CHAPTER – IV
BERGSON
Of all modern western philosophers, Bergson has emphasized most strongly the standpoint of intuition. His conception of Reality is vitally connected with his theory of intuition. He conceives of Reality as an uninterrupted movement, unimpeded flow. In his "Time and Free Will" he identifies it with Time and in his "Creative Evolution" he calls it the elan vital, the vital urge which goes on rushing, like a river in full flood, carrying everything before it, unhampered by any boundaries. The central idea of his ontological scheme is Motion or Becoming. This is pure Heracliteanism.

AGAINST MECHANISM AND TELEOLOGY

Reality is conceived by Bergson as creative force. It is free, chooses new forms of expression every moment. The truth is that we change without ceasing and that state itself is nothing but change. Bergson in his book, "Creative Evolution" says "I say indeed that I change, but the change seems to me to reside in the passage from one state to the next: of each state, taken separately. I am apt to think that it remains the same during all the time that it prevails. Nevertheless, a slight effort of attention would reveal to me that there is no feeling, no idea, no volition which is not undergoing
change every moment: If a mental state ceased to very its duration would cease to flow."

If reality is such then we have to revise our ordinary notions of causation in nature and evolution of the universe. Two contending views of causation are generally upheld by the scientists and philosophers namely —— mechanism and vitalism.

Mechanism is the theory of causation generally accepted by physics, chemistry and other sciences. The mechanistic theory holds that the living organism is only a physico-chemical machine. Its structure and behaviour can be completely explained in terms of physical and chemical process and these very processes constitute non-living matter. There is no fundamental difference between organic and inorganic matter; they differ in complexity, the organic being more complex than the inorganic. Mechanism stated that life is not a mysterious entity radically different from the ordinary process of activity and movement that are observed in the living organism. Life is what it does. If the behaviour of the organism can be explained in terms of mechanistic causation then life is said to be explained. It is claimed that many so-called vital phenomena — respiration, circulation, digestion etc. have been so explained. We have every reason to believe that all vital movements will, sooner or later, be explained mechanically with the progress

1. H. Bergson, Loc. cit, PP 1-2
of human knowledge. If biology is to be progressive it must abandon, once
for all, the mysterious vital force and surrender to mechanism as the only
intelligible hypothesis.

Mechanism connotes a type of causation which operates in the mate-
rial world, in accordance with which every event is and must be determined
by an immediately preceding event. Every movement of the machine is the
result of some antecedent movement. Under similar conditions, the move-
ment that takes place in a machine is regular and uniform thought. In me-
chanical causation there is rigid uniformity such that, given a cause, the
same effect invariably follows in the same order without variation. Mechanical
causation therefore implies uniformity of behaviour where stage is de-
termined by what goes before.

Mechanism dealing with static things and unchanging states. The
mechanistic explanations "hold good for the systems that our thought artifi-
cially detaches from the whole." According to the mechanistic theory whatever happens is completely determined by the totality of causal conditions preceding it, so that if we know this sum of conditions completely we can predict what effect would take place. "The essence of mechanical explana-
tion, infact, is to regard the future and the past as the calculable functions of
the present, and thus to claim that all is given. On this hypothesis past,

2 Ibid, P. 39
present and future would be open at a glance to super human intellect capable of making the calculation. 

Thus we see that according to this theory every effect is pre-determined. There is no room for choice. The present is nothing new; it was already contained there in its determining antecedents. That we cannot see the future is due to our ignorance of the complete set of antecedents which determine it. The past, present and future are therefore the ideas of an imperfect mind, and they do not exist for the omniscient. In a word time does not really exist. "For time is here deprived of efficacy, and if it does nothing, it is nothing. Radical mechanism implies a metaphysics in which the totality of the real is postulated complete in eternity and in which the apparent duration of things expresses merely the infirmity of a mind that cannot know everything at once." 

Duration is the very essence of Reality. Reality freely evolves at every moment out of the past, which it conserves and utilizes, a future which is something new. As reality rolls on like a snow ball, it adds to its content. "It swells as it advances." Like the trunk of a paint it retains and expands its pasts into new forms as it grows. There is no possibility, therefore of the past as such being repeated in future, it is new in every moment. This novelty we saw is due to a choice or spontaneity which freely uses the past to

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3. Ibid. PP. 39-40  
4. Ibid. P. 41
evolve an unforeseeable future. We are inwardly aware of such spontaneous creation when we feel how our personality shoots into new directions and how our consciousness expands. It is the most 'indisputable' experience we possess and if Reality grows in the manner of our consciousness, or rather if this underlying consciousness in us is the reality of "the very substance of the world in which like", in favour of which supposition we have had such strong arguments, we cannot accept any mechanistic explanation of the world's evolution.

The mechanistic explanation of course, the detached and fragmentary view of reality. It does not suit any synthetic view of reality as a whole.

Like mechanism, finalism or teleology the other theory of causation, also fails to explain the evolution of the world. The doctrine, of teleology in its extreme form, as we find it in Leibnitz for example, implies that things and beings merely realize a programme previously arranged. But if there is nothing unforeseen, no invention or creation in the universe, time is useless again. As in the mechanistic hypothesis, here again it is supposed that all is given. Finalism thus understood is only inverted mechanism. It springs from the same postulate, with this sole difference, that in the movement of our finite intellects along successive things, whose successiveness is reduced to a mere appearance, it holds infront of us the light with which it claims to guide us, instead of putting it behind. It substitutes the attraction
of the future for the impulsion of the past. But succession remains none the less a mere appearance, as indeed does movement itself. In the doctrine of Leibnitz, time is reduced to a confused perception, relative to the human standpoint, a perception which would vanish like a rising mist, for a mind seated at the centre of things.

Again in this radical form of finalism, the omniscient mind already foresees the future, since it is pre-arranged. There is thus no room for spontaneity, and this theory also is incompatible with the nature of Reality of which we have such an unshakable knowledge in our consciousness.

Finalism is impressed by the harmony, the nice adaptation of means to ends, observable in the world. According to finalism, the world must be made and controlled by an omniscient and omnipotent Mind, with a previous conscious plan. But Bergson points out that the harmony we observe in the world is “far from being as perfect as it has been claimed to be.” There is rather an impulse to achieve harmony by adaption and adjustment than harmony actually achieved. We can observe so many cases of conflict and struggle among species and individuals, where harmony yet remains to be attained. This points to the existence of rather a common force impelling things from behind and struggling for adjustment, adaptation and harmony, than a creator gradually unfolding a pre-arranged harmonious plan.

