CHAPTER - I
CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

G.R. MALKANI'S LIFE

Professor Ghanashamdas Ratanmal Malkani is an eminent contemporary Indian philosopher. He was born at Hyderabad in the province of Sind (now in Pakistan) on 4th of June, 1892. He was the second son of Late Ratanmal Gidumal Malkani. Gidumal Malkani was a pleader by profession. Malkani had five brothers. His brothers are Sri N.R. Malkani (a Parliamentarian), Sri B.R. Malkani (a medical practitioner), Sri Kishan Chand Malkani (a businessman) and the youngest is Sri K.R. Malkani (a member of Parliament).

Malkani obtained his Master's Degree in Philosophy in 1916 from the University of Bombay. He was a Research Fellow of the first batch of the Indian Institute of Philosophy at Amalner. It was a private Institution founded by two cotton-mill owners, viz., Srimant Pratap Seth of Amalner and Seth Vallabhdas of a neighbouring town called Yeola. Later Pratap Seth sent him to Cambridge University in 1921 where from he obtained M. Litt. Degree in 1923.

In 1924 he became the Superintendent of the said Institute. He was also appointed as the Editor of The Philosophical Quarterly in 1929, which was the premier journal of Philosophy in India. In the year 1935 Malkani succeeded as the second Director of the Institute after K.C. Bhattacharyya, the first Director of the Institute. He continued in this post till 1966. After 1966 the Institution was closed because of the death of Pratap Seth, the founder of the Institution. Since then
Malkani led his life at Mumbai as a retired person. Thus Malkani spent most of his career in this Institute from 1920 to 1966, starting as a student and retiring as the Director of this renowned Institution. On 28th April, 1977 Malkani died at Mumbai.

Malkani was very simple at heart. He led a simple life and had dedicated whole of his time to the Institute. He was very punctual in his activities. He was so much punctual in his daily life that it has acquired a legendary status. It is said that his time of evening walk helped the town folk of that town to set their clocks. He was also a religious minded person. His unselfishness, dedication and competency helped to build a pioneer Philosophical Research Centre viz., Indian Institute of Philosophy at Amalner. George Burch writes about his competent personality and his dedication in a Review Article thus: “The soul of the Institute is Malkani”, who has shaped it with his forceful personality. His erect bearing reveals an inner integrity of character, but his brusque manner conceals an inner warmth of devotion. His habits are of Kantian regularity, he never leaves Amalner except for the Annual Indian Philosophical Congress............” quoted by Sharad Despande.

MALKANI’S WORKS

Malkani authored a number of books and monographs.

(1) **The Problem of the Self**: It is a small book published in 1939 from Amalner. It was reprinted in 1966 in America.

(2) **Vedāntic Epistemology**: It was published in 1953 from Amalner. This book includes a criticism of K.C. Bhattacharyya’s philosophy. Here Malkani discusses the importance of Epistemology to know the Self or Reality.
(3) *Metaphysics of Advaita Vedānta*: This book has been published from Amalner in 1961. In this book he has discussed the Advaitic metaphysics. This book has five chapters including an Introduction. The different chapters are related to the Absolute, the Self, Māyā, Epistemology, Ethics, Religion etc. From his own admission the writing of this book has been his long-cherished desire because in his view the Advaita Vedāntic school contains the purest philosophical truth. "It has long been my desire to write a book on Advaita metaphysics, because I consider this system as the highest expression of Hindu philosophical thinking. For me at any rate, it is the purest philosophical truth beyond which it is not possible to go."²

(iv) *Metaphysics of Energy*: It has been published from Amalner in 1920. This book contains the following chapters viz., Energy of Physical Sciences - where he has discussed about the concept of Energy as discussed by Mechanics and Physics, and also its conservation and dissipation. The chapter II is on Energy in Bergson's System. The third and fourth chapters discuss about Problems of Motion. Chapter IV is concerned with Meaning and Efficiency. In addition to these chapters this book has an Introductory chapter.

(v) *The Problem of Nothing*: This book was published from Amalner in the year 1918. This book primarily indicates the object of the Institution. Here he has done a comparative study of the Eastern and the Western philosophy with a view to help those who are interested to know the highest problem of life.

(vi) *A Study of Reality*: It was published in the year 1927 from Amalner. This book tries to prove that something is real. Here he tries to disprove the Sceptics’
Malkani was an original thinker and scholar. But he has never presented himself as a scholar. He was also not a Sāṁskritist. For the purpose of understanding the Advaita Vedāntic works which are all in Sanskrit he took the help of Pandit Atmaramsastrī Jere, a renowned scholar and a traditional Vedāntin at the Institute. He explained all the original Advaita Vedāntic works to him. Malkani has interpreted them in English language rather than translating the Sanskrit versions. His purpose was to make Vedānta a living philosophy and not to regard it as ancient or dead. He was not in favour of keeping this system with the orientalists who likes to keep it as ancient. This is clear from his writing in the preface of Metaphysics of Advaita Vedānta. So instead of presenting scholarly representation of the existing commentaries etc., he preferred to interpret the philosophical ideas in his own way. He expressed these views in English language which was convenient to him. Not only that, it is also convenient for the mass people. Malkani was a truth seeker and as such he was not interested in presenting the views of a particular scholar or any particular text. His writings are the free presentations of his truth-seeking mind. So he has not cited any textual reference to support his views. He maintains that it is true that there are various interpretations and “I claim only a particular interpretation of it, which appeals to me most.” His aim is to give a modernized form of Vedānta. He believes that only a modern form of such a consistent philosophical system can get its acceptance by the modern thinkers.

Monographs

His important monographs are:

i) The Real, the Actual and the Possible
ii) Reason and Its Limitation

iii) A Discussion on the Law of Karma

iv) Essay on suicide.

