Chapter-VIII

Summary and Conclusion

Our study reveals that Sino-Indian relations deteriorated over the issue of Tibet in 1950, when China moved its troops into Tibet and once again in 1959 with the uprisings in Tibet. Nehru felt sympathy and moral obligation towards Tibet, as India shared closed cultural, religious and social ties with Tibet and at the same time, he wanted to maintain amicable relations with India’s powerful neighbour- China.

Thus, Nehru’s policy towards China was basically influenced by these two contradictory forces. On the one hand, he had to strike a balance between these two factors. On the other hand, he had to deal with the political parties in the Parliament, all of which, except the C.P.I, adopted a pro-Tibet stand and having feared for India’s security, constantly pressurized Nehru to be firm with China and this included some of the Congress members too. As a result, when China moved its troops into Tibet in 1950, Nehru by way of assuring the members of the Parliament commented that there would not be any compromise on the security of the nation. However, due to his desire to maintain cordial relations with China, he also persuaded the Parliament to adopt a realistic approach. He referred to China as a great power and stated that the resolutions of the Parliament could not change this fact. Thus, he had to persuade the Parliament to accept his line of thinking (at least apparently) in approaching China.

Nehru’s China policy was again questioned in the Parliament when Sino-Indian agreement on Trade and Intercourse was signed in 1954. Though the agreement and especially its preamble embodying the principles of Panchsheel were much lauded in the Parliament, there was an objection over the term, “Tibet region of China”. By this agreement,
India accepted Tibet as a part of China and consequently, gave up all the extra-territorial rights that it (India) enjoyed in Tibet since the British times. Nehru gave a moral justification for his policy, stating that India could not hold on to the imperialistic tradition of Britain. However, not all in the Parliament were satisfied. Thinking of national interest, even some members of the Congress felt that India should not have accepted Tibet as a part of China and given up her rights there. In this case, as we have elaborated in our study the criticism of Nehru's China policy was perceptible, but not of a great magnitude.

However, Nehru policy towards China invited a lot of flak in the Parliament in 1959 with the uprisings in Tibet. As stated earlier, Sino-Indian relations once again deteriorated over the issue of Tibet in 1959. When the news of uprisings in Tibet was first received in India, Nehru tried to brush aside the incidents. He was not willing to comment on the Tibetan issue but had to give a statement on the issue under the pressure of the Parliament in which, he said that it was embarrassing to discuss events of a neighbouring country. At this stage, he characterized the Tibetan uprisings as merely a clash of wills than clash of arms or physical bodies. As stated earlier, the contradictory forces (domestic pressure of the Parliament and Nehru's desire of friendship with China) kept on influencing Nehru. Thus, though he showed concern for Dalai Lama's safety but at the same time cautioned the Parliament that since it was a difficult situation, the Parliament should not do anything, which would worsen it.

The pressure of the Parliament upon Nehru was definitely increasing. Nehru, thus, not only granted political asylum to Dalai Lama, when the latter sought it but his policy also exhibited a certain shift from his earlier stand. Thus, in spite of his own admission earlier that it was embarrassing to discuss events happening in other countries, he himself
upheld Parliament's right to discuss any matter, in the wake of Chinese allegations that the discussion of Tibetan affairs in the Indian Parliament was improper. Whereas earlier Nehru cautioned the Parliament, not to react vehemently on the Tibetan issue, which he said would worsen the already difficult situation, later he himself stated in the Parliament, “anything that happens in Tibet is bound to be very deep, as we see it. It is not for me to object to those reactions”. Further more, Nehru gave a bold statement saying that, “...it should be made perfectly clear to all concerned that this Parliament is not going to be limited in exercise of its right of discussion, saying or action, anything by any external or internal authority”. By external authority, Nehru obviously implied China. At this point of time, Nehru also went a step further and directly deplored China saying that the Chinese were using the language of cold war, regardless of truth and propriety.

Having said all this, Nehru, however, did not support the Jan Sangh resolution of referring the Tibetan issue to the United Nation. Thus, Nehru did not abandon his basic policy towards China. However, the firm statements that he made against China during this time indicate a certain shift in his policy towards China, if not in content, at least in emphasis and the Indian parliament had a role in bringing about this change. After all, the Parliamentarians, belonging to all the political parties except C.P.I exerted pressure on Nehru. During this time, as it has been illustrated in our study, a spate of debates took place discussing Nehru’s China policy. The nature and content of the debates as elaborated in our study underwent a change during this time. The Parliamentarians became more vocal, somewhat aggressive, with much more active participation in the debates than the previous years. All this must have left its mark on Nehru. The year 1959 indicates a shift not only in Nehru’s
policy towards China but also in Parliament’s relation with Nehru, which
deteriorated progressively in the following years.

The roots of Sino-Indian border dispute lay in history. While
India held the view that the border was defined, China claimed that the
border was the product of British aggression against her (China) and was
never defined. The border clashes that started from 1959, increased with
the passage of time. Notes were exchanged between the two countries.
However, due to the controversial border claims of the two sides, the
border dispute could not be solved and it ultimately resulted in border war
in 1962.