5 Ibid, P. 53
“Harmony, therefore does not exist in fact, it exist rather in principle, I mean,” says Bergson, “that the original impetus is a common impetus and the higher we ascend the stream of life the more do deserve tendencies appear complementary to each other. Thus the wind at a street corner divides into diverging, currents which are all one and the same gust. Harmony or rather ‘Complementary’ is revealed only in the mass, in tendencies rather than in states. Especially harmony is rather behind us than before. It is due to an identity of impulsion and not a common aspiration.”

The error of radical finalism, as also that of radical mechanism, is to extend too far the application of certain concepts that are natural to our intellect. Originally we think only in order to act. Our intellect has been cast in the mould of action. Speculation is a luxury, while action is a necessity. Now in order to act, we begin by proposing an end; we make a plan, then we go on to the detail of the mechanism which will bring it to pass. This latter operation is possible only if we know what we can reckon on. We must therefore have managed to extract resemblances from nature which enable us to anticipate the future. Thus we must, consciously or unconsciously, have made use of the law of causality. Moreover, the more sharply the idea of efficient causality is defined in our mind, the more it takes the form of a mechanical causality.

6. Ibid PP. 53-54
Radical finalism is very near to radical mechanism on many points. Both doctrines are reluctant to see in the course of things generally or even simply in the development of life, an unforeseeable creation of form. In considering reality, mechanism regards only the aspects of similarity or repetition. It is therefore dominated by this law, that in nature there is only like reproducing like. The strict application of the principle of finality like that of the principle of mechanical causality, leads to the conclusion that “all is given.” Both principles say that same thing in their respective languages, because they respond to the same need.

Again both mechanism and finalism agree in doing away with time. Real duration is that duration which gnaws on things and leaves on them the mark of its tooth. If everything is in time, everything changes inwardly, and the same concrete reality never recures. Repetition is therefore possible only in the abstract: what is repeated is some aspect that our senses, and especially our intellect, have singled out from reality, just because our action, upon which all the effort of our intellect is directed, can move only among repetitions. Thus concentrated on that which repeats solely preoccupied in welding the same, to the same intellect turns away from vision of time. It dislikes what is fluid and solidifies everything it touches. We do not think real time. But we live it, because life transcends intellect. The feeling we have of our evolution and of the evolution of all things in pure duration is there. Mechanism and finalism agree in taking account only of the bright
nucleus shining in the centre. They forget that this nucleus has been formed out of the rest by condensation, and that the whole must be used, the fluid as well as and more than the condensed, inorder to grasp the inner movement of life.

Bergson thus comes to think that the evolution of the world can be satisfactorily explained neither by the accidental collocation of dead circumstances, as mechanism supposes, nor by reference to a perfect, pre-arranged plan, but by admitting a common living force which is striving to express itself along divergent paths and striving constantly for balance and harmony. This force he calls the vital impetus, the elan vital. It is identical with the basic Reality or force underlying all manifestation.

The hypothesis that basic Reality is a living impetus explains more satisfactorily the causation of the world than any of the alternative suppositions. Both mechanism and finalism hold that like a human handicraft, the world comes into being by the combination of materials with or without previous plan. Human manufacture always proceeds from the many to the one, the many parts are compressed or combined into one object. But the reverse is really the process of the evolution of living beings in nature. "Life does not proceed by the association and addition of elements, but by dissociation and division." He defines life is an original impetus, not the mere
heading affixed to a class of objects which live. Life or the vital impulse, consists in a demand for creation, "a will to create." It appears to be a current passing from one germ to another germ through the medium of a developed organism, "an internal push that has carried life by more and more complex to higher and higher destinies." The one cell devises itself and produces the many. The direction of evolution is from simplicity to multiplicity, from the undifferentiated to the differentiated. It is better understood as the expression of a basic life force or vital impetus which divides its energy along divergent paths as it advances, than as the product of many factors combined mechanically or teleologically, as mechanism or finalism believes.

Another merit of the hypothesis that basic reality is a living impetus is that it can explain the harmony we observe in a living organism or in nature as a whole. There is harmony in the many constituents of a living whole, according to this theory because they are the expressions of the same simple act or tendency which has split itself into the many. "Nature's simple act has divided itself automatically into an infinity of elements which are then found to be co-ordinated to one idea, Just as the movement of my hand has dropped an infinity of points which are then found to satisfy one equation."

Bergson's theory can explain the evolution of the different living species more satisfactorily than the theories of Darwin and other Biologist.

8 Ibid, P. 27
9 Ibid, P. 97
Scientific theories imitate physics and chemistry in trying to explain evolution mechanically. Bergson takes a crucial example and shows that all these mechanistic hypothesis fail to explain it and thus break down here. The example chosen is the evolution of the same kind of extremely complex organ, like the eye, under very different circumstances, in two widely different kinds of animals like man and mollusc, such as a pecten. "We find the same essential parts in each, composed of analogous elements. The eye of the pecten contains a retina, a cornea, a lens of cellular structure like our own. There is even that peculiar inversion of retinal elements which is not met with, in general, in the retina of the invertebrates."\(^{10}\) But the "molluscs and vertebrates separated from their common parent stem long before the appearance of an eye so complex as that of the pectan."\(^{11}\) So we cannot hold that the common organ is inherited from the common ancestor that possessed it. How can such a coincidence be explained mechanically?

According to Darwin's theory different kinds of living being arise from a common parent-stem by mechanical adaption to different environments. The influence of the environment he thinks acts indirectly, that is by elimination of those characters which are of suitable for that particular environment and the consequent automatic retention of the useful characters. Thus small and insensible changes occur and the gradual accumulation of such changes

\(^{10}\) Ibid, P 66
\(^{11}\) Ibid, P 66
during long periods gives rise to wide differences among the different branches which once originated from the same stock. But such a supposition cannot explain the evolution of an eye even in one animal. The evolution of the eye according to this process must be supposed to take place by the gradual and successive evolutions of its different parts. But it would be impossible according to Darwin's principle. Because each part being by itself useless would be eliminated by the process of natural selection and no possibility would be there for the retention and accumulation of complementary parts. The impossibility increases manifold when we try to understand the appearance of similar organs in the two different kinds of animals. How could the same small variations, incalculable in number, have ever occurred in the same order on two independent lines of evolution, if they were purely accidental? How could they have been preserved by selection and accumulated in both cases; the same in the same order, when each of them, taken separately, was no use?  