Malkani has not taken the already established techniques of presentations of his thought. In Indian philosophy there is a tradition known as *pūrvapaksa khandana*, where by considering the views of other systems of philosophy and then criticizing and rejecting them consequently, the philosopher expresses his own viewpoint. Malkani has not taken this traditional way of expressing his thought. Malkani unlike some of his contemporary philosophers has not done any comparative discussion of his ideas with the west. His primary object is to establish the philosophy of non-dualism. And in doing so he is expressing his own view, his own feeling. George B. Burch has rightly remarked: "He feels certain of the truth of his philosophy but does not feel any mission to convert others."\(^5\) While expressing his views he is rather consistent throughout his life. So Sharad Deshpande also points out in his introduction to the Philosophy of G.R. Malkani that throughout Malkani's writings he has not changed his views.\(^6\)

**ADVAYTA VEDĀNTA OF ŚĀNKARA**

The philosophical view propounded by Śāṅkara is known as Advaita Vedānta. Śāṅkara maintains that Brahman is the only Reality and the world of multiplicity is false. The individual self or the *jīva* is non-different from Brahman and this is meant by him as Advaitism or non-dualism i.e., the Ātman is identical with Brahman or Reality.
It is the view of the Advaita Vedānta that the very derivation of the word Brahman indicates its nature. The word is derived from the root ‘brh’ with the addition of the suffix *man*. The root ‘brh’ means to grow, to be great etc. The suffix *man* denotes unlimitedness. Hence Śaṅkara regards Brahman as *Vṛddhātmanatvāt* Brahman. It indicates the unparalleled greatness of the Advaitic Absolute. According to him, Brahman is *nirguṇa* and *nirviśeṣa*. He is the Self or *Ātman*. When viewed from the objective side He is Brahman. But when the subjective side is being considered He is the *Ātman* or the eternal Self. Reality is fully realized only when He is viewed both subjectively and objectively. For, “Not only does Brahman denote the eternal Self or the reality of the external world: the inner Self of man, too, more often referred to as *Ātman*, is Brahman.”

Śaṅkara defines Brahman by regarding Him as truth, knowledge, infinite and bliss. By *sat* is meant that Brahman alone is existence. He is the pure, uncontradicted existence. All other things are superimposed on him. When Brahman is regarded as *jñāna*, it does not mean that Brahman is the object of knowledge, but knowledge itself, like *satya*, it is not an adjective, but the essence of Brahman which overcomes the dualism of the knower and the known. Again, though He is described as *jñāna*, yet He is not transient. Again to guard against this, He is described as *ananta*, endless. Brahman is regarded as *ānanda* to refer to Brahman as bliss. The word ‘*ānanda*’ (bliss) does not mean ‘*ānandamaya*’ (blissful one) Śaṅkara has emphatically refuted the view that Brahman is blissful. In his view the word bliss refers to His very nature.

Śaṅkara contends that from the transcendental point of view Brahman is *nirguṇa*. But from the point of view of man of the world He is qualified or *saguna*. 
In this aspect he is the cause of the origination, sustenance and destruction of the world. Now cause is that which changes. If Brahman is regarded as the cause then the immutable nature of Brahman will be destroyed. To avoid this impasse the Advaita Vedāntins recognise a *saguṇa* Brahman or *Īśvara*.

So in the view of Śaṅkara from the transcendental point *nirguṇa* Brahman is the only reality. But for the explanation of the world appearances three factors are simultaneously necessary, viz., *māyā*, *jīva*, and *Īśvara*. According to the Advaita Vedānta these three factors are interdependent. Śaṅkara opines that Brahman as associated by *māyā* is the *Īśvara* or the *Saguṇa* Brahman. So *māyā* or nescience constitutes the very essence of *Īśvara*. Śaṅkara does not accept God as an independent reality and accordingly he rejects all arguments viz., cosmological, moral, ontological, to prove the existence of God. God is not the ultimate reality. He has only a phenomenal reality. So Śaṅkara maintains that, “The *nirguṇa* Brahman is distinct from *Īśvara* in as much as the former is beyond the sphere of all activities. It cannot be related to time, space, cause etc. The multiple powers associated with *Īśvara* do not apply to the Absolute whose freedom from all adjuncts is unqualified”.

According to Advaita Vedānta *māyā* is an indescribable cosmic principle, because of which Brahman appears as *Īśvara*, *jīva* and the world. Śaṅkara maintains that *māyā*, *mithyājñāna*, *avidyā*, and *ajñāna* are more or less interchangeable in meaning. *Māyā* is the power of *Īśvara* by which he creates this world. It consists of three *guṇas*, viz., *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas*. In this regard it is similar to the *Prakṛti* of Sāṁkhya. But unlike the *Prakṛti* of Sāṁkhya *māyā* is not an independent reality. *Prakṛti* in Sāṁkhya is one of the two independent realities.
Mayā is dependent on Isvara for its existence and functioning. Advaita Vedānta explains the appearance of many selves and the multiple world with this concept of māyā. So māyā can be regarded as the key-concept by which the Advaita Vedānta bridges the unbridgeable gulf between the appearance and reality. It is by accepting this inscrutable māyā the Advaita-Vedāntins established the non-duality of Brahman, the Absolute.

Mayā has two kinds of powers viz., āvaraṇa and vikṣepa. By its āvaraṇa śakti it conceals the real nature of Brahman and by its vikṣepa śakti it projects the multiple world. So it is because of māyā that the non-conscious and imperfect world seems to be existing independently of Brahman. From the transcendental point of view, the world of our ordinary experience is unreal or false. When the knowledge of the true nature of Brahman arises, the world of our ordinary experience ceases to exist and is revealed as Brahman. Māyā is indescribable or anirvacanīya. It cannot be regarded as real since Brahman is the only reality. Again it cannot be regarded as unreal, since then the world appearance will not be possible. It cannot be both real and unreal, as reality and unreality are contradictory in nature. Again it is neither real nor unreal, which will violate all logic. Thus, māyā is indescribable as sat (real) or asat (unreal).

