In the second phase of Indian thought and philosophy is developed in the composition of well modified books. The first phase of Nyāyadarśana is formed through logical science and Hetuvidya or Vīdavidya. The second phase it came into lime light as Nyāya darśana.

In ancient times there was a tradition to analyse the Upaniṣads and the meanings of the Vedas and it was ascertained through debate and discussion. Perhaps this may be the origin of the science of analysing method cause and causation Vītsyāyana states that Nyāya is the examination of objects through the means of valid knowledge. Even the Māmśa logically discussed the vedic meanings and its thoughts gave birth to Nyāyamāmśa. To recognize it as a darśana, the topic such as 'soul theories' was also included. Later it became renounced as Ānekāike. Ācārāyas like
Kapila, Dattatreya etc were considered as the first spoke persons of Ēnvēkāike. S.N. Dasgupta opines that the word 'Nyāyadarśana' signifies with a mixture of Hetuvidya and Adyātma vidya.

Kauṭilya’s Arthaśāstra has marked education as Ēnvēkāike which included Trayi, Vṛta and Daśaneti. The Ēnvēkāike includes three visions, namely Śīmkhya, Yoga and Lokāyata. This Ēnvēkāike, and trayi are different in the sense of knowledge. It recognizes that it has a free status to its approach to be logical or reasoning the reality. He explains thus:- Ēnvēkāike is the light of all knowledge and the means to all the actions and the basis of all virtues. Thus Kauṭilya declares that the paramount importance of reasoning in education. Kauṭilya observes that Ēnvēkāike is useful for the goodness and welfare of the world.
It is reasonable to think that from ancient times itself, traditional Indian medicine handled the topics of logic and its related things as a part of discipline. Even before CS debates, discussions and logical reasoning were very prevalent. It is presumed that CS collected all these details and we got the first textual material about these topics related with the art of debate.

CS observes two forms of debates. One is Sandhya (peacefully) and the other one is Vigya (in a spirit of opposition). It helps to find out the aspiration of the noble personality for knowledge and their efforts. According to Caraka a good physician should a good teacher. Engaging in conversation, promotes the ways of communication. It reinforces confidence and firm faith by removing the doubts in the accumulated knowledge. It also breaks the narrow mindedness of the persons who hesitate to share the knowledge they have acquired to others. This is revealed in CS.
S.N. Dasgupta states that the basis of the totaled logical thoughts, can be found as its basic form in CS.

*NS* is considered as the first systematic work of *Nyāya Darśana*.

**Nyāyasūtra:** Ēciṛya Gautama is regarded as the compiler of the work. The period of the composition of this work is considered as the beginning of the 2nd century A.D. It is difficult to ascertain the exact time of his life.

Dr. S.C. Vidyabhusana, in his book *A History of Indian Logic* (HIL), has stated that the founder of *Nyāya* system named Medhātithi Gautama lived in C. 550 BC. According to him Gautama and Akāpaṇda were not the same persons. They two have contributed to *Nyāyadarśana*. But some scholars did not agree with his statement. They state that Gautama is the clan name and the original name may be Akāpaṇda. It is believed that Gautama, who is also known as Derghatamas, was born in the village Gautamasthīna.
which is twenty eight kilometers north to Darbhanga in Bihar. But Vidyabhusana
strongly puts forward his views with supportive arguments that the compiler of NS
might be Akśapāda Gautama. Because he is quoted in Sarvadarśanasamgraha by
Madvīdīrya as Akśapāda and his darśanas is recorded as Akśapāda darśana. Thus
Medhātithi Gautama was popular as the founder of Nyāya system. And Akśapāda
Gautama has compiled all these sūtras in a textual form. He could present these topics
of Nyāya in a systematised way from stray thoughts.

NS is edited by Dr. E.D. Rose and Dr. Satis Chandra Vidyabhusana, from
Bibliotheca Indica series and it was published from Culcutta. NS has five chapters and
each chapter has two divisions namely jñnikas. In the first chapter, we can see the
normal description of the sixteen topics. Then detailed explanation is given on these
topics. The Second Chapter explains the nature of doubts, the materials for the validity
and their importance. In the third chapter, he deals with the discussion about soul,
body, senses, and the object of sense, intellect, mind and the like. Faults, fruit, pain and emancipation are discussed in the fourth chapter. The last chapter examines the analogue and the point of defeat.

Contents: Gautama's NS begins by stating that infinite virtue is possible only through comprehending the sixteen objects which are Pramāṇa (the means of right knowledge), Prameya (the objects of right knowledge), Samyaya (doubt), Prayojana (purpose), Dīnānta (example), Siddhānta (tenet), Avayava (members of a syllogism), Tarka (confutation), Nirāyā (ascertainment), Vīda (discussion), Jalpa (wrangling), Vīti (cavil), Hetvabhāsa (fallacy), Chala (quibble), Jñāti (analogue) and Nigrahaṃsthīna (the point of defeat).⁶

Among these sixteen objects, the prime importance is given to pramāṇa which can give the exact knowledge. Gautama acknowledges the four pramānas. They are
Pratyakṣa (perception), Anumāna (inference), Upamāna (comparison), and āabda (verbal testimony). He includes the Aitihya (tradition) in āabda, Arthāpatti (presumption), Sambhava (probability), and Abhīva (non-existence) in Anumāna (inference).

**Pratyakṣa (Perception):** It is the visual experience. It is the product of the senses to the topics and to the mind and the union of mind to the soul and the knowledge got thereby. But it is compulsory to be Avyapadeśa, (not nameable) Avyabhicēri (non-erraneous) and Vyavasyijmaka (definite).

**Anumāna (Inference):** Anumāna is based on perception. It means the visibility of something along with the presumption of others. Smoke is felt by presence. Later comes the knowledge and reason of smoke which is fire and it is by Anumāna.
Inference is divided into three (1) Pêrvavat (apriori) (2) àeÀavat (aposteriori) and (3) S¡m¡nyatod¤Àta (commonly seen). 7

Pêrvavat Anum¡na:- It is the knowledge of effect derived from the perception of its cause. For example rain clouds are seen in the sky and rain is presumed.

àeÀavat Anum¡na:- This is the knowledge of cause derived from the perception of its effect. For example the presence of water over flowing in the river is presumed to be the sign of rain.

S¡m¡nyatod¤Àta:- The knowledge of one thing derived from the perception of another thing with which it is commonly seen; For example, the animal which has horns surely will have a tail. The smoke in a hill can be presumed by the sign of fire. The smoke and fire are familiar objects and its memory of association is also quite natural. The basis of this presumption is that fire and smoke are closely related.
Upamṣṇa (Comparison):- It is the another valid knowledge. The acquired knowledge is used to transmit the knowledge and this is called upamṣṇa. 8

āabda (Verbal testimony):- This is the fourth type of means of valid knowledge. Here āabda is used in the sense of the opinion of the experienced or the wise saying. 9

Again Gautama critically examines to find out solutions to the problems known by regulations such as Samजयa, Prayojana, Dशजanta, Tarka, Nirाya, Jalpa, Vitaा, Hetyभhса and the like.

He explains 'Samजयa' as this:- The appearance of contradictory presumption of the same object is caused to as doubt. Samजयa emerges from the common quality of several objects or the absence of it or from contradictory proofs or from difficult observations or from the uncertainty of the visibility of the object. 10 It can be classified with certain illustrations. Suppose a tall object of five or six feet is seen vaguely. There
may be doubt that whether it is a man or just a pillar, for both have the same height.

Some other examples are that the visioneers claim contradictory statements about the existence of the soul. These contradictory illustrations raise doubt in the listness. We can see the water in the well, it is really present there. But in the illusion of mirages, the presence of water is felt. But truly, there is no water. The water covered by the grass is not seen. Yet there is water. There is no water in the desert. Truly there is no water. These are the nature of doubt found against reality.

Again Gautama deals with the prameya’s. According to prameyas as soul is used in the sense 'Aham' or 'I'. He clarifies that soul has no existence without body. Perception occurs through the contact of soul with mind, mind with sense organs, and sense organ with external objects. External sense organs are controlled by the mind and mind is controlled by the soul. Jñāna (knowledge) is the sign of the soul.” He
stresses that the exact knowledge of an object is incorporated with the real visual knowledge.\(^{12}\)

To Gautama, mind is an object to control the simultaneous knowledge occurring from many objects. It means to concentrate the same knowledge of same object. Mind is a peculiar atom and it is the reason for why the mind does not have various knowledge. Speed is the reason for multi perceptions of the mind. That which can not be seen is assumed by the mind. Mind is related to the soul.\(^{13}\)

Gautama has defined Iśvara (God) in these terms. God is the reason for the result of the karma. Without god man won't able to get the result of good or bad karma. If karma is impossible without life in living beings, its result is impossible without god.\(^{14}\)
Gautama states that soul can transmigrate into another body and goes beyond the universe after death. He says that soul will reject its body and accept another body when it completes the action accumulated in previous life. The basic reason of this is that the soul is permanent. Rebirth is not only in the other world, but it takes place in this world also. To prove this, Gautama has given the following reasons: The new born baby feels both happiness and unhappiness just after its birth. It is because of the practice in the previous birth. He defends his views criticizing the views of some opponent. This is not a natural process like the flowering and withering of the flower lotus, and lotus has its different stages owing to the changes in climate, heat, coldness and rain. The child has the tendency to feed on its mother’s breast owing to the tendency of its previous birth to have drinks and feeding.  

