CHAPTER VI
COMPARATIVE STUDY:
BRADLEY, BERGSON AND
RADHAKRISHNAN
From the very beginning reason, in western philosophical thought occupies a supreme place. It regards reason as a supreme source of knowledge. Anaxagoras distinguishes between the knowledge "by rational consideration" and 'by experience'. Democritus states that true knowledge is possible only through reason and not by senses. Real knowledge for Plato, is possible only through rational concepts and not through sense experience. Kant also makes a distinction between reason and understanding. Understanding relates one thing to another within experience, but does not go forward to the ideal completion of experience in a total system. Such an ideal completion is brought by the reason.

But the great difference between western philosophical tradition and Indian philosophical tradition is that though Indian philosophy gives a sufficient place to reason, yet it does not regard reason as a supreme source of knowledge. According to Indian philosophical tradition reason can speculate about and contemplate the real but cannot attain the unity with it. The
direct awareness of the transcendent Reality is possible only through intuition. But in western tradition the real can be comprehended in terms of rational concepts. It finds its culmination in the philosophy of Hegel who regards the real as identical with rational. Prof. Northrop distinguishes between eastern and western philosophies as generally formed of "concepts by intuition and concepts by postulation, respectively."  

The idealist tradition both in the East and the West has asserted the supremacy of spirit in man. Mere physical desire and passion, impulse and instinct, even intellect and will do not exhaust his nature. The spiritual status is the essential dignity of man and the origin of his freedom. It is the state anterior to the divisions between intellect, feeling and will where consciousness forms a unity which cannot be analysed. It is the pre-supposition, the limit, and the goal of our divided consciousness. When the spirit, which is the mind in its integrity, is at work, man has the immediate intuition of his unity with the eternal through in the derived intellectual consciousness, he remains apart and works into the grounds of his own being and discerns his relation to and dependence upon the presence behind the trembling veil of phenomena. 

Spiritual apprehension or the kind of awareness of real values which are neither objects in space and time nor universals of thought is called

1. F. S. C. Northrop, The Logic of the Science and the Humanities, P. 128
intuition. There is the controlling power of reality in intuitive apprehension quite as much as in perceptual act or reflective thought. The objects of intuition are recognised and not created by us. They are not produced by the act of apprehension itself.

Intuition is the innate ability in everyone to perceive truth directly -- not by reason, logic or analysis, but by a simple knowing from within. Intuition is the inner ability to see behind the outer forms of things to their inner essence. This intuitive ability is latent within all of us. It can be developed consciously to bring clarity to all our decisions. Intuition is calm and impersonal experience.

Human consciousness comprises three levels -- subconscious, conscious and the super conscious. The levels of consciousness represent different degrees of intensity of awareness.

The first level of consciousness, that is subconsciousness is relatively dim in awareness. It is the stuff of which dreams are made. It is the repository of all remembered experience, impressions left on the mind by the past experiences. Animals operate primarily on the subconscious level. In their fluid awareness, they have a certain degree of intuition. The subconscious mind can all too easily intrude itself on our conscious awareness, tricking us into thinking we are getting intuitive guidance, when actually we are merely being influenced by past impressions and unfulfilled desires. The
subconscious mind is in some ways close to the superconscious, where real intuition resides. Both subconscious and superconscious represent a flow of awareness without logical obstructions. The subconscious is therefore more open to the intuitions of the super conscious. But subconscious sometimes receives them mixed with confusing imagery.

The second level is consciousness. This is the level from which we receive guidance. It is the conscious state, the rational awareness that usually guides our daily decisions. When we receive the facts from the senses, analyse the facts and make decisions based on this information, we are using the conscious level of guidance.

The third level of consciousness is superconsciousness. Intuition and heightened mental clarity flow from superconscious awareness. The conscious mind is limited by its analytical nature and therefore sees all things as separate and distinct. The superconscious mind is unitive and sees all things as part of a whole. It can readily draw solutions when we are puzzled by a certain situation. In superconscious-ness the problem and the solution are seen as one.

The great scientist Albert Einstein says that "any true scientist needs a sense of mystical wonder and awe before the universe if he hopes to understand it. While yet a young man, he made his discovery of the theory of Relativity based on an insight that came to him in an intuitive flash. He
then struggled for many years to explain it logically to others, so that they too could understand it."

Intuition may be understood in many different senses - (a) an immediate feeling of certainty (b) a direct insight into a proposition (c) a sympathetic insight.

Most commonly intuition is identified with an immediate feeling which is going to happen. Intuition is closely linked with the mysterious, anything may be its object. Intuition is more or less vague feeling on the part of someone who is 'certain' that something has happened, that something with happen or that something is the case. The vagueness of the feeling is its main characteristic, despite the certainty which accompanies it.

In the second sense intuition may be understood as a direct insight into the truth of a statement or proposition. This type of intuition is exemplified in any instance where a proposition, such as "Between two points only one straight line can be drawn," is accepted as true as soon as, and apparently solely because of the fact that it is apprehended. Such propositions are found in formal logic and mathematics, and these sciences are called as intuitive sciences.

The third kind of intuition is sympathetic insight. It is different from a vague feeling of "certainty" that something is, or will be the case; and as a

direct insight into the truth of a proposition in mathematics or logic. "Sympathetic insight is appreciative apprehension of an object or situation. It is most clearly exemplified in the field of artistic appreciation and creation. For example, when I read a poem, I know what I read by the ordinary method, namely the method of sympathetically intuiting the poet's mood. Intuitive method is different from that of rational analysis. The mystic "illumination' may be taken as an example of this kind of intuition. We may find instances of this kind of intuition from our everyday experiences. For example - when two persons 'Know' each other by a sort of sympathetic insight on the part of each into the other's thoughts and feelings, which insight needs no aid of language for its functioning.

Philosophers like Bradley, Bergson and Radhakrishnan are accorded intuition as the highest kind of knowledge to know the Reality. The problem of Reality is an old problem of philosophy right from the Ionic period in Greek philosophy till today the problem of reality has attracted and engaged the minds of thinkers of all over the world. Controversy has centred round this problem of Reality.

The greatest representative of British idealistic school of 19th century is Frances Herbert Bradley. Bradley has made his significant contributions to various branches of philosophy like logic, ethics etc. But his contribution to the field of metaphysics is so immensely valued that he is rightly regarded
as the greatest metaphysician of the 19th century. His metaphysical views was developed in his famous book "Appearance and Reality". The most salient features of Bradley's metaphysics are rooted in his immense endeavour to map out reality as against appearance.

