CHAPTER IV

LINGUISTIC PHILOSOPHY OF YĀSKA

It is very interesting to deal with the multifarious problems on various aspects of language. From very ancient times Indian thinkers are acquainted with the linguistic philosophy i.e. the different analytical aspects of language—phonetic, etymological, syntactical, semantic, logical, epistemological, metaphysical etc. A bunch of questions have evolved from these aspects—what is the inner source of speech? What are the different stages through which it revealed as a spoken word? What is the ultimate unit of language—letter, word or sentence? Whether the word is eternal or created? What is the relation between word and meaning? Does the word refer to the universal (jāti), individual (vyakti), or form (ākṛti)? What makes a sentence? What are its essential factors and necessary conditions? What is the role or function of the verb? How does verbal cognition arise? When a word carries more than one meaning, how can we determine the intended meaning? Does synthesis (anyaya) precede expression (abhidhāna) or follow it? What is
the distinction between literal, figurative and implied meanings? What are their different kinds? How can the exact meaning be specified? etc. The area of these linguistic speculations from Nirukta to Navya-nyāya is vast—spread over various branches of knowledge and falling under different schools of thought. Hence we have treated in this chapter, some of these linguistic speculations obtained in the Nirukta of Yāska, the oldest available Indian treatise on etymology, philology and semantics.

We can communicate with each other through language. The base or the ultimate unit of this language is word. From the very primitive age a number of questions arises in the mind of philologists regarding this word. The main object of the Nirukta is to acquire knowledge of meaning of the vedic words. so it is required to know the various processes of understanding the meaning of the vedic words. In the Nirukta, Yāska has tried to explain these vedic words from the perspective of the various linguistic aspects like noun, verb, preposition, particle, general definition, special definition, synonym, homonym, understandable grammatical form, obscure form, words and their meanings, and the etymology of these words. Besides these, there are discussions on the eternity of words,¹ the infallibility of vedic words,² the impermanence of human

¹Yāska has established it by disregarding the view of Audumbarāyaṇa. Cf. Nir.I.2.

²Cf. 'karmasampattir mantro vede' - Nir.I.2.
knowledge etc. which are remarkable fundamental queries not only to the philologists but also to every orthodox system of Indian philosophy.

In this chapter we have discussed the various analytical aspects of language as presented in the Nirukta of Yāśka. We have treated these under four principal categories as (1) analysis of language in the light of sphotavada, (2) analysis of word and meaning from various outlooks specially treating on its aesthetic nature; (3) analysis of sentence and meaning according to Nirukta and (4) analysis of language from the viewpoint of figures of speech. We have also treated here Yāśka as an etymologist briefly.

Analysis of Language in the light of Sphotavada

Yāśka has discussed the nature of speech i.e. vāk (eternal verbum) from different outlook. From the etymology of the term the real nature of speech is revealed. It denotes that by which we can communicate with each other our mental thought. He has explained some of the synonymous words of speech as recorded in the Nighantu I.11. From these explanations we can surmise the multifarious nature and various types of speech.

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3 cf. purusavidyānityatvāt - Nir.I.2.

4 cf. vāk kasmād vaceh - Nir.II.23. Also cf. 'ucyate'naveti vāk' - Durgā on the same.
aksaram (Nir.XIII.12) - It denotes the eternity of speech (cf. na kṣarati, na kṣavyate vā; aksayam bhavati).

aditi (Nir.IV.22) - It denotes the unanalysed state of speech (cf. adīnā to analyse).

ilā (Nir.XI.48) - It indicates that vital air which helps to articulate sound. It also indicates all the places of articulation and the four stages of speech.

rk (Nir.I.8) - It denotes the speech used for prayer.

kasā (Nir.IX.19) - It indicates the revelation power of speech (vāk punah prakāsayat-arthān). Here is an indication of vākyasphota.

kākut (Nir.V.26) - It denotes the palatal sounds (kākudam tālvityācaksate).

gau (Nir.II.9; XI.41) - It denotes the atmospheric speech.

gauri (Nir.XI.39) - It is traced from guṇi 'to express an indistinct sound' (cf. Beng. gūi guī). It indicates the inarticulate speech, which is comprehensible only by intellect.

galda (Nir.VI.24) - It indicates the guttural sounds (< gāl 'to devour').

ghosa (Nir.IX.9) - It is a violent sound and indicates the pluta state of speech (< ghus 'to make a sound').

5 cf. kṣipyate preryate uccāraṇakāle prānena, ilā (< vid to cast) - Devarāja under the same (Ngh.I.11).
jihva (Nir.V.26) - It indicates the plosive sounds (which are touched by tongue). It is also used to denote tongue (kokuvā), which acts as a producer of sound. 6

dhisanā (Nir.VIII.3) - It indicates that the sentence holds the meaning. There is an eternal relation between word and meaning. 7 Here is an indication of vākyasphota.

dhenā (Nir.VI.17) - It denotes the uvular sounds.

mandrā (Nir.XI.28) - It is a kind of atmospheric speech which is pleasant to all for its motion.

vānī (Nir.VI.2) - It denotes the instructive speech (vāco vā vadanāt).

vāsī (Nir.IV.16) - It is the vaikharī stage of speech.

śloka (Nir.IX.9) - It is audible and pleasant speech. It is also used to mean sound (Nir.X.41) and fourfooted stanza of classical Sanskrit (Nir.III.4).

From the abovementioned synonyms of 'speech' we have an idea of its multifarious nature.

Yāska has also explained the evolution of speech and the fourfold stages of speech. 8

He has also discussed on the notable linguistic querry—whether the words are eternal or created?

