CHAPTER TWO

NYĀYA VIEWS IN THE NAIŚADHA-CARITA

The Nyāya-system of Indian philosophy, propounded by great sage, Gotama also known as Gautama and Aksapāda. He is the author of the Nyāya-sūtra. The Nyāya is also known as the Aksapāda system. The Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika philosophy are closely connected with each other. The Nyāya system finds a remarkable status because of its logical contribution to Indian philosophy. This system of thought is primarily concerned with the conditions of correct thinking and the means of acquiring a valid knowledge of reality. The philosophical stand-point of this system consists in the scrutinization of all objects by means of logical proof. Therefore, logic or reasoning is its distinguished feature.

The Nyāya system especially deals with inference supported by reasoning ‘Ānvīkṣikī’ (science of logic) is the ancient name of the Nyāya śāstra. The first work of the Nyāya philosophy is the Nyāya sūtra of Gotama. It contains five adhyāyas or books, each containing two āhnikas or sections. The subsequent works of Nyāya system, such as Vātsyāyana’s Nyāya-Bhāṣya in which he made a comprehensive discussion about Nyāya, Uddyolakāra’s Nyāya-vārttika, Vācaspati’s Nyāya-vārttika-tātparya-tikā, Jayanta Bhaṭṭa’s Nyāyamañjarī, Udayana’s Nyāya-vārttika-tatparya
parisuddhi and Kusumāṇḍjali etc. Nyāya is said to be the critical examination of something with certain sources of valid cognitions.1

The word ‘ānvikṣikī’ is derived from the word ‘ānvikṣā’, i.e. scrutinization or retrospective examination. According to Vātsyāyana, Nyāya-Sāstra is known as Nyāya-Vidyā or Ānvikṣikī. ‘Ānvikṣā’ is the inference backed by direct perception and verbal testimony. In other words, ‘Ānvikṣā’ is the scrutinization of certain object already known through direct apprehension and scriptural evidence.2 Therefore, ‘Ānvikṣikī’, the science of logic is the science which is based on logical reasoning. ‘Ānvikṣikī’ is popularly known as Nyāya and Tarka.3 According to Amarakośa, the science of logic (tarkavidyā) is regarded as ‘Ānvikṣikī’. The Manusmṛti gives a respectable position to the science of logic. In the Arthasastra of Kautilya, Ānvikṣikī is described as the illuminator of all sciences, the means of all activities and depository of virtues. Thus, in this manner, Ānvikṣikī forms a subject of great interest to the field of Indian logic.

Nyāya methodology is said to have a three-fold trend, i.e. enumeration (uddeśā) definition (lakṣaṇa) and examination (parīkṣā). Firstly, a matter is enumerated or enunciated, then it is defined and at last it is scrutinized by proper reasoning. In a general way, the assertion of a subject by name is called enumeration. Definition is the explicit assertion
of both general and particular features of an object by which it is
distinguished from other homogeneous and heterogeneous objects.
Examination is proper assimilation of object backed by the sources of valid
knowledge. Gautama in his Nyāya-Sūtra discusses sixteen topics or
categories with their enumeration, definition and scrutinization.

It is said that great sage Akṣapāda (Gautama or Gotama)
compiled the science of reasoning with some aphorisms in order to destroy
the sufferings of the world completely. In his Sūtra, Gautama declares
that by a correct and true understanding of the sixteen categories beginning
with pramāṇa, one gets liberated from this world of birth and death. These
sixteen categories are mentioned as follows:

1. Pramāṇa : (means or instruments of true knowledge)
2. Prameya : (Object of true knowledge or cognition)
3. Samsāya : (Doubt)
4. Prayojana : (Purpose or motive)
5. Drṣṭānta : (Example or instance)
6. Siddhānta : (Conclusion)
7. Avayava : (Member or factor of a syllogism)
8. Tarka : (Argument)
9. Nirṇaya : (Decisive knowledge or ascertainment).
10. Vāda : (Discussion [to arrive at the truth])
11. Jalpa : (Argument, both constructive and destructive) or Disputation.

12. Vitanṭa : (Mere destructive argument or wrangling)

13. Hetvābhāsa : (Fallacies in reasoning or fallacious reasons)

14. Chala : (Quibbling or specious argument).

15. Jāti : (unfair rejoinder or unavailing or futile objection).

16. Nigraha-sthāna: (Vulnerable point or defeat-situation).⁵

Pramāṇa is the means of knowing anything in a correct form. It is said to be the means of valid cognition. It includes all the sources or methods of knowledge. Of the philosophical topics, pramāṇa is the most important and so it is treated more carefully. In Nyāya it is of four types, viz. Pratyakṣa (perception), Anumāṇa (inference), Upamāṇa (comparison) and Śabda (verbal testimony).⁶

Prameya, literary means an object of Valid knowledge, i.e. reality. The objects of such knowledge, according to Nyāya, are twelve. They are (1) Ātman (self), (2) Śarīra (body), (3) Indriyas (sense-organs), Indriyārthas (sense-objects), Buddhi (apprehension), Manas (mind), Pravṛtti (activity), Doṣa (fault), Pretyabhāva (rebirth), Phala (fruit), Duḥkha (pain) and Apavarga (emancipation).⁷
Samśaya or doubt is a state of uncertainty. It represents the minds wavering between different conflicting views with regard to the same object. It also depends on the mutual discrepancy and on the irregularity of recognition.⁸

Prayojana is the aim or purpose in which the knower becomes active by considering it conducive or adversary.⁹

Drśtānta is the object which lays no contradictory understanding of common people and of considerate wise persons.¹⁰

Siddhānta is the state of particular knowledge accepted through science for special scrutiny, a complete argument and agreement.¹¹

Avayavas or the members of syllogism are five, they are — Pratijñā (proposition), Hetu (cause), Udāharaṇa (example), Upanaya (application) and Nigamana (conclusion).¹²

By applying a cause in an object previously not known, the inquisition or reasoning of its reality is called Tarka or argument.¹³

Nirṇaya is certain knowledge about anything, attained by means of any of the legitimate methods of knowledge. It is usually preceded by doubt and requires a consideration of all the arguments for and against as certain view or doctrine.¹⁴

Vāda is a discussion which is conducted with the help of pramāṇas and tarka, and in which arguments are fully stated in the five
formal steps of inference. It does not go against any accepted theory. In it, each of the parties, the exponent (vādī) and the opponent (prativādī), tries to establish his own position and refute that of the other but both try to arrive at the truth.15

*Jalpa*, being endowed with the characteristics of *vāda*, is the combination of sentences, having establishment of own view and refutation of opponent’s view by means of *chala*, *jāti* and *nigrahaḥstāna*. It is a kind of dispute using sophistry.16

When aforesaid *Jalpa*, becomes devoid of opponent’s establishment, it is called *Vitanḍā*. In other words, it is eristic without establishing counter-statement.17

*Hetvābhaśa* literary means - *hetu* or reason. It is generally taken to mean the fallacies of inference. It comprises five phases, viz. *Savyabhicāra* or *Asiddha* (unproved or unattested), *Viruddha* (contradictory), *Satpratipakṣa* (neutralized or stupefied), *Anekāntikas* (inconclusive) and *Kālānta* (belated or annulled) pseudo-reasonings.18

*Chala* is a kind of unfair reply in which an attempt is made to contradict a statement by taking it in a sense other than the intended one. It is a questionable device for getting out of a difficulty by quibbling.19
Jāti implies futile answer. It is sophistical refutation. Prohibition of reason by means of similarity and dissimilarity is such an unfair rejoinder.  