Emancipation is not imaginary or pleasurable object. Gautama opines that the soul will be consequently freed from transmigration and pains through valid
knowledge. When illusionary knowledge disappears and thereby desire and aversion will loose when these disappear, karma also comes into its end. When this dharma and adharma come to cease, birth also ends. When there is no birth, there is no misery.

Thus we get emancipation. Emancipation is a state of getting rid of body, senses, object of sense, intellect, mind, activity, fault, transmigration, fruit, pain. Gautama indicates that soul is devoid of mind, knowledge and action.

Valid knowledge is the means to attain emancipation. Akâapıda remarks that valid knowledge can be attained through eradicating the misconception about the object which is considered as the root cause of the misery in this world. One can be get rid of this miseries through attaining the real knowledge. The categories like pramāṇa, prameya etc are dealt by Gautama in aphoristic style in NS as the cause to reach it.
According to Gautama, tarka occurs when two contradictory decisions are possible. And it leads to the ascertainment of valid knowledge eradicating misconceptions.¹⁷

Nirṛaya is the establishment of a fact by rejecting the opposing ones and getting at a conclusive decision. Vīda (Debate) is the discussion of the participants who believe in the same discipline for getting more knowledge. Therefore one who indulge in debate must be either followers of the same belief; or students or teachers of the same discipline. That is why it is said ‘Vade vade tattvabodhayate’. This debate must be well arranged with five avayās. They are Pratijā (proposition), Hētu (reason), Udbhāra (an explanatory example), Upanaya (an application of the example) and Nigamana (a statement of conclusion).¹⁸ But jalpa is the discussion between the participants belonging to difficult disciplines. Jalpa measures the scholarship and
success of a person. One who indulges in Jalpa should acquired with vision and
mission of a meaningful debate.

It is not necessary that debate should always go straight. Along with these
qualities mentioned above Chala, Jiti, and Nigrahastha may be happened in a
competitive argument. But Vatsyayana states that one while practising Vita, i (cavil) in
a debate one should avoid the defects which occur from the confusing remarks or
unhealthy situations mentioned above.

Gautama defines Vita, i as an opposing of the statement which is not classified
with ones views and beliefs. Then he explains hetvabhisa (fallacy) as one among the categories and a
subdivision of Nigrahastha also. Hetvabhisas are divided into five, viz, Savyabhicra
(the erratic), Viruddha (the contradictory), Prakara,asama (the controversial), Sādhyasama (the counter questioned), and the Kālīteta (the mistimed).  

Savyabhīcāra (the erratic):- The cause which cannot be accommodated with possibilities is called Savyabhīcāra hetvābhāsa. For example 'the pot is touchable and it is impermanent, but sound is not touchable and thereby it is permanent'.

Viruddha (The Contradictory):- Where the cause leads to the unacceptable which is contradictory to the acceptable. E.g. 'sound is eternal like pot, cloth, etc. because of productivity'. This example is full of contradiction. Because product are non-eternal. So the quality such as productivity contradicts eternal things.

Prakara,asama (The controversial):- 'Sound is stated to be permanent by virtue of its audibility'. This is an indefinite conclusion. So let us think in terms of another cause. If kāryatva is a hetu, sound is also impermanent like 'pot'. Prakara,asama is the cause
available both to the argument and to counter point raised against the first, the former being the reason of the basic argument. It is also called Satpratipakṣa.

Sādhyasama (Counter questioned):- When evidence is required for the hetu which is put forward as an evidence to the argument, it is called Sādhyasama.

Kṣīteta (The mistimed):- ‘Sound is said to be permanent since it is made up of Samyoga’. The form is visible with the amalgam of light and object. Before usual perception the form exists there with visual sense organ, sound is not like that. The sound of drum is produced when the stick touch with drum. There is no sound before and after the beating with stick upon the drum. Such conclusions are leading us to mistimed expressions.
Gautama says that Chala is tendency to be avoided. Chala occurs while raising another meaning to the argument put forward by the first debater. Chala can be divided into three, viz V̄kchala, Śm̄nyachala and Upac̄ra chala. 

V̄kchala (Quibble in respect of a term): 'If a person is said to have Navakambala' Here Navakambala means nine blankets as well as a new blanket (for Nava has the meaning nine and new). The fellow who stated the sentence really meant that he had a new blanket. But the opponent retorts this is only a single new blanket where are the other eight blanket? Thus when an implied meaning is attributed to the normal meaning of an expression, it is called V̄kchala.

Śm̄nyachala (Quibble in respect of a genus): When one says that this Bṛhma,a is a scholar. The term Bṛhma,a, contains a meaning which states that all bṛhma,as have knowledge. Such kind of argument is called Śm̄nyachala. Here a particular and
individualistic expression is taken as a common rule and the meaning is taken as the representation of all Brāhmāns.

Upanāra chala (Quibble in respect of a Metaphor):- When people walk with furled umbrellas, it is usually said 'Several umbrellas go', This is expressed with a perceptual meaning. If the verbal meaning of the expression is taken 'umbrellas can not move' then how can they go? This kind of argument is called Upanārachala.

Chala is the tendency to defeat the meaning of opponents arguments twisting their expressions.

Gautama defines Jiti that the central point in a debate which occurs in the absence of the concomitance of Hetu. When the concomitance of hetu is forgotten the debate goes on with contradicting and controversial sides of an argument such tendency to defeat of the opponent is called Jiti. Then debate cannot go forward.
Nigrahaśthīna is the stage at which the debate cannot go forward owing to its contradictory statements or ignorance from the part of opponent and proponent. The ignorant one who makes use of treacherous means fails in the debate. Thus Gautama points out twenty two steps of the points of defeat in an argument.

Gautama tries to explain in details the different illustrations to find out the truth in the light of the means of valid knowledge. He had examined everything in the light of reasoning and negated everything, which were against the reason.

The followers of Nyāya has tried to change some interpretations and their meanings in accordance with the time and age.

Vātsyāyana the author of Nyāyabhāṣya

Vātsyāyana tried to give some modification to Gautama's Asthīna through his bhāṣya (NBh) in some topics. Gautama wrote his sūtras in an aphoristic style. Without bhāṣya
s£tras can be felt as a skeleton. So we get an extended knowledge about Ny¡yadar¿ana with the help of bh¡Àya of V¡tsy¡yana. V¡tsy¡yana records Gautama as a monk of very distant chronology. Thus to establish his argument he quotes from the Mahabh¡Àya of Patanjali, from Artha¿¡stra of Kau¶ilya and from Vai¿eÀika s£tra of Ka¸¡da. Dr. S.C. Vidyabhusana remarks that V¡tsy¡yana was born of Deccan in South India in the middle of 4th century AD. V¡tsy¡yana is also known by the name PakÄîlasv¡mi.

V¡tsy¡yana illustrates the name NS in this way. The verbal meaning of tarka is a process or an instrument which is applied in the mind to take a decision. Ny¡qa is the examination of objects through the examination of the means of valid knowledge.25

V¡tsy¡yana pointed out the NS treats of its categories through the Udde¿a (processes of enunciation), LakÄà,a (definition) and ParikÄ¡ (examination).26 It is the style of á¡strapaddhati.
Vīṣṇyāna records pramāṇa as an instrument of knowledge by which the seeker gets knowledge of the topic is called Nyāya.²⁷ The real cause of knowledge is attributed to pramāṇa.

Vīṣṇyāna says, knowledge has its own separate means to attain. It has also the relevance in its perceptual knowledge. When one is in search of knowledge of an object a faithful attempt should be taken. When one ask about an object to elder one he gives oral instruction to him. With the knowledge or consciousness of it, again he desires to confirm the knowledge about it through inferential knowledge when one gets this inferential knowledge, he has the desire to experience the knowledge visually. But when one is satisfied with its visual knowledge he gets away from further attempts.²⁸

Unless he succeeds to get the absolute knowledge his effort should continues till he gets its ultimate state of knowledge of that object.
Here mind is an essential element for perceptual knowledge. When one is reading something with full concentration; the sound of a kite does not get into our ears even if the soul it present throughout the body. And sound gets into the ears when one focuses at that object. When a particular sense is involved in an activity with full concentration, other sense organs are unable to receive the knowledge of some other things simultaneously. Here mind is unable to communicate with other senses while a particular sense is involved in an activity. This fact is accepted by jñāyas when they define ‘mind’. This proves that the presence of mind is essential to have perceptual consciousness.  

