It has already been explained that South East Asia is a vast region embracing both the mainland bulge of the Asiatic continent and adjacent island archipelagos extending well into the Pacific Ocean and almost to Australia. Its total area exceeds 1,700,000 square miles, "with a combined population exceeding 225,000,000." Its natural resources are so varied and valuable that it is one of the richest areas on the globe.

South East Asia is strategically situated on the main sea route between India and China and therefore, is much influenced by fear of its big and immediate neighbour, China — internally in such areas as freedom of movement and speech as well as in foreign policy decisions involving such alternative as alignment or non-alignment. The ease of access to South East Asia provided by the very waters which separate the region from its neighbours on three sides is a constant threat to area as witnessed by its recent history of prolonged external subjection. There are three times as many people in China as in all the South East Asian countries combined. And all the South East Asian countries are its southern neighbours. The Chinese constitutes a largest minority in the region. The Chinese exceeds 14,000,000 and is scattered over the whole of South East Asia. China being the world's most populous country (exceeding 700,000,000 people, has traditionally sought to influence its southern neighbours, and can apparently count on the support of large numbers of over
seas Chinese who still regard themselves as more Chinese than members of the societies in which they live. Therefore, their loyalty is doubtful. They are an influential but unassimilated part of the economic, political, and cultural life of such countries as Burma, Thailand, Malaysia, Laos, Cambodia, Vietnam, Indonesia, and the Philippines. Each of these countries must deal with the vexing problem of Chinese dual nationality, for the government in China, the Reds as well as their predecessors, has maintained that, "a Chinese remains Chinese wherever he may be domiciled." No matter what the legal nationality of a Chinese, China regards him as her citizen. Today, many of these overseas Chinese look to Formosa as their spiritual home. But if Red China is admitted to the United Nations and thus elevated to a position of international respectability, it is reasonable to expect that the loyalty of the overseas Chinese will be redirected toward Peking.

Professor Hall rightly observes, "This new world of South East Asia, created through the triumph of nationalism against foreign domination, was itself in a new setting. North-westwards of it were the newly independent states of India, Pakistan and Ceylon. Northwards, lay communist China, with a strength and an awareness of the outside world such as it had not shown since the early Mink period. In South-East Asia, the Chinese question mark was beginning to over shadow every other issue and complicate the internal affairs of the newly independent States."

The Chinese penetration of South East Asia is not new. It is the result of centuries. They started to migrate mainly from the Southern Chinese provinces of Kwangtung, Fukien, and Kwangsi to this region. In the words of Victor Purcell, "the similarity of their climate made it easier for the immigrants to survive the conditions when they arrived."

The laws of the Ch'ing (Manchu) dynasty laid down that all who clandestinely proceed to sea to trade or who move to foreign islands for the purpose of inhabiting and cultivating them, shall be punished according to the law of communicating with rebels and enemies, and consequently suffer death by being beheaded. Chinese religion, too, condemned those who deserted the graves of their ancestors as "unfilial". However, the pressure of economic necessity and the hope for gain were too overpowerful to be overcome either by the fear of punishment or the demands of ancestor worship, and the Chinese went abroad in large numbers. The coming of the West to Asia greatly stimulated this emigration for the Portuguese, the Spanish, the Dutch, the British, and the French in their turn created the conditions of order that were so necessary for successful trading. The Chinese came into this region in search of their livelihood. Therefore, they took very little interest in local politics. They worked as labourers in mines