For Bradley Reality is one harmonious undivided whole of experience, in which all aspects of infinite experienced are included, but are not parted and related. Reality is the Absolute. With Hegel, he agrees that reality is an all inclusive whole, but parts company with him. "Can thought however, complete, be the same as reality, the same altogether, I mean, and with no difference between them? This is a question to which I could never give an affirmative reply."³

For Bradley thought and Reality represent two categories. The gulf between them could only be bridged by the identification of being or reality with experience or sentient experience in its widest meaning. Experience according to Bradley is a whole which is not simply reason or thought but also feeling and willingness all of which remain merged in one undifferentiated Absolute. In "mere feeling or immediate presentation" says Bradley "we have the experience of a whole. This whole contains diversity and on the other hand, is not parted by relations. Such an experience serves to suggest to us the general idea of a total experience, where will and thought and feeling may all once move be one."⁴

³. F. H. Bradley, Appearance and Reality, P. 492.
⁴. Ibid, P. 141
The criterion of Reality, that Bradley suggests it that is should not be contradictory. For him Ultimate Reality is such that it does not contradict itself. Anything which fails to satisfy this criterion is not real. "Everything which appears, says Bradley "must be predicted of reality, but it must not be predicted in such a way as to make reality contradict itself." Again Bradley says "if you think at all so as to discriminate between truth and falsehood you will find that you can not accept open self contradiction ultimate reality is such that it does not contradict itself : here is an absolute criterion."  

He assumes that non-contradictoriness by itself leads to an affirmation of pure being. On the basis of this criterion of non-contradictoriness Bradley anatomises the notion of ultimate reality. His notion of ultimate reality can be understood under four heads. These four heads are namely -- (i) Reality is one (ii) Reality is individual and Perfect (iii) Reality is experience and (iv) Reality is absolute.

Bradley like spinoza conceived reality as substance. According to him reality is one in the sense that it includes all things into itself. It is all pervasive, all comprehensive, absolutely infinite and free from all contradictions and discrepancies. It is the underlying principle of appearances. Bradley says "the Reality is a whole, in which the finite blends, is

6. Ibid, P. 124
preserved, is transmuted, is neumalized, is supplemented, is submerged and is reduced. Its distinctions are suppressed. It goes home and takes its place in the Absolute, to which it constitutes and which own it. There it gets a 're-arrangement' and all pervative transfusion" with 'reblending of all materials' so that its things lose their individual nature."7

Again there is another point of similarity between Spinoza and Bradley regarding the notion of substance, when they explain the relation of many to one or one to many. For Spinoza the individual objects of the world are modes, having no reality of their own apart from the substance. They depend a substance. Similarly Bradley's appearances also have no reality of their own. They are wholly dependent on the Absolute.

But there is a very important point of difference between Bradley and Spinoza. Though both of them regards the ultimate reality as one, but Bradley's absolute is concrete individual whereas Spinoza's substance is abstract in nature. Spinoza had denied all attributes to substance by saying that all determination is negation, where- as Bradley has accepted appearances as the assets of the Absolute. Bradley wrote "The essence of reality lies in the union and agreement of existence and content."8

Again Bradley asserts that ultimate reality in its character as individual

8. F. H. Bradley, Appearance and Reality, P 403.
involves multiplicity of the existent world. Bradley says that as embracing "all differences in an inclusive harmony, the real is individual." Passmore wrote regarding the Bradley's view about the nature of real as individual as 
"if we consider a person or better still, a society. Just as a society includes the rich diversity of all members, in all their conflicts and co-operative efforts so does the real as individual include the diversity of the world as its content." 

Like Hegel Bradley also considers the absolute as concrete universal. But there is a difference between them. Hegel's absolute is concrete in the sense that it contains and gathers up into itself all the manifold richness of the world. Hegel has explained the nature absolute as concrete universal through his dialectical method. In his dialectical system of triads, has shown that each synthesis embraces the preceding thesis and anti-thesis and becomes in turn the thesis of another triad. In this process a dialectical triad absolute comes in the end. In the supreme synthesis all other synthesis and anti-thesis are embraced. But Bradley has not made direct use of the Hegelian triad in showing the nature of the Absolute as concrete universal. But Hegelian dialectic method has influenced Bradley while he depicts the different levels of reality. Dr. Metz has written in his book "A Hundred Years of British Philosophy," these different levels of reality as follows: "lowest is
the realm of immediate feeling, the pre-relational experience of undivided and undifferentiated wholeness. The next is the dialectical level, the realm of thought in which the original unity of feeling is broken up by relations and things are appearances only and not real. The third is the realm of reality, of the Absolute in which the unity and wholeness lost at the second stage are reconstituted in a higher synthesis."

According to Bradley the reconciliation of unity with diversity is possible only at the supra-relational level of the absolute. This supra relational experience or absolute experience, which is immediate and non-relational is the reality in its completest and most perfect form. The reality or absolute is of the nature of immediate experience or of the nature of concrete individual. For Bradley the individuality of the absolute means "the union of sameness and diversity, presence in all of the one and of the one in everything with the qualification of each by the other throughout and of the whole by all and everything -- so that there is no actual or possible other than the one and within the one, nothing can do anything else ever actually or possibly be merely other. And here and here alone can we escape from that self contradiction which everywhere short of this, is in everything degrees inseparable from our attempt to make the world intelligible.""

Bradley holds that absolute is sentient experience, a single

11. Dr. R. Metz, Loc, cit. P. 340
12. F. H Bradley, Collected Essays, P. 663
harmonious and all inclusive whole. His absolute is all inclusive in the sense that it includes all things into itself. It is a unity in which all things are transmuted. It gathers all our experiences into itself, and it is beyond it. In this sense it is "many in one". Bradley says, "the Absolute, has no assets beyond appearances; and again with appearances alone to its credit, the Absolute would be bankrupt."13

Our knowledge of the Absolute is incomplete. But the knowledge what we have about the Absolute is positive. No finite being, without ceasing to be finite, can have a knowledge of the details of the Absolute. But it does not imply that we cannot form a general idea of its main characteristics. Immediate presentation or feeling, which is a whole of differences, not parted by relations, suggests an all embracing experience of a higher kind at a level above that relational thought where will and thought and a feeling may all once move be one. From these sources "we can form the general idea of an absolute experience in which phenomenal distinctions are merged, a whole become immediate at a higher stage without losing any richness."14

