CHAPTER III
BRADLEY
The most rigorous metaphysician among the British Idealists is F. H. Bradley. He is not concerned explicitly with the theory of propositions as well as with the empiricist account of thinking. In his book "The Principles of Logic" he exposes the error of the empirical theory. He criticises empiricism because the empiricists consider images as one kind of symbol of thinking. The empiricist misunderstand the nature of symbols generally. Bradley says that even when thinking, involves images the content of the image is never the idea, it being only being a mental picture of its original. According to him, to hold images as thought ignores the fact of meaning. Everything that exists has two aspects — existence and content. Things exist with a certain character. It is true of images of anything else. But an idea 'means' something other than itself. Only Universals can mean, only that taken apart from its existence can stand for something other than itself. Empiricism has not understood what an idea is, and therefore it also misrepresented what thinking is. But the empiricist account of thinking ignores the aspect of judgment. Having of an image means that image occurs or happens in me. But to think or judge is to do more than to have something happen in my
mind. To judge is to refer an idea to the world and without this reference, there is no judgment. To Bradley, there are not two things, 'having' ideas and 'refering' them. Ideas are judgments on his view.

Bradley develops his own view in opposition to empiricism. First, he agrees that ideas must have an aspect of existence. For him all thinking involves images, that an idea is part of the content of an image. But in a later edition of the logic he rejects his view. Later he holds that thinking is possible without images.

Our ordinary experience has made us familiar with the distinction between what really is or exists and what merely appears to be. This distinction arises because our various direct perceptions are felt to conflict with one another. A. E. Taylor writes "when two immediate perceptions, both apparently equally authenticated by our senses, stand in direct conflict with one another, we cannot, without doing violence to the fundamental law of rational thinking, regard both as equally and in the same sense true.¹ We recognise that things are not always what they seem to be, what appears to us is not real, and 'what really is' does not appear to be so always. In two conflicting perceptions, one is real representation and the other is appearance. What part of our conceptions about the world does give us reality and what part only appearance? This is the central problem of metaphysics.

1. A. E. Taylor, Elements of Metaphysics, P. 3
Metaphysics systematically and universally asks what is meant by being real and to what degree? Our various scientific and non-scientific theories about the world are in harmony with the universal characteristics of real existence. Hence metaphysics has been called "an attempt to become aware of and to doubt all pre-conceptions"; and again "an unusually resolute effort to think consistently."\(^2\)

The subject matter of metaphysicians problems has distinguished metaphysics from some other closely related forms of human thought. Metaphysics as an enquiry into the meaning of reality has some affinity with religion as well as with imaginative literature. The aim of both religion and imaginative literature is to get behind appearance and interpret the reality which is the basis of appearance. But the difference with metaphysics is with the spirit and method. "Unlike religion and imaginative literature, metaphysics also deals with the ultimate problems of existence in a purely scientific spirit, its object is intellectual satisfaction, and its method is not one of appeal to immediate intuition or unanalysed feeling, but of the critical and systematic analysis of our conceptions."\(^3\) Metaphysics is different in its method from the other type of science. It is different from mathematical sciences, because mathematics employs the numerical and quantitative methods. These numerical and quantitative methods cannot be used in metaphysics.

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2. Ibid, P. 5  
3. Ibid, P. 5
Metaphysics is often criticised by asserting that by its very nature, metaphysics is impossible or if it is possible, it is useless and superfluous. Again metaphysics as it is essentially unprogressive.

The anti-metaphysicians maintained that metaphysics is impossible because the metaphysician's problems, in their own nature, admit no solution. It is often asserted that metaphysical questions are senseless ones and there is no meaning of the distinction between the real and the apparent. If there is any meaning at all in the distinction it is clearly necessary and proper to ask by what characteristic can one be distinguished from another. The contradiction which leads us to make the distinction may themselves be the ultimate truth about things. "Now whether this view is defensible or not, it is clearly not one which we have the right to assume without examination as self-evident; it is itself a metaphysical theory of first principles and would have to be defended, if at all, by an elaborate metaphysical analysis of the meaning of the concepts 'truth' and 'reality'. Again, the objection if valid would tell as much against experimental and mathematical science as against metaphysics. If the self contradictory can be true, there is no rational ground for preferring a coherent scientific theory of the world to the wildest dreams of superstition or insanity." So "there is no rational foundation at all for the distinction between reality and appearance, and

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4. Ibid, P. 9
then all science is an illusion, or there is a rational foundation for it, and then we are logically bound to inquire into the principle of the distinction and thus to face the problems of metaphysics."\(^5\)

An objection raised against metaphysics is that, it has no place in the scheme of human knowledge, because all the intelligible questions about reality must fall within the scope of other sciences. So there is no room for a series of metaphysical enquiries. But this argument is fallacious. "What the metaphysian asserts is not that there are facts with which the various special branches of experimental science cannot deal, but that there are questions which can be and ought to be raised about the facts with which they do deal other than those which experimental enquiry can solve."\(^6\)

It may be asked that various sciences are different in their dealing with different sets of facts. But the various sciences are not different in dealing with different parts of the world of reality, but with the whole of the world of reality, which can be brought under different aspects. They are not different in dealing with different sets of facts, but they differ in looking at the facts from different points of view. So it cannot be said that metaphysics deals with certain group of facts lying outside the scope of 'sciences', but to deal with the same facts from the different points of view.

\(^5\) Ibid, P. 9
\(^6\) Ibid, P. 9
It is said, there may be realities which are more than mere appearance. But the human faculties cannot know them. All our knowledge is limited to appearances which are called phenomena. What lies behind these phenomena is completely inaccessible to us, and it is loss of time to try to know it. But the assumption that we can know only phenomena is self-contradictory. The very statement that "we know only phenomena" has no meaning unless we know at least enough about ultimate realities to be sure that they are unknowable. The phenomenalist recognised one proposition as an absolute and ultimate truth that "I know that whatever I know is mere appearance." This proposition has its pastive value as to first principle of truth. Thus the arguments by which it tries to demonstrate that metaphysics is impossible themselves afford unimpeachable evidence of the necessity for the scientific examination of the metaphysical problem.

The charge of unprogressiveness is often raised against metaphysics. But this charge may be easily disproved by careful study of history of philosophy. No doubt the problems of metaphysicians are always the same, but it is also equally same with other sciences. The method which tries to solve the problem varies from age to age in close correspondence with the general development of science. "Every great metaphysical conception has exercised its influence on the general history of science and in return, every

7. Ibid, P. 11
important movement in science has affected the development of metaphysics. Every fundamental advance in science is a restatement and reconsideration of the old metaphysical problems in the light of the new discovery.

