The purpose of this thesis is to indicate the inadequacy of the rationalistic and empiricistic interpretation of the Mind and to stress the need to extend our psychological experience if we are to have a true knowledge of the nature of mind. The treatment of the problem is philosophico-psychological. The assumption of the treatment is that a given philosophical view is limited to the extent to which it admits certain experiences and rejects the others. A given position in philosophy is usually found to give some satisfying answer to a few philosophical problems - that too to a certain extent; but with regard to the others, it faces dilemmas and self-contradictions. Again more importantly with regard to its basic position, even though it may be true, we are unable to decide its truth due to the fact that they present themselves before us more or less equally cogent alternative basic positions. The indecision, I urge, cannot be resolved merely by philosophising or speculation. A mere philosophical treatment is not adequate to the task. Alternatives in philosophy would always result so long as we confine ourselves to our present level of knowledge. There is a conspicuous absence in our present body of knowledge of those "crucial facts" which alone would enable us to decide upon the truth of any given position from
among the other alternatives. A knowledge of those crucial facts is then imperative. And I think that a profounder psychology may be able to reveal to us some of those facts. Only a portion of such facts I have endeavoured to present and have attempted to draw their philosophical import.

Sciences are said to be positive and normative. A positive science claims to regard events as they are actually taking place and working in the universe, whereas a normative science proposes to take into consideration various norms, ideals and values which shape and mould the course of manifold events. It is a pertinent question to ask whether the distinction laid down as this is valid from philosophical point of view. Reply to this question will have an immense bearing on the progress and future of sciences such as Physiology, biology, sociology and psychology. As a result it might either elevate and support or allow degeneration of values in spheres of art, literature, morals, philosophy and religion. At present the positive sciences which directly or indirectly deal with human life, have developed a tendency either to neglect the richness of human personality or to explain away the intellectual and creative aspects of human mind.
There have been various schools of philosophy such as Realism, Pragmatism, Idealism, Naturalism, Existentialism, Logical empiricism and Mysticism which attempt to explain human mind and personality and relate it with the nature of Reality. Each school propounds legitimate criteria and means of knowledge to determine the nature of Reality and to know it. These schools, however, lack in the comprehensive and integral approach to the consideration of mind and its relation with Reality. An integral approach to various criteria of validity and modes of cognition is found necessary.

Philosophers, saints and mystics have widely differed among themselves in articulating and revealing the nature of Reality, i.e., whether it is personal or impersonal, transcendental or empirical, universal or particular, static or dynamic, cosmic or a-cosmic. The right course of philosophy is to discover the adequate means of knowledge and consequently the data of experiences which may reveal the true nature of Reality.

In psychology, there are several schools of it which endeavour to explain the human psyche. At present there is a movement in psychology to gradually lower down the status of mind and personality and thus indirectly to reject the aspiration of man to know Reality. If the existence of mind
is denied and consequently intellectual, affective and appreciative activities are not assigned their separate status, the philosophical activity, i.e., an attempt to know Reality as distinguished from transient and evanescent phenomena, human activity Par Excellence, loses its significance and thus we arrive at the bankruptcy of human mind and aspiration for self-realization is doomed for ever.

Philosophy is an intellectual attempt to know Reality in all its aspects. The word 'Tattvajñāna' implies that it is knowledge of the essence of the whole universe. Philosophy includes in its all-comprehensive compass every field of knowledge, be it so-called positive or normative science. Truly speaking, philosophy is the queen of all the sciences. Its 'knowledge' is of utmost value as it determines the order and plane of other kinds of knowledge such as scientific, aesthetic, moral, literary and religious. Sometimes a distinction is made between metaphysics and philosophy and accordingly it is maintained that the former takes a rational approach towards the knowledge of Reality while the latter is a vague term implying 'emotion', or 'intuition' or 'value'. Thus metaphysicians do not accept aesthetic, moral, intuitive and experiential approaches to Reality. This, however, is a misleading distinction. It
removes important and indispensable means and data of knowledge by which we can determine the nature of Reality, its relation with the cosmos and its way of manifestation.

Sometimes philosophy is sharply distinguished from mysticism; they are regarded as totally apart and therefore the method of one is regarded as inapplicable to that of the other. We will observe that philosophy and mysticism are, in fact, complementary to each other. Reason is not the only instrument of knowing Reality. Modern psychology reveals to us the depths of the psyche and higher flights of consciousness. It is true that philosophy should be as consistent as possible. But the inadequate concept of consistency should not blind us to the glaring data which mysticism provides us with. Moreover, reason is normally not so neutral and impersonal. The idea of impersonality of human reason is quite inadequate. We think according to what we are.

We want knowledge, that is our primary concern. If that comes by reason, we shall worship reason. But the history of philosophy teaches us that reason is not likely to disclose to us the inner secracies of knowledge. If experience can give us knowledge, we shall worship experience. But experience too is not uniform; it has startling variations; it has in its various reports
discomforting conflicts. The question is: Are these conflicts ultimate in the field of experience?

