CHAPTER IV

NSCN : FORMATION, IDEOLOGY, OBJECTIVES, STRATEGIES AND LEADERSHIP
1. FORMATION

Following the signing of the controversial Shillong Accord between the representatives of the NNC-FGN and the Government of India, a powerful section of the Naga political leadership consistent with their commitment to espouse the cause of Naga nationalism, made attempts to reorganize and consolidate its remaining forces. Th. Muivah, the then General Secretary of the NNC convened a National Assembly at Suphao on 16th October 1976. This Assembly condemned the Accord (for the second time) and sought direction and guideline from A.Z. Phizo, the President of the NNC. They requested him to come back home and lead the movement. They also elected Isak Chishi Swu as the Vice-President due the vacancy created by the arrest and physical inability of Imkongmeren.1 Thus, the Assembly reorganized the Federal Government of Nagaland in an attempt to consolidate the nationalist forces. Admittedly, Government of the People's Republic of Nagaland (GPRN) leaflet stated: "In fact, the revolutionary patriots had not only saved the nation from capitulation, but they had also strengthened the position of the President, A. Z. Phizo."2

A.Z. Phizo on the other hand, for reasons best known to him, refused to condemn the Accord saying: "I have nothing to do with the Accord".3 Over and above, he not only failed to give

directions or guidelines to the Naga nationalists (under Th. Muivah's command), but took into confidence the Shillong Accord signatories and the Shillong Accord group. As already stated this created misunderstanding and confusion among the rank and file. Meanwhile, the pro-accord elements took upper-hand and declared martial law. Th. Muivah, Isak Chishi Swu, Brig. Vidai and their close associates were arrested. As already stated several plans were made to liquidate Th. Muivah and Isak Swu but they were saved providentially. However, they were treated in a brutal manner, for instance, the accord group dug three times, at different places, the graves of opponents and hurled so many insulting words like "who ever would oppose A.Z. Phizo and Shillong Accord shall be totally crushed", and "the people of Nagaland will go wherever Phizo goes, even to India."5

In fact, Th. Muivah and others (anti-accord group) were pushed to the extreme. Th. Muivah and his associates write:

Thrashing them (pro-accord elements) out with reason...and every sensible approach made for reconciliation was spitefully rejected. Every truth was suppressed in Phizo's name.... Surely, things had gone past compromise. Only the correct decision could save the nation. Capitulation or fight to a finish for ope's Nation's freedom was the only choice left.6

Later, the accord group announced the end of martial law and tactfully reorganized the Federal Government of Nagaland inducting mostly those who supported the Shillong Accord and deliberately keeping out Th. Muivah. Isak Swu and all those who

opposed the Accord. Further, they passed a resolution placing a stipulation that Th. Muivah and Isak Swu could never be a member of national workers. 7 For Muivah and others "everything was driven beyond forbearance. The impossibility for unity became the hard fact of the day." 8 Though, the Accord group were planning to do away with Th. Muivah and Isak Swu, the opinion was divided i.e. one group advocated to hand them over to India and surrender en masse, and the other opinion insisted that they should be killed. 9 Meantime, S.S. Khaplang (who was then convinced by Th. Muivah about the true nature of the Accord as a surrender agreement) ordered for immediate arrest of all of those who conspired to impose martial law. 10

Thus, the emergence of a new nationalist organization was inevitable. Eventually, the formation of National Socialist Council of Nagaland was announced from across the border (what is known as 'Eastern Nagaland' on January 31, 1980. 11 What one intelligence officer described as the 'mother of the northeastern insurgencies' was thus born. 12 The NSCN leadership resolutely declared: "To us the Sovereign existence of our country, the salvation of our people ln Socialism with their spiritual

10. Ramkathing, loc. cit.
11. NSCN Manifesto (Preface) (Published by GPRN, Oking, January 31, 1980).

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salvation in Christ are eternal and unquestionable.\textsuperscript{13} They also emphatically ruled out the illusion of saving Nagaland through peaceful means.\textsuperscript{14} Hence, the National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN) represented the vocal section of Naga nationalists. In this research work, the focus is primarily on NSCN under Isak Chishi Swu and Th. Muivah's leadership and it is for various reasons\textsuperscript{*}. Although, the media has prominently projected two NSCN i.e. NSCN (I.M) and NSCN (K) as fighting for the cause of the Nagas, the ground reality differs. The NSCN under Khaplang is believed to be an intelligence sponsored group to counter the NSCN under Isak and Muivah. As a matter of fact, the former group has openly declared of their intention to checkmate the NSCN. They have never attacked the Indian army and their nexus with the Indian security forces cannot be easily sidelined. They have carried out a number of activities which are a complete negation of Naga nationalism. Therefore, the force that is committed to espouse the cause of Naga people is only the NSCN. Hence, the focus on this organisation.

A. Political organisation

In most cases, revolutionaries or any other liberation struggle will have to start from nothing. Starting from nothing specially requires organization.\textsuperscript{15} The fact is every nationalist force or revolutionary movement essentially requires an

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{13} NSCN Manifesto, \textit{op.cit.}, p. 52.
\item \textsuperscript{14} Ibid., p. 54.
\end{itemize}

* - Refer to the end of this Chapter for detail information.

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{15} McCuen, John J., \textit{The art of Counter-Revolutionary War}, (Stackpole Co. Pennsylvania, 1965), p. 30.
\end{itemize}
organisation to make it effective and thereby organize into a
force to reckon with. Regis Debray asserted:

As a general rule, a guerrilla centre cannot
survive without an organized means... This is
not merely to assure political contacts but
also to guarantee a supply of aims, funds,
fresh recruits... foodstuffs and so on. 16

It is true that in most cases as D.B. Vought and Michael A.
Babb (US Army) write, a nationalist movement "is not a
spontaneous popular upheaval nor a jacquerie; it requires
organized effort." 17 Thus, the necessity of forming organization
is explicit. S. C. S. Gurling points out how profitable it was in
the case of Chinese communists. 18

The vocal section of the Naga nationalists formed a new
organization, christined-National Socialist Council of Nagaland
(NSCN) with its government called Government of the Peoples'
Republic of Nagaland (GPRN). The organizational structure of the
two are given:

17. Vought, Lt. Col., et al. "Support for insurgencies Nike or
18. Girling, J. C. S., People's War, The Conditions and Conse-
    quences in China and in South East Asia, (George
National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN)

Chairman — Vice-Chairman — General Secretary

Central Committee Members

Council Members

National Socialist Women Organisation of Nagaland

Tatars (Members of the Parliament)

People's Revolutionary Court

Provincial Members

19. Sketch provided by 'Maj.' A.S. Ningkhan along with the written interview (conducted by the scholar, 7th July, 1993).
Government of the People's Republic of Nagaland (GPRN)

- President
- Vice-President
- Prime Minister

- Kilonsers (Ministers)
- Defence Ministry (Keeya)
- Minister In-charge of Religious Affairs

- Central Administrative Offices (CAO)
- Chief of the Army
- Council of Nagaland Churches
- Deputy C-N-C
- United Churches
- General Staff Officer
- Chaplains

- Military Intelligence
- Army Division

- Regional Council Guards
- Brigade

- 2nd BDE Patkai
- 1st BDE Thumbo

- HVT (Hevuto) Battalion
- STF (Security Task Force)

- ZB (Zesebituo) Battalion
- A C (Ashiho Chao Mai) Battalion

20. Sketch provided by 'Brig.' V.S. Atem, Chief of the Naga Army, along with the written interview (conducted by the scholar, 11th October, 1994).
Thus, unlike other political organizations operating outside the Constitution of India in the North East, the NSCN political organisation is a well-knit one. Moreover they have their Constitution (Yehzabo) by which their Government (GPRN) functions and is run. The army formation is equally noteworthy. The NSCN leadership has made certain radical changes in its organization arising out of their perception of (with they say) 'wrong policies of the NNC'. They are:

(1) Centralised System

unlike the NNC/FGN which practised decentralisation, the NSCN leaders strongly advocated a centralized system in the organization. For they were convinced that decentralization was fomenting tribalism among the Nagas. As Th. Muivah points that "tribalism, the most malignant bacteria that corroded the solidarity of the Naga people started emanating from the NNC policy." 21

The NSCN leaders believed that this tribalism emanated from erroneous NNC policy. Thus, Th. Muivah emphatically stated:

The NNC created Tribal units according to which every tribe had its administration, its army generals, officers and accumulation of arms and ammunition for itself. As a matter of fact, struggle in some way or other specially among the major tribes for supremacy and sphere of influence started beyond easy control. Land disputes among tribes, riding rough-shod over the weaker became common practice. Hatred that stemmed up from such state of affairs often exceeded even the hatred Nagas in general had against the

21. Interview of Mr. John Hamilton (alias Bertil Lintner) with Th. Muivah. General Secretary of the NSCN, (Published by GPRN, Oking, December, 1987), p. 3.
Indians. Nagas became the fatal enemy of themselves. This danger of self-defeat was imminent and Indians lost no time to exploit it. It is a pity, NNC never evolved policy to avert such dangerous self-defeat.  

The Chairman of the NSCN, Isak Chishi Swu reinforcing Th. Muivah's statement writes:

The conduct of national affairs on tribal line such as creation of tribal Horns. Generals, Councils put the nation into stagnation. Putting the tribe and family above nation and people became quite visible before the eye of the public. No attempt was made to reorient the organization and the Nation was led on the whim of the leadership alone. Eventually, it degenerated down to the signing of Shillong Accord.

The serious attempt by the NSCN leadership to check tribalism with a correct policy does not come as a surprise because all along, particularly with special reference to the political struggle of the Nagas, tribalism has been the greatest factor for rivalry, inter tribal killing etc. contributing much to the weakening of the movement. Thus, the NSCN Central Council while laying down rules resolved (reference to Tribalism) that "whoever is found inciting and propagating tribalism...shall be first admonished and if he/she persists...shall be penalized." Even, Markot Rumunyny the official actively involved in outwitting the Naga nationalists admittedly wrote: "Inter tribal rivalry contributed much to the final failure (Shillong Accord) of the armed insurrection." M. Horam, a Naga scholar too

22. Ibid, p. 4.

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identified 'tribalism' as a single factor that weakened the Naga movement. Thus, he writes:

This (tribalism) has been one of the main sources of tension and instability and in fact, has led to inter-tribal rivalry and killing in Nagaland during the past 30 years....If anything of the movement for Naga independence has during many a crisis, boldly accentuated the disunity of the Nagas and the recent rapid developments in its disintegrating ranks are ample proof of this.26

Thus, the new line of policy and strategy of the NSCN leadership is essentially to contain Naga tribalism and hence the whole exercise is to convey the message to the Nagas that defeat of the Nagas will not come from India's military might but from within the Nagas and that is certainly the greatest danger. Tribalism or inter-tribal conflict is indeed a defying factor against Naga aspiration. Throughout the political movement of the Nagas, inter-tribal conflict has undoubtedly been the cause of its setback. How this evil 'ism' penetrated into the Naga society is an important query to pose. The Nagas by tradition did not experience tribalism, it emerged only after modernization stepped in. For instance, a Naga's first attachment is his village and not the tribe. The practice of 'headhunting' was between villages and not between one tribe versus another tribe. Therefore, it was inherently the colonial administrative system which demarcated different tribes into different administrative set ups. Thus, important administration Headquarters sprang up - Kohima (Angami), Mokokchung (Ao), Ukhrul (Tangkhul), Wokha (Lotha), etc.

Besides, representation in the Government was done purely on tribal basis. Subsequently different tribal Hohos (organisations) were born and this generated the feeling of 'thine and mine' in the Naga society.

(2) Collective Leadership

Another distinctiveness, in the functioning of the NSCN is the system of 'Collective Leadership'. In all matters of policy and programme, collective decision of the Central Committee members is necessary. 'Major' Ningkhan Shimray relates that "the main power lies in the collective leadership. Any step or policy is to be decided collectively by them. The organization, Government and Army are all controlled by them."\(^{27}\) It is quite obvious that this new system is adopted as part of NSCN's overall corrective step vis-a-vis the NNC style of functioning. To recapitulate, the NSCN leaders had persistently resented the personality cult during the movement of the NNC.\(^{28}\) The NSCN professes to apply 'collective leadership' both at the centre and at the regional levels\(^{29}\) so as to make their governing or functioning more democratic and stint any element of autocratic outlook. Moreover, it also seeks to avoid any credulous error of a leader.

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27. Written Interview of Major Ningkhan Shimray, Coordinator Foreign Affairs, NSCN, (conducted by the scholar, 14th August, 1993).
28. Passim Polarisation and statement of the NSCN.
B. Administration

The NSCN with its Government namely the Government of the Peoples' Republic of Nagaland (GPRN) functions as a parallel Government. The Central Committee headed by the Chairman and the General Secretary of the NSCN are responsible for the over-all administration of the organisation as well as of the areas under their control. At the regional level, the Central Administrative Officer (CAO) exercises his/her power along with the regional Chairman, or vice-Chairman and Secretary in administering the different regions. Administrative functions relating to the organisation are as follows:

(1) Discipline of the members

Every party member of the NSCN must abide by the prescribed conduct. The organization maintains two categories of membership. The bulk of the members form the fighting unit and are known as Peoples' Army of Nagaland (PAN). The second group is the political wing otherwise known as the 'civil set up'. However, all the members, both army and civil shall undergo compulsory military training and service for a full term of two years. 30

On the observance of discipline. Evidently, refer the Peoples' Army of Nagaland Rules and Regulation says:

Every senior officer in the Peoples' Army should be the pattern for learning of good discipline and be the institution of imparting national responsibility to the junior. They should also help to inculcate mutual love and cooperation among the soldiers. Not saluting one's superior, smoking in their presence, showing disrespect in any form either in word

30. Resolution No. 6 of the Central Council Meeting. op.cit., p.3.
or misdemeanour and encouraging tribalism, groupism, parochialism that may be detrimental to the integrity of army are subject to severe disciplinary action.\textsuperscript{31}

Thus, the desire of the Naga nationalist leadership to train up committed, seasoned and disciplined members is implicit \textit{per se}. The NSCN leaders strongly emphasise on establishing a Christian state with the theme: "Nagaland for Christ". Consequently, they also prescribe a high moral discipline among its members in addition to the conventional army discipline. The NSCN rules and regulation thus emphasize: "Molesting women, drunkenness, stealing and quarreling shall be dealt with appropriate disciplinary action."\textsuperscript{32}

The rules specifically state:

(a) Fornication is punishable by disciplinary action with one year demotion of rank or suspension for one year from service. A case of corporal punishment shall be meted out for undergoing one month of hard labour.

(b) Adultery is punishable by disciplinary action with demotion of rank or suspension for one year from service. Raping is liable to the extent of court-martial. Infanticide and murder are punishable to the extent of death penalty. Eloping without proper or court marriage shall be punished with double demotion in the case of Lt. Colonel and above and one demotion in the case of other ranks and corporal punishment by undergoing two months of hard labour in the case of private soldier.\textsuperscript{33}

Quite recently, the NSCN Central Committee meeting further updated the moral code of conduct by adding that "NSCN views

\textsuperscript{32} \textit{Ibid.}, (No. 18 clause 4), p. 9.
\textsuperscript{33} \textit{idem}.
prostitution, drug peddling and drug abuse most deadly social crimes which sap the sanctity and life of society."