3. Ibid., p. 273.
and to lesser extent for a State, and some preferred employment of more lucrative kinds. On the whole they were the middle men and the retail traders, providing the medium of economic intercourse between the Europeans and the natives of the South East Asian countries. In Thailand, too, they occupied a leading place in trade, which has never been under western domination. In the words of Victor Purcell, "The Chinese Revolution of 1911 produced in the long run a great change in the attitude of the over Seas Chinese. From being conscious only of their family, clan or tribe they became aware that they belonged to the Chinese nation, divided politically though it was. The Chinese nationalist Party, the Kuomintang, received great support from the Chinese of South east Asia, as nationals of China according to the Jus Sanguinis, was the source of much friction between Chinese immigrants and the local governments. Communism too, after Chiang Kai-Shek had, in 1927, purged the Kuomintang of its leftist elements, gained more and more adherents among the over seas Chinese, especially among school teachers and the labouring classes." In 1949, Mao Tse Tung succeeded in carving out communist state in China which is known as People's Republic of China. Professor Mills rightly observes, "During 1950 there have been disquieting indications that the Chinese have given up their former support of Chiang-Kai-Shek

and are inclined to veer toward Mao Tse Tung. The very large majority are anti-communist, but they fear that communism will gain control of South east Asia, and they feel that it is expedient to make their peace with coming ruler. They realise too their unpopularity with the peoples of South east Asia and hope that communist China will protect their vested interests. They could be a dangerous fifth column and a formidable obstacle to the western policy of holding the line against communism in South east Asia. As yet they are undecided and are likely to support which ever side seems the more certain to win."

There are two most significant facts to be remembered about China, in addition to her economic ideology, are the tremendous territory she covers and the massive size of her population. Geographically, she occupies a dominant position in east central Asia. Chinese expansionism is nothing new, for historically every Chinese regime has sought to expand its frontiers whenever it had the necessary military power. From ancient times, the Chinese, through pressure of population on their limited and under developed resources have been pressing South-ward in search of food and shelter. The coastal and southern provinces have a long history of emigration, sometimes in violent hordes and sometimes peacefully. As merchants or money changers, peasants or petty shopkeepers, the Chinese have penetrated into every country that would receive them, and have successfully taken over a segment of
their hosts trade and commerce. The results of the expansion can be seen in the unassimilated Chinese minorities all over South East Asia — veritable States within States. According to Prof. Hall, "South East Asia's fears of China acrose largely from three sources; China's traditional claims to overlordship and her more recent claims to frontier-territories; communism and the potential threat to independence of the millions of Chinese living in South East Asian countries. From very early days, as we have seen, South East Asian rulers have been encouraged to send missions to Peking and to seek recognition of the emperor. The Chinese records show this relationship as one of the overlord-vassal, but such was not the view of the rulers themselves, one of whose aims was the establishment of profitable trade with China. In modern times Chinese overlordship was really a myth with China of the Ch'ing period cultivated, along with her excessive cultural pride, in response to the great changes brought by the Western impact upon Asia. It may have influence the outlook of the early Kuomintang leaders, but communist China does not seem to have paid much attention to it so far. On the other hand China's historic concern has been over the security of her frontiers and maintenance of stable conditions beyond. Hence the possibility of her military intervention has caused acute apprehension in South East Asia." He goes on to say that

"South East Asia was a key theatre of the Cold War. Communist China's aim was by subversion to secure willing to pursue policies which she approved. One noteworthy change in her tactics was to drop propaganda line of concern for the welfare of the overseas Chinese, and to all appearances to throw their interests overboard in seeking to allay the fears of the local governments regarding her intentions."

Communism is not merely an ideology in South East Asia any more than it is anywhere on the face of the globe. It is organized imperialism allied with an explosive idea. It is a well-organized apparatus and an international conspiracy as well as an ideology. It is said, that, the real and fundamental difference between communist societies and democratic countries lies in the area of human freedom — the people's right to choose and change their own economic, political, and social systems as they like, to elect those who shall govern them within the framework of those systems, and to enjoy within that same framework, the civil liberties which relieve them of the fear of arbitrary injustice, permit them to practice freedom of the mind, and enable them to walk with their heads up. Therefore, the basic ideological

