CHAPTER I

OCCUPATION OF LUSHAI HILLS

For about a decade following the Expedition of 1872, the Lushai frontiers remained relatively quiet.¹ A chain of outposts stretching from southern Cachar through Tipperah down along the Chittagong Hill Tracts and linking with those in the Arakan Hills had been established after extensive surveys and consultations between the military and the civil authorities on the defence of the frontiers.² Developments within the Lushai Hills equally proved to be an effective check upon disturbances in its frontiers. Intensive

¹ FPEP. February 1884; Nos. 302-309, K.W. No.1. Demi Official letter from A.Mackenzie, to the Secretary. “The peace was actually broken when on 18 January 1882, Hausrata, in collaboration with the Muallianpuis Chiefs, raided on the village of Lalsiva, the successor of Rothangpuia, Chief of Thangluah, for the latter’s assistance to the British during the late Expedition. The raiders killed as many as twenty nine people, wounded seven and carried off ninety nine persons as captives and the raiders had taken number of animals like gayals, fowls, etc. The Muallianpuis attacked a Frontier Police party who were on the way to Demagri from Burkhal by Kolodyne river on the 18 November 1883. This daring raid was actuated by the famine conditions in the hills and was therefore clearly intended to plunder.

² H.R.Browne, The Lushai, 1878-1889, (Shillong, 1889, Reprint, Calcutta, 1978), P.4. See also Col. E.B.Elly, Military Report on the Chin-Lushai Country, (Simla :1893, Reprint Calcutta, 1978), p. 11. “After the Expedition of 1871-72 the question of Frontier defence was reconsidered, and in 1874 Posts were established on the Cachar and Sylhet, frontier at Jirighat, Mainadhar, Monierkhal, Noarbund, Jhalnacherra, Chattachura, Oliviaherra, Lakhimamla, Fatehkuli, and Adampur. In Tipperah at Dharmanagar, Koilashut (Chirakuti), and Kamaipur. In Chittagong district at Demagri, Sirthay (Sirse), Ohipum(1) (Uolphum), Ohipum (2), Saichul (Saichal), Sungoo Valley, and Politai. In Arakan at Kulukwa and Dalema. The Frontier Officers were also endeavour to keep up frontier relations by means of bazaar and annual meetings with Chiefs, at which feast were held and presents given before 1871 at Kassalong, and afterwards at Demagri.”
rivalries between the eastern and western chiefs, which had broken out in open hostilities, had only served to absorb their warlike energies. As one officer with a later Expedition was to write:

The lesson taught by the Expedition of 1871-72 appeared to have made a considerable impression upon the Lushais, for although, in pursuance of hereditary feuds, or in retaliation for recent insults and injuries, they still continued to raid upon each other, such disturbances were, for a long time, confined to their own territory.¹

Even as these showed signs of abatement pressure from the advancing Pawis and Lakhers diverted attention southwards.² The assistance given to the Lushais during the famine in the early eighties by the Cachar authorities, too, had brought in a measure of good will between them. But events at the close of the decade, both inside and outside the Lushai hills, however, were to bring


² Of the impact of such pressures on the British frontiers an official document thus stated: “a general movement would seem to take place from time to time amongst these people, apparently as if swarms were thrown off from the more crowded villages in the higher central hills such swarms forming new communities all around the outer fringe of the tract, and in doing so driving before them the villages which had previously inhabited this fringe. The inhabitants of them are compelled, in consequence of the pressure, to take refuge in our territory or in Tippera or Manipur. There they are often followed themselves killed or taken captive and their villages plundered by the new comers. This seem to have been the origin of what is called the Kooki rising of 1849 and 1850, as it certainly was of the great series of raids in 1860-61.” Quoted in B.C.Chakravart, *British Relations with the Hill Tribes of Assam since 1838*, (Calcutta, 1964) p.49.
these extensive hills under colonial rule but not before overcoming a protracted resistance.

FRONTIER DISTURBANCES

The Expedition of 1871-72 had not touched the southern hills and the 'Shendus,' as the Pawis-Lakhers were then known, were left very much to themselves. Inter village warfare, not merely one village against another, but often a combination of villages against another grouping went on relentlessly. Large parties on the warpath were often heard prowling about the Chittagong frontier. It was the chance encounter between one such party and a British survey team that really marked the beginning of the frontier troubles.

After the annexation of Upper Burma of which the Chin Hills formed a part, the Government of India saw the need for a direct line of communication between and the newly acquired territories. As a preliminary to opening up communications between the two regions, Lieutenant John Stewart of the 1st Battalion, Leinster Regiment, was to begin a reconnaissance to the south east of Rangamati in the Chittagong Hill Tracts, to make a road and strengthen the frontier by additional outposts.

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He was to use Rangamati as his base and from there work southwards to effect a junction with another survey party under Lieutenant J. Mc D. Baird of the 2nd Battalion, Derbyshire Regiment. Two men of his own Regiment, Lance Corporal Mc Cormick and Private Owens, to assist him in his survey operations, accompanied Stewart. His escort consisted of one naik and ten Gurkhas from the Chittagong Frontier Police together with some porters.