So when cadres or members of the NSCN (Civil or army) violate Ahza* or code of conduct, on the merits of each case, appropriate disciplinary measures, such as warning, serious warning, removal from posts or rank-down, expulsion from the organization or even up to the extent of 'shoot order' in extreme cases are carried out.35 It is observed that the NSCN is quite uncompromising regarding members violating their strict code of conduct. For instance, members indulging in extortion, or branded as traitors or deserters are right away given capital punishment.36

Reinforcing the aforesaid rules and regulations or the moral code of conduct of the NSCN, the leadership resolved in 1987 stating that

(a) Hence forth national workers shall abstain from smoking tobacco and from taking all kinds of narcotic stimulants,

(b) drinking alcohol is prohibited,

(c) stealing, misappropriation and defalcation of government funds are strictly forbidden;

(d) immorality in sex is prohibited.37

   * - Ahza is a Naga nationalist term for a decree which emanated from Oking (Headquarters) and could bring death to traitors or any one violating the code of conduct for its members as well as anyone under their jurisdiction.
35. Passim Central Committee Meeting.
36. Passim Often reported in the Nagaland local papers.
The NSCN leaders also decided that the four stipulations ought to be first applied to the leadership. The triumvirate (Chairman, Vice-Chairman and General Secretary) and Kilonsers (Ministers) are under obligation to confess every year in the Tatar Hoho (Parliament) at its Budget Session what they had done with regard to the four points.\textsuperscript{38} This clearly manifests the total commitment of the NSCN leadership to do away with immorality, corruption etc. so as to set a good trend for the Naga people in general and particularly its cadres so essential for 'building a nation of higher order.'

It is against this background that one finds corroboration to the remark that the NSCN cadres are composed 'of men imbued with a sense of mission'. Significantly, Donald B. Vought and M.A. Babb of US Army writes:

Insurgent leaders must also demonstrate their ability to control the movement. Internal discipline is important to the insurgency as to the traditional military force ... insurgencies where discipline fails generally deteriorate to war lordism or banditry.\textsuperscript{39}

Similarly, the NSCN literature also claims:

Every NSCN is a practical man who works hard to temper and cultivate himself in every respect...He is a man who subordinates his personal interests to the party. The supremacy of the party's interests is the highest principle that governs the thinking and actions of every member of NSCN...Hence, every member of NSCN is a historical force to be reckoned with.\textsuperscript{40}

\textsuperscript{38} Idem.  
\textsuperscript{40} The Two world outlook (NSCN press handout) (By the Publicity department, GPIRN, Oking, 6th June, 1990), p. 6.
The fact that majority of the Nagas are Christians by faith is glaringly seen even in the Naga nationalist organization such as the NSCN. The impact of Christianity on the latter is overwhelming. This can be seen in the functioning pattern of the organization, as well as in the individual attitude. Evidently, the Free Nagaland manifesto declared: "We stand for the faith in God and the salvation of mankind in Jesus Christ, alone, that is Nagaland for Christ." In a way, they are prescribing precisely the salvation of mankind, particularly the Naga people, in Jesus Christ alone.

Thuingaleng Muivah, of the NSCN amply unfolded the fundamental reasons why Christ had to come in their movement. He says thus:

It is because a people simply cannot be unrelated to the unseen reality...Nationalism without a commitment to the cause of the truth is naive and destructive in itself. But truth is not man-made, it exists by itself without bounds because it is not subject to change. Therefore, apart from the question of worldly salvation (independence), a nation must exist for the realization of the eternal truth, for the search of mankind is salvation, not destruction.

No wonder, the NSCN has a separate independent ministry of Religious Affairs and a separate Council called the 'Council of Nagaland Churches' (CNC). This Ministry is responsible for all matters pertaining to spiritual or religious affairs within their

42. Written interview of Th. Muivah, of. cit., p. 12.
area of control. They establish unit churches and provide chaplains. They also carry out missionary assignments—preaching, of the Gospel (as they have practically done in a massive scale in North West of upper Myanmar). Besides, they do donate money and also in kind to needy persons particularly among its members. At times, they administered marriage ceremonies (of members) and administered "believers' baptism". etc.44

The NSCN leadership seeks to uphold the principle that one "needs to be committed more than being a mere patriot."45 To this end, Th. Muivah, the General Secretary of the NSCN in a Republic speech admonished the Nagas, saying: "It is wickedness that causes God's abomination upon a people. What, then, must we realize? It is sin and it shall inevitably be our own sin that will bring about the downfall of our nation because there is curse in sin and in the curse destruction."46 Therefore, to the NSCN leadership, salvation of a nation is secured if there is spiritual soundness of its citizens. The NSCN leadership, hence, is of the view that national independence is not the end in itself but rather a means for the realisation of goals of life.

(3) Administering their control areas

Following the formation of the NSCN, the leaders first tried to find a safe base area where they could organize themselves into a force. The solution was quickly found as Th. Muivah

44. Idem Annual Report.
46. Republic Day speech, 21st March, 1989, Th. Muivah, General Secretary of the NSCN.
47. Interview of Bertil Lintner with Th. Muivah, op. cit., p. 5.
stated: "It was unquestionably the eastern side (North West of Upper Myanmar) where we could create safe base area and consolidate ourselves there and retain in our hand the initiative of guerrilla offensive everywhere." 47

By the early 1980s, a sizable portion of these areas inhabited by the Nagas were brought under the virtual control of the NSCN. It is here that the Naga nationalists were able to control and administer bringing about radical transformation in the socio-economic lives of the Nagas in Myanmar. Indeed, it was a great achievement. 48 The NSCN embarked on a number of measures to mobilise public opinion.

Series of cadres were trained. Massive mobilisation was done among the people and progress was swift though ignorance of the public of the areas was still the major factor that stood in the way. Some important tasks like giving both political and primary education, propagation of Christianity, teaching terrace cultivation, sanitation, stoppage of poppy plantation, opium taking and selling were successfully carried out. 49

The NSCN activities are described in further details.

(1) Preaching Gospel

It is a fact that when the NSCN established control over the areas, there was hardly any Christian among the 'Eastern Nagas'. The impact of outside world was virtually nil. Head-chopping was held high as a manly honour until early 1980, when NSCN totally stopped it as a savage practice. 50

49. A brief account of free Nagaland, op. cit., p. 38.
50. Idem.
The animist Nagas earlier lived there isolated in their own world untouched by civilization. The NSCN described in their own words that "they were superstitious but simple, narrow but sincere, savage but zealous. There were no people to teach them the better world which they did not know. The swift feet of God's alien messengers were forbidden to teach them."  

As stated by the NSCN, "In the circumstances we felt called upon to preach the Gospel in that darkest part left behind by the world gone ahead of us. With missionary zeal we took the historic responsibility upon ourselves."  

Bertil Lintner, a free lance writer who visited the NSCN Headquarters remarked: "I was astonished at the manner in which the NSCN has Christianised the eastern hills." The NSCN organised volunteer Gospel Teams and preached the gospel everywhere with armed guards as they occasionally had to encounter the Myanmar forces. Besides through prayers and divine revelation, a number of incurable disease were believed to have been healed. By 1985, the converts reached around 40,000.  

According to the account of Isak Chishi Swu, the Chairman of the NSCN, two mission centres were opened at Iphai and Tamkhe villages. The national workers were made pastors of the new established churches, converting more than fifty villages. Corroborating this fact, the 'Eastern Naga students' wrote "By 1985, the Christian church membership had gone upto around 40,000."

51. Ibid., p. 44.  
52. Idem.  
55. Written interview of Isak Chishi Swu, loc. cit.
and several schools were established..... The first ever mission centre was established in Keishan Challam village, christened as Nagaland for Christ Mission Centre.

This great conversion brought about tremendous changes in the lifestyle of the people. If Christianity indeed has been the single most dynamic factor in modernising the Naga society in India, it is undoubtedly equally true for the eastern Nagas also. As Isak Chishi Swu exclaimed: "God was so gracious to the people that they could open their eyes and see the new light." Remarkably, head-hunting was totally stopped, poppy plantations, opium consumption and trade were strictly prohibited. Immoral practices were discouraged and harmful traditions gradually given up through education. It is here that the Naga nationalists essentially differed from other revolutionary groups in any part of the world. The NSCN, leadership firmly believed that "spiritual salvation in Christ is eternal and unquestionable. This is where the NSCN is firmly rooted.

(2) Establishment of Schools

The conversion of eastern Nagas to Christianity was coupled with the introduction of education for the first time in that region. It is a matter of fact that till date, the administrative control of Myanmar government has not reached the areas, particularly inhabited by the Nagas. Practically, there is no

57. Written interview of Mr. Isak Chishi Swu, loc. cit.
58. The Joint statement, loc. cit.
administration. It is only during military operation that the area is visited by the Myanmarese troops.

It is in this situation that the NSCN acts as an agency for social change and reformation. According to the NSCN sources, the Ministry of Education of the Government of the People's Republic of Nagaland (GPRN) took up extensive programme to impart education. Thus, education for the first time was brought into this remote areas by the members of National Socialist Council of Nagaland. It was learnt that fifteen primary schools were established and some hundred students were soon brought up within few years' time.

Naga nationalist leaders claim their success in their endeavour to impart education in that region. hence, they write:

The progress of the pupils were by our standard considerable. Conferences were organized for the welfare of the students. Campaigns were conducted from village to village which importantly contributed to the well-being of the people...NSCN could get things moving towards something real and higher. Its achievements were considerable. It was popular with the masses. The people understood the fact that NSCN alone cared for them and hence they reposed their trust in them.

However, these programmes were often halted and threatened by the military operations of the Myanmarese troops. Thus NSCN sources reveal "things had to face the brutal might of the Burmese (Myanmarses) troops time and again. Indiscriminate shooting, incineration of the villages, schools, churches and

60. Pakem, B., India-Burma Relations, (Omsons Publications, New Delhi 1992), p. 120.
61. Written interview of Mr. Isak Chishi Swu, op. cit., p. 3.
63. The Joint statement, loc. cit.
destruction of crops were ruthlessly carried out every time they launched operation." 64

The NSCN also taught the eastern Nagas about terrace cultivation wherever it was feasible. 65 The eastern Nagas earlier depended on primitive method of shifting cultivation which could hardly generate sufficient foodgrain for the year round.

The crux of the problem lies with the unconcerned attitude of Myanmar Government. This part of eastern Nagaland (North West of Upper Myanmar) is completely cut-off from civilisation and developmental activities. As Bertil Lintner vividly narrated:

The total neglect of the Rangoon Government was probably the most appalling aspect of the imbroglio; absolutely nothing had been done to improve the living conditions of those people. And it was this neglect that had enabled the NSCN to build up its base here in these remote mountains which are part of Burma (Myanmar) in name only on official maps. 66

(4) Finance

Financial matters of the organization are looked after by the Finance Minister. But in reality, it is the Finance Secretary who is responsible for management of funds, including its disposal. No liberation movement can be a success unless backed by a sound financial support. Thus, the Finance Department of the Government of the People's Republic of Nagaland (GPRN) significantly plays a key role in the NSCN set up.

The amount of revenue collection is determined according to the size of their operational area. Today, the NSCN practically

64. A brief political account, op. cit., p. 40.
65. Idem.
66. Lintner, op. cit., p. 89.
covers Nagaland state, Manipur, North Cachar Hills besides their operational link with insurgent groups in Assam, Meghalaya, Tripura, Arunachal and Mizoram.\textsuperscript{67} It is from these areas that the NSCN fund flows in.

There are specifically two broad categories of NSCN financial resources: First of all, there is the income from various 'tax' collection and secondly, there is another category which the NSCN calls 'windfall income' covering 'donation and gifts', booties and bank capture'.\textsuperscript{68}

Accordingly, in the areas under their control, the NSCN compulsorily imposed 'house tax' which each Naga household or non-Naga households in Naga areas have to pay amounting to Rs. 100 per annum.\textsuperscript{69} While commenting on peoples' support Rh. Raising, a prominent political leader of the NSCN remarked: "Our people are our bank."\textsuperscript{70} All the non-Nagas, whom the NSCN term 'foreigners sojourning in Nagaland', are also to pay 'sojourning tax' of various categories, ranging from Rupees one hundred to one lakh.

They are as follow:

1. First class business men Rs. 1,00,000 per annum
2. Second " " " Rs. 50,000 "
3. Third " " " Rs. 10,000 "
4. Workers and tailors Rs. 100 "\textsuperscript{71}

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\textsuperscript{67} Ray, Tapas, Fatal confusion Military and growing worries (\ldots) \textit{Frontline}, September 9, 1994. p. 28.
\textsuperscript{68} Central Council Meeting \textit{op. cit.}, p. 5.
\textsuperscript{69} \textit{Idem}.
\textsuperscript{70} \textit{Written interview of Rh. Raising} (conducted by the scholar Killo (Home) \& Chapee (Finance), 4th December, 1992), Kilonser (Minister). P. 5.
\textsuperscript{71} Central Committee, \textit{loc. cit.}
Besides, there is 'loyalty tax' which brings in a sizable fund to the NSCN exchequer. For instance, under 'loyalty tax' there are (1) income tax, (2) transport tax, (3) entertainment tax, (4) tax on forest product, (5) enterprise tax etc. 72

It has been observed that the NSCN tax collection is quite systematic and successful. As a reporter of a regional paper tells us, "The whole system of tax collection is highly systematic." 73 The "tax payers" never let anything slip from their lips even when asked by the Indian security forces which shows the fear and loyalty the NSCN commands. 74 The modus operandi of such tax collection follows a skillful technique. The NSCN leaders normally do not go openly and personally to the various villages or government departments to serve notices and collect the money. First a notice is sent to the village headman or the businessman or a government department, as the case may be. The headman then collects the 'tax' from people of his village, while the accountants of the government department deduct the 'tax' from salaries of the employees, all according to the rates fixed by the GPRN. On completion of the collection, the 'taxes' are deposited at an appointed place on a particular date. Generally, they also issue receipts for such payments. 75

It is in this context, besides other things, that one comes to the conclusion that the NSCN is running parallel government in Nagaland state and Manipur, a fact confessed by even the top

72. Passim Resolutions of the Central Committee Meeting.
73. The Sentinel 28 December 1993
75. Idem. (The newspaper reports find corroboration in the statements of the NSCN leaders)
level Army officers. Interestingly, it was also learnt that even the state police departments in Manipur and Nagaland state pay these taxes\textsuperscript{76} including officers\textsuperscript{77}. It is quite conceivable that they pay these taxes out of fear although some do it voluntarily.

On the other hand, those who refuse to pay the taxes do face severe consequences particularly those belonging to state establishment. For instance, the State Bank of India Regional Office at Dimapur (a town in Nagaland state) at one time decided to quit their operation in Nagaland state owing to inability to pay a whooping demand of Rs. 10 lakhs by the NSCN\textsuperscript{78} (of course, this decision was withheld owing to assurances from the state Chief Minister, including the Union Finance Minister). But not so fortunate case had been the Oil and Natural Gas Corporation (ONGC) which under orders from the NSCN and following damage to equipments, ultimately had to cease operation in Nagaland state indefinitely.\textsuperscript{79} Though it was reported that the NSCN had demanded huge sums of money, vehicles, arms, explosives etc. from the ONGC, the main objective of the NSCN is essentially to stop the exploration of Oil which according to them 'legitimately' belongs to the Nagas and are regarded as 'national wealth' to be exploited only when the 'Naga issue' is settled rightly. In fact, Isak Chishi Swu, in his speech at Geneva UN Conference on

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{76} Idem.}
\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{77} The Sentinal July 3, 1993.}
\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{78} Hussain, Wasbir., SBI resumes functioning in Nagaland The Telegraph July 3, 1993.}
\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{79} The Sentinel September 20, 1993.}
Indigenous Peoples complained of mineral resources being tapped in a massive scale by the Government of India. 80

Another disturbing trend for the Government of India is the expansion of NSCN operational areas particularly in Assam, Arunachal Pradesh, Meghalaya and even Tripura. The NSCN operational link with several North East militant groups also fetch a handsome amount from joint raids in banks or capturing of convoys carrying bank remittances. For instance, an activist of Hynhiewtrep Achik Liberation Council (HALC) who was arrested by the police confessed that "out of the loot, HALC had to give out 70 per cent to the NSCN." 81 Though this percentage given out to the NSCN may be exaggerated, the fact that they do receive a large slice of any successful joint raid cannot be ruled out. Till date, the NSCN made several successful raids on banks and ambushed convoys carrying bank remittances, sometimes jointly with other groups.