Nigrahaḥsthāna or the ground of confutation comprises misunderstanding and lack of understanding in a discussion.

In the Naśadha-carita, the Nyāya methodology with these sixteen categories is found. While describing the features of goddess Sarasvatī, poet Śrīharṣa refers to the Nyāya system. It is surmised that the two wreaths of Sarasvatī’s teeth which have the pearls arranged together, form the science of logic. This science of logic composed of two wreaths of teeth is characterized by sixteen topics mentioned twice, first on the occasion of ‘enumeration’ and then at the time of ‘definition’ and is adopted by the people aspirant for emancipation.

The number of teeth is thirty-two. Now if the sixteen topics mentioned twice, than it will also form that number. Thus, poet Śrīharṣa contends with some poetic wordplays, that the two lines of Sarasvatī’s teeth represent the Nyāya system with its sixteen categories maintained twice.

Here, the poet refers to both enumeration (uddeśa) and definition (lakṣaṇa) and does not speak of examination (parīkṣā). In his Nyāya-Sūtra, Gautama, mentions sixteen categories and declares that the true knowledge
of these categories leads the people to the final release. Poet, Śrīharṣa supports the view of Gautama and asserts that those who are desirous of attaining salvation should adopt and practice the theory of substance enumerated by the science of logic. A pun is understand in the word ‘muktikāmākalitā’ which is the adjective of ‘ānvīksikā’ and ‘daśanadvimāti’. So, it implies the two lines of teeth having pearls strung together and also suggests the science of logic adopted by the aspirants for liberation.

In the same way, the teeth of Sarasvatī’s mouth are represented as arguments. Otherwise, it would not be possible to make argumentation to cut asunder the leaf (of counter-arguments) in dispute and refute the (views of) meritorious opponents. Thus poet Śrīharṣa describes that the teeth of goddess Sarasvatī are conjectured to be arguments with which the mouth repudiates the counter-arguments.

Poet Śrīharṣa refers to the two facets of philosophical discussion, i.e. objection (pūrvapakṣa) and conclusion (uttarapakṣa), while depicting the lips of Sarasvatī. Both these philosophical forms are backed by the vehement partiality of disputant (vādī) and respondent (prativādī) each to his own view. In verse no. 80 of the tenth canto of the Naiṣadha carita, both the upper lips of Sarasvatī are described as the two forms of philosophical disquisition. In a literary sense also, the lips are adept in
speech as to argumentation and refutation. In this respect, poet Śrīharṣa gives an allusion to the Nyāya logic.

In another verse, vāda is found. In this verse Damayanti addressed to king Nala in describing the beauty of the letter. It is depicted that Cupid is invisible, for he is destroyed by Śiva ‘the old tradition; and this may be set aside by a new discussion. The new discussion appears that Cupid is invisible out of shame, as he does not possess the beauty of Nala’s body. Thus the old discussion is replaced by the new discussion.25

Hetvābhāsa or fallacious reasoning is found in another verse of the Naiṣadha-carita. This fallacious reasoning is found while the Cārvāka denies the theory of God. It is stated that reasoning as such is not beyond question. In view of mutual opposition, each one of the views loses merit being equal in force, just like a fallacious inference with a contradictory reason on the opposite side.26 Satpratipakṣa Hetvābhāsa is referred to by the poet.

In this manner, some theories of Nyāya such as sixteen topics and the fallacious reasoning are discussed above as traced out in the Naiṣadha-carita. The poet mainly points out the Nyāya logic to serve the purpose of the philosophical stand-point.

According to the Nyāya philosophy, there are two kinds of apprehension (anubhava) or cognition (jñāna), viz. Right Cognition
The knowledge of an object as it really is, i.e. 'silver is silver' on the other hand, when something is mistaken as something else, then that knowledge is called wrong apprehension, e.g. 'nacre is silver'. Right cognition is the knowledge of an object in its true nature and so it cannot be contradicted by wrong cognition. Dr. Harekrishna Meher has mentioned three kinds of wrong apprehension, viz., Doubt (samsaya), Misconception (viparyaya) and conjecture (tarka). This is from the *Tarkabhāṣā*. But on the other hand, in the book named 'An introduction to Indian Philosophy' by Dutta and Chatterjee, we find four kinds of wrong apprehension, i.e. Memory (smṛti), Doubt (saṁśaya), Error (bhrama or viparyyaya) and Hypothetical argument (tarka).

In a verse of the *Naiṣadha-caritra*, a reference to such a concept is found. The four gods prevented Kali from cherishing an evil idea when he insists before them that he would do harm to the married couple of Nala and Damayanthī. The speech of the gods addressed to Kali refers to the notion of right cognition contrasted with that of wrong cognition. The gods declare that princess Damayanthī is perfectly pious and hence she cannot be oppressed by chaps like Kali who is indulged in unavailing nuisance. In this respect, the poet exemplifies that right cognition which is rid of falsity.
cannot be sublated by error or wrong cognition that sticks to worthless unrealities.30

In the concerned verse, the concept of right cognition and wrong cognition is depicted with a pun. The word ‘vinītatamā’ is applicable both for Damayantī and Right Apprehension (pramiti). In Damayantī’s case, it means well-disciplined and in case of Right Apprehension, it means what is contrary to illusory notion or error. On the other hand, the word ‘vyarthānartha-graha’ is applicable both for Kali and Wrong Apprehension (vibhrama). According to Nārāyaṇa, the ‘pramiti’ is the true cognition in which illusion is set aside by misconceptions. So, correct apprehension of a thing in its real nature is contrary to the illusory cognitions. Here, he gives an instance of nacre and silver.31 Thus the poet, Śrīharṣa, appropriately opines in a single verse that Kali like wrong apprehension cannot oppress Damayantī who is like indubitable right cognition.

Anumāṇa (anu – after, māṇa – knowledge) literary means a cognition or knowledge which follows some other knowledge. Inference is the indirect knowledge arising from “consideration of sign”. Inference is of two kinds, viz. Svārthānumāṇa (inference for one self) and Parārthānumāṇa (inference for others).32 For example, a person very often observes in the kitchen the invariable concomitance (vyāpti) of smoke

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and fire. Now, that person when goes near a hill and sees smoke on it, than he remembers that 'where there is smoke there is fire' (yatra yatra dhūmaḥ, tatra tatra vahniḥ). And from there, the knowledge comes about that the hill has smoke in universal concomitance with fire. Such knowledge is called 'consideration of sign' (liṅgakāraṇa) or simply 'consideration' (kāraṇa).35 From this arises the knowledge that “the hill is fiery” and this knowledge is “inferential conclusion” (anumiti). So, for one self, this is inference.