We may mention here the relation between metaphysics and mysticism. The aim of mystic is to penetrate ultimate reality behind the appearance. So in this regard mysticism and metaphysics have close community. But the difference between them is that mystic has no interest in the world of appearance. Appearance for a mystic is untrue and ultimately non-existent. The object for a mystic is primarily emotional, not intellectual. What he wants is a feeling of satisfaction, which he can get from immediate contact with something which is taken to be finally and abidingly real. But the object for metaphysician is the attainment of intellectual consistency.

If there is a distinction between things as they really are and things as they appear, then there must be some universal criterion which makes the distinction between them. The first criterion of reality is that it is infallible. We cannot doubt its validity without falling into a contradiction in our thought. What is real is not self-contradictory and what is self-contradictory is not real. As Bradley says, “Ultimate reality is such that it does not contradict itself; here is an absolute criterion. And it is proved absolute by the fact that,

8. Ibid, P. 13
either in endeavouring to deny it, or even in attempting to doubt it, we tacitly assume its validity. As reality is free from contradiction, both internal and external, it is one all-inclusive systematic whole. Reality then is known to be a connected and self-consistent or internally coherent system. But which matter has composed this system? According to Bradley, all the materials or data of reality consist of experience, experience being provisionally taken to mean psychical matter of fact, what is given in immediate feeling. In other words, whatever forms part of presentation will or emotion must in some sense and to some degree possess reality and be a part of the material of which reality, as a systematic whole is composed; whatever does not include as part of its nature, this indissoluble relation to immediate feeling and therefore does not enter into the presentation, will and emotion of which psychical life is composed, is not real. The real is experience nothing but experience, and experience consists of "Psychical matter of fact." The real thing is indissolubly connected with the psychical life of a sentient subject and as so connected is psychical matter of fact. As Bradley explains this view, "Find any piece of existence, take up anything that any one could possibly call a fact or could in any sense assert to have being, and then judge if it does not consist in sentient experience. Try to discover any sense in which you can still continue to speak of it, when all perception and feeling have been removed; or point out any fragment of its matter, any aspect of its

9. F. H. Bradley, Appearance and Reality, P. 120
being, which is not derived from and is not still relative to this source. When the experiment is made strictly, I can myself conceive of nothing else than the experienced........... I am driven to the conclusion that for me experience is the same as reality." According to Bradley, the distinction between subject and object is a product of intellectual abstraction. If we go back to immediate experience we do not find these fragments. Immediate experience is fully unified and contains no breaks or relations, but it is not undiversified. "What we discover rather is a whole in which distinctions can be made but in which divisions do not exist." It is such experience which Bradley means when he says that reality is "Sentient experience."

For Bradley Reality is one organic whole. It expresses itself immediately in all its appearances. He argues, "........ all appearances must belong to reality. For what appears is, and whatever is cannot fall outside the real........ The character of the real is to possess everything phenomenal in a harmonious form." According to Bradley, ultimate reality is experience in the special sense, admitting of no distinction between subject and object. "It will hence be a single and all inclusive experience, which embraces every partial diversity in concord." He also observes, "Outside of spirit there is not, and there cannot be, any reality.

10. Ibid, PP. 127-128
11. Ibid, p. 128
12. Ibid, P. 129
13. Ibid, P. 123
and the more that anything is spiritual. So the more is it veritably real.\textsuperscript{15} For Bradley, Reality is above all relations, whether external or internal. Reality is an all-comprehensive and harmonious sentient experience. Bradley calls Reality as "Sentient experience" or simply individual. However Bradley does not take Reality to be personal. Reality, according to him, is both supra-relational and supra personal. The Absolute Reality for Bradley must be one, "because anything is experienced in or as a whole, and because anything like independent plurality or external relations cannot satisfy the intellect."\textsuperscript{16} For him, that Reality is one is more a matter of conviction than a reasoned out belief or knowledge. Reality must satisfy the intellect. Plurality and external relations between independent reals are self-contradictory. So it cannot satisfy the intellect. "But on the other hand the character of the absolute Reality is everywhere manifest, and we can possess no other possible criterion of truth."\textsuperscript{17} David Holdcroft aptly observes that "the principle of contradiction is not for Bradley just a formal principle; the thesis that ultimate reality is not contradictory does not mean simply what can be put in the formal mode by saying that any description of ultimate reality must be consistent, but means in the material mode, roughly speaking, that reality is a harmonious and intelligible whole in which there are no 'bare' conjunctions."\textsuperscript{18}

Bradley says that it is not wrong to accept the plurality of facts of daily

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{15} Ibdi, P. 498
  \item \textsuperscript{16} Ibdi, P. 127
  \item \textsuperscript{17} F. H. Bradley, Essay on Truth and Reality, P. 344
  \item \textsuperscript{18} A. Manser and G Stock (eds), The Philosophy of F. H. Bradley, P 192
\end{itemize}
life. It is necessary for practical convenience. The objects of the earth are really appearances of reality. The appearances of the daily life are not unreal, but they are partially real. Reality is unintelligible without appearances. Appearances belong to reality. Appearances are higher and lower. There are degrees of reality in appearances.

Reality is a systematic whole. The nature of the whole is manifested by its constituent elements and the change of the constituent elements changes the nature of the whole. So the nature of the whole is determined by the character of each of its constituents. Leibnitz holds that each of the partial experiences reflects the whole system from its own peculiar point of view. Complete experience reveals the Reality while the partial experiences in which its nature is diversely manifested are its Appearances. Appearances are not illusory or unreal. Partial aspect of a total system can only be understood by reference to the whole to which it belongs.

The whole can exist in so far as it expresses its nature in the system of its parts. Again the parts can have no existence except as the whole expresses itself through them. Reality then being a systematic whole, can have no being apart from its appearance, though, neither any of them taken singly, nor yet the sum of them thought of collectively. No appearance is the whole of Reality, in none of them all does the whole Reality fail to manifest as a whole. The whole is truly, as a whole present in each and every part, while yet no part is the whole.
But this conception of Reality as capable of degree may seem paradoxical. How can anything be more or less "real" than anything else? Must not anything either be entirely real or not real at all? According to some there can be no degrees of the infinite or the infinitesimal, all infinites and again all zeros have been declared to be manifestly equal. The concept of successive orders of infinitely great and again of infinitely small, magnitudes is not only intelligible but absolutely necessary if our thought on quantitative subjects is to be consistent. The Reality manifests itself in its various appearances. It is the same single experience system which appears as a whole and in its whole nature in every one of the substance experience systems, they are all alike real, and each is indispensable to the existence of the whole. The whole is more explicitly present in one than in another, there is an infinity of possible degrees of reality and unreality.