Lastly, the NSCN financial support also comes from some friendly countries or agencies. Admittedly, Rh. Raising stated: "many revolutionary people of the world are extending moral as well as material support to us." 82 This is further corroborated by the alleged statement of Khayao Huray, one time finance secretary of the GPRN. When arrested by the security force he allegedly confessed that "Pakistan has provided 1.7 million U.S. dollars to the NSCN to procure arms in four instalments." 83

82. Written interview of Mr. RH. Raising, loc. cit.
83. Aiding Ultras Pak style, North East sun, August 27th-September 2, 1994, p. 16.
Besides, 'Nagaland' becoming a full fledged member of the Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization (UNPO) amidst much global publicity, and earning at the same time international recognition of their political struggle, has indeed opened window of opportunity for the NSCN to seek friendly support, including fund from around the world. Rightly so, within a short time the NSCN has already established good contact with the Asian Indigenous Peoples Pact (AIPP), KWIA a Belgium based Flemish Support Group for Indigenous People and others.  

The NSCN have their own Constitution and the government i.e. Government of the People's Republic of Nagaland (GPRN) which act under it. Thus, they claim that they have constitutional right even to levy taxes. However, everyone does not agree with them. Obviously, in the purview of the Government of India such taxation is nothing but extortion. The media in India as a result use that term. In a way, the Government of India is at a fix because the NSCN system of taxation is seriously eroding the administrative machinery and its effectiveness in maintaining law and order. Some central agencies like the OIL and Natural Gas Commission (ONGC) has already withdrawn from Nagaland due to, inability to pay the exorbitant taxes to the NSCN. Even the State Bank of India based at Dimapur nearly followed the ONGC path. However, it must be noted that substantial Naga population pay those 'taxes' willingly as part of their identification with the movement.

84. NSCN leaders address UN meet (In) The Telegraph 31 August, 1994.

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C. Manpower and Weaponry

On the query "Why do the Nagas need national army?", the NSCN publicity department elucidates that it is needed "to defend their national territorial integrity and interests." The NSCN members comprise of broadly two categories - the People's Army of Nagaland (PAN) and the members of the political wing, the civilian set up.

The Naga nationalists claim that Nagaland is a sovereign state and consider the stationing of Indian and Myanmarese troops as an occupation force and an act of invasion of 'free Nagaland'. It is on this ground that they justify setting up their own national standing army called the People's Army of Nagaland (PAN). Inspite of the fact that the NSCN adopt 'protracted struggle' and 'guerilla strategy' as opposed to conventional warfare or full-scale warfare, their fighting force is purely organized on the pattern of independent state army like that of India, Pakistan, China etc. The army organisation pattern of the NSCN is quite remarkable, in the sense, that they fulfilled all the prerequisites of any regular army formation. The 'Peoples Army' have their distinctive army formation, oath administration, office administration, general administration and jurisdiction, defined service rules and regulations, rank and promotion, gallantry awards and the rewards, etc. Perhaps, the only distinction we can draw with the national army of other states is

85. The two world outlook, (Published by Publicity Department, GPRN, Oking 6th June, 1990), p. 2.
87. Passim, Peoples Army of Nagaland.
that the cadres of PAN are not paid soldiers and of course, they have to operate as a clandestine organisation.

The People's Army of Nagaland is divided into five commands which covers all the Naga inhabited areas. They are: Eastern Command (E/C), Western Command (W/C), Central Command (C/C), Northern Command (N/C), and the Southern Command (S/C).88 Till date, these five commands are manned by one Division, two Brigades having four battalions only. The four battalions are Security Task Force (STF), Zasibituo (ZB), Hevuto (HVT), Ashiho Chaomai (AC).89

The Yehzabo (Constitution) of Nagaland provides that the Chairman (NSCN) shall be the Supreme Commander of the armed forces of Nagaland. 90 However, since the NSCN functions on the principle of 'collective leadership', the constitution says:

He shall in consultation with the executive members, in exercising his power as supreme commander, have the power to issue directives for disposition of armed forces, for planning and execution of military campaigns, to deal with emergencies like foreign invasion and any matters appertaining to the conduct of war.91

Another distinctive feature of the People's Army of Nagaland is its distinctive religious bent. The 'Constitution of Nagaland' gives provision to each battalion to have a chaplain.92 According to the annual report of the Church Ministry of Council of Nagaland Churches, there were nine well established unit churches

88. Ibid., p. 12.
89. Written interview of Brig. V.S. Atem, (conducted by the scholar, 11th October, 1994), p. 16.
90. The Yehzabo, op. cit., p. 4.
91. Idem.
92. Ibid., p. 11.
and thirteen committed chaplains. Thus, the Naga nationalist slogan of 'Nagaland for Christ' is not an empty rhetoric but is ladden with a sense of commitment. Evidently, a statement released by the publicity wing of the GPRN clearly stated: "One of the main objectives of our revolution is to make our land for Christ and in order to construct a Christian state it needs army who trust in the Lord... Nagaland for Christ shall be built by those soldiers who trust in Him."94

Thus, PAN members are simply not just a fighting force alone, they are to play vital and constructive role as true revolutionary patriots. The NSCN claims:

"Believe us, each and every member of NSCN is a man of parts. In times of national war, he is a national army. In times of class war, he is a people's army. In times of holy war, he is a faithful soldier of Christ. In times of political crisis, he is a politician. And in every battle-field, he is a general."95

The NSCN manpower (comprising all the army and civil set up) is put around 3000 strong. Th. Muivah, the NSCN supremo put the figure between '3000-4000 armed soldiers'. Thus one cannot accurately point out the number simply because of the secrecy maintained over the matter. However, according to Th. Muivah, "Nagas could not sustain such a big force" and perhaps due to the change of strategy vis-a-vis the NNC period, he explicitly...

94. The two world outlook, op. cit., p. 5.
95. Ibid., p. 6.
maintained that "the whole of Nagaland can be manned by a 3000 strong army well equipped and smart. Only three thousand."\textsuperscript{99} Thus, in the opinion of the NSCN leadership, in a protracted and guerrilla warfare, a big force is not required partly because of the supposed inability to sustain it. Therefore, the NSCN's main thrust of the issue is stated "to have very very precise assessment."\textsuperscript{100} In other words, the NSCN leadership favours to have a precise number say around 3000 well equipped men imbued with a sense of mission. Rh. Raising, a hard-core leader of the NSCN, however, put it in another way, saying : "NSCN is as strong as 3 million (estimated Naga population) population. NSCN is the embodiment of 3 million Naga population, which has international support as well as moral sanction from the church."\textsuperscript{101}

The NSCN members are a highly motivated force. This is evident from the manner in which they operate and carry out ambushes and capture security forces' camps without even marginal casualties to the cadres.\textsuperscript{102} As Subir Bhaumik who tracked the NSCN Headquarters honestly confessed:"Battalions after battalions may be pressed into service in the hills of Nagaland and Manipur, but that will fail to crush the spirit of the brave Naga fighters."\textsuperscript{103} Even the Indian army, particularly its units serving in the Naga areas, have begun to respect the ingenuity

\textsuperscript{99} Ibid., p. 25.
\textsuperscript{100} Idem.
\textsuperscript{101} Written interview of Mr. RH. Raising, \textit{loc. cit.}
\textsuperscript{103} Ibid., p. 14.
and staying power of the NSCN. For instance, Brigadier Upinder Kumar confessed saying, "those boys (of the NSCN) are good.

Concerning the NSCN weaponry, even the Government of India openly admitted that they possessed sophisticated arms. In a special report to the Secretary General of the Unrepresented Nations and Peoples organisation (UNPO), the Government of India admittedly wrote:

The NSCN (1) has built up a formidable arsenal of weapons including AK-47, M-16, G-3 rifles, LMG, Russian built RPG-7 Rocket launchers, Grenade firing rifles, 2 inch mortars, handgrenades in addition to a large number of other assorted weapons and ammunition.

Thus the fact of NSCN possessing sophisticated weaponry leaves no one in doubt. 'Major' Ningkhan Shimray of the NSCN who reportedly masterminded both 'operation Red Sea' and 'Operation Jordan' listed down the types of weapon in the possession of the NSCN:

- AK-47,56 (sub. machine gun)
- M-16 (US origin and modified one)
- Carbine Assault Rifles-4
- G-2,3 and 4
- M-12 (semi auto rifle)
- M-23 LMG
- M-203 (M-16 attached with grenade launcher)

104. Bhaumik, loc. cit.
107. Written interview of 'Major' Ningkhan Shimray, op.cit., p.3. Vide Written interview of Isak Chishi Swu.
RPG-2, 5 and 7
Grenade launcher
60 mm mortar
40 mm mortar and 2 inch mortar
US sten carbine
SLR (mostly captured from Indian security forces)
303 -do-
LMG -do-
M-20
Luger
9 mm (both US and Chinese origin)
38 special US revolver
Steel mine
TNT
RDX 108

While relating Pakistan's alleged arms supply to the NSCN, a correspondent made sensational disclosure with corroboration from Intelligence Bureau (IB) and intelligence officials that the ISI recently supplied, a substantial consignment of weapons, including rocket launchers and anti-aircraft stinger missiles, to the NSCN. 109 However, it is yet to be proved whether the NSCN possess stinger missiles or not. Only time will tell the veracity of the disclosure. But for a formidable force like the NSCN, such a weapon may not be out of reach for too long even if it may be missing in their present armoury.

108. Written interview of "Major" Ningkhan Shimray, op. cit., p. 5.
On the other hand, the NSCN leaders do not totally rely on the weapons that they possess. Thus, NSCN literature claims:

The type of weapon we holds and the size of army do not matter much, but what really matters is the political significance in the bullet we fire. Every barrel of gun that belongs to the nation has the spirit of Naga nationalism and it is such sort of gun that shall liberate the nation.¹¹⁰

Rh. Raising more specifically says, "it is not arms but the spirit that fights. We inculcate fighting revolutionary spirit in every Naga Army. That is our best weapon."¹¹¹

Thus, the aforesaid statements explicitly reveal that the NSCN leadership does not believe that the weapons at their disposal are a deciding factor. The emphasis is rather on a clear-cut political objective. It is in this context that the NSCN leadership repeatedly emphasise on discipline of its cadres and demand one's best service to the national cause.

D. NSCN as a progressive force

With the emergence of the NSCN as a vocal nationalist force it is generally acknowledged as the most widely supported Naga resistance movement¹¹². Thus, the birth of NSCN in 1980 was like turning a new leaf altogether in the Naga political movement from the not so well organized to a clearly defined concrete political programme. Thus, the NSCN declared: "Sons and daughters of Nagaland, we the National Socialist Council of Nagaland have

¹¹⁰. The Two World Outlook, loc. cit.
¹¹¹. Written interview of Rh. Raising, loc. cit.
¹¹². Morris, Glenn T., Nagaland still fighting after all these years (In) Fourth World Bulletin, April, 1994, p. 15.
chosen for you this salvation line. Here is the call for you, lovers of nation, lovers of the truth of life, to come along and fight a good fight."\(^113\) Nirmal Nibedon, referred to Th. Muivah as the chief protagonist of the new ethnic philosophy.\(^114\)

(1) **NSCN on NNC**

The NSCN leadership took censorious and critical view of the NNC- its policy, programme and leadership and brought out some of the erroneous views upheld by the NNC leadership.

The NSCN leaders asserted that "the defeat of a people is not always brought about by the superiority of the adversary in strength but through incorrect leadership and pursuit of unfounded policy."\(^115\) To put it other way, they write, "a people that fail to admit the maxim that national victory is impossible without correct policy and correct leadership is doomed to ultimate fiasco."\(^116\) There is no doubt that correct policy is the 'lifeline' in any movement particularly in resistance movement such as that of the Nagas. The NSCN leaders emphatically asserted that NNC leadership miserably failed to evolve a sound and realistic policy at a time when it was most needed. Moreover, the NNC did not wrestle for initiative and the significance of initiative to be in their hands was not at all grasped.\(^117\) As Th. Muivah elucidates:

\(^{113}\) Polarisation, *op. cit.*, p. 48.
\(^{115}\) Free Nagaland Manifesto, *op. cit.*, p. 5.
\(^{116}\) *Idem*.
\(^{117}\) Written interview of Mr. Th. Muviah, *loc. cit.*
When the force of nationalism was not backed by correct policy and philosophical grounds it died down and dangers cropped up with loss of confidence in oneself and in the people. Thus, actuation with raw nationalism and selfish opportunism could not lead them anywhere.  

Thus, NNC/FGN was not only faced with internal chaotic condition, baseless approach to problem, self isolation and self-antagonism also characterized policy. When the Government of India came to know the precarious conditions they were in, it went right away on the offensive and got Shillong Accord signed. It is in this context that the NSCN leaders in an attempt to rectify the previous mistakes asserted:

Policy could be realistic when it is based on the actual conditions of the people concerned and their enemy, and the world in general.... Leadership should have correct assessment of any situation.

The NSCN did not even spare the NNC President, A.Z. Phizo for his alleged outright failure to provide correct leadership specially during the critical period in total isolation from the people by staying in a foreign land. The NSCN leaders being disgusted with the whole style of NNC/FGN functioning lamented, "Nagas were made to see a strange centre of power, being created out of the family and relatives of the leadership and a few others with whom he had apparently formed an aristocratic circle above the government." 

118. Idem.  
119. Interview of Bertil Lintner, op. cit., p. 5.  
120. Idem.  
121. Free Nagaland Manifesto, loc. cit.  
122. Ibid., p. 7.
Thus, the NSCN were quite bitter about the manner in which the NNC was functioning without any direction, strategy and vision. It is against this backdrop that the NSCN Manifesto assessed:

It is high time to sum up past and make a concrete approach to the confronting problems. Nagaland has got to be liberated from prejudices, injustices and from all sorts of aristocratic snobbery.\(^{123}\)

However, Phizo's failure to condemn the Shillong Accord the architect of which was his younger brother and the unfortunate lack of communication from his end received scathing attach from various corners. In fact, it is generally acknowledged by all camps that A.Z. Phizo's failure to officially condemn the Shillong Accord was his greatest setback. Eventually, even his close associates broke away in 1990 on this issue and formed a parallel NNC (K). As a result, division of NNC rank and file caused by the emergence of the NSCN now got accentuated.

The NSCN leaders also did not agree with the NNC leaders that it was impossible to resist "the colossal invading might of India and Myanmar" To them the issue was not a contest of strength but one of upholding the historical right against the aggressive forces.\(^{124}\) They retortedly asked:" Are the Nagas finished ? Are there no more now ? Have they (Indians) won the war ?" Th. Muivah painfully admitted in a interview and said: "The inability of the enemy to crush us in the past decades was

\(^{123}\) Ibid., p. 8.
\(^{124}\) Free Nagaland Manifesto, loc. cit.
not taken into consideration.\textsuperscript{125} As a result, writes Th. Muivah, "the nation-wide movement came to a standstill letting pessimism to pervade many a corner."\textsuperscript{126}

(2) **NSCN on the Government of India and Myanmar.**

The NSCN consider India and Myanmar as occupation forces particularly for unleashing acts of invasion against the Nagas. Very recently, Isak Chishi Swu addressed the Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organisation (UNPO) General Conference and stated: "India deliberately...launched unscrupulous massive invasion on Nagaland with the sole view to exterminating the Nagas and their nation."\textsuperscript{127} The NSCN also alleged that India not only invaded their homeland but subtly carried on Indianization process unrelentlessly. The NSCN manifesto earlier stated: "We are not only confronted with a war of physical force but also with more dangerous insidious war of assimilation."\textsuperscript{128} They also said that since Nagas are a distinct nation with distinctive culture and ethos, the Indian or Myanmarese process of assimilation will not come that easy but has to undergo tough course of time.\textsuperscript{129}

The manifesto of the NSCN gives one the impression that the NSCN have chosen the path of 'armed struggle' against the Government of India and Myanmar. In the manifesto, they declared:

\textsuperscript{126} Interview of Mr. Bertil Lintner with Th. Muivah, *op. cit.*, p. 9.
\textsuperscript{127} Written interview of Th. Muivah, *loc. cit.*
\textsuperscript{128} *Speech of Isak Chishi Swu*, Chairman of the NSCN at UNPO General Conference on 30th January, 1993 at Hague, Netherland.
\textsuperscript{129} *Free Nagaland Manifesto*, *op. cit.*, p. 18.
To break a stone, we use hammer, to reap a field we use sickle and to deliver Nagaland from the preposterous occupation of Indian and Burma (Myanmar) might, we need arms. The NSCN leaders reiterated from time to time that the Naga issue was basically political and it required a political solution. But since India and Myanmar sought military solution "Our freedom is forced into the battle field; we have to pick it up with a gun." Hence, they rule out peaceful means in defending their freedom or independence. The Manifesto thus stated: "We shall in no case meet invasion of our country with non-violence..."

