Chapter V

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The biggest changes in the post-world war II were the shift from multipolarity to bipolarity and the introduction of nuclear weapons. States co-exists in a condition of anarchy. Self help is the principle of action in a anarchic order, and the most important way in which states must help themselves is by providing for their own security. To build defences so potently strong that no one will try to destroy or overcome them, would make international life perfectly tranquil. The other way to counter the intended attack is to build retaliatory forces able to threaten unacceptable punishment upon a would be aggressor.

To ‘deter’ literally means to stop people from doing something by frightening them. In contrast to dissuasion by defence, dissuasion by deterrence operates by frightening a state out of attacking not because of difficulty of launching an attack and carrying it home, but because of the expected reaction of the opponent may result in one’s own severe punishment. Political leader began to debate the issue of nuclear proliferation literally before the dust cast up from the explosion at Hiroshima and Nagasaki had settled to earth. First they debated on power politics; the question was that what would happen ones the Soviet Union built its own nuclear weapons. Secondly the nuclear weapon will proliferate among the small powers. Political thinkers discussed whether proliferation is good or bad, have tended to split into two camps. The actual relationship between proliferation of nuclear weapons and likelihood of nuclear war depends on the durability of the deterrence. Defence and deterrence is often confused. Deterrence is achieved not through the ability to defend but through the ability to punish. The scholars opposed to the proliferation of nuclear weapons argued that the increase in the number of nuclear powers in the world would increase the likelihood of the nuclear war. Proliferation would put nuclear weapons into the hands of the less developed which usually have primitive economy and less responsible rulers. So there is chance, that if by miscalculation, on break down of communication between the countries may instigate the war situation, the new nuclear nations will face even greater challenges in building safe, survivable and credible nuclear arsenals. Proliferation pessimists see several reasons for concern.
about the command and control of new nuclear forces. Sagan (1994) argues, exhibit tendencies such as inflexible routines, parochial interests and organisational biases that can lead to deterrence failure. The scholars who supported proliferation have argued that, though, proliferation may increase the probability of nuclear war in the short run, but in long run it will decrease and eventually eliminate the probability of nuclear war.

Pierra Gallois, Brito, Kneth Waltz and Bueno de Mesquita supported the proliferation view. They argued that many nuclear power can launch a nuclear attack against any non-nuclear power, because there is no threat of retaliation. However, nuclear powers cannot attack other nuclear powers, because any such attack will be returned in kind. Proliferation in its early stages may raise the probability of nuclear war, because an increasing of nuclear powers would be poised to attack, a fairly large number of nuclear powers. But in its later stage proliferation will lower the probability of nuclear war because most states then would have the ability to retaliate and would thus be immune from nuclear weapons. In essence, waltz argues that logic that kept the world safe during the war nuclear confrontation is also applicable to new nuclear states. Waltz also suggests that new nuclear nations would be able to fashion credible nuclear forces and achieve deterrence not only vis-à-vis their possible regional nuclear adversary but even regarding the more established nuclear powers that have much larger nuclear arsenals.

Both the arguments of optimists and pessimists make different assumptions about the ability of a nuclear power to deter a nuclear attack by another nuclear power. The pessimists argument assumes that deterrence is very fragile no state, even one possessing its own nuclear force can be assured of deterring another state from striking it with nuclear weapons. While the proliferation argument assumes that each step in the proliferation adds to the total number of relationships between pairs of states in which mutual deterrence precludes nuclear war. Thus the validity of both arguments hinges on the question of deterrence, because many theorists have understood that deterrence is not an all or nothing relationship. Rather, the stability of deterrence between two nuclear powers depends on many individual factors.

Albert Wohlstetter (1959) described six specific conditions that a nuclear state
must meet in order to be assured of being able to retaliate against a nuclear attack. To
the extent that successful deterrence depends on the ability of a country to retaliate.
He talks about the following six conditions on which deterrence depends:-

(a) The maintenance of standing, reliable deterrence force in peacetime. (b) The ability of
this force to survive a pre-emptive first strike. (c) The ability of
national leaders to make the decision to retaliate and then transit this command to the
military force. (d) The ability of retaliatory force to reach distant enemy territory. (e) The
ability to penetrate enemy active defence and (f) the ability to overcome enemy passive defenses.

Thus, a state will be able to retaliate against its opponents only if it is able to
meet all six conditions. Later on Daniel Ellsberg formulized the Wohlstetter argument
by expressing the deterrence conditions in terms of an expected utility calculus. He
showed how there could be an interactive effect between the state that deters and the
state that is supposed to be deterred. According to Ellsberg, a state could undermine
deterrence by deploying forces that were especially well suited to striking first, but ill
suited to striking second. Such forces might encourage an opponent to calculate that
its best option was to strike first in a crisis, in which case the state would be said to
have undermined deterrence by 'provoking' its opponent into striking. But
Wohlstetter and Ellsberg theory is based on 'auxiliary assumption' it connects both
anti-proliferation and pro-proliferation theories. It is the ideological attempt in
western countries to rationalise and justify the induction, stockpiling and deployment
of nuclear weapons that has given the doctrine of deterrence the elevated status it has
had during the cold war period.

In the early 1960s one line of argument suggested that nuclear weapons had
made alliances obsolete. Facing the risk of complete destruction, no nation would risk
to jeopardise its own survival for others, therefore all the countries must have their
own nuclear arsenals to defend themselves from direct attack. This was criticised by
Henry Kissinger that it marked the end of collective security system and could lead to
international chaos. However, over-realism on the deterrence power of nuclear
weapon can produce a psychological barrier in planning for other forms of power.
Nuclear Deterrence Theory:

Deterrence evolved as the central organizing principles of relations between the super powers in 1960s. Nuclear deterrence retained its preeminence through the 1970s, and 1980s. During the long reign of the deterrence concept as a central theoretical concept to frame the completion between the United States and the Soviet Union, the strategic nuclear balance between the superpower’s became melded with regional balance of power considerations, especially between the Northeast Asia and Europe where the United States of America extended its strategic umbrella over its allies threatened by Moscow’s nuclear and conventional military superiority.

The advent of the nuclear age however, elevated the idea of ‘deterrence’ to prominence in strategies. In its most basic sense, the concept of deterrence implies deterring another state from doing something one does not wish them to do. Richard Med Lebow and Janice Stein offer a generally useful explanation of deterrence. “Deterrence seeks to prevent undesired behavior by convincing those who might contemplate such action that its costs would exceed its gains”. whereas, John Mearsheimer suggests, in the broadest sense, deterrence means persuading an opponent not to invite specific action because the perceived benefits do not justify the estimated costs and risks. In the area of Security, deterrence usually attempts to prevent challenge; but it also can and has been used to try to prevent unaccepted deployments or non-military action that defenders perceives as threatening to their national security. Deterrence requires the defender to define the behaviour that is unacceptable, publicise the commitment to punish or restrain transgressors, demonstrate the resolve to do so, and posses the capabilities to implement the threat.