According to the Advaita Vedāntin individual souls or the ājīvās are in essence non-different from Brahman. The Advaita Brahman appears as ājīva being associated with the psycho-physical complexes. Śaṅkara maintains that it is due to māyā that the Absolute is associated with these upādhis (adjuncts) and becomes the God, the world, and the ājīvās. Again, it is because of this māyā that the ājīva or the empirical
self appears to be subject to birth and death and also to be the doer of actions and
the enjoyer of their fruits. From the transcendental point of view, the individual
self is absolutely identical with Brahman. But in the empirical level this real
nature of the jīva is not revealed. The transcendental jīva is not limited by time,
space etc., and as such, is eternal, transcendental and all-pervading. It does not
undergo births and deaths. It has neither origination nor destruction. But so far as
the empirical existence is concerned, its existence is limited by time, space and
matter or mind-body complex being associated with māyā. It is not eternal as it
undergoes births and deaths. It is also not pure, as it is subject to desire, hatred etc.
As the empirical jīva does not realize its real nature so it thinks itself as bound and
as subject to the sorrows and sufferings of this world. Bondage is not natural to
the jīvas, in its real nature it is unsurpassable bliss. The jīvas are in bondage when
they identified themselves with the mind-body complexes. So jīvas can come out of
bondage only when they realize their real nature. And this is called liberation or
mukti.

According to the Advaita Vedāntins liberation consisting in the realization of
the real nature of the self or Brahman is of the nature of infinite bliss. So it is
said that, “Liberation is the cessation of avidyā which is said to be the bondage.”

The general view of all the Advaita Vedāntins is the same as with the view
of Śruti. In the Śruti, it is said that śravaṇa (hearing), manana (thinking) and
nididhyāśana (meditation) for the realization of Brahman. Actually in the view of
Śaṅkara immediate intuitive knowledge of Brahman is the means of liberation. But
he maintains that śravaṇa, manana and nididhyāśana are the internal means of
liberation. These three internal means destroy the obstacles like doubt etc. about the real nature of the jīva. As a result Brahma-jñāna is attained. It is found that all the Advaita Vedāntins agree on the point that liberation consists in the knowledge of Brahman as non-different from the jīva and that such, a knowledge is conveyed by the Śrūti only.

MALKANI AS AN ADVAITA VEDĀNTIN

Scientists are concerned with the things as they appear. He is only interested in the objective character of things. But this is not the case with the philosophers. Philosophers try to know the reality of things. G. R. Malkani is a philosopher who is interested about the real nature of things. He is not satisfied with the external matter. While perceiving the determinate things of the world, Malkani peers into the indeterminate things, which is indeterminate and self explained. According to Malkani so far as the determinate character of things is concerned the philosophers are worried about their determinateness. Here a question naturally arises that who determines them. A philosopher tries to find out the indeterminate on which these determinate things are grounded. Malkani maintains that the determinate remains determinate; it is finite. It cannot go beyond its finitude and become the infinite, the Absolute. The indeterminate is that which is self-explained. It is not determined by other relation and thereby explained by that relation.

Again Malkani is not satisfied with man's intellectual capacity to get true knowledge. In his view these are the external capacities of man. It is true that as a rational being man tries to explain everything, he is always interested in rational explanation of things. Malkani, as a philosopher is of the opinion that, so far as
the philosophical discussion of things is concerned, the philosophers differ from the common man in their explanation of things. In philosophical discussion one is interested to know the real nature of things. But the question is whether reason is sufficient to do so, whether the real is rationally attainable something or not. Malkani says that man has an inner capacity which is not easy to rouse but as soon as it arises it realizes the reality. So instead of reason, which is accepted by many philosophers as the true means of knowledge, Malkani regards intuition as the true means of knowledge.

Malkani being an Advaita Vedāntin believes that truth is non-dual. His purpose is to explicate and defend this thesis i.e., the non-duality of Brahman. Malkani maintains that Brahman is the only reality and the world of multiplicity is the appearance of reality. According to him there is nothing that can fall outside of Brahman. And Brahman is identified with the Self or Ātman. The Great Reality called Brahman is no other than our own innermost Self. So Ātman or the Self is real but the individual Self or the jīvas are not real. Though the individual selves and the world are not real yet we perceive them because they have an objective reality. These are seen as real only because of the ignorance of our real nature. We are Brahman in nature. But this nature of man is concealed to us due to māyā. He says that māyā is such a power of Brahman that conceals the real nature of Brahman and projects the multiple world before us. We are deceived by māyā due to our ignorance. He says that actually there is no creation (ajāta-vāda), Brahman does not create this world. He is immutable. Creation requires change but Brahman is changeless. It is māyā or Avidyā which is the cause of the world. God or Īśvara who is endowed with māyā creates the world which is ultimately unreal. Māyā is
false so its creation is also false. As there is no creation so the births and deaths of innumerable jīvas are ultimately false. He opines that there is only one jīva (Eka-jīva) which appears as many. That jīva is the ultimate Self which is eternal, immutable, infinite, consciousness and bliss. So it is nothing other than Brahman, the ultimate eternal substance of the world. Each person or jīva in ignorance creates this multiple world for him only. It is his perception which is responsible for the appearance of this world. Thus Malkani opines that the world is created by the perception of the perceiver. It is not that the world already exists and one perceives the world. It is evident that Malkani is a supporter of drṣṭi- srṣṭi - vāda i.e., perception creates the world. Since there is no creation so there is no world outside the mind of man.

Like all the Advaita Vedāntins, Malkani also maintains that the individual selves are ultimately unreal. Due to ignorance the individual self thinks itself as taking birth and faces the consequent sufferings of this world. So, it is the individuality which is the bondage of man. Malkani ultimately says that man can realize his true nature that he is non-different from Brahman or the Infinite Self. He opines that the real nature of man can be attained by action, devotion, and knowledge. But he repeatedly says that it is only knowledge and knowledge alone that reveals the Reality. He maintains that so far as action is concerned it must be disinterested. And only disinterested action can give peace to mind and thereby open the path towards the truth. Man consists of three kinds of mental states i.e., thinking, feeling and willing. In the stage of action his willing state is only realized. In the stage of devotion man feels an immense pleasure when he loves God. Since there is no object of love which is more resplendent and more beautiful than God. But in this
stage also man has an external relationship with God. So the real realization of God is yet to be attained. Here also the ignorance about God is not over come. It is the knowledge of God as not other than oneself only can destroy all ignorance. So Malkani says that knowledge of Divinity can crown all other approaches to Reality and fulfils them. When we know God we release for ever. In Malkani’s view here knowledge means immediate intuition not something mediate.