Then coming to the question of holding talks or negotiation for settlement of the issue, the NSCN has been quite skeptical of India's sincerity because of what they called 'past experiences'. Admittedly, Th. Muviah in an interview said: "We have had enough of India's way of dealing with us." Further he said:

If India cannot have a realistic approach to the problem, it is futile to expect the Nagas to come out and hold some sort of negotiation. The problem is that the Indians are never prepared to understand the true nature of the issue. So long as there is no preparedness from the Indian side, one cannot expect a solution.

Lately, a new dimension has taken place following the Naga struggle getting international attention as a result of NSCN leader's massive campaign. Nagaland became a member of the the Unrepresented Nations and Peoples organisation (UNPO) and

130. Ibid., p. 17.
131. Ibid., p. 25.
132. Idem.
133. Interview with Th. Muviah by Deepak Dewan, op. cit., p. 7.
subsequently UNPO made a declaration on Nagaland. This has dramatically affected the NSCN leadership's assessment of their policy. In an interview with the Hindu in Geneva, Isak Chishi Swu and Th. Muivah affirmingly stated: "We do not trust India and we will have negotiation only in the presence of a third party." Though, they did not spell out who the third party would be, one could safely assume the possible involvement of UNPO representative if any negotiation is to take place in the near future.

11. Ideology

The emergence of the NSCN as a vocal force had added a new ideological dimension to the Naga movement. In fact, all political movements adhere to some form of ideology. According to J.Y. Calvez, "ideology is...a sign of development; strictly traditional societies are unaware of ideologies, and live instead on continuity and tradition." The writer is emphasising the fact that ideology is a sign of modernization and indication of growth.

Social scientists defined ideology as "an integrated set of belief about the social and political environment." Padelford and Lincoln define ideology as "a body ideas concerning economic, social and political values and goals with positive action

134. Idem.
135. UNPO's support for Nagaland, Nagaland Post, February 1, 1995.
programmes for attaining those goals.\textsuperscript{138} Thus, it purports to tell us how the system is organized, which desired goals can be promoted, what agencies and channels can most effectively be employed to forward the goals in the given setting.

A study group at Dakar on on African socialism defined ideology from Third World perspective as: "a projection of a system of solutions, co-ordinated with a value system to which a human community adheres as it faces its destiny and masters its situation."\textsuperscript{139} Thus, without going into its complication, the scholar would confine to this understanding, particularly the Third World perspective. The need for an ideology for national development is often explicitly felt in the developing countries\textsuperscript{140} and where political movements for liberation are going on.

In this context, the NSCN leaders too unmistakably seem to adhere that ideology is essential for a political movement like that of the Nagas. Evidently, the NSCN writes:

\begin{quote}
We Nagas must be established on the safe foundation. Every Naga must know that it is not the shout for or against anyone but the correct line that will save Nagaland. Therefore, until and unless our people are settled down the line that protects the sovereignty, and to the line that removes the exploitation system from our society, there will be no salvation whatsoever.\textsuperscript{141}
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{139} Palmer, N.D. et al., \textit{International Relations}, (3rd Edition), (CBS Publishers & Distributors, Delhi, 1985), p. 73.
\textsuperscript{140} Calvez, \textit{loc. cit}
\textsuperscript{141} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 291.
While explaining, Th. Muivah stated that "in this world of ideological forces love for one's nation can no more be independent of the line that can ensure the salvation of the people in politics, economy and religion." Coming down to the social level, Th. Muivah also asserts:

One needs to be committed to be more than being a mere patriot, for what is independence if the country is exploited by a few people or is owned by some rich families? What is independence if nation is lost in vain philosophies? What is independence if society is lost in corruption?

In its search for a new ideology the NSCN leaders issued a caution in the context of the Nagas by stating that "mad dogmatism should be discarded." In this sense, the NSCN did not accept Marxism or Socialism of any brand, but picked up the good parts and discarded the rest which does not suit the Naga condition. In fact, the NSCN kind of socialism can be at best designated as 'Naga Socialism' implying application of socialist principles to suit Naga local conditions. This is also directed to remove the myth that the NSCN are ardent communists as alleged in certain corners. For instance, during the late 1970s and early 1980s, the NSCN were branded as 'communists' by the pro-accord NNC and the Government of India in order to win the support of the church and the Naga public and this propaganda was a great success initially.

142. Polarisation, op. cit., p. 42.
144. Ibid., p. 8.
A. NSCN Brand of Ideology: Naga Socialism

The NSCN manifesto declared: "We stand for socialism because it is the only social and economic system that does away with exploitation and ensure fair equality to all the people."\textsuperscript{145} However, the manifesto also stated that "we shall not struggle for the stage of perfect equality simply for the factual reason of impossibility."\textsuperscript{146}

It should be noted first of all that the NSCN brand of socialism is not compatible with Chinese or Russian socialism. This is corroborated by the statement of Isak Chishi Swu who said: "Our socialism has got nothing to do with Marxism and Leninism. It is never an importation but of indigenous origin."\textsuperscript{147} Thus, the distinctiveness of NSCN brand of ideology is clearly spelled out in the assertion that 'socialism is purely national in orientation'.\textsuperscript{148} The NSCN in its manifesto explains as to why this particular ideology was adopted.

In the traditional Naga society the right of every family to maintain ownership of land was not unfettered. The existence of community land had also restrained the unhealthy practice of concentration of landed interests. The practice of community possessions, common sharing, absence of social discrimination, social obligation towards the poor, inculcation of social responsibility through \textit{morungs}, recognition of individual contribution to the community and even the idea of equal

\textsuperscript{145} Polarisation, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 43.
\textsuperscript{146} NSCN Manifesto, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 41.
\textsuperscript{147} Ibid., p. 48.
\textsuperscript{148} Written interview of Mr. Isak Chishi Swu, \textit{loc. cit.}
distribution of commodities had the effect of preventing exploitation at social and economic levels.\textsuperscript{149}

Thus, the NSCN leadership advance their reasoning that Naga socialism is not something new but rather an attempt to reinforce the traditional systems. In this sense, the NSCN ideology is certainly not delinking people from tradition but rather retaining and conserving it in a better way. It also strikes an important note when they say that "The reposition of confidence in this guarantee makes his life worth its while which in turn promotes his sense of responsibility towards the society."\textsuperscript{150} In their assessment "for centuries such system enabled the Nagas to live virtually free from evil of the ruthless exploitation and domination found in the world of other societies. Fair distribution of wealth and the sanction of security to a great extent solved the law and order problem which the modern governments everywhere face."\textsuperscript{151}

However, the NSCN leaders observed that the commencement of the "naked armed invasion by India and Burma (Myanmar)' marked the beginning of enormous influx of Indian capital and its prominent role in Naga society has created wild condition. The concentration of capital in a few hands and its constant investment for acquiring more capital "has set the whole society on tremendous swing of exploitation of the Nagas by Nagas and the

\textsuperscript{149} Written interview of Mr. Th. Muviah, \textit{loc. cit.}
\textsuperscript{150} Free Nagaland Manifesto, \textit{op. cit.,} pp. 79-80.
The brief write-up by the NSCN is an account based on historical and anthropological evidences. To corroborate it, writings of Verrier Elwin, Alemchiba, M. Horam, R.R. Shimray, etc. are of much use.
\textsuperscript{151} \textit{Idem.}
Indian parasites." The Naga nationalist leaders also sound a grave apprehension of massive scale of exploitation by external forces. Thus, they write:

Today, our society and its institutions are in a serious challenge of being overwhelmed with exploitation, domination and assimilation. Backed by military and monetary powers, the process of the exploitation and domination of the puppets are in full swing. Substantial community lands are encroached upon, forests are exploited, mineral resources are appropriated, alien are brought in, in thousands to serve their interests. The rich are all the more fattened with the masses being marginalised. Who can deny now the existence of class antagonism? How to go about it? Where is the force to check it? This is a reality created in the main by the alien occupation.

It is in this context that the NSCN would be sharing the view of William E. Connolly who writes: "Thus ideologies develop when there is a felt social need for ideas and beliefs to guide political action."

It is in the same token that the NSCN leaders bring out two pressing considerations. In the first place, the free existence of Nagaland is a must for the salvation of the people. Further, the abolition of exploitation of the people is imperative if the people are to be assured themselves of their future. Then on the question of emancipation the NSCN asserted: "To us, it is definitely SOCIALISM basically of our national brand that alone can assure the fairest to the community

152. Ibid., p. 81.
153. Ibid., p. 33.
155. Connolly, op. cit., p. 54.
as a whole as it is the only social and economic system that does away with exploitation and oppression."\textsuperscript{156}

The NSCN advocate a via media between total privatization and total collectivization in their professed belief to do away with inherent contradictions of both.\textsuperscript{157} In particular, they point out that "total abolition of private property ownership system destroys all the elements of incentive for growth."\textsuperscript{158} At the same time, "the incentive stimulated by the idea of community ownership is not perennial."\textsuperscript{159} By this, they precisely meant to emphasise that individualism to a certain level must be promoted. This has to do with man's nature that needs to be reckoned with. Therefore, they argued saying "Any social system that does not take this point into consideration as the prime factor is bound to fail."\textsuperscript{160} Elaborating further they stated: "Man's freedom and his fundamental rights are inalienable. Yet the nature of his freedom is by no means unlimited; he is conditioned within the bounds required by sensible society."\textsuperscript{161}

The NSCN leadership totally negate the negative attitude of the communist governments vis-a-vis the national aspiration of the nationalists. Thus they emphatically stated:

\begin{quote}
Disregard of the forces of national aspiration for the so-called larger interest of the communist revolutionary ends was a flagrant denial of the inalienable right to self-determination of peoples. This force is stubborn despite being dominant now and then.
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{156.} Free Nagaland Manifesto, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 34.
\textsuperscript{157.} Idem.
\textsuperscript{158.} Written interview of Th. Muviah, \textit{loc. cit.}
\textsuperscript{159.} Free Nagaland Manifesto, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 83.
\textsuperscript{160.} Idem.
\textsuperscript{161.} Idem.
It has cost them the price they still cannot pay.\textsuperscript{162}

They are in fact, critical of the denial of the right of self-determination to various nationalities forcefully integrated into the erstwhile Soviet empire.

Finally, another point of bitter disagreement of the NSCN with the communist world is on the issue of faith. Thus, the NSCN stated: "The consolation they sought in the 'ism' of their persuasion, dismissing the power of faith in the absolute eternal reality apparently could not lead them anywhere."\textsuperscript{163} Here in lies the fundamental difference of the Naga nationalists with others and particularly the communist world who consider religion as the 'opium of the people'. Further in reference to the communist world, the NSCN manifesto stated:

Hopes were belied and the inner contentment they preached in materialism could not be attained at any stage. Disillusionment one after the other overtook them and at last the despised still Voice of Life that says: 'Man does not live by bread alone', could not be questioned any longer. The profound spiritual reality that lies far beyond the purview of science was perceived.\textsuperscript{164}

The NSCN adherence to Christian faith is implicit in their manifesto which says "spiritual salvation in Christ ... (is) eternal and unquestionable."\textsuperscript{165} It is precisely because of their commitment to the Christian faith that Bertil Lintner (who paid a visit to the NSCN operational areas) remarked that NSCN ideology

\textsuperscript{162} Idem.
\textsuperscript{163} Ibid., p. 84.
\textsuperscript{164} Idem.
\textsuperscript{165} Idem.
can best be "described as a mixture of evangelical Christianity and revolutionary socialism."166

However, NSCN leadership underlined that "the choice is no more between the capitalist and the communist economy .... The soundness of a society necessitated a mixed system of economy, the safe-guarding of the fundamental rights and the equal opportunity of the citizens to the extent the security - both economical and political - of the people."167 Thus in a final analysis, what matters to the NSCN is the kind of ideology which is workable, practicable and which promotes and can best safeguard the interests of the Naga society. Hence, they do not advance any dogmatic ideology but favours a mild form of socialism, a mixed economy with both individual and common property rights.

B. NSCN Ideology Vis-a-Vis the Naga People

In the initial stage, when the NSCN was formed, they were grossly misrepresented for their ideological stand. The NSCN were branded as Communists' Th. Muivah was seen as attempting to "inject Marxism into the Naga movement."168 Nothing can be more untrue than these allegations.

As a matter of fact, this term was used by the Accord group and the Government of India for a specific purpose, i.e., to garner the support of the Churches in Nagaland and the Naga public (who obviously were adverse to communism or marxism) for

166. Supra Free Nagaland manifesto.
167. Lintner, op. cit., p. 82.
isolating and neutralizing the hard-core NNC, the Alee Command. This stratagem of the accord group and the Government of India was a subtle move indeed and was a great success initially in winning over the powerful Church organisation as well as the gullible Naga public. The group under the command of Th. Muivah camping across the border in Myanmar had to receive the wrath of those who supported the Shillong Accord and the Government of India as they were considered a stumbling block to the peace process. Th. Muivah recalls:

Our men were shouted at as traitors and communists. They (public) were completely brainwashed with false concoction about us. But they (accord group) could not face the situation. For long they had to be on the run. But all the accord forces were closed up and reinforced, equipped and directly assisted by the Indian army. All the Christian leaders were also employed in collusion with the NNC, to whip up the public into a frenzy against us. 169

The Government of India and the Accord group meticulously exploited the situation. The fact that majority of the Nagas are Christians by faith and at a time when the 'red world' was strongly suspected of having persecuted the Christians, it was for the accord group and the church body to say so by propagating that the NSCN were bringing 'communism' into Nagaland. Though it worked for sometime, it turned out to be a mere propaganda. Very soon, the NSCN gained ground and emerged as a strong nationalist movement in the region. Significantly, the NSCN came to be

generally acknowledged as the most widely supported Naga political movement.170

III. Objectives

The primary objective of the National Socialist Council of Nagaland has been clearly spelled out in its manifesto as:

We stand for the unquestionable Sovereign right of the Naga people over every inch of Nagaland; wherever it may be, it does admit of no other existence whatever.171

Thus, the NSCN's primary political objective is to establish a 'Sovereign Christian Socialist country'.172 An important functionary of the NSCN stated: "We are fighting for the international recognition of our national right (even by India and Myanmar)."173

They declared: 'Nagas have their own history and every aspect of it does not admit of distortion.'174 The Nagas also claimed that History was on their side.175

The Naga nationalists are unanimous as far as this issue is concerned. Thus, they stated:

Historically and legally Nagaland was/is never an integral part of India. The claim that Nagaland is an integral part of India is not based on facts.176

175. Free Nagaland Manifesto, op. cit., p. 41.
176. Ibid., p. 42.
Further they advance the argument that "recognition of Naga independence by India is neither a question of 'separation' nor 'secession' from India. Separation or secession in their view comes only when there is a union. Nagaland was never a part of India and as such, Naga independence is neither a question of separation nor secession from India. In the same line, the NSCN leaders seriously challenged the stand of India. They stated:

The truth we hold is supported by historical facts which India dare not face except taking recourse to the boundless vain argument that India has inherited Nagaland from the British Imperialists, and the brazen claim made after 18 years that Naga "accepted Indian Constitution" by installing a puppet state in 1963 under sheer force of well above two hundred thousand armed forces using a few traitors who were also in the pay of the Indian government.