Despite the fact there is no defence against nuclear weapons, it has a major impact on deterrence in the nuclear realm. What distinguishes nuclear deterrence is the potential for mutual suicide or kill. If one were able to defend one self, one would have implied that one is relatively safe regardless of what the adversary does with military forces. Deterrence through punishment is about trying to influence the enemy’s choices, one is secure not despite military attacks, but only if the enemy is dissuaded from attacking in the first place. Deterrence is therefore a psychological strategy as well as a purely military one. It is effort to use fear to ensure peace, the
enemy's fear of our relation is meant to keep him from starting the war. Because, given the enormous destructiveness on nuclear weapons, retaliation would impose cost far more than any conceivable potential gain he could hope to achieve. Therefore, deterrence, is like beauty lies in the eyes of beholder. Because, as long as perfect deterrence is not possible, each sides security rests, in part on the visions and discussion of the other.

Deterrence may be taken to mean two sorts of things, one as a policy and second as a situation. A policy of deterrence is a calculated attempt to induce an adversary to do something, or refrain from doing something, by threatening a penalty for non compliance. A deterrence situation is one where conflict is contained within the boundary of threats. These threats are neither executed nor tested, if it is tested and not executed is no longer a deterrence. So in deterrence situation, each party sees the other as having potential for harm. Deterrence comes into being because a clash of interests between and intentions seems to have occurred.

The concept of deterrence implies that beyond a certain level of expected damage, States would prefer peace. This notion of deterrence level of distribution is entirely relative. It takes into account the geographical differences and demographic considerations. It is very difficult to define 'minimum deterrence' because no one can define with certainty what constitutes unacceptable damage. Moreover, it is possible that state make different assessments of the relationship between states and risk, while the risk depends on the cost of attack, on the one hand, and reprisals which it will invite on the other. In a conflict situation the risks are so high, it is difficult to see what gains could probably make up for the level of destruction by the reprisal.

Thus, deterrence is believed to harbour the potential for the achievement of Sun Tzu's famous dictum, "For to win one hundred victories in one hundred battles is not the acme of skill. To subdue the enemy without fighting is acme of skill". So the deterrence is the way through which a state can protect its interests while avoiding the possibly of severe risks and costs of war.

In 1946, a collection of Essays written by Fredrick Dunn, Bernard Brrodie, Arnold Wolfers, Percy Corbett and William fox presented a set of first principles for understanding the nuclear age entitled 'The Absolute Weapon: Atomic Power and
World Order' which dealt with the impact of nuclear weapons on international politics and its effect on the establishment of new post-war international order. Brodie viewed nuclear weapons as revolutionary devices, judged relation in kind to be the guiding strategic principles of the nuclear age, and international control of nuclear weapons would be very difficult to achieve. He considered nuclear weapons revolutionary as they alter the very nature of warfare by reducing the efficacy of defences and the benefit provided by quantitative and qualitative superiority on the battle field. It also highlighted an inescapably high degree of societal vulnerability to attack. This policy came to be labeled as Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) and relied on punishment for deterrence.

The fundamental logic of MAD was derived from the belief that the fear of nuclear retaliation and the uncertainty that accompanied it provides the essential motivation that precluded the use of nuclear weapons. Hence, a sufficient condition for nuclear deterrence. It is the possibility of fighting the war rather than losing it that induces restraint. Policies of deterrence like Minimum Deterrence, Existential Deterrence and Finite Deterrence drew their logical sustenance from this point of view. The Indian Draft Nuclear Doctrine with its emphasis on ‘Minimum Deterrence’ secured second strike capability essentially to draw its logical sustenance from the Borden view. Brodie argued that because the actual use of nuclear weapons could not be harnessed to any meaningful military objectives, the relation between weapons and war had been fundamentally altered. In case of nuclear war all major urban and industrial centres could be destroyed in a matter of hours as both adversaries have the capability to conduct such campaigns, the fear of retaliation would ensure deterrence against aggression. The other base of thinking about nuclear deterrence is motivated by a concern that deterrence might fail. W.L. Borden in his book entitled “There will Be No Time: the Revolution in strategy” maintained the awesome destructive aspect of nuclear weapons. He insists on thinking on through the possible use of nuclear weapons in ways familiar to traditional military strategy. This included contemplating their use in response to conventional aggression and maintaining the capacity for a wide range of option should be deterrence fail. He viewed regarding the failure of deterrence that ‘a full scale nuclear war will not be won by destroying the enemy’s military power of relation’. The war
fighting strategy is punitive in nature. The fact is that with the growth of nuclear weapons, war fighting looked impractical. Nuclear strategy increasingly came to be seen as a method to prevent nuclear war. Deterrence was supposed to achieve its aim by either denial or punishment. It could be symmetrical between super power and some small country. On the other hand, Borden in his “There will Be No War Time”, argued that while these weapons were revolutionary in their destructive potential and would change the way wars are fought, they were, nevertheless, ultimate weapons of war, and if they differed from other weapons, this was a difference of degrees rather than of kind. Much later, the distinction between the actual use and deterrent force of nuclear weapons began to be discussed as deterrence by punishment and deterrence of denial.18

No radically different conception of nuclear deterrence has emerged since Brodie and Borden have produced their seminal works. These two approaches have remained the most closely matched policy practices of nuclear deterrence.19Like all other theories, deterrence theory also had its fair share of ardent proponents and equally passionate opponents. Many Western deterrence optimists argued that weaponisation of hitherto unexercised nuclear capability in South Asia would be a welcomed development, as it will lead to peace and strategic stability20. Devin T. Hegarty also argued that the past practices in South Asia shows that in the area of crisis stability, the logic of deterrence is more robust than the logic of nonproliferation Optimists argued that the nuclear weapon capability had not created strategic stability but has put South Asia on ‘a short fuse’ Thus, we can say that nuclear deterrence theory alone can’t completely explain the behaviour of all nuclear states, particularly in the context of South Asia.

**Deterrence by Punishment:** It seeks to prevent aggression by threatening unacceptable damage in relation, by the threat of punishment. Deterrence prior to the arrival of air power and long term bomber was almost synonymous with denial. The advent of strategic bomber and use of chemical biological weapons (CBW) and the large scale destruction produced by them away from battle area highlighted for the first time the possibility of deterrence through the threat of punishment.21 The 1950s American strategies of massive retaliation and assured destruction are good example of deterrence by punishment. The central objective of assured destruction was ‘to
deter deliberate nuclear attack upon the United States.... Massive retaliation was no different from this and was more explicit in its threat of punishment as the means to deter the Soviet Union. The credibility of American massive retaliation started getting questioned once Soviet forces began growing. The fundamental concern of the American forces then was the US ability to retaliate after surviving a Soviet ‘first strike’. This added the term ‘second strike’ in nuclear literature. Credibility of the threat of a punishing retaliation therefore, became a focal point. There was a big information gap and American estimates of Soviet capability were off the mark. This lack of information only added to the threat perception. Even at the beginning of this century, US policy was based on using nuclear weapons once deterrence has failed. The question before the McNamara’s strategy of ‘Assured Destruction’ was the extent of damage that constituted punishment. There is no definite answer of this question because, accepting that no a prior judgment can be made about the capacity of any society to tolerate punishment. The strategy of the massive retaliation was severely criticized but the criticism was about the capacity of the nuclear deterrent itself. The primary objective of assured destruction “to deter deliberate nuclear attack upon the United States or its allies” was no different than the objective of the doctrine of massive retaliation.

**Deterrence by Denial:** As the term itself implies, deterrence by denial is a function of defence. There is true distinction between the deterrence by punishment and denial. Though Glenn Synder suggested that difference between ‘deterrence and defence’. So the assumption that defence rather than deterrence is the true objective of the denial is premised on the failure of deterrence. The ‘victory theorists’ of American nuclear debate in 1970s provide the best example of deterrence by denial. They assumed that deterrence can fail and insisted on the need to plan for that eventually. They tried to prevent aggression of adversary by convincing the aggressor through defence preparation that its aggression would face certain failure. Colin Gray sate that “No one can guarantee that deterrence will always work”.

