CHAPTER - III
THE CHRISTIAN CONCEPTION OF GOD

3.1. Introductory

God is the central concern of theology and philosophy of religion. But there is no unanimously accepted definition of God. One concept, generally accepted by all is that God is the Supreme Being or the fundamental Reality of the universe.\(^1\) It may also be acceptable to all to describe God as a being "all knowing and endowed with all powers, whose essential nature is eternal purity, intelligence and freedom."\(^2\) If we broaden this description further it becomes more specific from the standpoint of a particular religion, but is not acceptable to others.

As a theologian Otto has displayed his concern for the being and nature of God. His concern for God is not that of a neutral spectator but that of one with personal involvement. Otto is aware of the far-reaching consequence of science for Christianity. Otto, like many of his contemporaries, has felt that unless a new interpretation is given to essential tenets of Christianity, it cannot withstand the onslaught of naturalism.
This must be made clear, however, that naturalism and the consequent atheism is not a product of modern science alone. Atheism is as old as religion. There have been die-hard disbelievers throughout the ages. In the ancient and mediaeval periods atheism was an exception and religion was the rule. In modern times the trend is the other way round. The philosophy of Karl Marx (1818-1883), which is a political philosophy based on economic considerations, felt it proper to denounce religion as the opium of the people. So when scientists, positivists and Marxists joined hands against religion, it became difficult for religion to survive. Theologians and idealist philosophers have been trying their best against all odds. But now the theologians are also disturbed. Some theologians of America are talking of the Death of God. Curiously enough, it is an echo of the philosophy of Germany during Otto's time. When Nietzsche declared the Death of God in Thus Spake Zarathustra (1883), Otto was a boy of 14. Nietzsche's atheism growing through the existentialism of Martin Heidegger and Jean-Paul Sartre culminated in the Radical Theology of today's America. Otto might have foreseen the subsequent frustration to seize the Christian theologians so that as made a strong attempt to immunise Christianity against science and scepticism. For this purpose, he gives a new interpretation of the idea of God in general and finally brings the interpretation to favourably bear on Christianity.
Traditional Christian theology has been based upon the proofs for the existence of God. The presupposition of these proofs, psychologically, if not logically, is that God might or might not exist. They argue from something which everyone admits exists (the world) to a Being beyond it who could or could not be there. Otto appears to have foreseen the difficulty of attempting to prove the existence of God, much in line with the observation of Robinson quoted above. So the main problem before Otto is now to interpret the Biblical concept of 'God up there' in such a way as it is 'qualitatively' different from the traditional interpretations. This is the starting point of Otto's religious philosophy: a proof for God's existence which does not begin with a doubt of His existence and a proof which is not vulnerable to the devastating logic of a sceptic.

Otto has all along remained a faithful Christian theologian. Principles of Christianity have remained the broad frame-work within which his theology works. If vindicating of the Christian faith has been his main aim, the traditional arguments for God's existence are the 'past experience' for him to achieve the aim. 'Past experience' in the sense that the arguments are completely ineffective and anything to be done in future must not be in line with them. Hence we see that two things have great significance in Otto's theology: (a) the Christian concept of God and (b) the traditional proofs for God's existence; needless to say that the latter work as a kind of 'compass' for Otto's theology as to which direction it
was to take. In what follows we discuss these two things.

3.2. The Christian Conception of God

Christianity, in the course of its growth, has developed more theological literature and has branched off into diverse sects and sub-sects. Though there is difference among the sects about rites, rituals etc., we can certainly discern a unanimity about the conception of God.  

The Christian conception of God, like other Semitic conceptions of God, is monotheistic. There is one and only one God. About the infinity, eternity, spirituality, omnipotence, omniscience etc. of God, there is a broad agreement among the Semitic religions. In a sense this is true about all the higher religions of the world which accept God Christianity also accepts the transcendence of God. But it is toned down and compensated for by the concepts of God the Son and the Holy Spirit.

The central point in the Christian experience of God is the personality of God. He is conceived as Father, a loving Father in Heaven. This is the most touching improvement Jesus wrought on the old Jewish concept of a transcendent God. In the Old Testament also God is a person, but the New Testament has added a new dimension and depth to this concept. Over and above other moral attributes love is one thing that characterises God's personality. God is love. For the Christian, "A God who humbles Himself and suffers in order to redeem, because only thus can the
redemption of finite spirits be effected, becomes more than credible. A supreme manifestation of holy love in action is demanded alike by the needs of man and the nature of God. Love and mercyfulness of God is neither opposed to, nor does it eclipse, God's righteousness.