Therefore, they strongly argued that Nagaland remains independent - a status which cannot be altered, nor could it be distorted.

(A) Policy

Objectives and policy were so closely related that they cannot be separated. Objectives without a sound and pragmatic policy will always remain unachieved goals. Thus, a failure or success of one's organisational objectives will be determined by the type of policy formulated and put into effect.

178. Ibid., p. 71.
Articulating on policy, the NSCN leaders quoting Mao stated: "Policy is the life-line." According to the NSCN leaders, "The defeat of a people is not always brought about by the superiority of the adversary in strength but through incorrect leadership and pursuit and unfounded policy." They also point out that "it is policy that decides the outcome of any contest apart from strength." Thus, the NSCN emphasise on the importance of evolving sound policy is explicit.

(1) The Policy of United Front

The NSCN leaders borrowed this idea from the Chinese at least in principle but the content is entirely different. The NSCN has reshaped it to suit local conditions. In the words of Lin Piao, "United front is defined as to hold aloft the banner of national liberation, unite with all the forces that could be united to form a broad national united front." In the case of the Naga nationalists, the NSCN perception of 'united front' is to forge unity among the various nationalists or with all the revolutionary forces (in their words) in and outside India. That is the basic difference with the Chinese application of 'united front'. The NSCN united front policy has both national and international dimension.

In Th. Muviah's words, "United front is an effective strategy in confronting the adversary of superior power."

179. Free Nagaland Manifesto, loc. cit.
180. Supra Free Nagaland Manifesto.
181. Ibid., p. 5.
182. Idem.
Admitting India to be a superior power, the NSCN leaders are of the opinion that she needs to be confronted on all fronts so as to scatter her force to weaken it and deprive the advantages of being superior in strength. We should also penetrate his line and wreck him from within.\textsuperscript{184} Therefore, the question of the strategy of united front with all the forces that could be united with some way or other cannot be dispensed with\textsuperscript{185} writes the NSCN manifesto.

Significantly, the NSCN have changed the old style of fighting single-handed like a bull\textsuperscript{186} which according to the NSCN leadership is strategically wrong and unreliable. The NSCN policy of 'united front' is born out of Naga's practical experiences. The NSCN leadership believed that one of the reasons of Naga's defeat (Shillong Accord) was essentially because of the lack of allies and for fighting alone and without any strategy. The NSCN leaders severely criticised the former leadership for their lack of acumen in reading the minds of the enemy and lack of evolving an effective policy in confronting the adversary of superior force. Thus, in their manifesto, the NSCN leaders points out these problems:

\begin{quote}
It is pity that the leadership persistently harps and counts on the tantalized boon of some particular imperialist country and bosses and the sensibleness of the adversary by making antagonistic pronouncements against the countries which are sympathetically sharing with us the weal and woe (China and Pakistan).... Unfaithfulness to our friends in the critical times (1962 and 1972 wars) have done much damage to the mutual confidence.
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{184} Written interview of Th. Muviah, \textit{loc. cit.}
\textsuperscript{185} Idem.
\textsuperscript{186} Free Nagaland Manifesto, \textit{loc. cit.}
When war broke out between our friends and our adversary, the leadership betrayed cooperation for the wanton purpose of winning the favour of the adversary. The two faced policy of the enemy was often miscalculated. Wounds caused by such perfidy are not easily healed. Every friend is wounded; the adversary is gladdened and strengthen against us. 187

This clearly unfolds the actual picture of their relationship with China and Pakistan. That shows that everything was not well in the relationship between the Nagas and the two supporting countries. This account can be considered as true because it was Th. Muviah who went to China as a plenipotentiary and who coordinated the whole affair. Therefore, if the Chinese were bitter against A.Z. Phizo for the aforesaid reason, Th. Muviah would know indeed.

For the ardent Naga nationalists there is readiness to unite with all the forces, "God-fearing and Godless, that can be united with and fight against the monster." 188 Thus, the main thrust of the united front policy is as Th. Muviah writes:

To be realistic he must be confronted from all sides. Until that we can hardly claim to cope with him. But that can be best done only when a United Front is forged against the common enemy. Yes, to fight in the packs against the enemy is most commended. We have been on that job. 189

Of late, the NSCN has expanded its area of operation to the entire North East region and helped establishment of a number of 'revolutionary groups' in addition to tie-up with other groups of

188. Ibid., p. 30.
189. Idem.
the region and beyond. 'Brig'. V.S. Atem, chief of the Naga army, GPRN succinctly acknowledged saying:

Yes, it is a fact that we (NSCN) have been helping quite a few revolutionary brothers of the North East. But the general notion that the NSCN has been trying to create unrest in this part of the world by just inciting or abetting and helping the so-called people of the North East to take up arms and fight with India is wrong. Our leadership is very pragmatic and realistic in approach to any problems and we know that revolution is not like a commodity that can be put on sale in the market.190

Thus according to Brig. V.S. Atem's the NSCN came forward to assist the 'revolutionary groups' only when "our neighbours have now realised of their folly to have joined India"191 or in the words of Th. Muviah when "more and more minority sects are feeling exploited."192

As of now, the NSCN is able to extend help to the Bodo Security Force (BSF) in Assam, United Liberation Front (UNLF), People's Liberation Army (PLA), Kanglepak Communist Part (KCP), Prepak in Manipur, National Liberation Front of Tripura (NLFT) in Tripura, United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA) in Assam, Achik Liberation Matgrik Army (ALMA) in Garo hills of Meghalaya, Hynniewtrep Achik Liberation Council (HALC) in Khasi hills of Meghalaya, Hmar People's Convention (HPC) in Mizoram,193 the Dimasa National Security Force (DNSF),194 and lately, the NSCN also maintained link with the Council of Khalistan (COK).195

190. Written interview of Th. Muviah, loc. cit.
191. Written interview of Brig. V.S. Atem, loc. cit.
192. Idem.
194. Written interview of Brig. V.S. Atem, loc. cit.
Then of course, the most significant step taken by the NSCN in realising the united front is the decision to form a common front called the Self Defence United Front of the South East Himalayan Region for political and military cooperation and coordination in combating the Indian Force.\textsuperscript{196} Besides, the NSCN also maintained operational link with other 'revolutionary groups' outside India like Arakan Liberation Party (ALP), New Mon State Party (NMSP), National United Front of Arakan (NUFA), Wa National Party (WNP), Karen National Union (KNU) and Chin Liberation Front (CLF) and "many other ethnic revolutionary forces have been promoted a clear understanding of recognising each other's right and to extend help whenever needed."\textsuperscript{197}

Thus, the NSCN successfully developed a close network of relations with a number of 'revolutionary groups' and continually stressed on close cooperation and increasing coordination with other groups in the North East region and beyond. This greatly enhanced the expanding strike radius of the Naga nationalists that is 'giving mandarins in the capital's corridors of power sleepless nights.'\textsuperscript{198} This development has helped the NSCN in two ways: (1) It has greatly enhanced the strength of the NSCN in spreading out its influence in almost all these areas giving more space for military manoeuvring and other advantages, (2) It has

\textsuperscript{196} Khalistanis back Naga rebel groups, \textit{The Telegraph}, April 24, 1993.

In a letter signed by the President of the Council of Khalistan Dr. Gurmit Singh Aulakh urged all sikh soldiers soldiers in the Indian army serving in Nagaland to cease oppression of the Nagas and support their freedom. (This was widely circulated in Nagaland).


\textsuperscript{198} Written interview of 'Major' Ningkhan Shimray, \textit{op.cit.}, p. 3.
fostered greater coordination and built up a relationship making it a powerful force. This has particularly helped in foreign related mission such as shipment of arms.

Thus, NSCN leadership harping on 'victory' writes:

Yes, India could not crush the Nagas even when the latter were alone. Will India do better when all the revolutionaries in the South East Asia are firmly behind us and those of India convulsing into a force? It will be too far-fetched a logic if anyone thinks India will...Time will bear out whether Nagaland will first disappear or India becomes ten.199

Recounting the success of the NSCN policy and strategy, Subir Bhaumik observed: "The Indian army is already suffering from overstretch fatigue."200 Bhaumik was the first Indian reporter who trekked to upper Myanmar, the General Headquarters of the NSCN and personally interviewed Th. Muivah and other officers. He also said: "Like Che (Guevara), the NSCN is trying to light more prairie fires than New Delhi can extinguish."201 This is precisely the present ground reality in Nagaland and in the North East from security point of view. Thus, admittedly, Maj General A.K. Sengupta, the General Officer Commanding (GOC) of the Indian army's 57 Mountain Division stated: "We believe that the military can only contain insurgency and not solve it. Our efforts would be wasted if it is not backed by a political settlement."202

201. Bhaumik, loc. cit.
In this context Th. Muivah, the General Secretary of the NSCN clearly stated:

Now Indian forces are fighting not in free Nagaland alone, they are being deployed in various parts to fight and they have been fighting without any clear-cut success anywhere. Indians are now no longer strong enough to be decisive in any confrontation. The danger of a single-combat is thus averted.  

It is observed that one of the ultimate objectives of the NSCN is to defeat the Government's will to fight and thereby forcing it come to a rightful settlement of the issues.

(2) Policy of establishing safe base area

Another important policy of the NSCN leadership is the necessity of establishing a safe base area. Yet establishing a safe base area in a remote or inaccessible region, was not so much a condition of victory as of survival. Thus, according to Th. Muivah, there is "danger of being wiped out if their forces continued to fight in the area where the adversaries would do better and already there and to make a shift in this respect is no less imperative for their survival." Therefore, the leadership of the NSCN stated: "This compelled us to have concrete examination of the enemy's weakest point. It was unquestionably the eastern side (Naga territory in Myanmar) where we could create safe base areas and consolidate ourselves there."  

In this way, the NSCN leadership were convinced that

204. Written interview of Th. Muivah, loc. cit.
205. Interview of Bertil Lintner with Th. Muivah, loc. cit.
fighting initiative will be always retained by them and can go for offensive everywhere outside the base area.  

As a matter of fact, it was here that the NSCN built up their forces, mobilised the public, gave comprehensive political teaching both to the cadres as well as to public and commands were also sent out from time to time. It was here that the Government of the People's Republic of Nagaland (GPRN) directly administered these un hospitable terrain and professed to work as 'true revolutionary patriots for bringing socio-economic and religious reformation in a big scale.'  

Thun, what Lin Pino said of the Chinese base area was also true of the Nagas. He said: "Our base areas were in fact a state in miniature... (and) became the springboard for the people's war of liberation."  

It is a fact that the NSCN were quite successful in establishing a strong 'impregnable jungle fortress' around Challam, Tongyu, Longkai area in upper Myanmar which they strategically considered the weak spot of both the Indian and the Myanmarese armies. Thus, they did achieve something significant which the NNC and the Federal Government of Nagaland failed to realise. They completely failed to grasp the decisive significance of the base area so as to retain the initiative always in their hand.  

The impact of having a safe base area on the NSCN cadres was glaringly narrated by GPRN document which says: "They had been better trained militarily, better established politically, ideologically and

206. Idem.  
207. Idem.  
208. Passim, A brief political account of Free Nagaland.  
even morally. 210 Besides, batch after batch belonging to ULFA, UNLF etc. were trained in that base area and stayed with the NSCN. 211

However, when the tragic incident took place in 1988, when S.S. khaplang and his associates created internal dissensions the core of the NSCN forces had to abandon the base area and shift temporarily to the borders of Nagaland state.

(3) Policy of Self Reliance

The NSCN adoption of the policy of 'self reliance' is novel at any rate. By this, the leadership of the NSCN desires to make political struggle more realistic and self assuring to face any eventuality.* To them it is the practice of relying on oneself that gives reality to one's existence.

Pointing out the past mistakes that made the political movement lose its strength and initiative, the NSCN writes:

The most dangerous harm affecting our politics today is that right from the start the people were made to believe in foreign help for their survival. This policy of letting the people on the hope of external help weakens the initiative to save themselves. Such policy is opportunist and treacherous in that the people are driven to despair and capitulation when things would not turn out as they expected. 212

211. GPRN A brief political account of Free Nagaland, op. cit., p. 41.
* To them it is the practice of relying on oneself that gives reality to one's existence.
By this, the NSCN is not ruling out foreign aid, but what concerned them is the 'false hope' detrimental to promoting self-reliance and initiative. Thus, the essence of NSCN policy of self-reliance is evidently the enlightenment of the people in that their own effort is the determining factor to change the course of events.

(4) Policy Against Social Evil

The NSCN's uncompromising campaign against social evils is second to none. In fact, their successful endeavour in this area has been well acknowledged by all including the Indian army circle. Admittedly, a high ranking Indian army officer stated: "The support of the people is entirely with the NSCN because they deal most effectively with the evil practices in the society and the anti-social elements."213 Similarly, a newspaper correspondent reported: "It goes to the credit of the NSCN leaders that the number of drug addicts and the like is very low among the Naga tribes."214 Significantly, the same reporter acknowledged that "elected representatives (MLAs) and all those persons who want to see a better society in Manipur are happy with these campaigns."215 In reality "It is the NSCN which has been policing these four districts (Ukhrul, Tamenglong, Senapati and Chandel). Drug addicts, habitual drunkards, womanizers, women of easy virtue and other petty criminals are rounded up and then

213. Free Nagaland Manifesto, op. cit., p. 27.
beaten." Interestingly, a regional reporter writes: "Today, one cannot find peg of liquor for love or money at Ukhrul district headquarter, the stronghold of the NSCN. Similarly, drug-traffickers are on the run in the district." One local newspaper in Nagaland gave a fascinating report that, "the campaign has left the local police here (Ukhrul) quite satisfied about the positive effects on the law and order problems as crimes have almost disappeared over night."

Since the inception of the NSCN, their stand against social evils is quite indicative. For instance, the 'disciplinary rule of the NSCN emphatically caution all concerned including Central Council members against indulging in immorality or social evils. Isak Chishi Swu and Th. Muivah in a joint statement stated:

Yes, dirt must be swept out starting right from the topmost room (leader) because revolutionaries believe more in the practical values...The 'Chinese saying, 'clean your compound and the whole village will be clean' has an undying value to us. After several years of strenuous efforts, most of the national workers were persuaded of the danger of being indulgent in immorality and wickedness.

