CHAPTER V

KRIPKE'S REFUTATION OF DESCRIPTION THEORIES:
CRITICAL ESTIMATE

5.1 Introduction:

In his seminal lectures *Naming and Necessity*, Kripke argues against the thesis of Frege and Russell, according to which proper names are abbreviated or truncated definite description. He claims that ‘Nevertheless I think it’s pretty certain that the view of Frege and Russell is false’. He provides several counterexamples to refute the theory. Salmon asserts that Kripke’s argument against descriptivism (pure aspect) is three fold i.e. modal, epistemological, and semantical. While delivering the lectures, the basic problem before Kripke is to refute the thesis of Frege and Russell. I believe that the refutation is actually directed to mention that description theories fail to solve the problem of reference fixation of proper names.

Kripke holds that considering ‘Aristotle was fond of dogs’ may be analyzed, according to Russell, in terms of the description ‘the last great philosopher of...

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110 See, Mark Sainsbury, “Philosophical Logic”, in A. Grayling (ed.), *Philosophy: A Guide Through the Subject* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 74-6. He doubts whether the view actually belongs to Frege and Russell or not. However, Russell has been found to claim the point that proper names behave as truncated descriptions. But there seems to be no evidence found which may show that Frege has this standpoint. Still some philosophers taken it for granted that Frege too possess similar view. Frege seems to talk about that description are service of reference fixation of proper names. If I rightly understood, he has never approached the issue (that proper names are truncated descriptions) directly. For present purpose, we will have to assume Kripkean position against what Ahmed calls ‘Frege-Russell Thesis’ or FRT.

111 Kripke, op. cit. 29.

antiquity was fond of dogs'. Kripke insists that in some counterfactual
counterfactual situation, there could have been some person other than Aristotle; who would
have been the last philosopher of antiquity. This impure definite description
seems to be central concern for Russell. Kripke holds:

...we merely use the description to fix the referent then that man
will be the referent of ‘Aristotle’ in all possible worlds. The only
use of the description will have been to pick out to which man we
mean to refer...

Kripke tries to portray the picture of inability of a definite description to
stipulate the referent of a proper name. According to Kripke, the description
theories are in service of reference identification and stipulation and they don’t
provide meaning to proper names. For example, ‘Aristotle’ may not be
substituted with the description ‘the teacher of Alexander the Great’ as there
might have been some other person who had taught Alexander the Great in
some other counterfactual situations.

The description theories only provide reference to a proper name. The
description does not provide meaning to a proper name but it only helps in
reference determination of the same. Fregean sense is that property of
description which provides a way to determine the reference of a proper name.

Kripke tries to present an alternative model for reference identification and
stipulation. He invents the notion of rigidity; and maintains that a proper name
behave as a rigid designator which rigidly designates the same referent in all

113 Kripke, op.cit.57.
possible worlds. According to him, the description theories fail on fix the referent of a proper name in all possible worlds. First, it is useful to analyze the notion of rigidity itself.

5.2 The notion of rigidity:

If the designator does not designate any object in other worlds where it does not exist, then it may be called as what Salmon calls persistently rigid designator. In his arguments against Frege and Russell, Kripke seems to talks such sort of rigidity. In *Identity and Necessity*, Kripke asserts "...In a situation where the object does not exist, then we should say that the designator has no referent and that the object in question so designated does not exist...".

Ahmed's observation seems to be plausibly clear. I think that Kripke is interested to provide a criterion for designator to be existent in all or some or even none possible world. Kripkean notion of rigid designator may be called what he describes as strongly rigid. A proper name refers to the same thing in all possible worlds where that thing actually exists. These are the cases of necessary existence of certain specific properties of an object. In order to be strongly rigid, a designator needs that its referent must actually exist in all possible worlds. If it is not so; then the designator is not strongly rigid but persistently rigid.

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115 *Identity and Necessity*, 173.
116 *Naming and Necessity*, 48-49.
Nathon Salmon calls such designators as *obstinately rigid* which seems to be synonym with Kripke’s notion of rigid designator as strongly rigid. I would prefer to introduce the term *uniformly* rigid designator to characterize the behavior of such proper names.

In *Identity and Necessity*, Kripke asserts that a name, say, “Nixon,” would be called as “Nixon” even if there is no person ever existed in any possible world. It seems surprising but Kripke argues that the name “Nixon” is going to designate the Nixon as a person in all possible worlds. Obviously in those worlds, it will be taken for granted that there is no actual existent person. The person may be character in some story or film or in some what Frege calls “work of fiction.” The point is that even in such cases the notion of rigidity never fails. I have held that there may be several names which are devoid of any actual referent.

But how is it possible to develop a relation between a designator and its referent which is non-actual or fictional? In virtue of what ‘Nixon’ is going to designate Nixon while he does not exist at all. I even wonder how such arguments have become possible at the first place. Christopher Hughes tries to rationalize the issue in following manner:

> ...a proper name designates the same thing with respect to every possible world (even worlds in which that thing does not exist), in much the way that a proper name designates the same thing

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117 Nathon Salmon, 1982, 33-34.
with respect to every time (even times at which the thing no longer exists, or did not yet exist)... 118

In making these remarks, Hughes seems to accept at least one thing: non-existence of referent of a proper name is a matter of some possible worlds i.e. situational. In other words, there must be at least one world in which the referent like Nixon, of proper name “Nixon” exists.

It means that a proper name designate the same object in all possible worlds or what Hughes calls with respect to every possible world. The argument provides momentum to Kripke’s anti-thesis against the description theory of Frege and Russell. Definite descriptions are non-rigid designators because same object is not designated by them, in all possible worlds i.e. the content of description is going to vary in different possible worlds. Hence, a proper name cannot be an abbreviated description.

Kripke tries to deal with the issue of void proper names119 in holding that such proper names are still going to designate the same referent in all possible worlds. For example, if someone utters ‘Unicorn’ had never existed, even then the proper name ‘Unicorn’ rigidly designates to an animal of particular kind that had never existed in some explained possible world. In 2005, in the capital of India, Delhi there was found a ‘monkey man’ which had spread violence all over the capital. Some people believe that ‘monkey man’ had never existed. It

119 I have dealt with the issue of void proper names in my paper entitled “Frege: The theory of meaning concerning proper names”. In the paper, I have pointed out a lacuna in Fregean approach over the issue.
was just wrong information which had been spread by some cunning political
people in order to create fear in the society. It is also true that such man has
never been found, up to now. It seems quite controversial that whether
“monkey man” really existed or not. But Kripke would have insisted that in
spite of aforesaid fact, the name still designate ‘monkey man’ in some possible
world in which he is so called i.e. Delhi. 120

In Kripkean system, he insists that a proper name rigidly designates its referent,
even in counterfactual situations in which the referent is absent. If we say that
“Sir Syed Ahmad Khan” founded “Aligarh Muslim University,” what we mean
by it? Was it necessary that “Sir Syed Ahmad Khan” founded the ‘Aligarh
Muslim University’? Perhaps not. Some other person would have founded the
university. “Sir Syed Ahmad Khan” would not have started the mission of
founding a university at the first place, so that a particular community may rise.
Kripke’s view suggests that in some counterfactual situations, 121 “Sir Syed
Ahmad Khan” might not have founded the university or ‘Aligarh Muslim
University’ might not have been founded at all.

It seems surprising and awkward but Kripke suggest it as philosophical theory
and not ordinary man’s thought. 122 We may suppose that in some possible
world “Sir Syed Ahmad Khan” might not have founded the “Aligarh Muslim
University.” It may be argued whether such worlds are possible; Kripke claims
that there are possibilities of such worlds in terms of presenting descriptions of

120 See also, Kripke op. cit. 290. Kripke held this point taking the example of ‘Hitler
121 Actually Kripke is talking about some transworld identity.
122 Kripke, op.cit.41.
these worlds. Possible worlds are in fact stipulated and not discovered. They do not mean a distant concrete world like our actual world. He insists that we may suppose that the description regarding possible worlds may be fixed in some counterfactual situation like ‘the things might have been’. He further asserts that an object may be identified in terms of its properties. The description of these properties may be described as the criteria of identity in all possible worlds. Now such criteria are true in all possible worlds.

If we provide a description about “Sir Syed Ahmad Khan,” we will have to provide a necessary and sufficient condition of this person as “Sir Syed Ahmad Khan.” These conditions include certain properties essential to a certain person like “Sir Syed Ahmad Khan.” Kripke makes a distinction between rigid designator and non-rigid designator. The former is that property of a proper name which rigidly designates the same thing in all possible worlds, while the later reflects those entities which contingently designates the object i.e. it may or may not designate the object.

In order to refute the thesis of Frege-Russell, Kripke deals with three arguments what Salmon asserts as modal, epistemological, and semantical. The modal argument seems to be central to the refutation of Frege-Russell doctrine. It also seems to be the most discussed one.

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123 Ibid., 44.
5.3 Modal Argument:

In this type of argument Kripke talks in terms of actual and possible worlds.\(^{125}\) Kripke talks an analogy of two ordinary dice from school exercises in probability. He holds that "...in fact introduced at a tender age to a set of (miniature) possible worlds. The thirty six possible states of the dice are literally thirty six possible worlds...\(^{126}\) Now, there is only one, what he calls miniature world is actually realized, depending on the face of dice comes up such as 2, 4 or 6.

I think that there remains no confusion on the issue. He further clarifies that "'possible worlds' are total 'ways the world might have been' or states or histories of the entire world."\(^{127}\)

Kripke tries to portray the picture of the theory of proper names in holding that we can stipulate a reference by providing some unique properties to someone so that we can pick out that a particular individual in some using application of proper names. If we say that 'Stephan Hawking' is the person who challenged the theory of relativity of Albert Einstein, then there may be several people who are unaware of this fact. But these people successfully use the name in spite of being ignorant of his theory. But in such cases there is a violation of what Kripke calls non circulatory condition.\(^{128}\) He uses another example of 'Gödel' who proved a theorem of incompleteness of Arithmetic, which is

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\(^{125}\) The possible worlds may mean different to different philosophers. For example, David Lewis thinks that possible worlds are some concrete worlds, similar to this world.

\(^{126}\) Kripke, *op.cit.* 16.

\(^{127}\) Ibid., p-18.