Reality is one in the sense of being an individual self contained of experience. Individuality means that it is the systematic embodiment of a single coherent structure in a plurality of elements or parts, which depend for their whole character upon the fact that they are the embodiment of precisely this structure. If this is so then degrees of reality mean the same thing as degrees of individuality, and that a thing is real to the same extent to which it is truly individual.

Idealists are of opinion that judgment is the unit of knowledge.
Knowledge is an interpretation of reality or experience according to idealist. But this act of interpretation is possible with the help of judgment. The mind receives isolated sensuous impressions but this cannot give us knowledge of reality. Sensuous impressions can only be felt but never known. Knowledge arises only when the mind discerns meaning in the sensuous impressions. The discernment of meaning in sense impressions consists in their organisation into a system which is the knowledge or interpretation of them. This organisation of sense impression into a system or interpretation of them is the act of judging. So interpretation of sensuous impressions involves judgment. Immediate experience is basic to all knowledge in the sense that all that we become aware of has its origin and unity here. But despite its cardinal role in knowledge, it is not knowing. "For forms to remain everywhere within the stage and the limits of feeling is impossible. If we are to know, we must understand."¹⁹ Thus for Bradley, a single experience cannot be by itself an instance of knowing, for knowing involves an application of ideal content to datum that is far more complex than any such experience. The basic manifestation of knowing is judgment. To think at all is to judge. Bradley defines judgment as "The act which refers an ideal content to a reality beyond the act."²⁰ Bradley means that judgment is the mental act by which we refer or ascribe an idea to reality, but such idea can never wholly comprehend

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reality. In the judgment ‘The table is round’ we refer the ideal content ‘round’ to the table which is reality. But roundness is not the whole of the table. The table is always beyond or more comprehensive than whatever is conveyed by any judgment whether by the given one or any other. According to Bradley when we assert something we ascribe a predicate to a subject. The subject is the same with reality and the ideal content is the predicate. Thus subject and the predicate are brought into relation with one another in the judgment. They are not separate elements of thought, but they are regarded as a whole or unity which is more real and concrete than each subject and predicate because it transcends each of them.

For Bradley an idea is not a particular image or sensation. An idea for him is an incipient judgment which deals with the universal. So, the judgment which consists of ideas can never directly assert a fact. According to the empiricist theory of Psychological atomism, every idea or sensation is a distinct entity, and every judgment expresses one atomic fact, but Bradley rejects this view. Bradley tries to show that no judgment can directly express a fact.

There are three kinds of judgments, according to relation. They are the categorical judgment, hypothetical judgment and disjunctive judgment. In disjunctive propositions there is either .......... or. For example, ‘This is either a mouse or a mole’. Here no fact is of the nature of either or. So,
disjunctive proposition can never directly assert a fact. In a hypothetical proposition, there is if ........ then. A hypothetical proposition deals with supposals. But supposal is not an actual state of affairs. So hypothetical proposition does not also directly assert a fact. Categorical proposition is either singular or universal, affirmative or negative. A negative judgment, denies a fact and does not directly assert a fact.

Universal judgments are hypothetical. For example “All men are mortal,” means if there are men, then they are mortal. But hypothetical proposition cannot directly assert a fact, so universal judgment being hypothetical cannot assert a fact. So there is one type of judgment namely categorical singular judgment. Singular judgment is of three types —

1) Analytic judgment of sense

2) Synthetic judgment of sense

3) A judgment which deals with a reality which is never a sensible event either in space and time.

We can omit the third type of judgment because they deal with the supra-sensuous entity. An analytic judgment of sense makes an assertion about that which we feel or perceive, e.g. “I have toothache”. A synthetic judgment of sense on the otherhand, states either some fact of time or space or again some quality of the matter given which we do not here and now
directly perceive, e.g. "This road leads to Delhi". If it possible to show that a judgment directly asserts a fact then this claim is strongest in relation to the analytic judgments of sense. If we can show that the analytic judgment of sense cannot directly assert a fact, then we conclusively refute the empiricists' thesis that there are atomic facts which are asserted in atomic judgments.

Bradley takes up analytic judgment and shows that it never succeeds in asserting a fact. The so called facts which is referred to by analytic judgments are no facts at all. They always refer to something which transcend them and ultimately to an all inclusive all harmonious whole.

Bradley rejects the thesis that a judgment is a relation between two ideas in which one idea is subject and the other is predicate. Bradley also rejects the contention that there is a grammatical subject in every judgment, because if we accept this view, then it would logically support pluralism. Bradley reject pluralism and advocates monism. As each grammatical subject is said to be a substance and as there are many grammatical subjects, it would mean that there are many self contained substances or things. Hence Bradley rejects the theory that in every judgment there is a grammatical subject.

"By the subject I mean here not the ultimate subject, to which the whole
ideal content is referred, but the subject which lies within the content, in other words the grammatical subject.\textsuperscript{21}

But Bradley does not totally reject the subject–predicate view of judgments. According to him there is only one ultimate subject of every judgment. As a matter of fact all ordinary judgments are adjectival to or are predicates of one subject called the Absolute Reality. The real subject of a judgment is the supreme Reality and the whole of the grammatical judgment is the predicate of and is adjectival to the supreme Reality. The valid form of judgment is not ‘S is P’ but ‘Reality’ is such that ‘S is P’. The finite or “mere judgment” which ignores this consideration, “is no more than an abstraction, which lives solely in and through our one-sided emphasis and our failure to observe.”\textsuperscript{22}

While explaining the nature of judgement, Bradley has the empirical thesis in the background. The empiricist equate an idea or a thought with an image or a sense impression. Image or sense impression is a psychical fact. Bradley is opposed to this view. He shows that the important element in an idea is its meaning or signification, and this is a universal and can never be any particular given fact.