Anumāna (Inference):- The verbal meaning of anumāna is to measure something with the help of some experienced knowledge. It is the knowledge followed by acquired knowledge. We get the knowledge related with linga (hetu) from the object which includes it (lingi). Earlier it has been explained that inferential knowledge is the
continuation of the acquired knowledge. A person assumes the presence of fire in smoke only after connecting both with fire and smoke in his earlier experience.\textsuperscript{30}

Inference works out not from things unknown or unfamiliar, it is in association with the acquired knowledge. Inference can be done only about presumptive ideas.\textsuperscript{31}

This topic of inference by Gautama is interpreted by V\text{\textv{\texti{}}tsy\text{\textv{\texti{}}yana} in a bit different way. In inference we get a knowledge from perceptual knowledge to its related knowledge. This relation is occurred in three ways.

The principle of anum\text{\textv{\texti{}}na may be the cause of perceptual principle; or else it may be the matter about it, or it may be the normal evolution of the amalgam of any previous knowledge. We can predict rain by looking at the clouds. It is known as 'P\text{\textv{\texti{}}rvavadanum\text{\textv{\texti{}}na'. Here we make use of the previous experience of perception along with presumptive knowledge from inference. When we see the overflow of a river, we
presume the areas of rain from where the floods come. The earlier stage can also be assumed with the help of an acquired knowledge and here takes place the inference of āegovadanumṇa. When we see an animal with horns we can presume that it has tail.

This example can be included in Sṛṃṇyatodūṭṇumṇa. It is the amalgam of acquired knowledge rather than effect, cause relationship. We can assume the position of the sun with familiarity of its knowledge based on its earlier experience.

Vṛtsyāyana indicates that the members of five membered syllogism can be represented as based on the principles of various pramṇas. Pratijñi gets validity from āabdapramjā. Hetu is inferential. Udāharaṇa is from perceptual knowledge. Upanaya is from Upamṇa. All these are based on the same idea which indicates presumption.32

Vṛtsyāyana criticizes against some logicians who belongs to the opinion that there are ten avayavās (syllogism) related with the inference for the sakes of others.
They are Pratijµ¡, Hetu, Ud¡hara, a, Upanaya, Nigama and along with these Jijµ¡sa,
Sam¿aya, áakya-pr¡pti, Prayojana, Sam¿aya-vyud¡sa.\textsuperscript{33}

1. Jijµ¡sa (inquiry as to the proposition):- The desire to know about the fire can be
seen every where in the forest or in some places.

2. Sam¿aya (is present at questioning the reason) For e.g. When we see the smoke it
might be vapour or not and such other doubts.

3. áakyapr¡pti (capacity of the example to warrant the conclusion):- Since the melted
iron does not have smoke, the doubt may be arised whether the fire and smoke
should go together and it could be established with illustrations.

4. Prayojana (purpose for drawing the conclusion):- The prayojana follows nir,aya or
ascertaintment.
5. Samayavayudsa (dispelling all doubts):- The relation between hetu and possibility of reason and different kinds of its presence are the doubts about them and the clearance of the doubt and thereby, Vytsyayana states that all these are unnecessary for perceptual knowledge even though the steps help one to establish the conviction and clarity of an object.

Upamnya (Comparison):- It is the attempt to get a new knowledge from the close associative memory of a known object. Similarity between a cow and another cow is very seldom. When visible similarity predicts something, it is not necessary to think that it should be faultless. For example buffalo and cow are similar in many ways they are not the same in its own nature. Though there is some material resemblance between 'Mahameru' and mustard, it can not be similar. In the hypothetical logic, the reason is not given to number but to the weight in considering its validity. They should have close relation between the object and the idea when it conveyed. Hypothetical
debate gives us the knowledge of its relation to causation. It is related to the problem of identification. The name we are advised that 'gavaya' is related to a name with some similarity to that of a cow. When we observe an object of similar, we give a name to signify it.34

áābda (Verbal testimony):- áābda is an advice of an Ēpta according to Śetrakṣa. Ēpta or the faithful speaker will be adopt in a particular skill. He should have the perceptual knowledge of that topic. He can transmit that knowledge to others with clarity. Thus other can realize it. According to him Ēpta represents Īśis or noble personalities from any caste.35 If a young man reaches to the side of a river and he cannot ascertain whether the river is fordable or not, and immediately an old experienced man of the locality, who has no enmity against him, comes and tells him that the river is easily fordable; the assertion of the old man is to be accepted as a means of right knowledge.

According to Vītsyāyana the knowledge derived from verbal communication is quite
unlike the knowledge which we get the knowledge from anumāna and Upamāna. Vātsyāyana also states that aitihya becomes valid or invalid based on the validity of verbal cognition. Vātsyāyana defines tarka or confutation is something against a particular reality which is impossible. He states that confutation is not a real means to knowledge.

Vātsyāyana follows the statements of 'Hetvābhāsa' given by Śrāvakāra without any modification such as 'Savyabhicāra, Viruddha, Prakaraṇa, Sādhyasama, and Kālāteta.

According to Vātsyāyana what is rejected by real knowledge is illusion and it is material. To him the prudential knowledge of an object is consciousness. Vātsyāyana also states in NBh that the acquired knowledge decides the fact and process of the future knowledge which is still to be acquired.
Vitsyāyana quotes the theory of Mādhyamikas about time for criticizing their view. According to Mādhyamikas the conception of time is no present without the past and the future. The past is something comes before the present and future is something that comes after the present. But beyond this past and future, no present time has any relevance. As a response to this Vitsyāyana states that these are mistaken beliefs in between time and space. Once an object falls down it takes a particular time to cover a particular space and a little more time is necessary for its final fall. It has no space that is to be covered in the present context. After getting through the past is mentioned, the future will be mentioned by the space, which is to be overcome. There is no space to think between these past and future time. And Vitsyāyana says that the awareness of time is not by the consciousness of space but by action. Only after the final fall does the past begins. And when the same thing does not happen we think of the future. But when the object is doing the action and moving through the air we have
the present time. If the person is not conscious of this on going action, how can he 
beware of the past and the future? In these two (i.e. past and future) the matter is 
inactive which means action brings us the consciousness of the present time. This 
present time involves the present position of the object and its motion. Thus the 
situation at present, earlier and future constitute the consciousness of time. We can't 
perceive past and future without a present situation.\textsuperscript{42} 

\textit{Vtsy\'yana denies and argues against many theories regarding the origin and} 
nature of the universe. He criticises the K\'a\'rikv\'da (the theory of momentariness) when 
a moment is over the next moment takes the duty over the gone moment. The basis of 
his argument is that there is link between the past and the future. Let us accept 
mortality where there is a perceptional stop of further future action.\textsuperscript{43} But if there is no 
perceptional knowledge like the knowledge of a stone how can this be accepted? as 
'stone'.
The 'consciousness about matter reveals that their existence is also constant. If everything is short lived, or everything is non-existent then how can there be unified objects? This is charged against the question of kAa klatva. It cannot be proved that every matter is inter-related. If they are short or long or inter dependant, one can not be there without the existence of the other. This theory of momentariness is due to the generation and degeneration of objects. V¡tsy¡yana argues that like the jk¡¡a (ether) k¡la (time) and de¡a (place) there are some qualities which stand for ever in the universe like wise, it is also visible that there is a contradiction about the theory of permanance. For many things that are taken for granted as permanent and short lived are compounded elements which are subject to decay.

The universe is not produced from s£nya or nihilism. It cannot produce anything new. Those who advocate thinking of non-existence, they argues that there will be no permanent matter unless their cause to destroy. They exemplifies 'the sprout
comes up destroying its seed'. Vātsyāyana opposes this concept and says that the cause of destruction will not rise up again after the destruction of that object. An annihilated object cannot produce anything new. If the destruction of the seed is the cause of its germination, there germination would be possible if the seed is crushed and sown. The generation or germination of the plant is owing to the compounded elements, which contained in it. Thus germination is not out of a nihilism of germination which is the result of the reconstruction of the compounded elements in the seed.43 Again the idea that the universe is accidental is also rejected by Vātsyāyana after proper analysis. He observes that the law of cause and causation can not be denied by any one and one fails by establishing every experience as futile and meaningless.

Vātsyāyana explains the soul in this way. Soul is an actual essence containing the qualities of desire, aversion, pleasure, pain, action, knowledge etc. The sense of consciousness and the like proves that the essence of the soul is constant and
permanent.\textsuperscript{46} When one is curious to know something, he thinks about and identifies it. Knowledge comes to one person when he becomes curious and contemplative. This knowledge in the form of personality becomes an index of an ordinary person. When a person observes something and desires it and works hard to possess it, the unified force of all these activities is the same and its basis is soul.\textsuperscript{47}

To V\textit{ij}ts\textcircled{y}ana moral laws have no values unless we consider any difference between soul and body. Since body changes in every moment the same sin may not follow us in our rebirth. If cetana (consciousness) is the essential spirit of the body, body can never deprive of this essential quality. Consciousness is not the natural quality of the body. Every one can visualize it through contemplative meditation.\textsuperscript{48}

Soul is the lord who controls the sense organs. It amalgamates the different experiences related senses organs. The eye is helpless to hear and the ear is unable to
see objects. If soul is not different from the sense organs and external form, the
associative consciousness becomes impossible. Since sense organs are instruments, they
have a control and it is apparent. Senses are natural and therefore the consciousness
and the spirit can not be part of them. Even if the object and the power of sight are
destroyed, the knowledge remains. This knowledge is not out of the quality of the
object or of the senses but the presence of soul. Soul can not be identified with the
mind; mind helps the soul to ponder over things and acts as an instrument for
thinking of the soul. Since mind is atomic, it cannot become soul as in the case of the
body. Even if the soul is incapable of getting omniscience, it is qualified with body.