\(^{128}\) See also, Kripke, *op.cit.*, 83.
known as “Gödel” theorem. But the reality is that his student “Schmidt” actually propounded the theorem. “Gödel” somehow obtained the work. Now, referring to “Gödel,” we are actually referring to “Schmidt.”

Kripke tries to identify that the essential properties (attached with a particular name) by virtue of which we know a particular referent are not necessarily true of the object. The name, “Gödel,” in this case abbreviate a description in spite of the fact that in some counterfactual situation, it turned out to be false. But the way it abbreviate a description is different from the approach of Frege and Russell.129 Even if it is discovered that “Gödel” wrongly credited for the proof of the incompleteness of arithmetic, but still he would be described as “Gödel.”

Kripke also rejects Donnellan’s suggestion of referential definite description according to which a definite description itself may be used as ‘referential expression’ in place of a proper name.

One of the most significant intuitive doctrines of Kripke is that of proper names behaving as rigid designator. In previous example, someone other than ‘Sir Syed Ahmad Khan’ might have founded the university (his grandson Sir Ross Masood might have founded later on), but in that case too, the name “Sir Syed Ahmad Khan” remains the same. No other person except “Sir Syed Ahmad Khan” himself can replace him. Hence, Kripke describes proper names as rigid designator, which rigidly designates the same object in all possible worlds, irrespective of its properties which may alter across the world in which the

129 Ibid. p.87. Footnote 37.
object exists. If a proper name designates rigidly a particular object in all possible worlds then the designator may be described as *strongly rigid* as Kripke maintained.

The concept of rigid designation may be comprehended by the notion of transworld identity criteria in which a certain name is stipulated (by some description, of the sort what might have occurred to him) and accordingly counterfactual situations may be described to explain the behavior of rigid designator.

This view suggests that any theory of meaning concerning proper names is reduced to a theory of reference as the theory serves merely for stipulation of reference. The theory suggest nothing like meaning but only reference. Proper name ‘Sir Syed Ahmad Khan’ is associated with the description ‘the founder of Aligarh Muslim University’. Now, what is the meaning of ‘Sir Syed Ahmad Khan’? It is devoid of meaning or what Russell and Mill call connotation. It serves only in the determination of reference i.e. the person who founded Aligarh Muslim University, that’s all.

According to traditional description theory of Frege and Russell, an individual has been assigned such great works as necessarily immanent in their personality to perform great tasks. But it is not necessarily true that such individual involve in great tasks. For example, ‘Sir Syed Ahmad Khan’ might not have been founded the Aligarh Muslim University.

\(^{130}\) Ibid., p. 48.
Kripke remarks on Searle’s observation that a definite description is necessarily true for the referent in question. For example, “Sir Syed Ahmad Khan” may be described as “the founder of Aligarh Muslim University.” But it is not necessarily that he be “Sir Syed Ahmad Khan.” He might not have ever thought of founding the university. He might have spent his entire life in the job he was in, as “Sadar Amin” in Bijnor, India. Then, it will be impossible to call him as “Sir Syed Ahmad Khan.”

According to Kripke’s notion of rigid designator, “Sir Syed Ahmad Khan” would still be called as “Sir Syed Ahmad Khan” as the name of the same person. The properties attributed originally to him, might not have been attributed to him in some counterfactual situation. This theory of Proper name is all about fixing a reference in actual world; it may change its course in some counterfactual situation.131

Another interesting thing Kripke tries to clear that it is not conditional that the designated thing must be presented in all possible worlds. For example, if we say that “Sir Syed Ahmad Khan” had not existed at all, even in this case “Sir Syed Ahmad Khan” designates rigidly a name which had never been existed in any possible world.

Kripke tries to frame the problem of reference stipulation. He argues about initial baptism in which a referent is fixed by mean of certain description. The name being used does not abbreviate description, as Frege and Russell

131 Kripke cleared the point that the concept of rigid designation of proper names is applied to English language only and not for any other language.
maintains. The reference is fixed by mean of some contingent properties of the object i.e. in some counterfactual situation the properties of an object may not be satisfied. But the name being a rigid designator will continue to refer to that object.

Kripke's speculation concerning the object containing essential properties may be elaborated in his being recognized the distinction between a priori city and necessity. He talks about the "table" present in the room where he was delivering lecture. The table could have been made up of another material, say, of ice. It could have been placed exactly in the same position. But two tables are different from each other, as consist of different material.

5.4 Argument involving Semantics:

This argument does not talk in terms of necessity and possibility as the modal argument does. Kripke's refutation of descriptivism may be looked in terms of semantic argument. The argument follows that facts regarding the referent of a proper name is not contingently true; but it is actually true, provided those facts are discovered empirically. However, the same would be contingent; if descriptivism account is to be followed i.e. some particular proper name would mean same as its corresponding definite description.

A proper name may be analyzed in correct sense by mean of a definite description which is empirically or what Hughes calls semantically equivalent.

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132 Kripke, op.cit, 114. See also footnote 56,57. It is very important to see the footnotes carefully.
to the referent. In order to deal with this sort of argument, I would like to consider once again Frege's example of "Aphla" and "Ateb" (The example is a general outline of pure descriptivism). Now, "Aphla" abbreviates to 'the mountain 5000 meters high from northern region' while "Ateb" abbreviates to 'the mountain 5000 meters high from southern region'. And the empirical discovery has been made that two names, in fact, refer to the same mountain. This is impure account of descriptivism. The proposition attributed to "Aphla" is same as the proposition attributed to "Ateb."

That's why, it is against pure account of descriptivism because for them "Aphla" must consist of same unique properties (in terms of quality). According to pure descriptivism, it is necessary truth that "Aphla" exists if and only if it has got those set of unique properties which uniquely stands for it (the same is true for "Ateb"). But here, both the names are sharing most of the properties. Hence, pure aspect of descriptivism fails. But still impure or mixed aspect remains intact. They seem to hold both names abbreviates same description like "the mountain 5000 meters high", however with different senses. Before empirical investigation, both "Aphla" and "Ateb" thought to refer to different mountains.

Considering Kripke's insight on the issue, even after empirical investigation, both proper names refer to different objects. "Aphla" refer to mountain from northern region while "Ateb" refer mountain from southern region. Both the names cannot mean the same. Even if there would have been still another mountain which is 5000 meters high from northern region, say, "Apheb;" still
“Apheb” may not be called as “Aphla.” Hence, Fregean identity terms “Aphla” is not “Ateb.”

Kripke seems to have a doubt whether a proper name has got an aggregation (or cluster or set) of purely necessary and sufficient qualitative properties of being a proper name.\(^{133}\)

Description theories (both pure and mixed) seem to be shattered in front of Kripke’s semantical argument. Mixed form of description theory may defend, to some extent, Kripke’s modal argument.

Ahmed claims that the semantic argument requires that there are some cases in which speakers are aware of only one description, uniquely satisfies by the referent of a proper name, in spite of accepting the suggestion of cluster theory of proper names.\(^{134}\)

For example, “Gödel,” as a proper name, is commonly attributed to ‘the man who proved a theorem of incompleteness of Arithmetic’ and speakers are generally ignorant of other descriptions that uniquely satisfy him. But Kripke observes that it is quite possible that the description fails to refer to Gödel, as a person.

According to cluster approach, some description falls heavy on other, at least to common speakers of language. Some specific speaker may know the dominant description that falls heavy on the rest descriptions available.

\(^{133}\) Hughes, *op.cit.* 18.
\(^{134}\) Ahmed, *op.cit.*, 30.
For example, a proper name like ‘Charles Darwin’, consist of several
descriptions attached to it, but the common or dominant one ‘the first man who
propounded the theory of evolution’, fall heavy on the rest. Ignorant speakers
do not mean ‘Charles Darwin’ as ‘the first man who propounded the theory of
evolution’. While another description could be ‘the man whom historians call
‘Charles Darwin’ seems to be more general known to maximum number of
speaker in a speech community. Hence, ‘Charles Darwin’ does not mean same
as ‘the first man who propounded the theory of evolution’, because the name is
not semantically equivalent to the dominated definite description.\(^{135}\)

In Kripke’s example of “Gödel,” he was thought as ‘the man who proved a
theorem of incompleteness of Arithmetic’; but in fact ‘Schmidt’ did so. Now,
incompleteness of Arithmetic theorem may be attributed to ‘Schmidt’ and not
to ‘Gödel’. But the referent following the description ‘the man who proved a
theorem of incompleteness of Arithmetic’ will change (from ‘Gödel’ to
‘Schmidt’).

Looking on the speaker’s side, the speaker may be aware to use a proper name
that the name is common to maximum number of speaker in a certain speech
community (the approach may be called as utilitarian approach).

Kripke asserts that even in the absence of remembrance of reference in
borrowing, a person may successfully use a proper name. He seems to suggest
that the theory of meaning, as proposed by Frege and Russell, is different from

\(^{135}\) Ahmed took the example of ‘Columbus’ to explain this issue. See, \textit{Ibid}, 32.
the theory of reference which reflects that the referent of proper name is
determined by its description.\textsuperscript{136}

Now, the theory of reference or what Ahmed calls \textit{reference fixing theory}
seems to be preserved while the theory of meaning of Frege and Russell to be
shattered completely by Kripke.\textsuperscript{137} However, the theory of reference may be
charged with criticism through the notion of reference-borrowing practices. A
person may forget from where he borrowed the reference of a proper name. But
still he may be successful to refer to that person. Hence, above argument make
sense that semantic argument against descriptivism does not sounds justified.

5.5 Epistemological argument:

Some of Kripke’s arguments are of epistemological nature, dealing with
knowing the truth regarding reference \textit{a priori}. Kripke’s use of ‘Gödel’s
example is in fact two fold i.e. for epistemological as well as for modal
arguments. The former need not be confused with the later, and in fact there is
no confusion either.\textsuperscript{138}

Looking on the epistemological aspect of Kripke’s argument; we may assert
that ‘Gödel’ stands for ‘the man who proved incompleteness of arithmetic
theorem’; leads us truth about ‘Gödel’ \textit{a priori}, as per the conviction of
description theory (\textit{pure}).