Thus from the above discussion it is clear that Malkani is an Advaita Vedāntin although he has presented the philosophy in his own way. He himself told in the preface of his book, Vedāntic Epistemology that, “My exposition of the subject ..., is a free and independent rendering, which keeps the spirit of Vedānta intact, and at the same time adapts the expression to the understanding of those who are imbued with the spirit of Western thought, and who are in the habit of thinking on the compartmental lines of European philosophy.”

MALKANI AND HIS CONTEMPORARIES

Malkani was born in such an enlightened period when Indian philosophy has been discussed and interpreted in a new light to show its relevance for the modern society. He was an Advaita Vedāntin and is called a contemporary one. The term ‘contemporary Vedānta’ or ‘the modernist restatement of the traditional Indian Vedānta’ thus applies to various kinds of writings some of which were attempts to formulate new doctrines...”

Malkani is not only a philosopher but also belongs to such a period of Indian philosophy when many of the eminent Indian philosophers came into existence. They are K.C. Bhattacharyya, D.M. Datta, S. Radhakrishnan, P.T Raju,
Daya Krishna, Ras Vihari Das and many others. As Malkani was the Director of the prestigious Indian Institute of philosophy, so he got the opportunity to come directly in contact with many of these philosophers. As a philosopher he sometimes accepted their views and sometimes criticized them.

The contemporary Indian philosophers, especially the contemporary Vedāntins may be categorized into four groups. To the one group belongs the philosophers like Tilak, Gandhi, Tagore and Aurobindo. These philosophers have apprehended the traditional doctrines though influenced by the western thinking. They also accepted the tradition itself in their life. That means these philosophers follow the philosophy in their life itself what they preach as a philosopher.

To the second group belongs K.C. Bhattacharyya. In his view the assimilation of the western ideas and ideals with those of India is unavoidable. But he thinks that in doing so one must not forget his own independent thinking which he calls ‘Svarāj in Ideas’.

G.R. Malkani, Ras Vihari Das, D.M. Datta, S.K. Maitra, M. Hiriyanna, P.T. Raju, T.R.V. Murti are the philosophers whose basis is English. They belong to the third group who try to present Vedānta philosophy in such a manner that an English-educated reader can grasp it easily. As such they used modern logic and idioms of English language in their exposition of traditional Vedāntic thoughts. However, they remained faithful to the main doctrines.

There is a fourth group of philosophers who are always alert to kept the tradition intact. They are the traditional pandits.

Thus it appears that Malkani has tried to give different interpretation of the classical Advaita Vedāntic doctrines remaining faithful to the core doctrine. His was
a 'free presentation of a truth-seeker' whose primary concern was the readers who have no acquaintances with the classical texts.

**Malkani's Criticism of P.T. Raju's View**

Malkani is a staunch supporter of Advaita Vedānta and believes that a person who follows Vedānta can duly do pure philosophy in India. Malkani strongly opposes the view that only western philosophy is doing pure philosophy by accepting reason as the means of doing philosophy. According to P.T. Raju, Indian philosophers do not have any pure philosophy. They give preference to antiquity rather than to philosophy. They accept any of the earlier philosophy and try to give their interpretations. As a result Indian philosophers deny to think the truth personally. In Raju's view Indian philosophy can be pure if and only if, rather than interpreting the ancient philosophy, the philosophers do think the truth personally. He maintains that in this sense western philosophy is pure since the western philosophers are interested in thinking freely about the philosophical problems. He also argues that western philosophy is pure because it accepts reason as a method of thought. Reason is such that it accepts nothing dogmatically. Reason helps to know the truth which is undoubted. Prof. Raju maintains that Indian philosophy is dogmatic in the sense that it has laid emphasis on Śruti and other such texts. Indian philosophers have so much respect towards the tradition that tradition becomes an impediment towards them. He says that the pure philosophy which is found in India is only of western type. But in his views it is wrong to imitate western philosophy also if we want to do pure philosophy in India.
Malkani has criticized this view of P.T. Raju. Malkani agrees that there are certain philosophers who try to do Indian philosophy with the help of western methods. It means that they are taking the help of Indian and Western philosophies alternatively wherever they think they suit to be. So it would be better to call it a synthesis of Indian and Western philosophies rather than taking it to be any new philosophy. Prof. Raju is of the opinion that Indian philosophers have their own method of thinking but they do not follow it. He again maintains that the method of western philosophers is reason which is the only reliable method of philosophy. Malkani opines that there cannot be two types of pure philosophies and consequently there cannot be two types of methods also. He also expresses doubts about the capacity of reason itself. According to him reason can bring divergencies in discussion. The western philosophers are giving their own philosophy based on their own reason. They are not interested about the logic of other philosophers. So reason instead of giving universality in thought has given divergency in discussion. Again he maintains that reason is applicable only in case of observation and experiment. But metaphysical questions are beyond mere observations and therefore does not depend on hypothesis about the observed facts. So he opines that reason itself cannot help us to do philosophy. According to Malkani it is the belief in revealed words as supported by reason which is the true method of philosophy. It is said that belief in an authority is devoid of all reasons. So it cannot give pure philosophy. Malkani on the other hand opines that it is only the revealed words that can lift man above experience. Logic itself cannot prove the reality. Since if we only depend on logic to arrive at a firm philosophical position it will lead only to an infinite regress. The philosophical truths given by each philosophers must
have their own logic to establish that. So logic cannot give us a direct view of reality, it only goes on rejecting one position than another. In the view of Malkani it is only Vedānta which can present Reality directly before us. Malkani says that it is the guru (preceptor), who sees the truth by himself, can give us the true knowledge of reality. Guru can teach the truth since he has come across the texts. So it is the texts i.e., Sruti which is the only principle of getting pure philosophy. Sruti is Vedānta.

Malkani, thus, concludes that the tradition of Vedānta is the only reliable tradition. The philosophers of India must based their truth on the Vedāntic ideal. It is true that Vedānta has been taught in ancient times. But he says that so far as truth is concerned there is nothing old or new. So, for presenting the ancient truth to the modern man it is required to give it a new garb only.