Soul is individualistic in every person. Soul is innumerable. Every soul is
unable to understand the thoughts and feelings of others because of its individualistic
nature. If soul is the same for every one, the experiences of the individuals will also be
the same.
Vṛṣṭyaya states about emancipation thus: the arguments related to the previous births and the future are emphasised by the moral. If we do not think of our soul as having a past and future our moral sense will be violated by the decay of virtue and the attainment of evil rebirths. There is a future for us to undergo the aftermath of our karma. To find out a justification for the destiny of the present individual there must be life of the past. If the impact of karma entrusted to us is absolutely lost then our soul will be free from rebirths and it will get into liberation. According to Vṛṣṭyaya, all our destiny of character is attained at the life just before emancipation.

Emancipation is the liberation from misery. It is equal to eternal, and immortal stage is the life with the attainment Brahmapada. Vṛṣṭyaya observes that emancipation is the absolute and faultless condition of being in bliss. It is not the destruction of the soul but it is the release from the bondage.
God is free from mistaken beliefs and carelessness. He is copious in quality, knowledge, competency and concentration. There are eight super human powers working in him depending on these abilities of competency and concentration. It is God’s quality that spreads everywhere and makes everything moving. Here the signification of God shows more similarity to the concept of God in Yoga Sūtra.

To Vītsyāyana God works with paternal relationship towards the creations. God is omniscient since he is the most conscious of the real knowledge and the one who is devoid of errors. He has no need for memory or inferential knowledge since his consciousness is constant and incessant.

Vītsyāyana observes and defines doubt as it has been defined by Gautama. By seeing different dharmas against the single dharma, why is this? and this dismay and confusion arouses doubt. These doubts are five types. (1) Saṃpadharmopapatti
(Recognition of common properties),

(2) Anekadhamropapatti (Recognition of properties not common),

(3) Vipratipatti (conflicting testimony), (4) Upalabdhi (Irregularity of perception), (5) Anupalabdhi (Irregularity of non-perception). One may doubt whether it is a man by seeing a tree. The Samñadharma of height is considered there. But the Viñesadharma of branches in a tree and limbs in the body are not seen. This state of the brain arises doubt. This is the doubt based on the absence of the cognition of Viñesadharma while there the knowledge of Samñadharma exists.

Earth is different from other substances because of the quality of smell. It is different in quality and action from other substances. Thus the knowledge of similar and dissimilar qualities is produced simultaneously. This state creates doubt. Such vagueness is caused from the knowledge of several attributes and there doubt arises because of the absence of the knowledge of particularity.
Some argue that there is soul and some others are against this view. We can
not say the present and absent at a time. There is no evidence based on either the
claims. This situation is called Vipratipatti. Whether it is water or mere a mirage and
such doubts are called the disorder of knowledge system. It is derived from the
baselessness of upalabdhi.

If the pot is closed so as not to pour for the water, we may not get it, or if the
water in it had been lost and thereby we may not get it. When we reach a new place, we
may be uncertain because of these doubts. This is from the baselessness of
Anupalabdhi. Similarly disorder of the knowledge system may create doubt.

Vjtsyijana follows SEktrija in defining Jalpa, Vita, and Nigrahasthina that
these are caused to failure in an argument.
Vitsayana has composed the NBh rejecting the Nihilism of Nigrrjuna to defined his teacher's position.

*Nyâyavrtika* of Udyotakara (C. 6th century AD)

The *Nyâyavrtika* (NV) of Udyotakara is edited by Mahamahopadyaya Ganganath Jha from Motilal Banarsidass and it published from Delhi in 1912.

It is believed that Udyotakara lived in sixth century AD. He is also known as Pîḻupatciyra. Although he followed the manner of BhîAyakîra, he had a free style of his own. It is transparent and illustrative. He is the first spokesman to prove the existence of God with evidences. He has criticised Vasubandhu, Nîgrrjuna and Diʾnîga through his works. Yet he receives the strain of Hetu, Sîdhya and PakÂa, followed by Diʾnîga, and Dharmakerti. He has made use of this process along with the idea of parîmarjâ by Udyotakara. It is believed that Udyotakara was the first writer to present
‘Erambhavida’ in logical works belongs to the path of Akâapada. Muni Nîrayanaprasad observes that Udyotakara in his ‘Erambhavida’ has been remarkably able to unify the ‘Sat Kârya vîda’ of the Sîmkâs.

Udyotakara calls pramâna as cause of valid knowledge and it acts as the cause of knowledge. Pramâna is considered as the real reason for knowledge. If there is no pramâna, nothing else can bring knowledge. Therefore pramâna is the basic reason of knowledge.

Udyotakara defines perception in this way. Perception is a kind of knowledge. Some information is not known by a single name. Then how can it be physical and perceptual? Perhaps perception may be unnameable for a similar knowledge is transmitted with a similar name. Perception indicates a self form and not attribute. To Udyotakara perception is something that we can make our fellow beings to
understand. Because our acknowledgement about certain things is on particular rate.

The physical evidence of perception is its amalgam with mind, soul, senses. Thus sensual perception is valid and it becomes particular one because of its validity.

Udyotakara follows Śetrakṛta and records six types of perception, that they are

Samyoga (conjunction), Samyukta - Samavṛya (conjoined - inherence), Samyukta - Samaveta - Samavṛya (conjoined inherent inherence), Samavṛya (inherence), Samaveta-

Samavṛya (inherent inherence), Viśeṣa,ata (qualification or particularity) etc

Anumāna (inference):- Udyotakara defines inference as the knowledge just after perception. Inference is the possibilities of the reason before perception. For example from perception of smoke, fire is presumed. Because the knowledge of fire and smoke extends to presumption (1) when there is smoke, there is fire (2) there is smoke in the hill (3) therefore this hill has also fire.
Udyotakara classified inference into three types. (1) **Anvayi** (exclusively affirmative), (2) **Vyatireki** (exclusively negative), (3) **Anvaya-vyatireki** (affirmative negative).

(1) **Anvayi** (exclusively affirmative): In this both 'hetu' and 'pakåa' are included for example, since it can be named it is subject to identity and knowledge.

(2) **Vyatireki** (exclusively negative): Here 'hetu' has incorporation with 'Pakåa' e.g. Soil is different from other minerals since it has smell.

(3) **Anvaya - Vyatireki** (affirmative negative): It has in corporation with 'hetu' and 'pakåa'. For e.g. Sound is short lived for they are subject to sensual knowledge.

Udyotakara has suggested certain points by differentiating inferential and perceptual knowledge. (1) When the vision of Yogis are excluded, all other perceptual knowledge is the same. But inference are of many kinds
(2) Perception involves and limits in the present matter and in the sensual accessibility.

But inference is bound in the present, past future components. (3) For inference

previous knowledge or memory is a pre- requisite; But in perception, this is not

compulsory.

Udyotakara modifies the view of Vṛṣyṭyāyana that the sun changes its direction

as one is familiar with its way of sunrise, noon, evening and so on. Udyotakara finds

that we see only the different parts of the sun and we do not see the movement of the

sun. To him, pṛrvavat, āvavat, and sāṃnyatodāta are not three steps of inference in

there stages. To him inference is memory based causal relation or the perceptual

knowledge of hetu and the constant connection of hetu and possibility; along with

memory are the knowledge of inference.61 To some thinkers there are ten Avayavas.62

In his opinion the last two may be included in a meaningful and logical discussion
members of the inference for the sake of others are not to be avoided. Though they are logically unnecessary they are useful for the purpose of a debate.

Uparın (comparison): Uparına is a product of the ābda with the aid of memory and the memory of association brings out Uparına and this is the observation of Udyotakara. He tries to clarify the views of his predecessors and brings out comparison as a separate pramāṇa.

ābda (Verbal testimony): In the opinion of Udyotakara ābda is short lived for it is produced like the pot. The meaning of an object is got when it is listened to with the conceptual association of the similar words. Then the similar words of the earlier knowledge are memorised. When the last word is listened to naturally the word just before it comes to the memory. When we listen to the word, 'cow' with out the utterance of the last word, the meaning does not come to memory but the last utterance makes
memory full. Thus the three syllables or letters in 'cow' gives us the knowledge and meaning of the term with the object. Thus with the mingling of the matter and sound, we become familiar with objects. There is something, which gives us meaning beyond the words. After the utterance of each word there is a sound impact. This is different from sound. It is equal to the burst of sound formations called 'sphoṅa' (phonetic explosion) in the Grammarian view.