But Kripke insists that inspite of the fact that ‘Gödel’ proved incompleteness of
arithmetic theorem, the truth may not be known \textit{a priori}. He provides

\textsuperscript{136}Kripke, \textit{op. cit.} 31. See also, Ahmed, \textit{op cit.}, 35.
\textsuperscript{137}Ibid. 35.
\textsuperscript{138}As Ahmed holds, see p-37.
counterexamples in holding that some other person ‘Schmidt’ discovered the same and we have wrongly credited the same to ‘Gödel’. Now, it is later discovery and hence the truth is known a posteriori. The counter example is actually two fold i.e. one to refute descriptivism and another to refute Immanuel Kant’s epistemology and his slogan synthetic judgement a priori. In Kripke’s example, ‘Gödel’ is not equivalent to ‘the man who proved incompleteness of arithematic theorem’, which is mixed description. In contrast, pure descriptivism expects that there is some description which is qualitative similar to a proper name like ‘Gödel’.

Now, even in the absence of any genuine unique description attributed to him; one may still refer to ‘Gödel’, but the name is again including itself. This is what Kripke calls violation of circulatory condition.

So, the knowledge of ‘Gödel’ seems to be very difficult to know a priori. For example, ‘Diamond’ purely describes ‘the hardest substance on earth’. The knowledge may be known a priori as the speaker refers to the quality of something as hardest substance called ‘Diamond’ which nothing satisfies.

However, if some discovery reveals that there is another substance which is hardest; then the knowledge would naturally be turned out to be a posteriori. Now, ‘Diamond’ does not satisfy the quality of being hardest substance. Even if there is availability of pure description, the description still fails to provide epistemological account of proper names. Kripke tries to convey that there can never be such description which can replace a proper name. In other words,

\[139\] See Frank Thilly, *A History of Philosophy.*
names can not abbreviate descriptions (*pure or mixed*). The knowledge of proper name does not obtain *a priori* in all the cases.

Kripke defended descriptivist approach by providing several counterexamples like the definition of ‘one meter’ as ‘stick S is one meter long at t₀’. This definition plays no role in providing meaning to ‘one meter’. Kripke insisted that the definition merely suggests ‘one meter’ as the standard of length and not the length in itself.¹⁴⁰

Kripke holds that ‘one meter’ may designate rigidly this entity i.e. length, in all possible worlds. The description of ‘one meter’ as ‘the length of S at t₀’ does not necessarily designate it rigidly. In some counterfactual situation, the definition may change owing to some conditions like excessive heat or cold which may expand or condense the length of stick S at time t₀.

The problem before Kripke is to fix the reference, not to provide a meaning to proper names. That’s why he admits that definitions like that of ‘one meter’ suggest how reference of ‘one meter’ is stipulated. Epistemologically, Kripke asserts that the person who provides such definition might have been aware of it as length of ‘one meter’, *a priori*. That’s why anyone may know ‘the length of stick S at t₀’ as ‘one meter’ without discovering himself that whether length of the stick as standard of length, is one meter or not¹⁴¹. Metaphysically treatment of this statement suggests it to be a *contingent* statement where ‘one meter’ behaves as a *rigid designator*. However the length is subject to change

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¹⁴⁰ *Naming and Necessity*, 54.
¹⁴¹ Ibid. p.56.
as per the conditions like heat or cold. In this Sense the statement may reflect contingent a priori truth.  

But I think that the standard of length is defined according to some particular conditions like a specific temperature and pressure. In this sense, the length is not going to change and will too behave as a rigid designator. In other words the description ‘the length of stick S at t₀’ (where t₀ is defined) behaves as a rigid designator along with ‘one meter’. This standard unit of length i.e. ‘one meter’ in MKS system is stipulated under specific ideal conditions. So the question of change in length does not arise in the first place. If we don’t bother to preserve the standard unit of length as exactly ‘one meter’ according to the provided definition, then surely we may change external conditions like temperature or pressure. In this case, the definition may not rigidly designate ‘one meter’, but it will not be the length which we call ‘one meter’ either. Kripke insists that the knowledge of proper names cannot be obtained a priori.

5.6 Natural Kind Terms:

Kripke maintains that his refutation against descriptivism for proper names also applies to the terms of natural kind. He argues that natural kind terms like ‘water’, ‘gold’ consist of same properties which are not necessarily known a priori. He refutes long standing doctrine of Kant in holding that analytic judgement like ‘gold is yellow metal’ may not be known a priori. In some

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142 See also Naming and Necessity, Footnote 21, p.56: It is not ‘analytic’ which demands necessary a priori truth. Here Kripke seems to successfully refute Immanuel Kant.

143 Kripke, op. cit. 127-8., NN-322-3.
counterfactual situation, gold may not be of yellow in color. However, the term consists of some essential properties. For example, atomic number of gold is seventy nine (79)^144. According to Kripke, this is essential property that may be attributed to gold. Likewise, the chemical composition of water is H\textsubscript{2}O, which is its essential property.

In general natural kind terms are those expressions that may include elements like ‘gold’ compounds like ‘water’ and species like ‘tiger’ etc. Kripke does not bother to describe in detail about the nature of natural kind terms.

He claims that in addition to proper names, terms of natural kinds too behave as rigid designators. Scott Soames shares his observation with Kripke in holding that the propagation of natural kind terms is like proper names i.e. following a chain of communication. The terms are Millian and rigid. He asserts that the semantic properties of terms are different from their predicates. For example, ‘red’ rigidly designates color red. He holds that the predicate ‘is red’ refers to all things that are red colored which are likely to vary in different counterfactual situation. Hence, the predicate ‘is red’ is non-rigid.\(^145\) Kripke maintains that natural kind terms consist of some ‘contingent properties’ that are phenomenal in nature.

For the first time, in the history of philosophy, Kripke tries to refute Kant’s notion of \textit{a priori} and \textit{analytic} judgement and Considering theoretical identification, such as ‘Water is H\textsubscript{2}O’, ‘Gold is the element with atomic

\(^{144}\) See also, \textit{Kripke} op.cit, 123-126, NN-319-21.
\(^{145}\) Soames Scott, \textit{What are Natural Kinds?}, School of Philosophy, Department of South California, Dec.2008.
number 79. According to Kant ‘Gold is a yellow metal’ is analytic judgment which is a priori. But we may observe that yellowness of gold can’t be taken a priori as its essential property. In some counterfactual situation the color of gold may be changed, say, ‘blue’ instead of yellow. Hence, it can’t be known a priori. When we heard of gold, we heard about thing sometimes discovered as a part of some speech community. It contains certain properties and we call it ‘Gold’. Kripke assumes that we may discover some another substance, say, fool’s gold which resembles gold, in terms of some properties like yellowness. But in fact fool’s gold is not real gold. Here the term ‘Gold’ behave as a rigid designator, which behave rigidly in all possible worlds like proper names.

Some other natural kind terms too behave as a rigid designator. For example, ‘tiger’ may be described with the description ‘four legged striped carnivorous belonging to cat family’. Now the description is appealing to description theorists. The ‘tiger’ belongs to this unique description. The terms of natural kind may also be called as Proper names because they behave rigidly like them. That’s why Kripke extends the notion of Proper names to natural kind terms such as ‘gold’, ‘tiger’, ‘water’, ‘heat’ etc. which are introduced by some introducers with descriptions like gold ‘is a metal which consist of atomic number 79’, tiger is ‘four legged striped carnivorous belonging to cat family’, Water ‘is H₂O’. The behavior of these terms as a rigid designator is so because some of their properties like yellowness of gold is a contingent property but its
atomic number seventy nine (79) is an essential property of gold. The essential property is not going to change in all possible worlds.

Kripke maintains that those statements are necessarily true which are followed by some scientific discoveries such as gold possess atomic number 79. But no discovery is the last work. It opens to explore future scientific investigations. He asserts that the doctrine of rigid designation may be applied to the terms of natural kind such as ‘tiger’, ‘dog’ etc. Names of bacteria such as *Escherichia Coli*, bacteriophage, *Herpes virus* too behave as rigid designators because they belong to a particular species. Mass terms such as ‘gold’, ‘water’ also behave likewise. And the terms of natural phenomenon such as ‘light’, ‘sound’, ‘heat’ also fall in the same category.

Mill holds that common name or natural kind terms consist of connotation owing to their specific association with some species. In agreement with Russell, Mill holds that genuine Proper name serves the purpose of denotation only. While definite description possesses both denotation and connotation. The cluster description theory suggests a cluster of properties which determines the referent of a Proper name. Kripke depicts that such cluster might not have been associated with the referent. But the term could have been existed even in the absence of the referent. Again, Kripke tries to go in the problem of stipulation of reference. How reference of a certain term may be stipulated?

Any term fixes its reference by mean some baptism like the definition of ‘one meter’, which stipulates its reference. Likewise, natural kind terms such as

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147 See also Kripke, op. cit. 134.
‘alcohol’, ‘apple’, ‘lion’ etc. too fixes in similar fashion. And the terms of
natural phenomenon like ‘sound’, ‘light’ etc. also do so by mean of scientific
observation like light is that ‘which shows a stream of photon’. This is how
terms pass in a linear chain of communication, irrespective of the ways which
speaker acquire to pass the same. I may assert that Kripke tries to overlook the
notion of Fregean ‘Sense’, which seems not be avoided so easily. He also tries
to depart from Kant slogan of synthetic judgment a priori in holding that all
terms behaving as rigid designator reflect truth but contingently. The properties
of referent may change in some possible world (transworld identity), but the
term is going to behave as a rigid designator in all possible worlds.

Kripke, raised another question of theoretical identification. He holds that even
some scientific discoveries such as gold’s atomic number 79 may turned out to
be false as in case of identity terms i.e. Hesperus=Phosphorous. Now, Hesperus
might not have been Phosphorous. Taking another example, Kripke argue that
the identification of pain is often associated with the stimulation of C-fibers
which is contingent truth. Because in some counterfactual situation ‘pain’ may
not be associated with ‘C-fibres firing’, hence it is contingent property of
‘pain’. However, the phenomenological term ‘pain’ behaves as a rigid
designator like Proper names. In similar line of argument he thinks that ‘pain’
could have existed without producing any sensation of pain. Hence, description
like ‘pain’ is ‘C-fibres firing’ is accidental property of ‘pain’, which could have
been otherwise. The referent of such terms is determined by these accidental
properties. In case of ‘pain’ the referent may be picked out by its ‘immediate
phenomenological quality. While other such terms like ‘heat’, the referent may be picked out by the accidental or contingent properties (as ‘molecular accelerated motion’). The sensibility in human beings would not have been so as to associate ‘molecular accelerated motion’ with ‘heat’. Now, what is the cause of different behavior of reference stipulation of two such terms? ‘Pain’ is phenomenological term while ‘heat’ is something which may be known a posteriori.