Having inferred fire from smoke applying a syllogism, when someone shows it to others, than that inference is called ‘parārthānumāna’. According to Nyāya logic, Inference is of five membered syllogism. According to the Nyāya Sūtra, Inference comprises five members, viz. pratijñā (proposition), hetu (reason), Udāharaṇa (example), Upānaya (application) and Nigamana (conclusion).36 In the Indian philosophies, this five membered syllogism is very popular. Pratijñā as the first member asserts something.37 Hetu states the reason for that assertion.38 The link between the reason and the asserted matter, as backed by familiar example is shown by Udāharaṇa.39 Upānaya is the application of familiar example to the present case.40 The conclusion that follows from the preceding members of syllogism is called Nigamana.41
The popular ‘parārthānumāna’ of the Nyāya syllogism may be illustrated as follows:

_Pratijñā_ or Proposition : The hill is fiery (parvato vahnimān);

_Hetu_ or Reason : For, it is smoky (dhūmavattvāt);

_Udāharaṇa_ or Example : Where there is smoke, there is fire, as in a kitchen (yatras yatra dhūmah, tatra tatra vahniḥ, yathā mahānase);

_Upanaya_ or Application : So is the hill in the present case (tathā ca parvate);

_Nigamana_ or Conclusion: Therefore, the hill is smoky (ataḥ parvato vahnimān).

In the _Naiṣadha-carita_, there are lots of allusions related to inference are found. In this literary composition, the popular illustration of the Nyāya logic took a very important place. Poet Śrīharṣa uses this instance in the case of king Nala and princess Damayantī. The context is that after hearing Nala’s love-message from swan, Damayantī becomes ardently overwhelmed with the anguish of Nala’s separation. Here logically the poet remarks:

“It is a matter of wonder that Damayantī’s maiden-friends, after observation, infer Nala to be the cause of her fever by merely seeing tears in his eyes. And it is an inference that does not prove untrue”.42
Here poet Śrīharṣa prudently places the Nyāya logic simply with a manipulation of literary word-play. The Nyāya syllogism is reflected here. In the cited verse, pun is found in some words, viz. ‘dharaṇī-bhṛdbhū’, ‘bāspa’ and ‘tāpa’. And half ‘a’ is to be inserted here in order to established the inference. Now the syllogism in the present case may be arranged as follows:

Pratijñā : The site of the hill has fire that causes heat (dharaṇībhrd bhūḥ tāpakarāṇalavān);

Hetu : For, the site of the hill has mist (of smoke or heat) (bāspamatvāt bāspanirikṣaṇād vā);

Udaharana : Where there is heat, there is fire causing heat (as in the kitchen) (yatra yatra bāspaḥ, tatra tatra tāpakaro’nalaḥ, yathā mahānase);

Upanaya : So also is the site of the hill (tathā cāyaṁ dharaṇībhrd bhūḥ);

Nigamana : Therefore, the site of the hill has fire that causes heat. (ataḥ sa tāpakāraṇalavān).

This syllogism is very akin to the Nyāya inference having the instance of hill and fire. In depicting the inference in both the manners, poet Śrīharṣa displays his ingeniousness and erudition.
A gist of inference is found in another verse of the epic. In this verse, Damayantī addressed Nala, the disguised messenger of the four gods, Damayantī describes that Cupid has not acquired even the beauty present on the toe of Nala’s foot. Indeed the half moon, the emblem of Cupid’s conqueror Śiva, is there in the shape of a toe-nail; and it is the evidence in this concern.43

In the same context another allusion to inference is found. Damayantī remarks that the two eyes of antelope are visible on Nala’s moon-like face; and the presence of that antelope is inferred because Nala’s face is the moon, while its tail with a flashing bunch of hairs is visible in the guise of his charming locks.44

The poet makes a reference to the inference in another verse of this epic. The king of land Puṣkara, Savana by name, is present with others in the svayamvara of the princess. But she wisely makes the twist of her creeper—like eyebrows and writhing of her appearance which is the index of her non-acceptance of that King. In the case of King Savana, the smoke of his pervasive gloom becomes the symbol of the fire of his sorrow caused by his failure to win the princess.45

In another place of the epic, a reference to inference is seen. The feature of Nala’s chariot, which is offered to him by his father-in-law, King Bhīma, is described in the concerned verse. It is stated that the great
chariot with an exquisite charioteer, is manifested from Nala’s link with its poles and that is why its excellence as great as that of ‘puspaka’ chariot of Kubera, can be inferred from Kubera’s own instance.46

In another place, the inference has been hinted to in a verse. In the concerned verse, Damayantī spoke to her beloved Nala, describing the unbearableness of her separation illustrating in the guise of Cakravāka bird. The verse reads:

“Here is an example is support of the inference that the deeds of animate beings are determined by their destiny. The two Cakravāka (Sheldrake) birds would bring ill to themselves, their own separation guided, though all their past deeds have been by a sense of their personal good.”47

Here the Nyāya theory of unseen power (adrṣṭa) is also reflected. Beings are controlled by their fate and they experience the result of their previous commitments. According to the past actions, good or evil is brought about in this life. So beings are always guided by some unseen power.

In another verse of the epic, inference pertaining to the spot of moon is found. The poet says that all those wise scholars who inferred the existence of fire in snow, because of the Lotus-plants being consumed by
It is popular that fire is inferred from smoke, that moon is snowy and snow destroys Lotuses. Therefore, moon is supposed to be fiery and its spot is conjectured as the volume of smoke. In this respect, the inference may be presented as follows:

"Moon is fiery (himām uḥ dāhakārī);
For it has spot – like smoke (kalahka-rūpa – dhūmavattvāt);
Like fire (agnivat)."

Nārāyaṇa explains this inference with an illustration of fire and smoke.49 Poet Śrīharṣa thus depicts the Nyāya philosophy of inference.

The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophy holds the view that effect does not exist (asat) in its material cause prior to its production. This theory is known as Asatkāryavāda. When effect comes about, it destroys its previous non-existence. So it manifests as a new creation or beginning (āṛambha). As such the doctrine of the new beginning is called Āṛambhavāda. Effect is entirely a new entity and is different from its material cause. For example, cloth is made of threads; but the threads are not cloth; they are absolutely different from cloth.

The cause – effect relationship is a principal feature of the Nyāya school. A cause is defined as an invariable antecedent 'rid of accidental
antecedence.' It is essential that a cause must precede the effect invariably and must not be an accidental antecedent (anyathāsiddha).\textsuperscript{50}

‘Anyathāsiddha’ may be stated as an entity which is the cause of effect’s cause, but not the cause of that effect. It does not help the production of effect, but necessarily precedes the effect. It has no direct relation with effect. An effect can be produced without the help of ‘anyathāsiddha’. Viśvanātha in his Muktāvali on the Bhāsāpariccheda discusses five sorts of anyathāsiddhas.\textsuperscript{51} It may be contended that anyathāsiddhas are not real causes.