6 cf. 'jihvā kokuvā kokuyamanā varnān udatītī vā'—Nir.V.26.
7 Cf. AT, p. 950.
8 For details, see chapter I of this work.
Words are eternal. From time immemorial it exists everywhere. It is not produced by somebody. It is revealed only by utterance. Other view is that the words are non-eternal as they are perished just after the utterance. Before establishing the eternity of words he presents the view of Audumbarāyana as prima facie- 'indriyanityam vacanam' (Nir.I.1). The words are permanent in the organs only. The rejoinder of Yāska regarding this indicates that he is the supporter of the eternity of words. He discards the oppositions view by saying if the words are non-eternal the four-fold classification of word—nāma, ākhyāta, upasarga and nipāta is impossible as the letter cannot be produced simultaneously. They disappeared just after the utterance. If we admit the non-eternity of words the mutual relation and the grammatical relation of words are not possible. So all these functions of words are possible only if we admit the eternity of words. In this way Yāska has supported the eternity of words and then he engaged in the sphota theory.

Like mīmāṃsakas Yāska also supports the doctrine of ubiquity and permanency of words. He explains it clearly by saying - 'vyāptimattyāt tu sādasya' (Nir.I.2) He wants to say that the words are no doubt eternal, moreover, the various

9 cf. tatra catustvam nopapadyate. ayugapad upo annānām va sābānam itaretarpadesah. āsstrakrto yogasca' - Nir.I.2.
functions like the selection of classification of words; the mutual relation and grammatical formation etc. are possible as the words are ubiquitous and permanent. Words and their meaning have a permanent entity in the mind of the both speaker and hearer. The hearer and the speaker know that this word indicates this meaning. When a word is uttered it passes through the ear of the hearer and on accepting by the mind awakens its own sense. Thus through the uttered words perish yet their original ideas have a permanent place in the mind of us. This may be called the sphota theory according to Yāska. It is the earliest reference of sphota. Later grammarians, even some western scholars also follow this idea to express the same.

From Yāska's theory of sphota we have found the eternal word-symbol is different from letters (vānātirikta), revealable by letters (vānābhīvyānga) and indicative of meaning (ārtha-pratyāyaka).

Various kinds of sphota is presented here in a tabular form as envisaged by different Indian thinkers.

\[10\text{cf. "Sphota is a meaning whole or idea, that eternally exists within consciousness and that is evoked or manifested by the spoken words of sentences, can be directly perceived through intuition" --'Sphota Theory of Language' by Harold G. Coward, p. 152.}

\[11\text{Cf. "Trends of Linguistic Analysis in Indian Philosophy' -- H.M. Jha, p. 11.} \]
All such divisions into different parts of sphota is artificial. Actually the meaning as a whole is one and indivisible. This is the opinion of the supporters of the sphota, from the outlook of indivisible sentence (akhanda vākya vāda). It is also the view of grammarians and the etymologists.

Among the above-mentioned divisions of the sphota we have found in the Nirukta the indication of akhanda pada sphota and akhanda vākya sphota. According to Yāska every word consists of a root by its analysing tendency and a suffix, is analysable into various parts. He said that the sentence is the manifestator of meaning (cf. vāk punah prakāśayat-arthān - Nir.IX.10). Though these distinctions into various parts i.e. words, letters etc. is found in the Nirukta yet these distinctions are practically impossible.

From the etymologists' view we have obtained that sphota is a complete meaning whole idea, which is indivisible into parts. Though it is indivisible (akhanda) yet it has the power of manifestation through various letters and words. And these
distinctions are envisaged by various thinkers for practical purpose. It is said that dhvani (sound) is the external manifestation of sphota (sense). We have not any clear indication about it in the Nirukta.

In this regard we may clear the linguistic query, 'what is the ultimate unit of language—letter, word or sentence?' Though it is discussed from different outlook, yet it is actually based on the theory of relativity as the letters constitute word and the words constitute sentence (vākya) and from vākya we can achieve in mahāvākya. So a sentence has no separate entity without words and a word has no separate entity without letters. The distinction between a sentence and its parts (i.e. words and letters) is recognised for practical purpose (lokavyāvahāra).

**Analysis of Word and Meaning**

The term (śabda (word)) is used to denote various senses in the Nirukta. śabda is used to denote sound in two forms—(i) inarticulate (various natural sounds), and (ii) articulate (dhvanyātmaka and varṇātmaka). Varṇātmaka śabda is easily comprehensible (cf. anīyastvācca śabdēgā samjñākaranam vyavahārārtham loke — Nir.I.2). Again it is of two kinds: (i) sārthaka (meaningful) and nirarthaka (meaningless). Yāska has mentioned about the meaningless particles used as
expletives e.g. kam, im, it and u (Nir.I.9). We have obtained the concept of both meaningful and meaningless words in the Nirukta. He has also traced some words which are formed from the natural sounds.

The relation between word and meaning is expressed by Yāśka while giving the etymologies of the word artha\textsuperscript{12}---

(i) \( \sqrt{r} \) 'to go' (arteh) as it is understood (lit. gone to),

(ii) arāṇa +\( \sqrt{sth} \) i.e. the meaning of word exists in the mind of the hearer though the letters perished just after the utterance. The object of the Nirukta is to know the meaning of the words.

The essence of a word lies in its denotative or expressive power. The word or páda is signifier (vācaka) and the meaning or the padārtha is signified (vācyā). The relation of vācyā-vācaka bhāva is determined by the primary function or abhidhā of a word. It is also called the power (sākti) of a word. According to Yāśka every vedic word has a suitable meaning to denote some sense. It is clear from his attitude of supporting even the meanings of the prepositions and the particles. He discards therefore the view of Kautsa that the vedic words are meaningless (cf. Nir.I.15).