The Absolute is not mere thought. Absolute is more than thought. Thought is only one element of absolute. Thought is relational and discursive and as judgment, involves the distinction of subject and predicate, a

what and that. The predicate is not mere a quality or mental image, but an ideal. The content which belonging to a subject. Fact and ideas are not two different things. They have no meaning apart from each other connection. Facts which are not ideal, whose content is not loosened from existence are simply nothing. On the other hand ideas always attach themselves to definite objects. For thought fact and ideas are never in perfect accord with each other and it is unable to heal the division of existence and content. It aims at a harmonious whole of experience which it is unable to reach. If thought succeeded in overcoming the dualism on which it is based and in attaining its goal, it would cease to be thought and would become absorbed in a richer experience containing thought, feeling and will as its constituent elements. Such an experience, Bradley wrote, "would possess in a superior form that immediacy which we find (more or less) in feeling; and in this whole all divisions would be healed up. It would be experience entire containing all elements in harmony. Thought would be present as a higher intuition; will would be there where the ideal had become reality; and beauty and pleasure and feeling would live on in this total fulfilment. Every flame of passion, chaste or carnal, would still burn in the Absolute unquenched and unbridged, a note absorbed in the harmony of its higher bliss."15

The founder of French intuitionism is Henri Bergson. The development of Bergson's thought is marked by three distinct phases. We can indicate

15. F. H. Bradley, Appearance and Reality, P. 152
these three phases by the titles of psychology, epistemology and metaphysics. They coincide with the publication of his three greatest works: 'The Essai sur les Donnees immediates de la conscience', 'Matter and Memory', and 'Creative Evolution'. These three phases correspond with the development of one and the same problem in Bergson's mind: a problem which by the very fact of its self-expansion outgrows the limits first of psychology and then of epistemology, and finally reveals its true metaphysical character.

Bergson begins with psychology. He begins by raising the question, How do we intuite directly? The succession of emotions, of thoughts, in general of states of mind, has a quite unique character. It is not a superimposition of facts on facts, but an interpenetration of moments, the one within the other, a combination in a progressive and irreversible series in which every element is fused with the preceding one and enriches with its absolutely original totality the state of mind with which it is fused. This organisation of the facts of consciousness is the work of time. Time is the form which the succession of our states of consciousness assumes when our ego lets itself live, when it refrains from separating its present state from its former state, when on remembering these states it does not set them alongside its present state as one point alongside another, but unites them organically with it, as happens when we recall the notes of a melody, fused, so to speak, into one another.
Thus the analysis of our innermost ego reveals a qualitative series of heterogenous moments, none of which has fixed and clear-cut out lines, but each of which merges, as it were, into other, and permeates it. Their succession is not a quantitative accumulation, but a quantitative progression.

If at this point we turn from the internal to the external and observe the manner in which the products of consciousness are organised, no longer in their spiritual actuality but as the content and matter of knowledge, the spectacle changes completely. We have no longer the fusion of heterogeneous states in a unique whole, but the superimposition of homogeneous inert elements: The character of the whole is produced simply and solely by the addition of the parts. The material elements are not fused, but are essentially impenetrable. They are not continuous, they do not succeed one another in time, but co-exist in space; that is to say, within the limits of geometrically fixed outlines: matter is intrinsically "ballasted with geometry". Here we see Bergson's dualism taking shape: internality and externality, time and space soul and matter.

Bergson gradually becomes conscious of the 'long and terrible decline down which he is slipping", but having once begun by identifying reality with the immediacy of life lived, so far from resolving the dualism he is driven merely to intensify and "exasperate" it. Yet it must be resolved if
knowledge is to be possible. Is not knowledge in fact, a resolution of the other into the ego, of nature into the spirit? Now there is a so-called empirical science which attempts a compromise, a mediation between the terms of the dualism. It solidifies the forms of qualitative becoming into the schemata of quantity, and temporal progress into co-existence in space. May not this be the means of surmounting pure psychological immediacy? Does not this offer at any rate a provisional point of contact between spirit and nature? The real solution of the problem does no doubt lie here; but we have seen that Bergson has already identified reality with the immediate experience of the subject. Hence any compromise between subject and object, spirit and nature, must necessarily appear to him unreal, a falsification of pure experience. But how then does he explain the transition from duration to extension, from reality as it is lived to his solidified schema in space? There must be such a transition, or how do we explain the fact of knowledge, the existence of science? The ground of this transition, Bergson proceeds, is not to be found in the innermost self; the self, if left to itself, would let itself live eternally, without ever passing over into something different from itself: being absolutely irreflective, immediate, it rejects all reflection and denounces it as false. The impulse must come from elsewhere. And thus, without any previous warning, we suddenly come upon an intruder into the realm of the innermost self, in the shape of the will of action. We have to construct a nature in the forms of space because our action, wills
that it should be so, because action can only move among solids among things with clear and definite outlines upon which it can take a hold. Natural science is thus our means of possessing ourselves of the real: in it we mutilate the real, divide it up, destroy it as reality in order that we may conquer it, get the mastery of just that part of it which will serve our purpose, control it better according to the needs of our active life.

Bergson does not deny the scientific method which gives considerable control over nature. His primary concern is a philosophical question, namely, whether reality, the basic nature of things, is what science assumes to be. In early decades of 20th century the major assumption of science is that nature consists of material objects. Matter is the final irreducible stuff out of which all things are formed. All particular things of nature were thought to be parts of a large mechanism. Moreover, as parts of a mechanism, things are related to each other as cause and effect. Human nature is also viewed in these material and mechanical terms. As a result men are not 'free' as possessing freedom of the will.

This is the main philosophical problem for Bergson. He wonders whether nature really consists of material objects located in space, whether the intellect is capable of discovering such an orderly mechanical arrangement of things. Can there be any genuine novelty in nature if the basic reality is material and its various parts organised in a tight mechanism?
Can inner matter overcome its static status and 'evolve'? How can the concrete experience of life be explained in terms of a lifeless nature? How can human freedom be explained in a thoroughly mechanical universe?

Bergson's conviction is that there are two profoundly different ways of knowing a thing. The first way, according to him, implies that we move around the object, and the second way is that we enter into it. Knowledge which is derived from the way depends on observation of an object and therefore this made of knowledge will be different for each observer and on that account relative. The knowledge derived from observation is expressed in symbols. The second kind of knowledge is according to Bergson is absolute. Because in this case by "entering" the object, we overcome the limitations of any particular perspective and grasp the object as it really is.