In the opinion of Buddhist thinkers, sound doesn't represent definite objects. The words we listen to help us to reject other meanings. The sound of the word cow reminds us of a cow and it exclude the though a horse from that context. From this the word cow denotes the sound which tells of a cow with the following reasons Udyotakara criticises this 'Apoha theory'. If we have not understood the expressionistic technique, we can not understand the sensible technique. Every negation has an expressionistic technique 'only negation' is meaningless. At the same time every special negation has
an implication of this expressionistic side. In the case of two contradictory sounds the
name of the one may reject the same of the other, but such rejecting is not possible in
the matter of the sound.

Udyotakara has divided doubt in to three Samññadharma, Anekadharma and
Vipratipatti.\textsuperscript{64}

**Samññadharma (Recognition of common properties):** When two objects of the same
properties are seen, we get doubts; for example whether it is a pillar or a man. Here
though the figures are different, the similarity or the resemblance of height makes it so.

**Anekadharma (Recognition of many properties not common):** If the properties are
many, it will cause doubt; An extra ordinary presence of properties which makes a
memory of contradiction, there arises doubt.
Vipratipatti (Conflicting nature of properties): When contradictory properties are dealt with there arises doubt. This doubt might be related with senses. Are they physical or not? This is a doubt of special kind. To Vārtikākara upalabdhi and anupalabdhi are the reason for doubts, the objects related to the topic of upalabdhi make the doubt whether it is of essence or not essence. There is sampradharma which implies both in upalabdhi and anupalabdhi. 65

Udyotakara discusses the confutation along with definition of Śrtrakara. Confutation is the assumption through philosophical knowledge about an unknown matter.

Wrangling is defined as a part of logic. Wrangling is a part of disputation in accordance with quibble, analogue, and a point of defeat which is used to establish one's own argument and rejects the idea of opponent. This is called Jalpa. With chala
and the like, a man with limited knowledge testifies his idea and creates an illusionary feeling by the opposite creating a meaningless state.

According to Udyotakara mind mediates between the soul and the senses. This creates the impossibility of acquiring different types of knowledge simultaneously. That is why different types of knowledge do not take place at a time. In his opinion, mind is not related to any other, but the senses can work only within a limited area. Mind has the similarity with the soul when it is immersed in the matters of joy and bliss. Each soul has a separate mind. Though spaceless and invisible, it is eternal. Each soul has only one mind. If there many minds are in the same soul, there would be several types of consciousness at a time. Similarly the soul would have different types of desires at a time. But that is not the fact.
To Udyotakara, the sense of sight is not the cornea or iris. He argues that it is only the basis of visual knowledge. The sense of sight is a lustrous forum. The lustrous eyes sets out from the cornea and reaches at a distant object. Thus the object is closely and really seen. It is there by that we get visual perceptions of the sides, distance and position.

Debate goes ahead with a purpose of affixing truth through the free exercise of the five members of a syllogism. But it is degraded the position of wrangling which is aimed at victory or the situation of vested interests. It misplaces as cavil which is merely for the sake of rejection.  

Udyotakara has explained fallacies with the same views of Śetrakṣra. He compares mithya (illusion) with the mirage of the oasis etc. Bhrama is the illusion of an object where it is not like that.
According to him soul cannot be accommodated with mind or the senses. Because even when body is no more and senses out of work and mind is still, the soul is active. The soul is the subject or the lord. The luster of the flame cannot be separated from the flame of fire consciousness cannot be separated from the soul. But it does not mean that the soul should have a consciousness, it is a spiritual quality made out of amalgam of the soul's relationship with the mind. It is a quality of the soul. The soul in proportion to its worthiness is existent with a body and it is eternal. The union of the soul and body is with birth and their separation is called death.

Since the theory of previous birth is a generally accepted one, there is not much effort to prove it. To Udyotakara, newborn babies show signs of sukha and dukha at an early stage itself. But their smiles and cries cannot be considered like the flowering and folding of the lotus, which are mechanical. Human being is more than a flower. The tendency of the newborn baby to suck its mother's breast milk cannot be compared
to the magnetic power of iron and magnet. Because the child is not a mere metal piece. To Udyotakara, the matter is produced with all its qualities, a child cannot be produced with all desires, because desires are not mere quality but they come out from culture of the previous birth.

Udyotakara records emancipation as not the destruction of the soul but destruction of the bondage of action in the soul. If the liberated soul is to have eternal pleasure, it should have a permanent body. Because without body experiencing pleasure etc is not possible.

*Nyāyavartikātparāṣekha of Vācaspati Miśra (C. 9th century AD)*

*Nyāyavartikātparāṣekha (NVTT)* of Vācaspati Miśra is edited by Rajeswara ājstri Dvivedi. It has been published by Kasi Samskrita series from Benaras in 1925.
It is believed that Vācaspāti Miśra lived 9 AD in Mithilā. He revived Nyāya from the attack of the opponents and reestablished its importance. His famous works of Nyāya are *NTT, Nyāyasācinibandha* etc. He was not only an expert in interprets of justice but also an adept in all kinds of visionary establishments. He was the great thinker who tried to codify all darśana through arranging them with harmony and based on subject. It was he who wrote ‘Bhāmati’ on the Advaita Vedānta and *Śīmkhyatattva kaumudi* on Śīmkhyadarśana. Thus he got the honors, ‘Sarvatantra Svatantra’ and Saddarśani Vallabha.\(^7\) *NTT* is an authentic work on Nyāya. It is also known as *Titparya ṇekī*. With the composition of this book, Vācaspāti Miśra became famous as ‘Titparyacīrya’. He has criticised the views of Diṅgā and Dharmakīrti in his book.

Vācaspāti Miśra states that pramāṇa is the object of upalabdhi. The knowledge is knowing of an object which is not cognised before. It gives some difficulty in
understanding of the object for the ordinary man. Vācaspati Miṣra, according to the opinion of his master, Trilocana, has divided pratyakṣa (perception) as savikalpaka (determinate) and nirvikalpaka (in-determinate). Savikalpaka is based on evidential knowledge. For example the statement this is a man contains only the knowledge of something. It has no clarity. To Vācaspati Miṣra pratyakṣa can easily be comprehended. Sannikāra (intercourse) in co-operation with memory could not be included in pratyakṣapramāṇa, while nirvikalpaka perceives through the indriyārtha sanākarsa (sensual intercourse) is related with definite in the later stage.

Inference is the relation between the sādhya and hetu based on vyāpti. Vācaspati records that vyāpti is a natural relation.

According to Vācaspati inference which is free from disagreements and comparison based on essential resemblance have their self-sprung validity. Because
there is the reasonable necessity related to consciousness and the topic. But this cannot
be confirmed in sensual perception and in the validity of sound.

Comparison is the knowledge of thing through its similarity to another thing
previously well known. The man in the city, with the help of the memory of the word of
a forester, can recognize 'gavaya' in perception, the animal resembling cow. 78

According to Vi°caspati sound contains all information, which is extended in
time and place, the common knowledge of every thing in the past and the present. The
word knowledge in memory can eliminate doubt and viparyaya; and it is
communicable and infallible while transferring our ideas to some one.

To Vi°caspati, confutation is something related to an invalid or indefinite thing.
It is not the substantiation of the one side. Tarka takes place where the opponent
doubts about the objects real. In the place of the definition of confutation, it is said,
when two dharmas are presented, one is denied and other is accepted as valid. Owing to this, doubt in the topic will be arised till ascertainment and therefore doubt is a part of a debate.\textsuperscript{79}

To \textit{V}\text{c}asi\text{p}ati, \textit{pram}j (Right knowledge) is the knowledge of the reality of an object. \textit{Apram}j (Wrong knowledge) is the condition of an object in its unreality or it is illusion.\textsuperscript{80} Wrong knowledge or mithya is said to have five features.

\begin{enumerate}
\item \textbf{Etma-Khy\text{it}i (manifestation of the self)}: This is the presentation of the soul. This is a wrong knowledge. The knowledge in the mind which is fault and itself is the case with \textit{etma- khy\text{it}i}. \textit{Yogic\text{c}ra Buddhists says that our knowledge is the only truth and its external representations are the wrong knowledge.}

\item \textbf{Asat-Khy\text{it}i (manifestation of the unreal)}: This is a wrong knowledge. This is non substantial and unreal. The knowledge of the existence of an untrue object is called
Asat - Khyāti. For example a shell is mistaken as silver, even if there is no silver, it is interpreted as silver. The exponents of this theory are the Mādhyamika Buddhists. To them every thing is to be attributed. Error takes place when internal knowledge is transmitted into the external.

3) Anirvacaneya-Khyāti (manifestation of the undefinable): Here a knowledge cannot be defined having a definite existence of it. The shell is misconceived as silver. But we have no clear idea about silver. We have little knowledge of that which is not silver. It is impossible to define it clearly. Its exponents are the Vedāntic of the non-dualist theory. When we think that the external object is real, we have the illusionary knowledge and that is immaterial since indefinable.