Christ is love incarnate. God has revealed His essence and His will through Christ. Therefore, the Christians believe that He is personal. Jack Finegan argues in favour of the personality of God thus: There is the inorganic, then the organic, then the conscious, then the self-conscious, and the whole realm of personality. God, who has made this universe, will not be less and lower than the highest being that is in it. He will be as high as that and more. We believe that He is personal because we find ourselves praying to Him, and we pray to Him because we believe that He is personal. It does not seem reasonable to pray to the law of gravity. The Christian theologians are conscious of the threat posed by the concept of an Absolute in the philosophical sense to the concept of a personal God in the religious sense. They aver that there need not be any discrepancy between these two concepts. God "is Infinite spirit, possessed of personality in a sense that can be predicated only to the infinite consciousness, knowledge, feeling, will, each at its highest, and all indissolubly blended in the unity of immediate, inalienable self-existence." But logically it is difficult to equate personal God with the impersonal Absolute. Both of them do not appear to be simultaneously true.
Otto must have been seized with this problem of personality of God. He must have felt the stronger appeal of the Absolute for the logic-minded persons. So he set to work out the relation between the Absolute and God in such a way that the personality of God and the impersonality of the Absolute would not be a problem for Christianity. His derivation of the idea of a personal God (Holy) from the feeling of the impersonal Absolute (Numen) is the outcome.

Now let us examine the arguments for the existence of God, which developed during the long course of the history of Christianity and Christian Theology.

3.3. The Traditional Arguments for the Existence of God

There are four traditional philosophical arguments or proofs for the existence of God. They are the Cosmological, the Teleological, the Ontological and the Moral arguments.

3.3.1. The Cosmological Argument

The Cosmological argument argues the existence of God basing on the imperfection and contingency of the universe. The universe is not self-explained. It cannot account for itself. Such nature of universe can be intelligible only in relation to something which is not contingent i.e. necessary and perfect, absolute and self-explained. This explanation of the universe is God.
In his celebrated 'five ways' St. Thomas Aquinas gives different forms of cosmological argument. The argument of the first way is almost a repetition of Aristotle's argument for an Unmoved Mover. Everything has to be put in motion by something which again is put in motion by some other thing. But this process cannot go on indefinitely. It is necessary to have a first mover who is not moved by any other thing. This is God.

The second way is the argument from the nature of efficient cause. In order to avoid infinite regress in finding efficient causes of things one has to admit a first efficient cause. And that is God.

In the third way Aquinas argues for a necessarily existent being. In the fourth way he argues for God as the cause of perfection in anything. And in the fifth way his argument for God is that there must be an intelligent director of things to their ends. This last argument, of course, is different from causal argument and can be designated as argument from design or teleological argument.

In Descartes we have a different version of this argument. He, instead of arguing God as the cause of the world, argues him as the cause of the God-idea. The innate idea of God is that of an infinite, independent, omniscient, perfect being. What is the cause of this idea? The cause must be as real or perfect as the effect itself. Thus God is there as the cause of the idea of God.
In Leibnitz this argument takes a new form. This is how Russell summarises Leibnitz's argument: He argues that every particular thing in the world is 'contingent', that is to say, it would be logically possible for it not to exist; and this is true, not only of each particular thing, but of the whole universe. Even if we suppose the universe to have always existed, there is nothing within the universe to show why it exists. But everything has to have a sufficient reason, according to Leibnitz's philosophy; therefore the universe as a whole must have a sufficient reason which must be outside the universe. This sufficient reason is God. Russell admits that this form of the Cosmological argument is better than the straightforward First Cause argument.

The Cosmological or Causal argument cannot prove the existence of God. From the pluralistic universe of our experience, we can only have a plurality in the series of causes. From the variety of causes which cannot a priori be thought to merge somewhere as we progress, we can have only a plurality of First causes and not one First Cause, i.e. God. Even supposing it is possible to reach, it will merely be an 'idea' and not a being. So the problem of reaching the being of God from the idea of God is not solved by this argument.