In this regard we may discuss the linguistic query---

'Does the word refer to the universal (jāti), individual

\textsuperscript{12}cf. Nirukta Notes Series-I, Mehendale, pp. 42-46.
(vyakti) or form (ākrti)?' as we have in the Nirukta. In
determining the meaning of a word Yāska is not biased, moreover,
his etymologies indicate that he wants to explain a word in a
required sense. If we absorbā into the discussion about the
various points like whether Yāska is an individualist or a
universalist or a supporter of form (ākrtivādi) or impartial
in explaining the meaning of a word, we should discuss all
the etymologies. But it is a very difficult task to justify
impartially from more than 13 hundred etymologies. Still we
have treated a word from this outlook. The term manusya is
etymologised by Yāska as 'matvā karmāni sīvyanti, manasyamānena
srstāḥ, manasyatiḥ punarmanasvibhāve, manorapatyam, manuso vā'
(Nir.III.7). It is a universal form. He also treats it in
a plural form (manusyāḥ). But it is difficult to determine the
meaning of the word from a particular view i.e. jāti, ākrti or
vyakti, as here are four etymologies. The real essence of a
word lies in the separation power of meaning of that word from
other. Here the first etymology 'matvā karmāni sīvyanti'
indicates that both the thinking power and their orderly
arranging power lies in a man. This is existed among many,
hence it may be treated Yāska as an individualist. It is
difficult to trace the view of Yāska on the query whether
word refers to universal, individual or form. We have
left this for further investigation.
Now we shall engage into determining the relation of word and meaning from Naiyāyika's outlook as we have an indication of the fourfold classification of words from this viewpoint in the Nirukta. These are etymological (yaugika), conventional (rūda), derivative conventional (yogarūda) and 'etymological or conventional' (yaugika-rūda). This classification is mainly on the basis of meaning. Of these yogarūda words hold a very important place in the field of semantics. Here is a brief discussion of these words from the Nirukta -

(i) rūda - It is a kind of word, the meaning of which is admitted conventionally. It will not be out of place in this regard to mention the relation between abhidhā and rūda. Abhidhā or primary power is always conventional (rūda). Yāska has used the term samvijnāta for rūda. The words whose accent and grammatical formation are regular and which are accompanied with an explanatory radical element, bear the conventional meaning (cf. 'tad yatra svarasamśkāray samarthau prādesikena gunena anvitaḥ svatēm samvijnātāni tāni' - Nir.I.12).

(ii) yaugika - The meaning of this kind of word is determined by the meaning of its parts. E.g. the meaning of the word vak is traced by the meaning of its constituent parts. Here the root is va( to speak), which bears the meaning 'by which we

13 cf. 'samvijnānabhūtam rūdhamagāṇam' - Durgā under Nir.VII,12.
can express our mental ideas' and the suffix is kvip (cf. vāk kasmād vaceh - Nir.II.13). So vau̇gika word carries only the meaning denoted by its parts.

(iii) yogarudha - The meaning of this kind of word is determined partly by the etymology and partly by the convention. Generally, the etymological meaning of this kind of word is restricted by the convention. For example the word asvā is derived from the root sasy 'to pervade'. The horse pervades the path. Or, it is derived from the root sasy 'to eat'. It is voracious (cf. asvāh kasmād aṣnute adhvānam mahāsāno bhavatīti vā - Nir.II.27). Though etymologically asvā means root-pervader or voracious yet this literal meaning is not taken now in toto. The meaning of asvā is now restricted to denote horse only. It does not mean cow or any other creature which is road-pervader or voracious. The meaning of this kind of word is semantically treated as the case of 'the law of specialisation'. The opposite of this type is the words based on faded metaphor (nirūdhalaksanā). It is treated as the law of generalisation. E.g. the term payāh primarily used to denote milk but later it is also used to denote water because the quality of drink (pā) and growth (pyāy) is existed in both cases (cf. payāh pivaterva pyāvaterva - Nir.II.5).

(iv) vau̇gikarudha - When the meaning of the word can be ascertained either etymologically from the meanings of its
component parts, or conventionally from usage by the whole word taken together, it is called yaugikarūdhā. Both the meanings are determined independently of each other and understood separately. E.g. the term aruna means 'shining' from etymological sense and 'the sun' from its conventional sense (cf. 'aruna ārocanāḥ' - Nir. V.21).

The exact meaning of an expression is determined by its contextual factors. In the Nirukta we have an indication of verbal cognition i.e. the means of knowing the meaning of words with the help of grammar, etymology, analogy, dictionary, usage, gender, juxtaposition of a well-known word, vākyāsēsa etc. To determine a Vedic passage as well as an ordinary sentence Brhaddevatā shows the six principal factors: ārtha (purpose), prakaraṇa (the subject-matter), liṅga (indication), aucitya (propriety), deśa (place) and kāla (time). All these are taken from the Nirukta (cf. VP. II.316). Bhartṛhari gives another list (cf. VP. II.317) taking the ideas from the Nirukta, which is followed by later grammarians like Nāgēśa etc. and ālāṅkārikas like Mammaṭa, Viśvanātha, Hemacandra, Appaya Dīkṣita and Jagannātha etc. The contextual factors are - (1) samsarga (contact) or saṃyogā (association), (2) viprayoga (dissociation), (3) sāhacarva (companionship), (4) virodhitā (opposition),


15 For details, see chapter III of this work.
(5) **artha** (purpose), (6) **prakarana** (the context of situation),
(7) **linga** (indication), (8) **anyasābdasānnidhya** (the vicinity of another word), (9) **sāmarthya** (capacity), (10) **auciti** (property), (11) **desa** (place), (12) **kāla** (time), (13) **vyakti** (grammatical gender) and **śvara** (accent). Yāska has stressed on the etymology, context, **kosa** or lexicon, **vṛddhavyavahāra**, **āptavākya** (vedic literatures), **upamāna** or analogy and **vākyasēsa**. Among the above mentioned 14 factors Yāska has stressed on **artha** (cf. **arthanityah parīkṣeta** - Nir.II.1) and **prakarana** (cf. **naikapadāni-nirbrūyāt** - Nir.II.3).

The relation between word and meaning is explained in the Nirukta by praising the persons who are well-versed in proper meaning of a word or sentence. He who knows the meaning of a sentence attains the good (cf. 'yo' rthajña it sakalam bhadram asnute etc. - Nir.I.18). The manifestation power of meaning is clearly expressed by Yāska in the explanation of a Rgvedic verse in Nir.I.19. To explain the part 'uto tvasmāi tanvam visasre' he says 'prakāsānamarthasyāhānayā vācā' (cf. Nir.I.19).