As for the response of the Indian Parliament to the above
events, it can be said that there was a hue and cry in the Parliament when
it was revealed through the publication of White Paper I in September
1959 that the Chinese intrusions in India had started right from 1954.
However, Nehru in the beginning tried to underplay the seriousness of
Chinese intrusions as he had done in the case Tibetan uprisings in the
initial period. Regarding Chinese claims to Indian territory, Nehru
remarked, “we have had no such claims directly or indirectly made on
us”. The Parliament, however, was exercised. It questioned and criticised
not only Nehru’s China policy but also his foreign policy as a whole in
the wake of Chinese intrusions in the Indian territory.

Majority of the Parliamentarians alleged at this time that
Nehru’s policy of nonalignment and peaceful co-existence had failed. As
we have illustrated, Parliament during this period put an unprecedented
pressure on Nehru. He was pressurized to clearly spell his policy in regard
to China. Nehru, however, asked the Parliament not to take an alarmist
view of the situation. Clarifying his policy before the Parliament, he said
that though he stood by the McMahon line broadly, he was willing to
have any kind of conciliatory, mediatory or arbitration of any authority
agreed to by the two parties. Thus, Nehru wanted to solve the border dispute basically by means of negotiations. However, many Parliamentarians strongly suggested that India should not take recourse to negotiations unless China vacated the Indian territory completely.

With the passage of time, the Parliament became more and more vocal. The Parliament criticised Nehru for hiding information and keeping it (Parliament) in dark. The Parliament also demanded explanation from Nehru for every act of the Government related to the Sino-Indian border dispute.

Nehru tried to pacify the Parliament. His attempts were reflected in his statements. He responded by saying that if any thing significant occurred, the Government would naturally go to the Parliament to explain its stand and would gain its support and confidence. Highlighting the importance of the Parliament, he said, “we in the Government necessarily have to follow policies which are laid down or approved by the Parliament. He also stressed that the Government would take directions from the Parliament and follow those directions.

These statements reflect a clear change in Nehru’s approach towards the Parliament from this period onwards. Earlier, he would address the Parliamentarians individually and would mostly give the justification of his policy. Now he addressed the Parliament as a whole and stressed that it was Parliament’s prerogative to lay down policies, which he said, the Government was bound to follow. However, the Parliament was not satisfied. It continued to criticise Nehru and question the defence preparations of the Government. Accordingly, Nehru kept on informing the Parliament about the defence preparations that the Government was taking.

Parliament also exerted a great deal of pressure upon Nehru to deal firmly with China. Any leniency shown towards China was severely
criticised. Besides this, the Defence Minister, Shri Krishna Menon was severely criticised and there was an intense pressure upon Nehru to drop him from the Cabinet. That the pressure of the Parliament upon Nehru had become quite intense can be understood from the fact that Nehru had to drop against his own wish his personal favorite Krishna Menon from the Cabinet.

The features of this period were –

- Not only the big but small parties too voiced their concern strongly in the Parliament.
- The speeches of the Parliamentarians were unusually long and surcharged with emotion during this period.
- Some of the Parliamentarians had become too much aggressive and criticised Nehru on an unprecedented scale.

It is worth mentioning here that even Congress members exerted pressure upon Nehru to reorient his policy towards China. Some of them even vehemently criticised Nehru. Due to Parliament’s vigilance and pressure, Nehru had to keep the Parliament informed of all the correspondence that took place between him and the Chinese Premier Chou-En-Lai. During this period, almost all the political parties except C.P.I adopted the following stand:

- Charged Nehru with following the policy of appeasement towards China.
- Alleged that Nehru had kept the Parliament in dark about Chinese intrusions for years.
- Pressurized Nehru to adopt a firm policy towards China.
- Urged Nehru, not to pursue the Policy of negotiation which China unless she ended her aggressive activities on the Indian soil.
 Forced Nehru to reorient the defence policies and preparations and to drop Shri Krishna Menon from the Cabinet.

The impact of Parliament upon Nehru can be judged from the following facts:

- Nehru started informing Parliament of all the correspondence that took place between him and the Chinese premier, Chou-En-Lai.

- Nehru acknowledged that it was the Parliament’s prerogative to lay down the policies, which the Government was bound to follow and that the Government would take directions from the parliament and follow them (this indicates a change in Nehru’s approach towards the Parliament).

- Nehru actually adopted a firm policy towards China from mid 1962 onwards. He declared that India would not withdraw from its established posts and that it would not budge under Chinese threats. A week before China attacked India, Nehru gave a statement on October 13, 1962, that he had ordered the Indian troops to throw the Chinese back. It is believed that the statements of Nehru preponed the Chinese attack.

- Nehru ultimately dropped Krishna Menon, his personal favourite from the Cabinet.

