The philosophy of language deals with philosophical questions to clarify, to explore, to analyze, and to make sense of human language. It tries to put a systematic and organized account of language. It is philosophical critique about language which looks into the nature, origin, and development of language. It inquires about the meaning of “meaning” itself. It seeks to know the nature of meaning of words, and thereby sentences. This discipline of philosophy has been primarily initiated by German mathematician Friedrich Ludwig Gottlob Frege.

In his work *Begriffsschrift*, Frege tried to create a formal system of language in which mathematical assertions may be proved. He observed that natural language is too vague to perform investigation in sciences like mathematics. While formal language consists of syntax which is more comprehensive and plausible to understand. In his earlier thesis *Grundlagen*, he is interested to know the meaning of words which combine to make a sentence meaningful. While using the word “meaning”, obviously we are not talking about literal meaning of words. Rather the intention is to know: in virtue of what a particular word has got a particular meaning? How is it that some two words have got the same meaning? How is it that a word has got more than one meaning? What is the exact, definite meaning of the words? What speaker does
with these words while using them? How the hearer is going to understand a word, uttered by a speaker in the same sense? All these questions belong to philosophy of language.

Philosophical interest on this issue of proper names was first observed in *Vedā*. In Greek philosophy, *Cratylus* (Plato’s dialogue) was found to be earliest text to discuss proper names. In beginning of the dialogue, Hermogenes (a character in the dialogue) asks Socrates to clarify whether names are natural or conventional devices for communication.

There are various issues related to proper names like: how the reference of proper names may be identified? In virtue of what the reference of proper names may be stipulated? How proper names got their reference at the first place? How proper names co-refer two or more identical objects?

This dissertation is an effort to answer first two questions i.e. how the reference of proper names may be identified and stipulated? Philosophers of language like Frege, Russell, Searle, and Kripke deal with this problem in their own ways.

Frege uses word proper names for all singular terms generally. However, he nowhere provided a definite criterion for an expression to be regarded as proper name. He thinks that proper names are linguistic devices that stand for objects. According to him, proper names reflect the most general logical function of linguistic expressions. This reflection is the formal criteria of expressions to be called as proper names. Proper names serve the function of ejecting the concerned object in question. Proper names pick out particular objects for which they stand. He takes these objects as the meaning of proper names.
He describes proper names to a variety of objects such as planets, human beings and the terms of natural kinds such as 'tiger,' 'water,' 'gold' etc. He even regards numbers as objects and hence numerical terms may be described as proper names as per the Fregean criteria. The criterion for such ascription of numbers in the category of proper names is that they fall in to the category of objects. He even thinks of points, lines, shape and even weight as proper names because of the same reason. He further ascribes classes in the category of proper names e.g. 'the class of mammals', 'the class of bachelors' etc., as the classes fulfils the criteria of being a proper name. That's why, he call such classes as classes objects for objects can be the only criteria of being a proper name.

Frege calls meaning (Bedeutung) a semantic property. He invents the notion of sense (Sinn). Sense is that semantic property of a word or sentence by virtue of which it reveals meaning of the word or sentence. He thinks of sense as a way of description. This way seems to be an important ingredient in providing meaning to words or sentences. Now, he thinks that the sense of a sentence directly depends on the sense of its constituent parts.

The objective of Frege's invention of the notion of sense is to provide the maintenance of objective content in the utterances being used among speakers of language. Hence, sense seems to be the property of propositions by virtue of which they are capable of transferring this content.

Frege tries to present a system of communication. The competent speaker of language expresses a particular sentence, say, 'PN is R', where 'PN' is a proper name and R is the referent of this proper name, as some concrete entity. Now,
the speaker consists of thoughts in his mind about the referent, the content of this thought depends on the sense he ascribe to the proper name 'PN'. The expression of thought has to be concerned with the referent R, which has to be thought in particular way. This way determines the sense of proper names.

The hearer of this sentence understands it and the thought associated with it, in the same way i.e. having similar truth value as the utterance of the speaker. In this case, the content of thought of the hearer will also have to be determined by the sense he stipulates to the same expression. But there seems to be no justification that both speaker and hearer understand the sentence in the same way. However, both may believe to involve in the same practice. Hence there seems to no epistemological value of these utterances.

