Having examined the nature and function in contemporary situation and in Indian Darśanas, I propose now to elaborate and analyse the nature of consciousness and its relationship with mind as described and explained by important Western Psychologists of modern times and Indian Darśanas. I have not limited the study of Darśanas to the classical six systems only but extended it to the study of Jainism, Buddhism, development in the writings of Ācāryas and the culmination in the thought of Sri Aurobindo in modern times.

Man lives conscious as well as unconscious life. And some persons even reach the height of conscious life and its achievements. Such realizations, however, are not accepted as real occurrences by all.

The ancient schools of the West had generally accepted the spiritual truths necessary for the human progress and its integration. They had described the conscious states of mind and self. But mostly the older psychologists seemed unaware of the activities of the hidden states of mind which are now known as the
"subconscious" and the "subliminal". In modern times, materialist thinkers do not take cognizance of supra-physiological or "paranormal" phenomena, religious experiences and beliefs. They have ignored the fact that there could be a separate existence of consciousness or soul. On the other hand, those who accept the truth of occurrences of self-awareness, consciousness, and mind over and above the neural processes in the brain expound psychological parallelism. The fact of consciousness has been approached with doubt. And at times the subject was treated with speculation bias. I am expounding here various views, Western as well as Indian, regarding the structure of Mind and consciousness. I wish to draw a comparative estimate of these views and arrive at a tenable conclusion regarding the two terms widely used in philosophical and psychological literature.

In the West, William James, James Ward, G. H. v. Harston, Contemporary Schools of Psychology and Bergson have significantly contributed towards the analysis of the nature of consciousness. I shall consider their views first and discuss the views of Indian systems on the topic subsequently.
Till the beginning of the sixteenth century Western Psychology worked under ideas and theories which had come down from the Greeks and scholastics. Hobbes rebelled against such psychology and attempted to make a new start towards modern psychology. Descartes applied the new physics to human and animal behaviour. He maintained that human soul, with the faculty of thinking is non-physical. Hobbes reduced all mental process to physical motion. External motion striking the sense-organs was communicated to the nerves, brain and heart and this internal motion, once started, persisted by inertia in form of memory and ideas. Early in the seventeenth century Galileo revolutionized physics and astronomy showing that perhaps all physical processes could be described in terms of motion and inertia. Harvey, by discovering the circulation of blood made a start toward explaining physiological processes in physical terms. The trend of modern science, however, is in a direction different from that adopted by the materialists of the nineteenth century. The realisation has come upon the scientist in present times that what energy itself is in its intrinsic nature is more than science can tell.
But in the latter half of the nineteenth century, physiology and biology dictated the situation in thinking.

Consciousness according to William James:

While considering the analysis as given by William James we have to bear in mind that it is the physical-biological basis of consciousness that he attempts to establish. Is the consciousness which accompanies the activity of the cortex the only consciousness that man has? Or are his lower centres conscious as well? To these questions James replies that "The cortex is the sole organ of consciousness in man, if there be any consciousness, the self knows nothing of it".¹

James, however, regards consciousness as an important feature of human organism. He considers the mind-stuff theory and holds that such a view is not in position to do proper justice to the principle that essential character of organic being. It is true that our mental states are compounds. But the content of such a compound is not mere brain-matter. The fact that mind can become unconscious shows that there is plasticity in the contents of mind. It is to be seen that the entire
brain process is not physical fact at all. It is the appearance to an onlooking mind of a multitude of physical facts. He maintains that the theory of soul is "less positively objectionable than either mind-stuff or a material-monad creed. But soul is to be regarded as a state of consciousness.

Thinking is considered to be the best expression of the presence of consciousness. In its process there are five important characters (1) Every thought tends to be part of a personal consciousness (2) Within each personal consciousness thought is always sensibly continuous (3) Within each consciousness thought is always changing (4) It always appears to deal with objects independent of itself (5) It is interested in some part of the objects to the exclusion of others. There was still no need, James insisted, for a 'thinker'; there was only the passing thought which took over and appropriated its predecessor. But what is the essence of this passing thought which makes it so peculiarly personal? James replies:

"I am as confident as I am of anything that in myself the stream of thinking is only a careless name for
what, when scrutinized, reveals itself to consist chiefly of the stream of my breathing. The "I think" which Kant said must be able to accompany all my objects, is the "I breathe" which actually does accompany them. There are other internal facts besides breathing.... and these increase the assets of "consciousness", so far as the latter is subject to immediate perception; but breath, which was ever the original of spirit, breath moving outwards, between the glottis and the nostrils, is, I am persuaded, the essence out of which philosophers have constructed the entity known to them as consciousness. That entity is fictitious, while thoughts in the concrete are made of the same stuff as things are.  

It can be seen that James conceives of consciousness as ultimately reducible to breathing in which a process could occur an event without having a permanent subject above it. James holds that repeatedly and usually called 'Me' is an empirical aggregate of things objectively known. Empirical 'I' is a 'thought' at each moment, but appropriate of the latter together with all that the latter called its own. The successive passing thoughts and brain states are functions of each other. Psychologically, James holds, the knowledge of
thought as such is inaccessible to us. Psychology as science should remain satisfied with the naturalistic point of view and James feels that it should not deal with the problem as to "who the knower is?"

Consciousness, its analysis and its relation to various activities and parts of organism present pertinent problems to the science of psychology. Especially when it is mainly related to the study of subject experiencing feeling, desires and sentiments. Consciousness admits of indefinite gradations. "It is co-extensive with mental life in so far as that life is considered to rise and fall in degree". So Brain gives this as the first of thirteen meanings of consciousness. Again Fleming holds that the meaning of a word is sometimes best attained by means of the word opposed to it. Unconsciousness, that is the want or absence of consciousness, then, is the state in which we are when all or any of our faculties are in exercise. This reflects the modern exploration into the unconscious states of human personality.

**View of James Ward:**

A question may be raised regarding the attribution of activity to consciousness. In reply to this, quite
often a distinction is made between the subjective state and objective events. For instance, James Ward maintains that wherever we feel we are conscious, we should point "I" or pure ego which is the subject and the experience. Indeed we often speak as if something happened to 'Me' and we are tempted to identify this 'I' with 'Me.' Ward holds that it is logically impossible to identify 'I' and 'Me' for it is to identify subject and object. "We have two terms asymmetrically related and therefore on the principle of identity of indiscernibles the 'I' cannot be the 'ME' nor the 'Me' the 'I'. At the same time the objective 'Me' is impossible without the subjective 'I'." In this analysis Ward does not adequately distinguish between consciousness and the subject object situation in understanding. It may happen that what is called pure 'I' does not operate as consciousness. It may be just an ego pretending to assume the role of self but in fact moving in ignorance.

It has also to be observed that the way in which psychology views at experience is unique and therefore it cannot be equated in its standpoint with natural sciences as physics, chemistry, biology or mineralogy. Of all the facts with which he deals, the psychologist may truly say
that their "esse est percipii" or that their objects imply a subject. The world of objects outside have meaning and existence in relation to individual consciousness.

E.B. Titchener maintained that biological and psychological viewpoints are radically different since biology views the organism in relation to the environment while psychology views conscious experience in relation to the organism. Conscious experience, according to him, has direct relations, not with the environment, but only with processes occurring within the organism. But regarding the true import of the term consciousness, Titchener wavers from one meaning to another. He does not clearly distinguish between consciousness and mind.

Consciousness according to Titchener:

According to Titchener, consciousness means the mind's awareness of its own processes. Just as from the common sense point of view, mind is the inner self which thinks, remembers, chooses, reasons, directs the movements of the body, so is consciousness the inner knowledge of this thought and government. One is conscious of the correctness of one's answer to an examination question, of the awkwardness of one's movements, of the purity of one's motives, consciousness is thus something more than mind,
Titchener holds; it is "the immediate knowledge which the mind has of its sensations and thoughts". There is also another sense in which consciousness is identified with mind, and 'conscious' with 'mental'. So long as mental processes are going on, consciousness is present, as soon as mental processes are in abeyance, unconsciousness sets in. Titchener thinks that since mind is a process and not a personal being, 'mind' and 'consciousness' should be meant to be the same. For the sake of convenience they should be distinguished. Mind is the sum-total of mental processes occurring in the life-time of an individual. When the sum-total of mental processes occurs at 'present' time or 'now', it is regarded as consciousness. It is a section or division of the mind-stream.

We will be able to observe in the course of our discussion of the topic that such an identification of consciousness and mind is faulty. What is generally called 'mind' is part of matter and the usual attributes of choosing, reasoning, determining assigned to mind do not really belong to it. If the two terms are not properly distinguished, consciousness becomes merely the by-product of accidental and assimilated events. Consciousness is not the resultant property of psychical dispositions.
William James suggested that it is not 'mind' that thinks, but the thoughts themselves are the thinkers. So it was held that what is conscious, is consciousness. The Pan-psychists believe that with every unit of matter there must be closely associated a unit of consciousness; and since matter is now thought to be finally electrical, we have consciousness as associated with electricity. According to pan-psychist the phrase 'conscious of' is really meaningless. He does not make a distinction between consciousness and conscious content, consciousness is composed of certain items—as for example, redness, hardness, pleasantness, and so on—but it is added that it is not possible simply to list a succession of such items in order to have a description of consciousness. "Consciousness is made up of parts just as an automobile is, but as with an automobile, the parts do not make an indiscriminate heap but are arranged in a definite design".  

If consciousness were made up of parts as the pan-psychists believe we would not be very far from holding that "Consciousness is complex thing made up of elements, a stream of nerve messages. For every feeling in consciousness there is at the same time a nerve message of the brain". There is the physiologist's
brain-cell theory in which it is asserted that consciousness is closely connected with the human organism and the question is that "where is the connection made?" In reply it is stated that certain specialized cells exist in the brain and that consciousness results from the stimulation of these cells by interior activities of the organism, whether such a result follows from a connection thus made between the material realm in which the cells reside and an immaterial or 'spiritual' realm of consciousness, or whether the activation of the cells itself constitutes consciousness, remains a moot point among physiologists.

Nerve-net theory of consciousness:

A similar but more ingenuous view of the physiologist is found in the nerve net theory propounded by J.T. Culbertson. According to it behaviour is accompanied by consciousness; and the sense-data, memory images, feelings involved in that consciousness are determined by the structure of thought. To show this, nerve net theory of sense data is elaborated. A distinction is made between sense world and physical world. Culbertson refers to Eddington who says that there are two tables; one table is in my sense world. This table has a brown colour and appears solid. It is part of
my stream of consciousness as William James would say. Then there is the table described by the physicist. It is quite different. It consists mostly of empty space in which electrons, protons and other ultimate particles are in motion. Now what is the relation between these two tables, the physical table and the table in my consciousness? Light rays coming from the surface of the physical table enter my eyes and fall on each retina. This causes neuron impulses to pass through my optic nerve to my brain where further neural activity may lead to my muscles and cause me to react in some way to the physical table. Nothing that happens in my sense organs, brain muscles seems to require any mention of the table which is in my consciousness. Neural activity is caused only by prior neural activity or by stimuli and results only in further neural activity or in behaviour. This constitutes a closed system of analysis within which none of these mental or introspected data have any place.

It should be explained as to how sense data and other items in our stream of consciousness do actually occur. It is ordinarily believed that the neural activity in a brain causes the sense data and other aspects of the
consciousness experienced by the man having the brain, but the way in which brain activity (in addition to causing behaviour) can also cause consciousness is not understood. The nerve net theory of consciousness tries to explain the occurrence of introspected data including the sense world.

"The neuron impulses not only constitute a causal sequence leading from stimulus to response but also constitute a set of relations called 'Psychorelations' between the different parts of the stimulus. Before they elicit behaviour, the neuron impulses conjoin and désjoin to form a network which relates together certain elemental parts of the stimulus object. In example given above certain parts of the surface of the physical table are interrelated by the light rays and then neuron impulses coming from them in such a way that these parts, interrelated by causal transmissions coming from through the brain constitute the perceived table in the sense world".11

Culbertson, in this explanation, has not shown the link between light rays and the neuron impulses. It may be that there is a link between the two but that which is
explain by Culberston is not the explanation. Culberston tries to see the explanation in the sphere of neuroanatomy. But this is not itself well shown by him when he maintained that it leads to causal chain having no final end to it.