Strategically, preparation for deterrence by denial is a complex task. There have to be strategic offensive forces, a command and control system that can survive nuclear exchange, strategic defensive forces, a society that is prepared for nuclear war. Theoretically, surviving after first strike and the capability of the force to go for
retaliation is a very difficult question. Ever since the advent of nuclear weapons, the concept of nuclear deterrence has become central to military strategy. However, the concept of deterrence appears simple but it has proved extremely complicated to implement in practice. The challenge of maintaining stable deterrence is revealed as the challenge of strategy. With the change of world political scenario new alliances are being formed to counter unforeseen enemies. Weapons of Mass Destruction have become linked to irrational non-state actors which make all theories of rational deterrence redundant.

The central premise of deterrence is based on three assumptions that is adequate capability, a clearly communicated threat and a credible willingness to carry out the threat. Many theorist gave emphasis on material cost-benefit logic to deterrence and a strong rationalism, for instance, if one assumes that decision makers in states employing nuclear weapons are rational, than self-interest naturally deters the state, as retaliation would cause overwhelming devastation to the state and society. Even the pressure of over whelming nuclear weapons in a state and the prospect of completely annihilating the adversary do not provide deterrence, it is rationality that stops a state from deploying its nuclear weapons. The US was perhaps facing such a dilemma during the Vietnam War, and yet it could not garner itself to use nuclear weapons on Vietnam even though it was fighting a losing battle. So the theory of nuclear deterrence assumes that before initiating armed conflict, decision makers are going to perform a cost benefit analysis. It has often been pointed out that the US did contemplate using nuclear weapons on many occasions, but it never used them after the Second World War.

**Existential Deterrence:** It is based on the personal experience of Mc George Bundy, a member of Kennedy administration during Cuban Missile Crisis, he argues that nuclear deterrence is the primary function of the survivable thermo nuclear arsenals of both superpowers. Though he did not call it ‘existential deterrence’, Bundy has defined the concept, “As long as each side has thermonuclear weapons that could be used against the opponent, even after the strongest possible preemptive attack, existential deterrence is strong and it rests on uncertainty about what could happen.” According to Bundy, existential deterrence was strong in every major crisis between the super power since ‘massive retaliation’ became possible for both of them in the
1950s. As every one closely involved recalls, such deterrence was particularly powerful during the Cuban missile crisis. Bundy argues that "there has been literally no chance at all that any sane political authority .... Would consciously choose to start a nuclear war". Can existential deterrence work only in the presence of arsenals that U.S. and Soviet Union developed. Because there is confusion in his thinking about the kind of nuclear forces that are required for achieved existential deterrence. Later on he suggested that the balance of nuclear force is irrelevant for the working of nuclear deterrence which mean that the deterrent effect of smaller nuclear forces are similar to the super power arsenals of cold war period. He suggests that the destruction of just one city would be considered catastrophic, there would be little difference between having hundred warheads and ten thousands of forces, there could be no complete guarantee that the larger forces would not be able to retaliate with at least a few nuclear warheads.

During Cuban missile crisis, when despite a 17-to-1 advantage in strategic nuclear warheads the United States gained no measurable advantage in dealing with Khrushchev. President Kennedy’s Secretary of Defence, Robert Mc Namara, concurred with this assessment. He said that during the Cuban Missile Crisis (1962) Washington was deterred from "even considering a nuclear attack by the knowledge that, although such a strike would destroy the Soviet Union, tens of their weapons would survive to be lunched against the United States. Then it would kill millions of Americans. No responsible political leader would expose his nation to such a catastrophe."

Under condition of opacity, the role of existential deterrence is even more pronounced. Since each side in an opaque nuclear arms competition has only limited information about the other side’s nuclear forces, any deterrence is not derived from nuclear capabilities and strategic doctrines but on the shared realisation that each side is nuclear capable, and thus that any outbreak of conflict might lead to nuclear war. Of course, there is a stark difference between the huge US-Soviet thermonuclear standoff and the comparatively tiny atomic bomb balance between India and Pakistan.

Jasjit Singh has coined the term ‘recessed deterrence’ a concept that
basically prohibits the mating of weapons with delivery systems. What is required to put in place are the plans, procedure and organization that are ideal for effective nuclear operation in any eventuality. George Perkovich calls it ‘non weaponised deterrence’. 33

In its simplest and earliest form, nuclear deterrence predicts that the presence of nuclear weapons, particularly in a dyadic relationship will, guarantee the absence of nuclear war. The faith is based on the notion that use of nuclear weapons by one side will guarantee a nuclear retaliation by the other side and, therefore, there would be no incentive for either side to initiate a nuclear war except to commit suicide, which is irrational. The ultimate use of these weapons was governed by two doctrines that are denial and punishment. Deterrence by denial requires convincing the opponent that they will not attain goals in the battlefield while deterrence by punishment involves threatening to destroy large portions of an opponent’s civilian population and industry.

**Regional Nuclear Deterrence:** The main terms of non-interference policy is the belief that new nuclear states will be prone to preemptive nuclear escalation which Thomas C. Schelling called the condition of ‘reciprocal fear of surprise attack’. 33 The low survivability of emerging proliferant’s second strike forces, and their unsophisticated command, control, communication and intelligence (C3I) capability could breed miscalculation of adversary actions or intentions that will lead to unnecessary hasty decision making. To reduce the vulnerability of their weapons, non nuclear states might adopt launch-on-warning producers, which in turn could promote their trigger reaction to perceived threats.

Regarding regional nuclear deterrence Brad Roberts says “there are many reasons to think that the emergence of stable deterrence in the East-West context that had to do with unique cultural and geographical circumstances not found in the Middle East, South Asia and East Asia ... the political, technical and situational factors in the region differ sharply from the cold war nuclear framework”. 35 Bruce G. Blair argues that “the super powers were themselves more vulnerable to crisis instability than is commonly believed and that aspiring proliferant’s lesser technological capabilities make them even more subject to preemptive war
pressure". He maintains that because the leader of US and Soviet Union knew that their C\textsuperscript{3}I system were vulnerable to disruption by even a few incoming war heads, Washington and Moscow delegated alert and launch authority to lower level in the chain of command and shortened response time of perceived attacks. Sophisticated early warning network created an extremely time sensitive interaction between the two C\textsuperscript{3}I system, which guaranteed intense escalation pressure. The emerging nuclear powers will face the same dilemma. The logic of nuclear deterrence downplays the likelihood of preemptive war between non-nuclear states. For Kenneth N. Waltz, preemption is viable “only if the would be attacker knows that the intended victim’s warheads are in number, knows their exact number and locations, and knows that they will not be moved or fixed’ before they are struck. To know all of these things, and to know that you know them for sure, is exceedingly difficult.” He further explained that nuclear weapons are easy to hide and move, creating uncertainty for the attacker and it does not require advanced technology. John J. Waltman pointed out that the preemption is not viable for some region where short distances ... combine with economic and industrial constraints to suggest that local powers will never be able to achieve level of survivability in comparison to one another like the superpowers in cold war period. He further adds, however, “that high population densities in small areas” also characterize these region’s; failure to eliminate every single deliverable weapons. It would risk catastrophe, and short distance means that no great sophistication in means of delivery is required for a successful counter value response. Although survivability in any regional nuclear balance will be lower than that between the superpowers, it will hardly be negligible.