Reaffirming their earlier stand, the Central Council meeting passed a significant resolution. It says: "NSCN views prostitution, drug peddling and drug abuse as most deadly social crimes which sap the sanctity and life of society. We shall continue our all-out commitment to combat against them through to

219. Minutes of the Central Council meeting, loc. cit.
the end."220 In the same way, the women wing of the NSCN called the National Socialist Women Organisation (NSWO) warned and cautioned the Naga girls indulging in immoral activities and other social evils.221 In this connection, the NSCN has from time to time chastised many and some were executed in extreme cases (as per their judgement). These included the killing of Biju Sahni alias Kalia, accused of being a ring leader in drug trafficking in North Eastern region222 and the execution of four NSCN members allegedly involved in extortion.223 To this end, the NSCN openly admit of having awarded capital punishment to many.224

It may be recalled here that most of the national press and particularly the Government of India squarely accuse the NSCN of drug trafficking though without any substantial evidence. For instance, both have suggested that the NSCN considers the town of Moreh crucial to its operations because of its being a lucrative centre for smuggling. It was also alleged that the NSCN uses Moreh as a centre for regional drug trafficking so as to project it as no more than a druglord terrorist organisation.225 Th. Muivah has emphatically countered the allegation as baseless. The NSCN has condemned drug trafficking in Nagaland and has reportedly taken measures against Nagas and non-Nagas alike who

225. Morris, loc.cit.
deal in drug in their areas.\textsuperscript{226} In a rejoinder submitted to the Secretary General of the UNPO against the allegation of the Government of India, Th. Muivah stated:

The problem of drug addiction often went out of hand in Nagaland especially in urban areas. Our (NSCN's) relentless campaign against drug peddling and abuses alone has saved the society a great deal...To us, a society that is succumbed to sex, drug, money and wine is the weakest of all. We will never allow under any circumstances our society to be given up to such vanities and frailties.\textsuperscript{227}

Th. Muivah also did not spare the Government of India and other groups for alleged involvement in drug dealing. Thus, while refuting the blame he stated:

But to the great hurt of our conscience, many responsible army officers, a number of Kachin officers, the Kukis, the NNC traitors and some puppet Ministers are found involved in such unhallowed deals. But brazenly enough Indian mass media took the luxury of blaming us that NSCN wrestled for the benefit of drug business. What an unscrupulous mentality to tell such a lie! We have done away with a good number of drug peddlers. We are serious and we simply can't spare them for the salvation of society.\textsuperscript{228}

Similarly, when asked by a journalist to comment on some news report that the Naga-Kuki fight is for the 'drug traffic control', Muivah explicitly denied saying: "We are not interested in drugs. You know the Nagas, particularly NSCN, they value the sanctity of society, they value the importance of young

\textsuperscript{226} Th. Muivah's rejoinder to the Indian Propaganda Stunt, \textit{loc. cit.}
\textsuperscript{227} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 14.
\textsuperscript{228} \textit{Idem}.
generation... We, the NSCN are quite critical of those things, deadly against drug menace."\textsuperscript{229}

It is an established fact that the NSCN has earned for themselves the admiration of many in the campaign against drug menace and for sense of duty towards the society.

Lately, the NSCN has also embarked on the mission of checking corruption in Nagaland. In a strongly worded statement, they observed "what is independence if the country is exploited or is owned by some rich families?"\textsuperscript{230} Hence, rooting out corruption becomes inevitable according to their assessment. The present Naga society in NSCN view is plagued with injustice, corruption, exploitation, power struggle, religious apostasy, hypocrisy etc.\textsuperscript{231}

The NSCN is fighting in two fronts i.e. with the internal enemies like social evils and the external enemies which include Governments of India and Myanmar. Admittedly, the Central Council meeting points out that "the main objective of the Naga army is to continue fighting with external as well as internal enemies."\textsuperscript{232}

IV STRATEGIES

The emergence of the NSCN witnessed a significant shift in Naga nationalists' military strategies vis-a-vis the Government of India and the Government of Myanmar. According to Oxford

\textsuperscript{229} Interview with Th. Muivah by Deepak Dewan, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 9.
\textsuperscript{230} Written interview of Th. Muivah, \textit{loc. cit.}
\textsuperscript{232} Proceedings of the Central Council meeting, \textit{loc. cit.}
Dictionary, strategy is defined as "the art of war; management of an army or armies in a campaign." In our context, therefore, strategy can be understood to mean the art of conducting a campaign and maneuvering an army.

The NSCN's major shift in strategy arose from the military defeat of the NNC. The setback of the movement led to serious re-evaluation and analysis and finally they evolved a new strategy of continuing the resistance war against (what they termed) 'naked invasion of Nagaland' by India and Myanmar. The NSCN strategist, Th. Muivah declared:

> Our tactical line is based on Mao Ze Dung's concept of guerrilla warfare, protracted in form and revolutionary in content. I do not believe in the flashy brilliance of one or two successful encounters with the enemy and which is endowed with greater resources. On this revolutionary war, we have to survive. Survival is more important. If we stay in the fight, we will get the chance to go on the offensive when India starts disintegrating.  

Thus, the NSCN military strategy is clearly spelt out as being a low cost offensive posture, avoiding direct confrontation with the strongly armed Indian Army and preferring guerrilla warfare to a set pitch battle. This new idea of strategic fight is borne out of its own experience of three decade long resistance against Indian and Myanmarese Governments. Recapitulating the past error, the NSCN manifesto opined:

> "persistent fighting, as it was done in the past, in the area.

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233. Interview Th. Muivah, Gen. Secretary, NSCN by Subir Bhaumik Special report Sunday, 14-20 June 1987, p. 25. Subir Bhaumik became the first Indian journalist to visit the NSCN GHQ in 'Eastern Nagaland'.

234. Ibid., p. 22.
where the enemy could do better should be discouraged. In this way, we can wrestle and have initiative almost all the time in our hand in dealing with the enemy however superior he might be."\(^235\)

By this, the new leadership of Naga nationalists implicitly conveyed the message that the NNC's failure was precisely due to wrong policy and strategy. Therefore, the NSCN writing on the wall clearly called upon Nagas to be realistic and instead of being swayed by bombastic assurances.\(^236\) Moreover, the NSCN manifesto also stated that upholding the principle and shouting that Nagaland belonged to the Nagas alone would not ensure any concrete result.\(^237\) The NSCN leadership is optimistic and believe that initiative is in their hand. Thus, Th. Muivah writes:

Nagas will no longer suffer from the mistake of over estimation nor underestimation of the opponents and ourselves. We can deal with them in the way objectivity requires. We are no more alone, besides, we have plenty of guts to hold out in any circumstances. We have seized the initiative on all fronts.\(^238\)

A. Protracted Struggle

As stated earlier, the NSCN leadership having studied the security environment opted for 'protracted struggle'. According to NSCN manifesto. "The enemy is superior, therefore, our war will have to be a protracted one."\(^239\)

\(^{235}\) Free Nagaland manifesto, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 28.
\(^{236}\) Interview of Mr. Bertil Lintner with Th. Muivah, \textit{loc. cit.}
For instance, NNC in the post Shillong Accord period propagated that 'Nagaland will soon become a member of UNO' which turned out to be untrue.
\(^{237}\) Free Nagaland manifesto, \textit{loc. cit.}
\(^{238}\) Written interview of Th. Muivah, \textit{loc. cit.}
\(^{239}\) \textit{Ibid.}, p. 2.
writing exclusively on Th. Muivah relates: "Almost sounding like slain Pakistani Premier Zulfikar Bhutto (who promised a thousand years' war with India), Th. Muivah talked of a long protracted struggle against New Delhi." Subir Bhaumik (who personally interviewed Th. Muivah) remembers Th. Muivah drawing a parallel between the Vietcong's struggle against the mighty American forces and his little bushwar against vastly superior Indian forces.

Hence, their vision of Naga resistance war would be protracted in form and revolutionary in content. It must be noted here that it was Mao who developed the strategy and tactics of protracted war—the way in which the weak could defeat the strong. It was to wear out the enemy by guerrilla warfare, rather than risking defeat in a head-on clash. But it was also the way to built up strength to be ready to strike when the opportunity came.

As Lin Piao, pointed out is his report on People's war, "Guerrilla warfare is the only way to mobilise and apply the whole strength of the people against the enemy, the only way to expand our forces in the course of the war...gradually changes the balance of forces between the enemy and ourselves...switch from guerrilla to mobile warfare and finally defeat the enemy.

General Giap's famous passage with reference to 'guerrilla warfare' writes: "There was no clearly defined front in this war.

It was there where the enemy was. The front was nowhere, it was everywhere.\textsuperscript{244} In the same line, as Mao Tse Tung had explained years before, the absence of fixed battle lines as one of the 'outstanding characteristics' of Red Army operations. "In a revolutionary civil war, he wrote in December 1936, there cannot be fixed battle lines... Our base areas are constantly expanding and contracting, and often as one base area falls, another rises."\textsuperscript{245} Thus it becomes a vicious circle.

Mao Tse Tung also declared; "We must adapt our thinking and our work to the circumstances ... our strong point, and our means of defeating the enemy. Fight when you can win, move away when you can't win."\textsuperscript{246} It is in this context that Mao postulates the general rule of fighting a guerrilla warfare. Thus, he writes:

\begin{quote}
The enemy advances, we retreat;  
The enemy camps, we harass;  
The enemy tires, we attack;  
The enemy retreats, we pursue.\textsuperscript{247} 
\end{quote}

On the effectiveness of the strategy Mao Tse Tung stated: "guerrilla warfare behind the enemy lines cripples the enemy, pins him down, disrupts his supply lines and inspires the regular forces... The aim is the 'accumulation of many minor victories to make a major victory.'"\textsuperscript{248}

In this context, the NSCN have sought to apply this strategy with slight variation from the Chinese or Viet Cong pattern. In fact, the NSCN has carried out a number of successful raids,

\textsuperscript{244} Giap, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 21.  
\textsuperscript{245} Girling, \textit{loc. cit.}  
\textsuperscript{246} Ibid., p. 78.  
\textsuperscript{247} Idem.  
\textsuperscript{248} Ibid., p. 81
attacks and capturing of camps without any significant loss on their side. The following are some of the successful operations against the Indian security forces:

(1) On 19th February, 1982, under the command of `Captain' Wungmatem 21 Sikh Regiment jawans were killed and many injured in an ambush. One light machine gun, one sten gun and five SLRs with a huge amount of ammunition were captured by the NSCN.

(2) On 4th November, 1984, under the command of `Sgt. Maj.' Ramkathing, ambushed a convoy of Mahar Regiment at Pfutsero killing 14 jawans and injuring 8 others.

(3) A convoy of 8 Granadiers was completely liquidated in an ambush laid under the command of `2/Lt.' Stone at Nambisha on the 18th February 1985, killing 15 soldiers and captured 4 sten guns, 8 SLRs, 1 LMG, a set of walkie talkie.

(4) On 13th August, 1985 a convoy of Mahar Regiment was ambushed killing 7 soldiers, including one Major, one Lieutenant, two Sergeants while 7 were seriously injured.

(5) On 6th May, 1986, in an ambush, 10 BSF men were killed on the spot and many reportedly injured. The ambush was carried out under the command of Lt. Mark.

(6) On the 12th November, 1986 under the command of `2/Lt.' Ramkathing captured a sum of one crore fifty one lakh and twenty thousand besides seven 303 riles, 1 sten gun, and 1 revolver were recovered from the deceased jawans. This ambush took place in Phek district.
(7) On the 23rd April, 1987, the NSCN cadres under the command of 'Captain' Mark successfully captured the VVF camp at Kamjong in Ukhrul district. All the VVF personnel were captured alive along with their sixteen 303 rifles with 665 rounds of ammunition.

(8) On the 23rd April, 1987, the NSCN commander '2/Lt.' Ramkathing attacked with his men, the VVF post at Paorei, Ukhrul district and captured it along with all the arms.

(9) The NSCN killed about 17 jawans of the Assam Rifles at Nungou on the 7th May, 1987.

(10) On the 9th July, 1987, the NSCN under the command of 'Captain' Mark assisted by 2/Lt. Ramkathing attacked the D/Coy Hq. of the 21 Assam Rifles at Oinam in Senapati district killing 9 soldiers and injured 3 others. It was here the NSCN captured a huge arms and ammunition. It included: 90 SLRs, 10 LMG, 20 carbine stens, 2 barrels of 2/inch mortar with 8 shells, 500 hand grenades, 30,000 rounds of ammunitions etc.

(11) On June 4, 1988, the NSCN ambushed an Assam Rifles column in Kiphire area killing 8 jawans including a JCO.

(12) On 7th July, 1988, the NSCN gun down two Army Majors and a jawan in the heart of Ukhrul town.

(13) In October 1990, Battalion Commander 'Lt. Col.' Hanshi and his comrades liquidated a section of BSF at Khudengthabi in Manipur and captured a dozen of sophisticated arms with a huge quantity of ammunition.

(14) Since 1991, the NSCN (Alee Command) procured sophisticated military hardware from international sources and brought
them back home. These operations were code named 'Operation Red Sea' and 'Operation Jordan' (significant Biblical events) successfully carried out under the command of 'Major' Ningkhan and his associates.

(15) On 9th December, 1991, NSCN cadres under the command of Lt. Col. Hanshi liquidated a convoy of CRPF cash remittance party at Lokchao and captured 1 LMG, 11 SLRs and 3 carbine stens. A sum of Rs. 52 lakhs was also captured from them.

(16) On 14th February, 1992, NSCN cadres under the command of 'Lt. Col.' Stone ambushed a treasury convoy at Aghunato and captured 1 LMG, and nine 303 rifles along Rs. 45 lakhs.

(17) On 12th June 1992, a convoy carrying 15 Gorkha Regiment with its Brigade Commander, '2I/C Adjutant' and other officers were ambushed near Layni, Manipur-Nagaland border by NSCN under the command of 'Captain' Phungthing Shimrah. 14 soldiers including three officers were killed and 10 seriously injured. They captured one 2" mortar, one LMG, two sten carbine, and seven SLRs along with a sizable amount of ammunition.

(18) In a daring raid, the NSCN under the command of 'Captain' Phungthing Shimrah captured the Manipur Rifles Post at Tengnoupal in Chandel district on 17th January 1992. The whole army personnel were captured alive and disarmed. The seized arms includes two 2" mortars, 2 LMGs, one sten gun, twenty seven 303 rifles, one revolver and two wireless sets.

(19) In a daring ambush, NSCN members masquerading as innocent tribal youths waylaid a police party accompanied by 80 BSF
jawans and ambushed them killing 7 security men and fatally wounded many. This happened at Mahu, North Cachar Hills on 5th August, 1992. The same group also shot to death an army Colonel and his body-guards that year.

(20) On 29th June, 1993, the NSCN commandos ambushed 15 Assam Regiment column killing 26 jawans in Manipur's Chandel district. It was reported that 20 jawans were seriously injured.

(21) A company Hq. of B. Coy 6 Battalion NAP at New Beisumpui was stormed by NSCN forces on 16 November, 1993. All the 150 disarmed personnel were set free but all the arms and ammunition were carried away which included two 2" mortors, 14 Rifles, 2 GF rifles, 5 LMGs, 2 pistols, 2 sten carbines, 3 walkie-talkie sets and 7000 rounds of ammunition.

(22) On 20th December, 1993 in Mokokchung district, the NSCN commandos under the command of Maj. Ramkathing ambushed 40 strong column of the 16th Maratha Light Infantry killing 15 armymen including the C.O. Col. Nayar and one JCO. It is to be noted that Col. Nayar was awarded the highest military award during peace time Ashok Chakra posthumously.

(23) On 14th March, 1994, the NSCN in a daring ambush killed 2 armymen including the C.O. of the 16th Assam Rifles Col. Ajit Singh and seriously injured 8 others in Dimapur area.

(24) On 18th August, 1994, in one of the biggest ambush, at least 23 Assam Rifles jawans including some officers were gunned down and 13 others seriously injured. This ambush took place near Yangkhullen in Manipur bordering Nagaland State.
In Manipur's Chandel district, the NSCN guerillas killed 8 Assam Rifles jawans in an ambush on 5th September, 1994. The NSCN successes have earned them praise from the media as well as the Indian Army Officers. Admittedly, a well known journalist Subir Bhaumik (who said: the ability of the NSCN calls for praise) quoting a statement of an Army officer with long experience of North-Eastern theatre writes: "The Naga rebel really knows fighting. He knows how to consolidate an ambush, which cannot be said of other over-publicised groups like the ULFA." Rabin Gupta, another journalist writes: "There seems to be some grudging respect for the NSCN as a fighting force." He also quoted the statement of Brig. Upinder Kumar, C.O. Assam Rifles who said: "Those boys (NSCN): they are good." Thus, Lt. Gen. O.P. Kaushik, Chief of Staff, Eastern Command which is fighting one of the largest 'low intensity conflicts' in the North Eastern Region admittedly made this observation and stated: "The J & K militant is a much more wary person, but the North-Eastern tribal is very arrogant. If a North-Eastern tribal lays an ambush, only God can save you. It is because of this characteristic that casualties in the insurgency-ridden areas are much higher than that in Kashmir." And of course, Major

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250. Bhaumik, Subir., NSCN rejuvenation or last flicker? *loc.cit.*


252. *Idem.*

General A.K. Sen Gupta the General Officer Commanding (GOC) of the Army’s 57 Mountain Division plainly admitted:

"Everything is to the militants' advantage. Villagers are forced to help them out of fear. The terrain is friendly to the insurgents and they can choose the time and place of any encounter with security men. After all, they have been involved in jungle warfare for 40 years."

