CHAPTER II

THE THEORY OF PROPER NAMES: FREGE

2.1 Introduction:

The German mathematician and logician Friedrich Ludwig Gottlob Frege was the first to provide a systematic account of proper names. He used the word *eigename* for proper names to all singular terms generally. He did not provide a precise definition of proper names. He was interested to construct a formal language so that the defects and ambiguity of natural language may be avoided. He tried to integrate formal logic with language. Proper names have been encountered as an important issue by Frege because of their importance in sentence construction.

Frege uses the term "proper name" for all singular terms generally. However, he nowhere provided a definite criterion for an expression to be regarded as proper name. He thinks that proper names are linguistic devices that stand for objects. According to him, proper names reflect the most general logical function of linguistic expressions. This reflection is the formal criteria of expressions to be called as proper names. Proper names serve the function of picking out a particular object for which it stands for. He takes this object as the meaning of that proper name.

In his work *Grundlagen* (1884), he described proper names to a variety of objects such as planets, human beings and the terms of natural kinds such as
“tiger,” “water,” “gold” etc. Frege even regards numbers as objects and hence numerical terms may be described as proper names as per the Fregean criteria. The criterion for such ascription of numbers in the category of proper names is that they fall into the category of objects. For example, number “One” may be associated with those objects which show oneness in nature like God\(^1\). This oneness is unique because, by its very nature, it does not allow plurality. Because of this unique quality of proper names, they can be treated as numbers also.

On the one hand, objects possess proper names while on the other hand number of objects also functions as proper names. This is the dual attribution of proper names. For example, number “ten” corresponds to ten objects. Each of these objects keeps proper names of their own. Number “ten” also acts as a proper name because the number is the bearer of ten objects. Frege even think of “points,” “lines,” “shapes,” and even “weights” as proper names because of the same argument.

According to Frege, proper names may be distinguished from expressions of other kind by providing some definite criteria associated with the functioning of proper names. However, he never provided any such criteria for determining which expressions are to be classified as proper names and which are not.

He treats proper names as objective devices. That’s why; he expects that proper names should reveal same meaning in all contexts i.e. to refer to single objects.

He tries to integrate formal logic with the philosophy of language. He talks

\(^1\) Frege, G. (1968) *The Foundations of Arithmetic*, Northwestern University Press, pp.1-3. The enlightened insight of my supervisor had been very useful to understand this concept. See also, Mohammad Muqim. “Sense And No-Sense Theories On Proper names” Indian Philosophical Quaterly XXXIII No. 1, Jan 2006, p.95.
about reconstruction of language in logical form i.e. in the form of premises and conclusion. According to the idea, only those sentences are meaningful that reflects truth conditions. These sentences consist of constituents parts that are separately meaningful. One such meaningful constituent part is proper names. Proper names are separately meaningful as long as they refer to objects.

Frege never bothered to provide any organized method by which one can identify a linguistic device as proper names. What we need to decide whether a term is working as proper name or not is to examine whether they belong to the category of objects or not. What exactly are objects? Does Frege prescribe any particular definition of objects? He devoted large sections about a wide range of objects, including abstract ones. In the category of objects, he also added “directions,” “shapes” and even “classes” such as the class of human beings. He even regards colors such as “blue” as proper name (only when it is used as noun). For example, blue is ‘the color of the sky.’ But when it is used as an adjective, the color does not function as proper name, as in the sentence-“That car is blue.’

Frege thinks of proper names as complete and predicate as incomplete expression. He also treats propositions as complete expression which looks similar to the criterion provided for proper names. Hence, propositions may be called as complex proper names. It means that complex terms like propositions may also be treated as proper names. He is actually looking for exploring all possible definition of proper names. He was very aware of the fact that there always lies a possibility of proper names that possess no meaning because they are empty. “Unicorn” is an example of such empty proper name. These may be
cases of fiction or story. The referent of proper name of this sort is not real; it may be imaginary or fictional. He dares to hold that even such proper names display meaning.