Real significance of the concept of causality - i.e., in which sense we understand causality itself - also has a bearing on the cosmological argument. For Kant, for instance, "The principle of causality has no meaning and no criterion for its application
save only in the sensible world. But in the cosmological proof it is precisely in order to enable us to advance beyond the sensible world that it is employed."\(^{15}\) The principle of causality is applicable to phenomena only and not to God, an Idea of Reason.

The principle of causality has suffered heavy caustics in recent philosophy which is much influenced by recent theories in physics. As it is said, the Heisenbergian principle of Indeterminacy of quantum theory of modern physics is built on the ruins of the Principle of causality.\(^{16}\) Along with the banishment of the principle of causality, there can be no question of arguing from the universe as the effect to God as its cause.

Furthermore, modern logic has revolutionised the concepts of existence, contingency, necessity, universe etc. Universe as we understand has no meaning for it. Only propositions are contingent and necessary and not beings. So that to argue a necessary being God from the contingent world is unwarranted.\(^{17}\) Traditional notion of existence is also not spared. To quote Russell - "When you take any propositional function and assert of it that it is possible, that it is sometimes true, that gives you the fundamental meaning of "existence". ... Existence is essentially a property of propositional function."\(^{18}\) Restricting existence to the truth of propositional functions we are prevented from speaking anything about 'existence' of things of the universe or of God.\(^{\top}\)

Much of it is open to discussion and ultimately depends on what attitude we take. All do not subscribe to the views of
modern logicians. What we have endeavoured to show is that the cosmological argument can hardly prove the existence of God, not at least to the satisfaction of all.

3.3.2. The Teleological Argument

This is the second traditional argument. It is called the argument from design also. Kant calls it the physico-theological proof. By whatever name we designate it this is a forceful argument. Kant feels that this argument is the oldest, the clearest and the most accordant with the common reason of mankind and that it deserves to be mentioned with respect.¹⁹

The teleological argument is succinctly but quite vigorously put by St. Aquinas in his Fifth Way to demonstrate the existence of God. There is order in the universe. Natural objects stand in an ordered relation to an end. This is a mark of an intelligent designer of the universe. Intelligent order is not possible in fortuitous combination of different elements. Hence an intelligent designer of the whole universe, God, must exist. This is the summary of the teleological argument. Lotze has expressed the argument in two small sentences: "experience presents the world to us as a system of means adapted to ends. Such adaptation is a proof of the wisdom of a personal supreme being who sustains the world."²⁰

When we look around us: far away at the sky of near home at the earth or nearest of all at our own bodies - we
naturally see harmony, concord, design and above all a law-abiding nature of everything great or small. The intricate structure of human eye, brain or bones; the automatic beating of heart; coming of trees to flower and going to seeds; movement of planets and stars - and myriads of such phenomena confront us with design, regularity, adaptation and purpose. This purposive order, says Kant while summarising the argument before showing its hollow-ness, "is quite alien to the things of the world, and only belongs to them contingently; that is to say, the diverse things could not of themselves have co-operated, by so great a combination of diverse means, to the fulfilment of determinate final purposes, and they not been chosen and designed for these purposes by an ordering rational principle in conformity with underlying ideas... There exists therefore, a sublime and wise cause, ..., which must be the cause of the world not merely as a blindly working all-powerful nature, by fecundity, but as intelligence, as freedom."?? This sublime and wise cause is God.

The teleological argument is quite persuasive and appealing. But as a proof for the existence of God, it is no better than the earlier argument. Both Hume and Kant, besides many others, have elaborately criticised the argument.

It is obvious that as a proof for the existence of God, the teleological argument is a version of the cosmological argument itself.23 Whereas the cosmological argument directly asserts the existence of God as the cause of the universe, the teleological
argument asserts the existence of God as the cause of the 'harmony' found in the universe. Hence all the difficulties in accepting the cosmological argument are applicable in the case of this argument also. The central point of Hume's criticism of the argument is that there is nothing like God in the universe. The theists accept this and still they try to deduce the existence of God from the experience of the universe. So Hume says: "It is only when two species of objects are found to be constantly conjoined, that we can infer the one from the other; and where an effect presented, which was entirely singular and could not be comprehended under any known species, I do not see, that we could form any conjecture or inference at all concerning its cause." So taking the world and its perceptible design as the effect, we cannot infer God as the cause.