If a judgment consists in referring an ideal content, then it refers to

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\textsuperscript{21} F. H. Bradley, The Principles of Logic, Vol. 1, P. 22
\textsuperscript{22} Ibdi, Vol. II, P. 624f
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something beyond the given the fact, for an idea transcends the immediately given. But a judgment must have reference to reality, otherwise it cannot be true or false. Unless a judgment is true or false, the judgment cannot be a judgment at all. According to Bradley truth and falsity depend on the relation of ideas to reality. Bradley in his book 'Principles of Logic' asserts that "We not only must say something, but it must also be about something actual that we say it. For consider, a judgment must be true or false, and its truth or falsehood cannot lie in itself. This involves a reference to something beyond. And this, about which or of which we judge, if it is not fact, what else can it be."

According to Bradley, judgment proper is the act which refers an ideal content (recognised as such) to a reality beyond the act. "In judgment an idea is predicated of a reality." The predicate is not a mental image but a mere feature of the content and as such ideal. "The predicate is a content which has been made loose from its own immediate existence and is used in divorce from that first unity." In reality everything has two aspects that are inseparable, a 'what' and a 'that' an existence and a content which are "distinguishable only and not divisible." But the judgment presents the

23. F. H. Bradley, Loc. Cit., P. 41
24. Ibid, I, P. 10
25. F. H. Bradley, Appearance and Reality, P. 144
26. Ibid, P. 144
27. Ibid, P. 143
content as separate from the existence of the subject and so divides what in reality is only distinguishable. The subject possesses an aspect that the predicate lacks, namely existence. Hence Bradley says, "Judgment is essentially the re-union of two sides 'what' and 'that', provisionally estranged. But it is the alienation of these aspects in which thought's ideality consists."\textsuperscript{28} As the predicate is merely ideal, it can never be equivalent to the subject which exists. Bradley observes, "Truth is the object of thinking, and the aim of truth is to qualify existence ideally."\textsuperscript{29} But truth can never attain its goal. Since the subject of judgment is a concrete individual while the predicate is an abstract universal, "thought is compelled to take the road of indefinite expansion."\textsuperscript{30} So absolute truth is unobtainable by finite thought.

Logically, the form of thought is judgment. Reasoning is also thought. Judgment is the sundering of an original unity into subject and predicate. According to Bradley, this unity is given in feeling. This original unity does not disappear inspite of division between subject and predicate. Subject and predicate are the two parts of the original whole and are related to each other. And it is only possible to hold this relation between the terms because of the presence of the whole. Bradley writes: "Every such relation is inconsistent with itself ............. For it exists within and by virtue of an

\textsuperscript{28} Ibid, P. 145
\textsuperscript{29} Ibid, P. 145
\textsuperscript{30} Ibid, P. 145
embracing unity, and apart from that totality both itself and its terms would be nothing."31

Prof. Cunningham also interprets Bradley similarly. He writes: "It is important to note that immediate experience is present within the relational level as foundational. It functions as the background or the nucleus in which terms and relations germinate, so to say and from which they grow: it is the felt unity that is the immediate centre of all mediate experience. It is not a 'stage' which may or may not at some time have been there and has now ceased to exist. It is not in any case removed by the presence of a not-self and of a relational consciousness. All that is thus removed is at most, we may say, the mereness of immediacy .......... Thus in all experience we still have feeling which is not an object and object and at all our moments the entirety that comes to us, however much distinguished and relational is felt as comprised within a unity which itself is not relational."32

If judgment is present only within a wider unity we should say that thought must be an identity-in-difference. Reality cannot be identity-in-difference. To reach the reality thought is to be transcended, therefore the form of thought, that identity-in-difference must also be transcended in reality.

31. Ibid, P. 228
32. G. W. Cunningham, The Idealistic Argument in Recent British and American Philosophy, P. 82
Bradley says that identity-in-difference is a conception of thought, therefore it is inadequate to express the nature of reality.

Bradley starts his enquiry and finds that the revelation of the intellect can at best acquaint us with the fact with the help of the categories. Categories like substance, attributes, causality, relation, time and space, motion, self etc are riddled with contradictions. Bradley also affirms that to have the conception of the unity of reality with the help of the external relations is meaningless and the internal relation though consistent with its intellectual conception cannot apply to absolute reality. Bradley admits that the Absolute reality is non-relational. So Bradley holds that intellect is not the proper organ for the grasp of the Absolute reality. But the whole of mental life is constituted not by intellect alone but also by will and feeling. The absolute reality is a whole in which the elements cohere not in their own intrinsic character as conceived by the intellect, but in their sublimated and transmuted character. So that the whole as a system harbours the elements within its bosom in their sublimated and transmuted form and is grasped by the whole of experience which is transcendental and alogical. Bradley thinks that such Absolute can be identified with and described as experience with capital E. Human experience is of a piece with transcendental experience. Thus the Absolute of Bradley, is to be felt, experienced or realized, which cannot be known simply by intellect.
Bradley held that thought is inadequate to grasp Reality. The nature of thought is that it inevitably leaves reality outside of its reach. According to Bradley, thought can reach the real, if it could be “absorbed into a fuller experience.” Bradley’s contention is that reality is never given to thought in an immediate presentation. Thought is ideal, therefore thought is distinguishable. But thought is not separable from the fact or real. There is a distinction of idea from fact, of content from existence in every judgment. Bradley says, “in judgment, we find always the distinction of fact and truth, of idea and reality. Truth and thought are not the thing itself but are of it and about it. Thought Predicates an ideal content of a subject, which idea is not the same as fact, for in it experience and meaning are necessarily divorced.” Thought in its nature is discursive and relational. So thought can grasp reality in an immediate presentation or in an experience of oneness with it.

By saying that thought is merely ideal. Bradley means to deny its facthood. We are prone to take thought as a fact inside the mind or inside the head, and miss the point that thought is never a fact. Take any fact whatsoever, within the head or outside it in the external world the fact itself is not what is predicated of it or vice-versa. The ‘that’ is never the ‘what’ and the ‘what’ is never the ‘that’. Bradley puts the point thus “In judgment an idea

33. Ibid, P. 143
is predicated of a reality. Now in the first place, what is predicate is not a mental images. It is not a fact inside my head which the judgment wishes to attach to another fact outside. The predicate is a 'mere' 'what' a mere feature of content which is used to qualify further the 'that' of the subject. And this predicate is divorced from its psychical existence in my head, and is used without any regard to its being there. When I say 'this horse is a mammal', it is surely absurd to suppose that I am harnessing my mental state to the beast between shafts.”34