Three divisions of cause are enumerated in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory of causation. Those are inherent cause (samavāyi-kāraṇa), non-inherent cause (asamavāyi-kāraṇa) and efficient cause (nimitta-kāraṇa). The cause in which the effect remains with intimate or inseparable relation is called inherent cause. This is also known as ‘material cause’ or ‘constituent cause’ (upādāna-kāraṇa). For example, threads are inherent cause of cloth.\textsuperscript{52} The relation between cause and the effect is inseparable and is called ‘inherence’ (samavāya). This relation subsists between two ‘inseparable entities’ (ayuta-siddha), such as the whole and its parts, the Quality and the substance, the Action and the Actor, the Individual and the Class, the Specific Quality and the Eternal Substance.\textsuperscript{53} Effect is intimately related to its constituent cause; so this cause is always a substance.\textsuperscript{54}
Non-inherent or non-constituent cause (asamavāyi kāraṇa) is that which is in close proximity, i.e. the constituent (samavāyi) cause; and which has its casual efficiency towards certain effect. For example, conjunction of threads is non-inherent cause of cloth. Similarly, the colour of threads is the non-constituent cause of the colour of cloth.

Non-constituent cause inheres in the constituent cause by two methods, viz. direct inherence (sākṣat – pratyāsatti or kāryāikārthapratyāsatti). In the case of direct inherence, effect and its non-constituent cause remain mutually related in one and the same object. For instance, both pot and the conjunction of clays remain in clay. Here, inherence is through ‘effect’ (kāryāikārthapratyāsatti). But in the case of indirect inherence, effect and its non-constituent cause, depend on some other object for their mutual relation. For example, the colour of pot is the effect of the colour of pot. Here both the colours are not directly related to each other; for the effect, i.e. colour is not inherent in pot; and its cause, i.e. the colour of clay, is inherent in clay. So the relation of cause and effect depends on pot, i.e. the inherent cause of effect. Here inherence is through ‘cause’ (kāraṇāikārthapratyāsatti). The non-inherent cause is always a quality or an action.

Efficient or instrumental cause (Nimitta-kāraṇa) helps the inherent cause to produce effect. It is neither inherent cause, nor non-
inherent cause, yet a cause. For example, weaver is efficient cause of cloth.\textsuperscript{58} The efficient cause includes accessories, e.g. the loom and shuttle of weaver. Likewise, the rod and the wheel of the potter are accessories in the production of pot. God’s will, direction, time, Unseen Power etc. are efficient causes of effect in general. Efficient cause may be a substance or a quality or an action. Thus a cause is the invariable and unconditional antecedent of an effect and on the other hand, effect is the invariable and unconditional consequent of the cause.

The instance of cloth has gained much popularity in the \textit{Ny\={a}ya} doctrine of causation. In a verse of the \textit{Nai\={s}adha-carita}, the poet refers to this concept with an interesting illustration.

“The shuttle (tur\={i}) is depicted as the skill of Nala’s soldiers, acting in co-operation with loom (vem\={a}) which is assumed to be his mighty sword. The shuttle weaves on the battle-field with his moon-coloured virtues serving as threads (gu\={n}a), the wide cloth (pa\={t}a) of his fame. And that fame – cloth covers the limbs of maidens who are assumed to be the regions of the sky (diga\={n}gan\={a}).\textsuperscript{59}

Here, threads are the constituent or material cause of cloth. The thread-connection is the accessory cause, while shuttle and loom are assumed to be instrumental causes. The poet logically adopts the popular example of Ny\={a}ya theory and adorns it with literary puns. According to
Nārāyaṇa’s interpretation, the word ‘bahu’ used in the said verse, implies ‘mahāparimāṇa’ corresponding to the fame – cloth; as such, this permeates the limbs of all direction-damsels. Nala’s world-wide fame is depicted in this way.\textsuperscript{60}

The cause-effect relationship has come up in another verse of this epic. The golden-swan describes before Nala, The beautiful breasts of Damayanti. The attribute of revolving in potter’s wheel is seen in the pot. And it is surmised whether that quality is born of the potter’s rod, the instrumental cause of its own.\textsuperscript{61}

The Nyāya system asserts that the essence of material cause manifests itself in the effect, while the instrumental cause cannot do so. Clay is the material cause of pot and the attribute of clay, i.e. blackness etc. is inherently found in the effect, i.e. pot. Therefore pot also becomes black like its cause i.e. clay. But wheel, red, string etc. are non-inherent and accessory causes; and none of the attributes of these inheres in pot.\textsuperscript{62}

Likewise, the attribute of potter, the instrumental cause, is also not inherently seen in pot. Pot made by a fair-figured potter cannot become fair in colour. Similarly, pot made by white rod or accompanied by white string does not become white. This is so, because neither instrumental nor accessory cause possesses the nature of inherent cause.\textsuperscript{63} In the present case, as Cāṇḍūpaṇḍita explains, the attribute, i.e. rotation of wheel, is seen
in pot and this rotation is produced from rod which is not inherent cause of pot.64

In this case of poetic expression, it is seen that the instrumental cause manifests its attribute in its effect. This expression is dubious. So question arises whether it is true, explains Narahari.65 Mallinātha also refers to cause-effect relationship of the logicians and explains that the attributes of instrumental cause do not creep into the effect.66

To solve such a dilemma, the poet surmises, it may happen so. The attribute of potter’s rod may be present in the pot. The proof is given in a word-play. The pot is said to have turned into high breasts of Damayantī and by its flow of refulgence, it maddens the eyes of its spectators; and makes the eyes move like the rotation of potter’s wheel. The attribute of turning round the potter’s wheel abides in the pot. For that attribute is the cause of rotation and is described to have born of the rod, its instrumental cause. Through poetic embellishment Śrīharṣa illustrates the pot, potter’s wheel and rod etc., though it is not possible in the Nyāya theory.

In another verse of the epic, poet Śrīharṣa speaks of the pot-making art of potter with accessory elements. Potter requires the accessory objects such as rod, wheel, water etc. for making pot. In the concerned verse, the line of hair on Damayantī’s belly is represented as
rod. Her hip is compared with the wheel, while her virtue is the rope. The excellence of her beauty is conjectured as water necessary for the formation of her pot-like breasts.

The Nyāya philosophy maintains the efficient cause (nimittakāraṇa) which is also known as auxiliary cause (sahakāri kāraṇa). This cause is the accompanying feature for the material cause. In the present case, the poet refers to the auxiliary causes such as rod, wheel etc. in depicting the pot-like breasts of the princess.