Malkani’s Criticism of Daya Krishna’s View on Adhyāsa

Daya Krishna, in his article “Can the Analysis of Adhyāsa ever Lead to an Advaitic Conclusion?” has given some critical expositions of Śaṅkara’s view of Adhyāsa. He is not in agreement with Śaṅkara regarding the view that the objective world is an illusion. His primary quarry is that whether Śaṅkara by regarding the appearance of not self as an adhyāsa ultimately rejects the not self i.e., the reality of the objects. He is of the opinion that identification of one object with another is not the cause of adhyāsa.

He maintains that man cannot live without some kind of identification as man cannot live without action. His main point of argument is that not-self is identified with the self, but this does not make the not-self false. Since when rope is
identified with the rope, it is not false. When rope is identified with the snake then it is false. So identification itself does not make anything false.

Daya Krishna maintains that in the perception of rope as snake, both rope and snake are real. Since without the previous perception of rope and snake, snake will not be confused for the rope. According to him, the examples of adhyāśa as given by Śāṅkara viz., Śukti-rajat (conch shell – silver), two moons are not of the same type. In the first case 'Śukti and rajat are both perceived as real in separate experiences. And now, one is confused with the other. But in the case of double moon no two moons are perceived separately. Again in the perception of double moon one is conscious that it is not two moons but one moon. So it is not a case of illusion, here one thing is not confused with the other thing. So Daya Krishna says that either there are two adhyāsas or no-adhyāśa. Daya Krishna also maintains that as the not self is imposed on the self, so the not-self must have some kind of objectivity. Since in the illusory perception both the objects must be previously perceived. Again he says that in Śāṅkara’s view only the ignorant suffer from illusion. In the view of Advaita Vedānta, though the ākāśa is not perceived and not coloured yet it is perceived and perceived as coloured by ignorant people. Daya Krishna, while rejecting this view that the ignorant is only caught by illusion, says that even the non-ignorant perceives colour in the ākāśa.

The Advaitins believe in jīvanmukti. According to them, the psycho-physical realization of the jīvanmukta does not lead to bondage. They realize the psychophysical state only to teach others who have not realized the self. So here the identification of the jīvanmukta with the body that does lead to bondage, is not illusory. There are other types of identifications also. A person in drama identifies
himself with the character that he happens to play. In the Čūḍāṁśū Śrīkṛṣṇa himself said that ‘Aham’. Here he has identified himself with the body. Aham here indicates the embodied self otherwise called ātma or ego. Thus it is found that so far as identification is concerned there may be different kinds of identifications. So Daya Krishna opines that, “then, the question is not of erroneous identification or superimposition or adhyāśa as the Advaitin has thought but whether it occurs in consciousness or rather at the self-conscious level and whether it is free” in the sense that one can withdraw from it and is not too much affected by it”16. According to Daya Krishna Advaita view of rope-snake identification by which they try to explain the fact of illusion is a childish attempt. Firstly in the rope–snake illusion the identified objects behave differently so there arises the doubt about the identification. The Advaitin by using the example of rope–snake illusion to explain the world illusion is actually attempting to say that Brahman is like a snake. In the view of Daya Krishna it is nothing but a foolish attempt. So he argues that the whole world of not-self cannot be regarded as false or as maya.17 The example of erroneous cognition arising out of identification does not make unreal either of the objects which are said to be erroneously identified with each other. So he strongly opposes the concept of adhyāśa laid by the Advaitins only.

Malkani does not accept this contention of Daya Krishna. He says that experiences of Brahman identified with the Self ‘I am Brahman’ and Brahman identified with the world as, ‘I am this’ are different in their meaning and interpretation. By accepting this we accept something other than I. Again to say that Brahman is identified with the world reach only to a negative conclusion that the world is not real. I am not the world. But in case of saying I am Brahman one can
directly reach to reality, his oneness with Brahman. So he says that, “Thus the identity of Brahman with the world is of one kind, while the identity of Brahman with the self is a different kind. The former is reached through negation - the world is not world, it is really Brahman. The latter is reached directly through a proper interpretation of the terms”. So he points out that these are two kinds of identifications. In Advaita Vedānta Brahman is identified with the self not with the world or this. There is no world at all so the question of identification of Brahman with the world i.e., the subject with the object does not arise at all. So there is a distinction between the ontological status of the erroneous objects in Śaṅkara and in Saṅkhya. He says that Daya Krishna fails to see this difference. In Saṅkhya view so far as error is concerned it is due to the non-discrimination between the two real things. But in Advaita Vedānta error occurs due to the identification between a real and the object which is neither real nor unreal hence anirvacanīya. So he says that Daya Krishna is wrong when he says that what Śaṅkara describes as the root form of all ignorance is the identification of the subject with the object in any of its forms and at any of its levels. Advaita Vedānta has identified I and Brahman. They have not identified the subject with the object.

Malkani’s View against Prof. D.M. Datta

Prof. D.M. Datta is a contemporary of Malkani. He is also a follower of Advaita Vedānta. His important publications are Philosophy of Mahatma Gandhi, The Chief Currents of Contemporary Philosophy, Introduction to Indian Philosophy by D.M. Datta and S.C. Chatterjee and The Six Ways of Knowing.
According to him, Brahman is the only Ultimate Reality and the world of multiplicity is the creation of *māyā*. He maintains that the Advaita Vedāntins accept all the six ways of knowing only to prove that Brahman is the only reality. In Indian philosophy different systems have accepted different numbers of *pramāṇas* but it is Advaita Vedānta, which accepts all the six *pramāṇas*. He says that when Advaita Vedānta accepts perception as a source of knowledge it accepts the perception of the universal existing in all particulars. The Infinite Self exists in all individual self or *jīva*. Perception as a *pramāṇa* gives us the knowledge of universal I as existing in the particular I. The universal I or *Brahman* is indeterminate, while the particular I is determinate. So in perception both the indeterminate and the determinate are perceived at a time. The things of the world are finite, determinate and changing. All these limited qualifications ultimately lead to the concept of an infinite, indeterminate and immutable substance. So there is something which is dissimilar from all the things of the world. And that is Brahman, the Ultimate Reality. D.M. Datta opines that when comparison helps us to know something it helps us to know not by similarity only but by dissimilarity also. All things of the world are unreal, so Brahman who is dissimilar to the world is real. He says that though the world is unreal yet it appears only due to *māyā*. He maintains that *māyā* is the material cause of all phenomena. In illusion the illusory object is ultimately non-existent even though we perceive the illusory object due to *māyā*. So, he opines that *māyā* is the cause and the illusory appearance is the effect. It is said that between the cause and the effect there must be some similarity otherwise they cannot be called as cause and effect. In D.M. Datta's view there is the resemblance between the cause *māyā* and the effect.
illusion in the sense that, “an illusory non-existent and māyā there is this point of resemblance, namely that both are different from Brahman, and therefore false from the transcendental standpoint”\textsuperscript{19} Brahman cannot be apprehended in this world since He is not existent like the things of the world. His non-apprehension in the world ultimately leads to the fact of apprehension of Brahman as indescribable in worldly terms. In the knowledge of Brahman no exception is found i.e., Brahman is real in all cases. So the Advaita Vedāntins hold that Kevalānvayi is the only type of anumāna that ultimately gives us the knowledge of Brahman as the only reality. It also helps us to know that the nature of Brahman is uncontradictory.