Bradley says, “Truth is the object of thinking, and the aim of truth is to qualify existence ideally. Its end, that is, is to give a character to reality in which it can rest. Truth is the prediction of such content as when predicated, is harmonious, and removes inconsistency and with it unrest. And because the given reality is never consistent, thought is compelled to take the road of infinite expansion. If thought were successful, it would have a predicate consistent in itself and agreeing entirely with the subject. But on the other hand the predicate must be always ideal. It must, that is be a ‘what’ not in unity with its own ‘that’ and therefore in and by itself, devoid of existence. Hence so far as in thought this alienation is not made good, thought can never be more than merely ideal.”35

34. Ibid, P. 143
35. Ibid, P. 143
According to Bradley truth has no existence. Truth is an adjective divorced from 'that'. Bradley asserts that, "Thus the truth belongs to existence, but it does not as such exists. It is a character which indeed reality possesses, but a character which as truth and as ideal, has been set loose from existence; and it is never rejoined to it in such a way as to come together singly and make fact. Hence truth shows a dissection and never an actual life. Its predicate can never be equivalent to its subject. And if it become so, and if its adjectives could be at once self-consistent and re-welded to existence, it would not be truth any longer. It would have been passed into an other and a higher reality."  

So Bradley comes to the conclusion that thought is relational. The relational mode of thought cannot give us truth, it can only give us appearance. Bradley says, "A relational way of thought – anyone that moves by the machinery of terms and relations — must give appearance and not truth. It is a makeshift, a device, a mere practical compromise, most necessary, but in the end most indefensible .......... our experience where relational, is not true."  

The relation of thought to reality, plays an important roles in the philosophy of Bradley. For Bradley thought is inadequate to reality. Bradley's

36. Ibid, PP. 145 –146  
37. Ibid, PP 28 – 29
philosophy is essentially an intellectual pursuit, but how can his philosophy ultimately rest content with the doom of thought? Bradley writes, "I have assumed, that the object of metaphysics is to find a general view which will satisfy the intellect, and I have assumed that whatever succeeds in doing this is real and true and whatever fails is neither. This is a doctrine which so far as I can see, can neither be proved nor questioned. The proof or the question, it seems to me, must imply the truth of the doctrine and if that is not assumed, both vanish."38

Here the question arises, how could Bradley acquiesce in the final doom of thought? Bradley accepts the validity of thought for relative experience. But he says that thought is not enough for the knowledge of the Absolute. Thought is valid so far as it goes. Thought seeks to realize an ideal of knowledge, but cannot completely do so. It is our instrument for understanding reality. In deeper scrutiny thought can criticize its own operations, the self-contradictoriness of its concepts. Thus thought indicates the ideal of an experience free from all contradictions. Such an experience free from all contradictions can be held by intuition. When acquired it will not contradict the ideal laid down by the intellect, but will give us as a fact what the intellect could only abstractly lay down as an ideal. Bradley assumes thought as a means of philosophizing, but in the end, thought in its discursive

38. Ibid, PP. 491-492 (Appendix)
and relational form, cannot realize the ideal of complete non
ccontradictoriness. Bradley also asserted that thought cannot also differentiate
between ideality and facthood. Thus though Bradley started with thought as
an instrument of philosophizing yet thought cannot give uncontradicted
experience.

Bradley denies the possibility of metaphysics. Metaphysics for Bradley,
is "a refuge for the man who burns to think consistently" and if there is to be
philosophy its proper business is to satisfy the intellect, and the other sides
of our nature have, if so, no right to speak directly." Bradley says that truth
and falsity depend entirely on the intellect. Bradley says, "Since metaphysics
is mere theory, and since theory from its nature must be made by intellect, it
is here the intellect alone which has to be satisfied. Doubtless a conclusion
which fails to content all the sides of my nature leaves me dissatisfied. But
I see no direct way of passing from 'this does not satisfy my nature' to
therefore it is false.' For false is the same as theoretically untenable, and
we are supposing a case where mere theory has been satisfied, and where
the result has been in consequence taken as true. And, so far as I see, we
must admit that, if the intellect is contented the question is settled. For we
may feel as we please about the intellectual conclusion, but we cannot on
such external ground, protest that it is false."39

39. F. H. Bradley, Appearance and Reality, P 136
Though philosophy is based on the function of intellect or reason, Bradley concluded that the “perfect experience, which is absolute truth (and) reality cannot (as I have often argued) be fully realized intellectually either by the understanding or by any other form of intuition. It is the complete union not only of one side but of every side of our being and experience. It is feeling, will, sense and understanding in one. And though from any one side it can be approached and enjoyed, it cannot be fully there except from all sides at once in a way which, in and for finite beings, is not possible. But this is the one and ‘ultimate’ criterion of truth and reality. And in this sense neither feeling nor relational experience is ultimate and final.”

Thus Bradley holds that reason is unable to grasp ultimate reality. To have knowledge of the Absolute reality non relational immediate experience can alone be adequate.

Bradley’s problem is: how can we know the individuality of the real? Bradley distinguishes three stages of apprehension — feeling below the level of relations, relational thought and feeling above the level of relations. The first one, namely feeling below the level of relations, is roughly equivalent to Kant’s sensation and gives immediate contact with reality. It is however inarticulate. By it we merely grasp a something which at this level we cannot characterise. To know ‘what’ which complements the ‘that’ we must pass to the sphere of

relational thought and bring the universals of understanding to bear. But though
the relational thought enables us to find experience meaningful, Bradley argues,
it does not afford us true knowledge or abiding satisfaction.

Relational thinking has two aspects —

1) First, it attempted to breakdown and analyse what is given in feeling.

2) Secondly, it tries to reunite the parts in a more stable whole. But
relational thinking can never be accompanied the task.

Bradley asserts that "thought is relational and discursive, and if it
ceases to be this, it commits suicide; and yet, if it remains thus how does it
contain immediate presentation? Let us suppose the impossible
accomplished; let us imagine a harmonious system of ideal contents united
by relations and reflecting itself in self-conscious harmony. This is to be
reality, all reality; and there is nothing outside it. The delights and pains of
the flesh, the agonies and raptures of the soul, these are fragmentary meteors
falling from thought's harmonious system. But these burning experiences -
-- how in any sense can they be mere pieces of thoughts heaven? For if the
fall is real, there is a world outside thoughts region, and if the fall is apparent,
then human error itself is not included there. Heaven in brief, must either not
be heaven or else not all reality."41

41. F. H. Bradley, Appearance and Reality, P 150
The problem of the relation between thought and Reality is one of the most complex problem. Bradley admits that we have some idea of Absolute. But he denies any relation between it and its appearances. Thought distinct the predicate from subject and it tries to reconcile the original integrity. The very nature of thought to divide the original into parts. Bradley asserts that thought cannot transcend the relational form. The nature of thought to distinguish and try to synthesize. So, Bradley rejects thought and states that the nature of the Absolute is sensuous experience.