But what does Bergson mean by "go around" an object and to "enter into it"? By "go around" Bergson means the special activity of the intellect that he calls analysis. In contrast, by the term, to enter into an object, he means "intuition". By intuition Bergson means "the kind of intellectual sympathy by which one places oneself within an object in order to coincide with what is unique in it and consequently inexpressible."16

Bergson says that the analytic intellect learns ironically by destroying the object's essence. Its essence is its dynamic thriving, pulsing living,
continuing existence -- its duration. Analysis however, interrupts this essential duration. It stops life and movement; it separates into several independent and static parts. In true life is a unified, organic and dynamic reality. Intellect forms a series of concepts about a thing cutting out of reality that it can act conveniently upon it. Intellect has been made to utilize matter. It has a limited function. The very structure and function of intellect is to analyse. Even when it studies the most concrete reality, namely the self, the intellect proceeds analytically. It is never capable of discovering the true self.

Bergson asserts that reason represents the static. Reason cannot justify the changing object. It operates on immobile and lifeless object. Bergson asserts that reason cannot grasp élan vital which is living force. Reason gives us partial and imperfect knowledge. Bradley also supposes that reason separates 'what' from 'that' and then by a kind of relational synthesis tries to restore the unity of the two. Thus reason is not the primary source of knowledge. It works on the materials which are supplied by the sense experience. Radhakrishnan observes that "The phenomena of life cannot be squeezed into the rubrics of reason. Life eludes logic. Philosophy must be intuitive while science may be intellectual."17

But another way of knowing the self, according to Bergson is intuition.

17. S. Radhakrishnan, Reign of Religion, P. 139
He says that there is one reality which we all seize from within by intuition, not by simple analysis. Like Descartes, Bergson founded his philosophy upon his self-Knowledge. Bergson set-forth the method of intuition which is different from rationalism. Intuition, as Bergson says, is a kind of intellectual sympathy. Intuition enables one's consciousness to become identified with an object. Intuition signifies immediate consciousness, a vision which is distinguished from seen object. The difference between analytic and intuitive thought that analysis begins with the static. But intuition starts from movement perceives it as reality itself and sees in immobility only an abstract moment, a snapshot taken by our mind.

Intuitionism is an open protest against kant's agnosticism than a direct development. There are many forms of intuitionism. But it is Bergson who has strongly protested against kant. Bergson agrees with kant that reality is not knowable by means of the intellect. But he does not agree with kant that reality cannot be known by means of other ways. For Bergson, Reality is life in its onrush, pure duration. So the principle apprehension of reality is to be a dynamic one. The static principle like intellect cannot apprehend the reality. "God and freedom and perhaps immortality which are beyond demonstration by the intellect and its constructions may be hence quite within the grasp of the other way of knowing. This other way of knowing is intuition, and not postulation of practical reason." 18 It is true that kant

18. J.G. Arapura, Radhakrishnan and Integral Experience, P 41
himself has taught us to use intuition although he did not grasp its full implication for knowledge. As Radhakrishnan points out, "The self-evidencing and underivative character of intuitions is the lesson of Kant's philosophy, though he was himself not conscious of it."\textsuperscript{19}

Bergson describes intuition as "the kind of intellectual sympathy by which one places oneself within an object in order to coincide with what is unique in it and consequently inexpressible."\textsuperscript{20} To follow it he says, "we must break with scientific habits which are adopted to the fundamental requirements of thought we must do violence to the mind, go counter to the natural bent of the intellect."\textsuperscript{21} This reversal of our usual cognitive attitude is precisely the function of intuition. So intuition is a sort of intellectual activity which is found clearly in the writings of Bergson.

Bergson is not always consistent in his statements concerning the nature of this "intellectual sympathy" with which he identifies intuition. Sometimes he emphasizes its intellectual character, but in doing so, he seems to insist that it grows directly out of judgmental experience with the result that the distinction between "intellectual sympathy" and ordinary judging becomes quite vague and elusive. Again sometimes he tends to identify intuition with the sort of "sympathy" which is exemplified for instance, in one's insight into

\textsuperscript{19} S. Radhakrishnan, An Idealist View of Life, P. 160.
\textsuperscript{20} H. Bergson, An Introduction to Metaphysics, P 7
\textsuperscript{21} H. Bergson, Creative Evolution, P. 31
the nature life derived from living as contrasted with thinking. In this sense intuition tends to merge without limit into the sort of insight which Russell calls "acquaintance".

Intuition is bound up to a duration which is growth, perceives in it an uninterrupted continuity of unforeseeable novelty. Bergson's attention is upon the process in all things which is called by him 'duration'. He criticises the classical schools of philosophy on the ground that they failed to take duration or becoming seriously. Philosophers like, Plato, Descartes and Kant wanted to interpret the world through fixed structures of thought. Bergson says, neither the rationalist nor the empiricist took the matter of mobility, duration, development seriously. He argues that to think in duration is to have a true grasp of reality. Such thought gives us a more accurate notion of time, real, continuous time as compared with the 'spatialized' time created by the intellect. Reality according to him is duration. Reality does not consist of things. Reality is not selfmaintaining states. Rest is only apparent.

Locke who vehemently criticised the idea of innate ideas concedes the reality of intuitions. "As for our own existence, he says, "we perceive it so plainly and so certainly that it neither needs nor is capable of proof." All knowledge and logic start with this principle of self-certainty. For Fichte, the knowledge of self is due to intuition. Schopenhaver contends that "we

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22 S. Radhakrishnan, An Idealist View of Life, P 134
become aware of something that is more than phenomenal in our experience. It is will, and all phenomena are its manifestations. Not through intellect, but through the immediate consciousness we have of our own volition, we attain to awareness of reality."\textsuperscript{23}

Bergson holds a similar view. Bergson asserts "the true self is not the growing self which goes on gathering its past experience through memory and pressing forward to its future ends. It is to be defined by pure duration which knows not past history or future progress. It is the undivided present to which the categories of time are irrelevant."\textsuperscript{24} We reach pure duration only in those rare moments of real freedom. We cannot intuit pure duration if we do not get rid of our tendency to misinterpret the categories of intellect. In other words, we can intuit pure duration only if we make ourselves into it. Bergson holds that intellect working with distinctions of the knower, the knowledge and the known cannot attain to self-knowledge where these three are not different. Intellect ignores the fundamental oneness of the movement which is indivisible. Intuitive self-knowledge knows itself as single indivisible act of knowledge, an act which is one with its self-existence. It is through intuitive understanding or sympathetic interpretation that we know other minds.