On assuming that both speaker and hearer, who is competent speaker of language, are using objective property of expression of human language and both hold a definite sense to it, we may claim that the hearer will receive the same thought as expressed by the speaker. Now considering this, we are moving with the idea of Frege. He seems to agree on the point that there may be some instances in which propositions of a natural language are successful in expressing a thought.

But the notion of empty proper names threatens the very foundation of the theory of meaning. In principle there should not be any semantic value of empty proper names. However, Frege holds that they still possess sense and hence semantic value. This is where the invalidity Frege’s argument lies.

The notion of sense is useful in several cases like proper names showing identity between them and hence between two propositions that contain them.
In the metaphor used above, different senses are reflected by two proper names present in two propositions. However, their referent is same.

Frege’s notion of reference of proper names, assumes that the meaning of a proper name or sentence may be revealed even in the absence of referents. But the meaning may not be revealed in the absence of sense. Hence, it seems that he thinks the notion of sense as superior and more fundamental to reference. It appears that Frege treats the theory of meaning as an integral part of the theory of sense and the theory of reference. Both the theories are inseparably connected to the notion of proper names.

Frege seems to be too much concerned about the Ideal aspect of language. That’s why he was concerned about the construction of propositions as well as truth value reflected by them. It seems that he proposed the theory of meaning for this purpose. The notion of sense serves the function of providing a way to determine the reference. The notion of reference has been treated as fundamental concept on which the notion of proper names rests. The notion also provides semantic value to the propositions.

In his theory of meaning, Frege tried to create a highly ideal account of language. His theory of meaning offers an organized account of the theory of sense and the theory of reference. In spite of the criticism of the Fregean notion of sense by Kripke, there are several virtues of the theory which motivates philosophers to put evolutionary approach on the issue. Frege’s insistence on propositional content of utterances containing proper names may be preserved along with Searle’s intentional content, speech acts theory of Searle and Austin.
The classical description theory of Frege and Russell suggest that a proper name behave as an abbreviated definite description. Frege claims that the sense of a proper name is associated with the sense of its definite description. Both Frege and Russell hold that the referent of a proper name consists of distinctive properties necessarily supplied by the definite description stands for it. The theory suggests that a proper name is synonym to the description that uniquely attached to it.

This does not mean that a proper name may be substituted in place of its definite description. The theory says that a proper name consist of same meaning as some definite description which the name unique satisfies.

An improved version of the theory has been presented by Searle and Strawson. According to the theory, a proper name consists of a cluster or set of purely necessary and sufficient qualitative properties of being a proper name. That’s why; the version is termed as cluster theory. Now, out of several properties attached to a proper name, only dominant or weighted most property determines the referent of the name. For example, “Aristotle” is known by the description ‘the teacher of Alexander the great’. But there may be other dominant descriptions in this category. It is not necessary either that the name satisfies all the properties or weighted most or dominant property.

The description theory (of Frege and Russell) claims that a proper name consists of some purely, uniquely, analytic, necessary descriptions that may be attached to the name. Christopher Hughes suggests that the theory (both classical and improved) offers pure and impure aspects. The requirement of pure aspect is that the description should not contain any proper name,
demonstrative or indexical. Impure description does not reflect any such requirement. The theory deals with both pure and impure aspects. Hence, it has got two fold applications. However, neither classical nor modern theorists draw such distinction.

The description theory determines the sense as well as reference of proper names. That's why Devitt referred description theory as complete theory of meaning.

In his seminal lectures Naming and Necessity, Kripke's threefold argument directed towards the refutation of the description theory (both pure and impure aspects). Frege and Russell's thesis had been principle target of Kripke. He had been found to argue more against impure aspect of the theory. According to Kripke, the only virtue of the thesis of Frege and Russell is that the thesis serves the purpose of reference stipulation of proper names.

Kripke suggests that instead of definite descriptions, causal history of proper names may stipulate their referent in a more comprehensive manner. In order to identify the referent of a proper name, one needs to go in to causal chain of communication, established by the users of a particular speech community. He tries to provide an alternative model to Frege and Russell in terms of proposing causal theory or new theory of reference. Frege did not talk about such causal linking of a name with the concerned object.

The causal theorists suggest that a proper name has got some causal history which determines its referent. The theory suggests that a proper name behave rigidly in all possible worlds in which the name exists. Kripke insists that a proper name is introduced by some initial baptism in some using application of
proper name. He tries to present an improved approach over description theory which suggests the non-rigid nature of proper names. The causal theory also avoids propositional approach of Frege, intentionality approach of Searle. The theory suggests reference identification and stipulation of proper names purely on causal basis.