7. Ibid., p. 822.
issue before Asia is a struggle not between Capitalism and Socialism but between freedom and totalitarianism. The worker in the Soviet Union or China has no freedom, nor does he enjoy in return for the loss of his freedom, a higher level of living than the workers in many "capitalist" countries. Under democratic Capitalism both abundance and freedom are possible. About the over seas Chinese, Professor Hall observes "The figures themselves are significant, but less so than the fact that the Chinese occupied and still do... key positions in the economies of these countries, with a measure of control over internal trade and industry quite disproportionate to their numbers. They had all along lived as a community apart, especially in the Islamic countries where intermarriage was rare, but also in the Budhist countries, where religion imposed no bar to assimilation and even in Vietnam with its Chinese type civilization. Their economic importance and cultural unassimilability had led King Vajiravudh of Siām (Thailand) to call them the Jews of the East." Their contempt for the culture of the Southern barbarians was increased by the Chinese Revolution of 1911; and when after the communist victory of 1949, China's position in the World became incomparably stronger. Pride was deeply stirred. Thus upsurge of national sentiment among the over seas Chinese coincided with an equally strong nationalistic phase in the

history of the South East Asians, and of the world war II the conflict of nationalism were extremely bitter. Hence, with the Communist victory in China every country of South East Asia became uneasily aware of the presence of a potential Chinese 'fifth column' in its midst. 10

Professor Buss rightly observes that "the communists pledged themselves to the protection and promotion of the legitimate rights and interests of Chinese residing abroad. They compromised with capitalism in the stage of the New Democracy appealed to the wealthy successful Chinese living overseas. The Chinese rather than the Russains, assumed the directorship of the communist hierarchy in East Asia. The communist set up a National Commission on over seas Chinese Affairs within the government structure and induced some of the wealthiest Chinese abroad to serve as members. They organised local associations in Fukien and Kwangtung for service and assistance to over seas Chinese. The head quarters doubled as places for good fellowship and centres for propaganda control. The Peking government encouraged student exchanges and goodwill tours and exploited every means to multiply emigrants remittances and investments in Chinese industries. It tailored propaganda programs to over seas Chinese and without doubt explored ways and means to convert

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them into successful fifth columns for possible movements of crisis.\(^{11}\)

The Chinese are sizeable number in the region and therefore South-East Asia is a major objective of communist penetration and can thus be considered together from that aspect, It has neither geographical nor historical unity, consisting as it does of several well-marked areas with little innately in common. In the words of Dr. Vlugt, "Paradoxical though it may appear, the Communist campaign in Southeast Asia has been greatly furthered by Japanese imperialism. From the turn of the last century, the rising power of Imperial Japan nurtured the grandiose dream of dominating the entire Far East. That dream led Japan to challenge the Western Powers in the late war, during which Japanese armies temporarily conquered the whole of Southeast Asia. Although Japan eventually collapsed in utter defeat, those occupations has inflicted terrible material damage shattered western prestige, and left behind chaotic situations which greatly favoured both native nationalist movements and communist penetration." \(^{12}\) According to Professor Buss, "when the Chinese communists took over the direction of their nation's foreign policies, they represented the merging of two boiling streams of thought.

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13. Ibid.p. 129.
They inherited the qualities of the Chinese race and a Confucian political ideology which had persisted from the time of Christ. In addition they adhered to the philosophy and techniques of international communism. They saw no conflict between the ideology of the movement and the legacy of China's past living in their own people, in place of an effete imperial bureaucracy. Instead of limiting themselves to the achronistic Universalism of Confucius coterminous—which China, they embraced an authoritarian doctrine which they hoped to make the basis of a radically—reconstructed world." About the nature of the Chinese, Vlugt declares, "if Communist activity has already made notable progress in Southeast Asia, it is easy to imagine what it will be like if the resident Chinese communities are marshalled and directed for the Communist cause by a Communist mother country as China has become. To be sure, the wealthy upper-class Chinese normally tend to be conservative and anti-Communist. But the expatriate Chinese are everywhere opportunists, 15 bowing to the prevailing wind." Therefore, the Chinese minorities in the region have the ability of the united Chinese element to disrupt the economic life of these countries and thereby foster native unrest on Peking's will. No doubt, the Chinese economic grip is strongest in Malaysia and it is everywhere considerable.