It is not only that God cannot be inferred as the cause of the design of the world, but the very design and purposiveness of the world can be called to question also. This is a stock criticism against the teleological argument. If there is harmony, purposiveness, adaptation of means to ends in the world, there are countless contrary evidences also. Hume is quite alive to this aspect of the universe.

For Kant, the teleological argument can at the most prove an architect working on already existing materials of the world and not a creator of the world. Whatever contingency of things can be experienced may belong to thought itself and not to the things-in-themselves. We do not know that "in their substance" they are "the product of Supreme wisdom." That is, we cannot jump from
harmoniousness to a deity imposing harmony, from apparent teleology to the all-wise being responsible for the telos.

Lotze has brought out the central weakness of the argument clearly. The crux of the teleological argument is that there are in nature particular objects which serve particular purpose. But we do not have any ground to call this result an end to be attained. It may be merely the necessary outcome of the conditions. We have no right to regard it as an end, unless we can prove it in a logically satisfactory manner. 27

The common difficulty of the cosmological and teleological argument is that they at the most can give us an 'idea of God' and not the 'existence of God'.

3.3.3. The Ontological Argument

In contrast with the Cosmological and Teleological arguments, the Ontological argument is an argument from the concept of God as a perfect being to His existence. It is an inference from God's nature to His being. 28 St. Anselm first formulated this argument.

Anselm argues that "that than which a greater cannot be conceived cannot stand only in relation to the understanding. For if it stands at least in relation to the understanding, it can be conceived to be also in reality, and this is something greater. Therefore, if "that than which a greater cannot be conceived" only stood in relation to the understanding, then "that than which a greater cannot be conceived" would be something than which a greater
can be conceived. But this is certainly impossible.**

Therefore, God, than whom nothing greater can be thought of, both stands in relation to the understanding as well as exists in reality. It is not even possible to conceive that God does not exist. 30

Munk Gaunilo argues against Anselm that if God, the greatest conceivable something must exist, then the best conceivable island also must exist. 31

Anselm's reply to Gaunilo is that whereas the best conceivable island can be conceived not to exist, God cannot so be conceived. God’s existence in reality is inferred by necessity. 32

That is only God's existence is necessary existence and not the existence of others. Necessary existence is the divine essence. 33

This point of necessary existence has been much stressed by Norman Malcolm while discussing Anselm's Ontological Arguments. 34

Descartes slightly modifies the Anselmian version of the ontological argument. For him, while the ideas of all other things include only the possibility of existence, necessary existence is inseparable from the concept of the most perfect being. We cannot think God to be without existence, "He has the ground of his existence in himself; he is a se or causa sui." 35 God's essence involves existence. Whereas ordinary things can be thought not to exist, God cannot be so thought of. The conception, idea or
definition of God which points to the essence of God shows that God exists by virtue of His nature. The statement, "God exists" cannot consistently have its contradictory.

In Leibnitz we have yet another version of this argument. What Leibnitz does is to supplement the traditional argument. He gives a proof to the effect that God as a perfect being is possible. He defines God as the most perfect being or the subject of all perfections. He defines perfection as a "simple quality which is positive and absolute and expresses without any limit whatever it does express." No two perfections are incompatible. "There is, therefore, or there can be conceived, a subject of all perfections, or most perfect Being. Whence it follows also that he exists, for existence is among the number of the perfections." 36

The ontological argument has been criticised by philosophers right from its inception. Monk Gaunilo's criticisms and Anselm's reply to them are famous. The Ontological argument has not found favour with St. Thomas Aquinas. Lotze thinks that this argument is not a proof for God's existence on two grounds: first, it does not have the force of a conclusion based on premises; secondly, that of which it would prove the existence need not necessarily take the form of a being at all, still less the form of a personal being. 37 That is, whatever is necessary for avoiding self-contradiction in thinking cannot be projected as existing in any sphere outside thought.

Kant is the first thoroughgoing critic of this argument. The most notable point of his criticism is that existence is not
a predicate. He says that 'Being' is obviously not a real predicate; that is, it is not a concept of something which could be added to the concept of a thing. It is merely the positing of a thing, or of certain determinations, as existing in themselves. Existence is more a matter of grammar and logic than of metaphysics. The logical positivists have taken over from Kant to hold that existence is not a predicate. As A.J. Ayer asserts: if existence were itself an attribute it would follow that all positive existential propositions were tautologies, and all negative existential propositions self-contradictory. We are to distinguish between logical or grammatical predicate and a real predicate. Logically, positing of a thing is merely the copula of a judgement. In the proposition 'God is omnipotent' there are two concepts God and omnipotence which are added together by the small word 'is' — and it in itself does not add any new predicate to the subject.