Culberston, again, explains that "when stimuli give rise to neuron impulses which pass through the brain, these impulses pass over channels determined in part by neuroanatomy and in part by brain impulses already present upon which they are superimposed, so to speak, and then they give rise sooner or later to effector activity resulting in behaviour. In addition to behaviour and its (efficient) causes, however, there is the consciousness (here used to mean sense and all other introspected data) which accompanies it."\(^{12}\)

The meaning of consciousness which is given here "Sensa and all other introspected data" is misleading as it may as well mean part of electrical charges and images quite reducible to physical sense-data. In fact there is no warrant for culberston to make use of the term "introspected data" as they imply a different method to observe the phenomena not acceptable in the sphere of neuroanatomy.
Bergson's view of consciousness:

Mechanistic causation which has proved its worth in the realm of physical sciences is adequate for explaining phenomena in the biological sciences also. Such is the attitude of mechanistic biology which is not accepted by Bergson and he argues on purely scientific grounds. Had the criterion of mechanistic evolutionism been really valid and adequate, evolution should have ceased long ago. There are many lower organisms perfectly adapted to the environment. The impulse, elan vital, life urge, is postulated by Bergson as the only possible explanation of all the baffling riddles of evolution. Matter is believed by him as an aggregate of images, shape, resistance, colour etc. Perception and thought are believed by him to be essentially practical.

In primitive organisms there are no two sets of organs for perception of the environment and for reaction to it. The contact of an external object with the surface of a primitive organism is marked by an immediate reaction. The sensory mechanism is found to be an instrument of action. Perception arises only when and so far as, automatic reaction is not adequate for adjustment and there is room for choice, selection and hesitation.
Consciousness which we find in perception and thought, is described as "the light that plays round the zone of possible-action". It signifies hesitation and choice. Where many equally possible actions are indicated without there being any real action, (as in deliberation that has not come to an end), Consciousness is intense. Physical body, according to Bergson, is the centre through which selection is implemented. It consists of sensory and motor apparatus and is provided with a central organ, the brain. It is only "arrested or potential energy, which is received, selected and retained by the brain, and not created by it".

In his "Matter and Memory" it is contended that the disadvantage of the materialistic hypothesis is that though it believes that consciousness is a new kind of fact, not originally present in the external world, nor in the changes made by it in our body, still it has to say that at the end of a series of changes in the brain, all of which are conscious, there suddenly comes into existence this altogether new kind of a phenomenon by a sort of "deus ex machina". Another difficulty of it is that it has to maintain that the idea of the world
perceived depends on the brain, which is absurd, since, the first consists of the totality of images, whereas the second is only one image forming a part of that totality and it would be absurd that the container should issue from the contained.\textsuperscript{15}

In psychology of Bergson, the word consciousness has two meanings. In the first meaning, it is primarily identified with inward and the most interior depth of the real being. It is the conservation of all the past activities of the individual. It does not perform the ordinary functions of thinking, feeling and willing on the conscious level. Memory is regarded as the basic character of consciousness. The experience of one's past when applied to the present is an act of memory. It is a selective process. With the help of brain which is an instrument of selection we are able to recall or get out of the whole store of past experience conserved. In his "Mind Energy", Bergson maintains that the "brain is a selector rather than a generator. Brain is an organ of attention to practical life. It is the mechanism of recall and not a store of ideas. It simply stores motor habits".\textsuperscript{16} Consciousness, according to Bergson, has another function also which is called anticipation. It
does not retain the past but tends towards the creation of something new to rise in future. "To retain what no longer is, to anticipate what as yet is not, - these are the primary functions of consciousness". 17

If memory is to be identified with consciousness than it clearly comes in opposition to what we ordinarily call consciousness which works on the level of thought and activity. Bergson's meaning of consciousness in this sense becomes the determining, unconscious portion of personality. Then it will be better to call it "Store of motor habits" which are allowed to surge up on the "conscious level" owing to certain temperament of the individual.

It is held by Bergson that though we have a close relation between the brain and our practical consciousness of every form, we have no reason to admit that changes in the brain are parallel to those in consciousness. He says that a coat hangs from a nail and falls down if the nail is taken off, it should not resemble the nail in every point. 17 Against parallelism, there is prima facie objection that nature does not suffer any superficiality, and it is unlikely that "nature has indulged in the luxury of repeating in the language of consciousness
what the cerebral cortex expresses in atomic or molecular movements..... A consciousness which is only a duplicate, unable to intervene activity, would have long since disappeared from the universe, supporting it had ever been produced. Do we not see that our actions become unconscious in the degree that habit renders them mechanical?  

Anti-intellectual arguments and the resulting attitude had Bergson to hold that consciousness ought to be made identical with habitual and mechanical unconsciousness. Bergson endeavours to make mind ontologically discontinuous with Matter and so he holds that mind or consciousness has the capacity to select and choose and in so doing cuts and divides the universal and ever-dynamic flow of life. Bergson's tendency to erect the vital impetus into the supreme metaphysical principle is indirect opposition to the materialistic tendency to reduce life to a resultant of physico-chemical forces. But to explain matter entirely in terms of life is no less invalid than to explain life totally in terms of matter. Matter, in its objective essence is, according to Bergson, the descending movement of the
exhausted explorious of the life-force, it is in the nature of action unmaking itself. But what is it that conditions this descending movement, this tendency to unmake oneself? What is it that brings about the exhaustion of creative impetus? No satisfactory solution to these problems is found in the system of Bergson's thought.

"Consciousness" in contemporary Schools:

During late nineteenth century various 'schools' developed and held different points of views regarding the nature of consciousness and its relation with bodily activity and the springs of inner motives and desires. These schools gradually assumed clear forms and distinctions in earlier twentieth century. Sigmund Freud established his chief discoveries in the last decade of the nineteenth century. McDougall, Watson, Kohler, Lewin, Adler and Jung made their contributions to the subject in the first half of the twentieth century. Amongst these psychologists, Watson and Freud attempted to explain the working of consciousness. Some of the facts of human and animal organism and personality were partially revealed by these two psychologists. But their emphasis was too great to look at the total being of man as it is expressed in its various activities.
For Watson, the human organism is a responding mechanism. Man's endowment is limited to bodily organs, a nervous system, a few undifferentiated instincts, mere "squirmings", Watson calls them, and specific member of emotions. All of these react as a coordinate unit through the medium of sure muscles. Of the bodily organs, the ductless glands or endocrines are accorded an important role. While taking into consideration intelligence and will, he adopts the method of conditioning. The chief tool is the conditioned reflex. It operates in a simple manner. If you scratch an infant's hand he with­draws it. This is a reflex activity. If the act of withdrawing the hand is accompanied by a loud noise and this association is repeated, the child will withdraw the hand upon hearing the noise even when it is not scratched. The behaviorists claims that he does not require anything to explain behaviour but the ordinary laws of physics and chemistry. Man comes into the world with a bundle of embryologic responses whose sources of energy reside in neuro-physiological mechanisms closely tied together by highly sensitive neurones. The responses are augmented indefinitely by conditioning; the law of permutation and combination offers the psychologist the means of building countless habits.
Such brushing aside the use of the terms "consciousness", "mind" and personality was made possible by ignoring the phenomena of abnormal behaviour. Phenomena such as illusion, hallucination, phobia, dreams, illogical behaviour cannot be explained by a rule or principle based upon the working of neurological processes. To explain behaviour that could not be linked with consciousness, recourse was to be had to assumption of the "subconscious".

Experiments which Sigmund Freud witnessed at Nancy in 1889 impressed him strongly. Hypnosis for the treatment of hysterics was undertaken and considered. It was, however, realized that everybody could not be hypnotized. Whole treating the patient, only the symptoms were attended to and the deep cause was overlooked. "The patient not only remained in darkness about himself but his personality appeared violated by having a foreign will forced upon him". Freud believed that the complex processes of planning and deliberating could go on in the unconscious. It was even held earlier that the whole psychic life was primarily unconscious, with quality of consciousness only sometimes superadded. He
regarded dreams as the expression of suppressed wishes. They are a means by which tendencies which have been kept out of consciousness during everyday waking life can, through symbolism, express themselves with relative freedom from interference. The dream is a dynamic expression of forces which, though repressed, are struggling to regain a place in consciousness. Freud affected a revolution in our attitude towards the nature of mental functioning. Consciousness has no access to the region of unconscious mentality. The incompatibilities of the individual are accumulated in the unconscious mind. Such contents which are in disharmony with other contents of the psyche would be painful associations or further disturbing factors which by their elements of cruelty, fearfulness, forbidden sexual impulses interfere with the attempted conscious attitude. Freud says that they are repressed into the unconscious by an act of forgetting enforced by some special circumstances. Freud and his followers applied these findings and conclusions to the study of many aspects of human activity. The particular mechanism which Freud found in the neurosis, he demonstrated in detail in many other spheres such as art, literature, religion and politics.
But the principle of infantile sexuality which was so much stressed by Freud seemed to Adler a strained interpretation of the little child's behaviour. Adler thought it important to look at the behaviour of child in relation to other brothers and sisters. Child naturally resists to be dominated by others. If this type of dominance by others takes place, child suffers from certain complexes. These complexes resulting from dominance by others are equally powerful as sexual desire at the later stage of life. Adler believed that everyone has a fundamental will for power, an urge towards dominance and superiority. The entire family situation with which the child has to cope in his first few years induces him to develop a certain attitude towards life, a certain "style of life".

The non-recognition of the important parts of conscious individual life has led certain European Psychologists to go to the other extreme of taking into account the manifold activities of human personality gradually. The history of psycho-analysis from Freud to Erich Fromm is an instance to the point.
Jung applied Galton's psychometric method of word association to the further study of unconscious mental processes. He analyzed mental processes into sense perception, feeling, thinking and intuition. Jung's innovation had to do with the neurosis and with the libids. Freud by tracing the adult's neurosis back to the oedipus complex of the small child had revealed the 'predisposing cause' of the neurosis but not the exciting cause. Therefore, Jung suggested the exciting cause of a neurosis is some problem demanding for its solution a greater output of psychonic energy than the individual can collect. Freud attempted from the very beginning to find universal dynamics applicable to each case. Interest in fundamental individual differences was believed to be secondary. Despite the recognition of heredity in predisposing toward one or another character type, Freud was always concerned fundamentally with the conception of instinctual life and the disposition of energies applicable to all human experience. With Jung, on the other hand, there was an important emphasis on typology, that grouping of persons into basic types. Combining extrovert and introvert with the four kinds of mental activity, there are according to Jung eight types of persons.
Jung used the term 'libido' in broader sense than Freud, stripping it of its distinctively sexual character. He made it include both Freud's libido and Adler's "will to power", and in short whole range of motives. For Jung, libido is the total vital energy of the individual which finds its outlet in growth, in reproduction and in all kinds of activity. There are, according to Jung, deeper and deeper layers of unconscious. The last deeper layer is the personal unconscious which is composed in part of material repressed by the individual, as Freud pointed out, but also contains material that has been forgotten and material that has been learnt unconsciously. Deeper than the personal unconscious lies the racial or collective unconsciousness; the common ground of humanity out of which each individual develops his personal conscious and unconscious life. The collective unconscious includes the instinct which took the form of "Id" in Freud's latter system. Archetypes are also included in it. The instincts are primitive ways of acting, archetypes are primitive ways of thinking. Since thinking and acting so on together at the primitive level, the two are not entirely separate. Jung has shown how in the ancient myths and allegories the collective unconscious
is buried and then gradually developed in beliefs and supernatural practices.

With the psychology of the collective unconscious, we arrive at the extension of terms which were used till now by classical psychology. Psychology with him did not remain only a cause-effect finding chain of past to the present. Dr. Ira Progoff, American Psychiatrist, described it while holding that "In psychology, it not enough to be oriented towards one's past- that was the mistake with analysis- but towards the future too ". Progoff further says that "What we call depth psychology is just a form and a phrase. Its significance in the history of western thought, as I see it, is that with its help western man may work his way back to the forgotten depths of the psyche. If there had never been a break or scission such as the Age of Reason involved, there would not perhaps have been any need for this kind of psychology".