Frege invents the term “sense” which functions as ingredient in providing meaning to proper names or sentences. Sense provides a way of expression which may be differed from context to context; from speaker to speaker. The significance of Fregean sense is that it provides meaning to even empty proper names. He argues that imaginary proper names appearing in the work of fiction or story cannot be considered as meaningless. These names are meaningful because of possessing sense. In any fiction or story, such names display sense; and therefore meaningful.

Frege further ascribes classes in the category of proper names e.g. “the class of mammals,” “the class of bachelors” etc. because the classes fulfils the criteria of being a proper name. That’s why he calls such classes as objects for objects can be the only criteria of being a proper name.

2.2 Criteria of Identity:

Frege often tries to provide a grammatical test for whether a certain expression is proper name or not. In Grundlagen, he talks about the criterion in which one object may be recognized as same in repeated occurrences. Frege was aware of the fact that it is not possible to recognize a particular object as same in every repeated observation because an expression will reveal different senses in different contexts. The concept behind the identity of proper name lies in the general notion of stipulation of identity criteria with a proper name. The
intention is to set a criterion through which proper names may be identified in different contexts. Such stipulation brings forward the stipulation of truth condition of propositions. We may claim our assertions as true or false on the basis of such conditions. We may use them for future references like providing a definition or narrating a story. The criterion of identity may serve the purpose of enhancing communication between speaker and hearer in a certain speech community.

A number and the object for which it stands are inseparably associated to each other. The idea is that numbers cannot stand in isolation on their own. Numbers always stand for some objects. Even number “zero” signifies the absence of objects or the presence of zero objects (that means the same). Numbers match with the criterion that Frege provided for proper names. That’s why he treated numbers as proper names. But from the side of objects, there seems to be no principle basis of such criterion of identity.

2.3 The problem of meaning:

I will now show that Frege’s position to base the theory of meaning on the truth conditions of sentences is not well directed. He holds that the meaning of a proper name is the object of immediate acquaintance. His idea is that the meaning of propositions depends upon the meaning of its constituent parts. Moreover, the meaning of any sentence depends on the thoughts expressed by the speakers during the utterances made in conversation. The meaning is also concerned about the contexts, speaker’s belief, propositional attitude etc. Frege was concerned about the role of meaning in the determination of truth value of
propositions. In order to answer this question Frege invents the notion of “sense.” The meaning of a proper name may be displayed by the sense it reflects. To grasp the sense of a proper name is to know its meaning in terms of identifying a given object. The sense functions in setting a criterion whether a given proper name is true for the corresponding object (it stands for) or not. In other words, in a sentence one may determine the sense of a proper name and thereby its meaning and then knows whether it is true for the given predicate or not.

Frege’s describes the term “sense” as an ingredient in the meaning of proper names and the propositions in which they occur. It is important to verify the utility of sense as an important ingredient in the theory of meaning. I think that Frege revived several ideas of Aristotle regarding names and their referents. He talks about ideality in language. He was more concerned about objective aspect of communication. This pattern was also followed by Aristotle when he tried to formulate a formal language.

However, Frege elaborated these views in the light of advocating an organized theory of meaning. Frege raised the issue of meaning occurring in the utterances of natural language which is full of ambiguity and vagueness.

In his work Grundlagen, Frege raises the issue of meaning of words occurring in propositions. The meaning of any word occurring in a sentence solely depends on its role in determining truth value of the propositions rather than any mental image or idea of the word (as empiricist holds). Frege holds that the utterance of propositions should be restricted to the determination of its truth
condition. In the later part of the Grundlagen, he emphasizes that the meaning of a sentence directly depends on the meaning of its constituent parts.