It is also noted in the Nirukta that the words are not always followed by meaning (cf. **athānanyvite'ṛthe** - Nir.II.1).

Now we shall discuss here the relation between word and meaning from aesthetic outlook as we have found in the Nirukta. A reader of the Nirukta does not fail to notice Yāska's opinion

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16 cf. 'ūta tvah paśyannya dadarsā vācamuta tvah śṛṇvannya śṛṇotyenāṁ uto tvasmāi tanvam visasre jāyeva patya uṣati suvāsaṁ' - RV X.71.3.
about the power of words. Yāska admits the threefold power of words which is followed by later rhetoricians. These are (i) abhidha (primary power), (ii) laksanā (secondary power), and (iii) vyanjanā (tertiary power). Naturally, there are three corresponding meanings: (i) vācyārtha (literal meaning), (ii) laksyārtha (figurative meaning), and vyanjārtha (implied meaning).

By abhidha the grammarians, logicians, mīmāṃsakas and ālāṃkārikas opine that the function by which the primary intrinsic meaning (mukhyārtha or sākyārtha) of a word is known. We have found the term abhidha is used in the Nirukta to denote various senses. These are -

(i) 'etavatam arthanām idam abhidhanam' (Nir.I.20) - indicates the word in the context of homonymous words.

(ii) 'svāngābhidhanam' (Nir.IV.6) - indicates the denotative power of abhidha.

(iii) 'tathābhidhānāni' (Nir.VII.5) - indicates 'name'.

(iv) 'tathābhidhānāni' (Nir.VII.6) - indicates 'conversation'.

(v) '...abhidhānai samvujya haviscodavati-indrāya...etc. (Nir. VII.13) indicates attribute.

(vi) 'vyanjanamātram tu tat tasyābhidhānasya bhavati' (Nir.VII.13) indicates the conventional meaning. It is noted that both the term abhidha and vyanjanā are existed in the sentence.

In most of the above citations Yāska has used the term abhidhāna in the sense of literal meaning.

Abhidha i.e. primary power is always conventional. He has used the term samvijñātā (Nir.I.12) and samvijñānabhūta (Nir.VII.13) for
conventional meaning (rūdhārtha). It is the primary power of words.

When the primary meaning of the word is incompatible, laksanā or indication is required. Though we have not found the term laksanā to denote the secondary sense in the Nirukta yet we have found there the word bhakti in the sense of conveying secondary or gauna meaning (amukhyā i.e. laksanā). He says, yatho etat teśam punah pātrasyendrapānamiti bhavatī bhaktimātram tadbhavatī (Nir.VIII.2) and again 'āgneyā iti tu sthitiḥ bhaktimātramāttramīta (Nir.VIII.22). We have obtained various uses of laksanā in the Nirukta. In the etymology of the word adhvara as 'apivādhīyāne yur upabandhah' (Nir.I.8), adhvara is used to mean the reader of adhvarāstra in secondary sense. In osadhe trāyasvainam' (Nir.I.15) and svadhite mainam himsīh (Nir.I.15) we have found the sense of living being implied on these inactive matters only by laksanā. Otherwise the addressing of inactive materialistic matters like active creatures is impossible. Durgā treats aditi as secondary sense in aditiḥ sarvam 'the all-pervadingness of aditi' (Nir.I.16). 17

So when the primary meaning is obstructed we have taken the secondary power of words i.e. laksanā. Laksanās as

17 cf. 'dvividhā hi śabdapravṛttir mukhyāgaunīca.
tatraivaṃ sati yatra mukhyāsambhavastatra gauny-āśrīyate, sa eva bhaktivādah syāt' - op.cit.
nirūdha (rūdha) and prayojanavatī are divided each into śuddhā and gauni of which the śuddhā prayojanavatī is again of four kinds: upādāna, laksana, sāropā and sādhyavasāna. But the gaunti prayojanavatī laksanā is of two kinds: sāropā and sādhyavasāna. We have presented here some of the various types of laksanā as explained by Yāska.

Nirūdha laksana –

(i) pratiloma (Nir.I.2) - It means opposite hair from its etymological sense (pratigatam lomah), but its implied meaning 'opposite' is fixed by convention (also cf pratiñomyam -Nir.1.3).

(ii) daksina (Nir.I.7) - It means right hand from its etymological sense but it is also used to denote the south direction due to implied sense (cf digghasta prakrtih - Nir.1.7).

(iii) parva (Nir.I.20) - Primarily it denotes joint but secondarily it denotes the joints of two fortnights like the new moon, the full moon etc. (cf. parvah punah prānāteḥ...ardhamāsaparvah... tat sāmānyāt - Nir.I.20).

(iv) pāda (Nir.II.7) - It means 'foot' from its etymological sense (pādah padyate), but secondarily it denotes quarter (¼ th) in prabhagāpāda, and foot of a stanza.

(v) prāṇi (Nir.II.14) - Its primary meaning is white but figuratively it is used to denote the sun.

(vi) arbuda (Nir.III.10) - Primarily it denotes a number but secondarily it is used to denote a cloud.
(vii) indrapāna (Nir.VIII.2) – Primarily it denotes the drinking vessel of soma-juice of Indra but secondarily it is used to denote the general drinking vessel of soma-juice of any god, as vāyavya is not only the drinking vessel of vāyu, but it is used as a general drinking vessel of soma juice (cf. Nir.VIII.2).

It is also noted in the meaning of some vedic metres.

(viii) usnik (Nir.VII.12) – Primarily it denotes a turban but secondarily it is also used to denote a vedic metre.

(ix) kakup (Nir.VII.12) – Primarily it denotes a hump but it is also used to denote a vedic metre figuratively.

(x) pipilikāmadhyā (Nir.VII.13) – The etymological sense of the vocable is the middle part of an ant but it is used to denote a vedic metre figuratively.

Prayojanavatī laksanā

Yāska has used the term kṛṣṇa to denote dark (Nir.XII.13) which is its primary sense. But he has used it to denote the dark night during the explanation of a Rgvedic verse (I.113.2), where he explains the part 'kṛṣṇā sadanānyasyāh' as 'kṛṣṇavarnā rātrih'. This is due to the figurative requirement.