From the above discussion, it can be concluded that the Parliament was never a mute spectator in regard to Nehru’s policy towards China. The Parliamentarians not only voiced their concern in the Parliament but also directly criticised and questioned Nehru and this included the Congress members as well. This was in great contrast to the early years when Nehru could pacify the Parliamentarians through personal persuasion and urge them to adopt his round of thinking. Things changed from 1959 onwards. Nehru’s personal persuasion became less
and less effective. The Parliament became increasingly active since 1959, first on the issue of Tibetan uprisings and then the border conflicts. It also adopted more and more aggressive approach with the passage of time. It questioned and criticised Nehru in a manner, it had never done before. It became much more vigilant and Nehru could no longer pacify the Parliament. As a result, Nehru experienced an intense pressure of the Parliament, which he never faced before. It can be said that from 1959 onwards he lost the flexibility he had earlier in dealing with China, as he neither could ignore the Parliament nor convince it. Since the Parliament categorically demanded that Nehru should not follow the policy of peaceful negotiations unless the Chinese vacated the Indian territory, Nehru did not have much choice. Perhaps the Sino-Indian relations would have taken a different shape; perhaps the Sino-Indian border war could have been averted or would have occurred later if Nehru’s relation with the Indian parliament had not undergone a sea change. Be that as it may, this study conclusively establishes one fact: that the Indian Parliament enforces the accountability of the Government to itself, that it keeps a watch on what the government does and what it does not and that it is only along such line of watching, sometimes zealously and sometimes not so zealously, but somehow or the other always, the Parliament makes democracy in India work and thrive so well.
A Post Script

Developments in Sino-Indian Relations Since 1976:
An Overview

The Sino-Indian border war of 1962 marked the culmination of the ongoing Sino-Indian border conflict going on since 1959. After the 1962 war, the relation between the two Asian giants remained virtually frozen for about nearly a decade and a half. Diplomatic relations between the two nations at the level of ambassadors were restored only in 1976. The following is an account of the developments since 1976-1977.

In 1977 Janata Party came to power in India. As a result there were speculations about the attitude of the new Government regarding China because the Janata Party always adopted a tough stand against China. Its leaders, like Shri Vajpayee, for example were always apprehensive of China's designs ever since the emergence of new communist China. Thus when the Party came to power at the Centre, it was thought that the normalization process in the Sino-Indian relation would receive a jolt.

However, the Janata Party retained the policy of the Congress towards the normalization of relations with China. Thus, the then Prime Minister of India, Shri Morarji Desai gave a statement in Calcutta that he was ready to talk to the Chinese leaders for improving relations with China.¹

¹ The Stateman (Delhi), February 16, 1978.
A high level Chinese goodwill delegation for friendship with foreign countries visited India (7-23 March, 1978). The delegation called on the Minister of External affairs on 8 March 1978.\(^2\)

Wang Pingnon, leader of the delegation, stated, "Sometimes even brothers quarreled but brothers were brothers. Quarrels were temporary. Our fraternity is everlasting." He stressed that the bitterness that developed between the two nations due to border conflict was a thing of the past\(^3\). However, the Indian Prime Minister stressed that complete friendship with China was possible only after the return of its territory\(^4\). He also stated in the Rajya Sabha that there was no possibility of having full friendship with China, - border solution first, amity afterwards\(^6\).

Thus, though the process of normalizing Sino-Indian relations started in late 70's, during that time in India the solution of the border question was seen as a precondition to the normalization process. China on the contrary felt that the border issue should not be made a precondition for the normalization of relation between the two nations. She felt that relations could be developed in the culture and economic spheres in the beginning\(^7\).


\(^4\) The Times of India (editorial), 16 March 1978.

\(^5\) Sunday Standard (New Delhi), 9th April 1978.

\(^6\) The Hindustan Times (New Delhi), 29\(^{th}\) April, 1978.

\(^7\) Sunday 18\(^{th}\) March 1979.
Thus, when Vajpayee visited China during 12-17 February, 1978, the Chinese again reiterated that the border question should be deferred and the two countries should improve their relations in other spheres first. Vajpayee stressed that the border issue should be solved first. However, Vajpayee had to cut short his visit because of Chinese invasion of Vietnam during this time.

India had excellent relations with Vietnam and the incident during this time revived the memories of Sino-Indian border war in 1962. After Vajpayee’s visit, India’s attitude towards China got hardened. The Janata Government remained committed to the 1962 resolution of the Parliament.

The then Prime Minister of India Morarji Desai stated in a public meeting that China should vacate every inch of land belonging to India. He showed his willingness to negotiate with the Chinese but at the same time insisted on getting back the lost territory.8

Thus due to the difference in stand points of the Indian and the Chinese Government the normalization process between India and China could not make much headway in the 70’s.

The era of 80’s:

In the era of 80’s the process of normalization in Sino-Indian relations made much headway and thus efforts were made to resolve the border dispute between the two countries. In June 1980, the Chinese leader Deng Xiapong gave the proposal of “Package deal to India”.

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8 The Statesman 2 April 1979.
Basically, it meant to put the border issue aside, while normalizing the relations in other spheres. These proposals also denied legality to the McMahon line. As a result, the package deal was rejected by the then Foreign Minister, Shri Narshima Rao. Shri Rao insisted that the border issue could not be put aside and gave it priority over normalization of relations.  

However, the Chinese leader Mr. Huang Hua visited the Republic day celebration at the Indian embassy in January 1980. Next he met Shrimati Indira Gandhi, the Prime Minister of India, in Salisbury in April, 1980. During this time the Chinese leader expressed the hope that the “issues left behind by the past would not hinder the process of development of friendly relations between China and India.” In the month of May, the two countries had their highest level of contact in Belgrade, when the Chinese premier Hua Huofeng told Mrs. Gandhi that China “was more than ready” to improve relations with India. Mrs. Gandhi too expressed the same sentiments, saying that India was ready to do the same, adding that their problems could be solved only if they were not involved in confrontation with each other. These meetings created conducive environment to normalize their relations. In June 1981, Mr. Huang Hua visited India. At the end of his visit, he announced that China would take a positive attitude and initiate sustained dialogue on the

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10 The Statesman 19 April 1980.