Kripke’s argument against identity theorists seems to be well directed in holding that a physical state such as C-fibres firing corresponds to a mental state (pain) and vice-versa. It is not the relation of identity between them as there lays a possibility of existence of one without another. Metaphysically, Kripke describes C-fibres as created by God which can stimulate them in some physical state, irrespective of its being felt as C-fibers in the form of pain. Hence, the relation between them can’t be of identity because stimulation of C-fibres may show its existence without pain.

In general, natural kind terms may be described as common nouns that apply to mass terms such as ‘gold’ or ‘water’. Kripke maintains that his refutation against descriptivism for proper names also applies to terms of natural kind. He argues that natural kind terms like ‘water’, ‘gold’ consist of same properties which are not necessarily known a priori. He refutes long standing doctrine of Kant in holding that analytic judgment like ‘gold is yellow metal’ may not be known a priori. In some counterfactual situation, gold may not be of yellow in

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148 Kripke, op.cit. 152.
149 Kripke, op.cit. 127-8., NN-322-3.
color. However, the term consists of some essential properties. For example, atomic number of gold is seventy nine (79). According to Kripke, this is essential property that may be attributed to gold. Likewise, the chemical composition of water is H₂O, which is its essential property.

In general natural kind terms are those expressions that may include elements like ‘gold’ compounds like ‘water’ and species like ‘tiger’ etc. Kripke does not bother to describe in detail about the nature of natural kind terms.

He claims that in addition to proper names, terms of natural kinds too behave as rigid designators. Kripke maintains that natural kind terms consist of some ‘contingent properties’ that are phenomenal in nature. For example, gold consist of yellowness, malleability, glittering nature etc.; water possess colorless, volatile ness, liquid at room temperature etc. Tiger has four legs, felinity (belonging to cat family), being carnivorous etc. He holds that these contingent properties attributed to the natural kinds, may not be known a priori. Some or all of these properties may not be attributed to a particular natural kind terms necessarily a priori. Kripke maintains that:

Could ‘we discover that gold was in fact yellow? ... Suppose there were an optical illusion which made the substance appear to be yellow; but, in fact, once the peculiar properties of the atmosphere were removed, we would see that it is actually blue...what would be announced would be that though it

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150 See also, Kripke, op.cit., 123-126, NN-319-21.
appeared that gold was yellow, in fact gold has turned out not to be yellow, but blue.¹⁵¹

In other place, Kripke holds that we use the term ‘tiger’ to designate a species, and that anything not of this species, even though it looks like a tiger, is not in fact a tiger. Just as something may have all the properties by which we originally identified tigers and not yet be a tiger, so we might also find out tigers had none of the properties by which we originally identified them. Perhaps none are quadrupedal, none tawny yellow, none carnivorous, and so on; all these properties turned out to be based on optical illusion or other errors, as in case of gold.¹⁵²

It seems plausible to accept that in some counterfactual situation, tiger has got none of these properties. Still we hold that tiger exist but don’t have got any of these properties. Hence, the knowledge of tiger because of these properties may not be obtained a priori. This epistemological argument looks more appealing in case of other terms like gold, water, which has got some sort of chemical composition.¹⁵³

For pure descriptivism, a proper name may be known a priori if and only if the name follows a unique description. Epistemologically, the knowledge of a proper name may be obtained by mean of a unique description which the proper name satisfies.

¹⁵¹Kripke, op.cit. 118, NN, 315-6.
¹⁵²Kripke, op.cit., 121.
¹⁵³See also, Ahmed,op.cit 61.
In some using practices of proper names, it is assumed for descriptivism that competent speaker possess a knowledge (by mean of some analysis providing definition of that term) of some geometrical term like triangle (the competent speaker knows \textit{a priori} that the sum total of all angles of a triangle is 180 degree; of chemical term like water, gold\textit{(a priori} knowledge of some unique properties); of biological term like tiger, cat, \textit{Escherichia Coli}, etc.

Now, it is a matter of speculation that the natural kind terms seem to satisfy pure descriptivism account but only on the condition that are necessarily true of that term. According to Kripke, Mill accepted such account of these terms, but not that of proper names.

Kripke utters that natural kind terms consist of properties that are necessarily true of it. The properties those are true of the term in all possible worlds. Moreover, these properties are subject to empirical investigation also. Gold consist of atomic number 79 is an example of such property. Now, the property may not be attributed to anything except gold. Even if some counterfactual situation, if we use the term gold we could not deny that element which has got seventy nine protons in its nucleus.

Here, pure descriptivism account may be preserved because a term like ‘gold’ necessarily follows necessary, analytic \textit{a priori} descriptions. Ahmed raises such objection to this position of Kripke:

\textbf{It is trivial that in } that \textbf{world iron pyrites both exists and was iron pyrites? We can easily amend the argument to get around this}
objection. We simply suppose that \( w \) contains iron pyrites, where gold is actually found while making no stipulation that the iron pyrites is not gold.\(^{154}\)

The argument does not seem sound because ‘iron pyrites’ and ‘gold’ are two separate terms, however, resembling each other. But any resemblance between two terms means distinction as with other terms which do not resemble at all. Even if, we do not stipulate that the iron pyrite is not gold; then it is taken for granted that iron pyrites is not, need not to be, gold.

Ahmed further goes to consider the intuitions (which seem to be acceptable, at least to Ahmed) that there would be a world where gold did not exist or there would be a world where gold did not have atomic number 79. In nutshell, he is arguing that there are contrary intuitions which questions necessary properties of gold in some possible world.\(^{155}\)

It seems counterexample to Kripke, and naturally plausible to suppose. But answer may be provided in term of what Hughes calls bi-vocal aspect of proper names. The name ‘gold’ may be used for two referents. A person may borrow the term ‘gold’ and superimpose the term on some new referent which is not element and does not consist of atomic number 79. But still, the new name (in new counterfactual situation) ‘gold’ don’t have anything to do with old name ‘gold’, which is also used by community of speakers who have got a common language. If I am right to infer, then Ahmed’s argument is not well directed.

\(^{154}\) Ahmed, op. cit 63.
\(^{155}\) Ibid. 63-64.
However, Kripke’s position against the thesis of Frege and Russell wavers a little by Ahmed’s argument.

To encourage pure descriptivism of Frege and Russell, ‘gold’ refers to such properties which nothing else describes or uniquely satisfies. Now, it is known *a priori* that gold satisfies such and such properties. Ahmed holds that “...it is unclear that the epistemological and modal claims refute the Frege-Russell thesis for natural kind terms.”^^156

Kripke targets Frege and Russell, along with the Mill’s account of natural kind terms (*Lecture III, Naming and Necessity*), while in lecture II he argues against descriptivism as proposed by Fregean and Russellian thesis. If the term ‘tiger’ has got various properties like a large carnivorous quadripedal feline, tawny yellow in color with blackish transverse stripes and white belly,^^157 then it is not necessary that the ‘tiger’ word satisfies all the properties (or weighted most or dominant property, as per descriptivism) *a priori*.^^158

Kripke continues that in the absence of these properties (that is attributed to ‘tiger’ by a certain community of speakers or by Shorter Oxford Dictionary), there may be a species different from ‘tiger’, say, it belongs to class reptile; having internal structure of reptilian type. But we can only say that the species belongs not to tiger but to some other animal like it. So, the properties attributed to natural tiger (or as the dictionary describes) may not be known *a priori*.

^^^^156 Ahmed, op.cit. 68.
^^^^158 Kripke, op.cit. 318.
Believers of descriptivism may defend that there must be some purely, uniquely, analytic, necessary descriptions that may be attributed to tiger (as the dictionary tells). But what are the methods to acquire *a priori* knowledge of something (in the form of satisfying some unique properties or dominated ones), of something that may be called as ‘tiger’? Is it the internal structure of mammals? Or are there some external properties (which are contingent, as Kripke holds)? Kripke suggests internal structure to be an empirical discovery.

That’s why descriptivism defense seems to be shaken, as they seem to be at loss to provide any descriptions that uniquely satisfies to the tiger. If some advocate of descriptivism insist that ‘tiger’ is that which may be described as ‘the animal that has got the properties of tiger’; then the description is becoming impure, and what Kripke calls *violates circulatory condition*.

If we take geometrical term like triangle, the describing the term as geometrical figure consisting of three sides and the sum total of all angles of a triangle is 180 degree. It may present a definition providing analytic and necessary description of something being a triangle. In the geometrical term, descriptivism seems to be defended in supplying some unique, analysis providing qualitative description.

Hughes points this issue out that Gabriel Segal claims that a natural term like ‘water’ is actually determines some *extension conditions* that leaves open the possibility that something is water (however, it could not been H₂O).¹⁵⁹ Now,

¹⁵⁹ Hughes, *op. cit.* 52.
scientific discoveries changed extension condition of the term water by stopping what Segal says a motley concept. Before 1750 (scientific discovery of water), it would not have been called as H₂O. Only scientific discoveries endorse it with H₂O. The same is true of gold (possessing atomic number 79); so is for 'tiger'.

Now, if water had been discovered with 'such and such properties' and chemical composition H₂O in 1750, it is not like that it had just started an expression of its extension condition: It was exactly the same in composition even before the discovery. Descriptivism still has to face Kripke's refutation as the situation shows contingent truth a posteriori instead of necessary truth a priori (epistemological account of descriptivism).  

Kripke clarifies it that he is not presenting an organized theory of the reference of proper names, instead he tries to depict that is how proper names and natural kind terms determine and stipulate reference. The reference of proper names and natural kind terms are determined by a causal chain of communication linked with the history of that proper name or natural kind terms. Epistemologically, descriptivism (at least pure) tries to motivate an empirical-less, a priori knowledge. Kripke contributes in refuting such an account of knowledge. Alternatively, he tries to endorse a posteriori knowledge.

If the term 'water' has got impurities; then it would be still called 'water.' It is appealing to suppose that the contamination of water may change its physical

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160 See also, Hughes, op.cit. 54.
and even chemical composition, then the stuff may not be described as ‘water’ in the stipulated sense in which a community of speakers use the term.