Thus, it will be right to say that the radical Naga nationalists are not like conventional army of professional soldiers but men imbued with a sense of mission.

The NSCN in its integrated strategy of weakening the grip of the Indian state in Nagaland have resorted to taxing banks and transports, employees and businessmen. In fact, all government establishment now have to pay various forms of taxes to the GPRN. The intention is very clear (according to NSCN statement) i.e. "to drive out the enemy and all her occupation forces from Nagaland. To this end, we are bound to destroy all her establishments and make India's occupation of Nagaland a costly affair....India must pay dearly for occupying our land." This statement is implicitly seeking to justify imposition of forcible taxation on what they called 'occupation force' and all their establishments.

It comes not as a surprise when even top Indian army officers admit that the NSCN virtually runs parallel government in Nagaland and Manipur state. However, still worse situation

254. Gupta, loc. cit.
is the reported news that "state police departments of Nagaland and Manipur pay those taxes." 257

According to NSCN leadership, the Nagas under the NNC did suffer from pessimism. This is what Th. Muivah termed as "the crisis of losing confidence in themselves, in the people and in the cause." 258 According to the NSCN leadership, the NNC fought without the strategy and calculation to make the opponent realise the formidability of the Nagas.

On the other hand, the NSCN have made the Government of India including defence Officers realize the futility of military solution and favouring instead a political solution of the issue. Evidently, Major General A.K. Sen Gupta, the General Officer Commanding (GOC) of the army 57 Mountain Division admitted: "We believe that the military can only contain insurgency and not solve it. Our efforts would be wasted if it is not backed by a political settlement." 259 On the same line, Lt. General K. Chiman Singh, GOC, Eastern Command stated in reference to the NSCN: "We believe that there should be a political solution that can be achieved through a constant dialogue." 260

It is not a secret that the Prime Minister of India, P.V. Narasimha Rao had offered a unconditional peace negotiation with the NSCN though the latter spurned the same. 261 The former Union Minister of State for Home, Rajesh Pilot who with a keen approach to the problem of the Nagas emphatically stated: "It is a

258. Written interview of Th. Muivah, loc. cit.
259. Phanjoubam, Pradip., Army clarifies its stand, loc.cit.

253
political problem, we understand; stick is not the solution. We have to open our hearts. We (centre) have an open house with open approach." Thus, the aforesaid statements clearly indicate a shift in the Government of India's policy towards the Naga issue from military solution to a political approach. The statement of the Governor of Nagaland O.N. Shrivastava further reinforced this changed perception. In an interview with a local daily, he made it implicit that the Government of India was willing to open 'unconditional talk' with the Naga nationalists. The apparent seriousness of the Government of India was indicated when the Union Minister of state for Home M. Kamson who was officially deputed from the Prime Minister's Office to convey its willingness to hold an unconditional talk with the NSCN. The same was repeated by Syed Sibte Razi, Minister of State for Home Affairs. Even P. V. Narasimha Rao reiterated his earlier commitment that the Government of India was prepared to hold talk without any pre-condition. Thus, the changed perception explicitly speaks for itself. This is precisely what the NSCN leadership seek to achieve to impose a psychological win over the government of India. As Th. Muivah said: "I think it is not a small point; it is an achievement indeed. Indian bosses are now gradually realizing the futility of military solution though not reconciled yet."  

265. Times of India, February 15, 1996.  
267. Written interview of Th. Muivah, loc. cit.
It is evident (from the NSCN literatures and the Constitution) that directive is passed on to the Chief of the Naga army (military related matters) and subsequently to all the 'field commanders'. The field commanders have the liberty to decide as to how best they could be carried out. Directive of political nature and others matters are handed down to the respective ministries i.e. External, Home etc. Concerning the regional affairs, the regional Chairman or Central Administrative officer (CAO) can issue directive relating to the regional affairs (of course within the over all framework of policy and guideline).268

The modus operandi of the NSCN's armed wing is "to use one 'section' of Nagas against one battalion of Indian armed forces."269 Bhaumik reportedly said: "Muivah's men were striking at hard targets like security forces in batches of 15/20 guerrillas over a vast expanse of territory covering Nagaland, Manipur and Assam."270

It is under the NSCN spell of success that an army 'position paper' supposedly points to brilliant tactical maneuvering by the Naga nationalists. The position paper prepared by one of the security agencies monitoring the developments in Nagaland points out the following steps (carried out by the NSCN) as tactically brilliant.

269. Interview of Th. Muivah with Deepak Dewan, op. cit., p. 25.
* Going for smaller outposts in jungle instead of big ones.
* The shifting of the 'Oking' (NSCN Political Headquarters) and training schools to Bangladesh from "unfriendly" Burma (Myanmar).
* The expansion of its "striking radius" by spreading out in the outlying areas of Nagaland, Arunachal Pradesh and North Cachar Hills in Assam.
* The enforcement of a vigorous population and resource control programme.
* The disruption of the economy of the North-East to undermine the administration.
* The internationalisation of the Naga secessionist cause. 271

Besides, one of the vital strategies of the NSCN is the procurement of sophisticated arms and ammunitions from undisclosed sources. It is a fact that China and Pakistan were the main weapon suppliers to the Naga nationalists but since late 1970s the free flow of arms ceased even from China. As a result, the NSCN sought arms from international arms dealers and friendly countries and successfully shipped all these arms safely to their bases. 272 Over and above, the NSCN has also shown their proficiency in arms capturing from their enemy. In fact during 1987, 1993 and 1994 there had been the highest armed capturing carried out by the NSCN. 273 Even the Chief of Staff, Eastern Command, Lt. General O.P. Kaushik admitted that the NSCN captured

272. Gupta, loc. cit.
273. Passim 'Newspaper's reporting.
around 227 weapons from Nagaland Armed Police alone around 1993 and 1994. One only recalls what Mao Tse Tung said: "The Red Army gets almost all its supplies from the enemy." thus, the saying (in guerrilla warfare situation) that "your enemy is your quarter master" is not without basis.

A critical step in preparation for the active phase of an armed struggle is the formation of an intelligence network. An effective intelligence network is important for several reasons. The network will increase security for the nationalist movement by providing early warning of enemy government operations. A faulty assumption made by the Malayan Communists in the 1950s was that security could be provided by the jungle alone. When the British deployed experienced jungle troops the insurgents became insecure in their own jungle. As equally important function of the intelligence network is to facilitate the nationalists' assessment of their own programme(s) of what positions, on what issues and what tactics are generating support for which groups and is as important as knowing what the Government is doing. Once military operation begins, the intelligence network can expand its role, selecting targets for operational units and providing damage assessments.

In regard to NSCN intelligence network, the whole affairs have been closely guarded and top secrecy is always maintained. As a result, it becomes an impossible task to write on its set-

277. Idem.
up, mode of operation etc. The only conclusion one can draw, having observed their over-all performance, is that they seem to have an excellent network of intelligence without which no movement can be so successful. Subir Bhaumik in his review observed: "their system of intelligence and command structure is far better than our army silverbrass can imagine."²⁷⁸

V. LEADERSHIP

A "dictionary of politics" defined leadership as "a quality which in theory signifies the ability of a person or (more really) a group of persons to persuade others to act by inspiring them and making them believe that a proposed course of action is the correct one."²⁷⁹ Many recent sociological studies have attempted to explain some related facts of leadership. Some argue that leadership results from charisma. Others now reject attempts to explain leadership in terms of the personal characteristics of the leader and prefer to see leadership as a relation dependent upon social context, so that those who are leaders in one situation may not be leader in another.²⁸⁰ Thus, debate on this issue can go on unabated but what is implicit is that leadership is a necessity, and this is more truly so in the case of any political movement such as that of Nagas. Thus, the Nagaland Free manifesto of the NSCN declared: "The defeat of a people is not always

brought about by the superiority of the adversary in strength but through incorrect leadership and pursuit of unfounded policy.281

A. Naga nationalists' perception on leadership

The NSCN perception of leadership can be understood from their over-all criticism of leadership under the NNC. The NSCN's antipathy of the NNC leadership is explicit particularly in its criticism targeted against 'aristocratic outlook' and 'aristocratic circle' created out of the family and relative of the leadership and reinforced by personality cult. Isak Chishi Swu, Chairman of the NSCN as well as the President of the GPRN lamented the inevitable consequence of the absence of any clear cut ideology of the NNC. As a result, "putting the tribe and family above nation and people became quite visible before the eye of the public. No attempt was made to reorient the organization and the nation was led on the whim of the leadership alone."282 Th. Muivah, the General Secretary of the NSCN and the Prime Minister of the GPRN echoes the impression and finds fault with the chauvinism of the leadership, leading to a sacrifice of the 'higher values of a nation'.283

Besides, 'Brigadier' V.S. Wungmatem, Chief of the Naga Army and one who had witnessed the Naga war theatre since the early period of the Naga movement, emphatically repudiated the NNC style of leadership. In his view,
When NNC was formed our people were extremely fired with Naga nationalism but the leadership failed to orient it properly by imparting political education to form a strong patriotic revolutionary force. Leadership had no clear cut ideology and therefore no correct policy and programme. War strategy and tactics was never taught to the rank and file. Leadership was not bothered in the least to built revolutionary cadres.

Describing NNC as a house of cards, he stated:

Persons at the helms of affairs were only after power and they were preoccupied in only personality cult building. Individuals were placed above the party and the people's government. At times national interest was made to play secondary role to satisfy a few.  

Thus, in consideration of the aforesaid statements made by some of the top leaders of the NSCN, one can vividly evolve a Naga nationalist perception of leadership. Hence, the following fact on leadership can be pointed out from the NSCN perspective:

(1) **A leader must be objective and down to earth.**

The NSCN does declare their view on leadership when they stated: "We are revolutionaries; we do not believe in fantasy and absurdity; neither could we ever be persuaded to be the talisman of any helpless leadership. We shall not fly in the air, we shall walk on the ground and work with the people."  

Th. Muviah in an interview with Bertil Lintner confided: "Indulging in giving false hope to the people is in no sense a good politics."  

Th. Muviah was referring to the NNC propaganda in Nagaland that "the UNO will intervene in Nagaland case and

286. Interview of Bertil Lintner with Th. Muviah, *loc. cit.*
Nagaland will soon become a member of the UNO'. Rather he said, "we shall choose to enlighten the people with the actuality of problems around us and have them established on concrete foundation with us."287

Corroborating the other NSCN statements, 'Brigadier' V.S. Wungmatem, Chief of the Naga Army writes:

Nagas took him (Phizo) for granted in everything. Yes, they were fed from time to time with false hopes of the magnanimity and power of the West. People were taken for a ride and they were fed with false information that UN was going to take up our case very shortly and that our national travail was coming to end soon.288

The NSCN leadership vehemently emphasize that leaders must be objective in their policy programme etc. The NSCN manifesto openly declared: "any policy that is independent of the objective condition is without basis and as such, is bound to suffer failure."289 Th. Muivah, thus, admitted and said: "They (NNC leadership) loved Nagaland but the way to save it was not prepared in any sense. The fate of nation was made to hang on the availability of external assistance."290 Th. Muviah in another interview further pointed out the main thrust of his postulate and stated: "In many respects they (NNC) completely failed to understand India and Nagaland. As already stated the questions:

287. Ibid., p. 11.
288. Written interview of Brig., V.S. Atem, op. cit., p. 2. Vide Written interview with Khodao Yantha. To the question of Nagaland securing membership of the UN he said: "Phizo might have said that to encourage the Nagas or to bluff the simple Nagas."
290. Interview of Bertil Lintner with Th. Muviah, loc. cit.
What India could and could not do? What Nagas could and could not do? were never assessed. 291

2. A leader must be above tribalism and petty politics

As earlier stated, 'tribalism' has played the most destructive role in the Naga movement. Time again and again it, proved to be the main stumbling block against strengthening Naga nationalism. The NSCN leaders squarely blame the NNC policy as the root cause of 'tribalism'. In the words of Th. Muviah, "Nagas became the fatal enemy of themselves. This danger of self-defeat was imminent." 292

Accordingly, when the NSCN was formed, its leadership took care to oppose the politics of any family or tribe and resolved to do away with parochialism of any form. the laws of the GPRN provide for adequate safeguards in this regard.

(3) A leader must be home based

From their experience, the NSCN strongly advocated that leaders must not stay from the home base, particularly during national crisis. They believed that one could not have objective and precise assessment of the given situation when staying away from the homeland.

In its view, a leader should be around the centre of situation, that is, he has to be with the masses, mobilizing and working in close association, to lead them through all the critical stages with policy that is warranted by the conditions.

291. Written interview of Th. Muviah, loc. cit.
292. Interview of Bertil Lintner with Th. Muviah, loc. cit., p. 3.
It is in this way that the people could appreciate the wisdom of the leadership and his concern for the nation. 293

They also deplored that in the past the leadership acted completely independent of the actual conditions and in total isolation from the people. 294 The NNC President stayed away thousands of miles away from home; he could not take corrective assessment of the objective situation at home. 295

(4) A good leader must evolve a clear perception of the underlying trend of event and change course accordingly.

Mao Tse Tung rightly observed when he stated:

When condition change, tactics must change accordingly. The making and changing of tactical campaign and strategic plans in accordance with scope and circumstances is a key factor in directing a war. 296

J. Filella writing on leadership observed that all the basic qualities of a leader "may come to naught, if the leader himself is not endowed with sensitivity to changing conditions and flexibility to adapt oneself to the process of change in the society." 297 She further elucidates and writes "The unique behaviour of leaders over all situations and tasks as concerned with (a) analysing the situation and (b) initiating action required." 298

293. Idem.
294. Idem.
295. Written interview of Brig. V.S. Atem, loc. cit.
296. Girling, loc. cit.
298. Idem.
Unfortunately, the NNC leadership miserably failed to objectively analyse the situation and change course accordingly. The worst moment of the Nagas was during the late 1960s and early 1970s when massive military operations were conducted and several Naga resistance forces started surrendering one after another. Referring to that period, Th. Muviah writes: "They fought without the strategy and calculation." Consequently, ultimate defeat was imminent and "leadership at home also started losing faith and confidence in themselves... Thus, NNC ended up in capitulation and ignominy." Evidently, the letter of 'Major General' J. Saney Ao, GOC. Northern Command, Naga Army to Major General M. Asa, GOC. Northern Command, Naga Army clearly indicate the total disarray and disillusionment among the top military leaders resulting in lack of direction. Thus, he wrote:

> ultimately not getting any direction from the Headquarters; I decided to come overground along with my command ... In view of the prevailing situation, I appeal to you that the time has come that you should come overground with your friends and colleagues to join the mainstream.

The Split

In 1988, eight years after the formation of the NSCN and the GPRN, certain incidents occurred within the organisation. S.S. Khaplang, the Vice Chairman along with Brigadier Khole attempted to capture power and in the process killed over two hundred NSCN cadres including top military and political officers. Among them

299. Written interview of Th. Muviah, loc. cit.
300. Written interview of Brig. V.S. Atem, loc. cit.
were Hanong (Minister), Angam (Minister), Beyau (Minister), 'Col'. Drunning, General, Staff Officer commanding, 'Col'. Anshiho Chaomai, Deputy Chief Naga Army, and 'Lt.Col'. Luita, Council Commander.\textsuperscript{302} However, Th. Muivah and other leaders miraculously escaped. The move was considered a failure since it could not dislodge the leadership and capture political power as schemed. As a matter of fact, the NSCN organisation remained intact under Isak Chishi Swu and Th. Muivah's leadership.

