
defines pramāṇa as the most efficient instrument amongst a collocation of causes forming the immediate, invariable and unconditional antecedents of any true knowledge or pramā. The view of Rāmānuja is very much like the view of Śaṅkarācārya on the point that both Rāmānuja and Dharmarājadhvīndra, a successor of the Vivaraṇa school of Padmapāda of the Śaṅkara school, agree in defining pramāṇa as the 'karaṇa' or instrument of valid knowledge.

According to the Advaita Vedānta, pramāṇa is the operative cause or 'karaṇa' of valid knowledge or pramā. Dharmarājadhvīndra defines pramāṇa as the unique operative cause or extra-ordinary cause i.e. the means or instrument (karaṇa) of pramā.109 Sarvajñātmamuni defines pramāṇa as that which gives rise to the knowledge of something which is previously not cognised (anadhigata).110 Madhusūdhana Sarasvatī points out these two definitions and in defining the nature of pramāṇa he upholds the definition as defined by Sarvajñātmamān.111 Madhusūdhana opines that pramā is the knowledge of something which is not known before and the means or instrument (karaṇa) of

110. ajñātam artham avabodhayadeva mānam. SKŚ.,2.8
111. ARR.,p.32
such pramā is pramāṇa, but, he shows that the ‘not contradicted’ (abādhita) portion (of pramā) of the definition by Dharmarāja is redundant in that.112

Dharmarājādhyāṭīndra states in the Vedānta-Paribhāṣā, Pramāṇa is that which gives rise to modification (vr̥tti) that manifests consciousness (cit). It is said to be modalised consciousness (vr̥tti-jñāna). Cit or pure consciousness is self-shining (svayam-jyoti), self-revealing (svayam-prakāśa) and undivided (akhaṇḍa) but when it manifests through the medium of the internal-organ (antaḥkaraṇa) or mind, it assumes the form vr̥tti-jñāna. Pramāṇa, according to Vācaspati is illusory, as in his view, as for all Advaitins, Brahman alone is real. Pramāṇas in this sense are not absolutely real. Thus, Advaitins spend a good deal of time discussing the number and nature of the Pramāṇas.

Different schools of Indian philosophy adopted a divergent scheme regarding the number of the Pramāṇas. The number of the pramāṇas accepted by the systems differ from one to nine. The thinkers of the Cārvākas hold that there is one single pramāṇa, Pratyakṣa (perception) alone. The Bauddhas and the Vaiśeṣikas accept two pramāṇas- (i) Pratyakṣa and (ii) Anumāṇa (inference).

112. na ca bhrame ativyāptih tadviśaya bhramamātrakā- līnatvena ajñātatvābhāvāt. ibid
The Sāṁkhyas add one more pramāṇa, Śabda (verbal testimony) and make them three. The Yoga, the Viśiṣṭādvaita, the Dvaita recognise this view. The Naiyāyikas recognise these three with an addition of Upamāna (Comparison or Analogy) as the fourth. The Prabhākara school of the Mīmāṁsā admits all these four pramāṇas by adding Arthāpatti (postulation or presumption) to them. The Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṁsakas and the Vedāntins accept six pramāṇas, namely, (i) Pratyakṣa (perception), (ii) Anumāṇa (inference), (iii) Śabda or Āgama (verbal testimony or authority or scriptural testimony), (iv) Upamāna (Comparison or Analogy), (v) Arthāpatti (postulation or presumption) and (vi) Anupalabdhi or Abhāva (Non-apprehension or Negation). The historians or paurāṇikas add two more pramāṇas to the earlier list, namely, Saṁbhava (Possibility or Probability or Inclusion or Concurrence) and Aitihya (Tradition Heresay) and make the number eight

Some Tāntrikas recognise Čeṣṭā (Indication) also in addition to the above as the pramāṇa. Besides, the rhetoricians recognise Pratibhā (Intuition or Imagination) as a separate pramāṇa.

According to the Advaita Vedāntins and the Bhāṭṭa school of Mīmāṁsā, the six sources or means of valid knowledge, i.e. pramāṇas can enable us to verify the validity. These pramāṇas

113. MM., p. 8
are: (i) Pratyakṣa (perception),

(ii) Anumāna (inference),

(iii) Śabda or Āgama (verbal testimony or authority),

(iv) Upamāna (Comparison or Analogy),

(v) Arthāpatti (postulation or presumption) and

(vi) Anupalabdhi or Abhāva (Non-apprehension or Negation).

It is remarkable that scholars pay attention only to the above mentioned six pramāṇas. According to the Bhaṭṭa school of Mīmāṁsā, all other such pramāṇas or sources are not really additional sources, and hence, these may be termed as pseudo-sources of valid knowledge. Raghunātha, a famous Bhaṭṭarian, states: Scholars pay attention only to six pramāṇas and quotes the Rāmāyaṇa ‘Oh Rāma, in the world there are six means whereby everything is known’.

With this short background, let us try to examine the Pramāṇas (means of valid knowledge) according to the Advaita school of Vedānta as interpreted by Dharmarājādhvīndra, the author of the Vedānta Paribhāṣā.

114. pramāṇanāṁ śādvidhyam tu ‘rāma sad śaktayo loke tābhīḥ sarva api dṛṣyate’ iti rāmāyaṇiya-vākyam api saṁvadati. PR., p. 87 (XVIII.6)