Application of Fregean sense in causal theory reveals the significance of preserving the notion of sense. In Frege's example, both ‘Aphla’ and ‘Ateb’ have got different meanings because:

a. Both display different senses.

b. Both belong to two distinct using applications of Proper names.

c. Causal theorist explains that both names have different roots of origin or what Devitt calls different groundings.

d. The theorists also explain that both names possess different reference borrowing practices.

e. ‘Aphla’ is ‘Aphla’ reflects uninformative ness; while ‘Aphla’ is ‘Ateb’ provides some information.

Hence, both names have got different meanings because of c and d (Causal theorists). The problem of ambiguity among names i.e. what are determinant factors which binds a particular use of proper name with its right bearer? Devitt tries to solve the problem of ambiguity of proper names by coining terms ‘token’ and ‘type’ and explains relation between them. But his suggestion does not seem to add anything new in the problem. However, the suggestion makes problem better defined that’s all. He re-frames the problem like this....the
semantic type is explained by the token which speaker possess in his mind. Description theorists relate a name token with a definite description attached with it. Causal theorists suggests, as we already maintained that the type of token being associated with a name is determined by its causal origin and reference borrowing.

The causal theory of proper names works through a causal chain of communication. The chain starts by mean of initial baptism, the initial grounding of a proper name. Then the reference is being borrowed by the users of language in a certain using application of proper names, in a certain speech community. In spite of criticism of the theory by several philosophers including Evans (by mean of his example of ‘Madagascar’), Searle (by his notion of intentionality) etc., the theory has got several virtue which it plausible to accept, however partially.

Kripkean proposal for reference stipulation practices of proper names (in terms of the causal theory) is actually not presented in the form of what he utters as a full blown theory of the reference of proper names. He is committed to present a better picture of the reference stipulation practices. In this sense, the theory is not structured. In spite of the fact that the grounding of a proper name may be non-baptized one (as in case of ‘Madagascar’) or by mean of referential move; the reference of a proper name (Kripke argues) is fixed by originally baptized name (arbitrarily or by fixing a description).

Frege and Russell’s thesis of descriptivism (both pure and impure version) had been main target of Kripke’s seminal lectures Naming and Necessity. Kripke
claims that 'Nevertheless I think it's pretty certain that the view of Frege and Russell is false.'

Kripke tries to establish the argument that definite descriptions fail to stipulate the referent of a proper name because the description may change in some counterfactual situations. For example, 'Steve Jobs' may not be substituted with the description 'the founder Apple Corporation Ltd.' as there might have been some person other than Steve Jobs who would have founded the company.

Kripke mainly establishes this modal argument to refute the doctrine of Frege and Russell. He holds that the description theories only provide reference to a proper name. The description does not provide meaning to a proper name but it only helps in reference determination of the same.

Kripke tries to present an alternative model for reference identification and stipulation. He invents the notion of rigidity; and maintains that a proper name function as rigid designator which rigidly designates the same referent in all possible worlds. According to him, the description theories fail on fix the referent of a proper name in all possible worlds.

Similarly, in *Identity and Necessity*, Kripke asserts that a name, say, 'Nixon', would be called as 'Nixon' even if there is no person ever existed in any possible world. It seems surprising but Kripke argues that the name 'Nixon' is going to designate the Nixon as a person in all possible worlds. Obviously in those worlds, it will be taken for granted that there is no actual existent person. The person may be character in some story or film or in some what Frege calls
A proper name may be analyzed in correct sense by mean of a definite description which is empirically or what Hughes calls semantically equivalent to the referent. In order to deal with this sort of argument, I would like to consider once again Frege’s example of ‘Aphla’ and ‘Ateb’ (The example is a general outline of pure descriptivism). Now, ‘Aphla’ abbreviates to ‘the mountain 5000 meters high from northern region’ while ‘Ateb’ abbreviates to ‘the mountain 5000 meters high from southern region’. And the empirical discovery has been made that two names, in fact, refer to the same mountain. This is impure account of descriptivism. The proposition attributed to ‘Aphla’ is same as the proposition attributed to ‘Ateb’.