4) Akhyāti (non manifestation) - That which cannot be represented if we can not present the difference of an object to the difference of another. Thus when it cannot be
represented, the object is resembled to another object. Prabhakara memamsakṣas are the
followers of this theory. It is owing to the drawback of the senses that knowledge is not
presented when we see silver and shell. We are able to identify their specialities but we
cannot know their differences.

5) Anyatha-Khyāti (a converse manifestation): When an object is mistaken as another
owing to its resemblance, it is called Anyatha-khyāti. Owing to certain likeness
between silver and shell, we became helpless to understand them. We mistake the shell
to be silver. The exponents of this are the Naiyāyikas.

To Vīcāspati, this Anyathā-khyāti is the only satisfactory one in the presentation
of mistaken knowledge. A person thinks of something to be some other object. There
our perceptual knowledge prompts us to think it another object.
Vîcâspati follows Sûtrakâra in dealing with fallacy. There is no additional knowledge. *NyâyavrtikatîtparyaGekaparîuddhi* is the interpretation of Udayanâcûrya for - the *TîtparyaGeka* by Vîcâspati.

*NyâyavrtikatîtparyaGekaparîuddhi of Udayanâcûrya (C.10th Century AD)*

This book (*NYVTTP*) is edited by Mahâmahopâya Gañgîtha Jhî. It was published from Delhi by Motilal Banarsidass Publishers in 1912.

This is very a detailed and comprehensive work. It has a remarkable place in the history of *Nyâyadarśana*. The well known *Naiyâyika* Udayana lived in Mithilâ in the 10th century AD. He has contributed much to the *Nyâya-Vaiṣeṣika*. His works are examples of unification of *Nyâya-Vaiṣeṣika darśana*. The interpretation of Udayana on the work of *TîtpariyaGeka* by Vîcâspati is very well known. *Ētmattatva - viveka, Kîraṇvale, Nyâyaparîśâga* are also his well known work. Udayana's *Nyâyakusumâjali*
is a very famous book. Here Udayana has tried to establish god’s existence and importance.

He has defined validity in this way. The consciousness of the real nature of object is called prama. The acquirement of such knowledge is called pramäa.  

Udayana’s general reference is called inference.

Udayana describes the term 'Anadhitatva' in his work NVTT related with birth and its cycle. He opposes the views of the Buddhists that invalid and the adäjya (Unseen result) from the practice of Veda is also invalid. But he did not consider memory (Smäti) as a pramäa. But he does not explain memory in his given theory. According to him memory is unreal. Since it is retrievable to the past and present.
To him doubts are of three type (1) Samñadharma, (2) Anekadharma, (3) Vipratipattidharma. He says that dharma is no knowledge with imagination different from doubt.

1) **Samñadharma**: When an object of similar dharma is seen there arises doubt. The doubt whether it is pillar or man arises from the similarity of height.

2) **Anekadharma**: The source of many dharma may arises doubt. When an uncommon dharma arises memory of contradictory features, there arises doubt.

3) **Vipratipattidharma**: In the sentence having contradictory dharmas may arise doubts. The question, whether the senses are material or not causes Vipratipatti dharma.

Udayanajñeya deals with confutation in a different way. Confutation is said to be 'anisaprasa'ga'. (undesired outcome). Confutation is the flow of unfavourable
words. Udayanī has defined confutation with five differences: Ėtmīrāraya (self dependent), Itaretarīrāraya (reciprocal dependent), Cakraka (circular) AnavaĀthī (infinite), AniĀtaprasa’ga (undesired outcome) are five difference. He strongly states that confutation may cause the knowledge of inferable things.

**Nyāya Maṇḍhari of Jayanta Bhatta (C.10th century A.D)**

Śṛṣya Narayana áukla edited the *Nyāya Maṇḍhari (NM)* which is written by Jayanta Bhatta. It has been published by Kasi Sanskrit series No. 106 Benaras in 1936.

It is a free version written in accordance with *NS*. Jayanta lived in the 10th century AD. S.C. Vidyabhusana remarks that he was born in Kashmir and was the son of Pandita Chandra. He is known as the last spoke person of the ancient school of Nyāya darśana and also famous as Vṛttikīra. He criticises the sphoṭavīda of the Grammarians and the Buddhist teachers like Dharmottara, Kalyāṇa Rakṣita etc. In his
work he criticises the theories of Apohasidhānta (the knowledge of a thing by the exclusion of its opposites) and Kāabha’ga (the momentary existence) ārutyaprīmiya (denial of the authority of the Veda), īyara - bha’ga (the non-existence of God).

To him, that which is subjected to pramā is a pramā, a. With the word 'Pramā,a', he criticises the Buddhists and tries to remove Buddhist concept according to his vision. Pramā,a is evident when one follows the action which deny or accept the objects of pleasure and pain.

In the definition of perception to the term 'avyapadeśa' given by Gautama he adds some classification. Gautama thinks it as indescribable. It is not necessary that an object is perceptual as it has a name. Name has a social relevance. But in the knowledge of an object name may not work as a perceptual agent. Jayanta mentions the remarks of an icryā who states that perceptual knowledge is external to all other
perceptions of matter that have an inseparable name.\textsuperscript{89} ājñābdikṣā claim that the perceptual capacities are sounds which incites perceptive objects Jayanta criticises this view. Jayanta says that perceptual topics can not incite sound or name. Sound is not a subject of visual perception. Savīkālpa-paṇḍrayākāa is a combination of sound symbols. But nirvīkālpa-paṇḍrayākāa is not so. It does not discern the matter, quality, action, name, purpose etc. The symbolised specialities of an object discern only the individual elements.

Jayanta describes the reasons for mistakes in perception. The mistakes of the external elements can be by their motion or resemblance. The shell is appeared to be silver because of its glittering due to sun rays. We can’t see anything if the light is dim. The illness of the eye or deficiency of sight will lead to the mistake of visual knowledge. If the mind is distracted or the soul is ecstatic, there will be the mithyā or mistaken belief.
According to Jayanta inference should be suggestive to the aim. The definition of anumāna is 'tatpapraka'.\(^9^0\) Comparison arises out of the effect of relation between samjīva (remark) and samjīvi (remarker), it describes analogy to a famous object. An urban, when visualises a gavaya brings the memory of an animal like the cow.\(^9^1\) But he recognize that this animal is different from cow because of the words of a forester.

To explain 'āabdapramāṇa', Jayanta puts forward two claims. They are abhihitānyavāda and avitiabhidhiṇavāda. Bhāṣamāṁ-sakas are the followers of abhihitānyavāda. In verbal meaning there is the coordination between meaning and expression. Here the relationship between meaning and expression is dealt with, this is called verbal meaning.

Prābhākara māṁśakas are the followers of the second vīda called avitiabhidhiṇavāda. According to them, a sentence may have any kind of meaning. A
word can transmit many meanings. These meanings have been mutually related.

Jayanta denies the second claim, that is to say, it is difficult to believe that word can not contain a specific meaning.

Similarly Jayanta disagrees with spha\c{\i}da of Grammarians. The essence of sound is revealed through alphabets or sentences. If it is through sentence, i.e. vi\k{\i}yaspha\c{\i}a; here the word and it meaning are complimentary when a word is uttered, its meaning prevents and not the sound of the expression.

That is, when, the word ‘cow’ is heard, perception comes to the mind. And when the words are indistinct, there is no distinct meaning. If the sentence is not conveying its meaning, it can not make a verbal cognition and it can not transmit any information any mental construction about that animal. Those who advocate ‘Padaspha\c{\i}a’ say that when the word is heard, meaning is conveyed. Those who
advocate Vjkyaspho¶a, say that meaning comes through sentences. A sentence is the

beginning of a conversation and letters are part of it.

The root concept of áabd¡ has self existence. It denotes the permanent

relationship with the object and its meaning. In fact it can be explained through letter,

then word and sentence. But it is impossible to explain without any of these things.

Truly the letters of cow do not make meaning but the sound is the basis of its meaning.

Jayanta contradicts this opinion. He says that the letters C, O and W make the

word and then transmission of meaning takes place through this. To him the letters in

the word themselves are the cause of communication. Therefore, the basis for

communication is letters and if it is attributed to spho¶a, it become superficial or

surficial.
The views of Jayanta against Buddhism are these: He criticises the perception of Dharmakerti. To him knowledge has only two elements, perception and inference.

These are the two types of knowledge and differentiations. He criticises the Buddhists theory of the concept of the soul. Jayanta says "you say that there is no soul but you build up palaces and desires to get pleasures after death, you say that everything is momentary, yet monasteries are built to retain for centuries. You say the world is voidness, But you speak about wealth and lead to it. You have all presumptions". Thus Jayanta has recorded in his *Nyaya Magjari* about contradicted claims of Buddhists.