Nuclear Deterrence in South Asia:

Indo-Pakistan Posture: Until 1974 Deterrence in South Asia was purely of conventional nature. Although Pakistan’s membership of CENTO, China’s nuclear and missile development and India’s Territory of Peace and Friendship with the Soviet Union did, in theory introduce the nuclear dimension to the region, it was not considered to be particularly significant for deterrence purposes. Though scared by the overwhelming military defeat by India in the 1971 war, the Pakistani government made a decision in January 1972 to pursue nuclear weapons to secure absolute protection and the nuclear means to deter India from ever again using its
conventional military edge against Pakistan in the manner it had done during 1971 war. After 1971 war, there was a series of crises between India and Pakistan but all these crises stopped short of full scale war whereas these crises played out against the emerging nuclear scenario in South Asia. Since 1974, when India conducted its first nuclear test, Pakistan embarked on its nuclear weapons programme and China refined its nuclear capability.

In 1983-84 there were persistent reports that India would attack Pakistan’s nuclear weapons production facilities and Pakistan threatened to retaliate with similar attack on Indian facilities. During 1987 crises India conducted ‘operation Brass-tacks’ its biggest military exercise ever, close to the border. Pakistan fearing that the exercise might be converted into an attack, launched its own defensive disposition ‘operation sledgehammer’. The Indians then responded with a mobilization to counter Pakistan’s deployment by operation Trident. Although the crisis was resolved, Pakistan indicated that it had acquired nuclear weapons capability. The 1990 Indian Pakistan crisis started after Pakistan’s biggest military exercise, Zar-b-i-Momin, in the 1989. In the wake of this exercise there was a sudden spurt in the insurgency movement in Kashmir, India blamed Pakistan for operating camps and threatened to carry out ‘hot pursuit’ across the border into Pakistan to strike the military training camps. Pakistan had conveyed a message in clear terms that it had the capability to inflict unimaginable damage on India if India took any action that threatened Pakistan’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. Pakistan’s former Army Chief Mirza Aslam Beg openly stated that ‘both the nuclear option and missiles act as a deterrent and these in turn contribute to the total fighting ability of the Army, which act as deterrent to the enemy. Despite nuclear capability, both countries were deterred from war in 1990 by each side’s knowledge that the other was nuclear weapon capable and that any military hostilities could escalate to the nuclear level. So in 1990 crisis America’s intervention may have been helpful, but it was ‘logic of deterrence’, even though ‘opaque’ that prevailed over them and it has continued in the years since. Seymour Hersh assert that a nuclear war did, in fact nearly break out in May 1990, and was averted only through America’s intervention. Many scholars are still grappling with issues related to the 1990 crisis. Most of the strategists and scholars opine that the crisis can be best explained as the logic of nuclear deterrence under condition of opaque proliferation.
By all accounts, nuclear deterrence is believed to exist between India and Pakistan which was not clear due to lack of actual declaration of nuclear status, acknowledgement of production or deployments of nuclear warheads by either country. The essence of this deterrence is ambiguity as articulated by President Zia-ul-Haque, “with respect to their (India’s) nuclear capabilities, if they create ambiguity, that ambiguity is the essence of deterrence ... the region had achieved a stable nuclear deterrent, relationship based on ambiguity as to whether India or Pakistan had nuclear weapons, and if they did, how many they possessed.” Ashok Kapoor also expressed the same views that “India and Pakistan have long been playing a game of deliberate nuclear ambiguity, developing their nuclear options but refrain from actually acquiring a nuclear weapon since the option alone meets their diplomatic and military objectives.” Ashley J. Tellis observes that “India and Pakistan can both defend their territorial integrity adequately with the forces they currently have in place, but would be hard pressed to dramatically change the territorial status quo through a quick conventional or even nuclear attack. Former Secretary of India, Muchkund Dubey, argued that nuclear deterrence worked between India and Pakistan for a long period. He believed in non-weaponised deterrence. Jasjit Singh used the term ‘recessed deterrence’ instead of non-weaponised deterrence, which meant that a state had to have a nuclear technological base and that it was more than adequate to achieve weaponisation on short notice.

The strategy of deterrence in the India Pakistan case has been based on uncertainty. Since the adversaries did not know exactly how long it could take for their revival to assemble a weapons, neither state could strike first with any certainty that prompt retaliation would not be the consequence. In 1997 K. Subramanyam stated that “we may be able to have the weapons on short notice... May be a couple of days to couple of months... Pakistan also do not know how long it will take for India to make the bomb... As tension grows, as India facts it may be used, it may even become two hours for it to be ready. The sheer uncertainty is keeping the two countries away from wars... I think mutual deterrence is working between India and Pakistan.”

The deterrence situation prevailing between India and Pakistan before overt nuclearisation cannot be appropriately characterized through any of the known
models which were used to define the deterrence relationship between the superpowers during the cold war years. However, the term 'Non-Weaponised Deterrence' coined by George Perkovich very aptly described the relations between the two South Asian adversaries. As Liven argued, Pakistan nuclear arsenals are the key deterrent of Pakistan against India. It plays the same role as did Western nuclear forces during cold war, it deters a potential adversary with a heavy superiority in conventional forces.

The nuclear deterrent capability of the two sides was 'opaque' only to the extent of being willfully blind. In the aftermath of the nuclear tests of May, 1998 each side has stated in justification of its actions, that the tests of the other only confirmed what it knew all along. The Kargil crisis of May-July 1999 provides a very good case for studying the various facets of theories of deterrence in South Asia. This was the first major crisis after both India and Pakistan tested several nuclear devices and declared themselves to be nuclear weapon states in May 1998. Unlike the past, in this crisis, both sides were well aware of the presence of the nuclear weapons in each other's arsenals. Both the countries moved their missiles in launching position.

Despite the fact that Kargil did not involve deployed nuclear weapons, it was centre of the threat of use of nuclear weapons. The nuclear dimension of the Kargil conflict became apparent when Pakistan's Foreign Secretary Shamshad Ahmad gave an statement that 'Pakistan will not hesitate to use any weapons in its arsenal if Indian forces were found to be operating on Pakistan's sides of border.' The Pakistani action of crossing the LoC in the kargil area of Jammu and Kashmir signaled a major breakout and challenged the relative stability that had been established under the non-weaponised deterrence relationship between the two antagonists since the early 1980s. Kargil was different because it was the longest and perhaps bloodiest, military confrontation between the two countries, which did not end with bilateral negotiation. To a large extent, this crisis was resolved at the behest of a third party intervention. However, India showed utmost restraint and the escalation spiral was contained. Pakistani analysts see the role of external actor as central to India-Pakistan deterrence, while third party intervention is not taken into account in any of the theories of deterrence. This is in sharp contrast to the pre May
1998 period when the use of the term ‘deterrence’ was taboo. As K.C. Pant says India does not subscribe to the doctrine of nuclear deterrence. However, India just cannot afford to overlook the fact that three major nuclear powers operate in its neighborhood. If we are to influence three major powers, then it becomes inescapably necessary for us to reckon with their nuclear deterrence belief concepts.\(^5\)