11 The Hindustan Times, 10 May 1980.

border issue\textsuperscript{13}. It indicated a significant departure from the earlier Chinese stand that the border issue could be put aside, until there was sufficient improvement in trade, scientific and cultural relations between the two countries. As a result, Huang Hua’s visit facilitated the negotiation on border issue. Thus, the first round of border talks was held in Beijing during 10-14 December, 1981. The two countries differed in their standpoint. While China insisted on the package deal as proposed by Deng Xiapong, India rejected the proposal. Thus, no breakthrough could be achieved during this round of talks.

During the second round of border talks that were held in New Delhi during 17-20 May 1982, China again made it clear that she (China) would not accept the McMahon Line and emphasized that instead scientific, cultural and technological ties should be expanded. Thus, though there was not much progress on the border issue but significant development was made in the cultural, scientific and technological fields in this round of talks\textsuperscript{14}. Third round of talks was held in Beijing from January 27 to February 1983. It failed to yield any positive result with regard to the border problem.

On October 30, 1983, the fourth round of talks ended at New Delhi. While a settlement was still distant, China now agreed to consider India’s sector-by-sector approach and India agreed to consider, if not accept China’s package plan. Both the countries agreed to examine the

relevance of such factors as historical evidence, custom and tradition for border settlement.

In the fifth round talks held in September 1984, it was reported that Sino-Indian differences had been narrowed\textsuperscript{15}. The only achievement of this round was that the two sides agreed to begin discussions on the long-standing problem in the eastern sector at the sixth round of talks\textsuperscript{16}.

After the fifth round of talks, there was an increased contact between India and China and it was expected that the sixth round of talks between the two countries would solve the contentious issues, viz. border problem. However, the two sides could not reach an agreement on the various lines in the eastern sector which could be mutually acceptable to both of them as the starting point of their discussion. Besides this, there could not be any agreement on how to go about defining the basis for substantive discussion. From the Indian viewpoint, the Chinese had adopted a tough stand at this round of talks and India also felt that a new element had been introduced by the Chinese demand for territorial concessions from India in the eastern sector\textsuperscript{17}.

India, however, continued to maintain the same standpoint and in the Rajya Sabha, the then Prime Minister announced that the trade relation with China would depend on progress on the border issue\textsuperscript{18}.

\textsuperscript{15} Indian Express, New Delhi, September 23, 1984.

\textsuperscript{16} The Hindu, September 23, 1984.

\textsuperscript{17} The Hindu, Madras, November 11, 1985.

\textsuperscript{18} Indian Express, New Delhi, November 19, 1985.
However, in spite of this statement given by the Indian Prime Minister, a trade agreement was signed between India and China and it was agreed that the talks would continue between the two countries. It was also announced that in the next round of talks there would be discussion on the central and western sectors of the border\textsuperscript{19}. There was high level of contacts between the two countries after the fifth round of talks and it was expected that the sixth round of border talks would prove to be fruitful. But in the sixth round of talks that began in New Delhi on November 4, 1985, China asserted that the eastern sector was the most contentious issue of the entire boundary question and India was in illegal possession of 90000 thousand square km of Chinese territory.

After the sixth round of talks the seventh round of talks was scheduled to be held in July 1986. The seventh round of border talks held in July 1986 was, however, overshadowed by reports in the Indian media of Chinese incursions into the Sumdorong Chu valley in Arunachal Pradesh. This was followed by reports of large-scale troop movement on both sides of the border in early 1987 and grave concern about a possible military clash over the border.

\textbf{Sumdorong Chu Incident (June-October, 1986)}\textsuperscript{20}:

This region falls along a traditional route from Lhasa to Tawang - and from there to the Brahmaputra valley - and the nearby Thag

\textsuperscript{19} \textit{The Patriot}, New Delhi, December 12, 1982.

La ridge had witnessed serious clashes in the '62 conflict. The area had been considered a neutral area by both sides since 1962/63 and had not been monitored by India between 1977 and 1980. Patrols resumed in 1981 and by the summer of 1984 India had established an observation post on the bank of Sumdorong Chu valley, which apparently afforded a view of Chinese positions on the other side of Thag La. This post was manned by personnel of the Special Security Bureau (SSB) of India through the summer and vacated in the winter. In June 1986, when Indian army personnel returned to the area they found a sizable number of Chinese personnel already present, engaged in constructing permanent structures. Until June, the Government in the Parliament tried to underplay the seriousness of the issue but by August, the Chinese constructed a helipad and began supplying the troops by air. Soon after this, the Indian army began aggressive patrolling in this region. By September '86 the public and opposition parties in the Parliament mounted strong pressure on the Government to take a strong action against the Chinese. The Government of India sought to avoid the crisis by suggesting that if the Chinese withdrew in the coming winter, India would not re-occupy the area in the following summer. This offer was rejected by China whose troops were by now prepared to stay through the winter. In response to this, the Indian side too started constructing a helipad close to the Sumdorong Chu valley known as Operation Falcon. As a result, the Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping warned India that if such incidents continued across the border, China would have to "teach India a lesson". In the mean time in December 1986, Arunachal Pradesh was made a full state of the Indian Union, which further aggravated the tension between the two sides. As a consequence of all these incidents, the situation became so tense that there was a real possibility of military clash between the two countries. By the spring of 1987 the Indian and
the Chinese camps were next to each other. During this time the Sino-Indian relations further deteriorated over India’s military exercises, code named, Operation Chequer Board (October 1986-March 1987) along the India-China border. It involved 10 divisions of the Army and several squadrons of the IAF and redeployment of troops at several places in the Northeast. As a result of increasing tension between India and China, the seventh round of border talks held between the two countries ended in a complete fiasco over the border issue. The Sino-Indian relations also deteriorated due to India’s granting of statehood to Arunachal Pradesh. However, the rising tension was to some extent lowered after a visit to China by the Indian External Affairs Minister in May 1987, where both sides reaffirmed their desire to continue talks on the border issue.