An instance of cause-effect relationship is found in another verse of the epic. The doctrine of causation is reflected when the golden swan describes its own bodily colour before Damayantī. It is stated that the swan acquires the prosperity of the bodily charm is keeping with its food. As the swan feeds on the tips of stalks and fibrous roots of the golden lotus-plants in the river of firmament, golden colour creeps into his body. And it is verily said that the attribute of effect spring from the attribute of the cause. In the present verse, the word ‘nidāna’ implies material cause. Neither non-inherent nor efficient cause is meant here. For, the effect acquires the attribute of its material cause only.

In the same context, the greatness of Nala’s war and fame is depicted by the swan. In this case, the cause-effect relationship is reflected. Nala’s arm possesses the quality of pinching for war. The fame
caused by the arm has a passion for rubbing itself against the edge of rivers that are the regions of heaven, because of the very nature of its cause.\textsuperscript{69}

Here Nala’s military celebrity is depicted to have spread in all regions. One, who experiences an itching sensation, rubs oneself against something. Here Nala’s arm has such a sensation and the effect is his fame produced by his arm. The fame possesses the same attributes of its cause and rubs itself against every direction. Thus the quality of the fame follows the inherent attribute of its cause.\textsuperscript{70}

The same view of cause effect relationship is found in another verse of the epic. On the departure of the golden swan, the messenger of her beloved Nala, Damayantī becomes overwhelmed with impatience which is contrary to the gentleness of woman. She seems to have learnt restlessness; and this is supported by the view that what comes immediately from something, becomes the effect of it.\textsuperscript{71}

Explaining the verse, Nārāyaṇa gives the views of Gautama that what arises immediately from something, owes its origin to that object.\textsuperscript{72} There is no intervention between a cause and its effect. In the present case, the cause of Damayantī’s impatience is the sudden valediction of the golden swan. From the flying speed of the swan, she is conjectured to have experienced the learning of turbulence.
In another place of the present epic, an allusion to causality is found. The verse is the resemblance of son with his father.\textsuperscript{73}

Satisfied with the pledge of king Nala, Indra tells him how it is possible for Chāyā’s son Śani, born of Sun having a thousand feet to become cripple by his foot. Son indeed resembles his father. The attribute of cause must go to its effect, as it is seen in \textit{Nyāya} theory. Here, Sun, though endowed with thousand feet of rays (sahasra-pat) manifests himself to be lame in the act of rising above Nala’s power and provides the gods with a proper answer. Here celebrity of Nala is described and sun is said to be lame in reaching the fame of Nala. So Śani’s lameness is proper as it has sprung from his father Sun.

It is stated that, in the context of depicting the ears of Damayanti, it speaks out of Cupid to have possessed of four arms; for he is the image of his four-armed father Viṣṇu. Here, with four arms and two bows, Cupid is represented as a god. The eye-brows of Damayanti are assumed as two bows, while her board creeper-like ears are two bow-strings.\textsuperscript{74}

The \textit{Nyāya} doctrine of cause and effect is applicable here. Cupid is known as the son of four-armed Viṣṇu and so has rightly become four-armed. On the said verse, Nārāyaṇa in his commentary, cites the scriptural view that a son resembles his father.\textsuperscript{75}
A similar hint to the cause-effect relationship is given in another verse. Moon undergoes waxing and waning, as he bears the qualities of his cause, i.e. ocean. Moon is described as the son of ocean. Everyday ocean waxes and wanes. But it is wonder that in case of his son Moon, such waxing and waning come in a fortnight. But verily the qualities of father are identical with those of son. Here corresponding to the theory of causality, the identical nature of Moon and Ocean is depicted.

In another verse of the epic, poet Śrīharṣa speaks of the similar view. The lotus that grows in water, is a phantom caused by lotus-plant. The real lotus is present at the fore-end of Damayanti's arm; for it is thorn with sharp-pointed nails arising out of a thorny stalk. Such is the conjecture of the poet. The real and genuine lotus originating from a stalk which has small thorns on it, should logically be thorny. This is so in keeping with the rule that the attribute of a cause inheres in its effect. But the lotus that grows in water is devoid of thorns. So, it is an evidence against its genuineness. Damayanti's hand, on the other hand, has thorns in the form of its nails, a proof that it is genuine lotus. Such is the philosophical stand-point reflected here. Thus a few examples corresponding to the Nyāya doctrine of causation have found a place of discussion in the epic. From the above discussion, it is seen that although
the *Naiṣadha-carita* is a poetical composition, still it contains several topics and tenets of the *Nyāya* philosophy.

The *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* philosophy holds the view that blackness of offspring is due to parent’s food, e.g. black vegetable etc. In the *Nyāya* system, regarding the colour of a son, the following inference is very popular. The inference incurs a fallacy of reasoning and may be explain as follows:

“That son of Mitrā is black (sa mitrā-tanayaḥ śyāmaḥ)

For he is the son of Mitrā (Mitrā – tanayatvāt)

As other sons of Mitrā are seen black (dṛṣṭa-mitrā – tanayatvāt)\(^78\)

According to *Nyāya* philosophy, before birth the parent’s food determines the colour of a child and not by the fact of being parent’s son.

In the *Naiṣadha-carita*, such a conception is reflected. Poet Śrīharṣa gives an example of Sun. Sun is personified here and bears a refulgent fair complexion. As Sun eats ‘darkness’, the black food, his offspring, viz. Yama, Yamunā and Śani are born black in colour. In this concern, the poet admits that the view of the *Nyāya* scholars in determining the colour of child from parent’s food is true and reasonable.\(^79\)

According to *Nyāya* system, God (Īśvara) is the creator of the world. It also maintains that *Adṛṣṭa* is backed by God’s will serve the purpose of commitment with each and every being. The expounder of the
Nyāya system, Gautama, observes that God is the cause of universe. In view of the supremacy of God, the Mahābhārata declares, “All creatures are ignorant and helpless regarding their pleasure and pain; and they go to hell or heaven, as directed by God.”

In the Naiṣadha-carita, the concept of God (Īśvara) and Adrṣṭa is reflected. It is maintained:

“In this world, person’s mind is always controlled by God or by the current of the concatenation of causes of the succession of individual souls moving elsewhere without any origin. In whatever way, God or Adrṣṭa, regulates a person, his mind sticks to that way; and man cannot do according to his own sweet will.”

Here Damayanti tells her friends that she is not dependent of herself. She told she has no propensity towards any one of the four Gods accept Nala. This is because of God or to her Adrṣṭa. The Nyāya system adopts the theory of God and Adrṣṭa simultaneously. In the present verse, Damayanti speaks of her dependence on God and Adrṣṭa.