14. Buss. op. cit., p.540
15. Vlugt. op. cit., p.131
In Thailand, the Chinese probably handle nine-tenths of the country's every day business. In Philippines they control about fifty per cent of the retail trade. Indonesia and even in Burma they were likewise economically prominent before the mass upsurge against them. In Cambodia in Java and in Vietnam also they have been predominant even politically. Therefore, nowhere in Southeast Asia are the Chinese a negligible factor. Prior 1949 the Communists in the region looked Soviet Union for guidance. Moscow was considered as spiritual home. Russia was directing Communist movements in Southeast Asia. But when Communist China came into being in 1949, the Communists who are predominantly hailing from China in this region, consider Peking as their spiritual home. Russia and Communist China are now no more on friendly terms. Vandenbosch and Butwell rightly observe, "unless relations between China and Russia improved greatly, Russia could get no advantages from communist gains in Southeast Asia, for this region is China's sphere, and whatever the Communist harvest there might be, it would be reaped by China." The Communist China is still assisting as most promised in the past, the all liberation movements in this region and the war in Vietnam is the recent example. Professor Buss rightly points out, that communist China's determination to assert its leadership in the Asian region followed and expanded the classic pattern of the strong dynasties of the past.

16. Vandenbosch and Butwell, op. cit., p.182
17. Buss, op. cit., p.55>
Communist China took number of steps for the leadership in the Asian region. The Chinese took the initiative in assembling a major international conference of the trade unions of Asia and Australasian countries in Peking in December, 1949. They set up an Asian-Australian Laison Bureau of the world Federation of Trade Unions, which served as an effective propaganda sounding board. Three later they called the Asian-Pacific Peace Conference, with almost 400 delegates and observers from thirty-seven countries. That conference passed resolutions against the rebirth of Japanese militarism, for a just and reasonable settlement in Korea, for support to Asian national independence movements, and for the promotion of close economic and cultural relations among the Asian and Pacific peoples. It also established a permanent Peace Liaison Committee which, with a Liaison Bureau of the WFTU, constituted a kind of Asia com in form. These organisations did not spread dogmas of Stalin's socialism but the teachings of Peking's democratic united front, the thought of Mao Tse-Tung. The "Asia-Cominform" together with the central Bureau of overseas Affairs and the Far East Committee for People's Revolutionary Affairs made effective organizational structure for the implementation of China's leadership in the Asian region. But soon Communist China took advantages of recently formed institutions and Southeast Asia received first priority in the determination of China's real interests. The communists made their cause the cause of

18. Ibid. p.556
Southeast Asia and assumed the right to meddle in internal affairs of the "Asian Balkans" - Indochina (now Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam - North and South) Thailand, Malaysia (now Malaysia), and Burma. The Viet Minh's Communist leader Ho Chi Minh, led the underground resistance to Japan during the war and established the independent Republic of Vietnam (Democratic Republic of Vietnam) in September, 1944, just after the Japanese surrender. As war broke out between the Viet Minh and France, it seemed to be just another colonial skirmish until the communists came to power in Peking. Then in 1950 the Chinese communists and the Viet Minh regime exchanged recognition and together joined the camp of freedom and democracy led by the Soviet Union. "The Chinese sent advisers and tons of supplies and equipment to the Reds in Indochina and through their support converted a local colonial skirmish into a major front between the free world and its enemies. In other areas the Chinese communists remained in the background. In Burma they exacerbated the arguments between the government and the Chinese Nationalist guerillas and in Malaya (now Malaysia) they undoubtedly extend sympathy and perhaps some money to the Chinese communist bands fighting in the jungles. In Thailand they worked among the students and labourers and exploited the anti-Chinese nationalistic legislation of the Thai government. In all areas they filled the air waves and the columns of newspapers with propaganda and they fomented strikes or other troubles wherever they could embarrass