Jainism believes in 'Anekāntavāda'. As a result, each object has unlimited dimensions. Therefore it is impossible for a common man to understand everything about an object. There is mortality and immortality existing in the same object. Therefore our knowledge about an object is relative. The relativity about knowledge is called Syādvāda. The word 'syād' means perhaps -'maybe' or in this view etc. The word
'syād' is used to indicate only a possibility 'Syādvāda' declares that a particular object may be exist with one point and non-existent in another point. We cannot say anything absolute about an object.

According the Syādvāda theory, there are many means of discern the reality. The means to this judgement are called Naya. The ancient Jaina works like Bhagavatesṭtra, mention only three Nayas (1) perhaps soul is existing (2) perhaps soul is non existent (3) perhaps soul is indefinable. Later the number of Naya's increased to seven and Syādvāda theory later come to be known as Saptabha'gi Naya. These are the seven Naya's

1. Syādasti - Perhaps there is

2. Syādnāsti - Perhaps there is not

3. Syādasti nasti - Perhaps there is or may not be

4. Syādavyaktam - Perhaps there is indescribable
5. *Syādasti, avyaktam*—Perhaps there is but indescribable

6. *Syādnāsti, Avyaktam*—Perhaps no existent and indescribable

7. *Syādastināsti Avyaktam*—Perhaps there is, perhaps not, perhaps indescribable.

The Jainas of the middle ages were not satisfied with the these seven Nayás. They examined oneness, eternity, soul and god with the help of these seven Naya’s

*After the death of Jaina, Jainism underwent many changes. On the one side, it developed into the new horizons with the help of reason, Anekāntavāda and Syādvāda.*

Along with it, the spiritual content of it was strengthened. Jainism got many interpretations and got into different denominations in the course of time.

The Jainas were also active in the process of establishing their theory, while with the advent of different philosophy by the Greek caused conflicts in the Christian era.
Thus we understand that the Jainas presented the vision based on śyādvāda. In the beginning of new era, the first Jaina author is recorded as Umasvati. It is believed that he lived in the 1st century AD. *Tattvārthādhigamaśṭra* of Umasvati a philosophical work is considered as the first book of the Jainas in their new emergence. From 1st century AD onwards, there were two groups, viz, āvetambaras (white dress) and Digambaras (naked). But in their vision and views there were no fundamental changes. The contribution of Siddasena Divākara, Akalakadeva, Mākāyaya Nandi, were worth special mention in Jainism.

Siddhaśēkara

Dr. S.C Vidyabhusana remarks that he lived between AD 480 and AD 550. He is the first systematic writer who belongs to āvetambara sect. His famous book is known as *Nyāyāvatāra*. Another famous work ‘āmātātarkāśṭra’ is written in Prakṛti by him some concepts are elaborately explained by him in these works. He explains
Pramāṇa and Naya in Nyāya. Pramāṇa is described in two ways: (1) Pratyakṣa (direct valid knowledge) and (2) Parokṣa (indirect valid knowledge). Direct valid knowledge is two-fold: (1) Vyāṣṭika (practical) and Prāmāṇīrtha (transcendental). Indirect valid knowledge is also of two kinds: inference and verbal testimony.

**Siddhasena Gañi**

Dr. S.C. Vidyabhusana has recorded that Siddhasena Gañi lived 600 AD. He was a member of the Avetambara sect and has composed an interpretation for the work *Tattvārthādhigama* of Umasvāti. Here the logical principles of pramāṇa and Naya are discussed.

**Samantabhadra**

Samantabhadra lived in 600 AD. He belonged to the Digambara sect of southern India, was famous as the author of a well known commentary on Umasvāti's...
Tatt¯rthdhigamas¯tra called Gandhahasti-mahabh¯aya. The introductory part of this commentary is called Devigamastotra or Eptam¯msa and is repleted with discussions of logical principles besides a review of the contemporary schools of philosophy including the Advait¯da. We can see the details of Saptabhangi Naya or Sy¯dv¯da in Eptam¯msa.

Akala´kadeva.

He is a famous Digambara who lived in AD 750. He is also known as a poet.

He has written an interpretation called AA¯Ga-ati for samantabhadra's Eptam¯msi.

It is a philosophical text of high value. He has also written a book called Nyyaviniḥcaya.
Mikyanandi

He is a Digambara Jaina who lived in AD 800. His *Parekṣāmukhasūtra* is a valuable book on Jainism. Here pramṇa viđa is discussed. The book has been divided into six chapters. The first chapter is pramṇaśvarpa (the characteristic of valid knowledge), the second one is pratyakṣa (direct apprehension or perception) the third one is parokṣa (the indirect apprehension), the fourth one is viśaya (the object of valid knowledge), the fifth one is phala (the result of valid knowledge) the sixth one is ābhisa (the resemblance of fallacies).

Buddha Philosophy

The early Buddhism is a scheme which is fundamental in presenting the history of these visions. Buddhism in its beginning stage probed into every thing and closely examined and observed them with great courage and followed the rational thinking.
Though Buddhist vision are dependent on logical science, in its basic texts of dharmas there is no dealing of its established principles. In it there is mention of the experts of the logical science. Takki and Vimśi (hetuvādī) are mentioned in Brahmajālasutta.

In Milinda Pañha ‘Nyaya-darśana’ is termed as justice. Logic is dealt with as Hetuvidya in Lalitavistara. Though the scientific explanation of Nyaya vīda was enforced in the early period of Buddhism the origin of Nyaya can be found even before Buddha.

Buddha in his life time did not compose any texts of his vision. We can discern the vision and views of Buddhism only with the help of the texts prepared by his disciples and followers. His followers and disciples circulated his advice and sermons and moral theories through volumes of books. These volumes or collections are known as the piṭakaś. Suthapiṭaka (related to mean) Vinayapiṭaka (related to discussion), Abhidharmapiṭaka (related to philosophical knowledge) are the three piṭakas. It is
said that the basic philosophical feeling of Buddha are these three piyakṣas. Buddhist vision does not have faith in God or in soul but believes in the cycle of rebirth.

Buddha's teaching can be classified into two namely the truths related to misery and pratitya samutpāda. Existence of dukha the cause of dukha, eradication of dukha and the solutions to dukha are the four noble truths. Buddha tried not to achieve pleasure in life after death but to avoid misery in this world. Misery is a reality in life. Man undergoes different types misery, why is man miserable? Why there is misery? To Buddha attachment is the basis of misery. Misery will be there as long as there is attachment; to get rid of misery, attachment is to be prevented. The prevention of attachment is called 'dukha nirodha'. He taught eight means to get rid of misery, like true vision of life, true aim of life, true style of life and the like. The eight means to it are true belief, true decision, true word, true action, true life, true effort, true thought,
true meditation. These eight paths are not the means to escape from the realities of life, but it is a means of avoid misery along with this material life.

Buddha’s claims are epistomised thus. Whether it is a current of water or flaming fire, it is only continuation from its origin. Like wise the objects of this universe are short lived, change or flux is the only permanent thing. This is the meaning of the theory of momentariness. If fire is to be ignited, there should be fuel, heat and air. If any of these is lacking fire cannot be exist. Likewise, these universal phenomena are the union of different constituents. This is the meaning of the theory of origination pratetyasamutpāda (Dependent Origination). These two institutes antātma vijñāna which is the non-existence of the soul.

Later the teachers of Buddhism interpreted the teaching of Buddha in various ways and thus originated the different denominations in Buddhism. They are mainly
two Henayīna and Mahīyīna. It is from the period of king Kanishka that Buddhism was split into these two groups. In Henayīna there are two branches called Vaibhāṣika and Sautrāntika and in Mahīyīna there are two branches called Yogācāra (vijñānavāda and Mādhyamika (śāntavāda). The exponents of Vaibhāṣika are Dīṇīga and Dharmakīrti. Vaibhāṣika is called so since it takes vaibhāṣa as its main which is the interpretation of Abhidarmapīṭaka. Kumāralabdhha is the founder of Sautrāntika. They give importance to Suttapīṭaka. Substance with its limited evidence is regarded as real objects. Vasubandhu and Asaṅga are the main teachers of Yogācāra. Since they accredit only knowledge they are known as Viṣṇuvādin's and since they take yoga as the chief component they are also known as Yogācārin's. They do not accept 'padṛthas', knowledge is the only concept that has existence. Nīgīrjuna is chief of the Mādhyamika'. They are also known as śāntavādins since they deny knowledge and
padārtha and believe in ēnya. But ēnya doesn't mean mere void. Every group acknowledges Buddhā's momentary theory, Anītavijda and the theory of generation.

Nīgīrjuna

The greatest visionary of the Mahāyāna history is Nīgīrjuna who lived between 1st and 2nd century AD. He was born in Vidharbha in South India, in a Brāhmin family.