Many commentator gives their comments on this verse. According to Cāṇḍūpaṇḍita, both Nyāya and Mīmāṃsā schools support the theory of karma. Both opine that the series of births are not independent of actions done in previous life. Mallinātha also explains the concept of God and Adrṣṭa with reference to the scriptural view. Narahari observes
both the views of God and Adṛṣṭa in controlling the mind of persons in this world.\textsuperscript{83}

The \textit{Nyāya} theory of God is reflected in another verse of this epic. Damayantī depreciates the four Gods and consigns herself to God. The poet declares that what is written by God on the tablet of man’s forehead, though unsuitable is bound to come about, abdicating something that is suitable for him. It is exemplified that lotus is consumed not by the rays of the Sun, but by snow.\textsuperscript{84} Damayantī, among the five Nalas, could not recognize the real Nala and became nonplussed. Damayantī is undone when she sees five Nalas; so she does not think of what would be the consequence in respect of Nala and of hers. If Nala and Damayantī, both are befitting for each other, then he would be her consort. In the \textit{svayamvara} stage, as it is regulated by God, no fault is ascribed to the four gods. So Nala’s attainment or non-attainment is totally depend on God’s mercy and not on Damayantī’s own will. The poet Śrīharṣa gives an illustration of lotus supporting the pre-destined incident of each and every being in the world.

According to \textit{Nyāya} philosophy, God always favours the performer of actions. He is endowed with selfless generosity. As the Veda depicts, He is the creator, omniscient and Isvara. The Naiyāyikas are the chief devotees of Lord Śiva who stands for Supreme Being. In his
Nyāyasāra, Bhāsarvajña identifies Mahēśvara with God.\(^{85}\) The Bodhicaryāvatāra-panjika maintains that in the Nyāya theism, Śaṅkara or Śīva is the name of God.\(^{86}\) According to Haribhadra Sūri, in the Nyāya doctrine, the creator and destroyer of the world is God Śīva.\(^{87}\) So in this way, Śīva is the Almighty Lord, the creator of universe and the dispenser of fruits of actions.

In a verse of Naiṣadha-carita, God as Śīva admitted by the Nyāya system is referred to. In this verse, Kuśadvipa’s king is depicted in the context of Damayanti’s svayamvara. The poet remarks:

“Damayanti does not accept that king, the gem of whose fame is embellished with all words true as the Vedas, and who ever exert him for others, just as Mīmāṁsā philosophy does not accept the moon-crested God Śīva, the jewel of whose reputation is composed by all the Vedas, and whose eternal effort is spontaneous for the sake of others.”\(^{88}\)

Here the moon-crested God Śīva is described as the selfless and compassionate Supreme Lord as held by the Nyāya philosophy.

In the Naiṣadha-carita, Nyāya theism has also been found in a verse. Lord Śīva is featured as a formless God when the episode of Cupid is depicted. This verse states that Cupid assumes the role of conqueror of the world. One of the epithets of Buddha is ‘Lokajit’ (conqueror of the
world). As such Buddha is conjectured as Cupid’s adversary. Besides, the formless Cupid plays the role of creator of the world as if to equal Śiva.⁸⁹

In this verse, theory of formless God is reflected, as God Śiva is compared with formless Cupid so far as the creation of the universe is concerned. According to Nārāyaṇa, God Śiva is the enemy of love-god Cupid, as the latter is burnt by farmer’s their eye. So in rivalry with Śiva, the body less love-god assumes the role of creator of the universe and such view is referred to in this case.⁹⁰

The similar idea is found in the next verse of the present epic. God Śiva is declared to be the creator of the world. Love-god Cupid makes woman his armament, overwhelming Śiva’s creation as if he recalls his animosity with Śiva.⁹¹

In another verse, the poet Śrīharṣa refers to the Nyāya theism and it is criticized by the Cārvāka. God is depicted as compassionate, omniscient and of infallible true words of the Veda. The Cārvāka remarks that if God exists and is endowed with all-knowing power, benevolence and true words, then why He does not fulfill all the desires of suppliants, by sparing a single word from His mouth.⁹²

In the next verse, the theory of God allied with Adrśṭa is adduced to. It is also condemned by the Cārvāka. It is stated that, worldly beings are enjoy or to suffer according to their good or bad actions, as directed by God.⁹³
In the context of worship of God, King Nala asks God about latter’s peculiar affairs. It is asked, if God can fulfilled all desires, why He creates the world? If it is created by Him, why He destroys it? And if it must be ruined by Himself, why He maintains it by taking several incarnations in the universe? In this verse, God is described as the creator, sustainer and destroyer of the world.

Thus, it is seen that Śrīharṣa has reflected the Nyāya views in his epic, the Naiṣadha-carita.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. pramāṇair artha-parīkṣaṇaṁ nyāyaḥ. NB, 1/1/1.

2. pratyakṣāgamāśritam anumāṇam sā anvīksā; pratyakṣāgamābhyaṁ īkṣitasyānvīksaṇam anvīksā; tayā pravartata iti ānvīksikī nyāya-vidyā nyāya-śāstram. Ibid.

3. seyam ānvīksikī nyāya-tarkādi-sabdairapi vyavahriyate. Ibid.


6. pratyakṣānumāṇopamāṇasabdāḥ pramāṇāni, Ibid. 1/1/1.
7. ātmaśarīrendriyārthabuddhimanāḥ-pravṛttidoṣpretyābhāvaphalādūḥ-
khāpavargāstu prameyam. Ibid, 1/1/9.

8. samānanekadharma ...... vimarṣaḥ sarṇśayaḥ. Ibid, 1/1/23


10. yamarthaṁ laukika budhyante tathā parīkṣakāpi, so’rthro dṛṣṭantaḥ,
    VB on Ibid 1/1/25.


12. pratijñāhetūdaharaṇopanayanigamanāni paṅcāvayavāḥ, TS, p. 53.

13. Ibid, 1/1/40.

14. vimṛṣya pakṣapratipakṣābhyāmarthāvadhāraṇāṁ nirṇayaḥ,
    Ibid, 1/1/41.

15. Ibid, 1/2/1.

16. Ibid, 1/2/2

17. sa pratipakṣasthapanāṁḥinā vitaṇḍā, Ibid, 1/2/3.


20. sādharmyavaidharmābhyāṁ pratyavasthānaṁ jātiḥ, Ibid, 1/2/18.

21. Ibid, 1/2/19.

22. uddeśa-parvanyapi lakṣaṇe’pi
    dvidhoditaiḥ śoḍaśābhiḥ padārthaiḥ/
    ānvīkṣikīṁ yad-daśana-dvi-mālīṁ
    tāṁ muktiṃmākalitāṁ pratīmaḥ // NC. 10/82.
23. tarkā radā yaḍ vadanasya tarkyā
vāde’sya śaktīḥ kva tathāṅyathā taiḥ /
patraṁ kva dātuṃ guṇaśāli-pugāṁ
kva vadataḥ khāṛḍaayitūṁ prabhutvam// Ibid. 10/83.

24. avaimī vādī – prativādī – gāḍha -
svapaksa – ragena virajamane /
te pūrva – pakṣottara – pakṣa – śāstre
radacchadau bhūtavatī yadiyau // Ibid, 10/80.