19. Ibid, p.558
the government, or take the profits out of capitalistic enterprises. They sought support among the overseas Chinese who offered themselves as potential fifth columnists. The communist took it for granted that they would dominate Southeast Asia as the United States dominated the American continent, as Russia dominated Eastern Europe, and as India was determined to dominate Indian Ocean. However, the western powers warned China that they would treat aggression in Southeast Asia "with grave concern" and they intimated the possibilities of "massive retaliation." It is pointed out that, communist strategy and tactics followed customary lines. The first move was to inflame local nationalist movements, encouraging their leaders to seek not merely absolute political independence by a thorough-going ouster of the western colonial authorities but also the confiscation of western capital holdings and the breaking of all economic ties with the west. Therefore, it was communist plan to exploit the native people and its regime against the west. The communists also felt that, newly established native regime would be too unstable, inefficient, self-seeking and corrupt either to handle such gigantic problems or to maintain their authority over hungry and desperate populations. In such an atmosphere of deepening chaos and demoralization, the way would be clear for disciplined, fomentical communist minorities to overthrow the nationalist regimes and gain dictatorial power.

20. Ibid., p. 559.
Southeast Asia would thereby become another segment of the mighty communist Empire. The world revolution would have taken another giant step toward final realization. It has been the communist plan of conquest for Southeast Asia. According to Vlugt, "Naturally, it has been notably furthered by the southward sweep of communism in China and by the opening of a vigorous communist offensive in India. But the factor which probably decided Moscow to intensify communist activity since 1948 was a heightened determination to paralyse the region's economic revival so as to compromise the European Recovery Programme by depriving the western world of the supplies of rubber, tin, and other regional products so badly needed in western lands. Politically and strategically, a major explosion in Southeast Asia would likewise serve as a diversion of western attention and energy concentrated in Europe to check aggression on that continent. This is a familiar communist method to shift suddenly from one sector to another, thereby tending to confuse opponents and throw them off balance. Now Communist China is playing the same role as Soviet Union did about two decade ago. The Korean crises, the invasion on India in 1962 and more recently Vietnam problems are the living signs of communists attitude to the various problems. Professor Buss clearly states, "The victory of Mao Tse-Tung in China and the spread of internal communism to their territories turned the minds of the leaders of

22. Ibid., p. 134.
Southeast Asia more than ever from the luxuries of berating the imperialists and dreaming of the future to the realities of the responsibilities of freedom. They did not share the same distrust and fear of communist which existed in the United States and Western Europe. Southern Asia had no actual experience with communist dictatorship and discounted the stories which were told about it. On the other hand, Asian had personal contact with the western powers and reacted violently against them. Asian were obliged to recast their estimates of their own security, to determine whether the remnants of western imperialism or Russian and Chinese communist imperialism constituted the greater threat to their own independence and freedom. They were not immunized from the cold war and they could not find safety or comfort in policies of neutralism or isolation. They carped at the imperialistic sins of the west, but they needed the assistance of the west to expand their social services and improve their levels of livings. Fundamentally they needed the protection of the west to hold the line against the communist while they themselves labored to make their states and societies proof against the attacks of new aggressors from without and of seductive ideologies from within. But Vandenbosch and Butwell state, "The decline in western influence and the increase in China's position in Southeast Asia represent a historical process still being

23. Buss. op. cit., p.586
acted out. That is it presumably will continue at least a little longer until some new, more stable pattern of international relations involving Southeast Asia will have been established. Neither the United States nor the United Nations under existing circumstances can prevent the ultimate dominance of Southeast Asia by the Chinese. Effective among the Southeast Asian states might limit the opportunities for China's influence to be felt – as might genuine partnerships between states of the region and outsider (such as Philippines and the United States) or policies both strengthening the United Nations and a country's identification with the U.N.'s main proclaimed purposes (which is actually the opposite of the effect of Indonesia's withdrawal in 1965). Even so, however, geography and China's potential powers and intentions remain important likely determinants of the future relationship between the world's most populous nation and its less formidable southern neighbours. 24 It, therefore, follows that Communist China poses to be a constant danger to this region. Moreover the local communists in the countries of Southeast Asia look towards Peking for guidance, Peking in turn is propating its ideology through the Chains of Communist institutions. Each country of Southeast Asia has taken strong actions against the communists in the past and North Vietnam is the only exception. But the influence of the Chinese minorities in Southeast Asian countries can not