The estimate of depth psychology is that it is still groping in the unknown region of human psyche. Having not known what is the fundamental nature of consciousness, psychoanalysts analyse many abnormal phenomena and arrive at tentative generalizations. Since it is intimately connected with the practical work of psychiatry,
its advocates are not prepared to revise their thinking and look at new facts with fresh "frames of reference".

After analysing some of the important meanings of the term "consciousness" we can observe that in western psychology (1) consciousness has been identified with mind (2) Mind and spirit or psyche are meant to be the same (3) that body and consciousness are separate or one accompanies the other and (4) consciousness is a substance.

**Distinction between mind and consciousness:**

We will be able to observe in the course of our discussion that consciousness is the nature of Reality. In this sense it admits of infinite gradations. Along with existence and bliss, chit or consciousness is one of the three attributes of Reality. For the individual it is the most fundamental and intimate experience. It is the supreme value to be achieved and possessed as the goal and fulfillment. From this standpoint all other powers and energies of cognition, feeling and movement are its instruments. In this way spirit and mind cannot be identified with each other. Mind is properly the instrument to think and perceive. It is ordinarily understood in the western
psychology as covering the whole of conscious self and personality. This quite misleading. Whatever is contended is done with the help of mind and therefore it is thought that mind includes intelligence, feeling, perception, action and consciousness. But psycho-analysis has done service in discovering the still unknown region which cannot be called "Mind" or "Consciousness". We do not wish to call them too. But we are indicating the possibility of fundamental consciousness which is not of the nature of still known superficial consciousness. So all parts of the being and personality cannot equally be called consciousness.

At times, the self is called consciousness. This is quite true. It is self-luminous, "Svayamprakasa". It has direct knowledge of things and of itself. But the nature of self is not to be delimited to this alone. It means the "Psychic being" which is the inmost dynamic principle within the evolving individual. It rules over the various developing emotional, physical and intellectual parts of the individual. In still different sense it is felt as identical with Absolute Reality. In the West, the term 'self' is used in different senses. And the senses of term which I have pointed out are quite unacceptable to most of the Western psychologists. In the West, it is
used in the sense of the permanent spiritual principle of unity underlying thinking, feeling and willing. It is thought as mental substance permanently lying behind and above the changing mental processes. It is also used in the sense of real mental unity. It expresses in cognition, conation and affection without losing its unity and identity in them. 'Self' is used in the sense of bare mental processes or a series of such processes.

To mix and associate self with intelligence, feeling and willing is quite false and misleading as it makes us believe on the one hand that intelligence is capable of becoming impersonal, neutral and capable of judging things and events without any shade of impulse and desire and on the other hand it creates a pretence that each part and activity is truly performed by the self as knowing and behaving principle.

In Indian Psychology, self and consciousness are distinguished from Manas, Buddhi, Chitta and Ahamkara. In our times, Sri Aurobindo, in his philosophy of Mind, has attempted to distinguish between thinking Mind and the mind of desires and impulses which he calls the "Vital Mind". As consciousness is "Sui generis", it cannot be defined. It can, however, be described as the most fundamental and intimate experience and the supreme
value to be attained by human being. Such consciousness ought to be clearly distinguished from "Self" as it has three references viz., (1) as felt identical with Transcendent Reality (2) as the Witness consciousness (3) as the Psychic being.

**Indian Darśana:**

Indian thinkers have developed their psychology mainly in the course of ethical, religious and metaphysical progress and unfoldment. They studied the methods by which they reached the highest experience. Control of understanding and mind are essential for the knowledge of highest state of consciousness. Patañjali says in Yoga Aphorisms that the mind becomes totally illumined and goes beyond the limitations of the nervous system when it is controlled and integrated in the course of concentration and deep meditation. Almost all the schools except charvaka accept consciousness as fact and occurrence. There is difference among the schools of Darsanas regarding the nature of consciousness and its relation to bodily organism and the self. Higher grades of consciousness are described and established in modern times in the integral psychology of Sri Aurobindo. Matter and Spirit are not poles apart and extremes but they are merged and involved, helping the higher states and
expressions to evolve. Bergson in modern times in the West shows consciousness as evolutionary real showing its relation with matter, instinct, intellect and memory.

In Rigveda, mandal I following two stanzas describe the fact of rebirth and in it the importance of mind.

1. "Out of immortals, of which,—Nay, of whichever (immortal) God's beneficial attribute should we believe in?
   Who gives me again to our earth so that I may see father and mother?

2. Out of the immortals, let us believe in the beneficial attribute of the foremost God fire (agni); He gives me again to our earth so that I may see father and mother.

Elaborating the meaning of these mantras, it is clear that there are three immortal divinities - God, Soul and nature. The question is whom should we believe in as the creator giving rebirth. The question is answered as saying that out of the trinity of God, Soul and Nature, it is God (the source of life-giving force) who sends the Soul again (by way of rebirth) to this earth so that the soul, when reborn happens to see father and mother.
In Yajurveda, the following verse is given, "Let mind come back to me, let breath (life) come back to me, let soul come back to me, let the organ of seeing and the organ of hearing come back to me. Let the all-pervading universal fire who is the unobstructed source of life and protector of bodies, protect us from censurable evil". It is said here that it is God who gives back life to a soul with all bodily organs at rebirth.

"6 learned men, for the sake of seeing the sun, for the sake of doing all good deeds and for living a long life, let the Divine being give back the mind to us so that we can live a social life". 20

It means that God re-equip the soul with a mind so that the soul can see the Sun-perceive God, the solar system or life, can acquire good knowledge or memory of good actions, he can live a life for hundred years.

An interesting problem in connection with the Upanisadic psychology is the problem of the sheaths or bodies of the soul. Modern theosophists attach very great importance to the conception of 'bodies of man'. Corresponding to these bodies, they have recognised seven different planes, of which, according to them, the
the several bodies of man keep functioning. The various planes which they recognise may be said to be respectively the physical, the astral, the mental, the intellectual, the spiritual, the monadic and the divine. In the second chapter of the Taittirīya Upaniṣad, five types of planes of consciousness are described as Ānāmāyā, Prānāmāyā, Manomāyā, Vijnānāmāyā and Ānandamāyā Kosas.

Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika Darśana:

Nyāya system believes that the universe has some elements which are not corporeal. They are our cognitions, desires, aversions, volitions, and feelings of pleasure and pain. These modes of consciousness are fleeting. They are believed to be qualities of the substance called soul. Uddyotkara holds that the reality of the self is apprehended by means of perception. He maintains that the object of the idea of 'I' is the soul. The Vaiśeṣika believes that the self is an object of Yogic perception. It is believed by the Naiyāyikas and the Vaiśeṣikas that consciousness is an adventitious (aupādhika) quality, which enters temporarily into the soul as a consequence of the machinery of cognition. Consciousness is something different from the soul.
This view is refuted by the Jaina in the following way. 'If knowledge is supposed to be absolutely distinct from the soul, the knowledge of caitra is in the same position with respect to his soul as the knowledge of Maitra that is to say both the knowledge would be equally strangers to the self of Caitra, and there is no reason why his knowledge should serve him better than the knowledge of any other person in determining the nature of things. In fact, there is no such thing as his own knowledge, all knowledge being equally foreign to him. An explanation may be offered by the Vaisesika: knowledge is absolutely distinct from the soul but it is connected with it by inherent relationship (Samavāya Sambandha) and hence, the knowledge of Caitra is not in the same position with respect to him as the knowledge of Maitra for the former is connected with him by inherence while the latter is not so. But this explanation can be easily turned aside. According to the Vaiśeṣika, the category of inherence is one, eternal and all-pervasive, (śamavāyasyai Katvānitya Avapakatvāccha) therefore it is impossible that the knowledge should reside in Caitra and not in Maitra; and since the souls are also all-pervasive according to the view of this school, the knowledge that
takes place in one soul must take place in all the souls as well. Consequently, any knowledge that Caitra has acquired would belong also.

Granted it is possible for a particular knowledge to be connected with a particular soul by inherent relationship. But a question still remains to be answered. By what relation is the inherence connected with the knowledge and the soul? If the answer is that it is connected by another inherence, that would mean an unending series of inherent relationship and it will lead to an infinite regress. If the answer is in the form of 'itself', why should not the knowledge and the soul be connected of themselves without requiring an inherent relationship to accomplish the connection?

Argument and counter-argument:

The opponent again argues that the soul is no doubt conscious, but that is not without a cause but is owing to consciousness coming to reside by inherent relationship in the soul as is shown by actual experience. The counter argument advocated by the Jain is as under:

If you are prepared to accept the evidence of experience, you must admit that the soul is essentially of the nature
of consciousness (upayogatmaka). Nobody is aware of being first unconscious, and afterwards becoming conscious in consequence of the connection with consciousness. On the contrary, he is always aware of himself as the knower which implies the unity of soul and consciousness.  

Soul - not unconscious: It may be further held that the consciousness 'I have the knowledge' would prove a distinction between the knowledge and the soul, for the former is that which is possessed and the latter is that which possesses. This contention is also untenable. Who possesses knowledge in the theory of the opponent? Not the self, because it is supposed to be essentially devoid of consciousness like a pitcher. By this theory, it cannot be asserted that the self is unconscious and yet it is capable of becoming conscious. Hence, that substance which is conscious of having knowledge (Jñānavānaham) cannot in itself be unconscious by nature. Therefore, the soul is not in itself unconscious which afterwards comes to possess consciousness by inherent relationship. It is, on the contrary, essentially conscious.  

In modern times, Dr. Radhakrishnan, criticising Nyāya theory of soul, says, 'Unless we assume the
reality of self as consciousness, the explanation of consciousness becomes difficult. We cannot make a "tertium quid", a sort of mechanical glow which arises when two unconscious substances, soul and matter interact.

If the soul by itself is not conscious, and if consciousness is induced in it by the action of the outer world on it, there is nothing to distinguish the Nyāya theory from materialism, say as it may that consciousness is not a mere by-product of the brain. Consciousness is furthest removed from materiality, and we cannot find any mechanical equivalent to it. It is inconceivable how material and non-material entities interact. When we pass from a material to a psychical state, we step from one world into another incommensurable one. It is no explanation to say that conscious states are epiphenomena produced by the interaction of two unconscious substances, soul and manas. The soul is infinite and partless (niravayava), the manas is atomic and partless, and how can we conceive the interaction between the two? If consciousness is something originated in the infinitely extended self, is the substrate of this consciousness the self in its whole extract, or a part particularised by the body? The former is not admissible, since then all things should present themselves to consciousness all at once. The latter is not admissible.
It can thus be seen that Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika view of consciousness as quality of the soul is untenable. As opposed to this view of Jainas who maintain that the essential nature of soul or self is consciousness. In Jaina system the whole universe of being is traced to the two everlasting uncreated co-existing but independent categories of Jīva and Ajīva. That which has consciousness is Jīva, that which has not got consciousness, but can be touched, tasted, seen, smelt is Ajīva. Jīva and Ajīva do not correspond to I and not-I. This is an objective classification of things in the universe. Animate beings are composed of soul and body, and their souls being distinct from matter are eternal. Ajīva is divided into two main classes, those without form (arūpa) as Dharma, Adharma, space, time and those with form (rūpa) as pudgala or matter.

Jainas believe that Karma or action is of material nature. Thus Jainas hold that thoughts and ideas affect one's character and create or modify the tendencies of one's soul. The soul by its contact with the outside
world becomes penetrated and enveloped by the particles. They develop into Karma and build up a particular body namely Kārapaśārīra, which does not leave the soul till its final emancipation. The Karmic matter obstructs the glory of the soul. Śāvakarma is immediate to the Jīvas, while Dravyakarma belongs to the body. Although they are associated together nevertheless they are distinct and separate as the conscious and non-conscious.