Thus Darwin's hypothesis of evolution by the automatic principle of selection and gradual accumulation of small accidental changes proves unsatisfactory. Then we come to another important theory of evolution that is Lamarck theory of evolution. Lamarck's theory of evolution is different from Darwin's theory of evolution into two points. While the Darwin theory holds that "the essential causes of variation are the differences inherent in the

12. Ibid, P. 68
germ borne by the individual and not the experiences or behaviour of the individual is the course of his career."\textsuperscript{13} And that characters acquired a new by the individual cannot be inherited by its descendants.

The Lamarckian theory, on the other hand holds that the living individual possesses "the power of varying by use or disuse of its organs, and also of passing on the variation so acquired to its descendants"\textsuperscript{14} Adaptation to environment is the determining factor in evolution. As environment changes species put forth new developments to adopt themselves to it, those which are more successful in compassing the necessary adaptions tend to survive, the others to die out. A certain number of biologist holds a doctrine of this kind today. The variation that results in a new species is not, they believe, merely an accidental variation inherent in the germ itself, nor is it governed by a determinism Sui generis which develops definite characters in a definite direction, apart from every consideration of utility. It springs from the very effort of the living being to adopt itself to the circumstances of its existence.

Bergson thinks, this theory of evolution is the most satisfactory of the different forms of evolutionism. It can "account for the building up of identical complex organs on independent lines of development. For it is quite conceivable that the same effort to turn the same circumstances to good

\textsuperscript{13} Ibid, P. 90
\textsuperscript{14} Ibid, PP. 80-81
account might have the same result, especially if the problem put by the circumstances is such as to admit of only one solution.\textsuperscript{15}

But even this theory is not adequate. It can explain 'a mere variation of size,' but scarcely 'a change of form.' "That an organ can be strengthened and grow by exercise nobody will deny. But it is a long way from that to the progressive development of an eye like that of the mollusc and the vertebrates."\textsuperscript{16} An effort that can account for such development must be for deeper than the mere superficial one we make in our volition, for such effort is not found to be capable of producing such radical change. Moreover, the effort of an individual would be too inadequate to account for the continuation of changes in descendants, as well as, for the piling up of successive differences in the same direction through generation so as to lead ultimately to the formation of a complete complex organ like the eye.

So we come back, by a somewhat round about way, to the idea we started from, that of an original impetus of life, passing from one generation of germs to the following generation of germs through the develop organism which bridge the interval between the generations. This impetus, sustained right along the lines of evolution among which it gets divided, is the fundamental cause of variations at least of those that are regularly passed on that accumulate and create new species. In general, when species have

\textsuperscript{15} Ibid, P. 81
\textsuperscript{16} Ibid, P. 82
begun to diverge from a common stock, they accentuate their divergence as they progress in their evolution. Yet in certain definite points, they may evolve identically, in fact they must do so if the hypothesis of a common impetus be accepted. This is just what we shall have to show now in a more precise way by the same example we have chosen, the formation of the eye in molluscs and vertebrates. The idea of an "original impetus", moreover will thus be made clear.

Thus we find that Bergson's hypothesis of the original impetus, elan vital can explain the evolution of the universe more adequately than those of mechanists and teleologists.

INSTINCT AND INTELLECT

In the living world as we can observe it now, the vital impetus struggles to manifest through different kinds of material environment. The result of the evolution of life along three chief paths are — plants, lower animal and human beings. In plants the consciousness implicit in the original impetus has not been able to overcome the resistance of matter to any appreciable extent. It is still in a state of sleep or torpor. But not altogether non-existent. In lower animals consciousness has partially liberated itself from the overpowering influence of its material body and environment. This fact is indicated by its power of sensation and movement. But activity is caused here more by instinctive reaction than by reflection and choice, and consciousness is
not fully manifested. In man we find consciousness triumphing over matter, especially in intellect action preceded by deliberation, choice and free movement. "Vegetative torpor, instinct and intelligence" are the three main tendencies by which we can broadly distinguish three chief paths along which life has evolved.

We should not however think that these are the only three lines of evolution. The original impetus of life has divided itself are innumerable. The progress of life is not like that of a solid common ball along one straight line. Evolution would be very simple and easy process to understand if it followed one straight path. To describe it Bergson uses the metaphors —— we are dealing with a shell. "Life proceeds rather like a shell, which suddenly bursts into fragments which fragments, being themselves shells, bursts in their turn into fragments destined to burst again and so on for time is commensurably."17

Plants, animals and men represent only the lines along which life has evolved with conspicuous success. But there are paths along which life has not been so successful in its attempt to adjust itself to the environment. In some cases the forward movement has been checked, in some it has been diverted or turn back, and in some again life has become altogether extinct. Evolution is not only a movement forward, in many cases we observe a

17 H Bergson, Creative Evolution, P. 103
marking time, and still more often a deviation or turning back. It must be so, as we shall show—further on, and the same causes that devide the evolution movement often cause life to be diverted from itself, hypnotised by the form it has just brought forth. Thence results an increasing disorder. No doubt there is progress, if progress mean a continual advance in the general direction determined by a first impulsion; but this progress is accomplished only on the two or three great lines of evolution on which forms ever more and more complex, ever more and more high, appear; between these lines run a crowd of minor paths.

It is clear that the evolution take place in a straight line and that plants, animals and human beings occupy higher and higher rungs of the same ladder like course of evolution must be abandoned. Plants, animals and men represent the different branches of life, and not the lower and higher paths of the same branch. The difference among these branches is rather of kind, than of degrees.

Plants, animals and mens are the divergent lines of evolution possess similarity, owing to their common origin. But it is difficult to draw clear lines of demarcation among them. But they can still be distinguished by certain dominant tendencies. Plants can assimilate some of the substances lying around them e. g. — air, water and especially, carbon and nitrogen in the mineral form. So movement becomes unnecessary for self preservation,
and there is no cause for the awakening of consciousness which lies, therefore in a state of torpor or sleep. Animals cannot, however, assimilate minerals directly. They have to go about in search of food as they donot find it in their immediate neighbourhood, and consciousness is needed to direct such notion. Animals thus grow the sensori motor mechanism, the apparatus for receiving influences from outside and for transforming these influences into movements that can satisfy their needs.