25. āstām anangūkaraṇād bhavena
dṛṣṭyaḥ smaro neti purāṇa- vāṇī /
tavaiva dehaṁ śrītāya śrīyeti
navastu vastu pratibhāti vādaḥ // Ibid, 8/41.

26. tarkāpratiṣṭhīyā śāmyād anyonyasya vyatighnatāṁ /
nāpraṅmāṇyāṁ maṭānāṁ syāt keśāṁ satpratipakṣa-vat // Ibid. 17/79.

27. tadvati tatprakarako’nuḥbhavo yathārthaḥ (yathā rajate idaṁ rajatam iti jñāṇam) pramaṁ iti ucyate. tadabhāvavati tatprakārako’nuḥbhavo’
yathārthaḥ (yathā śūktau idaṁ rajatam iti jñāṇam) saivāpramaṁ iti ucyate. Tarkasāṁgraha, pp. 98-99.


29. AIIP, p. 171.

30. sā vinīta-tamā bhaimī vyarthānartha-grahair aho /
katha bhavad-vidhār bādhyā pramitir vibhramair ivā // NC. 17/145.

32. ānumānaṁ dvividham svārtāṁ parārthaṁcit. TS, p. 51.

33. yatra dhūmāstatraṅgirīti sāhacaryaniyam vyaṁtiḥ. TS, p. 49.

34. yatra yatra dhūmāstattrā tatra bahniriti sāhacaryaniyam vyaṁtiḥ. Ibid, p. 49.

35. Ibid, p. 53.

36. pratijñāhetūdāharaṇopanayanigamanānyavayavāḥ // NS, 1/1/32.

also –
pratijñāhetūdāharaṇopanayanigamanāni pañcāvayavāḥ / TS, p. 52.

37. sādhyanirdesaḥ pratijñā // NS, 1/1/3.

38. udāharaṇasādharmyāt sādhyasādhanam hetu // Ibid, 1/1/34.

39. sādhyasādharmyāt taḍḍharmabhāvo drṣṭānta udāharaṇam. Ibid, 1/1/36

40. sādhyasādharmyāt taḍḍharmabhāvo drṣṭānta udāharaṇam // taḍḍviparyayāvā vipaṁtaṁ // Ibid, 11.36-37.


42. udayati sma tadadbhūtam ālibhir dharaṇī-bhrd-bhuvī tatra vimṛṣya yat / anumito’pi ca bāspa nīrikṣaṇād vyabhicāra na tāpakaro nalāḥ // NC. 4/18.
43. bhavat – pādāṅguṣṭham api śrītā śrīr
dhruvaṁ na labdhā kusumāyudhena /
rāśā – jetuḥ khalu cihnam asmin –
nardhendur āste nakha-vesa-dhārī // Ibid, 8/36.

44. mṛgasya netra-dvitayaṁ tavāsyē
idhau viḍhutvānumitasya dṛṣṭayam/
tasya va cañcat – kacapaśa – veṣāḥ
pucchaḥ sphuraccāmara-guṭcha eṣaḥ // Ibid, 8/40.

45. bhru- vallī – vellitam athākṛtibhaṅgīṁ eṣā
līṅgaṁ cakāra tadanādaranasya viṣṇa /
rājño’pi tasya tadalābhaja –tāpa – vahnis

46. prasūtavattā nala-kūbarānvaya-
prakāśitasyāpi mahārathasya yat /
kubera – dṛṣṭānta – balena puṣpaka –
prakṛṣṭataitasya tato’numiyate // Ibid, 16/24.

47. api viraham anisṭam ācarantā
vadhigama – pūrvaka – pūrva – sarva – ceṣṭau /
idam ahaha nidarśanaṁ vihaṅgau

48. yair anvamāyi jvalanas tuṣāre
sarojini – dāha – vikāra – hetoh /
tadiya – dhūmaughatayā himāṁśāu
śaṅke kalāṅko’pi samarthitas taiḥ // Ibid, 22/90.

49. vahnau hi dhūmena bhāvyam; candraśca tuṣāramayatvādi uktārītyā
vahnimān tathā ca kalanko dhūma – samūha eveti taiḥ samarthitam.

Nārāyaṇa’s comm.. on Ibid.
50. (a) anyathāsiddhi – sunyasya niyatā pūrvavartita
   kāraṇatvam bhavet, tasya traīvidhyām parikirtitam // BP, 1/16.
   (b) yasya karyat purvabhavo niyato’nyathasiddhasca tat karanam.
   TB, p. 19.

51. BP, 1/19-22.

52. yat samavetāṁ kāryaṁ utpadyate tat samavāyī kāraṇaṁ; atas tantur
   eva samavāyī – kāraṇaṁ paṭasya, na tu turyāti. TB, p. 32.

53. Ibid, p. 31.

54. kāraṇaṁ iti dravye kārya-samavāyāt, Vai. Sū. 10/2/1.

55. (a) yat samavāyī-kāraṇa-pratyāsannam avadhṛta-sāmarthyari tad
   asamavāyī – kāraṇaṁ. yathā tantūsaṁyogāḥ paṭasyāsasamavāyī –
   kāraṇaṁ. TB, p. 36.
   (b) Vide, Vai. Sū. 10/2.5-6.

56. M, 1.18.

57. kāraṇaṁ tvasamavāyino guṇāḥ, Vai. Sū. 5/2/24.

58. yama samavāyikāraṇaṁ nāpyasamavāyikāraṇaṁ, atha ca kāraṇāni
   tannimittakāraṇaṁ. TB, p. 39.

59. sitāṁśu – varnair vayati sma tadguṇair
   mahāśi – vennah sahaṅkṛtvāḥ bahum /
   digaṅganāṅgāvaraṇāṁ raṅāṅgaṇe
   yaśāḥ –paṭaṁ tad-bhata-cāturī-tūri // NC, 1/12.

60. kiṁ – bhūtaṁ yaśaḥ paṭaṁ? bahuṁ mahāparimāṇam. ata eva diśa eva
   a ganās tāsāṁ aṅgānāṁ āvaraṇāṁ āchādanam’; sarva – dig –
   vyāpyasya yaśa āsīt. Nārāyaṇa’s comm. on Ibid.
61. kalaśe nijā -hetu - daṇḍajah
kimū cakra-bhrama-kāritā guṇāḥ /
sa taducca - kucau bhavan prabhā --
jhara - cakra - bhramam ātanoti yat // NC. 2/ 32.

62. tatra upādāna - kāraṇasya mṛttikāder guṇāḥ syāmatvādi ghaṭe kārye
samavaiti. tato ghaṭo'pi śyāmo bhavati. param asamavāyinah
sahakārikaraṇasya cakra - daṇḍacīvarāder guṇo na ghaṭe samavaiti.

CP's comm.. on Ibid; NCS, p. 369.

63. nimitta - kāraṇa - kulālādesca guṇo na kārye samavaiti. gaureṇa
kumbhakāreṇa kṛto ghaṭo gauro na bhavati. śvetena daṇḍa - kāṣṭhena
kṛtaḥ śvetena dorakeṇa cottāritaḥ ghaṭaḥ śveto na bhavati nimitta -
kāraṇasya sahaṅkāri - kāraṇasya ca dvayasyāpi asamavāyītvat. Ibid.