The eighth round of border talks held in New Delhi in November 1987, followed by visits of India’s Defence and Foreign Ministers in April and June respectively and it was decided to upgrade the talks from the bureaucratic to the political level. In this round of talks, there could not be any spectacular breakthrough, though both the sides laid stress on avoiding military confrontation and set up at the same time, trade and economic cooperation. China liked India’s assurance of non-interference in Tibet. Here it was felt that the Sino-Indian relations need political thrust, which came in the form of Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi’s 1988 visit to Beijing.

21 The Times of India, July 25, 1986.

22 The Times of India, April 16, 1987.

Rajiv Gandhi’s Visit to Beijing (December, 1988):-

The next important step in the resolution of the border issue was the Prime Minister, Shri Rajiv Gandhi’s visit to China. As a result of this visit, the tension between the two nations lessened. Deng Xiaoping, while welcoming the Indian Prime Minister, urged that both China and India should forget their past and look forward to the future.24

Both the countries also agreed to avoid war and find a solution to their long-standing border problem through peaceful negotiation. They also expressed their desire to maintain peace along their 4051-kilometers long border. In the joint communique that was issued at the end of Shri Rajiv Gandhi’s visit, the two countries reaffirmed their faith in the principles of Panchsheel and agreed to restore, improve and develop their relations on the basis of these principles.25

Secondly, both the nations decided to set up a joint working group to deal exclusively with the border question and try to resolve it within a definite time frame. The officials comprising the JWG would be under the control and supervision of the political leaders, who would come to their assistance if at any time, the talks got bogged down. Thirdly, the two sides also concluded agreements on cooperation in civil aviation, science and technology and on bilateral cultural exchange programme for three years.26


26 ibid.
After Rajiv Gandhi’s visit to China, there was an increased contact between the two nations. The first meeting of the JWG on the border, set up during Rajiv Gandhi’s visit, was held in Beijing (1-4 July, 1893)\(^{27}\).

In December 1989, the National Front Government came to power. The new Government also retained the policy of normalizing Sino-Indian relations and solving the complex border problem between the two countries.

The resolution of the border problem further became an issue when Chinese Premier Lipeng visited India during 11-16 December 1991. At this time, Soviet Union had collapsed and bipolar world was replaced by a unipolar world. The two nations expressed their opposition to any kind of international oligarchies and made a firm announcement that no country or countries should be permitted to manipulate world affairs and practice power politics\(^{28}\). During Lipeng’s visit, Shri Narshima Rao, the then Indian Prime Minister announced that neither side would allow the existing boundary differences to stand in the way of further developing and promoting bilateral relations\(^{29}\).

The joint communiqué stated, “the talks held so far by the Sino-Indian Joint working Group on the boundary question had enhanced mutual understanding and agreed that group should speed up its work in search for an earliest possible solution to the boundary question. They

\(^{27}\) The Statesman, July 2, 1989.


also agreed that the periodic meetings between the military personnel in the border areas should be held on a regular basis.  

**Shri P.V. Narshima Rao's visit:** -

The next major step in the normalization of Sino-Indian relations was when Shri Narshima Rao visited China in September 1993. The significance of this visit lies in the fact that adhering to the principles of Panchsheel, an important border agreement (maintaining peace and tranquility along the line of actual control in the India-China border areas) was signed on 7th September 1993 in Beijing between the two countries, which eased tension on border areas. Following are the contents of the agreement that was signed between India and China on the Maintenance of Peace and Tranquility along the Line of Actual Control in the India-China border areas.

**Article I**

The two sides are of the view that the India-China boundary question shall be resolved through peaceful and friendly consultations. Neither side shall use or threaten to use force against the other by any means. Pending an ultimate solution to the boundary question between the two countries, the two sides shall strictly respect and observe the line of actual control between the two sides. No activities of either side shall overstep the line of actual control. In case personnel of one side cross the line of actual control, upon being cautioned by the other side, they shall

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30 *Beijing Review*, vol. 34, No. 51
31 *ibid*, No.52, December 30, 1991-95.
Immediately pull back to their own side of the line of actual control. When necessary, the two sides shall jointly check and determine the segments of the line of actual control where they have different views as to its alignment.