**Modes of consciousness:**

In Jaina writings the word Jīva is differently used and denoted life, vitality and consciousness. Jīva is totally different from physical things of outside world. Jīvas are infinite in number and are of different kinds as ever perfect, liberated and those which are bound. Jainism recognises three modes of consciousness, cognition, feeling and conation. Feeling is the experience of pleasure and pain, which are fruits of Karmas. Knowledge (Jñāna) and perception (Darsana) are the cognitions. They constitute the essence of the self. Conation and activity are found in a mundane soul. They are actuated by attachment, aversion, and delusion which are the main springs of action. The actions of a mundane soul are self-determined, when they are determined by
emotions and passions. The actions of a perfect (siddha) soul are absolutely self-determined, since they are determined by the intrinsic purity of the soul. A liberated soul has infinite power, but no activity. It has infinite knowledge, infinite perception, infinite bliss, and infinite power. Life and consciousness are co-extensive. Life is an attribute of the soul.27

Nature of Jīva:

Jīva, in Jaina system is called Jīvastikāya because Jīvas occupy innumerable space-points in our mundane world (lokākāśa) and they have a limited size (madhyama parimāṇa). The word astikāya means anything that occupies space or has some pervasiveness. These souls expand and contract themselves according to the dimensions of the body which they occupy at any time (bigger in the elephant and smaller in ant life). It is to be borne in mind that Jainas believe that the soul occupies the whole of the body in which it lives, so that from the tip of the hair to the nail of the foot, wherever there may be any cause of sensation it can immediately feel it. The manner in which the soul occupies the body is often explained as being similar to the manner in which a lamp illumines the whole room though remaining in one corner of the room.28
Nature of consciousness in early Buddhism:

In early Buddhism, consciousness is regarded as ‘the relation between subject and object’. Each psychosis is awakened by an external stimulus. Visual consciousness is produced by the contact of the eye with a visible object. Auditory consciousness is produced by the contact of the ear with a sound. Thought is excited by the contact of the mind with a mental object. If the stimulus ceases, consciousness ceases. ‘Sometimes consciousness (citta), mind (manas) and intelligence (vijñāna) are identified’. Sometimes consciousness is included in the elements (vijñānadātu). Manas is the intellectual function of consciousness’. ‘Three degree of consciousness are recognised: the sub-conscious, the conscious and the super-conscious. Subconscious is concerned with desire (kāma), the material (rūpa) or the immaterial (arūpa). Normal consciousness is concerned with the material (rūpaloka), the immaterial (arūpaloka) or the supramundane (lokuttara).’

Vaibhāṣīka and Sautrāntika:

The Hinayāna Buddhism gave rise to two main schools, the Vaibhāṣikas and the Sautrāntikas. The Mahāyāna Buddhism gave rise to two other schools, the
Yogācāras and Mādhyamikas. The Vaibhāṣikas and the Sautrāntikas admit the reality of an outer world. Objects are distinguished by them into the bāhya or the externally and the abhyañtara, or the internal. Under the former they have bhūta, or the elements, and bhautika, or objects belonging to the elements. Under the latter they have citta, or intelligence, and caitīta or those belonging to intelligence. The Sautrāntikas believe in the extra-mental existence of the phenomenal world. Mādhavācārya describes the arguments by which the Sautrāntikas infer the existence of an external world in his Sarva Darsāna Samgraha, 'Cognition must ultimately have some object since it is manifested in duality.... If the object proved were only a form of cognition, it should manifest itself as such, and not as an external object'. If it is said that the internal principle manifests itself as if it were something external, the Sautrāntikas say that this is untenable, for if there be no external objects, there being no genesis of such, the comparison, 'as if they were external' is illegitimate. No man in his senses would say Vasumitra looks like the sin of a childless mother. It is said about consciousness that 'Consciousness by itself is everywhere alike, and
if it were all, the world must be one. We have, however, now blue, now red. These must be due to differences in the objects themselves. The varieties of forms of consciousness indicate the existence of external objects. Besides, those things which while a thing exist, manifest themselves only at times must depend on something else than thing. Consciousness manifests itself only at times as blue and so forth. Again that is knowledge of the subject (ālayavijñāna) which concerns the ego. And that is knowledge of the object (pravṛttivijñāna) which manifests blue, etc.

**Doctrine of Tathātā:**

*Mahāyānasraddhotpadāsāstra* is ascribed by tradition to Aśvaghōsa, the famous author of Buddhacarita, who flourished in the reign of King Kaniska. The doctrine of Tathātā or suchness elaborated and propounded in this book can be compared with the absolutistic monism of the Upaniṣads and the Advaita Vedānta. According to the philosophy of Tathātā the absolute suchness is beyond relativity. Saṃsāra is the empirical world of relativity. It is devoid of ontological reality. Aśvaghōsa attempts to account for the relation between Absolute suchness and conditioned suchness by the principle of
Avidyā. It is nescience or ignorance. It is the principle of individuation. *Nescience is a spark of consciousness that spontaneously flashes from the unfathomable depths of suchness. Awakening of consciousness marks the first step towards the rising of the universe from the abyss of self-identity of suchness. For the unfolding of consciousness implies the separation of the perceiving and the perceived*. 36

*The Vaibhāṣika advocates direct realism. He recognises the reality of external objects, which are directly perceived. The Sautrantika advocates indirect realism. He recognises the reality of external objects, which are inferred from their cognitions produced by them. External objects produce their cognitions and imprint their forms on their cognitions. There is likeness between the forms of cognitions (jñākāra) and the forms of objects (viṣayākāra). The cognitions are directly perceived. The external objects are inferred from them as their causes. This doctrine is representationalism. It paves the way for subjective idealism which reduces external objects to ideas (vijñāna). The Yogācāra denies the reality of external objects and reduces them to subjective cognitions. He advocates Vijñānavāda. Asaṅga wrote Yogācārabhumiśāstra, an important work on it. The
name Yogācāra may be derived from it. The Vijñānavādins used to practice Yoga, and hence might be called Yohācaras. 37

Asaṅga and Vasubandhu: their views:

'Asanga and Vasubandhu regard the absolute reality as one pure consciousness (Vijñānamatata), which is pure and external. Nirvāṇa consists in entering into this eternal, blissful consciousness. Thus the ultimate reality, which is one, self-identical, eternal, pure consciousness, and pure bliss is different from the Tathāta of Āśvaghosa, and very similar to the Brahman of the Upaniṣads. 38 It is foundational consciousness. It is the ground of the Ālayavijñāna which evolves the individual subjects and the objective universe. It is the foundation of the cosmic consciousness and the individual consciousness. According to Vasubandhu all appearances, subjective and objective are transformations of the eternal principle of pure consciousness. The external objects are self-creations or transformations of the pure consciousness in its manifestation as the Ālayavijñāna under the influence of the dispositions (vāsanā) of past experiences’. 'The eternal, unchangeable, pure consciousness is beyond all experiences. It is transcendent and non-empirical. It is the ground of the
Ālayavijñāna, the evolving cosmic consciousness which is transformed into the individual subjective centres and the external objective world. The nature of the pure transcendent consciousness is indeterminable and unthinkable. Even the Ālayavijñāna with the transformations is an imposition on it. The subjective centres and the objective appearances are merged in this pure consciousness in the state of nirvana. The subjective and objective appearances have their foundation in the pure consciousness. It is their ground and essence. They are unreal apart from it. The pure consciousness is one, homogeneous and undifferentiated. It cannot account for the variety of subjective centres and external world. So the Vijnānavādin makes the hypothesis of the Ālayavijñāna. Sthiramati says that it is called Ālaya because it contains the seeds or potentialities of all dharmas which produce defilements, or because all dharmas of the world are the effects of the seed-potentialities of all dharmas of the world, are the effects of the seed-potentialities preserved in it, or because it exists in all dharma in the form of a cause. All dharmas or subjective and objective phenomena exist in a potential state in the Ālayavijñāna; it exists in them as their
cause. It is the cause of the world which is its effect. The Ālayavijnāna and the world are intimately related to each other as cause and effect. Vasubandhu compares the modes of Ālayavijnāna to the tide of the ocean which creates the mental properties of contact, feeling and the like under the influence of the dispositions (vāsāṅga) or seeds (bijā) of the past experiences of all individuals. It is the constantly changing stream of consciousness. It exists in each individual stream of consciousness as the subconscious mind. The world is the expression of the Ālayavijnāna or cosmic consciousness.

Nature of Ālayavijnāna:

The pure consciousness is eternal and unmodifiable.

It is from the interfunctioning of Avidyā or ignorance or ignorance that there arises the cosmic consciousness of Ālayavijnāna which contains within it the seed-potentialities of all notions representing subjective centres, objects and their cognitions. On the ground of Ālayavijnāna cognitional forms are synthesised with particular subjective centres and their works in a spatio-temporal order, and in this sense the Ālayavijnāna may be regarded as the universal repository of all subjects.
and their experiences. The Ālayavijñāna, the receptacle consciousness is the foundation both of the external and the internal world; it is the essence of the inanimate world; it is the life that grows in the organic world. It attains sensation and perception in animals. It attains retention, association, discrimination and thought in the higher animals and men. It is the energy that produces matter, life and mind. This is the cosmic evolution of the Ālayavijñāna. The receptacle consciousness of the individual as well as to the sense-organs. There develops mind or normal consciousness, which discriminates the various phenomena and it fecundated by the receptacle consciousness, develops the conception of like and dislike. Then come the five forms of consciousness corresponding to the sense-organs, visual, aural, nasul, taste and touch consciousness, which fecundated by the receptacle consciousness, give the presentation of the world of experience. The interaction of the whole body of these factors is necessary for the knowledge of the world. Without, for instance, sight consciousness there could be no vision of colour; without the infected mind one could not discriminate form or size, and without the receptacle consciousness neither the individual nor the world would exist. Mind is the cause
proper (hetu), infected mind and the receptacle consciousness the conditions (pratyaya), and the experienced world the fruit. The ordinary mind sees in the infected mind the final reality. Bodhisattvas recognise beneath it the receptacle consciousness as its prior.44

Self and Consciousness:

The question of self is taken up in chapter VI of the Madhyamika Sutras. The general principle that there is no substance apart from qualities leads to the conclusion that there is no self apart from state of consciousness. There is no soul prior to acting, feeling and thinking. In chapter IX Nagarjuna says: 'Some say that the entity (soul), whose act it is to see, hear and feel, existed prior to the acts?... If soul could exist prior to and therefore without the act of the seeing, etc., how can it exist prior to each? If it is the same that sees, hears and feels, it must have existed prior to each. The soul does not exist in the elements from which the acts of seeing, hearing and feeling proceed. 'The soul cannot be known until the acts of seeing, etc., take place. So it did not exist prior to these acts. Nor does it become existent posterior to them. For if the acts of seeing, etc., could take place independently of the soul, what is the use of
bringing in the latter? The soul and the acts of seeing are simultaneous to each other. Unless they are independent of each other, they cannot exist simultaneously. Nagarjuna applies to the self the arguments which Yogacara used to undermine external reality. If the properties which we read into the outer universe do not involve a permanent reality called matter, why should the existence of ideas involve a self which is not an idea? The uninterrupted series of momentary mental states is all we mean by self. We know nothing about the nature of consciousness as such. It is a stream, an evolving field of presentation unrolling before us. Belief in a permanent self is as daring and dogmatic according to Nagarjuna as the parallel belief in a material world. That objects of consciousness are arranged in psychological sequences so as to constitute separate minds is a mere speculation. Things are just what they seem to be. We cannot even talk of a stream of ideas. If we admit the reality of a soul, apart from conscious states, it is only for the practical purposes. The mutual dependence of self and its states, the agent and his acts, is also brought out in chapter viii. 'The doer is so called in relation to the deed, and the deed is called in relation to the doer. Absolutely speaking, there is neither does nor doing.'
Principle of consciousness generally accepted in schools of Buddhism:

Thus it can be seen that in the course of its development the principle of consciousness assumes different forms. Those schools of Buddhism which are mainly idealistic, accept the principle of consciousness in one form or another. Of course, consciousness was maintained as fleeting, moving and becoming. There was no permanent soul established as it is seen in Kevalādvaita system.

Soul as permanent substance is not accepted in Buddhist system. There is a dialogue in the questions of King Milinda regarding the problem of existence of soul which is worth mentioning here.