Stewart left Rangamati on the 16 January 1888. But no sooner than he set out he received information from Demagri, supplied by the friendly chief Seipuia, that a large body of men from “Muallianpui, Thlantlang and Lungtian were on the warpath and proceeding in a westerly direction.” While eighteen miles off Rangamati on 3 February, Stewart received another warning about raiding parties. But, as Colonel Scott Reid, the Officer quoted earlier, wrote:

With such contempt did he regard either the probability of an attack on the valour of his enemies, that when pressed by the Naick of the escort to be on his guard and to take additional precautions he replied: ‘Kuki log ane se hamara salam do’ (give my

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1 Ibid.
2 FEAP. March 1888; Nos. 332-339. David Robert Lyall, Commissioner of the Chittagong Division to the Chief Secretary to the Government of Bengal. 11 February 1888.
3 Ibid.
compliments to the hill men and let them come on), and persistently declined even to post a sentry. He had left five sepoy\textsuperscript{s} of his small guard behind him, one to run with his elephants, another to take back his letters and three to look after part of the provision and form a depot a few miles to the rear.\footnote{A.S. Reid, \textit{op.cit.}, p. 40.}

Lieutenant Stewart paid for all this with his life. Early next morning he was attacked and killed.\footnote{\textit{Ibid.} p. 41. Reid thus described what happened: "In the early morning Lieutenant Stewart awoke, dressed, and gave the usual orders for the move, but had not left his hut or put on his boots. The two soldiers were still asleep in their own quarters, and the sepoy\textsuperscript{s} of the escort were beginning to move about, one lighting a fire, and the other engaged in the various preparations which precede the striking of a camp in the east." When the attack came, "Lieutenant Stewart received a bullet in the chest and fell back dead, not, however, before he and the two men had accounted for several of the enemy. Such was the story told by the survivors, but, as Stewart’s body was afterwards found at the foot of a precipice twenty or thirty yards from the huts, some of the particulars are probably inaccurate."} Stewart was apparently the victim of a quarrel between Hausata and his wife,\footnote{FEAP. October 1888; Nos. 87-117. C.S.Murray, Superintendent of Police, Chittagong Hill Tract to Inspector General of Police, Bengal, Panji Ham Dubashi’s report of the enquiry on the outrage thus concluded: "Hausata’s wife is a daughter of Jahoota; Hausata and his wife had a quarrel, and he beat her and generally ill used her. She then left her husband’s home and went to her father, Jahoota, to claim his protection. Hausata followed her to Jahoota’s village and tried to recover her. Jahoota at first refused, but finally agreed to give her up if Hausata would bring him two heads of any foreigners, i.e., of any one not a Kuki. Hausata agreed to this and assembled his warriors to the number of 150 and started off taking the following route: - They crossed the Phairuang kai, the Lungrang Hill, the other side of Ulphum range and made for the big Saichal, Hausata accompanying them. Seipuia got this information from his brother Vandula, who said to him, ‘You have sworn an oath of friendship with the foreign chief Murray Liena. You should therefore warn him about this.’} but it was an act that no government could overlook and it called for the customary punitive expedition. Besides, it was evident that the existing system of the frontier outposts was powerless to check raids and that only the appearance of British force in the Lushai country itself would prevent the tribes from creating trouble in the frontier.
Owing, however, to the lateness of the season, it was considered advisable to delay an expedition until the following cold weather. It was on 19 December 1888, that the Government of India issued orders for an expedition to the Lushai Hills. Its object were: to avenge the death of Lieutenant Stewart, to construct a good road to link Chittagong with Burma, and establish outposts which would dominate the tribes and prevent any hostility to their advance.

Even as the Government of India was working out plans for the expedition another serious incident took place. On 15 February 1888, an atrocious raid occurred upon the Chakma Raja Prenkhyn Mro in the Chema valley in the Chittagong Hill Tracts, wherein six persons were killed, two wounded and twenty-three carried off as captives.\(^1\) The raiders looted the village but strangely did not carry off the stored grain. Nor were the heads of the slain carried, indicating that it was in all probability a slave-raiding affair.\(^2\) Until the expedition was set on foot the frontier outposts were strengthened by the addition of 250 men from a Bengal Infantry regiment.


\(^{2}\) FEAP. March 1888; Nos. 322-339. D.R.Lyall to the Chief Secretary to the Government of Bengal. 25 February 1888.
Meanwhile, to the west of the Tuirial river significant developments were taking place. The death of the old British ally Suakpuilala in early 1881 was the signal for renewal of feuds between the western and the eastern chiefs. The first incident occurred shortly after Suakpuilala's death when a party from Pawibawia, Lalburha, and Chinhleia surrounded the village of Thanghulha, but on the latter's submission no bloodshed occurred. A similar feud took place when Liankhama and his party killed the men of Thatliana and carried off forty heads. However, hostilities ceased when famine in the hills broke out.¹

Once these difficulties were overcome disturbances returned to these parts. The strong hand of Suakpuilala was no longer there to restrain inter-village rivalries.

On 13 December 1888, the Chakma chieftainess Pakuma Rani's village, only four miles off Demagri became the victim of another raid. The chieftainess and twenty-one men were killed, thirteen heads were taken, and fifteen persons were carried off as captives.² A small party from Demagiri followed the raiders but were unable to overtake them. A second party also failed to meet the raiders who had retreated too far to be caught.