Article II

Each side will keep its military forces in the areas along the line of actual control to a minimum level compatible with the friendly and good neighbourly relations between the two countries. The two sides agree to reduce their military forces along the line of actual control in conformity with the requirements of the principle of mutual and equal security to ceilings to be mutually agreed. The extent, depth, timing and nature of reduction of military forces along the line of actual control shall be determined through mutual consultation between the two countries. The reduction of military forces shall be carried out by stages in mutually agreed geographical locations sector wise within the areas along the line of actual control.

Article III

Both sides shall work out through consultations effective confidence building measures in the areas along the line of actual control. Neither side will undertake specified levels of military exercises in mutually identified zones. Each side shall give the other prior notification of military exercises of specified levels near the line of actual control permitted under this Agreement.
Article IV

In case of contingencies or other problems arising in the areas along the line of actual control, the two sides shall deal with them through meetings and friendly consultations between border personnel of the two countries. The form of such meetings and channels of communications between the border personnel shall be mutually agreed upon by the two sides.

Article V

The two sides agree to take adequate measures to ensure that air intrusions across the line of actual control do not take place and shall undertake mutual consultations should intrusions occur. Both sides shall also consult on possible restrictions on air exercises in areas to be mutually agreed near the line of actual control.

Article VI

The two sides agreed that references to the line of actual control in this agreement do not prejudice their respective positions on the boundary question.

Article VII

The two sides shall agree through consultations on the form, method, Scale and content of effective verification measures and supervision required for the reduction of military forces and the maintenance of peace and tranquility in the areas along the line of actual control under this agreement.
Article VIII

Each side of the India-China Joint Working Group on the boundary Question shall appoint diplomatic and military experts to formulate, through mutual consultations, implementation measures for the present Agreement. The experts shall advise the Joint Working Group on the resolution of differences between the two sides on the alignment of the line of actual control and address issues relating to the redeployment with a view to reduction of military forces in the areas along the line of actual control. The experts shall also assist the Joint Working Group in supervision of the implementation of the Agreement, and settlement of differences that may arise in that process, based on the principle of good faith and mutual confidence.

Article IX

The present Agreement shall come into effect as of the date of signature and is subject to amendment and addition by agreement of the two sides.

After Shri Narshima Rao’s visit to China, the next important step in the normalization of Sino-Indian border disputes was the visit of the Chinese President Mr. Jiang Jemin to India in November, 1996. In the context of this visit by the Chinese President, an agreement was signed on 29 November, 1996 between India and China which is termed as the agreement on Confidence Building Measures in the Military field along the line of actual control in India-China border areas. Following are the contents of the agreement between India and China on Confidence
Building Measures in the Military Field along the LOAC in the India-China border areas.  

**Article I**

Neither side shall use its military capability against the other side. No armed forces deployed by either side in the border areas along the line of actual control as part of their respective military strength shall be used to attack the other side, or engage in military activities that threaten the other side or undermine peace, tranquility and stability in the India-China border areas.

**Article II**

The two sides reiterate their determination to seek a fair, reasonable and mutually acceptable settlement of the boundary question. Pending an ultimate solution to the boundary question, the two sides reaffirm their commitment to strictly respect and observe the line of actual control in the India-China border areas. No activities of either side shall overstep the line of actual control.

**Article III**

The two sides agree to take the following measures to reduce or limit their respective military forces within mutually agreed geographical zones along the line of actual control in the India-China border areas:

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(1) The two sides reaffirm that they shall reduce or limit their respective military forces within mutually agreed geographical zones along the line of actual control in the India-China border areas to minimum levels compatible with the friendly and good neighbourly relations between the two countries and consistent with the principle of mutual and equal security.

(2) The two sides shall reduce or limit the number of field army, border defence forces, para-military forces and any other mutually agreed category of armed forces deployed in mutually agreed geographical zones along the line of actual control to ceilings to be mutually agreed upon. The major categories of armaments to be reduced or limited are as follows: combat tanks, infantry combat vehicles, guns (including howitzers) with 75 mm or bigger calibre, mortars with 120 mm or bigger calibre, surface-to-surface missiles, surface-to-air missiles and any other weapon system mutually agreed upon.

(3) The two sides shall exchange data on the military forces and armaments to be reduced or limited and decide on ceilings on military forces and armaments to be kept by each side within mutually agreed geographical zones along the line of actual control in the India-China border areas. The ceilings shall be determined in conformity with the requirement of the principle of mutual and equal security, with due consideration being given to parameters such as the nature of terrain, road communications and other infrastructure and time taken to induct/deinduct troops and armaments.
Article IV

In order to maintain peace and tranquility along the line of actual control in the India-China border areas and to prevent any tension in the border areas due to misreading by either side of the other side’s intentions:

(1) Both sides shall avoid holding large-scale military exercises involving more than one Division (approximately 15,000 troops) in close proximity of the line of actual control in the India-China border areas. However, if such exercises are to be conducted, the strategic direction of the main force involved shall not be towards the other side.

(2) If either side conducts a major military exercise involving more than one Brigade (approximately 5,000 troops) in close proximity of the line of actual control in the India-China border areas, it shall give the other side prior notification with regard to type, level, planned duration and formations participating in the exercise.

(3) The date of completion of the exercise and deinduction of troops from the areas of exercise shall be intimated to the other side within five days of completion or deinduction.

(4) Each side shall be entitled to obtain timely clarification from the side undertaking the exercise in respect of data specified in Paragraph 2 of the present Article.