The meaning of constituent parts is directed by their conventional usage. This seems to be the reason why Aristotle believed words to be conventional devices. The idea is that such devices may change their meaning with the passage of time. This is what Socrates says in Plato’s seminal dialogue Cratylus- that the meaning of words is changed with the passage of time. Frege spins the same thing in terms of truth condition of propositions.

For example, name “cobra” had been used for all snakes generally, but because of passage of time it has changed its meaning and applied to a particular category of neurotoxic snakes. Similarly, name “buffalo” is derived from a Greek word for an antelope that used to be found in North Africa. Now the name is being used for a particular category of a ruminant animal. Frege seems to infer, like Aristotle, that names are conventional devices. These devices don’t have meaning of their own. They reveal meanings only if they refer something.

Frege calls meaning (Bedeutung) a semantic property. He found, like Cratylus, that the meaning of any name can’t remain static. It changes with the change in context, speaker’s belief, attitude etc. That’s why Frege invents the notion of “sense” (Sinn). Sense is that semantic property (of a word or a sentence) by virtue of which it reveals meaning of that word or that sentence. He thinks of sense as a way of description. This way seems to be an important ingredient in

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20 These examples were initially used by Gareth Evans.
providing meaning to words or sentences. Now he thinks that the sense of a sentence directly depends on the sense of its constituent parts.

However, he was more concerned about the sense of a whole sentence that may be revealed by the truth condition of sentences. This invention of sense made Frege's earlier work (Grundlagen) more justified. This is an important contribution of Frege in the philosophy of language. Frege further holds that both words and sentences may have meaning (Bedeutung) as well as sense (Sinn).

In contrast, Wittgenstein thinks that words possess only meaning but no sense. The meaning of word or name is nothing but the object it names. In Tractatus, he holds that propositions have only sense but no meaning. The sense of a proposition is revealed by the situation it describes. For Wittgenstein a proposition only describes a situation or a thing. It does not mean in the way names do i.e. having corresponding object it names.

The objective of Frege's invention of the notion of sense is to provide the maintenance of some objective content in the utterances being used among speakers of language. Hence, sense seems to be the property of propositions by virtue of which they are capable of transferring this objective content.

This new approach of Frege helped him in developing the theory of meaning. It was an effort to provide an analysis of particular atomic sentence such as "Sir Syed Ahmad Khan is wise." A kind of mechanism had been tried to establish in which the truth value of the atomic sentences may be determined as true or false. But what is the principle basis of claiming a particular atomic sentence as containing truth or false value?
Frege was concerned about the utterances being made between speaker and hearer. Both the users of language involve in linguistic practices that is directed towards providing the truth conditions of propositions used in their utterances. They involve in utterances that claim truth or falsity of the propositions being used. The idea is that both speaker and hearer must communicate the same thing in the same sense in every repeated utterances performed by them or within that community of speakers. Frege tries to clarify the working of atomic propositions.

A singular term or proper name like “Ram Dev,” serves the functions of introducing an object. However, speakers may falsely believe the introduction of an object. It is likely to be the case in which the proper name may not even exist, as in case of “Harry Potter.” Now the truth condition of the atomic sentence in which the name occurs fails because “Harry Potter” is a non-existent entity. The organized definition of Frege suggests that the meaning of proper name is the object that solely stands for it. According to this definition, any proper name that does not lead to an existent object is meaningless. That’s why “Harry Potter” is meaningless proper name.

However Frege even considers these empty proper names as meaningful because these names reveal meaning in the context of that fiction or storytelling, beyond that context, the truth value of these sentences fails.

This failure of truth condition distorts semantic property of that sentence. The basic purpose of the semantics of natural language is to provide semantic values to the propositions i.e. whether propositions are true or false. But truth
value of propositions may be confused by the speakers to be true or false. In
spite of this fact, one may go on believing a particular proposition to be true
while in actual case the proposition is false, or vice versa. That’s why Frege’s
projects to base the theory of meaning on truth conditions of propositions
seems to be shattered. Firstly, he utters that only those proper names have
meaning that consists of particular objects. The second premise of Frege’s
argument is that some proper names do not possess corresponding objects.
Hence, it follows that some (empty) proper names are meaningless. In his later
work, Frege seems to contradict his own work by ascribing sense to empty
proper name. This ascription of sense provides meaning to even empty proper
names. But in that case, the argument becomes invalid.