The King said, 'Is there Nagasena such a thing as the soul?

'What is this, O King, the soul (vedagu)?

'The living principle within which sees forms through the eye, hears sounds through the ear, experiences tastes through the tongue, smells odours through the nose,
feels touch through the body, and discerns things (conditions 'Dhamma') through the mind—just as we, sitting here in the palace, can look out of any window out of which we wish to look the east windows or the west, or the north or the south.

The Elder replied: 'I will tell you about the five doors, great King, listen and give heed attentively. If the living principle within sees forms through the eye in the manner that you mention, choosing its windows as it likes, can it not then see forms not only through the eye, but also through each of the other five organs of sense? And in like manner can it not then as well hear sounds and experience taste and smell odours and feel touch and discern conditions through each of the other five organs of sense, besides the one you have in each case specified?'

'No, sir'.

'Then these powers are nor united one to another indiscriminately, the latter sense to the former organ and so on. Now we, as we are seated here in the palace with these windows all thrown open, and in full daylight, if we only stretch forth our heads, see all kinds of objects plainly. Can the living principle do the same when the doors of the eyes are thrown open? When the doors of the
ear are thrown open, can it do so? Can it then not only hear sounds, but see sights, experience tastes, smell odours, feel touch and discern conditions? And so with each of its windows?'

'No, Sir'.

'Then these powers are not united one to another indiscriminately. Now again, great King, if Dinna were to go outside and stand in the gateway, would you be aware that he had done so?'

'Yes, I should know it'.

'And if the same Dinna were to come back again, and stand before you, would be aware of his having done so?'

'Yes, I should know it'.

'Well, great King, would the living principle within discern in like manner, if anything possessing flavour were laid upon the tongue, its sourness, or its saltiness, or its acidity, or its pungency, or its astringency, or its sweetness?'

'Yes, it would know it'.

'But when the flavour had passed into the stomach would it still discern these things?'

'Certainly not'.

'Then these powers are not united one to the other indiscriminately. Now, suppose, O King, a man were to have
a hundred vessels honey brought and poured into one trough, and then, having had another man's mouth closed over and tied up, were to have him cast into the trough full of honey. Would he know whether that into which he had been was sweet or whether it was not?

'No Sir'.

'But why not?'

'Because the honey could not get into his mouth'.

'Then, Great King, these powers are not united one to another indiscriminately'.

'I am not capable of discussing with such a reasoner, Be pleased, Sir, to explain to me how the matter stands'.

Then the older convinced Milinda the King with discourse drawn from the Abhidhamma, saying: 'It is by reason, O King, of the eye and of forms that sight arises, and those other conditions-contact, sensation, idea, thought abstraction, sense of vitality, and attention-arise each simultaneously with its predecessor. And a similar succession of cause and effect arises when each of the other five organs of sense is brought into play. And so herein there is no such thing as soul.(Vedagu)'

Consciousness as principle of Becoming and a Process:

Although the soul as permanent substance is denied,
consciousness as becoming is not rejected. It can be called wakefulness which remains present in one's being. Buddhism is totally against the theory of substance as category established in the universe or that which may be taken up as principle in interpretation of the universe. Buddhism, however, recognizes the process, development, movement and activity as ultimate principle while explaining the universe. Wakefulness is a portion of immortality. In the second canto of Dhammapada it is said, 'Wakefulness is the way to immortality (amatā); heedlessness is the way to death; those who are wakeful die not, the heedless are already dead.' In the first canto twin verses, importance of consciousness is well shown. It is said that 'All our tendencies of character (these are immaterial phenomena-realm of sensations, perceptions and predispositions) are the off-spring of consciousness, dominated by consciousness and made up of consciousness. If a man speaks or acts with a sullied consciousness, then suffering follows him, even as the wheel of the wagon follows the hoof of the bullock'.

Buddhist theory - an advance:

The Buddhist theory of consciousness was an advance in the times when it was believed that consciousness was the product of the combination of matter.
Gunaratna in his Tarkarahagyasipaka refers to Lokāyata (literally, that which is found among people in general) the name which all carvaka doctrines were generally known. The Carvākas did not believe in the authority of the Vedas or any other holy scripture. They did not believe in the existence of soul. Life and Consciousness were believed to be the products of the combination of matter, just as red colour was the result of mixing up white with yellow or as the power of intoxication was generated in molasses (madaśakti). There is no after-life and no reward of actions, as there is neither virtue nor vice. Life is meant for enjoyment. So long as it lasts it is worthless to think of anything else, as everything will end with death, for when at death the body is burnt to ashes there cannot be any rebirth. They do not believe in the validity of inference. Nothing is trustworthy but what can be directly perceived, for it is impossible to determine that the distribution of the middle term (hetu) has not depended upon some extraneous condition, the absence of which might destroy the validity of any particular piece of inference. They were Carvāka because they would only eat but would not accept any other religions or moral responsibility. "The word comes from caṛv to eat." The
Dhūrtta ācārvāka maintained that there was nothing but the four elements of earth, water, fire, air and water and that the body was but the result of atomic combination. The Suśikṣita Ācārvāka held that there was a soul apart from the body but that it also was destroyed with the destruction of the body.\textsuperscript{48}

\textbf{The undifferentiated Consciousness in Yogavāśiṣṭha:}

In Yogavāśiṣṭha, the state of undifferentiated consciousness is described as follows, "There is a fourth state (other than the three, namely, the waking, the dream and the sleep states) of existence, in which there is no discrimination of the ego, of being and non-being, which is a state of pure and balanced indifference". (via. 124,23). It is described further that the fourth state is experienced when the ego is transcendent, equilibrium, attained and the mind is brought to rest. (via. 124,27).\textsuperscript{49}

Looking towards the ascent of progress, one can appreciate here in Yogavāśiṣṭha that the climax of individual inner being is established.

\textbf{Soul in Sāmkhya Darśana:}

The Sāmkhya Darśana admits two principles, souls and Prakṛti, the root principle of matter. Souls are many, like the Jaina souls, but they are without parts and qualities.
They do not contract or expand according as they occupy a smaller or a larger body, but are always all-pervasive and are not contained in the bodies in which they are manifested. But the relation between body or rather the mind associated with it and soul is such that whatever mental phenomena happen in the mind are interpreted as the experience of its soul. The souls are many, and had it not been so (the Śāṁkhya argues) with the birth of one all would have been and with the death of one all would have died.

**Pure Consciousness in Śāṁkhyā**

Unlike the Jaina soul possessing Anantarāntajñāna, anantarādarsāna, anantasukha, anantavīrya, the soul in Śāṁkhyā is described as being devoid of any and every characteristic. Its nature is absolute pure consciousness (Git). The Śāṁkhyā view differs from the Vedānta, firstly in that it does not consider the soul to be of the nature of pure intelligence and bliss (ānanda). Bliss according to Śāṁkhyā is but another name for pleasure and as such it belongs to Prakṛti and does not constitute the nature of soul; secondly, according to Vedānta the individual souls (Jīva) are but illusory manifestations of one soul or pure consciousness the Brahman, but according to Śāṁkhyā they are all real and many.
The most interesting feature of Sāmkhya as of Vedānta is the analysis of knowledge. Sāmkhya holds that our knowledge of things are mere ideational pictures or images. External things are indeed material, but the sense data and images of the mind, the coming and going of which is called knowledge, are also in some sense matter-stuff, since they are limited in their nature like the external things. The sense-data and images come and go, they are often the prototypes, or photographs of external things, and as such ought to be considered as in some sense material, but the matter of which these are composed is the subtlest. These images of the mind could not have appeared as conscious if there were no separate principles of consciousness plane^could be interpreted as the experience of a person.51

Consciousness underlying change:

In Upaniṣads the soul or Atman is conceived as pure and infinite consciousness, distinct from the forms of knowledge, the ideas and the images. In our ordinary ways of mental analysis we do not detect that underneath the forms of knowledge there is some other principle which has no change, no form, but which is like a light which illuminates the mute, pictorial forms which mind assumes. The self is
this light. We all speak of our 'Self' but we have no mental picture of the self as we have of other things, yet in our knowledge it seems as if we know our self. The Jainas maintained that the soul was veiled by karma matter and every act of knowledge meant only the partial removal of the veil. Sāmkhya thinkers hold that the self cannot be found as an image of knowledge because it is a distinct, transcendent principle, whose real nature as much is behind or beyond the subtle matter of knowledge. 'Our cognitions so far as they are mere forms or images, are merely compositions or complexes of subtle mind-substance, and thus are like a sheet of painted canvas immersed in darkness; as the canvas gets prints from outside and moves, the pictures appear one by one before the light and are illuminated.'52 The silent characteristics of self is that it is like a light, without which all knowledge would be blind. "Form and motion are the characteristics of matter, and so far as knowledge is mere limited form and movement it is the same as matter; but there is some other principle which enlivens these knowledge-forms, by virtue of which they become conscious. This principle of consciousness cannot indeed be separately perceived, per se, but the presence of this principle in all forms of our knowledge is distinctly indicated by inference. This principle of
consciousness has no motion, no form, no quality, no impurity. It is important to note that Sāṃkhya has two terms to denote the two aspects involved in knowledge, viz., the relating element of awareness as such (cit), and the content (buddhi) which is the form of mind-stuff representing the sense-data and the image. Cognition takes place by the reflection of the former in the latter. The movement of the knowledge-stuff takes place in relation to consciousness. It appears as if it undergoes all changes of knowledge and experiences of pleasure and pain. Knowledge-revelation is not the unveiling or revelation of a particular part of the self, as the Jaina thinkers believed, but it is a revelation of the self only so far as knowledge is pure awakening, pure enlivening, pure consciousness. So far as the content of knowledge or the image is concerned, it is not the revelation of self but is the blind knowledge-stuff.

Puruṣa established as against Prakṛti:

Prakṛti is made up of three gunas, Sattva, Rajas and Tamas and so also are all the products of Prakṛti, i.e. the objects of experience. Therefore all objects as well as their primordial cause, viz., Prakṛti are composite wholes made up of parts, saṁhata padārtha as the
as the Sāmkhya says. But a saṁhata padārth has no being-for-itself, it has being only for another. For example, a bed is a saṁhata padārth or composite whole and it serves the purpose of another to lie down on and so also chairs, benches etc. Therefore there must be an asamhata or non-composite, undifferenced subject other than the composite Prakṛti and its modes for the sake of which the composite Prakṛti and its products exist. This proves Puruṣa, the intelligent subject, as the other of the non-intelligent Prakṛti and its modes. It cannot be said that one composite object exists for the sake of another composite object and the argument does not prove a non-composite intelligent subject as the opposite of Prakṛti. The bed, the chair, e.g., as composite wholes cannot be said to exist for the rest of the composite body, for the body being itself a composite whole will be for some other composite whole and that also will be for another such whole and that also will be for another such whole and thus we shall be landed into infinite regress of composite wholes. The law of parsimony (lāghava) does not allow the supposition of an infinite number of composite wholes where the supposition of one non-composite subject will meet the requirements of the case. An infinite regress is legitimate only where experience testifies to it as in
the case of the seed and the tree. Here, however, there is no evidence in support of the supposition of an infinite number of composite wholes. Further, the relation of the hetu, 'Composite Whole', in the above inference, holds only with parārtha thatva or 'being-for-another' and not with a composite 'para' or composite another. Therefore the objection does not bear examination. Thus is proved a subject other than, and opposite of, the non-intelligent, triple-natured Prakṛti. Hence as Prakṛti is triple-natured, non-intelligent, objective, active, etc., Puruṣa, as the opposite of it, must be non-composite, i.e. simple and without parts, intelligent, unobjective, inactive, etc. The fact that individuals seek liberation from experience and its sufferings also proves a subject other than Prakṛti. How can one be liberated from suffering if one is a mode of Prakṛti consisting of sukha, dukha and moha? The fact of Mokṣa-prayāsa or effort after liberation from dukha thus proves that the individual believes himself to be other than the duḥtamika Prakṛti. Further, Prakṛti and its modes consists of sukha, dukha and moha. Sukha and dukha as bhogya or objects of fruition or frustration, imply a bhoktā or objects.
Dr. Radhakrishnan's view about Purusa in Samkhya