That’s why it is against pure account of descriptivism because for them ‘Aphla’ must consist of same unique properties (in terms of quality). According to pure descriptivism, it is necessary truth that ‘Aphla’ exists if and only if it has got those set of unique properties which uniquely stands for it (the same is true for ‘Ateb’). But here, both the names are sharing most of the properties. Hence, pure aspect of descriptivism fails. But still impure or mixed aspect remains intact. They seems to hold both names abbreviates same description like ‘the mountain 5000 meters high’, however with different senses. Before empirical investigation, both ‘Aphla’ and ‘Ateb’ thought to refer to different mountains.

Considering Kripke’s insight on the issue, even after empirical investigation, both proper names refer to different objects. ‘Aphla’ refer to mountain from northern region while ‘Ateb’ refer mountain from southern region. Both the
names cannot mean the same. Even if there would have been still another
mountain which is 5000 meters high from northern region, say, ‘Apheb’; still
‘Apheb’ may not be called as ‘Appla’. Hence, Fregean identity terms ‘Appla’ is
not ‘Ateb’.

Considering on the epistemological aspect of Kripke’s argument; we may
assert that ‘Gödel’ stands for ‘the man who proved incompleteness of
arithmetic theorem’; leads us truth about ‘Gödel’ a priori, as per the conviction
of description theory (pure).

But Kripke insists that inspite of the fact that ‘Gödel’ proved incompleteness of
arithmetic theorem, the truth may not be, known a priori. He provides
counterexamples in holding that some other person ‘Schmidt’ discovered the
same and we have wrongly credited the same to ‘Gödel’. Now, it is later
discovery and hence the truth is known a posteriori. The counter example is
actually two fold i.e. to refute descriptivism and Immanual Kant’s
epistemology (synthetic judgement a priori) simultaneously.

In Kripke’s example, ‘Gödel’ is not equivalent to ‘the man who proved
incompleteness of arithematic theorem’, which is mixed description. In
contrast, pure descriptivism expects that there is some description which is
qualitative similar to a proper name like ‘Gödel’.

Now, even in the absence of any genuine unique description attributed to him;
one may still refer to ‘Gödel’, but the name is again including itself. This is
what Kripke calls violation of circulatory condition.

So, the knowledge of ‘Gödel’ seems to be very difficult to know a priori. For
example, ‘Diamond’ purely describes ‘the hardest substance on earth’. The
knowledge may be known a priori as the speaker refers to the quality of something as hardest substance called ‘Diamond’ which nothing satisfies.

However, if some discovery reveals that there is another substance which is hardest; then the knowledge would naturally be turned out to be a posteriori. Now, ‘Diamond’ does not satisfy the quality of being hardest substance. Even if there is availability of pure description, the description still fails to provide epistemological account of proper names. Kripke tries to convey that there can never be such description which can replace a proper name. In other words, names can not abbreviate descriptions (pure or mixed). The knowledge of proper name does not obtain a priori in all the cases.

Kripke defended descriptivist approach by providing several counterexamples like the definition of ‘one meter’ as ‘stick S is one meter long at t’. This definition plays no role in providing meaning to ‘one meter’. Kripke insisted that the definition merely suggests ‘one meter’ as the standard of length and not the length in itself.

Kripke holds that ‘one meter’ may designate rigidly this entity i.e. length, in all possible worlds. The description of ‘one meter’ as ‘the length of S at t’ does not necessarily designate it rigidly. In some counterfactual situation, the definition may change owing to some conditions like excessive heat or cold which may expand or condense the length of stick S at time t.

The problem before Kripke is to fix the reference, not to provide a meaning to proper names. That’s why he admits that definitions like that of ‘one meter’ suggest how reference of ‘one meter’ is stipulated. Epistemologically, Kripke asserts that the person who provides such definition might have been aware of
it as length of 'one meter', a priori. That's why anyone may know 'the length of stick S at to' as 'one meter' without discovering himself that whether length of the stick as standard of length, is one meter or not. Metaphysically treatment of this statement suggests it to be a contingent statement where 'one meter' behaves as a rigid designator. However the length is subject to change as per the conditions like heat or cold. In this Sense the statement may reflect contingent a priori truth.

Kripke holds that his criticism against Frege-Russell's thesis of descriptivism for proper names also applies to terms of natural kind. He claims that natural kind terms like 'water', 'gold' consist of same properties which are not necessarily known a priori. He refutes long standing doctrine of Kant in holding that analytic judgment like 'gold is yellow metal' may not be known a priori. In some counterfactual situation, gold may not be of yellow in color. However, the term consists of some essential properties. For example, atomic number of gold is seventy nine (79). According to Kripke, this is essential property that may be attributed to gold. Likewise, the chemical composition of water is H\textsubscript{2}O, which is its essential property.