¹ Ibid. pp., 86-87.
² FEAP. March 1889; Nos. 1-85, John Ware Edgar, Chief Secretary, Government of Bengal to the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department. 18 December 1888.
The initial reports said that the raiders came from Suakpuilala’s son Kalkhama’s village, headed by Kalkhama himself. Survivors of the attack were said to have heard his name being shouted as the village was plundered. The local authorities who took the raid rather seriously, was at a loss to explain why it had occurred. One view was that since there appeared no grounds for a quarrel between Kalkhama and the Rani, its object was to obtain loot. The raiders could not have been mere headhunters. The fact that the seven severed heads were badly mutilated, but not carried away also pointed to this fact. Another opinion suggested that the raid occurred on account of the chieftainess’ pro-British antecedents. Pakuma Rani was a near relative of Rothangpuia, the British ally, who was much disliked by the Lushais due to his closeness to the British and particularly for his assistance to them during the expedition of 1871-72. Pakuma Rani too was close to the British and had always been friendly towards them. Rothangpuia was long dead but his son and successor Lalchheuva’s village was earlier raided upon. Likewise Pakuma Rani was supposed to have incurred the wrath of the other chiefs.

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1 Ibid.
2 Ibid.
3 Ibid.
4 Ibid.
To find out the identity of the raiders the Chittagong authorities sent a number of men to the hills to make an enquiry. Till two months after the raids nothing certain was known of those involved or the village from which they came. Much less was known of their intentions. On 8 February 1889, however, David Robert Lyall the Commissioner of Chittagong Division and his assistant Murray met one of the captured women who with her child managed to escape and return to her village. Her name was Suaki, wife of one Vana, who said she was taken by Thata, mantri of chief Lungliana, in whose house she remained. From her statement it appeared that the actual leaders of the raid were Nikhama and Vanhnuna. Two other chiefs, Lungliana and Kairuma, the latter also from the same area, were also with them. She further added that there were sixteen prisoners of whom nine were in Lungliana's village and seven in Nikhama's. One girl was sold by Lungliana for sixty rupees to some Pawis in the south.¹ The women's account was confirmed by Hari Charan Sharma, political assistant in Cachar. Sharma reported, on the authority of an old Lushai of Thanruma's Punji, named 'Singa Pa' that Pakuma Rani's village was raided by Vuta's sons Lungliana and

¹ FEAP. March 1889; Nos.407-431. Lyall, Civil Political Officer. Lushai Expeditionary Force to the Chief Secretary to the Government of Bengal.
More correctly Chhinga Pa, i.e., father (pa) of Chhinga, the form used in Lushai to refer to a person using the name of the first male child—"father of so and so."
Kairuma. He had met Kalkhama who pleaded that neither he nor his brothers were involved.\(^1\)

Even as an enquiry into the plunder of Pakuma Rani's village was proceeding news was received of extensive raids on Chakma villages in what was called the Chengri valley in the Hill Tracts during 8-10 January 1889. The first village to be attacked was Poojgong, which occurred in the morning of the 8\(^{th}\). According to the statement made by the chief of this village the raiders were about four or five hundred in number, who knotted their hair at the back of their heads, clearly indicating that they were Lushais and not Pawis or Lakhers.\(^2\) The chief's wife, his two daughters and a daughter-in-law were carried away after most of the houses in the village were burnt or razed to the ground.

The next day, at about four in the morning, Lotibong village was attacked. This was followed by the plunder of other villages. During the three horrifying days, no less than twenty three villages had been plundered.\(^2\) The method used in these raids was somewhat novel: the raiders separated themselves into small groups of twenty to thirty fighting men attacking different villages simultaneously. Once this was over they regrouped and

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\(^1\) *Ibid.*, No. 426. J.Kennedy, Deputy Commissioner of Assam to the personal Assistant to the Chief Commissioner of Assam.

proceeded home with all their captives. The total casualty in the Chengri valley affair was 101 persons killed and two wounded. The numbers of captives were about 150, among whom were 100 women and the rest children below fifteen years. The total number of houses destroyed were 545 and the value of the property looted or destroyed was estimated at Rs.18,582/-.

The Chengri valley raid was attributed to Zahrawka, younger son of Suakpuilala and younger brother of Lianphunga. At this time Chengri valley was not under the control of either the British or the Tipperah Raja. Zahrawka laid claims to it as his elephant hunting ground. Apart from this the inhabitants were said to be often hanging about Zahrawka’s jhum cultivation and scaring the women and children who worked in the fields. Advised by his elder brother Lianphunga, Zahrawka raided the Chengri valley villages. Lianphunga himself accompanied him in this raid. Zahrawka and Lianphunga refused to release the captives to messengers sent by the district authorities in Cachar.