Laksana laksanā

It gives up its original meaning and assumes another meaning.
(i) **vijaya** (Nir.I.2) - Primarily it denotes victory but sometimes it is used to denote the things gained by victory (cf. *vardhate vijayena* - Nir.I.2).

(ii) **go**¹⁸ (Nir.II.5) - It sometimes denotes milk etc. instead of its primary meaning cow (cf. *gobhiḥ śrīnīta matsaram* - RV IX.46.4 in Nir.II.5).

(iii) **āśata** (Nir.VII.7) - It is used in the sense of connection instead of its primary meaning 'eating' (vāṣ 'to eat') in the time of stone-praising by the ṛk 'haviradyam āśata' (RV X.94.2).

**sāropā gauni laksana** - Here the subject on which the imposition is created is not covered up that which is imposed, e.g. *puruṣasimha*. Here *simha* is used in praise to denote a man with severe strength (cf. Nir.III.18).

**sādhyavasāna laksana** - Here in which the imposition made is completely swallowed up by that which is imposed on it. We have presented here some of this type from the Nirukta.

(i) **avasa** (Nir.I.17) - It means food (*pathyadānam*), but its implied sense is milk.

(ii) **jyā** (Nir.II.5, IX.17) - It means the bowstring beside the implied sense *gavyā* (made from some part of a cow).

(iii) **go** (Nir.II.14) - It means the sun (*āditya*) but its implied sense is ray.

¹⁸ cf Rajavade, p. xxxvii.
(iv) **ahi** (Nir.II.17) - It means the cloud but its implied sense is snake.

(v) **adri, grāvan, gotra, asman, parvat, giri, upara, upala,** etc. (Nir.II.21) are used to denote mountain in primary sense but all these words are used to denote cloud in secondary sense.

(vi) **ghṛta** (Nir.VII.24; X.16) - The primary meaning of this vocable is ghee (Nir.X.16) but secondarily it denotes water (Nir.VII.24).

(vii) **madhu** (Nir.IV.8) - Primarily it denotes honey. Secondarily it is used to denote wine (**soma**). This is due to sweetness in both cases. It is also used to denote water (Nir.VI.27; X.31).

(viii) **vṛṣabha** (Nir.IV.8; IX.22) - The etymological sense of this vocable is bull i.e. who brings down rain. In this sense it denotes Indra. But secondarily it also denotes **vāyu**. This is due to the **sādhyavasāna laksanā**.

After performing the primary sense and secondary sense of a word, when a word gives the tertiary implication, is called **vyanjanā**. In the Nirukta we have an indication of it during the application of the term **simha, vyāghra** etc. to denote excellence (cf. **simho vyāghra iti pūjyām** - Nir.III.18). Here **pūjā** (excellence) is used neither to denote the primary sense (**abhidheyārtha**) nor the secondary sense (**laksyārtha**), but it denotes a tertiary meaning (**vyaṅgārtha**).**

Analysis of Sentence and Meaning

From the Vedic Mantras we come to know that 'language started with sentences and not with individual words'. In the Nirukta of Yāska the real nature of Vedic sentence is expressed. It is a fixed combination of words (niyata-vācoyukti) which is very rigid and unchangeable (cf. niyata-vācoyuktayo niyatānupūrvyā bhavantī - Nir.I.15). It is synthetic but positional. In later literature this rigidity of sentence became lost. That is why the meaning of a sentence is same even the change of the position of the words. This also indicates the indivisible meaning whole idea i.e. akhandā vākyasphota.

The cognition of vākyārtha depends upon a number of conditions. Without the knowledge of the Nirukta verbal cognition is not possible (cf. athāpīdamantarena mantresvartha-pratyayo na vidyate - Nir.I.15).

We have treated also the linguistic query 'what is the most important word in a sentence?' from the outlook of Yāska. According to Yāska verb is the nucleus of a sentence. He has stressed on the verb in a sentence where both noun and verb are existed (cf. tad yatrobhe bhāvapradhāne bhavatāh - Nir.I.1.1). He has also showed it in kārmanāmika samskāra (Nir.I.13). To etymologise a word he often gives the root of that word after

20 cf. 'padajñānantu karanam dvāram tatra padārthadhi' - Bhāṣā Pariccheda, karika 81.
expressing the meaning. It is called the *kārmanāmika samskāra* (correct grammatical form of a verb). He has showed that name of anything is formed from its action (cf. *nāmāny-ākhyātajāni* . Nir.I.12).

He has mentioned that the sentence is the manifestator of meaning (cf. *vāk punah prakāsāyatyarthāna* - Nir.IX.19). It will not be out of place to mention here the theory of *anvitābhidhānānavaṇāda* finds its source from the passage mentioned above. The meaning of words (and their parts) in a sentence have been analysed thoroughly by the Indian etymologists. *Anvitābhidhānānavaṇāda* is formed by Prabhākara. It means the words are synthesised from before. According to this theory the words which are expressed, already related together and they produce the meaning collectively in a natural way.

Knowledge of different padas in a sentence is also essential for understanding *samhitā* which are the part and parcel of a sentence (cf. *Padapraṅkrṭiḥ samhitā* - Nir.I.17; also cf. Rk Prātiśākhya 2.1). Sometimes he has etymologised every word of a mantra. He says *'athāikapadika niruktam'* in explaining the Rgvedic passage *'īnām me...etc.'* (X.75.6) in the Nirukta IX.26.

In this regard we have presented also the analysis of a sentence into different parts of speech and their relation with meaning. In the Nirukta of Yāska we meet with a scientific division of speech. It is noted that he deals with the vedic words specially which are recorded in the Nighantu. At the
outset he discloses the nature of words and explains systematically the various linguistic queries.