Because of this shattering of the theory of meaning, the notion of reference also
stands ambiguous. The reference of an object is something that provides
meaning to the proper name which stands for it. In other words, the meaning of
a proper name is its bearer.

That’s why the theory of reference plays central role in the theory of meaning.
It is the reference that provides meaning to a proper name. This meaning
determines whether a sentence containing a proper name is true or false. Again
this is an evidence of invalidity of Frege’s argument.

It also rejects Dummett’s idea that the theory of meaning may be treated as
integral whole of the theory of reference and the theory of sense. One the one
hand, it is not necessary that reference is the criteria of providing meaning to
proper names and thereby propositions in which they occur. Proper names
without reference also own sense (as per Fregean criteria).
2.4 Sense theory of proper names:

Frege describes sense as a 'mode of presentation' of objects by mean of proper names. He thinks of sense as an ingredient in the meaning of proper names and thereby sentence containing them. I have maintained\footnote{Jamil, S. (2010), “Frege: The Theory of Meaning Concerning Proper Names”, Vol. 4, No.1, Kritike: An online journal of philosophy, Phillipines.} that some identity terms like “Aphla” and “Ateb” consist of same referent but they have different informative content. Both proper names- “Aphla’ and “Ateb,” share the description ‘the mountain 5000 meters high’ from northern and southern region respectively. Later, it was found that both travelers were actually talking about the same mountain. If we hold this point of view of Frege, then both the names are intersubstitutable i.e. substitution of one proper name with another is not going to change the truth value of the expressed proposition.

Frege observed that new discovery of “Aphla” and “Ateb” is informative. Now “Aphla” abbreviates the description ‘the mountain over 5000 meters high from northern region’ and similarly for “Ateb,” ‘the mountain over 5000 meters high from southern region.’ This is where the relevance of the notion of sense comes in.

For Frege the sense of a name is supplied by the sense of its associated description. The sense of a proper name, say “Barack Obama” is reflected by its associated description-“the present of United States of America.” Initially, sense seems to be in service of determination of its reference.
of the description, the sense of "Barack Obama" may be inferred. Hence, the notion of sense helps in reference determination and identification.

As maintained above, the notion of sense is extremely useful in case of identity terms like "Aphla" and "Ateb."

For example, in a metaphor used by Frege we may infer the following:

a) "Aphla" is "Aphla"

b) "Aphla" is "Ateb"

a) is a tautology and not informative while b) is informative i.e. "Aphla" and "Ateb" refers to the same mountain. Both a) and b) differ in meaning because they differ in the senses they express. "Aphla" and "Ateb" are associated with different descriptions. That's why both exhibit different meanings. However both terms have got same referent.

The descriptivism (of Frege) suggests the use of the term "sense," so that meaning can be provided to propositions. Sense is even displayed by empty proper names (as maintained above). They don't denote any object but still reflects sense. Despite its severe criticism, it may be asserted that empty proper names still display sense owing to their attachment with some sort of description. In the absence of any denotation, the notion of sense remains unaffected. This is the point, as I infer, which Frege wished to emphasize.

Frege's classical examples include "Morning Star" and "Evening Star." These two proper names refer to the planet Venus but display possesses different senses. In the morning, Venus is called as "Morning Star" while in the evening
the same referent is called as "Evening Star." These proper names have got
different informative content or value of cognition. This is what Fregean Sense
is all about. Now these proper names provide \textit{a priori} knowledge that both the
names refer to the same referent.