On December 15, 1998 A.V. Bajpayee spelt out in the Indian Parliament that the principal element of India’s minimum deterrence are no-first-use, no use against non-nuclear power, and commitment to the elimination of nuclear weapons. It is clear that nuclear deterrence can range from acquisition to mere declaratory posture with covert demonstration of capabilities...a form of existential deterrence to deterrence based on a near total certainty and elaborate nuclear arsenal based on the triadic nature of deterrent, air, mobile land-based and sea assets with command and control system, leaving no doubt about the certainty of retaliatory strike.\(^6\)

This does not necessarily mean that Indians and Pakistani were unfamiliar with nuclear deterrence theory and the discourse surrounding it but simply that they chose not to articulate it. Why did India and Pakistan come to embrace nuclear deterrence theory and bring the dominant western discourse and all its encompassing thesis in the post May 1998 period? The best suited explanations of this question are, firstly an acknowledgement and articulation of nuclear deterrence theory implies an acceptance of the presence and possession of nuclear weapons. Before May 1998, India challenged the possession of nuclear weapons in the hand of nuclear weapon state and also denied their own possession. Besides, using nuclear weapons without actually having nuclear weapons would have been meaningless. Secondly, both India and Pakistan sought to justify and legitimize their entry into nuclear club using the nuclear deterrence. Finally, having conducted nuclear tests without much thought about the eventual deployment of new weapons in their existing arsenals in the strategists and officials of the two countries turned to the convenient, if somewhat inadequate, nuclear deterrence theory to plan for their use as primarily political tools.\(^7\)

The India-Pakistan crisis of 2002 began with the terrorist attack on the Indian Parliament which was severely aggravated by Kaluchauk massacre. India mobilised
its conventional strike forces and argued for a 'limited war'. India’s Prime Minister A. B. Vajpayee issued what can only be described as a nuclear threat. He declared that no weapon would be spared in self-defence whatever weapon was available, it would be used, no matter how it wounded the enemy’. Within a week of this statement, India also test fired the 700 Km range Agni-1 on 25 January 2002. Subsequently Pakistan’s president Pervez Musharaf also issued a nuclear threat in April 2002 and test fired three surface to surface ballistic missile system of the Hatf series. Both sides were also reported to have put their nuclear weapons on high alert. The nuclear brinkmanship was further compounded by both sides closing down their official channels of communication and not allowing any back enhancement communication. Again in this crisis a high level shuttle diplomacy on the part of America ensured that deterrence worked, but only temporarily. Both India and Pakistan are still trying to grapple with making deterrence based on overt capabilities work and are learning through trial and error method.

In the wake of the Kargil conflict Pakistan had a tacit first use doctrine and elaborated its nuclear command and control structure. India which has a declared no-first-use doctrine and is working towards a second strike capability, articulated a draft nuclear doctrine. India has frequently declared its concept of a ‘limited war’ it is not clear whether it has even acknowledged the Pakistani message that even a conventional ‘limited war’, could lead to nuclear response by Islamabad. As both countries are still in the process of formulating their concept of nuclear deterrence, the messages are at best not delivered or at worst are often contradictory. For instance, Pakistan’s envoy to the United Nations stated that Pakistan could resort to the use of nuclear weapons even in conventional conflict which resented Pakistan President Pervez Musharaf and he dismissed the threat of nuclear war on 1, June 2002 crisis. Similar contradictions are evident on the Indian side. Indian President A.P.J. Abul Kalam declared that ‘nuclear deterrence on both sides helped (them) not to engage in a big war and to avoid a nuclear exchange’. This statement contradicted the former Army Chief General Ved P. Malik’s statement that ‘if Pakistan persists with its proxy war or transborder terrorism policy, Indo-Pak war, cannot be ruled out.
Bharat Kamard an Indian strategist explains three reasons which prevent South Asian crisis not escalating into nuclear exchange. First, the strong and intimate linkage between the two countries owing to ties of kinship, shared religion and culture, and the growing political consciousness and clout of the Indian Muslim Community. These factors politically prevent the Indian government from prosecuting a war of annihilation against Pakistan.

Second, the resulting Indian system of restraint represented by passive-defensive and reactive policy and acceptance of essential conventional military parity with Pakistan makes war non-feasible.

Finally, the manifestation of nuclear disparity and an exchange ratio is highly unfavorable to Pakistan in case of nuclear war. This not only undermine the credibility of Pakistan’s nuclear threats but mock deterrence theory models and concept from the cold war.

The government on India and Pakistan are agreed that the possibility of nuclear hostilities between the two countries is remote, and they denounce the myth of South Asia as nuclear flashpoint. The mere possession of the nuclear bomb does not constitute minimum deterrence, and the minimum deterrence should essentially be used to negotiate a better strategic balance. A strategic balance is required for South Asia region. Thus, one can conceive of deterrence moving towards peace in three overlapping stages and sets of policies on nuclear deterrence management, regional and domestic political regimes. Firstly, the stabilization of deterrence by cooperative security management including the organizing of orderly build up in parallel. Secondly, the building of economic cooperation and regional political regime leading to economic interpretation and mutual stakes on the patterns of European Union. Thirdly, political cooperation includes domestic reconstitution in line with non-discriminatory citizenship, secular state, federalism and power sharing.

**Deterrence for the Subcontinent:**

The geo-strategic environment of the sub-continent has no parallel in the cold war. India and Pakistan share a border-link while the US and USSR did not. This
dramatically shortens the timeframe within which either country would have to decide, in the midst of a crisis or war, whether or not use nuclear weapons.\textsuperscript{65} Hence, within the rational deterrence framework, three major requirements for stable deterrence must be created in the India-Pakistan context. Firstly, both countries must develop not just the ability to inflict acceptable damage to the other side, but also a sufficient degree of second strike invulnerability so that their forces could retaliate if attacked first. Secondly, the threat to retaliate with nuclear weapons for a nuclear attack must be credible. Thirdly, the nuclear arsenals must not be prone to accidental use.\textsuperscript{66}

At first, it appears that both India and Pakistan might have a kind of crude Weapons. Both sides acknowledge about the actual number and location of their nuclear devices. For the second strike capability the arsenals of both countries be technologically reliable, and there might be effective command, control and communication system. The ideal deterrence models for the subcontinent would be based on opacity on the grounds that declared thresholds and redlines undermine operational flexibility and increase nuclear risks during crises, and deterrence works through uncertainty. So transparency can only work when there is absence of continuous conflict and periodic crises. Restraints in nuclear deployment as a part of both India and Pakistan’s policy of minimum nuclear deterrence might help in crisis stability in South Asia.\textsuperscript{67} For credibility, perception of intentions and political will are crucial. Deterrence theory suggests that both intentions and capability are important factors in stabilizing deterrence and it would be worthwhile for both the countries to moderate their rhetoric. Since deterrence primarily relies on the threat of future harm, the deterrer’s credibility is obviously a key factor in making deterrence workable. In the South Asian context, the importance of the stakes involved in many of the potential deterrence situation may not be clear. The perception of deterrer’s are not only determined by the objective realities but also by subjective interpretation of observed actions.