Kripke utters that natural kind terms consist of properties that are necessarily true of it. The properties those are true of the term in all possible worlds. Moreover, these properties are subject to empirical investigation also. Gold consist of atomic number seventy nine (79) is an example of such property. Now, the property may not be attributed to anything except gold. Even if some counterfactual situation, if we use the term gold we could not deny that element which has got seventy nine protons in its nucleus.
Ahmed further goes to consider the intuitions (which seem to be acceptable, at least to Ahmed) that there would be a world where gold did not exist or there would be a world where gold did not have atomic number seventy nine (79). In nutshell, he is arguing that there are contrary intuitions which questions necessary properties of gold in some possible world.

It is a counterexample of Kripke's argument. However, Hughes suggests a way out; he talks about bi-vocal aspect of proper names. The name 'gold' may be used for two referents. A person may borrow the term 'gold' and superimpose the term on some new referent which is not element and does not consist of atomic number seventy nine (79). But still, the new name (in new counterfactual situation) 'gold' don't have anything to do with old name 'gold', which is also used by community of speakers who have got a common language. If I am right to infer, then Ahmed's argument is not well directed. However, Kripke's position against the thesis of Frege and Russell wavers a little by Ahmed's argument.

To encourage pure descriptivism of Frege and Russell, 'gold' refers to such properties which nothing else describes or uniquely satisfies. Now, it is known a priori that gold satisfies such and such properties. Ahmed holds that "...it is unclear that the epistemological and modal claims refute the Frege-Russell thesis for natural kind terms."

Kripke targets Frege and Russell, along with the Mill's account of natural kind terms (lecture III, Naming and Necessity), while in lecture II he argues against descriptivism as proposed by Fregean and Russellian thesis. If the term 'tiger' has got various properties like a large carnivorous quadrupedal feline, tawny
yellow in color with blackish transverse stripes and white belly, then it is not necessary that the ‘tiger’ word satisfies all the properties (or weighted most or dominant property, as per descriptivism) a priori.

Kripke continues that in the absence of these properties (that is attributed to ‘tiger’ by a certain community of speakers or by Shorter Oxford Dictionary), there may be a species different from ‘tiger’, say, it belongs to class reptile; having internal structure of reptilian type. But we can only say that the species belongs not to tiger but to some other animal like it. So, the properties attributed to natural tiger (or as the dictionary describes) may not be known a priori.

Believers of descriptivism may defend that there must be some purely, uniquely, analytic, necessary descriptions that may be attributed to tiger (as the dictionary tells). But what are the methods to acquire a priori knowledge of something (in the form of satisfying some unique properties or dominated ones), of something that may be called as ‘tiger’? Is it internal structure of mammals? Or are there some external properties (which are contingent, as Kripke holds)? Kripke suggests internal structure to be an empirical discovery.

That’s why descriptivism defense seems to be shaken, as they seem to be at loss to provide any descriptions that uniquely satisfies to the tiger. If some advocate of descriptivism insist that ‘tiger’ is that which may be described as ‘the animal that has got the properties of tiger’; then the description is becoming impure, and what Kripke calls violates circulatory condition.

The main idea of rigid designation seems to rest on the assumption that Kripke actually originated the idea. It was Ruth Barcan Marcus who originated the
idea of rigid designation. By providing counterexamples, Quentin Smith tried to prove his claims to be true. He raises objection in attribution of ‘New Theory of Reference’ to Saul Kripke and other leading philosophers of that time but ignoring Ruth Barcan Marcus who actually originated the theory. David Braun shows that direct reference theory concerning proper names was mainly provided by several landmarks of philosophy of language including Saul Kripke, David Kaplan, Keith Donnellan, Scott Soames etc.

Quentin Smith asserts that Marcus provided great contribution and more than anybody else. She actually developed a new theory of reference. Kaplan advocates that new theory of proper names is provided by Kripke. He also coined the term rigid designation for proper names. He holds that a proper name designates the same thing in all possible worlds. But as far as this term is concerned with common nouns, the credit should be given to Marcus and not to Kripke, as Kaplan did. Hence, Kripke’s idea of proper names, behaving as a rigid designator is actually credited to Marcus and not to Kripke.