Once existence is rejected as a real predicate, the Ontological argument loses all its force. For then there will be no difference between an imaginary God and a real God, both remaining within thought, so that 'that than which nothing greater can be conceived' cannot serve as a premise to lead us to the conclusion that 'it actually exists'.

There are great philosophers both in favour as well as against the view that existence is not a real predicate. The possibility that existence is a real predicate in some special sense in the case of God cannot be outright denied. The problem deserves careful investigation.
3.3.4. The Moral Argument

The moral argument rests on the moral nature of man. Morality is a universal feature of mankind. It is an autonomous faculty. One feels the prick of conscience while doing something against its dictate. We can suppress the feeble voice within us which immediately lets us know if we are doing the right or the wrong - but we cannot destroy it altogether. The most hardened criminal who can kill anybody without a flinch is also aware that killing is not good though he may give a thousand reasons for killing someone. It is due to such significance of the moral sense that Kant's mind used to be filled with admiration and awe by the starry heavens above and the moral laws within.41

Though the moral argument for the existence of God can be traced as far back as St. Augustine, systematic and forceful exposition of it is quite modern. Famous names associated with the argument are Kant, Newman, Martineau, Rashdall, Sorley etc.

Martineau argues that God is the source of moral obligation. Morality has a wonderful power the source of which is neither man nor society nor the state. If it were man-made, man would occasionally suspend moral obligations. There are, so to say, no moral holidays. The power of moral obligation is so much because it is ultimately due to God. The sacred order of our spring of action is the will of God. Hence our conscience is so authoritative about the goodness or badness of our actions. Conscience or revelations of our moral nature are "in us, but
not of us: not ours, but God's. "If ... we feel responsibility, are ashamed, are frightened, at transgressing the voice of conscience, this implies that there is One to whom we are responsible, before whom we are ashamed, whose claims upon us we fear ... If the cause of these emotions does not belong to the Object this visible world, to which (the conscientious person's) perception is directed must be Supernatural and Divine." Newman and many moralists take the existence of conscience as a sufficient reason for believing in the existence of God.

Sorley has given a new orientation to the understanding of the moral argument. He argues the necessity of God from the ideal of goodness. A particular instance of goodness can exist only in the character of an individual person or group of persons; an idea of goodness such as we have is found only in minds such as ours. But the ideal of goodness does not exist in finite minds or in their material environment. What then is its status in the system of reality? "This question can be answered, says Sorley, "if we regard the moral order as the order of a Supreme Mind and the ideal of goodness as belonging to this mind." For Sorley, the reality as a whole, both in its actual events and in its moral order, can be regarded as the expression of a Supreme Mind.

Kant is the ethicist par excellence in modern philosophy. The universe as a moral system is the last word in his philosophy. Kant has a special significance in a work like the present one. This is because of the deep-rooted indebtedness of Otte to Kant.
Kant has shown in *Critique of Pure Reason* that no theoretical argument can prove the existence of God. Indeed Radhakrishnan takes it to be the central contribution of Kant to religious philosophy. Though he has denied the logical demonstrability of God, he has himself advanced a forceful version of the moral argument. Kant's *Critique of Practical Reason*, particularly the moral proof for the existence of God, is a gesture of compensation for what *Critique of Pure Reason* has done to religion.

Happiness is the *summus bonum* of our life. Highest good is the aim of morality. Highest good and happiness are coincident. Morality must lead to proportional happiness. But how this can happen unless there is a dispenser of happiness proportionate to morality? We are compelled to assume, says Kant, the existence of God as necessarily belonging to the possibility of the highest good. The supreme cause of nature, in so far as it must be presupposed for the highest good, is a being which is the cause (and consequently the author) of nature through understanding and will, i.e. God. As a consequence, the postulate of the possibility of a highest derived good (the best world) is at the same time the postulate of the reality of a highest original good, namely, the existence of God. Now it was our duty to promote the highest good; and it is not merely our privilege but a necessity connected with duty as a requisite to presuppose the possibility of this highest good. This presupposition is made only under the condition of the existence of God, and this condition inseparably connects this supposition with
duty. Therefore, it is morally necessary to assume the existence of God.\footnote{50}

So, after all the hair-splitting arguments against the cosmological, ontological and teleological arguments for God's existence, Kant's own argument is that it is morally necessary to assume the existence of God. Strictly speaking, it is no argument, it is a supposition, a postulation. Whatever logic Kant uses here is only to show why we are to assume God's existence — and to that extent it has the merit of an argument.