Prof. Datta also maintains that the Advaita Vedāntins are vivarta-vādins and this can be proved by postulation or arthāpatti. In the Upaniṣads Brahman is regarded as the cause or ground of the world. On the other hand, in the Upaniṣads it is also said that the world is unreal. Hence as it is unreal so its fact of creation does not arise at all. Then it can be argued that here creation means apparent creation not real creation. So it can be concluded that the appearance of the world is only an apparent one i.e., it is the vivarta of Brahman, not real transformation of Brahman. By postulation it is proved that as the world is not a real creation so it is an apparent creation.

According to Prof. Datta, Brahman who is pure consciousness and bliss, can be known by direct knowledge only. But this does not mean that śabda or authority has no significance in knowing Brahman. Authority or testimony also helps to know the reality, since it is the knowledge which comes from a seer of Reality. But the fact is that śabda or verbal testimony can give us mediate knowledge only. Prof. Datta says that śabda preaches us that over and above these
particular things there is the ultimate Reality or Brahman. This mediate knowledge that comes from *Sabda* ultimately leads to know Brahman directly who, shines forth as the only Reality in all other things and the inner self. It is thus that teacher’s precept, “*Thou art Brahman*”, comes to be realized by the pupil in an immediate consciousness of the form, “*I am Brahman*”.

Up to this Malkani is in agreement with D.M. Datta. He also maintains that *Sruti* gives us *Brahma-jñāna*. But Malkani opposes D.M. Datta, when he says that Advaita Vedānta is evolved from Sāṁkhya philosophy. Malkani maintains that the Advaita Vedānta is not satisfied with the discrimination between Self and not-self as is found in Sāṁkhya philosophy. Malkani argues that, it is true that according to Advaita Vedānta, the self is discriminated from the not-self, but it is not true that both the self and the not-self exist separately. As soon as we know the separation of the self from the not-self, the self realizes itself as Brahman and has all the qualities, both intrinsic and extrinsic, that Brahman alone possesses. He says that the Self is not identified with something which lies outside it and consequently there is no expansion of the self towards Brahman which lies outward. According to Malkani, the *sādhanā* of the self is complete with the realization of its real nature i.e., It is Brahman. So he is not in agreement with Prof. D.M. Datta, regarding the view that inwardisation into pure subjectivity is insufficient to get rid of the ego completely.

**Malkani and Prof. K.C. Bhattacharyya**

Prof. K.C. Bhattacharyya, an eminent contemporary Indian philosopher was the first director of the Indian Institute of Philosophy, Amalner. After him Malkani
became the director of the Institution. As a contemporary of K.C. Bhattacharyya Malkani was much influenced by his views. He himself very humbly and expressly acknowledges the influence of K.C. Bhattacharyya in his philosophical thinking. He accepted many of the views of K.C. Battacharyya. But where K.C. Bhattacharyya departs from Advaita Vedānta he strongly opposes him as Malkani was an ardent supporter of Advaita Vedānta. He said in his article entitled ‘Philosophical Truth’ that he is indebted to K.C. Bhattacharyya where their views are similar.21

The subject as Freedom, The Concept of Philosophy in Contemporary Indian Philosophy etc., are the important works of K.C. Bhattacharyya. From his writings it is clear that he was a Vedāntin. But K.C. Bhattacharyya’s writings are not easy to enter into. Prof. D.M. Datta correctly remarks. “his style too compact and his thoughts too analytical and abstract to be intelligible to the ordinary reader without repeated attempts.22

Prof. K.C. Bhattacharyya’s concept of indefinite is similar to Śaṅkara’s concept of indefinite who is Brahman. Both regard Brahman as self-revealing and beyond speech. This Brahman or the Indefinite can only be symbolized but not spoken of. But, though K.C. Bhattacharyya’s view is similar to the Advaita philosophy of Śaṅkara regarding Brahman who is indescribable either as subject, or as object, yet he differs from Śaṅkara in many respects.

K.C. Bhattacharyya reaches to the indefinite which is self-evident by elaborating the subject to the limit of truth which is neither subject nor object. Advaita-Vedānta, on the other hand, reaches to the indefinite by way of negation i.e., by negating both the subject and the object.
K.C. Bhattacharyya maintains that there are two spheres of understanding viz., definite and indefinite. All distinctions of subject and object belong to the sphere of definite. On the other hand all that is beyond any distinction of subject and object is regarded as indefinite. The concept of indefinite is an important concept of metaphysics and most of the philosophers have discussed their views of indefinite. Bhattacharyya unlike Kant maintains that that which is unknowable cannot be thinkable also. Hence it is not the reality. He maintains that indefinite is unknowable in the literal sense but it can be thought of symbolically. It is true that the indefinite is not an opposite object like the objects of sense intuition or of pure thought, yet there is the thought of something beyond all experiences. He opines that the consciousness of definite always leads to the consciousness of indefinite. So definite can be regarded as a mode of indefinite. Thus his indefinite is both immanent and transcendent. Indefinite runs through the definite. The indefinite is K.C. Bhattacharyya's Absolute. In his view this indefinite can be known by the negation of subject and object. According to him, there are four grades of consciousness through which the Absolute can be reached. He maintains that the first step in the object and the highest is the consciousness which is neither subjective nor objective. Before that there is the subject or spirit which is completely devoid of all objectivity. In the second grade there is the contemplation of object which has no reference to sense-perception. He argues that by negating the different grades we ultimately reach to the truth, which is neither subject nor object. In his view subject is reality but which is neither subject nor object is the truth with which philosophy actually deals with. So he says that the philosophy of pure object is called metaphysics, philosophy of the spirit and philosophy of truth.
K.C. Bhattacharyya opines that until and unless we can realize the inadequacy of the lowest level or grade i.e., the facts of the empirical world we cannot proceed to the next level. So in knowing the highest i.e., the truth an elaboration of each levels from the lowest is required. He maintains that the truth is the substance of each level. Each lower level implies the higher. Thus he says that the higher truth in the philosophical analysis can be achieved by negation and reconstruction. What is found unreal and untruth is negated and the process tends towards the achievement of the truth. So it appears that the grades from the lowest to the highest is conditioned by the previous stage. He says that this process is both logical and psychological.