Bradley holds that the Absolute or Infinite is immanent and transcendent. It is immanent, because, it is the pre-supposition of all our knowledge, the underlying basis on which the super structure of thought rests. It is the ideal unity of the separate elements of thought. Yet it transcends thought because thought must vanish; if the ideal is to be realized.

Though the infinite is beyond the reach of thought, Bradley holds thought to be harmonious system. Bradley says “I mean that to be real is to be indissolubly one thing with sentence. It is to be something which comes as a feature and aspect within one whole of feeling, something except as an integral element of such sentience, has no meaning at all. And what I repudiate is the separation of the feeling from the felt or of the desired from desire, or of what is thought from thinking, or the divisions —— I might add- of anything from anything else.”

42. Ibid, P. 146
The identification of reality with experience does not mean own experience. Because my own experience cannot satisfy the conditions of completereness and harmony, which is essential to a ‘Pure’ or perfect experience. If we identify reality with our own experience then the following defect will arise——

1) Its (experience of one's own experience) contents are always fragmentary. It never contains more than the protest fragment of the whole welth of experience.

2) Again even my insight into my own aims and interests is of a very limited kind. For one thing, it is only a fragment of them which is ever given in the form of what is immediately felt in an actual movement of experience.

3) I never perceive more than just those aspects which attracts my attention just because they happen to be significant for my special interests. Everything that has an infinity of sides to it, over and above those of which we become aware because of their special importance for our own purposes. There may be an infinite wealth of character in the most familiar things, to which we are blind only because it has no ‘economic value’ for all these reasons we are absolutely forbidden to identify our own limited experience with the Absolute Experience.

Again we cannot identify this experience with the "collective
experience" of the aggregate of humans. But to begin with collective experience is a contradictory expression. Experience is essentially characterised by unique individuality of aim and interest. In this sense a true experience must be that of an individual subject and no collection or aggregate can be an individual subject. The so called "Collective experience" is not one experience at all, but simply an indefinite multiplicity of experience. The various experiences of finite individuals are all, we have said fragmentary and more or less incoherent. Experience is all comprehensive and all harmonious. But our finite experiences are not only fragmentary, but also largely contradictory and internally chaotic. We may believe that the contradictions are only apparent and that if we could become fully conscious of our own inmost aims and purposes we should at the same moment be aware of reality as a harmonious system. But we never do. Because of our finitude we never can attain this complete insight into the significance of our own lives.

Thus we see the necessary existence of a superhuman experience to which the whole universe of being is directly present as a complete and harmonious system. Reality has no meaning apart from presence in a sentient experience or whole of feeling. It has also been seen infinitely to transcend all that can be given as directly present to any limited experience. If this conclusion is sound, then our 'Absolute' can be said to be conscious
life which embraces the totality of existence, all at once and in a perfect systematic unity, as the contents of experience.

But such conception has its difficulties — how such an all containing experience must be thought to be related to the realm of physical nature. An all-containing coherent experience may be different in its detailed structure from our own piecemeal incoherent experience. If it is to be a experienced at all, it must apprehend its contents in the general way which is characteristic of direct experience. If it is to be a direct experience at all as exhibiting a structural unity which is the embodiment of consistent plan or purpose. It as containing in a systematic unity not only all the facts of which our various experiences have to take note, but all the purposes which they express. So when we attempt to form some approximate concept of such an ultimate experience in terms of our own conscious life, we must conceive it as the union of perfect knowledge in an indivisible whole with supreme will. We must however remember that, for such an experience the ‘what’ and the ‘that’ are inseparable. Hence its knowledge must be of the nature of direct insight into the individual structure of the world of fact, and it will always consciously expressed with perfect harmony and completeness in the ‘facts’ of which it is aware.

The Absolute or Infinite is regarded as supra-rational. It transcends thought. The infinite does not exclude the finite. Yet there is no conceivable
relation between the two. The experience of the infinite is the presupposition of our experience of the finite. Though the Absolute transcends thought, it is not unconscious. Thought cannot express the formal as well as the material nature of Reality. Thought distinguishes the predicate from the subject, and yet it tries to restore the original integrity. It is its very nature to divide the original whole into parts.

Hegel asserts that the infinite by its very nature expresses itself in judgment. But the infinite returns to its original integrity in self-containedness. This circular process is the relational form of thought. Bradley stated that thought cannot transcend the relational form of thought. The nature of thought is to distinguish and try to synthesize. But it cannot get rid of its other trait. So Bradley leaves out thought and states that the nature of the Absolute is sensuous experience or something akin to it. It is true that thought is both analytical and synthetical. The synthetical quality is only a tendency, not of a power, and can restore only as much unity as is possible in any relation. Hence thought cannot be the relation of the infinite. Thought is relational and infinite cannot be identical with thought.

Bradley says that truth is always an ideal, which so long as it remains as such, is never realized. But as soon as thought attains truth, thought commits suicide and truth becomes reality. Hence, the infinite cannot be of the nature of thought. Infinite is immanent and transcendent of thought. It is
immanent in thought because it is the pre-supposition of all our knowledge. It is the ideal unity of the separate elements of thought. Yet it transcends thought because thought must vanish, if the ideal is to be realized.

Though the infinite is beyond the reach of thought, Bradley assumes infinite to be a harmonious system. He says, "I mean that to be real is to be indissolubly one thing with sentience. It is to be something which comes as a feature and aspect within one whole of feeling, something which except as an integral element of such sentience, has no meaning at all. And what I repudiate is the separation of the feeling from the felt or of the desired from desire, or of what is thought from thinking, or the divisions — I might add of anything from anything else."43 Here Bradley insists on two points — (1) Thought disappears as such in the Absolute and (2) Distinction can be made in the Absolute "what we discover rather is a whole in which distinctions can be made but divisions do not exist."44

But how can distinctions be made in the Absolute? Bradley himself says that it is thought that distinguishes the predicate from the subject, and trying to restore the original unity has recourse to relational form. Bradley assumes that "The relational form is the compromise on which thought stands

43. Ibid, P. 146
44. P.T. Raju, Thought and Reality, P. 40
and which it develops. It is an attempt to unite differences which have broken out in the felt totality. Differences forced together by an underlying identity and a compromise between the plurality and unity —— this is the essence of relation.  