Kant's moral argument for the existence of God is a part of his theory of morality in general. It gives the impression that God has only a derivative significance in his system of philosophy. Neither in the Critique of Pure Reason nor in that of Practical Reason — the image of God is encouragingly bright. In the first he is an Idea of Reason, in the second just a postulate of morality. Morality is supreme and God is essential, only secondarily, because he has to dispense the highest good in proportion with the morality of an individual. God all alone leans on morality; this is surely not the God, the Supreme Being, of theology. Kant's interpretation of religion shows that he is interested in somehow explaining the idea of God and not the existence. It betrays his lukewarm attitude towards religion. Incidentally we can refer here to the Lampe episode. Heine portrays Kant to have been moved by the sight of his old servant Lampe 'standing by, .... a distressed onlooker, with
tears and the sweat of his anxiety running down his face.' At the sight Kant shows that he is not merely a great philosopher but a good man; and after reflection, half good-humouredly, half ironically, he says: "Old Lampe must have a God, otherwise the poor fellow won't be happy. Man should be happy in the world... therefore the Practical Reason may guarantee the existence of God." In consequence, Kant distinguishes between the theoretical Reason and the practical Reason, and with the latter, as with a magic wand, he brings to life again the corpse of the deism which the theoretical Reason had slain. Harsh words indeed, but the implication is that Kant has not been fair in his interpretation of religion.

The upholders of the moral argument can hardly avoid the vicious circle of "God and morality". God has to be there, because morality is there; one has to be moral, because God is there. Moreover this argument lacks logically assenting force. It cannot convince a person who either does not believe in the objectivity of moral values or thinks that morality is self-sufficient in itself, requiring no God as the dispenser of happiness. And supposing that one had to believe in such a 'dispenser' of happiness, it would only give us the idea and not the existence of God. So the moral argument does not fare better than the other arguments.

So we see that all the four traditional arguments fail to prove the existence of God. In fact all proof is analytic; it can only bring out what is in the premises. Lotze says that
proofs are ineffective due to this reason. As, "no premises could be allowed to be true anterior to this highest of all premises which gives to all realities their title to exist." From this rationalistic position we can become, depending on our temperament, sceptic, atheist, agnostic or fideist. A commonsense answer to this impasse is that it is not only God that cannot be proved; possibly nothing, excepting some tautologies, can be proved to anybody. As Donald Hudson has put the case, "Do physical objects really exist?" "Does moral obligation really exist?" - such questions are just as elusive to a final affirmative answer as "Does God really exist?" But this does not lead scientists to give up talking of physical objects or moralists of obligation. Nor should the systematic elusiveness of an affirmative answer to 'Does God really exist?' prevent anyone from sharing in religious belief.

The course taken by Otto is not, however, 'believe it because you cannot know it.' Everyone can know God, everyone can experience God. The knowledge of God cannot be communicated in the strict sense of 'communication', but it can be evoked in others. All men have a priori susceptibility to God-experience. One who already has this experience in developed form, can evoke similar experience among others by suggestions, by guidance.

So the problem of the objective validity of the idea of God has been tackled by Otto at the 'experience' level. It is a new approach and serves the purpose of an argument without being one. The place of logic is taken by experience.
examine the problem of 'religious experience' in the next two chapters.

References and Notes

1. Janmādasya yataḥ - that from which the origin etc. of the world proceed. - Brahmasūtra, I.1.2.

2. Śāṅkara's Commentary on Brahmasūtra, I.1.1. 4 (at the end parts of both the sūtras) Tr. Thibaut.

3. Robinson, J..A.T., Honest to God, p.28

4. Dr. Radakrishnan has taken an evolutionist approach in tracing the growth of Christianity. Palestinian, Greek, Roman elements have made Christianity syncretistic. So he says, "Its ideas about God ..... vary between a loving father, a severe judge, a detective officer, a hard school master and the head of the clerical profession."