According to Prof. K.C. Bhattacharyya the object of scientific enquiry is not the fact but the pure-object. He argues that pure-object is non-distinct from the true subject. K.C. Bhattacharyya maintains that unlike science the study of philosophy has a necessary reference to the subject. Science only studies the objective phenomena as it is. Any reference to subject to the study of phenomena is harmful for science. But metaphysics elaborates the concept of the object with reference to the subject. And this subject itself goes beyond metaphysics. So he says that philosophy does not study matter which is not independent of sensation. Thus the object is not public but private. It implies that object or matter has nothing for it except it is being perceived and known by a subject.

He opines that though the objectivity can be denied, its existence cannot be denied. Existence and objectivity are not the same thing. When objectivity is suppressed it is revealed through some higher principle. This higher principle is the being where all things are suppressed. It means that all things are ultimately
merged into the being or the higher principle. So it is said that all things or objects come from being, stay in being and return to being. This being is equated with Brahman, the Absolute Being signify the sat character of Brahman. It means that all things are super-imposed on Brahman but Brahman is not super-imposed on anything. The relation between the thing and being is conceptual and thereby false or illusory. There cannot be any real relation between them. So both the object and the objectivity can be denied. Objectivity has nothing in itself except as it is known by the subject. He says that being is the pure object that cannot be denied. In his view philosophy studies this pure subject which has no objectivity whatsoever.

It may appear as an error when we attach objectivity to being. K.C. Bhattacharyya’s concept of object is the concept of subject. But in this stage also the truth is not known. The logic of truth is known as the philosophy of the spirit. This subject is enjoyingly understood. But in the pure form the I is not enjoyingly understood. When the subject or I is enjoyingly understood then, "I is not only symbolized by the object as we have already seen, but it is also identified with some object or other." He maintains that as an enjoying subject there is the self and the object enjoyed with it.

Prof. K.C. Bhattacharyya opines that the over-personal reality of religion can be enjoyed. But the Absolute cannot be enjoyed since it is the negation of I or the subject. So he says that the Absolute of philosophy is not the God of religion. In the view of K.C. Bhattacharyya God in religion is a reality but Absolute is truth. Truth is that which cannot be enjoyed but reality is that which can be enjoyed. It is something to be believed in. It cannot be understood either as subject or as
object. This truth cannot be literally speakable. It can only be symbolized. So it is transcendental consciousness. K. C. Bhattacharyya while regarding the Absolute as neither the subject nor the object is not saying that it is a neutral entity. It is the self-revealing subject which is beyond all attributes relating to objective and subjective attitudes. The truth is not the individual I since it is the negation of I. But it is the real I which is infinitely great or Brahman. Self-revealing means the realization of Brahman in the sense that 'I am Brahman'.

Malkani criticizes the pure object of K.C. Bhattacharyya. Malkani says that object must be an object of perception. In the view of K.C. Bhattacharyya, pure-object is that which has no matter but has a form. Malkani says that such an object without any matter cannot be a content of metaphysical studies. Metaphysics is concerned with the question of what is a material substance. Malkani points out that in the Advaita Vedānta of Śaṅkara also the highest reality is self-revealing. It cannot be spoken of i.e., not literally speakable. It can only be symbolized. Symbolization is here an immediate fact. He maintains that the most immediate thing about which we can speak is the I. Hence I signifies the highest immediacy. So Malkani opines that in the view of Advaita Vedānta, "If anything is self-revealing it must be absolutely immediate and of the nature of the ātman, or the Self." Malkani has given an elaborate discussion of the Self, which will be discussed in the Chapter II i.e., Metaphysics I. In that chapter the discussion of Brahman and Self, their identity etc will be extensively discussed.

K.C Bhattacharyya argues that the truth which is self-revealing expresses itself in three alternative forms. Absolute is called ‘truth’ when it transcendence the
over-personal reality of religion. Then it is positive being. He is called 'freedom', when He is positive non-being. Again He is value in the sense of positive indeterminate. Thus we find that K.C. Bhattacharyya is of the opinion that truth or Absolute expressed Itself in three alternate forms. It means that the Absolute after reaching to the limit of negation has expressed Itself in three forms. "Prof. Bhattacharyya tries to go further and sees in the Absolute an alternation of forms".25 Malkani does not accept the view the Absolute reveals in three alternative forms. In the Advaita Vedānta of Śaṅkara it is found that Brahman is Truth, Beauty and Goodness Itself, but these are not his alternate forms. Truth, Beauty and Goodness are the three values and we shall try to discuss about these values in the chapter on Morality and i.e., in the chapter VI. Malkani says as soon as truth or the Absolute will express Itself in three forms It will be turned to an object. Only an object can have self distinctions. As the Absolute is self revealing it cannot have self distinctions which will make it an object of knowledge. Since self-revelation is abnegation of all distinctions. Self-revelation and knowability are rather incompatible to each other. Only one thing can be self-revealing. So he does not accept the view of K.C. Bhattacharyya i.e., in the highest limit of Absolute, It expresses in three alternate forms.