Sumit Ganguly stated that there is no uniform view about the nuclear strength of Pakistan or for what strategic purpose it will use it against India. Furthermore, Pakistan’s nuclear capability has added complexity to India’s strategic environment and it will be a critical factor in India’s security calculation.\textsuperscript{68} In South Asia, the intentions of parties
have always been opaque, particularly during crises. Dialogue and established channels of communication between India and Pakistan are, therefore essential factors in the maintenance of deterrence stability. The diplomatic, political and technological framework of confidence-building and crises management for stable deterrence is missing. Both the country need to put this in place as it will also address the problem of accidental or unauthorized use that may come from delegation of authority to use nuclear weapons.

**China in the Indian-Pakistan Nuclear deterrence:**

For considering issue involving nuclear weapons the geographical area of South Asia (excluding China) can’t be accepted as a self-contained zone for discussion. The geographical considerations make it pertinent and realistic to accept India, Pakistan and China as constituting a zone of ‘nuclear triangle’. Advocates of nuclear weapons in India also justify their demands on the basis of the deterrence value of nuclear weapons against both China and Pakistan. Regionally, even a numerically inferior nuclear force can establish effective local deterrence but its absence may make the nation vulnerable to nuclear blackmail. In a scenario where more than two states are engaged in trying to deter each other, the calculations are complex. All have different capabilities, weapons doctrines and intentions. India has to simultaneously deter China and Pakistan, the two countries that have different capabilities. It would be naïve to believe that deterring more than one state is simple, since a state may run the risk of nuclear attack whose initiator might not be clearly identifiable. Deterrence works if the aggressor is persuaded that the risk of aggression outweigh its benefits. If the costs of suffering retaliation are immense, as in the case of nuclear attack, the probability of retaliation need not be very high to render aggression a clearly bad bargain for any plausible political gain. The challenge is to maintain stable deterrence, given a certain set of norms. This calculation becomes complex in the South Asian context as norms setting does not last long, treaties are under stress, political rhetoric is high and non-state actors play an important role. It is also believed that India considers China, a competitor even though China is an extra-regional power. India is dwarfed by China military strength in terms of conventional military. Indian targets are well within Chinese aircraft and missile
cover and the Sino-Indian nuclear equation is hopelessly asymmetrical. China therefore has …” the strength to coerce India into unacceptable policies by virtue of her potential for nuclear blackmail. As K. K. Nayar viewed, the Chinese real intentions as far as India is concerned have been projected by the relations it has maintained with Pakistan through transfer of sensitive and nuclear ballistic missile components. One cannot deny the fact that China has continued to maintain friendly relations with Pakistan and that friendliness developed into serious military-security relations after 1971. Such developments would adversely affected India’s own security and India would then be forced to achieve a reasonable sufficiency vis-à-vis China in terms of a credible deterrence at the cost of its social and economic development. It is also believed that China assisted Pakistan in building a secret medium range missile factory in Rawalpindi.

China’s nuclear deterrence doctrine has been in synchrony with its conventional war fighting doctrine. It was initially based on self-deterrence during the era of ‘people’s war’. It is gradually shifted to one of minimum nuclear deterrence during the 1860s and 1970s and now appears to have established a limited nuclear deterrence, which includes nuclear coercion. China’s limited deterrence may be defined as a concept of “having enough capabilities to deter conventional threat and strategic nuclear war, and control and suppress escalation during nuclear war”. The close collaboration that still exists between China and Pakistan has a direct bearing on India’s security environment, and highlights that ‘new strategic dimensions of the threat from China’. It is tough to separate the two nuclear configurations, India-Pakistan and India-China and it is impossible to talk about the security concern of South Asia without fully understanding India’s concern over China. Stephen P. Cohen says “Keeping China out of the South Asian Problems means dealing with a region-and-a-half”. Some Indian Think Tank have opined that the Chinese nuclear arsenal still provides the major impetus for India to have a nuclear deterrent and Pakistan’s activities are a source of concern. A senior Indian strategist K. Subrahmanayam says, “since one of the factors in our security calculation is China, in fact it is the major factor and has thermonuclear weapons…thus country
it is argued, should conduct a few thermonuclear tests in order to have a credible deterrent against China’s".  

So for an effective deterrence between India and China required India to openly declare its possession of nuclear weapons. From the beginning India declared that it will require weapons sufficient merely to raise level of uncertainty for potential aggressors somewhat in order to induce adequate deterrence. Jasjit Singh argued that India did not need 500-500 weapons for par with China. If nuclear weapons are for potential use than a minimum deterrent capability is required. Regarding nuclear deterrence, and especially in the China-India case, in 1996 Raja Ramanna stated that “the use of plutonium bomb is sufficient enough to act as deterrent and we have that capability”. For Pakistan, possession and use of nuclear deterrence is very attractive and the idea could become more acceptable as the imbalance in conventional military strength between India and Pakistan increases in favour of Pakistan. Indeed, it is possible to stand the proliferation chain argument. The argument has been that if China acquired nuclear weapons, India would acquire them and this in turn would lead to Pakistani bomb. 

Since nuclearisation of India and Pakistan in May 1998, the China’s role in the nuclear relationship between the two nuclear countries of South Asia has not been as simple and straight forward as ‘containing’ and ‘diminishing’ India as it was by the mid 1960s. The nuclear tests of 1998 were to actually expose Beijing’s lack of the firm grip on the evolution of Pakistan’s and therefore South Asian nuclear deterrence. Nuclearised South Asia emerged as a major influence on China’s nuclear policies and problems of neutrality vis-à-vis nuclear deterrence between India and Pakistan. However, the centrality of China to South Asia’s nuclear deterrence relationship does not end with India’s and Pakistan’s nuclear tests in May 1998. In his speech Pakistani P.M. Nawaz Sharif expressed his gratitude to the ‘time tested’ relations with Beijing, understanding how, with these nuclear tests, ‘our friendship has been further strengthened’. On the contrary, the Indian Prime Minister blamed China for India going nuclear. He further explain after many years, India now has a credible nuclear deterrence against China, which it probably should have had many years ago.
Though China refrains from backing Pakistan in Kashmir, it has been steadily supplying sensitive military materials and technology to Pakistan. In this way, the Chinese have made effort to promote a Sino-Pak dependency and thereby to use Islamabad as its bulk work in its South Asian policy.\textsuperscript{85} Ashok Kapoor pointed out that Pakistan is an extended arms of China in the Indian subcontinent.\textsuperscript{86} From Indian prospective, the India-Pakistan nuclear deterrence is only a byproduct of India’s quest to establish nuclear deterrence with China. After 1998, the nuclear triangle of China-India-Pakistan presents the only example of its kind in which three nuclear neighbours share disputed border that have resulted in wars and continued violence and terrorism. Indeed China’s posture to take into account developments in India and Pakistan nuclear deterrence.\textsuperscript{87} In the end, the trilateral interface of China-India-Pakistan continues to determine the future of their nuclear deterrence discourse. It will be difficult to visualize their equation within the confined region of South Asia.

**Implication of Nuclear Deterrence in South Asia:**

Because of mutual vulnerability, nuclear weapons have both decreased the chance of war and increased the destruction that would be result of such a war to occur. Neither side can impose its will on the other by superior military means, because the victor is virtually impossible. In Bernard Brodie’s famous word, “thus for the chief purpose of the military establishment has been to win wars. From now on, its chief purpose must be to avert them. It can have no other purpose”.\textsuperscript{87} Brodie noted in shift from the notion of war as a political option to the notion of war avoidance as the political objective.