Dr. Radhakrishnan, while criticizing the arguments for the existence of the Purusa, says that they turn out to be proofs for the existence of the empirical individuals and not transcendent subjects. This fact comes out more clearly in the Samkhya theory of the plurality of purusas. The chief argument for the plurality of purusas is that, if there were only one purusa, when its buddhis return from its delusion the cosmic process would cease. But nothing of the kind happens. The cosmic play continues for the infinite number of bound souls, even when a few are released. The argument that if the purusas were not many but only one, then all individual souls existing in bodies would have to die at the same time and be born at the same time, assumes that birth and death apply to eternal purusas which is not allowed by the Samkhya system. We can only infer that the embodied souls are many and different, since they do not rise or die together. If one man sees a particular object, others do not see it at the same time, simply because each jiva has its own separate organism and interests. There does not seem to be any need to pass from the manyness of empirical souls, which all philosophers admit, to the manyness of eternal selves which the Samkhya...
upholds. The Sāmkhya Puruṣa is altogether distinct from Prakṛti. We cannot ascribe to it any features such as personality or creative force. All definite characterisation of Puruṣas is due to confusion. The self is without attributes or qualities, without parts, imperishable, motionless, absolutely inactive and passive, unaffected by pleasure or pain or any other emotion. All change, all character belong to Prakṛti. There does not seem to be any basis for the attribution of distinctness to Puruṣas. If each Puruṣa has the same feature of consciousness, all-pervadingness, if there is not the slightest difference between one Puruṣa and another, since they are free from all variety, then there is nothing to lead us to assume a plurality of Puruṣas. Multiplicity without distinction is impossible. That is why even the Sāmkhya commentators like Gaudapāda are inclined to the theory of the Puruṣas. 55

Yoga Pārśana:

The Yoga philosophy has essentially a practical tone and its object consists mainly in demonstrating the means of attaining salvation, oneness, the liberation of Purusa. The metaphysical theory discussed by Sāmkhya thinkers is the basis which justifies its ethical goal. It
is not itself the principal subject of Yoga discussion. Citta or mind exists in the form of its states which are called vrittis. These comprehend all the manifold states of consciousness of our phenomenal existence, and we cannot distinguish the states of consciousness from consciousness itself, for the consciousness is not something separate from its states; it exists in its states and passes away with their passing and submerges when they are submerged. It differs from the senses in this that they represent the functions and faculties whereas citta stands as the entity holding the conscious states with which we are directly concerned. The citta described as existing only in its states is called Kāryacitta as effect as distinguished from Kāraṇacitta or citta as cause. These Kāraṇacittas as cause are all-pervading like the Ākāśa and are infinite in number, each being connected with each of the numberless puruṣas or souls. The reason assigned for acknowledging such a Kāraṇacitta which must be all pervading is that the Yogi can have the knowledge of all things at once.

Relation of Kāraṇa citta and Kārya citta:

Prof. Dāsgupta in his study of Patañjali describes the relation between Kāraṇa citta and Kārya citta. Kāraṇa
citta contracts or expands and appears as our individual cittas in the various kinds of our bodies at the successive rebirths. The Karana citta is always connected with the Purusa and appears contracted when the Purusa presides over the animal bodies and as relatively expanded when he presides over human bodies and more expanded when he presides over the bodies of gods etc. This contracted or expanded citta appears as our states of consciousness. After death the Karana citta which is always connected with the Purusa manifests itself in the new body which is formed by the Apoor (filling in the of Prakriti on account of effective merit or demerit that the Purusa had apparently acquired). The formation of the body as well as the contraction or expansion of the Karana citta as the corresponding Karyacitta to suit it is due this Apoor. The Yoga does not hold that the citta has got a separate fine astral body within which it may remain encased and may be transformed along with it to another body at rebirth after death. The citta being all-pervading, it appears at once to contract or expand itself to suit the particular body destined for it by its merit or demerit but there is no separate astral body. In reality the Karanacitta as such always remains all pervading. It is only its Karya-citta or Vyrtti that appears in a contracted or expanded form, according to the particular body which it may be
said to occupy. This solves the riddle in Jaina psychology regarding the expansion of soul or its contraction according to the size or its contraction according to the size of the body. The soul of an ant is as small as an ant and soul of an elephant is as big as it.\textsuperscript{56}

**Nature of Citta:**

"It is this citta which appears as the particular states of consciousness in which there are both the knower and known reflected and it comprehends them both in one state of consciousness. It must however be remembered that this citta is essentially a modification of Prakṛti and as such is non-intelligent; but by the seeming reflection of the Purusa it appears as the knower who is knowing a certain object and therefore we see that in the states themselves are comprehended both the knower and the known. This citta is not indeed a separate Tattwa, but is the summed up unity of the eleven senses and the ego and also the five prāṇas. (Nagesh v.10) It thus stands for all that is psychical in man; the states of consciousness including the living principle in man represented by the activity of the prāṇas.\textsuperscript{57}

**Aim of Yoga:**

It is the object of Yoga to restrain the citta gradually from its various states and thus gradually
cause it to turn back to its original cause the Kāraṇacitta which is all-pervading. The modifications of Kāraṇacitta into the states as the Kāryacitta is due to its being overcome by its inherent Tamas and Rājas; so when the transformations of the citta into the passing states are arrested by concentration, there takes place a backward movement and the all-pervading state of the citta being restored to itself and all Tamas being overcome, the yogi acquires omniscience and finally when this citta becomes as pure as the form of Puruṣa itself, the Purusa becomes conscious of himself and is liberated from the bonds of the Prakṛti.

The Yoga system, in the first chapter describes the Yoga for him whose mind is inclined toward transe-cognition. In the second chapter, is described the means by which one with an out-going mind (vyutthān citta) may also acquire yoga. In the third chapter are described those phenomena which strengthen the faith of the Yogi on the manes described in the second chapter. In the fourth chapter is described the Kaivalya, absolute independence or oneness which is the end of all the Yoga practices.
State of Prajñā:

The final uprooting of Avidyā with its vasanas gives result to the attainment of true knowledge called the Prajñā in which state the seed of false knowledge is altogether annihilated and cannot be revived again. Before this state, the discriminative knowledge becomes strengthened in the mind. The impurity of the energy of Rajas is removed. The Sattva as the manifesting entity becomes of the highest purity. When the state of Buddhi becomes as pure as the Puruṣa itself, all self-inquiry subsides, the vision of the real form of the Puruṣa arises and the false knowledge together with the consequent fruition of actions, cease for all. This is that state of Citta which far from tending towards the Kaivalya of the Puruṣa, "The mind becomes deflected towards discrimination and bowed down (or by) isolation."

Dharmamegha:

In Sutra 28 (fourth pada) it is said that 'perfect knowledge means knowing the nature differing from each other of all elements in whatever order they exist: even, when this knowledge has taken place if the ascetic has not the desire for the fruit, or is not inactive, then, by means of the discriminative knowledge being entirely
consolidated on non-production of other thoughts, the medita
tion, that is called 'Dharma-Megha', cloud of virtue is attained. It is called the cloud of virtue because it irrigates or waters the highest virtue, which is called 'Ashtu-Krsna', neither white nor black, and is the provider of the chief aim of the soul.

Self in system of Śaṅkara:

Śaṅkara begins with a searching scepticism casting a shadow of doubt on everything whose reality could possibly be questioned. One may doubt not merely dreams but the solid realities of the walking world, dharma or religious duties prescribed by the Vedas, the science of Yoga and Sāmkhya and other system of philosophical speculation. But all the process of doubt and inquiry must rest on something indubitable. Doubt universalised destroys itself. We cannot doubt everything only because we would then be doubting our own doubt and left with no reason why we should anything else. Śaṅkarācārya finds in the self a reality beyond all possibility of doubt, a reality which I can deny only by denying my own denial. Everyone is conscious of the existence of his own self and never thinks 'I am not'. If the existence of the self
were not known, everyone would think 'I am not'. This self of whose existence all are conscious is Brahman'. The reality of the self cannot be doubted for this doubt is itself raised by the self. If it cannot be disposed neither can it be proved by any means of any right knowledge, for all knowledge presupposes it. 'Being self-resplendent consciousness, it shines forth without any external aid just as a light does not require another light to reveal it'. What is psychologically subjective, is metaphysically objective. Śaṅkarācārya regards the conscious stream of thoughts, desires and other mental events as no less objective than unchanging flux of nature. The self is not identical with the stream of sensations nor with the synthesizing operations of the internal organs. It is the unchanging witness of the successive states of the mind-complex. 'The Ātman' says the 'Vivek Chudāmani', 'is the witness of the individual soul and its operations; it is pure consciousness! If it were a member of the psycho-physical series in time the self would be an object and therefore cease to be the subject. It is the spirit that illumines the entire series in time and transcends it. It is clear that the self of which Śaṅkarācārya speaks is not the 'Soul' or 'Mind' which is complementary or opposite of the body in the simple dichotomy of mind and body.
Empirical self and Transcendental self:

Śaṅkarācārya distinguishes between the empirical self (Jīva) and the transcendental self (Ātman) and regards the former as the individual self and the latter as the infinite and universal self. The empirical self is the Ātman limited by mind (Manas), intellect (Buddhi), egoism (Ahaṁkāra) and the sense organs. It is the knower (Jñāta), the enjoyer (bhoktā) and the active agent (Kartā).

The distinction of cognition, feeling and volition is recognised. The internal organ (antaḥkaraṇa) is made of Sattva, Rajas and Tamas. Sattva produces knowledge and pleasure, Rajas produces pain, attachment, aversion, passions, volition and action. Tamas produces nescience (ajñāna) and delusion. Sattva produces merit. Rajas produces demerit. Perception, memory, imagination, reasoning and intuition are the different kinds of cognition. Pleasure, pain and neutral feeling are the different kinds of feeling. Bliss is the highest happiness. Desire, aversion, resolution and volition are the conative states. Actions are mental, vocal and organic. They produce merits and demerits. They are imperceptible like subconscious impressions (Saṁskāra). The Superconscious, the conscious, the subconscious and the unconscious are recognised as the different degrees of consciousness. All these are mental modes which do not belong to the pure
self (atman) which is pure homogeneous consciousness. It can be experienced by integral knowledge (samyagjnana) on the complete destruction of nescience.

Method of Introspection and self-consciousness in System of Samkara:

In his work, Šāmkara, a psychological study, Shri Rao has said that Šāmkara has comments to make on introspection as a method of self-observation. The problem of the self observing itself means for him the subject becoming an object of itself. He rejects the possibility of introspection on two counts: the nature of self and the nature of observation. Observation or cognition is contingent upon the duality of subject-object, which is bridged by sense-organs and the mind. We observe a tree because the object which is 'out there' and the self which is within are connected by the mind streaming out through the senses and mind. (Brhadāranyaka Bhāṣya, 3.9.26). Thus even if self were to be an object there would be no possibility of its observation, owing to the absence of the instruments of observation. 'As fire does not burn itself, so self does not know itself, and the knower can have no knowledge of a thing that is not its object' (Brhadāranyakabhāṣya, 2.4.14). 'If it be suggested,
Saṅkara further observes 'that the self can be both
the knower and the knowable, we argue that it is
impossible for self is altogether indivisible'; and 'it
cannot be that the self reaches to itself, because there
is no difference within the self (Taittiriya bhāṣya,
second valli). The familiar objection that is raised
against introspection that it implies the duplication of
self is admirably stated by Saṅkara: 'All that is
thinkable cannot be thought of except by the thinker
(i.e. the self), mind being only an instrument. If so,
what would be the result? ...... That which thinks of all
will only be the thinker and never the thinkable; and
there is no other thinker of the thinker when self is
to be thought by the self; or the same Atman should be
divided into two forms as the thinker and thinkable,
just as a bamboo is split into two; this is absurd'.