Dummett claims that such knowledge may be established by what he calls two
routes towards the Venus by mean of both terms of identity ("Morning Star" and
"Evening Star"). Sense seems to be in service of reference fixation of both
proper names. Here Frege seems to be concerned about to provide a way
towards stipulation of reference through the notion of sense\textsuperscript{22}. The muddle is
that is there is any fixed way to determine route to the right reference (for
which the name is being used)? In fact there are no fixed conditions sufficient
to identify the reference.\textsuperscript{23}

Usage of these proper names in two propositions reveals different senses of the
propositions. It shows that the sense of names possess the sense of their
associated definite descriptions. Sense does not reveal any meaning in
isolation. Frege asserts that even empty proper names consist of sense but no
reference.

Frege thinks that a speaker of language, who knows the referent of a proper
name, assumes that the hearer understands the sense of that proper name. But
the hearer may or may not possess understanding of the referent. In virtue of
what the hearer knows the sense of a particular proper name? The sense of an
expression (or proper name) provides information about its referent. This

\textsuperscript{22} Jamil, \textit{op.cit}, 158.
referent provides meaning to that expression or proper name. Is it possible to make sense of any proper name that does not possess referent?

For Frege yes! There are occasions when proper names show sense even without having any referent. For example, the existence of Aliens (people living in other planets or galaxies of the universe) is doubtful but it has got sense in the works of scientific fiction. However, some people even claim availability of evidences of their existence. If one day it is found that Aliens exists then the sense of their existence will become more powerful.

Frege's thesis of reference and sense says that propositions containing proper names of this sort are devoid of any truth values. He tries to make his point clear in holding that if someone accepts a sentence containing empty proper names, then he is forming a belief about the world and not about the language itself. In the words of Gareth Evans:

.....But what Sense can be made of a belief which literally has no truth value- which is neither correct nor incorrect? It is precisely this incomprehension, so effectively voiced by Dummett that makes Frege's choice of truth values as the semantic values of propositions so opposite.

This position leaves us in a state of paradox. On the one hand empty proper names do not possess referent while on the other hand these names display sense. As maintained above, this shows the invalidity of Frege's argument. However, as I may infer, he presented this position so that the crises of empty proper names may be dealt with. Empty proper names that appear in movies,
stories, fictions cannot be called meaningless at once because these names reveal meaning in the context of that movie, story, or fiction. This could have been the reason that produced the temptation in Frege to call such names as having sense, even without reference. In spite of the invalidity of his argument, this position of treating empty names as containing sense sounds quite safe.

Is there any possibility of making a reference of proper name without sense? It seems surprising to consider. Let us consider the example of “Pluto.” Recently, it had been discovered that planet “Pluto” will be no more in the category of planet in our solar system, being devoid of characteristic of planet. It used to be a planet in our solar system. What sense these singular expressions possess? What will be its mode of presentation as Frege held? The speaker of the language, who is not aware of this fact, will continue to add sense to it. But there seems to be no meaning being revealed by the term “Pluto” in terms of being a planet. However, reference is there as just a heavenly body present in the outskirts of the orbit of our solar system.

2.5 Criticism of the theory:

I have discussed above the invalidity of Frege’s argument as far as notion of sense is concerned. On the one hand Frege considers sense to be an ingredient in determining meaning of proper names that consist of actual referent while on the other hand he endorses sense to even empty proper names.

Descriptivism of Frege (and Russell) has been the principal target of Kripke’s criticism. That’s why it is very important to see how Kripke takes Frege’s notion of sense?
In his seminal lecture *Naming and Necessity*, he holds:

...Some people may give one sense to the name ‘Aristotle’, others may give another. But of course it is not only that; even a single speaker when asked ‘What description are you willing to substitute for the name?’ may be quite at a loss. In fact, he may know many things about him; but any particular thing that he knows he may feel clearly expresses a contingent property of the object. If ‘Aristotle’ meant the man who taught Alexander the Great, then saying ‘Aristotle was a teacher of Alexander the Great’ would be a mere tautology. But surely it isn’t; it expresses the fact that Aristotle taught Alexander the Great, something we could discover to be false. So, being the teacher of Alexander the Great cannot be part of [the sense of] the name.\(^{25}\)