24. Vandenbosch and Butwell. op. cit. p.332.
be ignored while the western influence is declining. If western influence is indeed declining in Southeast Asia and probably will continue to do so for some time to come (and if it is also true that the vacuum left by the decline of European power in the area has yet to be filled), it is difficult to see how Chinese influence can be prevented from growing—perhaps gradually and possibly even peacefully. This point, however, seems to be missed by many, although not, significantly, by Cambodia’s Prince Norodom Sihanouk or Indonesia’s longtime President Sukarno. Cambodia is apparently endeavouring to be China’s friend in order to assure its continued independence. Indonesia has made a bid for dominance in the area itself, possibly partly to serve as a counter weight to Peking. Either of these two policies may be more sensible than a standstill attitude toward revision of SEATO seemingly endless American aid to the Saigon government (which is no longer the same as South Vietnam) or Burma’s faith. That China will ultimately respect its genuine neutrality.

In Malaysia and Thailand, the Communist situation is unique. From the beginning in these countries communism has been geared almost entirely to the large overseas Chinese groups, which in Southeast Asia are by no means all communist or sympathetic to Commuimism but rather fall in each country into small groups, one communist, one anti-communist, plus the large majority uncommitted to either group. In Southeast
Asia most overseas Chinese would prefer to ignore the issue of communism and can concentrate wholly on their economic activities. In 1927 they split along the lines of the Kuomintang - communist split in China and ever since both factions have been represented in Southeast Asia. However, it is self-evident that communist or not, many overseas Chinese have been strongly influenced in recent years by the increased international prestige and power of Communist China. They have not assimilated to any marked degree into the cultures where they have been chosen to reside, especially since the beginning of the Chinese revolution and the upsurge of Chinese nationalism which accompanied it. In Southeast Asia the overseas Chinese often have been marked as victims of discriminatory legislation and antagonism, more economic than racial and, as a result, have looked to China, whatever that country's political complexion, for diplomatic support and protection.

The development of Communism among the Chinese living in Thailand and Malaya (now Malaysia) as well as as elsewhere in Southeast Asia, has proved a mixed blessing for the communists. While the communists among the overseas Chinese have provided a valuable fifth column for communism, the antagonism and distrust evoked by the Chinese among the indigenous peoples of Southeast Asia have tended to minimise the appeal of communism to the non-Chinese majority groups. In Thailand and Malaysia especially, communism is regarded as essentially a Chinese phenomenon, and

25. King op. cit., p.79
that seems to be sufficient reason for the indigenous population to oppose it. Communist activity in Southeast Asia was started more than thirty five years ago when the Communist parties were formed almost in every country of the region but Ho Chi Minh played a key role as a communist leader in Southeast Asia though he hailed from Indochina but from 1926 to 1930, he travelled about Southeast Asia recruiting and training men for local communist leadership.

The Communist parties of Southeast Asia emerged from the Second World War stronger, more popular, and with greater prestige and following than they had ever before enjoyed. Unlike nationalism, Communist in Southeast Asia failed to arise as a great national movement but did emerge as a strong and highly organized force in an excellent position to seize control of the authentic nationalist movements and to dominate the newly established governments. Since Second World War, each state of Southeast Asia had experienced communist uprising but the communist failed in their aims except Nort Vietnam which is totally communist dominated country led by the Hocchi Minh.

In the structure and function of the new government, the communists have faithfully copied Russia. In both countries, the democratic facade is more elaborate and complete than in

26. Ibid. p.80
27. Ibid. p.87
a real democracy. There are elections and voting. There is Parliament and debate. There are the President and Ministers and Governors. There are courts, judges, and law. Therefore, all these rituals are familiar to students of contemporary communist countries. But China has made a special point of her elections and boasts universal adult franchise for all except counter revolutionaries, unreformed capitalists and landlords, and political "criminals". No matter who does or does not vote, the results are a forgone conclusion. Communist elections, as Attlee pointed out long ago, are like a race with one horse. The communist party the only party — chooses the only candidates for election. The word "election" loses its meaning when applied to this elaborate force. The major political objectives of communist Chinese ideology and practice are peace and co-existence on the one hand — and territorial expansion on the other. And the Chinese see nothing paradoxical about this.