Helalso suggests the unnaturalness of such a
process. He asserts that our instruments of observation
are by nature characterised by an out-going tendency.
We naturally and for the major part of our lives, think of
the our world, and sometimes when we turn our attention
to 'ourselves' we are concerned with mental acts and
attitudes- which are, of course, objective to, and
different from the self, or observer. 'Nor has the thinker any time left to 'think' of himself as he is always engaged in 'thinking' of the thinkable. 'Besides only one mental activity can occur at a time; when one thinks of something, he cannot think of another thing at the same time. Attempting to bring about a process where and when another has already been on is futile. All introspection is at best a retrospection only.  

But Śaṅkara does not reject the possibility of observing our mental processes. And this, because the 'observer' happens to be the self while the 'observed' are the modifications of the internal organ, which are but objects for the self. Mind, however, cannot observe its own processes, as it is not in the nature of mind to be an observer; it is meant only to convey the facts of the outer world to the self. And self cannot observe itself as it cannot at once be object and subject. Further, mind cannot observe the self because it is inert and objectively oriented. But nothing prevents the self from being the observer of mental processes. Śaṅkara holds that the 'self is the witness of all the modifications of the internal organ'. His view about the self is succinctly stated thus: 'It can neither be striven after nor avoided.'
Consciousness in the system of Rāmānuja:

Rāmānuja holds with Śaṅkara that consciousness constitutes the essence of the self. But he differs from Śaṅkara in holding that the self is not mere consciousness but also the subject of consciousness: even as a lamp itself is of the nature of light, and still light is its property, so the self itself is of the nature of consciousness and still consciousness is a property of the self. According to Rāmānuja, there can be no consciousness without a self, just as there can be no light without a lamp; just as the lamp is nothing but light, still consciousness is referred to the unity of the self. Thus the self, according to Rāmānuja is not mere consciousness, but the ego is not a phenomenal appearance of the self when it is determined by the limiting condition of Ahamkāra, a modification of antaḥkaraṇa which is a particular form of nescience (avidyā); but it is identical with the self and constitutes its very essence.

Its comparision with Śaṅkara:

Śaṅkara holds that just as the idea of silver is illusorily superimposed upon a nacre, so egoity is illusorily superimposed upon the self which is really beyond the distinction of ego and non-ego. But if egoity
were nothing but an illusory superimposition of nescience upon the self, then there would be a non-discrimination of the ego from pure consciousness or the self and there would be such a consciousness as 'I am consciousness' and not as 'I am conscious'. But as a matter of fact, we always have such an experience as 'I am conscious': this undeniable fact of experience clearly shows that the self is the subject of consciousness. We cannot divide this single indivisible consciousness into two parts and hold that the element of 'I' is illusory and the element of consciousness is real- 'I' ness or egoity is an illusory superimposition of nescience, and consciousness alone is a real ontological verity. (Rāmānuja Bhāṣya, i, 11). Śaṅkara argues, that by ego we mean the agent (karaṇa) of cognition (jñāna), and that this agency of knowledge cannot be regarded as an attribute of the self which is changeless and eternal. Hence, egoity or the character of a knower which involves an action and consequently change, is not a property of the unchanging and eternal self, but of the unconscious antaḥkaraṇa (internal organ) which is modified into egoism (ahāmkāra). Rāmānuja contends that egoity or the character of knower cannot be the property of an unconscious object, viz., the antaḥkaraṇa, but that it is the distinctive
character of a conscious being, viz., the self. Moreover, the ego or knower does not involve change; it is the subject of knowledge; a knower is not necessarily an active, energizing, and changing principle. According to Rāmānuja, the self is eternal, and the neutral consciousness of the self is eternal; but though the consciousness of the self is eternal, it is subject to contraction and expansion which are not natural properties of the self, but its mere accidents due to the 'Karma' of the person in the cycle of his mundane existence. The self, in its pure essence, is unchangeable. But though changeless, it is knower or ego. The agency of knowledge cannot belong to the unconscious organ of egoity. How can the conscious ahamkara, which is a modification of the antahkaranam, become a conscious knower? It may be argued that the unconscious organ of egoity may appear as a conscious knower because of the reflection of consciousness in it owing to its proximity to consciousness or the self. But this argument is quite invalid. What is the meaning of the 'reflection of consciousness'? Does it mean the reflection of ahamkara on consciousness? Or, does it mean the reflection of consciousness on the unconscious ahamkara? The first alternative is impossible since Śāṅkara
does not admit at all that consciousness in itself, or the self, is a knower. Nor can consciousness be reflected upon the unconscious ahamkāra, since that which is unconscious can never be a knower.

**Consciousness and Ego:**

Śaṅkara holds that the self exists in deep sleep as the witness of the general non-particularized nescience, when the organ of egoity is dissolved. But Rāmānuja asks: What is the meaning of a Sākṣin? By a Sākṣin we mean that which directly and immediately knows an object; and hence that which does not know an object cannot be called a Sākṣin; mere consciousness is never regarded as a Sākṣin; a Sākṣin is nothing but a knower or an ego. Egoity is not an adventitious property of the self, so that when this property of the self, so that when this property is destroyed, the self may remain in its own essential condition as the pure light of consciousness which is above the distinction of ego and non-ego; but egoity constitutes the essence of the self; the ego is identical with the self and self is identical with the ego. And this egoity of the self persists even in dreamless sleep, but there is no clear and distinct consciousness of the egoity
at that time, since it is overpowered by Tamas, and there is no consciousness of external objects at that time. If it did not persist in deep sleep we could never remember that we slept well on waking from sleep. And even when the self is released from the fetters of mundane existence, it does not realize itself as pure consciousness but as an ego. The self is always manifested as an ego, and never as mere consciousness above the distinction of ego and non-ego. Rāmānuja’s conception of self as an ego agrees, to a great extent with Prabhākara’s view of the self, the only difference being that according to the latter, consciousness does not constitute the essence of the self as Rāmānuja holds with Śaṅkara, but it is a quality of the self which is its substrate.

Comparison of different views in ancient Darśanās:

The Cārvāka identifies the self either with the gross body or with the sense-organs. In the Cārvāka system the conception of self is that of the material self since it is believed that mind is material and thought is a function of matter. In the Jaina system self is the centre of consciousness and is pervaded everywhere. The Buddhist idealist identifies the self with the stream of consciousness without any core of unity or substantiality.
It is held that self is a psychic continuum. It is psychological me. The Naiyāyika recognises the self as a permanent substance endowed with the qualities of cognition, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion and effort. Some older Naiyāyikas hold that the self is an object of inference. It is inferred from its qualities as their substratum. It cannot be perceived because it cannot be subject and object of the same act of knowledge. The Naiyāika rises above the psychological Me to the conception of the pure self or I. He conceives the pure self as the substratum of the empirical self or stream of cognitions, affections and conations. The Sāmkhya also holds with Naiyāyikas that the self is an object of inference. But according to Sāmkhya the self can be inferred from its reflection (Pratibimba) in 'buddhi' as its original. The Sāmkhya dualism of Puruṣa and Prakṛti, Draṣṭṛ and Draśya, self and not-self makes the perception of the self impossible. The self is only the seer, it can never be seen; it can never turn back upon itself and perceive it. Vaiśeṣika holds that the self is not an object of ordinary perception, but it is an object of Yogic perception or higher perception. It is perceived only through the mind in relation to its qualities. The older Naiyāyikas hold
that the self is inferred from its qualities. While the new-naiyāyika holds that the self is perceived together with its qualities. The Bhātta agrees with the Neo-Naiyāyika that the self is an object of introspection or internal perception (manasapratyakṣa). He does not hold with Prabhākara that every act of cognition is appropriated by the self and that all consciousness involves self-consciousness. There is a distinction between consciousness and self-consciousness. The Bhātta holds that only when an object is known and appropriated by the self, it is known as an object of internal perception or self-consciousness. Prabhākara, on the other hand, holds that every act of cognition apprehends itself the cognizing subject and the cognizing object. Self-consciousness is not a higher degree of consciousness. All consciousness is self-consciousness. Object-consciousness and self-consciousness always go together. There is no self-consciousness apart from object-consciousness. The Jaina agrees with Prabhākara in holding that in every cognition of an object there is the cognition of the self, the object and itself; that every cognition is appropriated by the self. But Jaina differs from Prabhākara in holding that it is the self that perceives itself through itself together with
the object and the cognition of the object, and also that
the self is an object of internal perception such as 'I am
happy', 'I am unhappy', etc. But how can the subject be
perceived as an object? The Jaina replies that whatever
is directly and immediately experienced is the object of
perception. Śaṅkara conceives the self as pure conscious-
ness above the distinction of subject and object. He puts
pure consciousness above the distinction of subject and
object, while the Buddhist Idealist (Yogācāra) puts the
distinction of subject and object within consciousness.

Both of them have not to face the difficulty how the
subject can become an object. The individual self of
Śaṅkara is the knower, the doer and the享受者. It is the
subject from the individual point of view. The Jīva is an
object of self-consciousness (ahampratyaya), but the Ātman
is apprehended by immediate intuition. According to
Rāmānuja, the self is essentially an ego or subject; egoity
is not an accidental quality of the self, it constitutes
its very essence, and the self is always perceived as an
ego or subject. It is an object of self-consciousness and
is clearly apprehended by higher intuition.
Consciousness in Modern Thought: Dr. Radhakrishnan's View:

In modern thought, Dr. Radhakrishnan argues for consciousness and attempts to establish it. In his 'An Idealist view of life', it is said, 'The strikingly specific behavior of living beings cannot be confused with atomic activity'. 'There is a specific inner direction in living organisms which grow, repair, reproduce themselves and mould the outer circumstances into their own patterns. What we know of matter does not help us to understand the co-ordinated maintenance of life, life is a different order of fact. 66

Consciousness and Behavior:

It is said that 'The emergence of mind or consciousness in the consciousness of living matter marks the advent of another new quality which cannot be wholly reduced to matter or life. Though the connection between nervous and psychical phenomena is intimate, the one cannot be reduced to the other. When the behaviorist tries to identify consciousness with some organic responses, it mistakes the organism for the meaning it expresses. He also mistakes organic movements
for behavior. What is externally observable is not behavior but only movements. To treat them as behavior is to assume a unity of direction and activity on the part of the organism as a whole. Intelligent adaptation cannot be explained as a mere conditioned reflex. Because the former embodies an insight which manifests itself as a direct hit, whereas the latter is a random process, a result built up by many repetitions.

Dr. Radhakrishnan holds that the science of psychology is on a different level than that of physics or physiology. 'While the conscious arises from or emerges from or emerges out of the vital or the biological, it is as real as the biological, from which it emerges, and represents a kind of interaction with things different from the vital.' 67

Self-consciousness a higher degree of consciousness:

'In self-conscious beings, we meet with a set of phenomena quite distinct from the physical or the vital or the merely conscious'. 'Self-conscious marks a higher degree of consciousness, a new plane of emergence.' 'Self-conscious or reflective mind is different from the unreflective mind of the infant or the animal'.
The reflective capacity of the human mind and its power of free invention are not mere complications of lower instincts. It is the essence of self-conscious intelligence to look before and after the vary action according to circumstances. Instinct does neither. 68

Man has grown, it is true, out of the physical, vital and animal life; he is a part of nature, and has been 'carved out of nature's continuum'. But when 'we pass from animal to man, we find not a gradual development but a sudden break'. 'Man is not simply the animal gone up any more than an animal is a man gone down. Between the two there is a gulf. No amount of scientific observation can help us to explain the astonishing change'. 69

This view of Dr. Radhakrishnan can be traced in the Upaniṣads where matter (anna), life (Prāṇa), perceptual consciousness (manas), self-conscious intellect (vijñāna) and bliss (ānanda) are held to be truer and truer expressions of the spirit. The modern view of emergent evolution can be compared with this ancient view expressed in Upaniṣads.
Modern Times. Consciousness in Sri Aurobindo's System:

Sri Aurobindo does not accept the dualism of matter and spirit. Nor does he accept the a-cosmic nature of the Absolute Reality, which according to him is spiritual. It is both transcendent as well as immanent, static as well as dynamic. Sri Aurobindo's metaphysical position regarding the apprehension of the Ultimate reality in its essence as well as in dynamism is this, that all possible knowledge is within the power of man to acquire—for all cosmic and supra-cosmic aspects of reality there exist corresponding powers and faculties in man by which he can know them. God, universe and the nature of his own self, therefore, need not remain for him always a closed book; at a certain stage of his evolutionary growth, when he is sufficiently evolved psychologically, he can develop a higher level of consciousness to which powers and faculties of acquiring knowledge of supra-physical realities is intrinsic; a growth into what Sri Aurobindo calls the Supramental truth-consciousness can enable him to have direct and immediate knowledge of truths beyond the grasp of the purely rational intellect. Sri Aurobindo writes in his 'Life Divine': 'The unknown is not unknowable; it need not remain the Unknown for us, unless we chose ignorance or persist in our first
limitations. For to all Things that are not unknowable, all things in the universe, there correspond in that universe faculties which can take cognisance of them, and in man, the microcosm, these faculties are always existent and at a certain stage capable of development...