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1 FEAP. March 1889; Nos. 407-431, see Statement of Singbir Thappa.
2 FEAP. October 1889; Nos. 27-66, J. D. Anderson Deputy Commissioner of Cachar to the Secretary to the Chief Commissioner of Assam. 13 July 1889. Lengpunga’s own account of the Chengri valley raid appeared to be as follows: While Zarock ruled a separate village, he laid claim to the land of the Chengri valley people, and informed them that, in as much as they were not tributary either to the British Government, or to the Maharaja of Tipperah, he intended to assert his right to their land as an elephant hunting ground. Shortly after this, some of the Chengri valley Kukis hovered about Zarock’s jhum cultivation and scared his women and children. Zarock took council with his brother Lengphunga, who (he candidly admit) advised him that it was his bounded duty to subjugate the Kukis, and for that purpose lend him some of his young men.
Instead he insisted upon ransom money which were said to be due to him from some earlier transaction.¹

**LUSHAI POLICY: RADICAL CHANGE**

Meanwhile significant developments were taking place east of the Lushai hills. The incorporation of Upper Burma after the third and final Anglo-Burmese War (1885-86) brought about a radical change in the policy of Government of India towards the Lushai Hills. Hitherto, the area occupied by the Lushai tribes formed the 'real frontier' extending up to the border of Burma when the occupation of these hills would have brought the British into immediate contact with the tribes then under 'the imperfect control.'² Thus the expeditions in the early years were no more than what was called on the North West Frontier as "butcher and bolt". No attempt was made at controlling the tribes from within.

The new policy of establishing control over all the hills in the vast region between Bengal and Burma had already begun in

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¹ *Ibid.* "... seven of the captives have been ransomed from villages situated in the vicinity of the Dallesari belonging to Zarock and Lengpunga, sons of Sukpilal. It is reported that Rs.700/- was demanded as the ransom for these captives, and that as the persons who went in search had only Rs.185/-, they had promised to pay the balance Rs. 515/-, within a month. It is said that Lengpunga has threatened, if this money is not paid in due time, to commit further raids and to murder the remaining captives supposed to be sixty six in number. It is not known where all these captives are, but there is reason to believe that other villages besides those of Zarock and Lengpunga were concerned in the outrages... It will be seen from the above that although we have not as yet been able to obtain full information regarding the perpetrators of these outrages, we know with certainty who some of them are, and approximately the position of their villages, which lie North and East of the line taken by us in advancing on the Shendoos and west of the tribes of Chins, who have been so successfully dealt with this year by General Faunce."

the Chin hills. The first step was the occupation of the Kale state south of the Kabo Valley East of Manipur. At a durbar held on 26 March 1887 at Phongyikyang in the Kale state, the local chief Maung Pa Gyi was recognised as governor of that state, and the Chins were told that no raids upon the territory occupied by the British and no slave taking or trading would be permitted.¹ Slaves taken before British occupation were, however, permitted to be retained. It was also announced at that durbar that the British intended to open a trade route from Kale to Chittagong.²

For the occupation of the tract a chain of military posts was established in the area extending from Tamu and other stations in the Kubo valley to Gangaw, Minywa, and Tilin (Tiddim) on the Yaw border in the Chin hills. The country was surveyed, local resistance was crushed, and dacoity stamped out.³ Next the British tried to give a crushing blow to the Siyins and the Tashons and release their Shan captives.⁴ But Chin resistance proved more determined. Khawcin, chief of Kamhau, group of Chins, rounded up 1400 fighting men, and held the British at a place called Khuasak. Another attempt was made by the Chin to stop the advance of the British force at Hanthanglu. Here the

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² Ibid.
⁴ Vumson, op. cit., p. 117
British established a strongly fortified position, known as Fort White. The establishment of similar strong posts within the hills and the movement of small flying columns crushing each village finally put an end to Chin resistance.¹

The series of events in the Lushai hills border since the killing of Lieutenant Stewart and the progress of military measures on the Chin hills made it clear that any plan for dealing with the hill men should be worked in concert by the governments of Bengal, Assam and Burma. This would entail making in the first instance a road through the Chin hills and Lushai hills to connect Chittagong with Burma. John Ware Edgar, the Chief Secretary to the Government of Bengal thus wrote to the Government of India, about his government's views:

...no mistake can be greater than for each of these governments to deal separately with the villagers adjoining its own frontier without reference to those in the vicinity of the other two government, or in the centre of the tract, because the effect of this would be merely to divert attacks from one portion of the frontier to another while doing nothing to remedy the real source of the evil which I take to the belief of the inhabitants of higher central hills in the

¹ For details see Carey and Tuck. op.cit., see also Sir Charles Crosthwaite, The Pacification of Burma; and Dorothy Woodman, The Making of Burma.
inaccessibility of their country and their safety from the danger of punishment.¹

Edgar presumed that the frontier disturbances might be put to an end to if the governments of the surrounding country unitedly applied the same methods of dealing with these tribes. The Lushai hills were now surrounded on the one side by the settled districts of Bengal and on the other by the Chin hills over which control was being established. The Governor General in Council accepted Bengal's proposal for an Expedition and it move into the hills. The purpose of the operations, it was made clear, would be mainly to open the communications between Demagri to Seipuia's village further east and then to move further to punish Hausata's village.² This punitive expedition was to be undertaken with reference to Lushai raids. The manner in which the country should be dominated was yet to be decided by the Governor General in Council and Bengal was accordingly told that it would be communicated to them hereafter.