In the above quote, Kripke is actually criticizing descriptivism of Frege. According to him, the sense of proper name ‘Aristotle’ is not supplied by the sense of the definite description followed by the name. The sense does not reflect any essential property of the referent that may be stipulated to the name; rather it merely supplies contingent property of the referent. This contingent property is likely to change because of various reasons like passage of time, wrong attribution by the speaker etc. Hence, the sense of proper names cannot stipulate their reference.

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Kripke emphasizes that sense cannot contribute in fixing a reference by giving meaning of a proper name. The reference may not be fixed by a description; however a causal chain of communication stipulates the same. He further asserts:

Frege should be criticized for using the term ‘sense’ in two senses. For he takes the sense of a designator to be its meaning; and he also takes it to be the way its reference is determined. Identifying the two, he supposes that both are given by definite descriptions. Ultimately, I will reject this second supposition too; but even were it right, I reject the first. A description may be used as synonymous with a designator, or it may be used to fix its reference...

Kripke’s criticism is two-fold. He not only considers the rejection of the notion of sense to be the meaning of a proper name (designator) but also the way by which sense fixes the reference of a proper name. As maintained in the first chapter, the main problem before Kripke is: how to fix the reference of proper names? According to him, Fregean sense is unable to provide a way so that the referent of a proper name may be determined. His criticism falls heavy on the Fregean idea that sense is an ingredient in providing meaning to a proper name. While refuting descriptivism of Frege and Russell, Kripke takes the sense of proper names to be the sense of their associated definite descriptions.

Kripke’s two fold criticism does not seem well directed because, as I see it,

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26 Ibid 59.
Frege takes sense to be the meaning of proper names in terms of supplying referent (whether real or unreal). For the second sense i.e. the sense of fixing the right reference, there might special cases when the right reference may be fixed by the notion of sense. But that does not mean sense fails to do so in all cases of reference determination. Even by describing the contingent properties of referent, one may successfully make the reference by the use of proper name that stands for the referent. For example, a speaker describes “Aristotle” as ‘the teacher of Alexander the Great’. Now, the sense of proper name “Aristotle” is being described by the sense of associated definite description. According to Kripke, the definite description shows contingent property of Aristotle; in some counterfactual situation the property may not satisfy the referent. But it does not mean that the property will not be satisfied by the referent in all situations. In some situation, the proper name, say, “Aristotle”, satisfies the property by virtue of which reference may be established.

Ahmed criticizes the approach in holding that it does not show whether all proper names possess such sense. It also does not show whether it is necessary condition for all proper names to behave in such a way. As I see it, Frege nowhere tried to make a distinction among proper names in terms of with or without sense. In fact, he tried to ascribe the property of sense to all proper names, including empty ones. This ascription leads to invalidity of his argument.
2.6 Reference theory of proper names:

The theory of reference is at the core of Frege’s theory of meaning. The only meaning of proper names is the bearer that stands for it. Referent of proper names is something that determines the truth value of utterances passed during communication. This determination supplies meaning to those utterances. That’s why referents of proper names are something very fundamental entity in providing meaning to them. The referent is also stable, rigid, permanent feature of proper names that is always there as an evidence of meaning.

Frege takes the notion of reference as something central to the theory of meaning. The notion of sense works on the periphery as without reference there would be no such thing as meaning. According to Frege, mere presence of referent of any proper name is neither necessary nor sufficient condition for making an understanding of the name. This is where the relevance of sense comes in. It was only to say that mere existence of referents does not guarantee the meaning of proper names. There must some way of determining it- the way is known as sense.