It is sometimes argued that because military victory is impossible in a nuclear war, nuclear weapons have little utility. Glenn Synder has called the stability instability paradox. Strategic stability creates instability by making lower levels of violence, like low intensity conflicts, relatively safe.\textsuperscript{88} If therefore the probability of nuclear weapons being used is zero, they would no deter anybody. However, this logic is flawed. The basis of deterrence lies not in one’s on an adversary, but on the adversary’s uncertainty about possibility of such damage being inflicted upon it.\textsuperscript{89} This is the consequence of the singularly ‘incontestable’
quality of nuclear weapons; their capacity to cause immense destruction within a
time frame that does not permit an adjustment of costs. This has an important
bearing on ‘credibility’. A deterrent is not credible because it might inflict
cataclysm and there is chance of miscalculation to use or not to use armed forces
in a conflicting situation. Deterrence politics is all about risk.

Before May 1998, traditional nuclear deterrence theory suggests that India
and Pakistan should discard opacity and strive for assured second-strike
capabilities. These two countries of South Asia derived deterrent security from
their nuclear capabilities. While the fact is that their weapons were unassembled
that minimised the likelihood of nuclear accidents. Devin T. Hagerity pointed out
the nuclear proliferation and nuclear deterrence issue in South Asia as the concept
of the ‘reciprocal fear of surprise attack’. The notion that nuclear weapon states
embroiled in crises will inevitably face strong, perhaps irresponsible, pressure to
decapitate their opponent’s nuclear forces preemptively is deductively appealing
but empirically unsupported.

There is an increasing emphasis on finding ‘Combat’ uses for nuclear
weapons (war fighting or denial), rather than on the traditionally prominent role
of using nuclear weapons to deter the use of other nuclear weapons and that such
offensive strategy can be the sources of greater nuclear danger. The best example
of stable nuclear deterrence equation is the India-China dyad. Both India and
China have adopted nuclear deterrence postures that put great confidence in the
relatively small nuclear arsenals that the two countries have. Both have adopted
purely retaliatory strategies by declaring a No-First Use policy. But the India-
Pakistan nuclear dyad clearly shows the instability caused by denial strategies.
The denial strategy does not accept the nuclear capacity of small nuclear forces
because they would not able to fight and prevail against a large nuclear force. But
the deterrence by punishment emphasises on second strike and, more importantly
capacity to deter large nuclear forces.

Nuclear Deterrence and stability in South Asia:

As John J. Mearsheimer defines stability ‘the absence of war and major
crises’. Deterrence stability comprises three essential elements; that are absence of
incentives for rapid qualitative or quantitative expansion of states nuclear arsenal vis-à-vis that of an adversary, and the effectiveness of deterrence in reducing incentives for major coercive political changes. Deterrence stability is crucial in preventing war between nuclear adversaries. As Thomas Schelling pointed out that ‘Absence of deterrence- a situation in which the incentives on both sides to initiate war are out weighted by the disincentives is stable when it is reasonably secure against shocks, alarms and perturbations.’ In other words it is stable when political events, internal or external to the countries involved, technological change, accidents, changes in the intelligence available to both sides are unlikely to disturb the incentives sufficiently to make deterrence fail.

The overt nuclearisation of South Asia in May 1998 has led to the formation of two camps of deterrence theorist...over whether a nuclearised subcontinent will prevent a major conflict and foster escalation. Deterrence optimists maintain that nuclear weapons by making war catastrophically costly, generates incentives for war avoidance between nuclear rivals and therefore creates stability between them. Kenneth N. Waltz an intellectual architect of deterrence optimism attributed four benefits to military posture based on nuclear deterrence, that are (a) deterrence strategies include caution all around and thus reduce the chances of war. (b) Wars fought in the face of strategic nuclear weapons must be carefully limited because a country having them may retaliate if its vital interests are threatened. (c) Prospective punishment need only be proportionate to an adversary’s expected gains in war after those gains are discounted for the many uncertainties of war. (d) Should deterrence fail, a few judiciously delivered warheads are likely to produce sobriety if the leaders of all of the countries are involved and thus bring rapid de-escalation. The former Minister of External Affairs of India, Jaswant Singh wrote, “If deterrence works in the west...as it so obviously appears to, since western nations insist on continuing to possess nuclear weapons....by what reasoning will it not work in India”. An Indian strategist K. Sundarji, flatly predicted that nuclear deterrence “will add to stability and peace that the only salvation is for both countries to follow policies of cooperation and not confrontation.... A mutual minimum nuclear deterrent will act as a stabilizing factor”. Pakistan will see it as counteracting India’s superior power potential and providing a more level playing field. The chances of
conventional war between the two will be less likely than before.

Jasjit Singh argued that, with the advent of offsetting nuclear capabilities on the subcontinent, “deterrence will continue, but on a higher level. I don’t think we are going to use a slide towards instability. I don’t think anybody will allow it to happen”. 98 This view was widely echoed in Pakistan and General K. M. Arif declared that “the nuclear option will promote regional peace and create stability”. 99 Another General of Pakistan Mirza Aslam Beg expressed his view, “it is the nuclear deterrence that has kept wars in South Asia at bay”. 100 Ashley Tellis has argued that India-Pakistan deterrence is more stable than it is given credit for, the prospects for deterrence stability are ... high because no South Asian state is currently committed to securing any political objectives through the medium of major conventional and by implication nuclear war. This condition is only reinforced by the high levels of ‘defence dominance’ obtaining at the military level, and thus it is not at all an exaggeration to say that deterrence stability in South Asia derives simply from the Indian and Pakistani ... inability to successfully prosecute quick and decisive conventional military operation, especially with respect to wars of unlimited aims... what makes this situation meta stable is the fact that neither India nor Pakistan... has the strategic capabilities to execute those successful damage limiting first strikes that might justify initiating nuclear attacks in a crises. 101

Deterrence pessimists viewed that the situation in South Asia are different from cold war situation and it s far from stability. As Neil Joeck, argues that, India’s and Pakistan’s nuclear capabilities have not created strategic stability and do not reduce or eliminate factors that contributed to past conflicts..... Far from creating stability, these basic nuclear capabilities have led to an incomplete sense of where security lies....Limited nuclear capabilities increase the potential costs of conflict, but do little to reduce the risk of it breaking out.102 V.R. Raghvan concludes that the possibility of a nuclear war between India and Pakistan is high, in the event the two countries are engaged in direct military conflict. Talat Masood has expressed his view that “it would be dangerous for either country to presume that its nuclear capability provides a cover for high risk strategies or gives immunity from an all out conventional war”. 103 John Muller argues that “the nuclear weapons neither crucially defines a fundamental stability nor threaten severely to disturb it”. 104 Therefore, the
pessimists have their view that the military imbalance in South Asia is one of the reasons of instability of the subcontinent. From 1995 to 1999, South Asian military expenditure grew more than for any region of the world. There are many factors like territorial disputes, mistrusts, lack of institutionalised crisis management mechanism, lack of understanding of the nuclear strategy and deterrence.