Vegetative torpor, instinct and intelligence —— three are the elements that coincides in the vital impulsion common to plants and animals. They were made manifest in the most unforeseen forms in the course of development, have been dissociated by the very fact of their growth. “The cardinal error which, from Aristotle onwards, has vitiated, most of the philosophies of nature, is to see in vegetative, instinctive and rational life, three successive degrees of the development of one and the same tendency, where as they are three divergent directions of an activity that has split up as it grew.”¹⁸

The difference between them is not a difference of intensity nor of degree but of kind.

We have seen in the case of vegetable and animal life how they are at once mutually complementary and mutually antagonistic. We must show that intelligence and instinct also are opposite and complementary. But why we

¹⁸. Ibid, P. 142
are generally regard them as activities of which one is superior to the other and based upon it. But in reality they are not the things of same order.

Instinct and intelligence are the two important terminals points in evolution. They are not two stages of which one is higher than the other, they are at the end of two different roads. The wonders of instinct are a common place to students of animal and insect life. Man with their intellect, make tools, while instinct is tied to its tool. There is a wonderous immediacy, however, about instinct, in the way it acheives ends and its operations are often quite unconsciously performed. The insect or animal could not possibly "Know" all that was involved in its action. Instinct, then is one form of adaption, while intellect is quite another. In man —— the grown man —— intellect is seen at its best. Yet we are not without instincts; by them we are bound to the race and to the whole animal creation. But in ants and bees and such like creatures, instinct is the sole guide of life, and it is often a highly organized life.

Instinct and intelligence both are psychical activity, but while instinct is far more perfect, far more complete in its insight, it is confined within narrow limits. Intelligence, while far less perfect in accomplishing its work, less complete in insight, is not limited in such a way. But while intellect is external, looking on reality as different from life, instinct is an inner sympathy, it is deeper than any intellectual bond which binds the conscious creature to reality, for it is a vital bond.
It is because intelligence and instinct having originally been inter-penetrating, retain something of their common origin. Neither is ever found in a pure state. There is no intelligence in which some traces of instinct are not to be discovered, more especially no instinct that is not surrounded with a fringe of intelligence. It is this fringe of intelligence that has been the cause of so many misunderstandings. From the fact that instinct is always more or less intelligent, it has been concluded that instinct and intelligence are things of the same kind, that there is only a difference of complexity or perfection between them. One of the two is expressible in terms of the other.

If man is regarded historically, he should be described according to Bergson not as homo sapiens but as homo faber, man the worker, in terms of the construction of tools with a view to acting on the material environment. For man is "intelligent and intelligence considered what seems to be its original feature, is the faculty of manufacturing artificial objects, especially tools to make tools and of indefinitely varying the manufacture."\(^{19}\) Whatever intelligence may have become in the course of human history and of man’s scientific advance, its essential feature is its practical orientation. It is like instinct at the service of life.

The intellect is characterised by a natural inability to comprehend life.

\(^{19}\) Ibid, P. 146
Instinct on the other hand is moulded on the very form of life. While intelligence treats everything mechanically, instinct proceeds organically.

The essential difference between instinct and intelligent is instinct perfected is a faculty of using and even of constructing organised instruments; intelligence perfected is the faculty of making and using unorganised instruments.

The advantage and the drawbacks of these two modes of activity are obvious. Instinct finds the appropriate instruments at hand; this instrument, which makes and repair itself which presents, like all the works of nature, an infinite complexity of detail combined with a marvellous simplicity of function, does not once, when required, what it is called upon to do, without difficulty and with a perfection that is often wonderful. In return, it retains an almost invariable structure since a modification of it involves a modification of the species. Instinct is therefore necessarily specialized being nothing but the utilization of a specific instrument for a specific object.

Another difference between Instinct and intelligent is that “If instinct is above all, the faculty of using an organised natural instrument, it must involve innate knowledge (potential or unconscious, it is true) both of this instrument and of the object to which it is applied. Instinct is therefore innate knowledge of a thing. But intelligent is the faculty of constructing unorganized — that is to say artificial — instruments. The essential function of
intelligence is therefore to see the way out of a difficulty in any circumstances whatever, to find what is most suitable, what answers best the question asked. Hence it bears essentially on the relations between a given situation and the means of utilizing it. It bears essentially on the relations between a given situation and the means of utilizing it.

**DURATION**

For proper understanding of Bergson's philosophy it is necessary to grasp his views regarding time. Our ordinary conception of time, which comes from the physical science, Bergson maintains that it is false one. It is false because it is temporal. It is temporal, it is spatial. Space as a homogeneous medium without boundaries. Time also such another medium, homogeneous and unlimited.

Now the difficulty is that homogeneity consists in being without qualities, it is difficult to see how one homogeneity can be distinguished from another. This difficulty is avoided by the assertion that homogeneity takes two forms —— one in which its contents co-exist, and another in which they follow one another. Space is that homogeneous medium in which we are aware of side by sideness. Time that homogeneous medium in which we are aware of an element of succession.

Here we are distinguishing two supposed homogeneities by asserting a difference of quality in them.Space to be a homogeneous medium without
bounds. Then every homogeneous medium without bounds must be space. Then what is time? For on this showing time becomes space. Bergson says, 'Yes', that is so, for our common view of time is false. It is a spurious concept due to the illicit introduction of the idea of space, and to our application of the notion of space, which is applicable to physical objects. In our ordinary speech and conventional view of things, we think of conscious states as separated from one another and as spread out like 'things' in a fictitious homogenous medium to which we give the name time.

Bergson says, "at any rate we cannot finally admit two forms of the homogeneous, time and space, without first seeking whether one of them cannot be reduced to the other. Now externality is the distinguishing mark of things which occupy space, while states of consciousness are not essentially external to one another and become so only by being spread out in time regarded as a homogeneous medium. If then, one of these two supposed forms of the homogeneous, viz time and space, is derived from the other, we can surmise a priori that the idea of space is the fundamental datum. Time conceived under the form of an unbounded and homogeneous medium, is nothing but the ghost of space, haunting the reflective consciousness." Bergson remarks that "Kant's great mistake was to take time as a homogeneous medium."
Thus Bergson asserted the falsity of ordinary view of time and he proceeds to make clear his view regarding the Real time. Time which Bergson regards as so real, as opposed to the spatial falsity, masquerading as time, whose true colours he has revealed is duration.