Quentin Smith even claims that modal arguments that were attributed to Kripke, were actually provided by Marcus. Considering identity between names, ‘Hesperus’ may be substituted for ‘Phosphorous.’ But in modal contexts, it may not be true. The identity merely reflects equivalence between two identity terms like ‘Hesperus’ and ‘Phosphorous’. The star that has seen in morning might have been seen in the evening. Refuting description theorists like Frege and Russell, Marcus depicts that if they would be right then a description like ‘Venus is the evening star’ would have been known a priori. While in fact, it is known a posteriori as it is subject to empirical investigation.
Marcus further asserts that ‘Venus’ shows modally stablesense, when an equivalence is created in holding that ‘Venus’ = ‘Venus’. It may be asserted that mere reflection of the term ‘Venus’ shows that it signifies both ‘morning star’ and ‘evening star.’ Now, previously described two names of the planet ‘Venus’ i.e. “Phosphorous” and ‘Hesperus’ may be substituted one for the another, as per the principle of substitutivity in all possible worlds where planet ‘Venus’ exists. And these names do not do so in the counterfactual situations where the planet do not exists. Hence, the names would behave as non-rigid designators. These are serious allegations imposed on Kripke by Smith. Scott Soames reacted against this allegation. He asserted that “...the charges Smith makes against Kripke are false and that the historical picture he paints are inaccurate.” He presents a systematic account of whole scenario and concluded that “...I also hope that no one will be distracted by Smith’s overheated rhetoric and irresponsible sowing of discord from the truly outstanding contribution of both Kripke and Marcus.” Later, Stephen Neale confirmed that there is no plagiarism found in Kripke’s new theory of reference, as per allegations raised by Smith.

Kripke has been criticized by several others including Michael Dummett, Gareth Evans, and recently by Arif Ahmed. Ahmed tries to criticize Kripke’s thesis (on terms of natural kind) in holding that he provides no sufficient argument for necessity of theoretical identification like ‘heat’ is theoretical identified for ‘molecular motion’. He argues that a sort of identity is observed between heat and molecular motion. Heat may be associated with some properties. But these properties may vary in several counterfactual situations.
He says how empirical science demonstrates the association of ‘heat’ with ‘molecular motion’. Now, as I understand, Ahmed wishes to express that the notion of rigidity does not satisfactorily applies to the terms of natural kind (particularly the cases of theoretical identification like ‘heat’). It does not seem necessary identification of something to be ‘heat’ and its association with ‘molecular motion’. ‘Heat’ and ‘molecular motion’, both behave as rigid designators.

Kripke himself realizes that “...heat might have turned out not to have been molecular motion, and that gold might have turned out not to have been the element with the atomic number seventy nine (79).”

Kripke’s refutation of Frege and Russell on the basis of modal intuition could have been developed on the basis of even more strong argument. Evans suggests that it could have been in the form of thought, judgment, and belief. Unlike Frege and Russell, Kripke did not provide any organized theory of reference of proper names. His refutation against descriptivist philosopher had been assumed as right by several philosophers. The refutation has something to do with the functioning of human thought and psychological state of mind. Some philosophers just accepted Kripke’s argument, assuming it to be sound. However, his argument looks appealing.

Evans suggests that the abandonment of identification principle of Russell seems to be a consequence of speaker’s sayings and thinking. Now such abandonment is to be preserved. Kripke’s refutation suggests that he has mistaken belief for thought. Now, the approach of description theories directs us towards a certain belief about the reference identification and stipulation.
However, I think Frege and Russell initially had a thought for this approach (both independently). The refutation on the part of Kripke seems to run on this assumption. The description theorists suggest a way of reference stipulation only. I think that Frege and Russell nowhere claimed that this is and will be the only way to determine reference and its fixation with a proper name. Kripke tries to provide just another way for this (in the form of causal theory of reference), however in a better and more sophisticated way. He himself admits this in his seminal lecture *Naming and Necessity*.

I can be argued that recently introduced interdisciplinary science ‘cognitive science’ presents a more plausible and comprehensive way to solve the problems of the identification and stipulation of reference of proper names because through this approach, we can know better understand of human mind and its relation with external objects. However, this issue is beyond the scope of this dissertation.