There are four parts of speech (padajātāni), namely, noun (nāman), verb (ākhyāta), preposition (upasarga) and particle (nipāta) (cf. catvāri padajātāni nāmākhyate copasarganipātāsca - Nir.1.1). This view of etymologists is followed by various branches of language. It is very difficult to say whether Yāska is the first to make such division, because we have in the Gopatha Brāhmaṇa, some grammatical terms on the analysis of language namely, dhātu, ākhyāta, nāman, pratipadika, vibhakti etc.21 Yāska has placed first nāman and ākhyāta under one group and then in a separate compound upasarga and nipāta. The priority of the parts of speech is obvious according to their position.22 Noun and verb denote their own significance when they use separately.23 But prepositions and particles cannot present a clear meaning when they are detached from noun and verbs.

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22 Cf. atra nāmākhyātīyoh pūrvamabhidhānam prādhānyāt - Durgā under Nir.I.1, p. 10.

23 Cf. ubhe api nāmākhyāte nipātopasarga nīr apekse api sātisvamarthanam brūtah - Durga under Nir.I.1, p. 10.
The term *catvāri* in *catvāri padajātāni* indicates that parts of speech are strictly four in number. Yāska was also conscious about *gati* and *karmapravacaniya* though he has never mentioned it in the Nirukta. We have a faint indication in his explanation of *ā* in the sense of *adhi* in a Ṛgvedic verse (V.48.1) 'abhra āapah' etc. as *abhre ā apah* (cf. *ā ityākāra upasargaḥ* purastādeva vyākhyātah. athāpy. adhyarthate drṣyate - Nir.V.5). Mantrini Prasad has explained in details in his work about *gati* and *karmapravacaniya* ( Cf. op.cit., pp. 8-10, 380-382, 395, 397, 399).

A sentence contains mainly two parts noun or *kāraka* (case) and the verb or *kriyā* (action). The rest are subordinate parts. Of these Yāska gives importance to action. *Ākhyāta* is the ultimate unit of language. Generally we wish to express our action through language. That is why Yāska says 'tad yatrobhe bhāvapradhāne bhavatah (Nir.1.1; also cf. the term *vyākhyātavya* < *vi + ākhyātavya* - Nir.1.1).  

Though the term *saranāma* (pronoun) is absent in the list of four parts of speech yet Yāska was conscious about this part of speech. He has used this term in five passages -

1. 'tva iti vinigrahārthīyam sarvanāmānapudattam Nir.I.7
2. samamiti parigrahārthīyam sarvanāmānapudattam - Nir.V.22.
3. sarvagaṇam sarvanāmānam - Nir.VI.36. It may be compared with sarvādīgāna(cf. sarvādinī sarvanāmāni - Pā.1.1.27).
(iv) atha pratyaksakṛta madhyamapurusayogastvamiti caitena sarvānāmā - Nir.VII.2.
(v) atha ādhyaṭmiṃkya uttamapurusayogā āhamiti caitena sarvānāmā - Nir.VII.2.

For the sake of denoting a mass of things (substantives) Yāska mentions the pronoun 'adas' (cf. ada iti sattvanāmpadesāh Nir.1.1).

Adverbs are not familiar to Yāska but he has used some adverbial prepositions. As 'prepositions in Sanskrit are seldom used to express case relations, but mostly serve as adverbial prepositions' (cf. Sarup, p. 66). Yāska's classification of parts of speech is linguistically more comprehensive and grammatically more accurate than that of the Greek thinker Aristotle. According to Aristotle, 'Diction viewed as a whole is made up of the following parts: the letter (or the ultimate element), the syllable, the conjunction, the article, the noun, the verb, the case, and the speech' (cf. Poetics, 20.1456b, Bywater's ed., p. 57; also cf. Sarup, p. 66).

The explanation of four padas from various linguistic schools as given by Yāska is very interesting. This interpretation is more acceptable to the grammarians as recorded in the Nirukta Parisiṣṭha (cf. 'katamāni tāni catvāri padāni? Omkāro mahāvyāhṛtayaścetyārṣam. Nāmākhyāte copasaranipātāsceti vaiyākaraṇāḥ, rco yajūṃśi sāmāni caturthī vyavahārikiti nairuktān - Nir.XIII.9).
Yaska defines the verb as a word which denotes principally action (*bhāva*) and the noun as what involves principally the idea of substance (*sattva*) (cf. *bhavapradhānam ākhyaṭam, sattvapradhānāni nāmāni* - Nir.1.1). The term *bhāva* is synonymous with *karma*, *kriya* and *dhātvartha* (cf. *bhāvaḥ karma kriyā dhātvartha ityanarthāntaram* - Durgā on the same).

*Bhāva* (action) represents a stage of manifestation from the indistinct (*avyakta*). There are six modifications of *bhāva* - production, existence, transformation, growth, decay and destruction as enumerated by Vārṣāyaṇī (cf. *sad bhāva-vikārā bhavantīti vārṣāyaṇiḥ - jāyate'sti viparinamate bardhate' paksīyate vināsyatīti* - Nir.1.2). These are found in every creatures. By *bhāva* we may take here the sense of action or speech or substance or the secondary change (*māyika*) of the Supreme Being. This *bhāva* is attributed to brahman in the sense of *sat* or *sattvā* (cf. *sanmātram bhāvalingam syāt* - Durgā under Nir.1.9).

Yāska has given also the nature of *upasarga* (preposition), and *nipāta* (particle). Regarding prepositions Yāska quotes the view of Śākaṭāyana (a grammarian) that the prepositions cannot express any meaning when they are detached from verbs and nouns (cf. *na nirbaddhā upasarga arthāniḥḥuriti śākaṭāyanaḥ* - Nir.1.3). But according to Gārgya prepositions have their

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24 Cf. AT, p. 22.
individual meanings even detached from noun and verb (cf. 
uccāvacāh padārthā bhavantītī Gārgyāh - Nir.I.3). Following
the views of grammarians Yāska expresses that the main function
of prepositions are to specialise the meanings of nouns and
verbs. Or, he wants to say that prepositions act as indicative
(dyotaka) than denotative (vācaka) (cf. nāmākhyātayostu
karmopasamyogadyotakā bhavanti - Nir.I.3). He has mentioned
a list of twenty prepositions as in grammar with their
individual meanings. The etymologists' view that prepositions
indicate the special meanings of nouns and verbs is not
grammatically acceptable (cf. 'atra nāmāh karmopasamyoga-
dyotakā bhavantītyevam na grhyate. upasargāh kriyāyoge iti
prasiddho hyupasargānam kriyāpadena yogo na nāmā' - Durgā
under Nir.I.3), because according to the grammarians prepo-
sitions are joined with verbs.