The distinction between the false time and true time may be regarded as that between the mathematical time and living time or between abstract and concrete time. This living, concrete time is regarded by Bergson as true time. Mathematical time of the scientist in which time is broken up into moments and conceived in a spatial manner, and 'real' time, pure duration, continuity, which we can grasp in inner experience but can conceptualize only with difficulty.

Real time or duration is nothing but the elan vital itself. Change is the reality of the existence of a living being; our actual experience of which we are completely sure, is a constant flow, and it is this flow which Bergson calls duration. This duration is not a mere succession of instants. In Bergson's words — 'the continuous progress of the past which grows into the future.' Real duration is just what has always been called time, but it is time perceived as indivisible.

Real duration appears as a "wholly qualitative multiplicity, an absolute

22. C. E. M. Joad, Introduction to Modern Philosophy, P 95
heterogeneity of elements which pass over into one another.” Such a time cannot be measured by clocks or dials but only by conscious beings, for “it is the very stuff of which life and consciousness are made.” Intellect does not grasp Real time — we can only have an intuition of it. “We do not think Real time — but we live it because life transcends intellect.”

Bergson criticised the abstract mathematical time. Real time is different from space. It cannot be any homogeneous medium. Real time is heterogeneous in character. We are aware of it in relation to ourselves, for it has reference not to the existence of a multiplicity of material objects in space, but to a multiplicity of a quite different nature, entirely non-spatial, viz that of conscious states. Being non-spatial, such a multiplicity cannot be composed of elements which are external to one another as are the objects existing in space. State of consciousness are not in any way external to one another. Indeed they interpenetrate to such a degree that even the use of the word ‘state’ is apt to be misleading. The word ‘state’ serve to cut up consciousness artificially, but in reality, it is, as William James termed it” a stream’ and Bergson as ‘duree’ —— the Real as opposed to the False time.

Bergson says, “Pure duration is the form which the succession of our conscious states assumes when our Ego lets itself live, when it refrains

23. H. Bergson, Freedom and Will, P 196
from separating its present state from its former states. For this purpose, it need not be entirely absorbed in the passing sensation or idea, for then. On the contrary, it would no longer 'endure'. Nor need it forget its former states; it is enough that in recalling these states, it does not set them alongside its actual state as one point alongside another, but forms both the past and the present states into an organic whole, as happens when we recall the notes of a tune, melting so to speak, into one another. Might it not be said that even if these notes succeed one another, yet we perceive them in one another, and that their totality may be compared to living being whose parts although distinct, permeate one another just because they are so closely connected?²⁴

Real time, is not however, susceptible like false time to measurement. Real time is not quantitative in character, but is rather a qualitative multiplicity. "Real duration is just what has already been called time, but it is time perceived as indivisible."²⁵

In order to bring out the distinctly qualitative character of such a conception of time, Bergson says, "When we hear a series of blows of a hammer, the sounds from an indivisible melody in so far as they are pure sensations and here again give rise to a dynamic progress; but knowing that the same objective cause is at work, we cut up this progress into phases which we

²⁴ H. Bergson, Time and Free Will, P. 100
²⁵ Ibid, P. 196
then regard as identical, and this multiplicity of elements no longer being conceivable except by being set out in space — since they to the idea of a homogeneous time, the symbolic image of Real duration.²⁶

"Whilst I am writing these lines," he continues, "the hour strikes on a neighbouring clock, but my inattentive ear does not perceive it until several strokes have made themselves heared. Hence, I have not counted them and yet I only have to turn my attention backwards, to count up the four strokes which have already sounded, and add them to those which I hear. If then, I question myself carefully on what has just taken place, I perceive that the first four sounds had struck my ear and even affected my consciousness, but that the sensations produced by each one of them, instead of being set side by side, had melted into one another in such a way as to give the whole a peculiar quality, to make a kind of musical phrase out of it. In order, then to estimate retrospectively, the number of strokes sounded, I tried to reconstruct this phrase in thought, my imagination made one stroke, then two, then three and as long as it did not reach the exact number, four, my feeling, when consulted, was qualitatively different. It had thus ascertained, in its own way, the succession of our strokes, but quite otherwise than by a process of addition and without bringing in the image of a juxtaposition of distinct terms. In a word the number or strokes was perceived as a quality and not as a quantity; it is thus that Real time is presented to immediate

²⁶. Ibid, P. 125
consciousness and it retains this form so long as it does not give place to a symbolic representation, derived from extensity. Bergson tries to drive home his contention that Real time is essentially qualitative.

Real time is a living reality, not discrete, not spatial in character — an utter contrast to that fictitious time with which so many thinkers have busied themselves, setting up as concrete reality the distinct moments of a time which they have reduced to power, while the unity which enables us to call the grains 'powder' they hold to be much more artificial.

The true view of time as Real time would make us see it as a duration which expands, contracts, and intensifies itself more and more; at the limit would be eternity no longer conceptual eternity, which is an eternity of death, but an eternity of life, and change — a living and therefore still moving eternity in which our own particular duree would be included as the vibrations are in light, an eternity which would be the concentration of all duree.

Bergson reminds us that if our existence were composed of separate states with an impressive ego to unite them, for us there would be no duration for an ego which does not change does not endure. Real time, however is the foundation of our being and is as we feel, the very substance of the world in which we live. Real duration is the continuous progress of the past which grows into the future and which swells as it advances, leaving on all

27. Ibid, PP. 96–97
thing its bite, or the mark of its tooth. This being so consciousness cannot
go through the same state twice; history does never really repeat itself.

**INTUITION:**

The foundation of Bergson's philosophy is his method of intuition. Phi-
losophizing just consists in placing one's self by an effect of intuition, in the
interior of concrete reality. For him intuition is a useful instrument in the search
for reality; the most powerful, that men possess. By intuition is meant "the
kind of intellectual sympathy by which one places oneself within an object in
order to coincide with what is unique in it and consequently inexpressible."28

2Briefly, to philosophize is to feel the palpitating of the heart of reality.