**OCCUPATION OF LUNGLEI**

The Lushai expeditionary force under the command of Colonel Vincent Tregear consisting of 250 men of 2nd Bengal

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¹ Edgar, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, 17 December 1888, quoted in H.K. Barpujari, *op cit.*, P.89.
Infantry, 250 men of 9th Bengal Infantry, 400 men of 2nd Battalion 2nd Gurkha Regiment, 200 men of 4th Madras Infantry (Pioneers), two guns of No.2 Bombay Mountain Battery with 1000 coolies, moved to Demagiri and then to Seipuia’s village on 17 February 1889. By mid March a road up to Lunglei was completed by Captain John Shakespear, where a large timber stockade was built and came to be known as “Fort Lungleh”. John Edgar, in his letter to the Secretary to the Government of India had thus reported on the progress of the expedition:

A good hill road, practicable for elephants and mules has been made from Demagiri to Lungleh, a hill 3500 feet high in the neighbourhood of the village at present by Saipuya. At Lungleh a strong post had been fixed, which will be held during the rain by a force of 200 of the Frontier Police.

A reconnaissance party along with two guides provided by a chieftainess, Darbilhi, a near relative of Hausata, set out on the operation against the latter on 14 March 1889. The force visited Zahuata’s village first on the 19 March and proceeded towards Hausata’s though information had already been received that the chief was dead. The action in Hausata’s village thus described by one of the participants:

1 A.S.Reid, op.cit., p.52.
2 FEAP. October 1889; Nos. 27-66.
At 9-10 A.M. we got within 800 yards of Hausata’s village where we could see a few men. The ridge here turns at a right angle, and we could see across the ravine. The men called out something, but neither the guides nor Mr. Murray could understand what they said, as they were a long way off. A shot fired, clearly as a signal to burn the village, for almost immediately flames broke out in two or three houses in the lower end of the village. Colonel Tregear at once ordered up the gun, and also directed some volleys to be fired. The practice was good, and at once stopped the further firing of the village.

The inhabitants fled after sacrificing a dog and leaving its remains across the path approaching the village. When the troops entered the village they found it totally deserted, and even a stockade had been constructed for their defence was abandoned.

The guides from Seipuia village were understandably reluctant to show the expeditionary force the grave of Hausata. On being persuaded to do so, the grave was opened and beneath the chief’s dead body, Stewart’s gun was found, clearly proving that the dead chief was unmistakably the man behind the attack upon Stewart and his party.

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1 Ibid.
2 Ibid.
3 FEAP. October 1889; Nos.27-66, Lyall, Commissioner of Chittagong division, to the Chief Secretary to the Government of Bengal. 5 May 1889.
From Fort Lungleh as his base General Tregear scoured the country side. Thereafter on 3 April 1889, he held a durbar of the southern chiefs at Lunglei. The three great Haulawng chiefs Seipuia, Lalthangvunga and Lallauva, all of them Vandula's brothers along with Vandula's sons Sangliana and Lalthuama were in attendance. Vandula was by then an old man, and did not attend, but not so much because of his advanced years as for dislike of the British. General Tregear told the assembled chiefs to help him in his further operations against the offending chiefs to which the chiefs gave their assurance.¹

Owing to the lateness of the season the Pawi and Lakhers, or Shendus were not effectively dealt with except burning of the village of Hausata and Zahuata, and none of them attended the durbar. At Lunglei a garrison of one British officer and 212 men of the frontier police was locate and the road linking Demagri to Lunglei was completed.² By 16 April the main force returned to the base leaving Murray to command the Lunglei Fort.³

CHIN-LUSHAI EXPEDITION

In reviewing the results of the expedition Bengal's Lieutenant Governor General felt that to effectively deal with the

¹ L.W. Shakespear, op.cit., pp. 88-89.
³ FEAP. July 1895; Nos. 122-145.
Shendus and to punish the raiders of Pakuma Rani's village and Chengri valley and to release the captives taken, a bigger expedition in to the hills was called for. The operations in the Chin hills had to be coordinated with those proposed from the Lushai hills. The Government of India accepted Bengal's proposal and sanctioned the combined expedition on 11 September 1889, which came to be styled as the "Chin-Lushai Expedition." Its aim was to subjugate the tribes as yet neutral, to explore and open out, as far as practicable, the partially known country between Chittagong and Burma, and to establish semi permanent posts in the tracts so as to ensure complete pacification and recognition of British power by the tribes. The whole expedition was placed under General William Penn Symons General Officer Commanding Migguthi, with immediate control over the Burma forces. Vincent W. Tregear, now a Brigadier General, was to command the forces operating from the Chittagong side.