Secondly, Kripke assumes similarity between using application of proper names by competent speaker and ignorant speaker too. Both are successful in providing reference of a proper name. Both borrowed reference in similar fashion i.e. by some causal chain created during the course of communication (from the time of initial baptism to current usage of the name).

I think that Evans evaluation of Kripke’s model is well directed in first phase of his criticism, but as far as analogy of Kripke’s model with Photograph model is concerned, there seems to be no point of comparison between their approaches. Evans remarks that Kripke’s work direct the relational aspect of thought or belief with object. It may be true, but I find Kripke too moves around the
notion of reference stipulation. That’s why he provided a causal basis of such stipulation, through a historical, causal chain of communication that runs in a linear fashion.

Kripke’s doctrine that proper names are rigid designators and definite descriptions are non-rigid designators provides a *mechanism of identification and stipulation of reference*.

If I have rightly understood, Kripke had been unable to produce sound arguments that definite descriptions (rigidified) may also function as rigid designators like proper names. These descriptions may not necessarily behave non-rigidly. Kripke’s argument does not demonstrate this equivalence of proper names with definite descriptions.

According to Dummett, Kripke’s argument also seems to be shattered in the light of Frege’s theory of meaning. In this case the argument is discounted from modal intuitions. Dummett criticism of Kripke does not seem to be well directed because of the wrong interpretation of Kripke’s thesis against descriptivism.

Devitt calls Kripke’s argument as “lost rigidity” argument as the rigidity of definite description seems to be lost in this process. He infers that Kripke’s argument does not stand for all description theories. He says that the descriptions followed by proper names may be “rigidified.” These rigidified descriptions seem to be safe from Kripke’s refutation. However, Kripke’s position is true for most of the description theories. But what makes a description rigidified? Devitt suggests attaching a modal operator like actually in order to make a description rigidified. For example, ‘the person who was
actually the last great philosopher of antiquity' is a rigidified description of name ‘Aristotle’. The same is true of natural kind terms.

Scott Soames tries to criticize Kripke’s position (on the issue of identical terms) in holding that there seems to be a underestimated gap between contingent a priori (knowing that a sentence is true) and contingent a posteriori (knowing the truth expressed) or what I wish to call as hybridized or mixed truth. He claims that Kripke’s thesis that necessary truths cannot be known a priori is objectionable. He even claims that the principles of Strong Disquotation (SDQ) and Strong Disquotation and Justification (SDJ) could fill that gap. As far as contingent truths a priori is concerned, Weak Disquotation (WDQ) and Strong Disquotation and Justification (WDJ), which are concerned with the conversion of acceptable linguistic assertion (e.g. one meter length of stick S) in to knowledge (Soames seems to be too much concerned about epistemology rather than truth). This obtained knowledge may be converted in to a priori knowledge by still another principle, viz. Weak Linguisticism about the a priori (WLA). Soames refutes each of these principles.

I believe that Kripke does not even touch this sort of theoretical framework at all. His argument is beyond such framework. As I see it, his refutation of a priori knowledge suggests that the knowledge which is being called as a priori is obtained only after empirical investigation. For example, the knowledge ‘Hesperus’ is ‘Phosphorous’ may not be known a priori, as only empirical investigation can demonstrate the fact that ‘Hesperus’ means same as ‘Phosphorous’. Hence, the knowledge may be obtained a posteriori. I argue that Soames is mistaking to consider a posteriori knowledge to be a priori by
means of introducing several principles like SDQ, SDJ, WDQ, WDJ, WLA, RLA. That’s why Soames refutation does not seem to distort Kripkean system.

The objective here is to preserve the Fregean sense and Millian thesis along with providing value to Kripkean system. His approach considers the enrichment of a proper name, say, ‘Aristotle’ with a description of a sort ‘the teacher of Alexander’. But intuitive truth value seems to be a function of descriptive enrichment of the contexts. If we consider Kripke’s example of ‘Gödel’, then ‘Gödel’ seems to be descriptively enriched by ‘the person who proved incompleteness of theorem’. But in fact, this is not true.

Hence, if we ascribe the sense with Kripkean thesis, there seems to be no analytic necessity in his thesis. He only talks about epistemic and metaphysical necessity. It suggests no hope for analytic necessity. However, in case of theoretical identification like ‘Water is H₂O’, analytic necessity may be found.

In spite of severe criticisms and allegations, Kripkean system provides a great contribution in the tradition of analytic philosophy, logic, and philosophy of language.