Bergson stated that knowledge acquired by intelligence is relative and
maintains that while it may be limited knowledge, it brings us in a very true
sense, into touch with the "absolute". If we understand by that term no more
than reality in some one of its windings. In other words Bergson discards in
the first place, the distinction between noumena and phenomena and sub-
stitutes for it the notion of two opposed movements constitutive of reality —
spirituality or duration on the one hand and materiality or matter on the other
hand. In the second instance, he replaces the distinction between understand-
ing in the narrow sense as the faculty of conceptions and reason as
the faculty of ideas, by the distinction between two complementary but

opposed faculties of knowledge, intelligence and intuition. Bergson will have nothing to do with "things-in-themselves" either with subjects in themselves or with objects in themselves either with subjects in themselves or with objects in themselves. He will not allow for a moment that we are commended to the phantom of an incomprehensible "things-in-itself," but insists that by means of intelligence and intuition complementary faculties, we are introduced into the absolute. By means of that which is material in ourselves we are enabled to know matter; and by means of that which is vital and spiritual in ourselves we can come into sympathy with life and spirit.

Bergson insists on the limitations of intelligence as a faculty of knowledge. Life and spirit cannot be brought within the grasp of intelligence. In virtue of its very nature it is incapable of seeing the meaning of life. Even when it makes use of teleological conceptions it merely appears to escape a mechanical theory of life, for the most radical finalism is only an inverted mechanical theory. In short no multiplication of the conceptions of intelligence will ever bring us into closer touch with life and spirit, for the concept applies only to the static, the inert, the permanent, whereas life is always going, ever becoming. Intelligence is characterised by a native inability to comprehend life. Its work is to reconstitute and to re-constitute with ready-made conceptions, so what is new each moment of a history escapes it, and still more the process itself from moment to moment is beyond its grasp.
Then mind and life will be unknowable realities. Is life in its creative activity incomprehensible? Must man forever remain deprived of its secret? Must he content himself with taking a number of snap-shots of it as it glides by, pictures which show him only patches of its surface? Must he despair of entering into the sanctuary in which life shows itself in the making? Truly if intelligence were his only faculty of knowledge, and if intelligence were such as Bergson holds it to be, the way of the knowledge of life would be closed, and its secret remain hidden from human eyes. But this is not the tragic conclusion of Bergson’s philosophy. Life may be stubbornly refuse to yeild up its secret to intelligence, but it can be known by a second faculty, which man possesses in germ, and which he may develop — the faculty of intuition.

Intuition is derived from the Latin ‘intueri’ — which has been translated to “look upon”, “to see within” and "to consider or contemplate." The word intuition means various things to different philosophers, psychologists and laypersons. But the basic sense of the term is captured in the dictionary definition: "The act or faculty of knowing directly, without the use of rational processes."\(^{29}\)

This definition is so broad that it can be applied to a vast range of cognitive experience. Intuition applies to anything knowable, including vague

\(^{29}\) Philip Goldberg, The Intuitive Edge, P. 31
hunches and feelings about mundane matters, significant discoveries of concepts and facts, and divine revelation.

In ordinary usage, intuition might signify an event occurrence or a faculty of the mind. The basic sense of the word, though suggests spontaneity and immediacy, intuitive knowing is not mediated by a conscious or deliberate rational process. We use the word when we know something but do not know how we know it.

Intuition is experienced as non-sequential. It is a single event as opposed to a series, a snapshot as opposed to a motion picture. It just seems to happen, often when least expected, without the application of specific rules. Intuition is inexplicable. The intuiter might be able to provide a plausible explanation for what led to his knowledge, but he would be reasoning retroactively and could not be sure that explanation matched the actual process.

Intuition participates in formal rational thought. Deductive logic is a set of rules enabling us to go from a general proposition to a specific application, as in the classic syllogism. All men are mortal, Socrates is a man, therefore, Socrates is mortal. The rationalist philosophers understood that logic has to begin with self-evident, or axiomatic, premises. It could be argued that intuition provides the apprehension of self-evidence. Descartes used the term that way. "By intuition," he wrote, "I understand
not the fluctuating testimony of the sense, but the conception which an
unclouded and attentive mind gives us so readily and distinctly that we
are wholly freed from doubt about that which we understand."

Intelligence and intuition are two opposed and yet two complementary
ways of knowing reality. The dividing lines between these two are scientific
and philosophic knowledge. Intelligence finds its proper sphere of activity
within the positive sciences. Intelligence succeeds in the sciences, because
they have ultimately a practical aim, and intelligence is the instrument of
action.

"Science begins to become relative or rather symbolic, only when it
attacks the problems of life and consciousness from the side of physico-
chemistry. Provided that we recognize physico-chemical knowledge of life
to be relative or symbolic, we may attribute a certain value to biology, but
this symbolic or relative knowledge must be completed by 'a study of an­
other kind which is metaphysics," and which works by means of intuition.
Parallel to modern scientific knowledge, "there ought to be constituted a
second kind of knowledge which would retain what physics allows to es­
cape .......... one must transport one's self by an effort of sympathy to the
interior of that which becomes," and attempt to flow the flux itself to the real.
In successive efforts of intuition, philosophy must pursue its task."31

30. Ibid, PP. 33-34
31 J M 'Kellar stewart, A critical Exposition of Bergson's Philosophy, P. 12
Philosophy thus introduces us into spiritual life. In this way Bergson brings about a reconciliation between metaphysics and science and speaks of supporting the one by the other, without the sacrifice of either, after having sharply distinguished between them.

Philosophy has a definite task assigned to it. The task of philosophy is to build a progressive knowledge of life and consciousness, which shall be no longer symbolic. The philosopher will range himself alongside the artist and the poet. He will, like them express himself through metaphor, image and symbol, clear conceptual expression being reserved to the products of the scientific intelligence. As metaphysician the philosopher will like the poet and the artist, live by flashes of inspiration, he will feel the passage of his 'breath' through him and gain sympathetic insight into the heart of things. By successive efforts of intuition or intellectual expansion, he will follow the winding of life and consciousness in all the moments of their qualitative processes. "Thus all our knowledge, scientific or metaphysical is raised. In the absolute we live and move and have our being. The knowledge of it which we have is doubtless, incomplete, but not external or relative. It is being itself in its inner nature which we grasp through the combined and progressive development of science and philosophy."\(^{32}\)

Bergson conceives that philosophy or metaphysics is based on

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\(^{32}\) Ibid, P. 15
intuition, which he contrasts with analysis. By analysis he means the reduc-
tion of the complex to its simple constituents, as when a physical object is reduced to molecules, to atoms and finally to sub atomic 'particles' or as when a new idea is explained in terms of a new arrangement of ideas we already possess. By 'intuition' Bergson means the 'immediate consciousness' or direct awareness of reality.