In his work *Language and Nature*, Chomsky holds that some stuff, to be ‘water’ is based on its practical utility that interest is the concern of human beings. He takes example of a cup of water, when introduced a tea bag in to it; it becomes a tea and not water. However, the cup still contains water as H₂O (along with added flavor of tea). Hughes points out that it does not contradict Kripke’s assertions regarding the issue, he calls “…the relevant senses or standards of application are different.”

The point is that, this position does not provide any harm to Kripkean thesis. Kripke maintains that the term ‘water’ is stipulated to some unique set of essential properties which are in service of its reference determination and stipulation. This is what philosophers belonging to descriptivism (like Frege, Russell, Searle), are doing.

If we consider the approach of John Searle, then using the term ‘water’ as part of primary aspect of the speaker, his secondary aspect may be, say, a cup of tea (what Chomsky is describing); but still he means water which is H₂O as its chemical composition etc. Hence, the confusion in describing impure water for the term ‘water’ is not making any difference as far as use of the natural kind term ‘water’, is concerned. Hughes puts it as “…the relevant senses or standard of application are different.”

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162 Hughes, *op cit.*, 64.
He holds that:

“A strong form of Kripke’s thesis— that “water” rigidly designates H₂O is unambiguously and standard independently true—seems to be both initially plausible, and defensible, in the face of the arguments offered against it by Aune and Chomsky...”¹⁶⁴

Kripke provides some surprising metaphysical assertions. In Naming and Necessity, he says that cats might turn out to be strange demons. In his view, cats might turn out to be animal, different from our general perceptions about cats and not that cats do not exist.¹⁶⁵ He says that cats could have been discovered as belonging not to animal species, but to demons. But still, the term ‘cat’, is going to remain ‘cat’. All we can say is that the animal discovered does not belong to cat species. So, in actual and possible world, the ‘cat’ means a certain species of cat while demons means what Kripke calls ‘cat-like being which is not an animal.’¹⁶⁶

Now, reference stipulation practices natural kind terms follows, as per Descriptivism, some description, but the description is open ended i.e. it does not describes whether the term belong to a class of amphibian, birds, reptilian, or mammals, or even demons. In contrast, some terms like ‘gold’ are closed ended i.e. its description as ‘the element possessing atomic number seventy

¹⁶⁴Ibid, 65.
¹⁶⁵Kripke, op.cit. 319.
¹⁶⁶Kripke, op.cit. 321.
nine (79) reflects its quality of being an element. This is the weighted most, dominated description that may be attached to gold (to descriptivism or essential property (to Kripke).

Ahmed tries to refute Kripke’s thesis that ‘gold’ consist of some essential properties i.e. atomic number seventy nine (79), in holding that the premises of counterexample i.e. ‘it would be a world where gold did not exist,’ may be an acceptable intuition a metaphysical possibility.

Kripke puts same argument for phenomenal terms for theoretical identification like ‘light’ (according to descriptivism, is an abbreviated description of ‘stream of photons’), as he provided for mass terms like ‘water’. There may be some possible world in which ‘light’ is not associated with ‘stream of photons’.

Kripke’s utters:

...When we have discussed a phenomenon which in all possible worlds will be molecular motion- which could not have failed to be molecular motion, because that’s what the phenomenon is.

5.7 The New theory of reference: allegation and criticisms of Kripke

The main idea of rigid designation seems to rest on the assumption that Kripke actually originated the idea. It was Ruth Barcan Marcus who originated the idea. It was Ruth Barcan Marcus who originated the idea.
idea of rigid designation. It is indeed a big claim to make, but Quentin Smith did so. He raises objection in attribution of ‘New Theory of Reference’ to Saul Kripke and other leading philosophers of that time but ignoring Ruth Barcan Marcus who actually originated the theory. David Braun shows that direct reference theory concerning proper names was mainly provided by several landmarks of philosophy of language including Saul Kripke, David Kaplan, Keith Donnellan, Scott Soames etc. (Braun, 1994: 465, n. 1).171

Kripke tries to portray the futility of identity between names. Marcus depicts that ‘identity between names are necessary’. For instance, ‘Cicero’ is ‘Tully’ if somebody thinks this way; it means that the person believes that two names ‘Cicero’ and ‘Tully’ reflect necessary truths. Marcus uses the term ‘tag’ for Proper names. She depicts that Proper names serves merely the function of tagging. Now, I think that tagging seems to be like Russell’s notion of denotation. In other words, the notion of tag seems to be associated with Russell’s notion of Proper names working as denoting phrase.

This property of proper names seems to be not accepted by Quine. He holds that in the evening planet ‘Venus’ may be tagged as ‘Hesperus’ and the same planet may be tagged as ‘Phosphorous’ in the morning. Later, empirical investigation reveals that the same planet had been tagged twice. But these empirical investigation shows that there is only one referent i.e. planet Venus,

173 See also, Kripke, op. cit, 100.
then tagging twice may provide no harm to our reference stipulation practice owing to the fact that it is known that ‘Hesperus=Phosphorous’. Marcus says that such cases may be dealt by some dictionary which shows the same referent for two Proper names.

Kripke emphasizes, ‘...being present at that discussion, I remember that she advocated the view that if you really have names, a good dictionary should be able to tell you that whether they have the same reference.’ He thinks above view as incorrect and hence identity between names need not be necessarily true. But Quentin Smith criticizes this observation of Kripke, as Marcus later made it clear that what she meant by using the word ‘dictionary’ is the dictionary in mind that work just like encyclopedia (where names are present with same reference).

Quine’s idea that this twice tagged event may be applied to ordinary proper names. Kripke concludes that identity between names may not be true necessarily. The identity may be known a priori. However after empirical investigation, we may know that ‘Hesperus=Phosphorus’ i.e. a posteriori.

It may also be inferred that ‘Hesperus’ and ‘Phosphorous’ work as rigid designator in all possible worlds, when used as Proper names. Planet Venus is referred by both names in other possible worlds too, because reference fixing practices may be used in that world like providing description like our actual world. The point is that if we come to know by empirical investigation that

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174 Ibid., 101.
176 Ibid., 101.
'Hesperus' referring to the same object as 'Phosphorous' is referring. Even if we infer that in some counterfactual situation, 'Hesperus' is refereeing to a certain star and 'Phosphorous' is referring to another star. Hence both are refereeing to different stars. In this case too Kripke says from inference of this actual world, we may say that both are refereeing to the same object. From this discussion we may deduce the following:

a. "Venus" = "Venus" is known a priori.

b. "Hesperus" and "Phosphorous" are functioning as rigid designators.

c. "Hesperus" and "Phosphorous" are refereeing to the same object.

d. Point iii) is not necessarily known a priori.

e. Identity between names may not be necessarily true.

f. Point i) and ii), are true in all possible worlds. Point iii) is subject to empirical investigation. Hence, the reference of these two names is fixed by the empirical investigation of language user. Here, he seems to overlap with the notion of sense in that sense depends on the ways of presentation of an object. That's in this case senses are different. The sense too depends on the value of cognition i.e. empirical investigation.

g. Kripke doubts in point iv) and asserts that '.....there are contingent marks by which we identify a certain planet and give it a name'\(^{177}\). We may also infer that:

h. "Hesperus" = "Phosphorous" may be known a posteriori.

\(^{177}\) Kripke, op.cit. 105.
He tries to explore the issue of stipulation of reference by means of using the notion of rigid designation. Identity between names is the issue of linguistic behavior. The reason for not doing so may be a belief on the person who first discovered the fact and then passed it to other speakers, perhaps in a linear fashion or what Kripke calls in a chain of communication. Hence, Kripke would not have been visualized the need to verification of the empirical investigation (i.e. whether the discovery that ‘Hesperus’=‘Phosphorous’) is right. May be it would not have been the case that the discoverer might have seen same other body in the morning instead of “Venus” and tagged it\textsuperscript{178} as ‘Phosphorous’. In spite of his repeated observation, he would have wrongly named the body observed in the evening as “Hesperus” instead of “Phosphorous”. In either case, there is wrong identification of name(s) with the same referent i.e. Venus. Another remarkable objection provided by Kripke runs like this. The fact that ‘Hesperus’=‘Phosphorous’ and the referent being the same object i.e. Venus, the claim that this identity between names is necessarily \textit{a posteriori} truth. There is quite possibility that in future it may be discovered that “Hesperus” is not “Phosphorous”.

Quentin Smith asserts that Marcus provided great contribution and more than anybody else. She actually developed a new theory of reference. Kaplan advocates that new theory of proper names is provided by Kripke. He also coined the term rigid designation for proper names. He holds that a proper name designates the same thing in all possible worlds. But as far as this term is

\textsuperscript{178} According to Marcus proper names serves the function of tagging.
concerned with common nouns, the credit should be given to Marcus and not to Kripke, as Kaplan did. Hence, Kripke’s idea of proper names, behaving as a rigid designator is actually credited to Marcus and not to Kripke.

It is indeed a big allegation. However, if the allegation is proved to be true, it may correct our grave misunderstanding regarding the issue. It is like Kripke’s own example of ‘Gödel’ who propounded ‘incompleteness of arithmetic, but the theorem was actually given by ‘Schmidt’. ‘Gödel’ somehow obtained the work and published it by his own name. Of course, the same is not true of Kripke. It seems a misunderstanding on the part of initial acceptors of using applications of proper names. It is like a case of reference changing.

John Perry, a scholar contributing in new theory of reference too ignores Marcus’s contribution in new theory of reference. He thinks, in agreement with Kripke's idea that the reference of a proper name may be stipulated by causal chain of communication. Refuting Frege and Russell, he already maintained that descriptions don’t play any role in reference determination of proper name. Fregean sense too falls short of determining reference of a proper name. David Braun, in his work Nous, too suggests that Kripke, Donnellan, Kaplan, Salmon and Soames clearly advocate ‘Direct theory of reference’. David Kaplan emphasizes ‘New theory of Proper names’ to Saul Kripke.

According to Marcus, a proper name is an identifying description that serves just the function of tagging. It possesses no meaning or what Russell calls connotation. It is not an abbreviated description i.e. it can’t be convertible with
any description. It forms the basis of ‘direct reference theory of proper names’. For example, “Kripke” refers only to or tags to “Kripke” and not to any description like ‘The Author of Naming and Necessity’. In this sense proper names are directly referential. The problem of reference stipulation, encountered by Marcus runs like this. She asserts that descriptions do serve in discrimination of an object. But the practice is different form giving a proper name to an object.