PURPOSE AND SCOPE OF THE STUDY

From the foregoing discussions it is clear that Prof. G.R. Malkani was an original thinker and erudite scholar, whose contribution to the field of Indian philosophy nay, Advaita Vedānta can be judged from his extensive writings. His interpretation of Advaita Vedānta philosophy is marked by own reasoning and
judgement. In the view of George B. Burch, Emeritus Prof. U.S.A., “Malkani has freed Advaita-Vedānta, from its dependence on the literary tradition.” Malkani had tried to present everything on the basis of his ruthless reason. He was not dependent on any guru in his interpretation. On the other hand he believed that everybody had his guru inside him. As he had not based on any guru, consequently he had no disciple. “His philosophy is significant, however, not only for its form of expression but also for its metaphysical substance.”

It is true that the philosophy of Śaṅkara has been interpreted and discussed by many of the contemporary Vedāntins. Each of the interpreters has given their own exposition in their presentation. Malkan’s interpretation has its own significance, that deserves to be noticed. Malkani made no compromise with the common sense, current opinions, or tradition, but pushed the arguments to their logical conclusions. There are certain extreme positions in Advaita-Vedānta which have not been discussed by many philosophers of the contemporary age. The concepts which are studied rarely are: (i) drṣṭi-sṛṣṭi-vāda i.e., the theory that perception creates the object which is the position of the subjective idealist (esse-est-percipi), (ii) Ekajīvavāda i.e., the theory that there is only one jīva, the jīvas or individual selves are not many though they appear to be so, (iii) Ajātavāda i.e., the theory of no-creation. Not only these Malkani had given his interpretation on almost all spheres of Śaṅkara-Vedānta. He had written books on Advaita Metaphysics, Epistemology and many other topics where he had given his own way of thinking not influenced by any pandits.

The philosophy of Śaṅkara is undoubtedly a consistent and logically irrefutable philosophy. The concept of māyā as found, in Upanisads is interpreted by Śaṅkara
in such a way that no one before and after him has interpreted \textit{māyā} in that way. It is the key-concept in Śaṅkara’s philosophy by which he has established his \textit{Advaita Brahma-vāda}.

Now the question is how far Malkani, who was an \textit{ardent Advaita Vedāntin}, was successful in interpreting Śaṅkara’s view? Whether he could defend the much disputed concepts forwarded by Śaṅkara to the modern man for whom Malkani actually wrote? Did Malkani deny the possibility of morality as he accepted the reality of only one \textit{jīva}? These and many more such questions demand answering. With this purpose the present dissertation has been prepared.

Moreover, . . . the originality and importance of Malkani’s works cannot be denied, But it is a fact that his works have not been thoroughly discussed by modern scholars. His philosophical ideas have not attracted as much attention as he deserves because of this. Of course Dr. Sharad Despande has taken a keen interest in the study and publication of Malkani’s works. He has tried his best in presenting the philosophical ideas of G.R. Malkan in his work, \textit{The Philosophy of G.R. Malkani}. The present work has received much help from this work. Similarly George B Burch has also endeavoured to introduce Malkan’s philosophy to the modern scholars in his paper ‘Neo-Hinduism of G.R. Malkani’, published in \textit{God in Contemporary Thought}. This is also a scholarly paper which gives much needed exposition of Malkani’s philosophy to some extent.

But even then it is found that the philosophical ideas of Malkani and his contribution towards Indian Philosophy as a whole and \textit{Advaita Vedānta} in particular are not critically and systematically discussed in any extant works. If and when the works of Malkani are extensively studied and interpreted, then only his importance
will be conceived. Hence, there is a scope in explaining and interpreting the theories propounded by Prof. G.R. Malkani.

The present thesis is, on the one hand, a humble attempt to discuss the philosophy of such a great philosopher like Malkani who has not been noticed and studied as much as he deserved and on the other hand, to show how far Malkani, has succeeded in the interpretation and presentation of an age-long consistent philosophical system like Advaita-Vedanta of Sankara.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. *The Philosophy of G.R. Malkani*, p. xiii


3. “my attitude to the subject is not that of the orientalist, who views ancient systems as really ancient, and so dead and past. What I want to expound is a living system, though ancient. My presentation again will not be scholarly or rooted in the original Sanskrit text and their commentaries.” *Metaphysics of Advaita-Vedanta*, p.


5. George, B. Burch, *God in Contemporary Thought*, p. 242

6. “A continuous reading of these essays gives an impression that Malkani never changes his thoughts once they are formulated”. *The Philosophy of G.R. Malkani*, p. xx.

7. Cf. Sankara Bhasya on *Taittiriya Upanisad*, 2.1


9. Satyam jnanam anantam brahma, *Taittiriya Upanisad*, 2.1
   vijnanaan anandam brahma, *Brhadaranyaka Upanisad*, 3.9.28
10. “The way out of this impasse was to recognize a *saguna* Brahman or Brahman answering to a *tatastha lakṣaṇa*. Such is the logical origin of the concept of *Īśvara* in the Advaita system. The essence of *Īśvara* is a synthesis of the Being of the Absolute and the becoming of *Prakṛti*. Thus the self subsistent Absolute becomes a personal God, the cause of the world of flux, *jagat* or *samsāra*”, A.G. Krishna Warrier, *The Concept of Mukti in Advaita Vedānta*, p. 242.

11. Ibid, p. 258

12. avidyāstamayo - mokṣah sa saṁśāra udahṛta, *Brahmasiddhi*, p. 119


15. Cf. “Revelation will be our method of knowledge, and reason will be a method of confirming and deepening that knowledge by removing all mental or intellectual impediments to its complete fruition.”, G.R. Malkani, *The Philosophy of G.R. Malkani*, p. 410

16. Daya Krisha, *New Perspectives in Indian Philosophy*, p.159

17. “The whole world of not self cannot be considered as Māyā only because it presupposes the identification, in some sense or other, of the self with the not-self”. Ibid, p. 163


20. Ibid., p. 351

21. Cf. “My stand throughout has been that of Advaita Vedanta of Sri Śaṅkaraśārya; and if any of my arguments are found similar to those of Prof.
K.C. Bhattacharyya, it may be taken for granted that I am to that extent indebted to him.” - G.R. Malkani, *The Philosophy of G.R. Malkani*, p. 53


24. Ibid, p. 404

25. Ibid. p. 405