Yāska expresses the nature of nipāta as a word which
exhibits several meanings (cf. nipātā uccāvacesvarthesu
nipatanti - Nir.I.4). Then he classifies nipāta in three
groups: (1) upamārthiya (comparative), (ii) karmopasamgrahār-
thiya (conjunctive) and (iii) padapūranārthiya (expletive).
He also explains these with example in details.

These four parts of speech are defined in the Rk-
Prātiśākhyā in a single verse as -

kriyāvācakam ākhyātam upasargo vīsesakrt
sattvābhidhāyakam nāmah nipātāh padapūranāh

- op.cit. XIII.8.
The analysers (grammarians and etymologists) analyse these parts of speech into their final elements viz., stem or base, which is the last result of linguistic analysis and formative suffixes or determinant. The division of the words into roots and suffixes is based on the cognitive function of language with the help of analysing apparatus of language i.e. grammar. This process of analysis is known to Yāska as saṃskāra (cf. Nir.I.12). It indicates the synthetic character of old Indo-Aryan languages. Yāska has also named this process as śāstrakṛto yogah 'grammatical conjunction' (Nir.1.2).

Analysis of Language from the Viewpoint of Figures of Speech

Yāska was conscious of the figures of speech. Later rhetoricians are highly indebted to his speculations regarding the figures of speech as mentioned in his work. He has explained the vedic similies (upamā) and showed their various classifications. Upamā takes a very important role in explaining the vedic mantras as we have found in the Nirukta. He supports the view of Gārgya on upamā that yadatat tatsadrśām (Nir.III.13). By this definition of upamā we have three parts of it: (i) yat = upameya (the subject of comparison), (ii) tat = upamāna (the object with which anything is compared), and (iii) sadrśām = sādhāraṇa dharma (common element). It is
very interesting to note that the simile words are also compiled in the Nighantu III.13.

From the citation 'atha luptopamāny arthopamānītyā- caksate simho vyāghra iti pūjāyām. śvā kāka iti kutsāyām' etc. (Nir.III.18), it is clear that the luptopamā words are connected with arthopamā e.g. simha, vyāghra (in praise) and śvā, kāka (to condemn). So where the signifier is absent, it is called arthopamā i.e. understandable. Its opposite is śabdopamā where the signifier word is present. From these two types śabdopamā and arthopamā we have the two aspects of alamkāra-śabdī and ārthī respectively in later rhetoric language.

After defining the simile Yāska has treated the characteristic features from the functions of the simile. He says- 'tad āsāṁ karma - (i) jāyasā vā guṇena prakhyātatamena vā kaṇīvāmsam vāprakhyātam vopamimite. (ii) athāpi kaṇīyasā jāyasām' (Nir.III.13). The function of simile is to compare an inferior quality (object) or an unknown object with a higher quality or a very well known object. The higher quality is also compared with the inferior but its use is restricted in the veda only. He cites two examples of this type -

(i) tanūtyajeva taskarā vanargu rasānābhir dasābhīr abhy-adhitām' (RV X.4.6 in Nir.III.14).

Here the two arms employed in producing fire by friction, is compared with something inferior, i.e. two thieves, who rob people in a forest. The point of comparison is, just as
thieves secure their victim, so we tightly fasten the two sticks to produce fire. 25

(ii) kuha svid dosā kuha vastor āśvinā kuhābhipitvam karatah kuhosatuh ko vām sāyutrā vidhaveva devaram maryam na yosā kṛnute sadhastha ā

(RV X.40.2 in Nir.III.15).

Here Āśvins are compared with the husband's brother (devara) and the sacrificing person (yajamāna) is compared with widow. Practically husband's brother is inferior to Āśvins and widow is inferior to yajamāna. The twelve simile words as recorded in the Nighaṇṭu are divided into five categories in the Nirukta -

(i) Comparative or analogical particle - ā, ivā, cit, na, nu and yathā. Of these yathā is used as karmopama (cf. Nir.III.15).

(ii) Noun- bhūta (cf. mesa iti bhūtopamā, in mesobhūto'bhiyannayah - Nir.III.16).

(iii) Compound - the words - rūpa, varna, samārk etc. indicates the comparison by using between the upamāna and upameya (cf. hiranyarūpah sa hiranyasamārgh apām napāt sedu hiranyavarnah - RV.II.35.10 in Nir.III.16).

(iv) Secondary suffix - thā and vat indicate the simile by using with upamāna. Of these thā is a vedic simile and vat is well-known in both classical and vedic

(cf. *vaditi siddhopamā brāhmanavād. . . brāhmana iva* - Nir.III.16).

(v) Ṛṇṭi upamā - It is that where the signifier simile word is absent; as in a Ṛgvedic verse - *samvatsaram saśāyāna brāhmanā vratacārīṇah. vācaṃ parjanyājinvitām pra māndūkā avādisuh* - ṚV.VII.103.1. Yāska explains the simile as *'api vopamārthe syād brāhmanā iva vratacārī nah'*(Nir.IX.6) i.e. uttered speech like Brāhmaṇas, who are engaged in religious rites.

From this discussion it is clear that in Yāska's time there are two principle kinds of simile - (i) śābdī and (ii) ārthī. śābdī is again divided into three kinds: (i) signifier particles (*iva* etc. connected with upamāna or nominative), (ii) words based on secondary suffix (*vat, thā* etc.) and (iii) words connected with compound (*vāraṇa, etc.*).