The Chittagong Column consisting of 3977 men including Captain Shakespear as Field Intelligence Officer and Colonel G.J. Skinner, with C.S. Murray as Political Officer, that moved

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1 Reid, op.cit., p.11.
3 H.K. Barpujari, Problems, op.cit., p. 92.
4 Reid, op.cit. p. 10.
from the Southern Lushai Hills started from Demagri under the command of General Tregear by November 1889. The work entrusted to it included the construction of mule path to Haka to open up communications from Bengal to Burma; to establish a post in some suitable place; and to subjugate the tribe who were yet neutral and bring them under British control. From this main force a column was to march towards the north to punish Lianphunga for his complicity in the Chengri valley raid; Vuttaia's sons for their raid in the Pakuma Rani's village, and then to establish a permanent post near Lianphunga's village.¹

Chittagong column advanced to Lunglei in a matter of weeks. From there reconnaissance parties were sent in various directions. Brigadier General Tregear arrived at Lunglei on 24 December and thereafter a further advance eastward was made, across the Bualpui range and down to the Mat River and finally to Chhimtuipui. From there they ascended to the Darzo hill, where they found a good open space. As this place was good for the heliographic communication with various reconnoitring parties a strong defensive post of 200 rifles was established and came to be known as "Fort Tregear".²

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¹ A.S.Reid, op.cit., pp.191-192.
² L.W.Shakespear, op.cit., p. 92.
On 13 January fifty men of the 2nd Gurkhas under Captain Hall and the same number of Frontier Police under Murray accompanied by Captain Shakespear proceeded from Lunglei to explore the country between the Mat and the Tuichang rivers and to find out the real disposition of the chiefs of that region, of whom was included Lalthuama. A Pawi chief Paawna, who was reported to have been involved in the murder of Lieutenant Stewart, was found sheltered by Lalthuama. On reaching Lalthuama's village two days later, a fine of 10 pigs, 10 goats, 20 fowls, 30 guns and 100 basket of grain on the chief was imposed. Lalthuama was taken to Lunglei until the fines were paid up. Seven days later this was cleared and he was accordingly released.

A flying column under Captain Browne, Shakespear, and Mulaly with fifty rifles started on the 2 February from the Mat river camp to visit the Muallianpui chieftainess Darbilhi, who had maintained a cordial relationship with the British since the Lushai Expedition of 1889. The objects of the expedition were to reassure friendship, obtain the submission of the Muallianpuis, survey the country, and, if possible, open communications with

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1 Lalthuama was the youngest son of Vandula, who was the head of all the southern Haulawng and the son in law of Lianphunga.
2 A.S.Reid, op.cit., p.194.
3 Ibid.
General Penn Symons' column by heliogram. The column reached Darbilhi village on 4th where they were well received.

Messengers were sent to Vantura and Dokulha, both of whom were reportedly involved in Stewart's murder, to inform them to come in. Vantura submitted himself and gave up Stewart's revolver which he said he had obtained from Zahuata. Pending the full payment of a fine of a thousand maunds of rice and hundred guns imposed upon him Vantura was kept in custody. In the meantime Dokulha pleaded illness and failed to come in. In addition to Darbilhi two other Muallianpui chiefs, Dakapa and Patlaia, took the oath of friendship and professed their willingness to assist the British. Thus the object of the visit to Muallianpui was almost completely attained. However, heliographic communication with General Symond's column was found impracticable on account of an intervening high range.

On 24 February a reconnoitring party under Captain Hall left Darbilhi camp towards Haka. Two days later they met Captain Rundall and his party who had marched from Haka. The meeting of the two forces represented the "laying of the keystone in the arch," which now stretched across the wild country separating Burma from India. The combined parties proceeded to

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1 Ibid., p. 197.
2 Ibid.
3 Ibid.
Haka from the Tiau river on the 28 February. The following morning they reached Tlualam village where they met chief Lalhleia who confessed that Stewart's aneroid and field glasses were in his possession and that one rifle was in Tlualam and the heads of the victims and other rifles were in Paawna's village, Tangzang. Meanwhile some heads and one rifle were brought in from Zahuata's village to Captain Shakespear. The following day Shakespear marched towards Thlan Tlang where the aneroid and field glasses were recovered and the surrender of a Burmese captive was also received. At the next camp, in the valley of Sa the barrel and the lock of a Martini-Henry rifle was brought from Tangzang village to Captain Shakespear which were said to have been brought by orders of Lalhleia. The next march took the parties into Haka on 3 March.

After three days halt Captain Hall returned towards the Lushai hills from Haka. On the 7th he reached Tlualam where he found a captive Lushai woman. But their chief Lalhleia was said to have submitted to General Penn Symons and the mantri refused to surrender her without his authority. When the party reached Dopawrha's village a female captive taken from Lalchheuva's village and one who had been sold to chief Patlaia was

\[1\] *Ibid*
surrendered. On the 26 February seven more captives from Hausata’s village were also surrendered by Vantura.

By April–May 1890 the expedition succeeded in releasing captives, imposing fines and generally punished chiefs guilty of resisting the British or creating disturbances. Roads had been built and telegraph lines laid out. Colonel A.S. Reid thus summed up the work of the Chitragong column of the Chin-Lushai Expedition:

A good road of easy gradients had been made from Fort Lungleh to Fort Tregear and beyond the advanced post a fair mule path led to Haka 81 miles, completing the connection of India and Burma. Two large rivers Mat and Kolodyne, had been bridged. These bridges, the former 206 and the latter 304, feet long had to be very substantially built, and were of the crate and trestle type.¹

OCCUPATION OF AIZAWL

In order to punish Lianphunga for his raids upon the upper Chengri valley, Northern Lushai Column as it was called, under the command of Colonel G.J. Skinner, accompanied by Murray as Political Officer, was detached from the main force of the Chittagong Column. The task of punishing the sons of Vuttaia for

¹ Ibid. pp. 207-208.
their raid on Pakuma Rani was also assigned to this column.¹

With the help of a guide provided by the Haulawng group, the force left Lunglei by the end of January 1890 and moving up² the Tlawng River as far as it was possible for rafts, reached a point near Lianphunga's village.