In Naming and Necessity, Kripke talks about reference fixing practices of a proper name through some unique description. But the description is not part of the meaning of proper names. He thinks that the reference fixing practices are performed through a causal chain of communication which projects backward towards what he calls initial baptism, his innovation lies in the invention of this concept.

What is more interesting thing observed by Quentin Smith is that modal arguments that were thought to be attributed to Kripke, were actually provided by Marcus. Considering identity between names, “Hesperus” may be substituted for “Phosphorous”. But in modal contexts, it may not be true. The identity merely reflects equivalence between two identity terms like “Hesperus” and “Phosphorous”. The star that has seen in morning might have been seen in the evening. Refuting description theorists like Frege and Russell, Marcus depicts that if they would be right then a description like ‘Venus is the •143

evening star’ would have been known a priori. While in fact, it is known a posteriori as it is subject to empirical investigation. Marcus further asserts that “Venus” shows modally stable sense, when an equivalence is created in holding that “Venus”= “Venus”. It may be asserted that mere reflection of the term “Venus” shows that it signifies both “morning star” and “evening star”. Now, previously described two names of the planet “Venus” i.e. “Phosphorous” and “Hesperus” may be substituted one for the another, as per the principle of substitutivity in all possible worlds where planet ‘Venus’ exists. And these names do not do so in the counterfactual situations where the planet do not exists. Hence, the names would behave as non-rigid designators.

According to what smith calls ‘New theory of reference’, proper names refer directly, hence are directly referential. While definite description, as per description theories, refer indirectly through somewhat Marcus calls modally stable sense.

Quentin Smith attributes another doctrine of Marcus that was thought to belong to Kripke i.e. the idea of necessity a posteriori. Now, the two names of planet “Venus” may be recognized as belonging to the same planet, only after empirical discovery. In this sense, the truth occurred is necessary but a posteriori.

Most of the ideas found in Naming and Necessity (1980), were actually originated in 1961, when Marcus presented a paper entitled "Modalities and

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[180] Ibid. 310.
[181] Ibid., 194.
Intentional Language”. Kripke attended the seminar in which the paper was presented. He deliberately overlooked to quote Marcus in his work. It seems a fact, not an allegation. Smith suspects that Kripke might not have understood or grasped the idea delivered by Marcus at that time. Later he came to understand so but he never bothered to announce it. Smith asserts that:

I believe a reasonable explanation of why Kripke did not attribute the central features of the "New Theory" to Marcus is that he originally misunderstood Marcus’s New Theory of Reference. When he eventually understood it, after a year or two, the insight that came made it seem that the ideas were new. I suspect that such instances occur fairly frequently in the history of thought and art.\footnote{Smith, Quentin. ‘Marcus, Kripke, and the Origin of The New Theory of Reference’ in Synthese, Volume 104, No. 2, August 1995, pp. 179-189. Reprinted in (eds. James Fetzer and Paul Humphreys).}

These are serious allegations imposed on Kripke by Smith. Scott Soames reacted against this allegation. He asserted that “…the charges Smith makes against Kripke are false and that the historical picture he paints are inaccurate.”\footnote{Scott Soames, “Revisionism about Reference: A Reply to Smith”, in Synthese 104:191-216, 1995. He presented this paper in the division eastern meeting of the APA Boston, December 1994.} He presents a systematic account of whole scenario and concluded that “…I also hope that no one will be distracted by Smith’s overheated rhetoric and irresponsible sowing of discord from the truly outstanding contribution of both Kripke and Marcus.”\footnote{Soames, “Revisionism about Reference: A Reply to Smith”, in Synthese 209.} Later, Stephen Neale confirmed that there is no plagiarism found in Kripke’s new theory of
reference, as per allegations raised by Smith. Kripke has been criticized by several others including Michael Dummett, Gareth Evans, and recently by Arif Ahmed etc.

Ahmed tries to criticize Kripke’s thesis (on terms of natural kind) in holding that he provides no sufficient argument for necessity of theoretical identification like ‘heat’ is theoretical identified for ‘molecular motion’. He argues that a sort of identity is observed between heat and molecular motion. Heat may be associated with some properties. But these properties may vary in several counterfactual situations. He says how empirical science demonstrates the association of ‘heat’ with ‘molecular motion’. Now, as I understand, Ahmed wishes to express that the notion of rigidity does not satisfactorily applies to the terms of natural kind (particularly the cases of theoretical identification like ‘heat’). It does not seem necessary identification of something to be ‘heat’ and its association with ‘molecular motion’. ‘Heat’ and ‘molecular motion’, both behave as rigid designators.

Kripke himself realizes that “...heat might have turned out not to have been molecular motion, and that gold might have turned out not to have been the element with the atomic number seventy nine.”

Kripke asserts against description theories that it is most likely that a name may be borrowed from a speaker without any description about it. Even a child may

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186 Ibid. 140.
refer to Saul Kripke, hearing that he is eminent living philosophers of language, without getting it aside among the names used in the speech community.

Secondly, a description may be used to identify a referent. For example, proper name “Saul Kripke” is ‘the author of Naming and Necessity’. But it is not necessary that he is the author of Naming and Necessity, as some other person would have delivered the lecture on the subject. Now, what purpose these arguments serve? Is there any solution to bridge the speaker’s utterances and thoughts in his mind? It is natural to expect that name-token used by the speaker must correspond to its right referent, which provides reinforcement with the same name token.

The description theory of Frege and Russell suggest that the descriptions play pivotal role in identification and stipulation of reference. Frege and Russell hold that a description may replace a proper name. That’s why; I call this theory replacement theory. Kripke claims that the only function of description is to fix a reference. But in some counterfactual situation it may fail to do so, in such cases how we are going to fix a reference? He suggests that the stipulation of reference is performed by some ‘causal chain of communication’ which project backward towards finding the cause of a proper name, instead of some description as Frege and Russell hold.

The problem of picking out a reference must be examined with great care. Kripke promotes Searle’s suggestion that the classical description theory should be transformed in to cluster theory of description. In other words, single
description may fall short of fixing a reference and hence a cluster of
descriptions may be helpful in fixing a reference. The theory too suffers from
several demerits. However, the demerits are not as severe as that of classical
theory of description (of Frege and Russell).

Russell thinks that one must be able to refer to the objects, he is thinking. This
principle of Russell is refuted by Kripke. Evans put remark on this refutation in
holding that ‘...he would have shown something of even greater importance
than the unacceptability of the description theories of Names, or than any of the
many other fascinating conclusions contained in the lectures. But I think it fair
to say that Kripke didn’t refute Russell’s principle.’\textsuperscript{188} Kripke’s argument may
be evaluated on the conception of belief which speaker express regarding a
referent. A speaker must not only be able to express a belief, but he must also
be able to possess thoughts about the referent. He must be able to use the
referent, in countless ways, but the referent must remain intact. In contrast with
Russell’s conception, countless properties of an object and its thinking may be
performed, even in the absence of the object. It is here, modal intuition comes
in.

Kripke’s refutation of Frege and Russell on the basis of modal intuition could
have a more rational approach i.e. in the form of consistent, self-evident
approach. Evans even suggests that it could have been in the form of thought,
judgment, belief etc and some theory about each of them.\textsuperscript{189} I think that it is
justified and wise suggestion on the part of Evans. But any theory related to

\textsuperscript{188} Evans, \textit{op cit.}, 74.
\textsuperscript{189} \textit{Ibid.}, 76.
speaker's psychology would still be failed to provide a satisfactory answer to Kripke's refutation. Merely describing modal intuitions as self-evident principles will not be of much value as it should possess some rational basis.\(^{190}\)

In several places in *Naming and Necessity*, Kripke's argument seems to be weak. His refutation against descriptivist philosopher had been assumed as right by several philosophers. The refutation has something to do with the functioning of human thought and other psychological state of mind regarding objects.

The same has been assumed without any arguments expected on the part of philosophers.\(^{191}\) Evans suggests that the abandonment of identification principle of Russell seems to be a consequence of speaker's sayings and thinking. Now such abandonment is to be preserved. Kripke's refutation suggests that he has mistaken belief for thought.\(^{192}\) Now, the approach of description theories directs us towards a certain belief about the reference identification and stipulation. However, I think Frege and Russell initially had a thought for this approach (both independently). The refutation on the part of Kripke seems to run on this assumption. The description theories merely suggest a way of reference stipulation. I think that Frege and Russell nowhere claimed that this is and will be the only way to determine reference and its fixation with a Proper name. Kripke tries to provide just another way for this

\(^{190}\) I think that modal intuition does not contain rational basis; and is metaphysical. It even seems a guess work. However, the way Kripke's argument describes, it looks appealing.

\(^{191}\) Evans, op cit., 76.

\(^{192}\) Ibid., 76.
(in the form of causal theory of reference), however in a better and more sophisticated way. He himself admits this, elsewhere in *Naming and Necessity.*

Likewise, I intended to think that recently introduced interdisciplinary science ‘cognitive science’ seems to present a more plausible and comprehensive way to solve the problems related with reference, by knowing the functioning of human mind and its relation with external objects. Secondly, Kripke assumes similarity between using application of proper names by competent speaker and ignorant speaker too. Both are successful in providing reference of a proper name. Both borrowed reference in similar fashion i.e. by some causal chain created during the course of communication from at the time of initial baptism to present use of the name.

Now, question arises that in virtue of what a speaker is entangled in a particular using application of proper name regarding a particular name at a particular time framework? What is the criterion of choosing a definite using application? In virtue of what, a particular name is ejected among the vast data of names in a given speech community? What is the rational basis for this selection?

Evans also tries to raise similar question. He asserts that ‘...It is unfortunate that Kripke chooses to analyze the notion in this way......’ It is plausible clear outcome of Kripke’s proposal which suggest that speaker’s utterance possess (both competent and ignorant) some causal basis of the relation between an object and its respective utterance. In other words, we may describe

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194 Evans, op cit., 77.
it as speaker’s thinking about an object, directly rests on the causal substratum which in turn established by the inseparable relation of an object with the mental picture of the speaker involved in using application of a proper name in question. Now, thoughts seem to possess certain expressional instinct which scatters itself in order to create a link with the object of thought, during the process of communication. In present case, the link is causal.