Article V

With a view to preventing air intrusions across the line of actual control in the India-China border areas and facilitating over flights and landings by military aircraft:
(1) Both sides shall take adequate measures to ensure that air intrusions across the line of actual control do not take place. However, if an intrusion does take place, it should cease as soon as detected and the incident shall be promptly investigated by the side operating the aircraft. The results of the investigation shall be immediately communicated, through diplomatic channels or at border personnel meetings, to the other side.

(2) Subject to Paragraphs 3 and 5 of this Article, combat aircraft (to include fighter, bomber, reconnaissance, military trainer, armed helicopter and other armed aircraft) shall not fly within ten kilometers of the line of actual control.

(3) If either side is required to undertake flights of combat aircraft within ten kilometers from the line of actual control, it shall give the following information in advance to the other side, through diplomatic channels:

(a) Type and number of combat aircraft;

(b) Height of the proposed flight (in meters);

(c) Proposed duration of flights (normally not to exceed ten days);

(d) Proposed timing of flights: and

(e) Area of operations defined in latitude and longitude.

(4) Unarmed transport aircraft, survey aircraft and helicopters shall be permitted to fly up to the line of actual control.

(5) No military aircraft of either side shall fly across the line of actual control, except by prior permission. Military aircraft of either side
may fly across the line of actual control or overfly the other side’s airspace or land on the other side only after obtaining the latter’s prior permission after providing the latter with detailed information on the flight in accordance with the international practice in this regard.

Notwithstanding the above stipulation, each side has the sovereign right to specify additional conditions, including at short notice, for flights or lands of military aircraft of the other side on its side of the line of actual control or through its airspace.

(6) In order to ensure flight safety in emergency situations, the authorities designated by the two sides may contact each other by the quickest means of communications available.

Article VI

With a view to preventing dangerous military activities along the line of actual control in the India-China border areas, the two sides agree as follows:

(1) Neither side shall open fire, cause biodegradation, use hazardous chemicals, conduct blast operations or hunt with guns or explosives within two kilometers from the line of actual control. This prohibition shall not apply to routine firing activities in small arms firing ranges.

(2) If there is a need to conduct blast operations within two kilometers of the line of actual control as part of developmental activities, the other side shall be informed through diplomatic channels or by convening a border personnel meeting, preferably five days in advance.
(3) While conducting exercises with live ammunition in areas close to the line of actual control, precaution shall be taken to ensure that a bullet or a missile does not accidentally fall on the other side across the line of actual control and causes harm to the personnel or property of the other side.

(4) If the border personnel of the two sides come in a face-to-face situation due to differences on the alignment of the line of actual control or any other reason, they shall exercise self-restraint and take all necessary steps to avoid an escalation of the situation. Both sides shall also enter into immediate consultations through diplomatic and/or other available channels to review the situation and prevent any escalation of tension.

**Article VII**

In order to strengthen the cooperation between their military personnel and establishments in the border areas along the line of actual control, the two sides agree:

(1) To maintain and expand the regime of scheduled and flag meetings between their border representatives at designated places along the line of actual control;

(2) To maintain and expand telecommunication links between their border meeting points at designated places along the line of actual control:

(3) To establish step-by-step medium and high-level contacts between the border authorities of the two sides.
Article VIII

(1) Should the personnel of one side cross the line of actual control and enter the other side because of unavoidable circumstances like natural disasters, the other side shall extend all possible assistance to them and inform their side, as soon as possible, regarding the forced or inadvertent entry across the line of actual control. The modalities of return of the concerned personnel to their own side shall be settled through mutual consultations.

(2) The two sides shall provide each other, at the earliest possible, with information pertaining to natural disasters and epidemic disasters in contiguous border areas which might affect the other side. The exchange of information shall take place either through diplomatic channels or at border personnel meetings.

Article IX

In case a doubtful situation develops in the border region, or in case one of the sides has some questions or doubts regarding the manner in which the other side is observing this Agreement, either side has the right to seek a clarification from the other side. The clarifications sought and replies to them shall be conveyed through diplomatic channels.

Article X

(1) Recognising that the full implementation of some of the provisions of the present Agreement will depend on the two sides arriving at a common understanding of the alignment of the line of actual control in the India-China border areas, the two sides agree to speed up, the process of clarification and confirmation of the line of actual control. As
an initial step in this process, they are clarifying the alignment of the line of actual control in those segments where they have different perceptions. They also agree to exchange maps indicating their respective perceptions of the entire alignment of the line of actual control as soon as possible.

(2) Pending the completion of the process of clarification and confirmation of the line of actual control, the two sides shall work out modalities for implementing confidence building measures envisaged under this Agreement on an interim basis, without prejudice to their respective positions on the alignment of the line of actual control as well as the boundary question.

Article XI

Detailed implementation measures required under Article I to X of this Agreement shall be decided through mutual consultations in the India-China Joint Working Group on the Boundary Question. The India-China Diplomatic and Military experts Group shall assist the India-China Joint Working Group in devising implementation measures under the Agreement.

Article XII

This Agreement is subject to ratification and shall enter into force on the date of exchange of instruments of ratification. It shall remain in effect until either side decides to terminate it after giving six months' notice in writing. It shall become invalid six months after the notification.