It is very well to say that philosophy is based on intuition. What is the object of such intuition? A general answer might be that it is movement, becoming, duration, that which can be known only through immediate or intuitive awareness, and not through a reductive analysis which distorts it or destroys its continuity. This is to say within the framework of Bergson's thought that the object of intuition is reality.

In the second of his Oxford conference he makes the often quoted statement that "there are changes, but there are not, under the change, things which change: change has no need of a support. There are movements, but there is no inert, invariable object which moves: movement does not imply a mobile."33

Bergson says that existence is given in experience. He says that this experience will be called sight or contact, exterior perception in general, if it is a question of a material object: it will have the name "intuition" when it

33. F. Copleston, A History of Philosophy Vol. IX PP 181-182
bears on the spirit. Bergson does not mean that there is no existing reality. His contention is that reality is a becoming, the past persisting in the present, and the present being carried into the future, the whole process being continuous throughout and divisible only through the artificial separation affected by the intelligence for its own purposes.

Bergson holds that the subject matter of science and philosophy are different. He assigns matter to science and spirit to metaphysics. So the methods of science and philosophy are different. Science is the work of the intelligence and works by analysis. Whereas metaphysics is or is based on and draws its life from intuition.

The intuitive method is based on a negative view of the validity of intelligence outside a strictly limited domain. The limitations of intelligence are inherent in its nature; no extension of its categories will or can remove them. Intelligence is constructed with a view to action on inner matter, it is indeed, spirit insinuating itself into matter. That is its sphere and any extension of its use is illegitimate. Bergson is emphatic about this. "The intelligence is not made to think evolution, in the proper meaning of the word, that is the continuity of a change which is pure movement."34

Bergson holds that reality may be extra-intellectual, that is to say, either infra-conceptual or supra conceptual and yet knowable. We may instal

34. J. M. 'Kellar Stewart, A Critical Exposition of Bergson's Philosophy, PP 15-16
ourselves in this extra-intellectual real by an effort of intuition. It is this be possible, metaphysics and science, though still two opposed ways of knowing, will be complementary of each other. The one will be increasingly dominated by the law of identity; it will proceed by means of concepts in which space is always immanent; it will involve a distinction between the knower and the known. The other will be dynamic, by immediate intuition in which the distinction between the knower and the known is removed or has not yet emerged; in which the act of knowledge coincides with the generative act of reality.

Intuition is taken as a kind of impressionism; or as a substitution of feeling and emotion for clear logical thinking and sharp intellectual analysis; or as a kind of religious mysticism; or as a clear and definite method. Writers like Wildon Carr have emphasised that intuition is experience. On the other hand critics like Prof. A. D. Lindsay seem to take much trouble to let us understand that intuition is fundamentally intellectual. Those who support the view of Lindsay seek for authority in these words of Bergson — "intuition is thought lived, hence still intellectual." 35 And those who hold the view that intuition is a special kind of experience note the closing sentence in 'Introduction to Metaphysics', in which Bergson says that Metaphysics 'might be defined as integral experience'.

35. T.V. Seshagiri Row, New Light on Fundamental Problems Including Nature and Function of Art, P 80
Bergson discovered in intuition a method which is not merely intellectual, and by which metaphysics is still possible. The old method of trying to comprehend Reality by means of a fabricating intelligence is entirely cast away, and a new method of knowing Reality is discovered by recognising a faculty which is the development or enlargement of instinct.

Bergson's intuition is fundamentally experience — a special experience, which consists of a great effort on our part to press our individuality or personality to the centre of the reality whose true knowledge is our aim, whether it be the reality of our own personality or any object or person outside ourselves. Bergson does not mean anything other than this when he says, "Philosophy consists precisely in this, that by an effort of intuition one places oneself within the concrete reality." This placing oneself within the concrete Reality which Bergson refers to as intuition in his "Introduction to Metaphysics" is the same as what he speaks of in his "Creative Evolution" as the experience that seeks concrete duration that "follows the real in all its sinuosities."

This intuition is a psychical fact, and as Bergson says, "it is incontestable that every psychical state, belongs to a person, reflects the whole of a personality. Every feeling, however simple, it may be, contains virtually within it the whole past and present of the being experiencing it."
When Bergson speaks of intuition as "intellectual sympathy, what does he mean by saying that the sympathy is intellectual? He has explained what 'sympathy' means viz placing oneself in an object. In "Creative Evolution" he explains that intellect is necessary to rouse up instinct and enlarge it into intuition. Intellect tries to catch life and reality, but fails; and thus failing, it gives the start for instinct to enlarge itself into intuition so that it may catch the real.

Intuition has its birth in the death of intellect. When intellect breaks away, intuition springs up. Thus though intellect and intuition are complementary, yet they are different and divergent. When Bergson says that intuition is intellectual sympathy, he means that intuition is sympathy, not intellect, but a sympathy which is got through the help of intellect. Bergson further says that when instinct is once roused by intelligence, when once it is freed, it can turn inward on itself and awaken the potentialities of intuition which still slumber within it. This unmistakably shows that there is no intellect at all in intuition, as such.

Bergson holds that through intuition man can apprehend the very movement of life itself and be freed from the contradictions from the point of view of intelligence. Bergson admits that lack of development or through decay of intuition, is very little used by man, still less by philosophers, who have altogether given themselves up to the guidance of intellect; but it may, he
asserts be put to use, and only by its use can one attain to the true nature of reality, the very aim and end of the art of philosophy.