We have found in the Nirukta that the conventional meaning of a word is possible if we admit the luptopamā (without the particle of comparison). It is said that conventional meaning of a word is stronger than etymological meaning (cf. *rudhīryogād- valīvasī*). In the explanation of the Ṛgvedic verse *'pra nūnām jātavedasamaśvam* etc. (ṚV.X.168.1), Yāska says *'api vopamārthe syādaśvamīva jātavedasamiti'* (Nir.VII.20). The meaning is relevant if we admit here the simile *iva*.

Yāska has used the term upamārthe several times in the Nirukta -
From the above citations one thing is very conspicuous that Yāska has used the clause 'api vopamārthe syāt' several times and he has explained the mantras with the help of similie.

Similie words (na etc.) are sometimes used to mean at present (sampratī) (cf. astyupamānasya sampratyarthe prayoga iva padaṃ na dṛśyate - Nir.VI.19)

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Rgvedic mantras are very rich in similie words. Yāska has showed this during his explanation of the mantra, e.g.

(i) uta tva pasyān... jāyeva patya uṣāti suvāsāḥ (RV.X.71.3).

He explains the last foot as an instance of similie (cf.
(ii) abhrāteva pumsa eti pratīci gartārugiva sanaye dhanānām jāyeva patye uṣati suvāsa uṣā hagreva nirūnita apsaḥ

RV.I.124.7

He treats this mantra as conveyor of four similies (cf. catasra upamāḥ - Nir.III.5). These are (i) abhrāteva pumsah, (ii) gartārugiva, (iii) jāyeva patye, and (iv) hagreva.

It is really very interesting when we find the use of the term aupamika several times in the Nirukta and how this simile takes a very important role in explaining the vedic mantras. It denotes generally the secondary senses: E.G.

(i) ityabhrātrkāya anirvāha aupamikā (Nir.III.4) - This simile implies the prohibition of marrying a brotherless maiden.

(ii) madhu somamityaupamikam mādyateh (Nir.IV.8) - Madhu is compared with soma on account of simile in exhilaration.

(iii) usnik...usnisinī vetyaupamikam (Nir.VII.12) - Usnik metre is compared with the turban on account of the similarity in head covering.

(iv) pipīlikāmadhyeytaupamikam (Nir.VII.13) - The metre pipīlikāmadhyā is so called on account of the analogy in middle portion like an ant.
Agni is compared with beautiful smiling maidens on account of the similie in beauty.

The various kinds of similie (upama) may be traced in a tabular form.

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<th>Upama</th>
<th>sābdī</th>
<th>ārthī</th>
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<td>pūrnopama</td>
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<td>bhūtopama</td>
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<td>varna etc.</td>
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So from the discussion on upama (similie) we can surmise that before Yāska's time Indian scholars were conscious of rhetorics. In Yāska's Nirukta it is treated clearly.

Yāska and Ślesa

When a word expresses double meanings in a sentence, it is called Ślesa. Yāska was also conscious about the use of Ślesa. It is actually the homonymous words which create such result. In the Nirukta he clearly expresses about the homonymous words
where lies the germ of the ślesa (cf. ekārtham anekasābdam ityetaduktam. atha yānyanekārthānyeka-sābdāni tānyato'nu krami - svāmāh - Nir.IV.1). In this regard Dr. Siddheswar Varma's comment is of deep consideration - 'perhaps this is the germ of the double meanings (ślesa) of later classical sanskrit literature.'

For example, the word nirṛti(Nir.II.7) bears two meanings - (i) earth (prthīvi) and (ii) distress (krocchrāpatti). We have found several instances of ślesa in the Nirukta.

Yāska as an Etymologist

Yāska's manner of interpretation of Vedic mantras is very interesting. His tendency of etymologising the vedic words with regard to their meaning is followed in every etymologies in the Nirukta. He supports the theory of Sakatayana that all words are derived from some verbal roots. This philosophy is followed in every etymology of the words in the Nirukta.

He has etymologised the word even showing the dialectical difference of the language. He was conscious about place, time and usage during the explanation of vedic words. He was also conscious of provincialisms and these are not clear.

to us unless we presume that in his time sanskrit was a colloquial language to a certain extent. He has used several times in the Nirukta, the term anvadhyaya (Nir.I.4; I.5) to denote vedic language and dasatayi (Nir.VII.8; VII.20; XI.16; XII.40) to denote the Rgveda, and bhāsa (Nir.I.4; I.5) for classical sanskrit. He has mentioned the term prācyā to denote the language of the eastern part of the Aryan country and udācyā to denote the northern part of the Aryan country.

We have found in the Nirukta the clear conception of Yāska on vedic and classical stages of sanskrit (cf. arthavantah sabdasamānyat - Nir.I.16). As expounder of the Nighaṇṭu and the commentator of about 600 vedic stanzas he has used himself the language which may be considered to occupy the intermediate position of these two languages.

Yāska's craze for etymology is expressed in the beginning of the Nirukta. He gives three derivations of the term nighaṇṭu from three aspects of words. It indicates his attitude of treating the vedic words in three ways:

(i) pratyaksavṛtti (whose roots are apparent), (ii) parokṣa-vṛtti (whose roots can be inferred) and (iii) atiparokṣavṛttri (whose roots are non-existent).

Sometimes he has given various etymologies of a word and etymologised the word even from more than one root e.g. satya < √as + √i (Nir.I.13), manusya<√man +√siv or √man+√sri (Nir.III.7), agni<√i +√aŋi +√ni or √i +√dah +√ni (Nir. VII.14), mithuna<√mith +√van (Nir.VII.29) etc. All these
indicate his craze for etymology.

**Conclusion**

The discussion made in this chapter reveals all round depth of linguistic philosophy of Yāska in respect of eternality of words, relation between word and meaning in semantics, unit of language, figures of speech, vṛttis or power of words, the method of attaining verbal cognition, etc. Above all, Nirukta is the pearls of linguistic thoughts. Later philosophers, grammarians, rhetoricians have profusely used the materials of different theories from the thoughts of Yāska in the respective sciences.