Meanwhile, a simultaneous advance was made from Cachar by 400 men of the Surma Valley Military Police,³ under the command of W.W. Daly with the order to recover the captives in the Chengri valley raids and to punish Lianphunga, and establish a stockade and godown at Changsil, collect information, and effect a junction with Skinner's Column under whose command he was to operate.⁴ The movement of this force was ventured in close consultation with the government of Assam and Bengal.⁵ Daly reached Aizawl on the 4 February 1890, where he built a

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¹ FEBP. March 1890; Nos. 45-56, Diary of events, Chittagong Column, Chin-Lushai Expedition, for the week ending the 2 February 1890. The Northern Column consisted of Colonel G.J. Skinner, 3rd Bengal Infantry, Commanding, Lieutenant H.W.G. Cole, 2nd/2nd Goorkhas, Staff Officer, Captain O.A. Chambers, Warwickshire Regiment, Intelligence Officer, Lieutenant W.H. Birkbeck, 1st King's Dragoon Guards, Signalling Officer, Surgeon J.C. Lamot, in charge of A section, No.9, Field Hospital, Captain W.H. Allen, D.A.C.G, Transport Officers:-Captain E. Montague, Suffolk Regiment, Lieutenant T. St. C. Davidson, Leinster Regiment, Lieutenant E.H.S. Twyford, Scottish Rifles, Lieutenant M.C. Willoughby, 2nd Bengal Cavalry, with C.S. Murray, Assistant Political Officer, Sappers and Miners :- Captain R.D. Petrie, Lieutenant E.H. de V. Atkinson, 1 British Non-Commissioned Officer, 80 Native Ranks, 3rd Bengal Infantry:- Captain F.B.W. Richardson, Lieutenant Warren and Wikeley, 250 Native Ranks, 2nd/2nd Goorkhas :- Major F.R. Begbie, Captain F.P. Hutchinson, Lieutenant E.J.W. Drummond, Surgeon H. Fooks, 300 Native Ranks, 28th Bombay Pioneers :- Lieutenant G.A. Brownrigg, 102 Native Ranks, Frontier Police :- Fifty Native Ranks.
² L.W. Shakespear, op. cit., p.90.
³ Ibid., It included three British Officers, J.R. Carnac, L. St. Brodick of the Assam Police, S.N. Walker of the Bengal Police, with Dr. Partridge and Surgeon Coleman of the 43rd Gurkha. Rifles, as Medical Officers.
⁴ Reid, op. cit., p.10.
⁵ Ibid.
stockade on a commanding site. "Fort Aizawl" as it came to be called, and eventually became the headquarters first of the North Lushai Hills and later the United Lushai Hills District. From here he advanced to Lianphunga's village on 8 February and persuaded Lianphunga to come to terms, on the promise that he would not be detained and his life would be spared.¹

With the arrival of Colonel Skinner on 11 February, Lianphunga became nervous and fled into the jungle. Skinner and Daly occupied his village, only to be heavily attacked by the Lushais who also set fire to the houses in which their men were sheltered. A sortie or two drove off the assailants after which the village was destroyed and after over a thousand maunds of unhusked rice, its granaries and livestock. The Lushais were pursued into the jungle and hunted down mercilessly. In view of his assurance to Lianphunga before the arrival of Skinner's column Daly did not consider himself justified in attempting to seize the chief, at least not until he received further orders from higher authorities. Lianphunga had already surrendered sixty three captives, all women and children, and Daly had taken care of them well enough.²

² A.S.Reid, op.cit., p.217.
Nevertheless as a result of the destruction of Lianphunga's village all the chiefs up to the Fort Lunglei one by one began to tender their submission. Kalkhama and seven of his kinsmen, all sons of the late chief Suakpuilala, too tendered their submission. But they refused to surrender Lianphunga, and it was clear that they were ready to face the consequences. It was only because of General Tregear restraining him that Colonel Skinner, angered by their refusal to surrender Lianphunga, burning all their villages.

To punish the sons of Vuttaia for their raid upon the village of Pakuma Rani, a flying column of nearly two hundred men under Major Begbie advanced upon the villages of Nikhama and Lungliana on 6 March. Both villages were occupied and the chief took to the jungle. Lungliana's mantri surrendered six captives but a considerable number remained. On the failure of the chief to pay the fine and surrender all captives within the given time, this village was burnt. Major Begbie thus inflicted a fine of sixty guns and three hundred rupees on Nikhama to be realised within twenty four hours. He was also ordered to surrender all captives. On his failure his village was also burnt on the 9 March 1890.

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1 FEBP. May 1890; Nos.1-7, Dairy of events, Chittagong Column, Chin Lushai Expedition, (Northern Column's report) for the week ending 10 March 1890. Reported by Brig. General V.W. Tregear.
2 Ibid.
3 Ibid.
4 A.S.Reid, op. cit., p.220.
5 Ibid.
Thereafter the force then returned to Lianphunga's village on the 12th.