Thus the presence of the destabilizing factors in South Asia, coupled with the outbreak of the Kargil War in 1999 in a nuclear environment and the prolonged India-Pakistan military Standoff in 2001-02 has led many analysts to argue that the prospects for strategic stability between India and Pakistan are bleak. So the Kargil crisis has jeopardized the stability of South Asia. India has lost confidence in Pakistan because it was responsible for initiating the crisis. Although no country officially crossed the line of control, India used air power for the first time since the 1971 war. The crisis de-escalated without war, but it had tremendous impact on the overall stability in the region. This is not to suggest that India-Pakistan deterrence is secure against the risks of failure, but merely to point that the task of the management of their deterrent equation is not an impossible one. It can be made to work, provided both are willing to work together to seek strategic stability as an overarching goal. The best chance of defusing nuclear danger, controlling escalation and stabilising strategic stability lies in sustained and substantive political engagement

Compellence:

Compellence is an attempt by policy makers in state ‘A’ to force, by threat and or by application of sanction, policy makers in state ‘B’ to comply with demands of state ‘A’, including but not limited to retract actions already taken. As S. Rashid Naim pointed out, compellence is forcing another state to do something by threatening a nuclear strike—would only work, if one side were to have a monopoly of nuclear weapons or a military superiority, that would make it possible for the ‘compellence’ to retaliate against the ‘compellor’. At the very least, the demands made by the ‘compellor’ should not be viewed as so outrageous or so destructive to the nationhood of the ‘compelpee’ as to make these demands unacceptable even under threats of nuclear attack. The theory and practice of compellence has been the subject of considerable discussion and debate. Analyst have investigated its diverse
components, including its relationship with crises, deterrence and escalation in the entire range of conflict relationship, especially in the context of nuclear dyads. It is often suggested that nuclear ‘deterrence’ differ in important respects from ‘conventional deterrence’ and that extended deterrence is more difficult to pursue successfully than attempts to deter attack upon one’s own nation. Morgan says, general deterrence is used to destablised policies of opposing nations who maintained armed forces to regulate their relationship even though neither is any where close to mounting an attack.

The distinction between deterrence and compellence is important. Deterrence attempt to prevent on adversary action while compellene requires the adversary to react or initiate an action. Deterrence does not require the state attempting it to initiate an action, but compellence does. Deterrence has no time frame. but it is definite, where as compellence involves, or at least implies a deadline or short time frame work.

India’s post-December 13, strategy, which involved a massive conventional build up reinforced by the assertion of nuclear asymmetry, involved elements of both deterrence and compellence. C. Raja Mohan, a strategic analyst, noted the ‘growing belief in Delhi that the time has come to call Pakistan’s nuclear bluff’ lest India place itself in permanent vulnerability to cross border terrorism from Pakistan. Indian strategy underwent a significant shift from deterrence to compellence while it may be said that the demand that Pakistan cut back on its support to cross-border terrorism is a deterrence threat, it is also a compellent threat because it includes, among other things, the demand for a series of positive actions, including the handing over of terrorist. The threat was ‘decomposed’ and projected in a calibrated series of actions accompanied by parallel series of verbal statements designed to keep Pakistan off balance. At the level of action, the first major move was made by India on December 22, to recall its ambassador and to end bus and train services between the two countries. Two days later, it was announced that Indian Army had ‘moved’ but not ‘deployed’, the nuclear capable short-range Prithvi missile, normally stored at Secunderabad in the south, to the border region. Indian Defence Minister George Fernandes said that India had deployed fighter jets at bases along the border and that its missiles were in position. The following day, Pakistan civilian aircraft were
prohibited from over flying India, and India ordered the strength of its mission in Islamabad, as well as that of the Pakistani mission in New Delhi, reduced by half. By this time military build up was at pick and exchanges of fire were occurring regularly. At the mean time India tested its intermediate range missile Agni with a declared range of 700-900 km.

On the verbal plane, Indian rhetoric was strong. The consistent aim was to drive home the point that India stood by its plank no first use. If Pakistan were to use weapons first, it would be devastated by a counter-strike from India’s large arsenal. In other words Pakistan’s nuclear capability would no longer deter India from taking military action. The nature of India’s military action was left unspecified but, given the extent of its deployment, conceivably included a major conventional thrust. The threat of nuclear desolation came regularly and from diverse sources. On December, Jana Krishnamurthy the President of BJP, warned that if Pakistan attempted to use nuclear weapons against India, its existence itself would be wiped out of the world map. On the same day, Prime Minister A.B. Vajpayee declares: “We do not want war, but war is being thrust on us, and we will have to face it”. On 29 December, Defence Minister George Fernandes repeated the warning.

Pakistan can’t think of using nuclear weapons despite the fact that they are not committed to the doctrine of no first use like we are. We could take a strike, survive, and then hit back. Pakistan would be finished. I do not really fear that the nuclear issue would figure in a conflict. The rhetoric declined after Musharraf’s initial promise led to reduced tension, but rose against when tension grew in. Many observers did see the whole exercise as a bluff.

The central aim was to show that nuclear weapons are not simple equalizers, and that asymmetry does matter. It was not so much an affirmation that the nuclear asymmetry in itself is significance as a assertion that the combination of nuclear asymmetry and conventional asymmetry gave India a distinct advantage. The cost of a nuclear war would be disproportionate. India would be hurt but Pakistan would not survive. In short, Pakistan was effectively deterred from nuclear use altogether. The nuclear freeze, however, left India at an advantage because of its superior conventional force, which could be used to carry out operation without fear, if a Pakistani nuclear first strikes. Even in a conventional war, Pakistan would be
continuously inhibited by the fear of a possible uncontrolled escalation leading to nuclear war.\textsuperscript{118} Thus, these were strategic space for a limited war to conflict costs on an economically and politically unstable Pakistan. So long as its core interests were not jeopardized, Pakistan would have no incentive to launch nuclear weapons against India.\textsuperscript{14} Therefore, the nuclear-cum-conventional asymmetry shows that the role of nuclear weapons was not restricted to mutual nuclear deterrence. As India’s Naval chief, Admiral Sushil Kumar, pointed out, “The nukes are for negotiations. they are not weapons of war.”\textsuperscript{119} In general compellence shows a mixed picture.\textsuperscript{16} Compellence may or may not work, depending on a wide range of factors in a specific context. Between nuclear weapon states, barring the recent South Asian Confrontation (India-Pakistan) these have been only two serious crises that brought the adversaries to the verge of war that are Cuban Missile crises of 1962, and the Soviet-China border conflict of 1969 at Damansk island on the Ussuri river.\textsuperscript{120}

In South Asia, however the regional rivals have found a new use of nuclear weapons since they went nuclear officially in 1998. Apart from posing a divert compellence threat they have engaged in creative expansion of nuclear strategy to invite outside intervention in their conflict. This was first initiated by Pakistan in 1999 during Kargil crisis. India also engaged in similar exercise in post-December 13 build up. In Kargil crisis, Pakistan attempted to use the United States as a lever to compel India to negotiate on Kashmir. Whereas in the December 13 crisis, India compelled the United States to put intense pressure on Musharraf to abandon his support for Pakistan based terrorist groups operating in Kashmir.

The Indian experiment with compellence in a nuclear context is subject to criticism on two grounds. Firstly the strategy may work or it may not. Secondly the attainment of one’s objective is not fixed. The object of a compellence strategy may appear to succumb only to reverse its position at a time of its own choosing.\textsuperscript{121} Compellence through a third party is inherently problematic because the interest of third party tends to be its own, and these may be a drag on the compelling power. Hence, a successful use of nuclear weapons leads to a rapid escalation of such use, a situation equally unacceptable to both sides because of the destabilising effects it would have and the risk of a subsequent nuclear exchange. Thus, constraints on use of nuclear weapons for compellence are strong, and it is doubtful if attempts at such use would succeed.
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