This is the method more particularly, "now the image has at least this advantage, that it keeps us in the concrete. No image can replace the intuition of duration, but many diverse images borrowed from very different orders of things, may, by the convergence of their action, direct consciousness to the precise point where there is an intuition to be seized. By choosing images as dissimilar as possible, we shall prevent any one of them from usurping the place of the intuition it is intended to call up, since it would then be driven away at once by its rivals. By providing that, in spite of their differences of aspect, they all require from the mind the same kind of attention, and in some sort the same degree of tension, we shall gradually accustom consciousness to a particular and clearly defined disposition—that precisely which it must adopt in order to appear to itself as it really is without any veil. But then consciousness must at least consent to make the effort. For it will have been shown nothing: it will simply have been placed in the attitude it must take up in order to make the desired effort, and so come by itself to the intuition."\(^{38}\)

Bergson allows other objects of intuition besides pure duration as it is embodied with ego. Bergson says little about scientific and philosophic

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geniuses the remark that their use of intuition as a method will found on inspection, but the artist gift he calls intuitional and finds it in an immediate identity with and the understanding of the artist's object. Repeatedly he talks about intuition of movement, as distinct from the movement of duration. On our personality, on our liberty, on the place we occupy in the whole of nature, on our origin and perhaps also on our destiny, it throws a light, feeble and vacillating, but one which none the less pierces the darkness of night in which the intellect leaves us.

Bergson gives two descriptions of intuition: "By intuition is meant the kind of intellectual sympathy by which one places oneself within an object inorder to coincide with what is unique in it and consequently inexpressible."39 Here Bergson treats intuition as "intellectual sympathy." But when speaking of intuition as experiences by the artist, Bergson surely uses sympathy in a different sense — a feeling rather than an intellectual sympathy. "By placing himself back within the object by a kind of sympathy, in breaking down, by an effort of intuition, the barrier that space puts between him and his model."40

Both these types of intuition are commonly called imagination. By an effort of the mind, in the first case, using the powers of observation, analysis and comparison, the artist finds something in his object with which he is

39 H. Bergson, An Introduction to Metaphysics, PP. 23-24
40 H. Bergson, Creative Evolution, P 186
familiar in his own character; then he deduces, and so creates or comprehends a character. This may be described as intellectual imagination.

The second quotation describes the imagination of feeling — real sympathy. It is the imagination of the great artists who do not deduce their Antigones and Hamlets, but are momentarily one with the same. A new name is finding for this imagination which is so useful and necessary and essentially human faculty as "intuition". No doubt "imagination" is a term that like "intuition" itself should be used with discrimination, but its different species and degrees have been analysed. It is not an unknown or mysterious power of the mind. Both types of imagination are essentially different from that kind of sympathy which expresses itself in some instinctive emotion.

Bergson says that there is no clear distinction between intuition and "pure duration". The latter, as understood by Bergson, seems to be the potential physical reaction to the stimulus chosen by the body from among many for reasons of utility, but without any admixture of memory (a situation which as Bergson points out, never occurs, for "it is indisputable that the basis of real, and so to speak instantaneous, intuition on which our perception of the external world is developed, is a small matter compared with all that memory adds to it."�41 "Our eyes are closed to the primordial and fundamental act of perception — the act, constituting pure

41. H. Bergson, Matter and Memory, P. 66
perception, where by we place ourselves in the very heart of things."\textsuperscript{42} "Re-store, on the contrary, the true character of perception; recognise in pure perception a system of nascent acts which plunge roots deep into the real, and at once perception is seem to be radically distinct from recollecting; the reality is no more constructed or reconstructed but touched, penetrated, lived and the problem at issue between realism and idealism, instead of giving rise to eternal metaphysical discussions, is solved or rather dissolved by intuition."\textsuperscript{43}

In pure perception we are actually placed outside ourselves; we touch the reality of the object in an immediate intuition."\textsuperscript{44} Here "pure perception" and "intuition" are identical; yet Bergson has already told us that pure perception is rather without us than within; it is the effect of other images on that image which is our body, and the effect in question is action and has no connection with the mind. It would seem, inspite of such passages as the above, that intuition functions only when perception is not "pure" when it is in working alliance with mind.

Bergson, frequently uses the term "intuition" when he means the grasping by the mind of some truth, of some essential aspect of reality, or of an individual. In such cases it seems impossible to distinguish it from any

\textsuperscript{42} Ibid, P 67
\textsuperscript{43} Ibid, P. 69.
\textsuperscript{44} Ibid, P. 75
other truth receiving function of the mind, whether it be intellect or instinct. 

"Knowledge is knowledge."

Intuition pulls answer from nothing; it is not magic. It works with the materials of information; but it can work with information that is not consciously available, that may have been stored in the past or acquired through subliminal and other non-sensory means. Rational thinking has to work with whatever the mind is aware of at that time, one of the limitations that inspired the mathematician and philosopher Blaise Pascal to say that reason is the slow and tortuous method by which those who do not know the truth discover it. Intuition has no such restrictions; it is the product of the mind's capacity to do many things at once without our being aware of them.

Intuition does not give us more and more of reality. It gives the knowledge of the reality of the object in a flash or we take the knowledge by a grasp or by storm, if we may say so. Secondly, intuition penetrates into every detail without any conscious effort. Intuition gives us a glimpse of concrete Reality which is duration, but not of more degree of reality. It does not attempt to minimise the value of science, no triumph over the limitations of science. Science is a discovery of law. It cannot comprehend freedom, the fact of life that exists through duration, which intuition alone can comprehend. If we realize our life as it is being lived, we get an intuition of reality.
which is not a thought of it or a conception of it, but a conscious experience of the actual life as we live it.

One cannot be sure how many kinds of intuitions are allowed by Bergson. He speaks of "internal" and "external" intuition. "Pure intuition", external or internal is that of undivided continuity. But Bergson makes it clear that by intuition he means something which gives us direct access to the heart of a thing. Intellect moves round an object while intuition enters into the heart of it. However he passess from the conception of intuition as "intellectual sympathy with which he starts in his "Introduction to Metaphysics" to a wider and higher conception. The last sentence with which he concludes the book is: "Metaphysics can therefore be defined as integral experience."

If intuition is the sole source of metaphysics, it follows that intuition must be integral experience. Bergson feels the need of a cosmic intuition which can integrate the whole of experience into a harmonious whole. He seeks to preserve the genuine whole of experience instead of splitting it up into an infinity of parts loosely joined together by a general concept. That is why he defines intuition as "integral experience" also.