As result of this agreement, the visit of the Chinese President had been regarded as a great success. It was asserted by many that the agreement tantamount to a “No War” pact but on the other hand, it was
also stressed by some newspaper that as a result of this visit China got from India, whatever it wanted but India got nothing in return. As a result of this visit China got an assurance from India that it recognized Tibet as a part of China. On the other hand, China did not shift its stand on Sikkim and Arunachal Pradesh but merely promise to adopt a flexible approach on the two issues. In substance China, still refuse to recognize these two states as a part of India\textsuperscript{33}.

The utility of this agreement can be judged from the fact it brought into light the failure in implementing the 1993-peace accord. For instance, the new accord revealed that more than three years later the two sides, India and China were not closer to clarifying the line of actual control because they had not undertaken even the preliminary step of exchanging their maps showing their respective positions. Besides this, the accord mentioned the three key parameters that should govern troop and armament withdrawals, the nature of terrain, transportation across and the time element in induction and removal\textsuperscript{34}.

**The New Setback:**

Followed by a rapid improvement in relations, the process of warming up in Sino-Indian ties got a sudden setback when India carried out five nuclear tests in May 1998\textsuperscript{35}. During this time the then Prime

\textsuperscript{33} ibid

\textsuperscript{34} *The Pioneer*, December 4, 1996.

\textsuperscript{35} B.M. Jain, *India-China Relations: Issues, Trends and Emerging Scenarios*. 208
Minister Shri, Atal Bihari Vajpayee wrote a letter to President Clinton, published by New York Times on May 13, 1988, in which he raised the issue of nuclear threat to India from China. The Chinese Government brushed aside the Indian accusation as “utterly groundless”. The immediate fall out was that China cancelled its decision to participate in the prescheduled 1998 meeting of the joint working group alternatively held in each country to discuss confidence-building measures. From a pragmatic perspective, it was therefore, an unnecessary diplomatic provocation on India’s part that caused tension with China. However, in order to restore relations with China, the Indian Government soon sought to deploy a proactive diplomacy to remove mutual misperceptions. Indian Foreign Minister Mr. Jaswant Singh visited China in June 1999, in significant diplomatic move aimed at dispelling lingering irritants between New Delhi and Beijing. Mr. Singh tried to reassure Chinese leaders that India perceived no threat from China. In March 2000, India participated in the first ever security dialogue held in Beijing and in April 2000, JWG meeting was resumed. Gradually, the exchange of high level official visits gave a new momentum to the bilateral relationship. Premier Zhu Rongji’s visit in January 2002, promoted mutual trust and confidence building with a view to expanding bilateral cooperation in diverse fields. He gave clear signals of China’s genuine desire to strength mutually beneficial cooperation with India on three main issues:

- Economic Cooperation
- Counter Terrorism
- Indo-Pak Dialogue

Shri Atal Bihari Vajpayee’s visit:-
The Sino-Indian relations got a further boost when Shri Vajpayee, the then Prime Minister of India, paid a visit to China from June 22-27. It led to improvement in trade and business relations between the two countries. Quoting the former Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping, Shri Vajpayee said, “The twenty first century can only be the Asian century if India and China combine to make it so”. After all, the two countries, combine a third of humanity\textsuperscript{36}.

The Sino-Indian border problem supposedly moved a step towards solution in 2005, when the Chinese Premier, Wen Jiabo visited India on April 10, 2005. According to a newspaper report the outcome of the visit was as follows:

1. China promised to consider Sikkim as a part of India.
2. Furthermore, China promised to take following steps towards solving the border problem. In the first step directives will be prepared. In the second step after following the directives, through discussion the differences in the approach of the two countries regarding LOAC will be resolved. In the third stage, every sector of the border will be reviewed separately to locate the border afresh\textsuperscript{37}.

The border problem between India and China is yet to be completely solved. However, as a result in the efforts made in the 80's and 90's the relationship has been better now which may bring about a solution some day. As for the attitude of the Parliament, it was very much critical of China in the years following the invasion of India by the former. As stated earlier, Parliament took the resolution in 1962 that India

\textsuperscript{36} Path Breaking Initiatives, S.D. Nair, \textit{Business Line}. Internet Edition.
\textsuperscript{37} \textit{Anand Bazar Patrika}, April 11, 2005.
would take back every inch of the territory that China had taken during the invasion of India. Thus, the Parliament was very bitter and no solution of the border problem or normalization of Sino-Indian relations was possible in such an atmosphere. However, during the seventies, the Parliament mellowed in its approach towards China. Even a change was noticed in the attitude of the rightist parties, which had strongly denounced China. In 1977, when the Janata Party came to power the Government still favoured the normalization between India and China, though some members of the Janata Party insisted that India should not make the move for normalization of relations with China unless she (China) vacated Indian territory. However, the Government basically, whether, Congress or non-Congress, yearned for cordial Sino-Indian relations. The Parliament also became less and less critical on the issue with the passage of time, although, at times a few Parliamentarians demanded that India should try to get Indian territory vacated by China. On occasions, it has also been stressed that Indian Government should militarily be strong and develop nuclear capability to meet any threat. However, as a whole the Parliament changed its approach and perspective regarding Sino-Indian relations and the border problem between the two countries. Its manifestation is seen in the various Sino-Indian agreements including the agreement concluded in 2005 and one concluded in 2006 opening the border trade between India and China through the Nathu La pass.