Regarding evolution, Bergson, after having examination of the

\textsuperscript{23} Ibid, P. 135
\textsuperscript{24} Ibid, P. 135
scientific theory of evolution, comes to the conclusion that all these theories are not adequate. The particular inadequacy that he found was their inability to give a convincing account of how the transition is made through the gap that separates one level from a higher level. Darwin referred to variations among members of a species and De Vries spoke of mutations as the conditions leading some members to possess variations favourable for survival. But neither Darwin nor De Vries explained how such variations in a species could occur. Both of them inferred that either slowly or suddenly a change occurs.

Bergson says that evolution is best explained in terms of a vital impulse; the elan-vital, which drives all organisms toward constantly move complicated and higher modes of organization. The elan vital is the essential interior element of all living beings. It is the creative power that move in unbroken continuity through all things. Intellect cannot grasp the elan vital as it is the essence of duration, of movement and all change. Intuition can grasp this primacy of life. All things are motivated by this elan vital.

In Radhakrishnan's Philosophy intuition is the source of philosophical and religious insight. Further the source and goal of both philosophy and religion are integral experience or the integrated life. His entire system is based on the ideal of integration within the self, and the integration of the self with the universal self or Atman.
Radhakrishnan's epistemology and metaphysics are mutually dependent. For Radhakrishnan intuition presupposes the reality of the Absolute or Brahman, the intuition of which is the source and object of all knowledge. Similarly, the metaphysical claims for Brahman and the levels of reality which it includes, presuppose the great religious personalities, whose insight have achieved the spiritual realization in which all is Brahman. According to Radhakrishnan, recognition of the intuitive experience is precisely what characterizes Indian in contrast to western philosophy.

There is an ancient and widespread tradition that we can apprehend the Eternal Being with directness and immediacy. There are different types of knowledge: Perceptual, conceptual and intuitive. These various types of knowledge are suited to different kinds of objects. Intuitive knowledge may be called integral insight. It does not bring into activity merely a portion of our conscious being, sense or reason, but the whole. Intuition reveals to us the reality in its integrity. Thought works on and in existence and abstracts from it. Thought reaches its end of knowledge in so far as it returns to being. Thought is essentially self-transcendent. It deals with another than thought and so is only symbolic of it. Thinking deals with essences, and existence is unattainable to it. Existence is one way of being, though it is not the only way.

In integral insight we have knowledge by identity. Although logical
knowledge is mediate and symbolic, it is not false. Its construction is not an imaginative synthesis. It cannot give complete knowledge, because it gives the structure of being, not being itself. In integral insight we are put in touch with actual being. This highest knowledge transcends the distinction of subject and object. Even logical knowledge is possible because this highest knowledge is ever present. It can only be accepted as foundational.

The term intuition is used by Radhakrishnan in different senses. Sometimes he uses intuition, to allow duality between the knower and the known. Again he says, with intuition "we see things as they are, as unique individuals." Sometimes Radhakrishnan seems to deny the duality. He writes "Intuitive knowledge arises from an intimate fusion of mind with Reality. It is knowledge by being and not by senses or by symbols. It is awareness of the truth of things by identity. We become one with the truth, one with the object of knowledge." 25

For Radhakrishnan there is no dichotomy between the knower and the known, and the subject and the object, because it the ultimate state of realization there is only one reality, one continuum of spiritual existence. As he observes, "When the world is redeemed the end of the plot is reached. Earth and heaven would be no more; the timeless and the transcendent alone remains." 26

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25 S. Radhakrishnan, An Idealist View of Life, P. 138, 146
26 Ibid, P. 245.
The greatest mystery of all existence is the human life which Radhakrishnan tries hard to explain in his philosophy. Life, according to him, is larger than matter and is potentially the divine spirit which ideally is the farthest limit of all perfection. The search for the meaning of life is the deep-seated urge of all religious experience. As Radhakrishnan puts it, "it is the aim of religion to lift us from our momentary meaningless provincialism to the significance and status of the eternal; to transform the chaos and confusion of life to that pure and immortal essence which is its ideal possibility."27

Radhakrishnan defines religion as the insight into the nature of reality or experience of reality. This experience is the response of the whole personality, the integrated self to the central reality. Religion is the self manifestation of the ultimate reality in man. It is the awareness of our real nature as divine

Religious experience is a type of experience without the subject object duality. It is an integral undivided consciousness in which man's whole being seems to find itself, feelings are fused, ideas melt and merged and ordinary distinctions are transcended. The religious experience in which the individual self merges with the universal self, is self-established, Self-evidencing and self-luminous. Religious consciousness includes intellectual, ethical and aesthetic activities, but yet transcends them.

27. Ibid, P. 97
Radhakrishnan has been greatly influenced by Hegel. Just as in Hegel, the Absolute is an identity-in-difference, and the supreme synthesis of all realities; in Radhakrishnan, the Absolute is a whole with differentiated parts. It is also the self-conscious reality. The Hegelian Absolute is the self-conscious unity in which the different elements are in an organised unity in the supreme consciousness. The reality is self-conscious unity. It is neither passive nor indeterminate, nor devoid of self determination. It is not indeterminate consciousness but self-conscious existence. The Absolute is not unitarian and identity consciousness, but it is the self-conscious existence which unites all the principles and powers within itself. But Radhakrishnan's conception of the Absolute is higher than that of Hegel. For him, the Absolute is self conscious reality having infinite godly powers. According to Hegel, the Absolute is absolutely exhausted in its manifestation. Though the spirit transcends idea and nature, the transcendence is limited and related to cosmos. In Radhakrishnan, the Absolute manifests God and the world and also transcends them.

The philosophy of Radhakrishnan is thoroughly spiritual. The Absolute is not an intellectual concept nor is it human consciousness elevated to the highest degree. The Absolute is spiritual and its activity and manifestation are not known fully to the intellect. The Absolute does not manifest in a triadic manner. It works in many directions. It does not follow the limited path of thesis, anti-thesis and synthesis. God works in different directions in a
divergent manner. The Absolute is conceived as spirit in Radhakrishnan and as reason in Hegel.

According to Radhakrishnan, we use the direct mode of apprehension, when we contemplate a work of art, when we enjoy great music, when we acquire an understanding of another human being in the supreme achievement of love. In this kind of knowledge the subject is not opposed to the object but is intimately united with it. Integral insight does not contradict logical reason, though the insight exceeds the reason. Intellect cannot repudiate instinct any more than intuition can deny logical reason. Intellectual preparation is an instrument for attaining to the truth of the spirit, but inward realization of the truth of spirit transcends all intellectual verification.

For him the supreme is not an object, but the Absolute subject. We cannot apprehend the absolute by either sense perception or logical inference. Unmediated apprehension of the Primordial spirit is the knowledge of God. It is achieved by a change of consciousness. It means an illumined mind, a changed heart and a transformed will. Wisdom composes the various elements of our mental life, modifies our being. Man is a being who is trying towards infinity, in quest of eternity.