So the distinction can be made in the Absolute; still the relational form persists. But how is it possible if thought has disappeared? It is the nature of thought to make distinctions. Bradley cannot say that the predicate is separated from the subject, but only that it is distinct. Bradley pointed out that relation is but a compromise between difference and unity.

Thought is judgmental. Reasoning is also thought. Judgment is the sundering of an original unity into subject and predicate. According to Bradley this unity is given in feeling. Yet this original unity does not disappear inspite of division. Subject and predicate are the two parts of the original whole and are related to each other. And this relation can hold between the terms only because of the presence of the whole. Bradley writes, "Every such relation is inconsistent with itself .......... For it exists within and by virtue of an embracing unity, and apart from that totality both itself and its terms would be nothing." The plurality can exist only for unity.

Now the question is whether mere plurality along with the relations that appear within the whole of feeling is thought or whether the whole with its

45. F. H. Bradley, Appearance and Reality, P. 180
46. Ibid, P. 228
divisions and its relations is thought. That is, whether feeling exists beside thought or whether feeling itself is transformed into thought. This problem is due to the nature of consciousness. The problem lies in that it is the same individual that is at the level of feeling and of thought. When we experience plurality, the unity does not cease to exist, but simply recedes to the background. Thought is the plurality experienced within the unity and therefore is an identity-in-difference. Thought is sometimes said to be the unfolding of the differences contained in feeling. Thought is the whole along with the distinctions and their relations. Yet even at the level of thought we have some intimations of a unity that transcends these distinctions. This intimation of a unity is simply experienced but cannot be further explained. Thought is not mere plurality experienced within the unity, but an identity-in-difference experienced within that unity. Thought is the consciousness of difference with the feeling of unity as the background.

Reality is reached when thought is transcended. So the form of thought, identity-in-difference, must be transcended in reality. It cannot be pure identity, because Bradley says, "identity is a concept of thought and therefore inadequate to express the nature of reality."47

The doctrine of 'immediate experience' is very important in Bradley's

47. F. H. Bradley, Essays on Truth and Reality, P. 240
philosophy. Bradley himself says that immediate experience “opens the road, I submit, to the solution of ultimate problems.” Immediate experience is that experience which is pre-relational unbroken unity of feeling which is initially given in all experience. Prior to dialectical intervention of thought which splits it up into appearances, immediate experience is that original unity of experience “in which there is no distinction between my awareness and that of which it is aware. There is an immediate feeling, a knowing and being in one, with which knowledge begins; and though this is a manner is transcended, it nevertheless remains throughout as the present foundation of my known world.”

By immediate experience Bradley tries to apprehend the nature of ultimate reality and to solve all the difficulties of relational understanding. Srivastava in his book ‘Sāmkara and Bradley’ writes “Lower prototype of that higher unity of experience of many in one, is Absolute in Bradley. In the pure undifferentiated pre-cognitional feeling, Bradley finds the only parallel or analogue in our normal experience to the utility of the Absolute. The difference between the two is that the former is pre-relational and prior to the discursive activity of thought, the latter arises to a supra-relational level after transcending the relational activity of thought. The one is infra-conceptual, the other is supra-conceptual.”

48. Ibid, P. 160
49. Ibid, PP. 159–160
50. S. N. L. Shrivastava, Loc. Cit, P. 164
Immediate experience for Bradley not merely the initial Pre-dialectic phase of experience, but an inexpugnable and persistent reality at all the stages of our experience from the lowest to the highest, that is the pre-relational, relational and the supra-relational.

Dr. Rudolph Metz observes Bradley’s world view in three levels: “the lowest is the realm of immediate feeling, the pre-relational experience of undivided and undifferentiated wholeness. The next is the dialectical level, the realm of thought in which the original unity of feeling is broken up by relations, and things are appearances only and not real. The third is the realm of reality, of the Absolute, in which the unity and the wholeness lost at the second state are constituted in a higher synthesis. Bradley’s meaning may be faithfully expressed in a more concrete and human way. By eating of the tree of knowledge we have lost our pristine unity, and all our striving aims at recovering it .......... Man passes from the pure innocence of naive feeling through the guilt of knowledge to redemption in the Absolute.”

Bradley holds that immediate experience is present at the initial level. He says at the beginning there is no distinction between subject —— object. Bradley refutes those who hold that at the beginning we have only the subject —— object correlation without that inclusive unity which transcends this correlation. Bradley observes, ” If what is given in a many without a one, the

51. Dr. Rudolph Metz, A Hundred Years of British Philosophy, PP. 340–341
one is never attainable. And if what we had at first were the mere correlation of subject and object, then to rise beyond that would be impossible. From such premises there is in my opinion no road except to total scepticism........... If you take experience as above, then all the main conclusions which I advocate are assuredly wrecked .......... But what is more important to discuss is, I should say, the truth of the premises. The doctrine that what is given at the start is a mere Many or a mere Correlation, is we contend a fatal error. This we maintain, is no genuine fact, but is a fundamental perversion of the fact.\textsuperscript{52}

Bradley says, initially experience is a unity, a many in one, not merely one. It is because of this that we strive to restore the unity which is lost and final satisfaction is found in reaching the one which all inclusive. Bradley thinks that feeling is the criterion of reality. It is not only the foundation of experience in all stages. Regarding feeling Bradley observes, "Nothing in the end is real but what is felt, and for me nothing in the end is real but that which I feel."\textsuperscript{53}

Bradley asserts, "We never in one sense do or can go beyond immediate experience. Apart from the immediacy of 'this' and 'now' we never have or can have, reality. The real, to be real, must be felt. This one outside of matter. But on the otherside the felt content takes on a form which

\textsuperscript{52} F. H. Bradley, Essays on Truth and Reality, P. 199
\textsuperscript{53} Ibid, P. 190
more and more goes beyond the essential character of feeling, i.e. direct and non-relational qualification. Bradley says, "immediate experience is transcended when the discursive activity of thought is intervenes. He observes, "Distinction and separation into substantives and adjectives, terms and relations, alienate the content of immediate experience from the form of immediacy which still on its side persists. In other words the ideality, present from the first is developed, and to follow this ideality is our way to the true reality which is there in feeling." Again immediate experience, however much transcended, both remains and is active. It is not a stage which shows itself at the beginning and then disappears, but it remains at the bottom through out as fundamental. And further remaining it contains within itself every development which in a sense transcends it."