64. atra ghaṭe cakra - bhrama - kārita - lakṣaṇo guṇo drṣṭyate. sa ca
asamavāyikāraṇāt daṇḍat jātaḥ. Ibid.

65. ghaṭe cakra - bhrama - kāritā - guṇo drṣṭyate; sa nijasya ghaṭasya
hetubhūtād daṇḍājjataḥ kimu; anyatra samavāyi-kāraṇa-gatād guṇāt
kārye guṇotpattih. atra nimitta-kāraṇād daṇḍādapi guṇotpattir
āśaṅkyate. Narahari’s comm. on NC, 2/32; NCS, p. 366.

66. atro “samavāyī - kāraṇa - guṇa rūpādayaḥ kārye saṅkrāmanti, na
nimittaguṇaḥ” iti tārkikānāṁ samaye sthite guṇa iti cakrabhrama iti
cobhayatāpī vācya-pratiyamānyor abhedādhyāvasāya eva. Malli’s
comm.. on NC 2/32.
67. romāvatī - danda - nitamba - cakre
   guṇām ca lāvāṇya - jalaṁ ca bāḷā /
   tāruṇya - mūrteḥ kuca - kumbha - kartur
   vibharti śaṅke sahaṅkāri - cakram // NC. 7/90.

68. svargāpaga - hema - mṛṇālinīṇāṁ
   nātāṃnāḷāgra - bhujo bhajāma /
   annānurūpāṁ tanurūpa - ōddhiṁ

69. yaśo yad asyājani saṁyugeṣu
   kaṇḍūla - bhāvarī bhajatā bhujena /
   hetoh guṇād eva đigāpagaṁī

70. yasāḥ - kāraṇe bhuje vidyamānāt kaṇḍū - lakṣaṇāt kāraṇa guṇād eva
   yaśāṁ kūlaṅkṣatva - rūpaṁ vyāsanam āgatam iti.
   Nārāyaṇa’s comm. on Ibid

71. dhuvam adhitavatīyam adhīrataṁ
   dayita dūta - patadgata - vegataḥ /
   sthiti - virodhakarīṁ dvyaṅukodarī
taduditaḥ sa hi yo yadanantarāḥ // NC. 4/3.

72. “yadanantarām eva yad dṛṣṭye tat tasya kāraṇair” iti gautamaṁ.
   Nārāyaṇa’s comm. on Ibid
73. yam prāsūta sahasrapād udabhavat pādena khaṇḍaḥ kathām
da cchāyā-tanayaḥ sutaḥ kila pītuḥ sādṛṣyam anvicchati //
etasyottaram adya naḥ samajani tvattejayā laṅghane
sāhasrair api paṅgur aṅghribhir adhivyaktibhavan bhānumān //
NC. 5/136.

74. atmaiva tatasya caturbhujasya
jaṭaś caturdor ucitaḥ smaro’pi /
taccāpayāḥ karṇa-late bhruvor jye
vāṁśatvagamśau cipiṭe kim asyāḥ // Ibid, 7/65


76. guṇau payodher nija-kāraṇasya
na hāni-vṛddhi katham etu candraḥ /
cireṇa so’yaṁ bhajate tu yatte
na nityam ambhodhīrevātra citram // NC. 22/72.

77. chadmaiva tacchambarajāṁ visinyāś
tatpadmam asyāstu bhujāgra – sadma /
utkaṇṭakād udgamanena nālād
utkaṇṭakāṁ śāta – śikhārya yat // Ibid, 10/124.

78. sa śyama mitrā – tanayatvād ityatra śāka – pākaṇyavatvam upādhiḥ.
Muktavali, 138.

79. budhajana –kathā tathyaiveyaṁ tanau tanuṣjanmanah
pitṛ-śiti-harid – varṇādyahārajaḥ kila kālima /
śāmana-yamanā-kroḍaiḥ kālairitas tamaśaṁ pibād
api yadamalacchāyāt kāyāt abhūyata bhāsvataḥ // NC. 19/45.

80. (a) iśvaraḥ kāraṇaṁ, purūṣakarmāphalyadarśanaṁ. NS. 4.1/19.
(b) na; purūṣakarmābāve phalāṇiṣpatteḥ. Ibid. 4/1/20.
(c) tatkārittvādhetuḥ. Ibid 4.1.21.
81. ajñāḥ jantur anīśo’yam ātmanaḥ sukha duḥkhayoh /
   īśvara – prerito gacchet sargam vā śvabhram eva vā //
   Vanaparva, 30/28.

82. anāḍi-dhāvi-svaparamparāyāḥ hetu – srajaḥ srotasi veśvare vā /
   āyattadhīr eṣa janas tadāryāḥ kimādṛśāḥ paryanuyoga-yogyāḥ //
   NC. 6/102.

83. īśvare vā eṣa janaḥ adhīnadhīḥ; karmādhīna īśvarādīhina vāyam janaḥ;
   na tu svatantra ityarthāḥ.
   Narahari’s comm. on Ibid. 6/102; NCS, p. 393.

84. yasyeśvareṇa yadalekhi lalāṭa - paṭṭe
   tat syād ayogyam api yogyam upāsyam tasya vā /
   kā vāsanāstu bibhīyām iha yām hṛḍāhaṁ
   nārkātapair jalajam eti himaistu dāham// NC. 13/50.


86. īśvare iti saṅkarākhyā. Op cit. 9/118.


88. vedair vacobhir akhilaiḥ kṛta – kīrti - ratne
   hutuṁ vinaiva dhṛta-nitya – parārthā – yātne /
   mīmāṁsaye vah bhagavatyamṛtamsu – maulau
   tasmin mahībhuji tayānumatir na bheje // NC. 11/64.

89. vibhṛti lokajid-bhāvaṁ buddhasya spardhayeva yah /
   yasyesā – tulayevātra kartṛtvam aśāriṇaḥ // Ibid. 17/16.

90. yathā aśāriṇaḥ evesvārasya kartṛtvam iti nyāyavidāḥ, tathā
   ayam apyanaṅga eva san kāryakārī ityarthaḥ
   Nārāyaṇa’s comm. on Ibid.

91. īśvarasya jagat kṛṣṇāṁ srṣṭim akulayannimām /
   asti yo’streṣṭa strikas tasya vairam smaranniva // Ibid, 17/17.
92. devaśced asti sarvajñāḥ karuṇābhag abandhyā - vāk /

93. boavināṁ bhāvayān duḥkhāṁ svakarmajam apiśvaraḥ /

94. āptakāma sṛjasi tri-jagat-kiṁ
tiṁ bhinatsi yadi nirmitam eva/
pāsi cedamavatīrya muhuḥ kiṁ
svātmanāpi yadavaśya-vināśyam// Ibid, 21/105.