Radhakrishnan wrote, "the rationality of the world is transparent to intellect, but its mysteriousness can be grasped only by intuition."[28] Intuition is

[28] S. Radhakrishnan, My Search for Truth, P 38
direct knowledge, compared with intellectual processes, it is another manifesta­tion of spirit. Besides consciousness and self-consciousness, we have spiritual or super consciousness. In this experience there is an extension of perception to region beyond sense, an awareness of real values which are neither objects in space and time nor universals of thought, Radhakrishnan holds that "there is an expansion of consciousness. Intuition is integral experience, the exercise of consciousness as a whole, the response of the whole man. In this response the work of reason is included, for awareness of one's true nature is not intellectual but integral, and spirit is mind in its integrity. Intuition is individual, private subjective, intimately personal, the world has its focus in the individual, not the herd."29

Although we assume that subjective certainty differs from logical certainty and it is not necessarily truth. Radhakrishnan declares that "his is no appeal to a subjective whim or the morbid views of a psychopathic mind."30 "Intuition is not used as an apology for doctrines which could not or would not be justified on intellectual grounds."31 In fact, the validity of intuition, we can not think away from intellectual grounds, it belongs to a structure of mind. Any sound rationalism will recognise the need for it. He writes, "pragmatically, the truth of the experience is due to the fact that it satisfies our wants, including those which are intellectual."32

31. S. Radhakrishnan, Spirit in Man, P 269.
32 S. Radhakrishnan, Eastern Religions and Western Thought, P. 24.
Sometimes intuition is regarded as the form of an effortless insight. To know the truth the heart of a child is needed. It is also argued that successful intuition requires previous study and continuous creative effort. Radhakrishnan asserts that "intellectual effort appears to mark here an intermediate stage. First here is the simple intuitive experience which is free from doubt; doubt occur when reflection supervenes." There is no break between intuition and intellect.

There are some similarities between Henri Bergson and Bradley. Bergson agrees with Bradley that the intellect condemned as it is to treat all experiences in general terms, cannot hope to grasp things in their individuality. Biologically the function of the intellect is to facilitate action and does not to produce knowledge for its own sake; and the distortion of reality which thinking involves Bergson argues, is indispensable for the purpose of action.

Knowledge for Bergson which is produced by discursive intellect is true for practical purpose only. Bergson suggests, even of such refined products of the intellect as the physical sciences, indeed the distinguishing mark of all of these is that they presuppose a special conception of spatialized or public time, which is different from duree. For real understanding of the universe we must have recourse not to the

33. S. Radhakrishnan, An Idealist View of Life, P. 146
science but to intuition. It is intuition alone which gives us access to concrete reality.

Like Bradley, Bergson has rejected the characterization of intuition as intellectual. By the term "intellectual" he mean discursive understanding. Because of this terminology his doctrine can be viewed as anti intellectual and anti-rationalist. But Radhakrishnan holds that intuition is not anti-rational but supra-rational. Reason and intuition are not incompatible but they are mutually dependent on each other.

Bradley's concept of immediate experience has similarity with sanākara's concept of Brahman or Ātman. Let us discuss the following points of similarity --

Both Bradley and Sanākara agree regarding the nature of thought and its inadequacy to reality. Bradley asserts that the very nature of thought is indistinguishable though not separate from the fact or the real. Bradley says, "If we take up anything considered real, no matter what it is, we find in it two aspects. There are always two things we can say about it, and if we can not say both, we have not got reality. There is a 'what' and 'that' an existence and a content, and the two are inseparable ..... They are distinguishable only and are not divisible."\textsuperscript{34} According to Bradley we cannot know the nature of thought in its completed form unless we consider the nature of

\textsuperscript{34} F. H. Bradley, Appearance and Reality, P. 143
judgment. He says, in Judgment we find always the distinction of fact and truth, of idea and reality. Truth and thought are not the thing itself, but are of it and about it. "Thought predicates an ideal content of a subject, which idea is not the same as fact for in it existence and meaning are necessary divorced."\textsuperscript{35}

"Thought in its very nature is relational and discursive, and if it ceases to be this, it commits suicide."\textsuperscript{36} And as such thought can never comprehend reality in an immediate presentation or in an experience of oneness with it. This is the reason that the subject of the judgment always falls beyond its predicated content and is always other than it.

Like Bradley Saṁkara also holds that the nature of thought necessarily implies finite and discrete terms or existences that are related. Thought is sufficient to the understanding of finite and discrete existence. Regarding the importance of thought Saṁkara asserts that "Reason is the sole means of knowing truth and falsity. We can not question the validity of intellect in the phenomenal world. Discursive intellect confesses its importance only to be rejuvenated with new life and eternal vigour, and what appears to be its suicide is, in fact, its consecration."\textsuperscript{37} Thus Saṁkara holds that the validity of reason cannot be denied altogether, it is acceptable in respect of

\begin{flushleft}
35. Ibid, P. 148  
36. Ibid, P. 150  
37. C. D. Sharma, A Critical Survey of Indian philosophy, P. 289
\end{flushleft}
the objects of the world. It is useful in our practical life. But in case of Brahman it is not sufficient. Because rational or categorizing knowledge has only two possible forms, perceptual and conceptual or inferential and Brahman cannot be known through perception and conception.

Thus both declare that thought is unable to grasp the ultimate reality. While Bradley asserts the incapability of the nature of thought for the understanding of the absolute, Saṁkara admits the nature of the absolute beyond the comprehension of thought.

Bradley's immediate experience is characterised as inexplicable, indescribable, non-relational and non-objective. Saṁkara also describe Brahman as "beyond the grasp of speech and mind, unobjectifiable, innerscient self, eternal, pure, illumined and free."  

Secondly, Bradley says that immediate experience is an unbroken unity of feeling. In immediate experience there is no distinction between experience and experienced. Describing Ātman or Brahman Saṁkara writes, "this Ātman has nothing other than consciousness in its being, internally or externally. Uninterrupted consciousness alone constitutes its essential being, even as the lump of salt has the salty taste throughout and no other taste."  