Several philosophers including David Kaplan, independent of Kripke advocate ‘Direct Theory of Reference’, in which the object of our thought are subject to some direct empirical investigation or the same through some speakers. Now, it too contains some causal basis.

The causal relation involved between subjectivity of speaker i.e. his psychology and the objectivity i.e. concerned object, must have some relational basis. In other words, the relation must not be successful in determining or tracing the right kind of object under consideration. In order to achieve this objective, Evans suggest a model called ‘The Photograph Model of Mental Representation’, according to which causal relations embedded in mental states that are true of objects, are traced out. This tracing out of causal relation, in the view of Kripke and others, supplies a basis of inter-relation between psychological state of mind regarding an object and the object itself.\(^{195}\)

He admits himself that there may be confusion in differentiation of one object from other. Kripke’s proposal suggests digging out the history behind a proper

\(^{195}\) Ibid., 78. Evans assumes that approach refer to only one object, which is captured permanently at the time of production.
name, which is causally related with the object thought. Evans observes an analogy between Kripke’s model and Photograph model. The later may be applied to a wide variety of cases. It suggests what Evans calls ‘The Historical Explanation Theory of Reference’. It is also clear that Kripke’s work inspired several others to work on the functional aspect of thought, in relation with phenomenal objects.

I think that Evans’s evaluation of Kripke’s model is well directed in first phase of his criticism, but as far as analogy of Kripke’s model with Photograph model is concerned, there is no point of comparison between them. Evans remarks that Kripke’s work direct the relational aspect of thought or belief with object. It may be true, but I find Kripke too moves around the notion of reference stipulation. That’s why he provided a causal basis of such stipulation, through a historical chain of communication that runs in a linear fashion.

Kripke’s doctrine that proper names are rigid designators and definite descriptions non-rigid ones thus provides a mechanism which both has the same effect as scope distinctions and must be explained in terms of them. We could get the same effect by viewing proper names, in natural language, as subject to a convention that they always have wide scope; Kripke is saved from having to view definite descriptions as non-rigid in some contexts and rigid in others only by explicitly appealing to the mechanism of scope in their case. Such an explanation would not demonstrate the non-equivalence of a proper name with a definite description in any very strong sense: it would simply
show that they behaved differently with respect to ad hoc conventions employed by us for determined scope.\textsuperscript{196}

It seems that Dummett’s criticism overlooked the notion of modality or what we may call modal intuitions (we have already discussed the utility of these intuitions in philosophy) or by what preoccupation with Frege’s theory of meaning. Hughes asserts “I find it puzzling, and somewhat worrisome, that Dummett takes a sentence which I think has no true reading to have one” (Hughes:2004, 8-9). Hughes says that Dummett criticism of Kripke does not seem to be well directed because of the wrong interpretation (or false readings of sentences like ‘St. Anne could not but have been a parent’ possess false reading but ‘The mother of Mary could not but have been a parent’ possess true as well as false reading). This I believe too is a wrong interpretation of Kripke’s thesis. Hughes again says:

“...perhaps his intuitions are corrupted by a prior commitment to descriptivism”. But then, how do I know that my own intuitions aren’t corrupted by exposure to Kripke, Putnam, et alii? I’m not sure, but I take comfort from the fact that if I am blind...my form of blindness is very widespread.”\textsuperscript{197}

Moving in line with Hughes, I am inclined to think that modal arguments (which are being presented as device for refuting descriptivism) is commonly attributed to or what Hughes calls ‘standing convention’ like “...a sentence like

\textsuperscript{196} ibid., 128.
\textsuperscript{197} Hughes, op. cit 8-9.
‘n might have been F’ is to be understood as equivalent to ‘The G is such that it might not have been F’, and not to ‘it might have been that: the G is F’...

5.8 Rigid designation v/s Rigid application

Devitt calls Kripke’s argument as “lost rigidity” argument as the rigidity of definite description seems to be lost in this process. He infers that Kripke’s argument does not stand for all description theories. He says that the descriptions followed by proper names may be “rigidified”. These rigidified descriptions seem to be safe from Kripke’s refutation. However, Kripke’s position is true for most of the description theories. But what makes a description rigidified? Devitt suggests attaching a modal operator like actually in order to make a description rigidified. For example, “the person who was actually the last great philosopher of antiquity” is a rigidified description of name “Aristotle”. The same is true of natural kind terms.

Kripke, as Devitt assumes considers natural kind terms for their likeness with proper names. The terms have not been considered by description theories of proper names, Devitt maintains. He invents the notion of “rigid application” for all those rigid designators (including natural kind terms) which may be applied rigidly in all possible worlds. But whether applied or not; a rigid designator will continue to be so in all possible worlds (Kripke would have answered). He holds that natural kind terms like ‘gold’ function as rigid applier while its contingent description involving contingent properties like yellowness,

198 Ibid., 8.
200 Ibid. 145-147.
malleability is non-rigid applier. But if the description is rigidified i.e. adding modal operator, the description may behave as rigid applier.

Devitt maintains that the notion of rigid application does same job as rigid designation. But I think that both notions stand similar. The former is applicative while later stands for designating the reference of a proper name or natural kind terms.

Schwartz holds that all natural kind terms are not rigid applier (he is quoting example of ‘frog’). He maintains that in addition to natural kind terms, there are nominal kind terms which may be called as rigid applier. But primary task is not to have such kind distinction but to cover these terms which description theory covers and those which the theory avoids. Schwartz supposes that a frog might have been died as ‘tadpole’ (the name of frog’s larvae). And tadpole too may not function as rigid applier because it may become frog in later stages. So, natural kind terms, as Schwartz puts it, are not rigid applier. Devitt tries to present a solution to the problem of failure of rigid applier to natural kind terms like frog. He holds “...where rigidity (in the case that concern us) is explained by causal theory, weak rigidity is partly explained by a ‘causal theory and partly by a description theory.” Devitt claims that Schwartz criticism of rigid application is not well directed because rigidity is not meant for identifying the kind of natural terms. Schwartz claims natural kind terms to be non-rigid because of, what Devitt calls ‘their mode of reference is partly descriptive.’ Devitt thinks that the notion of rigid application may offer a

\[\text{Devitt, op.cit. 154.} \]

\[\text{Ibid..158.} \]
similar theoretical work for terms of natural kinds as that of the notion of rigid
designators.\footnote{Ibid., 159.}

For the first time, in the history of philosophy, Kripke tries to refute Kant’s
notion of 

\textit{a priori} and \textit{analytic} judgement and Considering theoretical
identification, such as ‘Water is \text{H}_2\text{O}', ‘Gold is the element with atomic
number seventy nine (79).'\footnote{Ibid., 116.} Now what are the essential properties of gold?
Kripke says that according to Kant ‘Gold is a yellow metal’ is analytic
judgment which is \textit{a priori}. But we may observe that \textit{yellowness} of gold can’t
be taken \textit{a priori} as its essential property. In some counterfactual situation the
color of gold may be changed, say, ‘blue’ instead of yellow. Hence, it can’t be
known \textit{a priori}. When we heard of gold, we heard about thing sometimes
discovered as a part of some speech community. It contains certain properties
and we call it ‘Gold’. Kripke assumes that we may discover some another
substance, say, fool’s gold which resembles gold, in terms of some properties
like yellowness. But in fact fool’s gold is not real gold. Here the term ‘Gold’
behave as a \textit{rigid designator}, which behave \textit{rigidly} in all possible worlds like
proper names.

Some other natural kind terms too behave as a \textit{rigid designator}. For example,
‘tiger’ may be described with the description, ‘four legged striped carnivorous
belonging to cat family’. Now the description is appealing to description
theorists. The ‘tiger’ belongs to this unique description. The terms of natural
kind may also be called as proper names because they behave rigidly like them.
That’s why Kripke extends the notion of proper names to natural kind terms such as ‘gold’, ‘tiger’, ‘water’, ‘heat’ etc. which are introduced by some introducers with descriptions like gold ‘is a metal which consist of atomic number 79’, tiger is ‘four legged striped carnivorous belonging to cat family’, water ‘is H$_2$O’. The behavior of these terms as a rigid designator is so because some of their properties like yellowness of gold is a contingent property but its atomic number seventy nine (79) is an essential property of gold. The essential property is not going to change in all possible worlds.

Kripke maintains that those statements are necessarily true which are followed by some scientific discoveries such as gold possess atomic number seventy nine (79). But no discovery is the last work. It opens to explore future scientific investigations. He asserts that the doctrine of rigid designation may be applied to the terms of natural kind such as ‘tiger’, ‘dog’ etc. Names of bacteria such as *Escherichia Coli*, bacteriophage, *Herpes virus* too behave as rigid designators because they belong to a particular species. Mass terms such as ‘gold’, ‘water’ also behave likewise. And the terms of natural phenomenon such as ‘light’, ‘sound’, ‘heat’ also fall in the same category.

Mill holds that common name or natural kind terms consist of connotation owing to their specific association with some species. In agreement with Russell, Mill holds that genuine Proper name serves the purpose of denotation only. While definite description possesses both denotation and connotation$^{205}$. The cluster description theory suggests a cluster of properties which determines

$^{205}$ See also Kripke, *op. cit.* 134.
the referent of a Proper name. Kripke depicts that such cluster might not have been associated with the referent. But the term could have been existed even in the absence of the referent. Again Kripke tries to go in the problem of stipulation of reference. How reference of a certain term may be stipulated?

Any term fixes its reference by mean some baptism like the definition of ‘one meter’, which stipulates its reference. Likewise, natural kind terms such as ‘alcohol’, ‘apple’, ‘lion’ etc. too fixes in similar fashion. And the terms of natural phenomenon like ‘sound’, ‘light’ etc. also do so by mean of scientific observation like light is that ‘which shows a stream of photon’. This is how terms pass in a linear chain of communication, irrespective of the ways which speaker acquire to pass the same. I may assert that Kripke tries to overlook the notion of Fregean ‘Sense’, which seems not be avoided so easily. He also tries to depart from Kant slogan of synthetic judgment a priori in holding that all terms behaving as rigid designator reflect truth but contingently. The properties of referent may change in some possible world (trans-world identity), but the term is going to behave as a rigid designator in all possible worlds.