Communist China is perhaps the best example in the world today of communist "double talks" and "double-think" policy. Visitors to China and students of her literature know that everyone, from Mao to the man in the street, talks about peace. The people, the press, the loudspeakers, the entire propaganda machine screen incessantly about peace. The Chinese want peace on the mainland, peace in Asia, and peace in the whole world. Obviously it was "in pursuit of peace" that the communist fought a bloody thirty

years civil war. In pursuit of the same objective, they fought in Korea, and are fighting for the offshore islands, not to speak of Taiwan. Only to promote "peace" they annexed Tibet. The current border disputes with India, Burma, Nepal, and Bhutan, we are solemnly assured, are also directed toward the same supreme ideal. Privately, the leaders dismiss the possibility of peace or peaceful co-existence as so much nonsense. They manufacture atomic weapons, increase the size of their armed forces, and equip them with the latest weapons - all in the same of resisting the much publicizing impending American aggression. But to the world outside, China poses as the living champion of peace. As an original signatory to Panch-Sheela, China swears by co-existence (lulling the suspecting India into believing her for nearly a decade) and pleads along with the Soviet Union against the manufacture, testing, and storage of atomic weapons as well as conventional armaments.

There is an other contradiction in Chinese policy. Peaceful co-existence, as spelled out in the Bandung Agreement, means the repudiation of violence and war-as-a-means-of-settling international disagreements and controversial political issues, the renunciation of interference in the internal affairs of other countries, and the peaceful competition of rival socio-economic systems. But the Chinese struck the first blow against co-existence when they invaded Tibet, and now they maintain that war is inevitable as long as capitalism continues to exist anywhere in the world.

There is another paradox in their policy. The Communists are now turning their attention to their second objective — ideological-cum-territorial expansion. The realization of this second objective is sought through propaganda, subversion, and, if necessary, military aid and intervention in Asia. Communist China undermines trust in existing non-communist regimes, fans tensions between communists and other parties, and promotes the creation of "people's democracies" in other countries. Ultimately she hopes to build a satellite empire in Asia as the Soviet Union has done in Eastern Europe.

It seems that China's policy is based on expansionism. Communist China has not forgotten the old routes of Chinese expansion. The road is familiar — Tibet, Indochina, and Himalayan border lands. Even before she had begun to better her own standard of living, China started on her imperialist journey — North Korea, Tibet, North Vietnam, Ladakh, Laos etc. The planned attack goes on without any effective opposition. It is an unfortunate thing that the Asians outside communist orbit have made no progress to unite against the common enemy, the China which is a constant danger to world peace. It is because of her deeds that have produced strain and tension, trouble and discord in areas where peace has prevailed for countless centuries. From northern Kashmir to South Korea, along a line of more than 6,000 miles, the Chinese communist have promoted ideological disaffection and subversion, military aggression and conquest.

30. Ibid. p.203
The fact that the Southeast Asian countries have been known so far less for co-operation than for fighting among themselves is a major tragedy. As soon often has been the case in the past, this has, made the area vulnerable once again to external exploitation of division within the region. The amount of co-operation that has been attempted is indeed surprising given the extent of ideological differences and traditional animosities among these countries.

There may in fact be more than one way to maintain the independence of the several Southeast Asian states. On the other hand, there may be conditions under which it is impossible to do so. Unfortunately, only limited progress has been made over past two decades in bringing the various countries of the area closer together in new patterns of military, economic, political, and social cooperation. The process could accelerate, of course, as the need to cooperate becomes apparent, but there is little immediate likelihood of this happening. The consequent power vacuum thus remains highly attractive to various outsiders.\footnote{Vandenbosch and Butwell, op. cit., p. 232.}