Bradley rejects that the non-relational, non objective immediate

38. Brahma Sutra, III. 2. 22
39. Saṁkara's Bhāṣya on Brahma Ṣutra, III.2.16
experience is the self. He rejects it on the basis of the correlation of the self and the not-self. The self for Saṅkara is the ultimate category of existence. It is the universal aspect. The self in its ultimate nature, according to Saṅkara is not empirically observable, knower but knowledge or consciousness in the most fundamental form, which is indistinguishable from Bradley's immediate experience. Saṅkara uses the word for this kind of knowledge of the self. It is Apora kṣāṇubhuti, which precisely means immediate experience.

Thus both Saṅkara and Bradley agree that Ultimate Reality or Absolute is of the nature of immediate experience and is a unity above all distinctions. Though they agree with the above mentioned points yet they are different in some other respects.

Bradley says "At bottom the real is what we feel, and there is no reality outside of feeling. And in the end the Reality (whatever else we say of it) is experience. Our fundamental fact is immediate experience or feeling. We have here a many in one where, so far, there is no distinction between truth and fact. And feeling again is mine, though of course it is not merely my feeling. It is reality and myself in unbroken unity."\(^{40}\)

Here Bradley asserting the same view of Saṅkara that the ultimate reality is of the nature of non-relational immediate experience, beyond the

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40. F. H. Bradley, Essays on Truth and Reality, PP. 315-316
distinction of fact and truth and beyond the distinction of myself and the Absolute. But Bradley's view regarding 'unborn unity' of the ultimate experience is different from Sarâkara. The ultimate experience for Sarâkara is a simple undifferentiated unity while for Bradley ultimate experience is not simple or undifferentiated, not devoid of diversity but a "many in one". His view about the nature of ultimate experience is based on his consideration of the nature of thought. The ideal of thought according to Bradley is unity in diversity, not a bare tautology nor a bare togetherness nor conjunction without an internal bond or connection. Thought demands both ground or bond of unity underlying the diverse elements and also diversity.

Bradley writes, "As a fact and given, we have in feeling diversity and unity in one whole, a whole implicit and not yet broken up into terms and relations. This immediate union of the one and many is an ultimate fact from which we start, and to hold that feeling, because immediate, must be simple and without diversity is in my view, a doctrine quite untenable. That I myself should have been taken as committed to this doctrine is to me, I must be allowed to add, really surprising."\(^ {41} \)

Regarding the knowledge of reality, Bradley and Sarâkara hold contrary views. For Bradley it is impossible for human being to have the specific experience of the Absolute. We can have only general idea of it. Bradley

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41. F. H. Bradley, Appearance and Reality, P. 508
wrote, "Fully to realize the existence of the Absolute, is for finite beings impossible. In order thus to know we should have to be, and then we should not exist." While Saṅkara holds that it is possible to have the specific experience of the Absolute. This specific experience (Swanubhuti) Saṅkara believes can be obtained through one's own realization of the truth in the form of "I am Brahman."

Bergson is against intellect and he merely represents intuitive cognition. But Radhakrishnan asserts that to be intuition, it must contain certain elements of intellect. He writes, "There is a tendency in Bergson to oppose intuition to intellect." He says, intellect not only must be present, but must be on the stretch. "In moving from intellect to intuition we are not moving in the direction of unreason but are getting into the deepest rationality of which human nature is capable." Yet intellect alone cannot fruitfully function without certain essential elements of intuition. Even the work of intellect cannot be properly prosecuted without the aid of intuition.

Radhakrishnan agrees with Bergson and Plato that rational intuitive insight is possible only "for those whose are prepared for it, by intellectual discipline and hard thinking." Radhakrishnan quotes Bergson with approval when he says "We do not obtain an intuition from reality--that is an

42. Ibid, P. 140
43. S. Radhakrishnan, an Idealist View of Life, P. 142
44. Ibid, P. 146
45. Randall and Buchler, Philosophy, An Introduction, P 176
intellectual sympathy with the most intimate part of it—unless we have won its confidence by a long fellowship with its superficial manifestations." 46 Again philosophy as conceptual knowing is a preparation for intuitive insight." 47

Both Radhakrishnan and Bergson oppose conceptual thinking. For Radhakrishnan logical or conceptual knowledge is indirect and symbolic in character. But he admits that "it helps us to handle and control the object and its working." 48 Again he asserts "logical knowledge enables us to know the conditions of the world in which we live and to control them for our ends." 49 Bergson also holds that "whatever value empirical science can possess with respect to the pursuit of truth is acquired only if it is based upon metaphysical intuition, also its value consists in its being an adjunct to the promotion of practical or technological end." 50

But Radhakrishnan does not deny the conceptual knowledge. But real knowledge according to him is different. He writes, "But if we want to know things in their uniqueness, in their indefeasible reality, we must transcend discursive thinking." 51 Radhakrishnan has a different notion of reason itself. He has re-interpreted reason as a form of intuition. The creative insight is not the final link in a chain of reasoning. Creative work advances by leaps.

46. Ibid, P. 148
47. Ibid, P. 179
48. S. Radhakrishnan, An Idealist View of Life, P 127
49. Ibid, P 140
50. J. G. Arapura, Radhakrishnan and Integral Experiences, PP. 79-80
51. S. Radhakrishnan, An Idealist View of Life P 140
The true work of reason is described by the term "inspiration". In case of science this "inspiration" manifest itself as an "instinct for research". Systematic logical processes can only take us up to the gate of inspiration, they cannot lead us into the point of truth. So they are dismissed at that stage, as they are no more at service. But the rational discipline is important and indispensable as a preparation for intuition Radhakrishnan agrees with Bergson and Plato that this kind of intuitive insight is possible only "for those who are prepared for it, by intellectual discipline and hard thinking."52

The difference between Radhakrishnan and Bergson in recognising the value of feeling is that according to Bergson we feel ourselves away into the world, into the primitive underived stream of life, the elan vital; while according to the former the world of objects itself is taken up into one's own self. For Bergson, it is the life-force of the universe that persists through changes, being the very soul of change itself. While for Radhakrishnan it is the self that persists.

There is another difference between both Radhakrishnan and Bergson regarding the real knowledge. Both of them proclaim that real knowledge is the result of the unity of the knower and the known. Bergson, by this unity implies that the knower finds himself in the known and the more undivided the known the more integrated the knower becomes. But Radhakrishnan by

52 J. G. Arapura, Radhakrishnan and Integral Experience, P. 75
this unity implies that the known whether it a single object or total universe, finds its concrete reality and unique existence in the knowledge of the knower.