5.9 Beyond rigidity argument:

Soames tries to criticize Kripke’s thesis in holding that contingent a priori truth and necessary a posteriori truth are separate issues. In Kripke’s example, ‘Hesperus’ is ‘Phosphorous’, is a posteriori truth. Soames considers this a priori. This identity relationship becomes a posteriori if a sort of replacement
happens in ‘Hesperus’ and ‘Phosphorous’ with what he calls appropriate rigidified description.

The length of stick S is one meter, if there is a replacement of one meter with real length that stick S possess; it is a contingent *a priori* truth. But it is stick S of one meter length is contingent *a posteriori*, as Soames claims. It is plausible to consider this owing to empirical investigation.

Soames suspects Kripke’s position in holding that there seems to be a underestimated gap between contingent *a priori* (knowing that a sentence is true) and contingent *a posteriori* (knowing the truth expressed) or what I wish to call as *hybridized* or mixed truth. The disquotational principles seem to be problematic, that may fill the so called *underestimated* gap. According to Soames, Kripke overstresses the issue of ‘Hesperus’ and ‘Phosphorous’ being different names of same planets having different locations in the sky\textsuperscript{206}. Soames maintains that the issue merely shows that the resulting position is false rather than the expressed proposition could be false. And the principles of Strong Disquotation (SDQ)\textsuperscript{207} and Strong Disquotation and Justification (SDJ)\textsuperscript{208} could fill that gap. But these principles are insufficient to fill that gap because how these principles express varied attitudes towards the same proposition. Soames emphasized that Kripke’s thesis that necessary truths cannot be known *a priori* is objectionable.

\textsuperscript{206}Kripke, op. cit. 104.
\textsuperscript{207}SDQ, as I understand, understanding a sentence S, realized it acceptable, if and only if he believes that the proposition is expressed semantically by S. See Soames, *Beyond Rigidity: unfinished Semnatic Agenda of Naming and Necessity*, 384.
\textsuperscript{208}SDJ tries to enrich epistemological content of the expressed proposition of a sentence S, in Gettier framework. The person is justified in believing (based on some evidence) the proposition semantically expressed by sentence S.
As far as contingent truths *a priori* is concerned, Weak Disquotation\(^{209}\) and Strong Disquotation and Justification (WDJ),\(^{210}\) which are concerned with the conversion of acceptable linguistic assertion (e.g. one meter length of stick S) in to knowledge (Soames seems to be too much concerned about epistemology rather than truth). This obtained knowledge may be converted in to *a priori* knowledge by still another principle, viz. Weak Linguisticism about the a priori (WLA).\(^{211}\) Soames refutes each of these principles.\(^{212}\)

Soames thinks that we know *a priori* 'Hesperus' is 'Phosphorous' because we think *a priori* 'Hesperus' is 'Hesperus'. But how this we do. Soames replies "a modest theoretical framework that goes beyond what Kripke explicitly commits himself to in Naming & Necessity."\(^{213}\) Soames takes two alternative of fixing a reference of one meter i.e. by mean of empirical investigation and by mean of what he calls "blind" fixing of reference.\(^{214}\)

Kripke was actually concerned about the later method of reference stipulation (based on empirical investigation). Soames claims "creates too large of a gap between the proposition expressed by a sentence...and the information with which competent speakers are presented when they understand the

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\(^{209}\) SDQ, as I understand, understanding a sentence S, realized it acceptable, if and only if he believes that the proposition is expressed semantically by S. See Soames, Beyond Rigidity: unfinished Semnatic Agenda of Naming and Necessity, 384.

\(^{210}\) SDI tries to enrich epistemological content of the expressed proposition of a sentence S, in Gettier framework. The person is justified in believing (based on some evidence) the proposition semantically expressed by sentence S.

\(^{211}\) The knowledge would be *a priori*, if and only if, the person's knowledge about the expressed proposition of a sentence is based on the knowledge of facts (of semantics) about the proposition.

\(^{212}\) I think going in further detail, to explain the principle basis of Soames refutation; is not plausible here.

\(^{213}\) Soames, Beyond Rigidity: unfinished Semantic Agenda of Naming and Necessity, 373.

\(^{214}\) It seems, to me, mere assumption of taking stick S as of one meter length without verifying its actual length.
sentence”\textsuperscript{215}. Yablo further goes “Soames blames the bad results on blind reference-fixing...Soames concludes that neither scenario delivers on Kripke’s promise of \textit{a priori} knowledge that stick S is a meter long.\textsuperscript{216}

If there is assurance that my knowledge about the proposition expressed by a sentence is true; then this understanding generates a sort of \textit{a priori} knowledge. The principles basis of this argument is what Yablo points out Regular Old Linguisticism about the a priori (RLA). In contrast with Kripke’s criticism, RLA supplies \textit{a priori} knowledge.

I can argue that Kripke does not even touch this sort of theoretical framework at all. Soames’s refutation of Kripke is not well directed. Kripke did not intend to provide such perspective. His refutation of \textit{a priori} knowledge suggests that the sort of knowledge is obtained only after empirical verification. Hence, knowledge may not be obtained \textit{a priori}. For example, the knowledge ‘Hesperus’ is ‘Phosphorous’ may not be known \textit{a priori}.

Now, if we have already knows both terms and also knows that both refer to the same thing. The later part itself based on empirical investigation; hence the knowledge thus obtained becomes \textit{a posteriori}. Hence, Soames seems to include \textit{a posteriori} knowledge of ‘Hesperus’ and ‘Phosphorous’ to be \textit{a priori} by means of introducing several principles like SDQ, SDJ, WDQ, WDJ, WLA, RLA, as Yablo tries to analyze. Soames assertion does not seem to distort

\textsuperscript{215} Soames, \textit{Beyond Rigidity: unfinished Semantic Agenda of Naming and Necessity}, 415.

Kripkean system. It merely seeks to explain the proper, guaranteed understanding of the terms used in utterances.

Sider and Braun try to draw distinction between a semantic expression and assertion. The intention is to preserve the Fregean sense and Millian thesis along with providing value to Kripkean system. His approach considers the enrichment of a proper name, say, ‘Aristotle’ with a description of a sort ‘the teacher of Alexander’. But intuitive truth value seems to be a function of descriptive enrichment of the contexts. If we consider Kripke’s example of ‘Gödel’, then ‘Gödel’ seems to be descriptively enriched by ‘the person who proved incompleteness of theorem’. But in fact, this is not true. According to Sider and Braun, Soames suggests that in Gödel example, some speaker who is unaware of Gödel’s theft may still uses in utterances like:

According to Soames, by uttering ‘the host believes that Prof. Gödel will speak on logic’, Smith primarily asserts the descriptively enriched proposition. The host believes that Prof. Gödel, who stole the incompleteness proof form Schmidt, will speak on logic.

Soames think that such descriptive enrichment are partly true (because Prof. Gödel is actually going to speak on logic) and partly false (because Prof. Gödel is wrongly attributed to incompleteness theorem of arithmetic). Kripke

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218 Ibid. 4.
considers that the usage of Gödel may be true in spite of its wrong attribution
to incompleteness theorem.

It is plausible to consider Soames thesis that in different contexts, the usage of
sentences may assert different propositions. Like Kripke, Soames too tries to
focus on counterarguments against descriptivism (pure/impure). The arguments
were based on some intuitions regarding truth value of sentences. He even
considers such arguments based on logical intuitions (intuitions involving
argument’s validity).

Sider and Braun consider Soametic perspective on logical intuitions regarding
counterarguments on descriptivism. They consider pragmatic and Tran
contextual position on logical intuitions that a competent speakers of language
may intuit in a particular context (in case of pragmatic position) or in all
contexts (in case of Tran contextual position), provided the argument asserted
by that argument in that context is valid.\textsuperscript{219} They hold:

\begin{quote}
If speakers inherit in a context that an argument is valid, then the
argument it asserts in that context is valid. (It)... is a consequence
of both the Trans-contextual and pragmatic positioning.\textsuperscript{220}
\end{quote}

Soames theory lays too much emphasis on logical intuitions. Speaker’s
intuitions seem to be what Hawthorne calls semantic blindness.\textsuperscript{221} Soames
perceives substitution of a proper name with rigidified description, which
results in shifting route to truth from \textit{a posteriori} to \textit{a priori} truths.

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{219}Ibid., 7.
\textsuperscript{220}Ibid., 8.
\textsuperscript{221}John Hawthorne (2004), Knowledge and Lotteries, Oxford, OUP.
\end{flushleft}
The basic question is that how a name acquire meaning or reference (for to Frege meaning of a name is its referent). Yablo holds that this foundational question is the principle target of Kripke. Soames objection to Kripke seems to be based on the expressed hybrid truth.

Kripke holds that the essential properties attributed to natural kind terms are rigid while contingent properties are non-rigid. For example, ‘gold’ containing ‘atomic number 79’ is rigid while ‘yellow metal’ (which Kant describes) is non-rigid. The same is true of other worlds. The essential properties attributed to the terms are, to Kripke, necessary but a posteriori (subject to empirical investigation). The essential properties of natural kind terms are:

1. Outcome of scientific empirical investigation, hence a posteriori.
2. Helps in reference stipulation of the term.
3. Functions rigidly as the term itself.
4. Necessary identical to its associated term.

Now, in virtue of what the concept remains in all possible worlds? Searle would have answered it, in terms of intentionality i.e. speaker’s intentions to express the concept. Davis points out that Kripke’s notion of rigid designator can’t be analytic because it is not clear what description uniquely follows a proper name. A proper name can’t be linked analytically to a definite description. Davis holds:

...In fact, no description referring to a name can be analytically tied to that name. The meaning of “Aristotle” does not guarantee
that its referent is named “Aristotle” or bears any relation at all to that name. And if someone asks a user of “Aristotle” who he is referring to, it would beg the question for him to answer using the second order description…

Hence, if we ascribe the sense with Kripkean thesis, there seems to be no analytic necessity in his thesis. He only talks about epistemic and metaphysical necessity. It suggests no hope for analytic necessity. But this is not true for theoretical identification. For example, ‘Water is H₂O’ is analytically true.

In spite of severe criticism by various philosophers like Dummett, Evans, and Soames; Kripke’s refutation of Frege-Russell’s thesis is an organized and systematic work.

\[222\text{Ibid., 117.}\]