Fundamentally, all possible knowledge is knowledge within the power of humanity'. In Sri Aurobindo's system the problem of higher knowledge is not certainly concerned with receiving stray 'intuitions' in the mind—what is usually understood by supra-rational knowledge,—but with psychological evolution, with changing the mode of consciousness and acquiring higher cognitive faculties through a transformation of the rational mind into what is designated by him as 'the mind of light', and then developing it further into the supramental state.

**Nature of Consciousness:**

Consciousness is not a phenomenon dependent on the reactions of personality to the forces of nature and amounting to no more than a seeing or interpretation of these reactions. Consciousness is a reality inherent in existence. It is there even when it is not active on the surface, but silent and immobile; it is there
even when it is invisible on the surface; not reacting on outward things or sensible to them, but withdrawn and either active or inactive within; it is there even when it seems to us to be quite absent and the being to our view unconscious and inanimate.

'Consciousness is not only power of awareness of self and things, it is or has also a dynamic and creative energy. It can determine its own reactions or abstain from reactions; it can not only answer to forces, but create or put out from itself forces. Consciousness is chit but also chit shakti'.

Range of Consciousness:

'Consciousness is usually identified with mind, but mental consciousness is only the human range which no more exhausts all the possible range of consciousness than human sight exhausts all the gradations of colour or human hearing all the gradations of sound-for there is such above or below that is to man invisible and inaudible. So there are ranges of consciousness above and below the human range, with which the normal human has no contact and they seem to it unconscious-supramental or overmental and subliminal ranges'.
Consciousness above Mind:

In Sri Aurobindo’s system, mind has got the nature to divide and analyse, to bisect and compass within its own narrow limits. But mind is not the highest instrument of cognition which a man possesses. There are still higher instruments by the help of which higher modes of our realities and inner grades of knowledge and consciousness can be grasped and realized. Sometimes such use of the term ‘Consciousness above Mind’ is considered to be ‘Intuition’ and therefore non-rational. ‘Intuition’ is looked upon by some schools of thought as something always irrational. But it cannot be arbitrarily presumed that the non-rational is necessarily the irrational. It can be supra-rational. It depends upon the capacity of the person who has a particular intuition. What we are normally conscious of as our self is only surface being, the most external and out-going part of our total personality; there is not only a submerged part of our being commonly known as the sub-conscious, but also a subliminal part— a level of consciousness alongside the normal, and a superconscient part with the spiritual and gnostic ranges, at the summit of which, Sri Aurobindo says, is the Supermind, the supra-mental Truth-consciousness; he calls it the gnostic light and
and creative dynamis of the Ultimate Reality. Sri Aurobindo states that it is an integral consciousness by attaining which one can know Reality in all its aspects, in its essence as well as in its modes and manifestation.

**Nature of Supramental Consciousness:**

The Supreme supra-cosmic Sacchidananda is above all multiple phenomena. Supermind may be described as its power of self-awareness and world-awareness, the world being known as within itself and not outside. So to live consciously in the supreme sacchidananda one must pass through the Supermind. If one is in the Supra-cosmic apart from the manifestation, there is no place for problems or solutions. The problem arises with regard to manifestation of the Supreme Person. Integral knowledge of such manifestation requires highest consciousness which is called Supermind. The Supermind is an entirely different consciousness not only from the spiritualised Mind, but from the planes above spiritualised Mind which intervene between it and the Supramental plane. Supramental consciousness is defined as Truth-consciousness or as Real-idea. It is the power of Vidyā that is knowledge. It is immediate, unerring, infallible and absolutely certain or indubitable. It
involves no temporal process, or activity and is entirely spontaneous. It is characterised by absolute identity between knower and known. In the technical terms of Sri Aurobindo's philosophy, supermind is described as 'The infinite consciousness higher than the mental being. Its evolution here is an inevitable necessity... It is the vastness beyond the ordinary firmament of our consciousness... It is a link between the two worlds: above is the unitarian or indivisible consciousness of Sachchidananda and below is the analytic dividing consciousness of the mind. Supermind is between them; a comprehensive and a creative consciousness. It has the knowledge of the one but it is able to draw out from the one its hidden multitudes. It manifests the many but it is not lost in them. Unity is the basis of the supermind'.

Mind, Soul and Supermind:

Mind and Soul are such components of the world of manifestation as reveal themselves at higher stages of evolution. Matter is the lower form of manifestation of the element of 'Sat', life is the lower form of manifestation of the element of 'Chit', soul is the lower form of manifestation of the element of 'Ananda' in Sachchidananda, mind is the lower form of manifestation of Supreme's creative Truth-consciousness. Mind is the power of Avidyā or ignorance groping towards the
light of knowledge. The different factors of mental life—thought, feeling and will—are, in a measure, at variance with each other, and all separated from the self-luminosity of Reality. Each of these mental factors again divided into a triplicity of subject, object and their relatedness. In quest of truth, mind always proceeds piecemeal taking snapshots of Reality from divergent standpoints, and attempting at the utmost an assemblage and co-ordination of such standpoints.

**Vidvā and Avidvā:**

Śāmkhya holds that the mind is essentially a modification or evolute of Prakṛti, illumined by the light of Puruṣa which is pure knowledge. In Advaita Vedānta, mind is believed to be a modification or function of Avidyā or ignorance which is considered trenchantly different from and consequently utterly discontinuous with the principle of pure knowledge. According to Sri Aurobindo, Vidvā and Avidvā, with all the difference that there is between them, are not absolutely exclusive of each other. Avidyā is in its essence a special mode of operation of Vidvā itself; it is not the negation of Vidvā or its direct opposite, but rather its purposive self-diminution. "Whereas Vidvā is
immediate knowledge of the infinite, Avidyā is the Infinite's exclusive concentration of consciousness in a particular direction for the fulfilment of a specific purpose - the purpose of phenomenal self-manifestation under apparently hostile circumstances. 74

Soul and psychic being:

Sri Aurobindo distinguishes between what is usually called soul and the new term which he coins as psychic being. Soul is a spark of the divine supporting all individual existence in nature. The psychic being is a conscious form of that soul growing in evolution - in the persistent process that develops first life in matter, mind in life, until finally mind can develop into overmind and overmind into the Supramental Truth. The soul supports the nature in its evolution through these grades, but is itself not any of these things. Soul is the static form of the Divine in a person, whereas psychic being or psychic is a progressive and evolutionary aspect of nature. Physical, vital, mental and spiritual are progressive aspects of an individual being. Psyche rules over physical, vital, mental and spiritual aspects by evolving into them and thus transforming the 'Prakṛti of ignorance into Prakṛti of Knowledge'. 'Psychic is not above but behind - its seat is behind the heart, its
power is not knowledge but an essential or spiritual feeling- it has the clearest sense of the truth and a sort of inherent perception of it which is of the nature of soul-perception and soul-feeling.

Psychic being is referred to in Brhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad as follows: "When the sun has set, Yājñavalkya, and the moon has set, and fire has gone out and speech has stopped, what light does a person here have? 'The self indeed is his light', said he, 'for with the self, indeed, as the light, one sits, moves about, does one's work and returns'. In the next verse, it is said, 'which is the self? 'The person here who consists of knowledge among the senses, the light within the heart. He remaining the same, wanders along the two worlds seeming to think, seeming to move about. He on becoming asleep (getting into dream condition), transcends this world and the forms of death'.

It is also referred to in the Kaṭha Upaniṣad as "He that is awake in those who sleep". It is our inmost being and supports all the others, mental, vital and physical, but it is also much veiled by them and has to act upon them as an influence rather than by its sovereign right of direct action'. When the psychic being becomes dominant and freely uses its instruments,
then the impulse towards the divine becomes complete and transformation of mind, vital and body, not merely their liberation, becomes possible.

According to Sri Aurobindo following is the picture of the relation between body, life, mind, illumined mind, overmind and supermind:

**Purushottama or Divine Consciousness**

as both static and dynamic

as dynamic it possesses all-comprehending consciousness, apprehending consciousness and projecting consciousness.

Dynamic status is the self-extension of Sachchidānanda. In all the all-comprehending consciousness there is no distinction between conscious soul and force-soul.

In apprehending consciousness God becomes both the subject and object. Here the universal divine becomes the individual Jīvātman.

Owing to Purushottama exercising divine consciousness there results concentration on the Jīvātman. Jīvātman enjoys all-comprehending status of supermind. Supramental realization is characterized by the knowledge of becoming all-I in all and all in Me.

In the projecting consciousness, the relation between Jīvātman and Iśwārā becomes dominant. Jīvātman involves itself into play. There is the beginning of dualism in unity.
There is no lapse into ignorance so far. But there is presence of conditions in which such lapse may be a consequence.

Overmental consciousness

It is global, but not comprehending. It is the consequence of the apprehending consciousness of the divine. It makes possible independent developments of myriad aspects of God. Individual realizes and visualizes vast movements, each independently, as it were, starting, developing and reaching its climax. It creates oppositions between aspects of God. (Such as personal and impersonal, static and dynamic, transcendent and immanent, immutable and mutable).

Here Purusha is able to return to its separate existence and abide in a free self sovereignty by rejecting Prakriti's overclouding material principle.

It is the golden lid which can hide the supramental consciousness.

It is determinative of all relations. Each overmental being has his own world each force has its own play and throws itself out to realize its own fulfilment in the cosmic play. All is possible and from this separative seat of conflicting and even mutually negating possibilities comes too the possibility of ignorance, unconsciousness, falsehood, death and suffering.

The Highest Mind is the intuitive consciousness. It serves for the true but limited relations:

- Intuitive Mind
- Illumined Mind
- Higher Mind
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<tr>
<th>Mind Proper</th>
<th>Mental consciousness: to piece out, to compare, to contrast and to limit.</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Thinking Dynamic Externalising</td>
<td>The final operation of the apprehending consciousness.</td>
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<td>Mind</td>
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Mental consciousness: to piece out, to compare, to contrast and to limit.

The final operation of the apprehending consciousness.

Psychic being which is the direct portion of divine consciousness rules over body, life and mind. This chaitya Purusha, essentially the bliss aspect of the divine consciousness.

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<th>Mind ----------- Inner mental</th>
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<tr>
<td>Life or Vital ------- Inner Vital</td>
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<tr>
<td>Body------------- Subtle Physical</td>
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The inner mental, inner vital and subtle physical are the regions called by Sri Aurobindo the 'Subliminal consciousness'. It is here that telepathy, clairvoyance, precognition and clairaudience take place.

The inner vital has connection with mind and body. It is called vital mind also. The function of this mind is not to think and reason to perceive, consider and find out or value things, for that is the function of the thinking mind proper, 'buddhi'- but to plan or dream or imagine what can be done.

The vital physical is the vehicle of the nervous responses of our physical nature; it is the field and instrument of sensations and reactions of all kind to the impact of the outer physical and gross material life. It is also largely responsible for most of the suffering and disease of mind or body to which the physical being is subject in nature. Along with mind the subliminal consciousness is a movement of knowledge-ignorance.
Around mind, life and body which appear to be the individual on the superficial layer, there are subconscious physical, subconscious vital and subconscious mental. They are called by Sri Aurobindo in general 'circumconscient or intraconscient'. Below the subconscious mental, vital and physical is the Inconscient.
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