It may be contended that reason is the judge of experience. But how, we may ask, shall reason decide? The general and formal truth of non-contradiction and the principle of all-comprehensiveness help us in deciding the final truth. The origin of a river from a hard rock of the mountain may simply be judged to be a self-contradiction if one has not seen it to be a fact. But in concrete reality contradiction is hardly so flat. The real source of contradiction is to be found in the depth of our consciousness where we will ultimately find that it is the ego which is self-contradictory. All-comprehensiveness would, in a sense, certainly be satisfying, that is, provided it is an experience, and not merely an abstract ideal. Indeed, Bradley conceives of the Absolute as an all-comprehensive experience. But he denies us any experience of the Absolute. If he is right, then, we shall be obliged to contend that we shall never have the true knowledge. But there is available to us an experience in which all experiences combine and find their due place. If it is so then its supposition and a search into its implication will not be unjustified. Such an all-comprehensive and 'Integral experience' cannot be contradicted by anybody.
If it is contradicted, it will simply be labelled as short of 'integral experience' or at the most as a penultimate experience. A truly 'integral experience' (the mark of which is that it is inclusive of any experience that is asserted and it is such that nobody will dare contradict it) is its own criterion, or let us say, it needs no test for its veracity. At lower levels of experience, reason may come into judge and organise our experience, even though, we must accept that its solutions can never be wholly satisfactory. This is the underlying argument of the present thesis. Indeed, it is not stated fully, since a complete statement of it would have led me into abstruse philosophical problems which lie outside the scope of this thesis. But what is stated in the thesis does indicate the direction towards this argument.

I have attempted to analyse the nature of mind, make a comparative survey of various opinions and theories concerning it, and to stress the need to explore and extend the field of experience. Under the leadership of empiricism which makes sense-experience and its allied modes of cognition the fundamental criterion of truth, psychology, in present century, can deny such a comprehensive approach to the nature of mind. But I shall urge that empiricistic approach has failed to account for the unconscious and
paranormal occurrences. The discoveries of psycho-analysis, psychopathology and psychical research hint at a significant departure from the behavioral and experimental bias of psychology. In fact, the distinction between 'fact' and 'value' is not absolute. Mind is creative, ideative and valuational in its pure and serene aspect. It possesses inherently the pure ideas of infinity, comprehension, harmony, integrity and perfection. Mind does not derive these pure ideas from sense-experience. Thus the method of positive verification as applied in physical sciences is inapplicable to philosophy which deals with pure ideas and experiences in their own right. The total nature of mind includes physical, biological, psychological, moral, social, intellectual and creative aspects of being.

In present day psychology mind is not adequately distinguished from self and consciousness. Those who do not ascribe separate status and value to mental activities usually confuse the issues and fascinated by scientific and so-called objective standards of verification, belittle the achievements and states of intelligence and consciousness. Such a rejection of mind and its creativeness has made degenerating influence on human morals, sense of appreciation and love for truth and Reality. Logical empiricism in Philosophy, Marxists in Sociology and Behaviorists in
in Psychology have vigorously tried to bring down human self, consciousness, sense of valuation and moral aspiration to the plane of animal existence.

In the ancient Taittirīya Upaniṣad, the cosmic evolution is represented by the stages of matter, life, mind, creative mind and bliss. Man accordingly possesses all the above planes of being. An exploration into various parts of being and consciousness will disclose several values and experiences revealing the nature of Reality.

In order to arrive at the true recognition of harmonious and integral nature of experience it is essential that the seeker of truth should integrate his personality. Purification of several modes of cognition and various instruments of knowledge is indispensable for 'knowing' Reality. This opens a way out for valuational consciousness which contributes towards more comprehensive nature of mind and experience.

I think there are sufficient grounds to believe that when the higher fields of experience are explored we shall come across the knowledge which will eliminate much of the present constructions of Logical empiricism and Analysis. There may come into being new Logic and a new method of analysis. The present researches in the unconscious and
paranormal occurrences may lead to more comprehensive psychology. The future is full of possibilities and I should feel rewarded if the present thesis makes an humble contribution by way of pointing to some glimpses, however faintly or inadequately, of that future.

I should like to acknowledge with gratitude the help that I have received from my guide, Dr. A.G. Javadeker, without whose constant encouragement and suggestive criticisms on my manuscripts this thesis could never have been completed. The view that Reality is Value - the view which I have often affirmed in the present thesis - is Dr. Javadekar’s and I owe much to his 'Axionoetics' in which he has fully discussed this view.

I should also like to thank Dr. J.N. Chubb, formerly Head of the Department of Philosophy, Elphinstone College, Bombay, whose various papers have largely influenced me and directly or indirectly have shaped some of the views expressed in this thesis.