(East and West in Religion, p.62) He appears to have deliberately over toned the diversity.

5. The Old Testament sets the trend of monotheism among the semitic religions: "...... and there is no God else beside me; a just God and a saviour; there is none beside me. Look unto me, and be ye saved, all ends of the earth: for I God, one there is none else."

Isaiah, 45: 21-22

6. In the New Testament: "Now unto the king eternal, immortal, invisible, the only wise God, be honour and glory for ever and ever....."

Timothy, 1:17

7. "Christians ..... are obliged by revelation to identify the absolute with a God who is fully personal, both in himself and in his dealings with mankind."

-Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, Vol.3, P.347

9. Ibid. p. 258. St. Paul sets a very high standard for love in Corinthians 13: 4-7. "Love is very patient and kind, never jealous or envious .... It is never glad about injustice but rejoices whenever truth wins out. If you love someone you will be loyal to him no matter what the cost ...."

The Greatest is Love, p. 133

10. Finegan, J., Christian Theology, p. 25


13. Falckenberg, History of Modern Philosophy, p. 92

14. Russell, B., History of Western Philosophy, p. 568


16. Mukerjee, A.C., Self, Thought and Reality, pp. 222-5


19. Ibid, p. 293. The Teleological Argument has indeed a popular appeal. Apologists are fond of using it. Even a hardened sceptic like Hume has made his characters speak so persuasively about the teleological aspect of the world in his Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion where he has almost exploded the argument to shreds: "In many views of the universe, and of its parts, particularly the latter, the beauty and fitness of final causes strike us with such irresistible force, that all objections appear (what I believe they really are) mere cavils and sophisms; ...." (Hume on Religion, p. 176) "A purpose, an intention, a design strikes everywhere the most careless, the most stupid thinker; and no man can be so hardened in absurd systems, as at all times to reject it."

(Ibid. p. 189)


21. William Paley, one of the earnest modern advocates of the argument, in his 'Natural Theology' gives a detailed exposition of this argument citing various examples. Incidentally, though Paley has written many years after Hume, he was not taken any notice of Hume's devastating criticisms against the argument.
23. "the physico-theological proof ... as ...
suddenly fallen back upon the cosmological proof..."
   -Kant, op. cit., p.297

In fact all the three arguments are deeply interrelated.
"Some historians of philosophy have indeed regarded them as variations of the Ontological, others as variations of the cosmological Argument."

McGregor, G., Introduction to Religious Philosophy, P.120.

24. Hume, Inquiries Concerning Human Understanding and Concerning the Principles of Morals, P.148
25. Ibid, P.138. His Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion is replete with examples of diasteleology, disharmony, chaos, evils and sufferings in the world.
26. Kant, op. cit., P.295
30. Loc. cit.
31. Ibid., P.22
32. Ibid, P.31
33. Ibid, P.32
34. Ibid P.301 ff.
36. Russell, History of Western Philosophy
   (Purported to be a quotation from Leibniz), Pp.567-8
37. Lotze, H. op. cit., p.12
38. Critique of Pure Reason, Tr.N.K. Smith (Abridged Edition) P.282
39. Language, Truth and Logic, P.43
40. Kant, op. cit. P.282
41. "Two things fill the mind with ever new and increasing admiration and awe, the oftener and the more steadily we reflect on them, the starry heavens above and the moral laws within."
   -Kant's Critique of Practical Reason and Theory of Ethics, (Tr.F.K. Abbot), P.260.
43. Newman, J.H.O., quoted by Hick, J. *Philosophy of Religion*, p. 27
45. Abernethy and Langford (Ed.) *Philosophy of Religion, A Book of Readings*, p. 204
46. Loc. cit.
48. Ibid, p. 26
49. "Kant's chief contribution to the philosophy of religion is his insistence on the logical indemonstrability of God."
   - *An Idealist View of Life*, p. 127
51. Heine's *Deutschland* quoted by Webb, C.O.J., *Kant's Philosophy of Religion*, pp. 48-49. Webb says that in spite of his academic scepticism Kant never abandoned his belief 'in the existence of God as a real being'.
   - Ibid, p. 50
52. Lotze, op. cit. p. 9.
55. of. Kālidāsa -

Satām hi sandehipadesu vastuṣu
Praṃāṇamantahkaranapravṛttayaḥ.

(Abjijnāna Śākuntalam, I:19).