Reference is essentially provides the substratum on which the theory of meaning rests. Frege takes reference as the meaning of proper names. Determining reference of proper names is as if one has determined the meaning of proper names.

On the issue of reference, one interesting comment is given by Donald Davidson. He suggests that because the theory may be justified empirically, there is no problem in dropping the reference. He thinks that in order to know
the meaning of a proper name, there is no need to protect the reference. He
holds that “The theory gives up reference, then, as part of the cost of going
empirical.”

Davidson rationalizes that the dropping reference does not mean that the
semantics had also been dropped. But practically dropping reference would
also drop the semantics of the propositions. If he would insist that the
semantics of the propositions would be preserved then the reference would
include it. In my view Davidson’s claim of dropping reference is not well
directed. It has been discussed above that it is only referent that determines the
semantic value of propositions. The theory of meaning needs reference in order
to equipped with empirical investigation. Reference dropping will drop the
meaning of proper names also, and thereby, the propositions containing them.

2.7 Alternative approach to Frege: Intentionality and Speech Act Theory

Frege seems to be too much concerned about objective dimension of
communication. He has ignored the natural aspect of human languages. Searle
introduced the notion of intentionality which seems to present an alternative
model to Frege’s approach. Instead of Fregean obsession with truth conditions,
he prefers intentionality as natural aspect of communication. The intentionality
establishes an improved account of communication.

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2.7.1 Intentionality: Searle

Wayne A. Davis points out that Searle proposes intentional content associated with proper names as a substitution of what Frege describes as propositional content. This association provides understanding in the mind of speakers and hearers (provided both associates same intentional content). Searle utters “[T]he speaker refers to the object because and only because the object satisfies the Intentional content associated with the name.” Searle insist on the competency of speakers to recognize the object for which he is using, what he calls identifying description. Any proper name, say, “Manmohan Singh” is capable of expressing intentional content. It is not necessary that speaker is able to describe that name. His recognition of a proper name as that name seems to be sufficient for identification of that name’s referent. Searle’s claim rests on the principle that proper names reflect a concept that corresponds to some unique objects.

Searle advocates descriptivism asserting “an utterance of a proper name must convey a description just as the utterance of a definite description must if the reference is to be consummated.” He actually means that hearer identifies the utterance of speaker, in terms of recognizing the object, which the speaker refers to. Davis tries to provide counterexample to Searle. According to him, if the hearer of a demonstrative doesn’t know anything about name, say, “Manmohan Singh”, how can he identify the reference of that proper name?

29 I have already maintained that Frege, in his theory of meaning, deals with the propositional content.
Likewise, if a hearer, a layman doesn’t know about ‘the first person on moon,’ how can he identify the same? But as I put it, it is already taken for granted that a hearer is known to a particular demonstrative or definite description which the speaker is talking about. Searle already took it for consideration in his theory of speech acts which has something to do with the hearer’s side.

Searle inquires in virtue of what we use and learn proper names. Again providing argument in favor of descriptivism, he says:

...we can only identify the object (the necessary preliminary to teaching the name) by ostension or description; and, in both cases, we identify the object in virtue of certain of its characteristic. So now, it seems as if the rules for a proper name must somehow be logically tied to particular characteristics of the object in such a way that the name has a sense as well as a reference.32

Davis argues that proper names express a concept which a corresponding referent satisfies. For example, “Manmohan Singh” expresses a concept which no other name satisfies. This is what the notion of rigid designator is all about. A particular concept expresses a name that, what Kripke calls, rigidly designates that concept. Kripke adds metaphysics to it by inventing the notion of possible worlds in which that concept exists.33 Searle asserts:

...if a proper name occurs in an existential statement, it seems that it must have some conceptual or descriptive content. But if it has a descriptive content, then it seems Frege's theory must be correct, for what could that descriptive content be except the sense of the proper name? Thus, the occurrence of proper names in existential statements poses another grave difficulty of the non-sense theorists.\(^{34}\)

According to Searle the referent of a proper name, say, "Dartmouth," is determined by the intentional content as we use it for the city. "Dartmouth" is not called according to Kripkean causal theory of reference, rather intentional content play primary role in determining the referent of proper names (instead of some causal chain). Even Fregean notion of "mock proper name" may have meaning based on the intentional content being used. The intentional content serves the purpose of stipulating reference of proper names.