Though immediate experience is transcended, it does not cease to be. Immediate experience still remains as the non-relation basis of our entire relational consciousness. Bradley writes, "At every moment my state whatever else it is a whole of which I am immediately aware. It is an experienced non-relational unity of many in one. And object and subject and every possible relation and term to be experienced at all, must fall within and depend vitally on such a felt unity.

54 Ibid, P. 190 (Foot note)
55. Ibid, P 190 (Foot note)
56. Ibid, P. 161
At any moment my actual experience, however relational its contents, is in the end non-relational. No analysis into relations and terms can ever exhaust its nature or fail in the end to belie its essence. What analysis leaves for ever outstanding is no mere residue, but is a vital condition of the analysis itself. Everything which is got into the form of an object implies still the felt background against which the object comes and further, the whole experience of both feeling and object is a non-relational felt unity. The entire relational consciousness, in short, is experienced as falling within a direct awareness. This direct awareness is itself non-relational. It escapes from all attempts to exhibit it by analysis as one or more elements in a relational scheme or as that scheme itself or as a relation or relations or as the sum or collection of any of these abstractions. And immediate experience not only escapes, but it serves as the basis on which the analysis is made. Itself is the vital element within which every analysis still moves while and so far as and however, much that analysis transcends immediacy.

Everything therefore, no matter how objective and how relational is experienced only in feeling and so far as it is experienced, still depends upon feeling. On the other side the objective and the relational transcend the state of mere feeling and in a sense are opposed to it. But we must beware here of an order. We cannot speak of a relation, between immediate
experience and that which transcends it, except by a licence. It is a mode of expression found convenient in our reflective thinking, but it is in the end not defensible. A relation exists only between terms and those terms, to be known as such must be objects. And hence immediate experience, taken as the term of a relation, becomes so far as partial object and ceases so far to keep its nature as a felt totality.

The relation (so to express ourselves) of immediate experience to its felt contents, and specially here to those contents which transcends it, must be taken simply as a fact. It can neither be explained nor even (to speak properly) described, since description necessarily means translation into objective terms and relations."

Bradley asserts immediate experience persists in all the stages of our experience. It is the basis or background of our relational consciousness. Immediate experience is not a stage which sometimes may exist and sometimes it does not may exist. In any case it cannot be removed by the presence of a not self and of a relational consciousness. In immediate experience every distinction and relation are continuously present in which we are aware and also felt. Bradley says the relation of immediate experience to its felt contents is inexplicable and indescribable. We cannot speak of its relation to objective facts except by a licence.

57. Ibid, PP. 175–177
"At bottom" Bradley says, "the real is what we feel, and there is no reality outside of feeling. And in the end the Reality whatever else we say of it is experience. Our fundamental fact is immediate experience or feeling. We have here a many in one where, so far, there is no distinction between truth and fact. And feeling again is mine, though of course it is not merely my feeling. It is reality and myself in unbroken unity.58

When we experience, our experience is not merely objects. The experienced will not all fall under the head of an object for a subject. In feeling at any moment there is more than the objects before us and no perception of objects will exhaust the sense of a living emotion. We have experience in which there is no distinction between my awareness and that of which it is aware. There is an immediate feeling, a knowing and being in one, with which knowledge begins.

How immediate itself can become an object? It becomes an object if it is transcend. But there is a doubt how such transcendence is possible.

Immediate experience, however much transcended, both remains and is active. It is not a stage which shows itself at the beginning and then disappears, but it remains at the bottom throughout as fundamental. Further it remains within itself every development. Bradley says, immediate experience is that which

58. Ibid, PP. 315–316
comprised wholly within a single state of undivided awareness or feeling. It is immediate as against those other special and mediated developments which throughout rest on it, and while transcending, still remain within itself.

Bradley accepts immediate experience as the starting point. For Bradley sentient experience is real. What is not sentient experience is not real. But the view of Bradley about the immediate experience is different from the view of empiricist. According to him the view of the empiricist is not a faithful description of what we find in immediate experience. For Bradley, "it is felt unity not yet parted by any relation and distinction."69

"It is all one blur with differences that work and that are felt, but not discriminated."60 This kind of immediate experience is the ultimate source of knowledge of Absolute Reality.

Reality is not self-contradictory. It is possible for us to have true knowledge that reality is positively self-consistent or coherent and it is a systematic whole. Reality is truly known to be a connected and self-consistent or internally coherent system. The materials or data of reality consist of experience. Experience or psychical matter of fact is given in immediate feeling. The real is experience and nothing but experience and experience consists of psychical matter of fact. Experience means immediate feeling.

59. F. H. Bradley, Appearance and Reality, P. 141
60. Y. Masih, A Critical History of Western Philosophy, P. 461
or apprehension. Immediacy is that which distinguishes an actual mental state from the mere thought of that state. When we define experience as "immediate feeling" or the content of immediate feeling or apprehension we must not misunderstand to mean that it is in particular sensation. Sensation is only one character of immediate feeling or apprehension, which we only distinguish from others by means of a psychological analysis. A pleasure or pain, an emotion of kind, the satisfaction of a craving while actually present, are felt or apprehended no less immediately than a sense perception.

The immediately experienced is always a this – what or process-content in which the distinction of the 'this' from the 'what' does not enter into consciousness. In any act of reflection, on the other hand, the 'what' is explicitly distinguished from the 'that'. In experience the existence and the content of what is apprehended are not mentally separated. This immediacy may be due to mere uninterpreted sensation, to the absence of reflective analysis of the given into its constituent aspects or elements. It may be due to the fusion at a higher level into a single directly apprehended whole of results originally won by the process of abstraction and reflection. There is an immediacy of experience which is below mediate reflective knowledge, but there is also a higher immediacy which is above it.

A completely adequate apprehension of reality would be one which
contained all reality and nothing but reality and thus involved no element whatever of deceptive appearance. As such it would in the first place, be all embracing, it would include in itself every datum of direct experience and nothing but data of experience which we called matter of psychical fact. Secondly, it would contain all its data without contradiction or discrepancy as part of single system with a harmonious internal structure of its own. Wherever there is discrepancy, there is imperfect and therefore partially false appearance. Thirdly, such an all embracing harmonious apprehension of the whole data of experience would clearly transcend that separation of existence from content which is temporarily effected by our own efforts to restate our experience in a consistent form. It would, because complete in itself, involve at a higher level that immediacy which, at a lower, we know as characteristic of feeling. It would thus experience the whole of real existence directly as a system with internal consistency and structure.