Radhakrishnan believes that reality is to be understood as the whole of cosmic process. "Reality as a whole and acts and advances as a whole. The control of the whole is present in the growth of the parts, whether they are chemical compounds or cultural movements. The process of the world is a creative synthesis, where the formative energy, local situation and cosmic control are all different factors. The final end is not contained in the beginning. The interest and attractiveness of the end cannot be divorced from the process which leads up to it." 53

commenting on Bergson's conception of intuition Radhakrishnan says, "To know reality we must become reality. Intuition is an effort to dissolve into the whole, but how is this possible? How can we know anything else than our own consciousness? How can we become one with, or assimilate the duration of the plant or the insect or a fellow-man or the world? How can we place ourselves in the moving currents of other objects? To know reality, the individuality or the concrete duration of individuality must interpenetrate the being of the knower, but the possibility is that when it comes to consciousness it may get fused with his own duration is one blended whole." 54

53. Ibid, P. 181
54. S. Radhakrishnan, The Region of Religion, P 190
Comparing both Radhakrishnan and Bergson professor J. H. Muirhead writes: "Along with striking resemblances, however, there are equally striking differences in his (Radhakrishnan's) account (as given in An Idealist View of Life). He agrees as to the directness, objectivity and authority of the intuition. But where as H. Bergson subordinates the passive and receptive side of the experience to the active, and finds the completion of it in voluntary participation in the onward creative movement of the 'elan-vital', Radhakrishnan reverses this order and finds the completion of the active co-operative element of religion in the sense of rest and salvation that come with the consciousness of unity with the whole as something beyond the reach of time and movement."\textsuperscript{55}

One important difference between Bergson and Radhakrishnan is that Bergson gave more emphasis on life force rather than on the self as the essential reality of consciousness. Intuition according to Radhakrishnan, is the function of spiritual consciousness and not the work of life force, nor a quality of duration. Intuition for him "is not life but our knowing consciousness keeping in step with the rhythm of duration of the object intuited."\textsuperscript{56}

Bergson is his book "Time and Free will" and "Creative Evolution" suggests that the knowledge of reality revealed by intuition, is a pure flow, a spontaneous movement, which Bergson calls Time. But this point is

\textsuperscript{55} J. G. Arapura, Radhakrishnan and Integral Experience, P. 28.
\textsuperscript{56} S. Radhakrishnan, The Region of Religion, P. 190
different from integral experience of Radhakrishnan. In pure flow there is no integration at all. There is no cohesion at all between what goes before and what comes after. Bergson points out that in his philosophy life implies some stability and some cohesion. We see that integral experience remains vague in Bergson's philosophy whereas in Radhakrishnan it assumes clear cut and central meaning of intuition.

There is a difference between Mādhyamika school of Buddhism and Bergson. In early Buddhism prajñā or intuitive insight represents the highest activity of the mind. For Mādhyamika, the complete disappearance of thought is intuition of the real. The difference between Bergson and Mādhyamika is that, for Bergson, reason spatializes things, it freezes reality which is movement, elan-vital- the life principle. The real can be apprehended by intellectual sympathy. The intuition of Bergson is instinctual in nature. On the other hand Mādhyamika's intuition is not instinctual. It is supra-rational, not infra-rational. According to Radhakrishnan, prajñā or insight is superior to vijñāna or logical knowledge and saññajñā or perceptual knowledge.

Bergson, the advocate of creative evolution, inspite of his more generally acceptable position as a whole, often falls into the rut of thinking that the whole evolution of life with its progressive manifestation of structure is latent in life. Speaking about the creative power of the universe,
Radhakrishnan observes, "there is no reason why we should identify it with vital force of life, as Bergson suggests, and not with spirit, for spirit is the highest we know." 57

Radhakrishnan's position is similar to Whitehead's ingressive evolution. It is observed that God is the ground and the goal of the whole evolutionary scheme. But unfortunately god is not entirely free from the process of reality. His nature finds completion only in terms of the world process. In any case he has a past which is irrevocable and a future which is not yet. God is immanent in the world and the world in God. As god transcends the world, the world transcends god. Whitehead is aware of the limitations of the Naturalistic schemes and falls back on the platonic version of the cosmic process. Whitehead's Position is presented by Radhakrishnan in the following words.----

"The ingredience of eternal objects into events is the explanation of historical becoming. The universe is a developing series of events revealing a hierarchy of grades and values. At every step we have the emergence of what is genuinely new, that was not in existence in any previous phase of the line of advance. Change is not a mere unfolding of what is implicit, or a rearrangement of constituents with nothing new in the whole they constitute. The higher cannot be adequately explained in terms of the lower. Every event

is a miracle, an event from above. It embodies an idea from beyond and satisfactory cosmology should account for it. Whitehead suggests an eternal order and a creative reality. The cosmic series has a nisus towards the eternal order which is beyond itself, though it is increasingly realized in the cosmic."

The relation between God and the world for Whitehead is one immanence and interpenetration. God is immanent in the world and the world in God. God is not the Absolute, but only one of the accidental actualizations of the Absolute. Whitehead holds that "It is God who envisages the realm of possibilities and the world of settled fact so as to focus them on each occasion for the creation of something new. It is he that determines that ideal plans of events by the imposition of his nature. Without such divine control, sheer, unlimited activity taken with the infinite world of ideal forms would be unable to achieve anything specific. The universe exhibits a creativity with infinite freedom; says Whitehead and a realm of forms with infinite possibilities; but this creativity and these forms are together important to achieve actuality apart from the completed ideal harmony, which is god. God is the home of universals and the ideal harmony."

We have to notice the synthetic character of Radhakrishnan's epistemology. He insists that different ways of knowing should not be

58. S. Radhakrishnan, An Idealist View of Life, P. 327
59. Ibid, P 328
compartmentalised. These ways should be seen as inseparable aspects of the total process of knowledge is its wholeness. Intuition is however the most important among these. It is only in integral intuition that we attain to the level of completeness. But this does not mean a break in the continuity of knowledge or between intellect and intuition. The movement from intellect to intuition is the movement towards the deepest rationality, towards wholeness. Radhakrishnan rejects Hegel's contention that intuition is an abstraction unrelated to the rest of the mental life. For, according to him, intuition is not a-logical but supra-logical. It is the wisdom of the whole gained by the whole spirit and transcends the fragmentary knowledge, whether it be the product of feeling or the intellect. Man possesses a spiritual consciousness or super consciousness over and above his animal consciousness and the ordinary self-consciousness. It is at this highest level of consciousness that the individual becomes aware of the indubitable reality of spirit. In this awareness the eternal Spirit realizes itself as the basis and reality of all experience. In the words of Radhakrishnan, "The living self is the final ground of all thought, and as independent of any further ground is free and absolute."

60. Ibid, P. 116.
61. Ibid, P. 124.