2.7.2 Speech Act Theory: Austin and Searle

J.L. Austin’s invention of Speech act theory tries to provide an alternative model to truth conditional approach of Frege. It does not refute Fregan doctrine but have tried to present what I call an evolutionary approach to Frege’s thesis. It retains Frege’s propositional approach along with prescribing other dimensions of communication. Speech acts are those acts which compel one to

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actually move into action while performing communication. Austin calls such utterances as *performative utterances*. Examples include “I swim”, “I criticize”, “I praise” etc. These utterances may be categorized in terms of giving appreciation, making a request etc. Illocutionary force is a property of utterances which decides the kind of speech acts to be performed. If this is not the case, then utterances may be termed as what he calls *hollow* and the speech act, in such cases, may be called as *infelicitous*.

Austin’s approach does not reject propositional approach of Frege. Rather, he suggests that the fundamental function of passing statements is to create actual performances in the absence of which communication may not be established. The approach also rationalizes my severe criticism\(^\text{35}\) to Frege’s notion of “mock thoughts” or “mock assertions” or “mock proper names” in maintaining that such utterances are simply *hollow*. Austin emphasizes that *hollow* utterances are parasite that infect the normal usage of language\(^\text{36}\). Hence, the theory works as a buffer for Fregean thesis of empty proper names and provides strength to the same. The utterances may be used without any problem because the speaker is aware that he has not the intention to produce actual performances, be it the case of fiction or movie or story etc.

Both Frege and Austin consider the involvement of speaker and hearer but with different orientation. Frege seems to observe the process of communication from speaker’s side while Austin just reverses the matter by looking the same from hearer’s side. He calls this property of utterances as *perlocution*.

\(^{35}\)Jamil, *op.cit*, 162-63.

John R. Searle also considers the advancement over Frege's theory of proper names. According to him, sometimes a speaker wants to perform more than his utterances. This linguistic ability of speakers enables them to perform indirect speech acts. These acts are performed in such a way so as to pass the real meaning of utterance. For example, a speaker may say to his servant "Will you give me a cup of tea". Now, he is not requesting him to prepare a cup of tea. The intention is to pass an order so that a cup of tea may be provided to the speaker. If the speaker passes the same sentence to his colleague; the intention would be to make a request rather than passing orders. However, in both the cases, the literal expression of the sentence is same.37

I think that the notion of speech acts equally works in case of identity terms. Frege uses metaphors "Aphla" and "Ateb," the intention is not to explain any geographical discovery about two mountains but to explain his notion of sense as mode of presentation. This is what Searle calls primary illocutionary act. The aspect focuses on the real intention behind speaker's utterance. Literal expression of any sentence reflects secondary illocutionary act which need to be the primary intention of the speaker. I have held that "there may be still another aspect (which may be called as tertiary) which suggests that both the names "Aphla" and "Ateb" refer to the same referent, i.e., mountain)."38

The theory offers an alternative model to the classical problem of reference stipulation of proper names. The reference may be determined by specification of the kind of illocutionary act under which it is being made. This reference

37 See also, Searle, John (1979), Expression and Meaning (Studies in the theory of Speech acts) (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 30-32.
38 Jamil, op.cit ,170.
framing (identification and stipulation of the reference) is one of the primary objectives of any organized theory of meaning (like that of Frege). Kripke seems to praise the Frege’s thesis as long as it works for reference identification and stipulation of proper names. However, Frege’s (and Russell’s) descriptivism had been the principle target of Kripke’s criticism.