As a follow-up, the NSCN held a National Assembly at 'Jordan Camp' on 7th November 1989 and condemned SS Khaplang as national criminal and expelled him from the organisation once and for all. The Assembly on the other hand reaffirmed the leadership of Isak Chishi Swu and Th. Muivah.\textsuperscript{303}

Meanwhile, S.S. Khaplang and others formed their own group using the same organisation name (NSCN), adopting same Manifesto, organisational frame and system of government. S.S. Khaplang became the Chairman, Dally Mungro the General Secretary and Brigadier Khole was made the Chief of their Army. Thus, the motive of their attempt was to create a parallel NSCN organisation.

As a matter of fact, the conspiracy organised by S.S. Khaplang and his supporters was seen more as the work of the intelligence services of India to checkmate the NSCN. Admittedly, Tajenyuba Ao Ex-MLA and a veteran political leader of Nagaland said: "It was a conspiracy engineered by the Intelligence

Although the latter's activities are shunted from public purview, the indirect involvement of the Intelligence Bureau (IB) is understandable. As evidences in this context, the following points can be cited:

(1) S.S. Khaplang's allegations against Th. Muivah, Isak Chishi Swu and others were never consistent; rather it appeared that they were his own concoction and that he was being used by some forces. For instance, his primary charge was that Th. Muivah and Isak Swu were conspiring to surrender to India. But when he was confronted by the Executive Council members on the issue, he immediately dropped the first allegation and seven fresh charges were brought up. Besides, Khaplang (inspite of repeated request) adamantly refused to come to the Central Executive Council meeting to settle the issue. Th. Muivah and others on the other hand strongly refuted the misinformation campaign and termed it as "total lies and canard." They were convinced by then that some external forces had been working to wreck the organisation from within. As a matter of fact, S.S. Khaplang's wild accusations, his dogged resolution not to face the Central Executive Council members (highest Executive body of GPRN) but stick to his scheme, etc. indicated that there was an "unseen force" determined to divide the Naga nationalists.

Interestingly, in early 1989 sensational news item appeared in the front pages of two leading Indian national dailies (The Telegraph and The Hindu) that Th. Muivah General Secretary, Angelus Shimrah, Foreign Secretary and Rh. Raising Political cum Regional Chairman of the NSCN were flown to Delhi reportedly for a few rounds of discussion with senior Union Ministry officials. Later, it was learnt that the story was planted by the Press Information Bureau (Defence Wing). Thus, the motive was clear. It was purported to give credence to S.S. Khaplang's allegation.

Following the violent incidents of killing, the Home Ministry and the Intelligence Bureau (IB) invited S.S. Khaplang to Delhi and started secret parleys with them. 'Brig.' Khole Konyak was secretly flown to Delhi for talk. Thus, one national paper sarcastically remarked saying "It is ironical that Khaplang and his men, who parted company with Muivah in April 1988 after accusing the latter of trying to set up a peace deal with the centre, themselves became available for talk. However, if one is to accept

308. Baruah, Subhajit, Guerrillas after 1975 Accord
Nagaland Post, March 15, 1994
Vide The Telegraph 7 April, 1993
Frontline, September 25, 1992, p. 42.
309. Baruah, Subhajit, Guerrillas after 1975 Accord
Nagaland Post, March 15, 1994
Vide The Telegraph 7 April, 1993
Frontline, September 25, 1992, p. 42.
CPI(M-L), Nationalities on War Path, (Vanguard publications, 1996), p. 11, which writes: "The Khaplang group visited Delhi in November 1992 and is said to have struck a secret deal with the Government of India by agreeing to act as scouts and trackers against the NSCN led by Muivah."
the alleged tacit relation between the Government of India (through the Intelligence Bureau) and the Khaplang group, there is no ambiguity. Although no one can tell precisely what transpired between the two parties, one thing is sure that no major political concession was offered to the group because New Delhi “only wanted to use them against the ardent nationalists under Isak Chishi Swu and Thuingaleng Muivah”.

The involvement of the Intelligence Bureau (IB) is nothing new in Nagaland. Not very long ago, in the 1960s, the IB was behind the formation of Nagaland People's Convention (NPC) and its various demands including the statehood were basically intended to divide and delude the Nagas.

It must be admitted that although the attempted seizure of power proved to be an abortive one, it caused general setback to the NSCN/GPRN. The major loss was its base which they enjoyed in ‘Eastern Nagaland' (upper Chindwin), which was finally given up and secondly Khaplang's supporters succeeded in projecting another breakaway NSCN organisation. Hence, the media started using two distinct terms i.e. NSCN (I-M) meaning Isak-Muivah and NSCN (K) to mean Khaplang. However, it must be also noted that NSCN (K) have come to be known more as a force within the Constitution of India primarily to checkmate the NSCN under Isak Chishi Swu and Thuingaleng Muivah and their commitment to the Naga cause is open to serious question. The following points further throw light on this line:

311. Baruah, loc.cit.
312. GPRN Document, A Brief Political Account, op.cit., p. 17.
(1) The NSCN (K) made an official declaration directing all its cadres that they were not at war with the Indian security force, Nagaland Police or the Accord (Shillong) group. Their prime duty would be to take on the NSCN. Thus, the NSCN (K) group's objective is to checkmate the hardcore NSCN. It is a well known fact that they had never ambushed Indian army convoy or attacked any camp.

(2) The NSCN (K) landed themselves in a major controversy and for which a lot of noise was made by the Naga public following its active collaboration with the Nagaland state Chief Minister S.C. Jamir. In fact, the latter has been accused of patronising the Khaplang group by no less than the former Governor, Lt. General V.K. Nayar (Retd). Kuldip Nayar, the former Indian High Commissioner of India to the U.K., concisely points out the tacit relationship between the NSCN (K) and the state Chief Minister S.C. Jamir and the Central Government. He noted, "Mr. S.C. Jamir, has been blessed to stay in touch with the other Naga faction (NSCN K). The Government openly finances it from the exchequer, which is liberally compensated by the centre." The Government of India's strategy in this connection may stem from the fact that most of the international experts on nationalist movements had stated that nationalist movement could

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    Nagaland Post, April 8, 1994.
be ultimately countered by the local people and more so if it could be executed within the nationalist organisation itself.

No wonder, the NSCN maintain consistently the allegation that NSCN (K) is nothing but an agent of the government of India. Thus, Th. Muivah in his report to the Secretary General of the Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organisation (UNPO) writes: "The so-called NSCN (K) is a criminal organisation sustained by the India Government to counter the only authentic organisation of the people of Nagaland, the NSCN." The allegation is serious because it comes not only from the NSCN but from a diverse section of people including prominent political leaders like Tajenyuba Ao, Vizol, P. Vamuzo etc. In fact, it is truism in Nagaland that the other faction has been instigated by forces (unknown to the public eye) to wage war on the NSCN in an attempt to neutralise the organisation. However the "Khaplang group (allegedly hobnobbing with the Indian intelligence services through the active involvement of Nagaland state Chief Minister S.C. Jamir) ... proved unimpressive and unconvincing, fading away into oblivion without much public support." Here, it is important to take note of the confession of C. Alemla, a close associate of Dally Mungro (General secretary of Khaplang group) who parted company with the Khaplang group. The

   Vide Nagaland Post, September 14, 1993.
   Nagaland Times, October 18, 1993.
scholar was able to interview her and her statements made it abundantly clear that Khaplang group and the Indian security forces were in close coordination. For instance, she confessed that she was arrested with others by the Indian security forces but when identified, they were soon released. In the same manner, several of their men too were arrested and all got released. Secondly, she also confided that Khetovi (defence secretary of NSCN-K) admitted of having received financial help from S. C. Jamir. Thirdly, the Khaplang group generally provides security to S. C. Jamir whenever he comes to Mokokchung. Fourthly, whenever, big officers of the Khaplang group comes to Mokokchung, they are always given shelter in the official quarters of top police officers of the state. Finally, she disclosed the fact of Khaplang group having trained and armed over a hundred of Kuki National Front (KNF) members in 'eastern Nagaland'.

C. Alemla’s confession is further corroborated by the confessional statement of one Longna Chishuhu Konyak, Commander Konyak region of Khaplang group. In his disclosure:

Chief Minister S.C. Jamir donated a sum of Rs. 30,0000 (three lakhs) and handed over to Gen. Secretary Dally Mungro during 1993 election time. Another Rs. one crore along with 5 AK 47 rifles and a jeep load of ammunition were donated...These special donations were made to fight against NSCN in 1994. In 1994 (alone) eighty KNF were trained, imparted arms training course...and later issued arms and ammunitions to them.

320. Written interview of Ms. C. Alemla, Sergeant in NSCN (K). She hailed from Chuchuyimlang village and was a close associate of Dally Mungro before she left the group. 20th April, 1995. Vide Hill Express, February 28, 1995.

And if doubt may have existed on S C Jamir's patronising the Khaplang group, the disclosure made in the report of the National Human Rights Commission (NHRC) categorically confirmed it beyond doubt. The report stated that Khaplang group had been operating freely and with impunity as it enjoyed the patronage of the Chief Minister S.C. Jamir. The report also revealed that the Khaplang group helped the Chief Minister during the election. Thus, the confessions made by C.Alemla and Longna Chishuhu including the NHRC report fully corroborate several charges and allegations of Khaplang group's tacit relation with the Government of India and the involvement of S.C. Jamir in the scheme to decimate the NSCN sideline.

The allegation of patronising Khaplang group became a public controversy following the formation of Nagaland Youth Liberation Front (NYLF). According to the NSCN sources, the NYLF was essentially formed as another conspiracy of S.C. Jamir to counter them. Thus, they write:

Being unable to assassinate Isak and Muivah, the so-called Nagaland Youth Liberation Front (NYLF) was formed by SS Khaplang in connivance with Mr. S.C. Jamir, the then Chief Minister of the so-called Nagaland state, purely with an eye to pull back the wheels of the legitimate government headed by Isak and Muivah...The interrogations of the arrested members of NYLF revealed that many of them were from the CID (Central Intelligence Department) of Nagaland Armed Police (NAP) whereas the rest were from Khaplang's party. Mr. Ashu Rengma, District Commander of the

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322. *The Times of India*, 26 April, 1995. (The report of the NHRC is supposed to be guarded secret but somehow it was leaked to the press).
323. Idem.
NYLF was an SI (Sub. Inspector) CID of the NAP.\textsuperscript{324}

In another sensational press release, Neingulie Angami named several Nagaland state top leaders including S.C. Jamir and bureaucrats as 'brain' behind the formation of the NYLF.\textsuperscript{325} According to the former, this information was given by one Limatoshi, President of the NYLF.\textsuperscript{326} Although, S.C. Jamir and others (whose names figured in the alleged confession) strongly refuted the allegations, the NSCN's (K) tacit understanding with the state government as well as the Government of India stands out as a public issue. It is the scholar's observation that the Khaplang group's primary objective is to decimate the NSCN under Isak and Muivah's leadership. They sufficiently made it glaring in all their statements and interviews. Ostensibly, they also claimed to be Naga nationalists but their words and deeds ironically impede Naga nationalism. For instances, when the Nagas in general were jubilant over the NSCN (IM) achievement in getting membership of Nagaland in the Unrepresented Nations and People's Organisation (UNPO), the Khaplang group commented on the futility of it.\textsuperscript{327} It is also admitted by 'eastern Naga students' that NSCN (K) have re-introduced narcotic and opium taking and permitted everyone to freely cultivate opium plantation. Churches and schools were closed down and instead encouraged animist

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324. \textit{Speech made by Rh. Raising Kilo (Home) and Chaplee Kilonser (Finance Minister) on NSCN Day the 31st January, 1991.} \\
326. \textit{Idem.} \\
327. \textit{Nagaland Post, December 15, 1995.}
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worshipping." In fact, Naga nationalism received the greatest threat from the Khaplang group. For instance, adverse situation was created when they issued 'quit notice' against the Tangkhuls in Mokokchung district and again the same quit notice was served against the Semas and Tikhirs in Kiphire area and lately Tangkhuls were asked to leave Kohima. It was indeed a sinister plot trying to divide the Nagas on tribal line. The Khaplang group (Angami region) with an evil intent singled out the 'Tangkhuls' and several Tangkhul lives were taken. They even termed the on-going Naga-Kuki clash as Tangkhul-Kuki. Lately, they resorted to the stratagem of imposing blockade on certain district like Zunheboto, Tuensang on the alleged ground that such areas happened to be the strong support base of NSCN. Thus, one cannot deny the fact that certain forces are behind the Khaplang group committed to destroy Naga nationalism at all cost.

In spite of bitterest pressure, the NSCN under Isak and Muivah has emerged as the strongest ethnic nationalist organisation in the North East and its operational area is ever expanding. Today, the NSCN operation covers almost all the Naga areas stretching from Chandel and Tamenglong districts (south) to Tuensang and Mokokchung (north) and from North Cachar Hills (west) to Somra tract (east). Almost all the Naga tribes are well

represented in the organisation. Even substantial Angamis and Chakhesangs (who for long were in the NNC) are joining the organisation. 335

In recent times, there are cases of desertions from Khaplang group to NSCN. For instance, the entire region of Sema and Lotha joined the NSCN. The same is also true of NNC. The whole Lotha and Chang Region Command of NNC joined the NSCN claiming it to be: "the only authentic political body of the Nagas" and joining "national mainstream politics". 336 It is important to note the way NSCN was strengthened due to series of groups joining it. The following well indicate this trend:

In 1993, in a significant development in the field of Naga political struggle, the entire Yimchunger region of NNC decided to join the NSCN under Isak and Muivah's leadership holding that, "the NSCN is the only dynamic political organisation for the Nagas." 337

In 1994, there were a number of defections from other groups joining the NSCN. In Phom-Chang region seven members of the Khaplang group joined the NSCN in February 1994 338. In another development, almost the entire Sema region Command of Khaplang group defected to the NSCN, which included one Central Council Member (CCM) and one action Commander. 339 A substantial number of the NNC (Khodao) including its General Secretary also joined the

In the same month of June 1994, 31 members of the NNC (K) defected to NSCN. The entire Sangtam Regional Council and the rank and file of the 19th Battalion of Federal Government of Nagaland (FGN), Adino faction led by 'Col. Yanpongse' joined the NSCN with all its personnel including arms and ammunition. In November, the Khaplang group led by Loveto (CCM) Sema region along with his supporters joined the NSCN.

This trend of consolidating the NSCN continued unabated even in 1995. Thus, a prominent editor of a local paper writes: "In addition to their awesome weaponry backed by a disciplined and well trained armed wing, today, as things stand, the NSCN (l-M) has managed to wrest control of almost the entire districts in Nagaland. It is worth noting here the support given by the NNC Executive Council to the NSCN. In a joint statement they expressed:

heartfelt gratitude and support to the achievements of NSCN leaders Isak Chishi Swu and Thuingaleng Muivah at the international arena for the cause of Naga sovereignty and urged upon all people to unite immediately in order to strengthen the mission of both these leaders for fulfilling the long felt aspirations of the Nagas as a distinct people."
The support from the NNC was significant and crucial for the NSCN in consolidating the unity of the Nagas for a common cause. In 1995, Khodao Yanthan, the President of the NNC and a close associate of Phizo took the decision of joining the NSCN. Thus, he issued an open statement from the Hague, Netherlands:

The undaunted Naga People, and the patriots in the forefront led by Isak Chishi Swu and Th. Muivah, with the unflinching support of the people, that has safeguarded the sovereignty of Nagaland from the unprecedented challenge of the perils since 1975.... I declare my association with, and full support for the National Socialist Council of Nagaland. There is no time for anyone to waver and to remain confused.

It is because of the aforesaid reality that the scholar holds that the NSCN is the most widely supported and represented national organisation of the Nagas at present.