By the close of March the Chin-Lushai Expedition had successfully accomplished its tasks. Those responsible for the disturbances in the Chittagong Hill Tracts were adequately punished. A mule track from Bengal to Burma was put into operation.¹

ADMINISTRATIVE ARRANGEMENTS

In the North was established Fort Aizawl with a garrison of 200 military police and its subsidiary stockade at Changsil with another 100 men.² Changsil and Aizawl were connected by a fair road but no other means of communication with Silchar existed beyond that afforded by the river Tlawng, the telegraph line from Changsil to Jhalnacherra was only partially completed.³

On the administrative side, the operations led to the creation of two districts- North Lushai Hills and South Lushai Hills. In connection with the occupation of the Lushai Hills, J.W. Quinton, Chief Commissioner of Assam on 15 May 1890 remarked:

Mere occupation by a police force of certain points in the tracts referred to would not in itself be sufficient.

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¹ Ibid. ² Ibid. ³ Ibid.
to bring under our influence the Chiefs with whom we have been so lately in collision, and that, if this object was to be adequately attained, it was essential that an Officer possessing both experience and judgement should be at the same time appointed to feel his way among the people and gradually accustom them to our control.¹

Quinton further added the necessity for the separate administrative set up thus:

It is true that our intercourse with the Lushais has hitherto been conducted under the control of that Officer, but such intercourse has been only very slight, and our dealings with the Lushais have been few and infrequent. This state of things has, however, been completely by the late expedition, and the Deputy Commissioner could not, consistently with the due performance of his other duties, spare the time required for the closer control and more constant communication, from which alone the extension of our influence over the tribes concerned can be looked for.²

With the conclusion of the Chin-Lushai operations and the reduction of the Lushai Chiefs to submission, the question of the

¹ Reid, op.cit., pp. 19-20.
² Ibid.
future administration of the newly acquired tracts began to engage the attention of the Government of India. Such details as whether there should be one head of the civil administration and one military commander, or whether these duties should be combined in a single Officer, the civil staff to be employed, the number of districts into which the new tracts should be divided, their boundaries, the organisation and distribution of the military, arrangements for transport and commissariat, and the political question of the retention of the chiefs and the kind of taxes and tribute to be imposed on the people had to be decided. Pending a settlement of these questions, tentative administrative arrangement was made for the occupation and control of the Chin - Lushai Hills.

For administrative convenience, the Chin hills already under Burma was divided into two tracts, viz. The Northern Chin Hills controlled from Fort White and the Southern Chin Hills from Fort Haka. Bertram S.Carey and Captain Ross were appointed as Political Officers respectively.1 The Chin hills remained under the direct administration of the Chief Commissioner of Burma.

The southern hills from now on referred to as South Lushai Hills was attached to Bengal under its Lieutenant Governor from

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1 FEAP. March 1890; Nos. 70-71.
1 April 1891. C.S. Murray of the Indian Police was appointed as the Superintendent with the Headquarters at Lunglei.¹ The district was put under the control of the Bengal Frontier Police, pushed up from the Chittagong Hill Tracts, which consisted of 529 native Officers, non-commissioned Officers and constables.² Besides Lunglei, Fort Lalthuama and Fort Tregear were established with a base at Demagiri. The boundaries of the district was in the west the Chittagong Hills District on which it abutted for its entire length, on the east lay the Chin hills while in the north and south its boundaries marched with the North Lushai Hills and the Arakan Hill Tracts respectively.

The northern region, now the Northern Lushai Hills was put under Assam from 3 June 1890. Captain Herbert Browne, the Personal Assistant to the Chief Commissioner of Assam, was designated the Political Officer to exercise general control over all departments with headquarters at Aizawl.³ The hills were to be held by the Surma Valley Military Police Battalion numbering 300 then at Aizawl which was increased by an additional 200 men. Posts were established apart from that at Changsil, at

¹ FEAP. September 1891; Nos. 38-59.
² Ibid.
³ FEAP. August 1890; Nos. 221-227. Under the sanction conveyed in Foreign Department telegram No.1308 E of 25 June 1890, confirmed by the Secretary of State's despatch No.64 (POL) of 18 September 1890.
Sairang, Rengte road and Tuirial, all on the road to Cachar.¹ No definite boundaries were laid down. The district was limited to the areas held by the descendants of Lushai chief Lallula Sailo, that is the tracts lying in the Cachar frontier on the north, Hill Tippera on the west, Manipur in the east and an imaginary line east-west through the Darlung peak, and the South Lushai Hills in the south.² The Secretary of State for India accorded this sanction to the several arrangements and ordered that these might be allowed to continue till such a time when he was in a position to propose a change.³

¹ FEAP, October 1890; Nos. 355-357. The force was necessary not only for defensive measures but also to enable the Political Officer to promenade through the country which was needed to keep the Lushais under proper control.
² H.K.Barpujari, op.cit., p.95
³ FEAP, August 1890; Nos. 1-3, The Sub-division of the Chin Hills into two tracts was done after the suggestion of the Chief Commissioner of Burma who felt that the tract was ‘too extensive’ to be administered from one centre and as several tribes occupying the country remained unsubdued.