He seriously learnt the texts of the Brāhmins. Later he became a bhikṣu and learnt all the Buddhist texts as they are. Later he made 'āresalām' his abode, and thereby his fame spread out and in the wheel of time the place become a spot of holiness. His famous works are Mīdhyamikakīrika, Vighrahavyāvartanikīrika, Prīmāavidhvaṃ-sana, and Upyakaujalyaḥdayajīstra. His Vighrāhavyāvartanikīrika denies all oppositions and theories that there is nothing absolute or perfect in anything and everything is merely an incessant flux. Since Vighrahavyāvartani is about the 'void', it is also known as
á£nyathasaptati. He has given his own interpretations on it. He describes the
greatness of void as thus; one who is able to known the void knows everything and the
others cannot know anything. Those who know the 'void' also knows the theory of
origination and those who know the origination know everything about dharma,
dharmahetu, and the result of dharma. He differentiates between adharma, dharma,
dharmahetu, result and the like. He knows, what is misery, its cause its object and so
on if all these are known the right means and the wrong means are understood and
knows how to get rid of there clutches and why it is necessary to free oneself from their
clutches.

Nígírjuna denies Príma,avída which was prevalent in that period, in his
Pramí,avidhvamsana. He denies it in the name of paramírthavída. In this text there
are the synoptical explanation of the eighteen categories. In Upíyakau,alyahzdaya,
there are scientific interpretations about the point of negation and universality.
Through Mādhyamikakārikā he moves that the absoluteness of an object cannot be acknowledged which is subject to creation; life and destruction Rahul Sankrityayana opines that among the works of Nīgīrjuna, Vīgrahavyāvartani and Mādhyamikakārika are the prominent ones.

Erya Asa’ga

It is observed that his period is between 405-470 A.D. He was born in a Brāhmin family in Peshwar. His younger brother Vasubandhu is a chief visionary of Buddhist teachings. Asa’ga and Vasubandhu, these brothers have tried to take Indian philosophy into its eventual development. We have got five books of Asa’ga namely Mahayānottara-tantra, Sātrākhyā, Yogacārabhūmi, Vastusamgrahani, Bodhisattva-puṣakavīḍa. Yogacārabhūmi is the most magnificent among them. Asa’ga upheld the theory of momentariness. His important views in Yogacārabhūmi
are prameya, Vijñnavada, Pratyetéśamutpida, Viddvidy, Paravidakha, dana, Dravya and Parami.u.

Asa’ga regarded knowledge in five classes (1) Adhyatmavidya (2) Cikitsavy (3) Hetuvidya, Tarkastra (4) āabdavidya (5) āilpāstra. By minutely explaining logical science, he has classified it into six (1) Vida (2) Viddhikara, (3) Viddhigna (4) Viddlankira (5) Vidanigraha (6) Vidoopayukta

Vasubandhu

Scholars consider that he lived in between 410-490 A.D. Vasubandhu the younger brother of Asa’ga was a many faceted genius. He wrote Abhidharmakośa and its interpretations.
Díṅga was a disciple of Vasubandhu. Díṅga later came to be known as the father of Indian Nyāya-jāstra during the medieval period. His period is in between 450 and 520 A.D. He was born in a Brāhmin family at Simhavaktra near Kēcevara in Tamil Nadu. He came to North India, became a disciple of Vasubandhu and learnt Nyāya-jāstra earnestly and spent his time defeating his opponents in logic and in composing texts on Nyāya. Though his works are scanty, they are excellent. In the sphere of Viśuṇavīda, the prominent among the successors of Vasubandhu, is Díṅga. Despite a South Indian, his field of work was in Orissa. Though he is very particular in reinforcing the spiritual stand of Viśuṇavīda, his main interests were in epistemology and logic.
Diṅga is more famous as the founder of Buddhist Logic. In his famous work *Pramāṇasamuccaya*, he has dealt with *Pramāṇasiddhi*. In this work he has logically criticised NBh of Vātsyāyana and the views of other logicians.

His refutation is best seen through the works of Dharmakirti, a South Indian and prasisya of Diṅga. Dharmakirti is the interpreter of the works of Diṅga. Dharmakirti also, like his predecessors, denies the atom theory.

**Dharmakirti**

He was born in Tamilnadu at Tirumalai in Chola Kingdom. In a Brāhmin family. To Stcherbatsky, he is the 'Kant' of India. He was highly influenced by the visions of Nīgrjuna, Vasubandhu, Diṅga. He became the disciple of Dharmapala the chief master of Nalanda. He was an enthusiast in Nyāyaśīstra. The chief among them is
Pramāṇavartika, Pramāṇavinicaya, Nyāyabindu, Hetubindu, Sambandhaparīkṣa, Vidyā and Santānāntarāsiddhi.

Pramāṇavartika of Dharmakirti is a self interpretation of Pramāṇasamuccaya. The topic of the four chapters are Pramāṇasiddhi, Pratyakṣapramāṇa, Svārthānapramāṇa, and Parythānapramāṇa. In Pramāṇavartika also, based on theory of momentariness how cause and causation can be acknowledged is dealt with.

It has also dealt with viṣṇuvidya. Though Dharmakirti accepted the stream of Yogacāra, he also incorporated the views of the Sautrāntika and developed a combination of these two schools of Buddhism.

Among his works Pramāṇavinicaya, Hetubindu and Nyāyabindu are of the same style in dealing with topic. Pramāṇavartika is considered as the greatest in content and size among his works. The eighteen points of defeats given by Ēcārya Ākārṣa in
Nyāyaśāstra are rejected by Dharmakirti in his Vīdaya. He opines that the reasons for the failure in vīda are the use of illogical statements and the inability to understand the weakness of the opponent.

Dharmakirti, in Sambandhapakāśa clarifies how the cause and causation can be acknowledged based on the theory of momentariness; the same is dealt with in Pramāṇaḥvṛtika also.

In Santāṇavīrtara siddhi, Manasandhiṇa is dealt with. Mind is not a fact, but a momentary product, which is lost and gained simultaneously.

Vinetadeva who interpreted the works of Dharmakirti lived in 7th century. Ravigupta who lived in the 8th century AD is the author of Pramāṇaḥvṛtikavṛttī. Āṇṭarakāśita is the author of Vīdayavṛttī and Vīdayya-vipaścīrttha. He lived in the 8th century AD. Ratnakirti who lived in the 10th century AD wrote Apohasiddhi and
Thus along with these, there are so many books which considerably contributed to the theories of Buddhism.

The Buddhist and Jainists treated Bauddha Naiyāyika and ĒnvēkĀiki separately. But Hindu Naiyāyika found them alienated. Atom, its qualities, soul, rebirth, god, universe and along with knowledge and their limitation were their subject of study. Njśtika Naiyāyika's were not interested in this trend of Ėstika Naiyāyika's. Their aim was at the purity of logic and its clarity. They dragged these subjects to the level of mincing the matter. As a result, the movement of Nava Nyāya was turned into logical thoughts.

Bhṛsārvajña is regarded as the last writer of the ancient school of Indian logic. His Nyāṣya is only an epitome of the thoughts of Nyāya. He introduced the style of
writings in manual works on logic in the school of Nyaya belonging to Akapida Gautama. The details about his life and works will be dealt in the next chapter.

Notes:


3. Ibid., 1.2.12, p.4.

4. See CS, Vimñasthana, 3.8.5, p.248

5. CP, HIL, p.50.

6. Dr. Sachidana, Mi¿ra, Ny¿yadar¿ana, The S¿tras of Gotama and Bh¿y¿a of V¿tsy¿yana with Sunanda Hindi Commentary, Bharatiyavidya Prakashan, 1999. N.S 1.1.1, p.4
7. Ibid., 1.1.5, p.27.

8. Ibid., 1.1.6, p.31.

9. Ibid., 1.1.7, p.32.

10. Ibid., 1.1.23, p.54.
11. Ibid., 1.1.10, p.36.

12. Ibid., 1.1.4, p.21.

13. Ibid., 1.1.16, p.42.

15. Ibid., 1.1.19, p.45.

16. Ibid., 1.1.22, p.47.

17. Ibid., 1.1.40, p.72.

18. Ibid., 1.2.1, p.77.
19. Ibid., 1.2.2, p. 79.

20. Ibid., 1.2.3, p. 81.

21. Ibid., 1.2.4, p. 81.

22. Ibid., 1.2.11, p. 88.

23. Ibid., 1.2.18, p. 95.
24. Ibid., 1.2.19, p.95.

25. Ibid., N.Bh,1.1.1, p.7.

27. Ibid., p.3.

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28. Ibid., 1.1.3, p.18.

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29. Ibid., 1.1.4, p.25.

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30. Ibid., ii.1.31, p.133.

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Ibid., 1.1, p.5.

Ibid., 1.1.39, p.70.
33. Ibid., 1.1.32, p.62.
34. Ibid., ii.1.44, p.95.

35. Ibid., 1.1.7, p.32-33.
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36. Ibid., 2.1.52, p.158.

37. Ibid., ii.2.2, p.176.
38. Ibid., 4.2.35, p.421.

39. Ibid., IV.2.29, p.416.

40. Ibid., n.1.39, p.148.
Ibid., 2.1.40, p.148.
42. Ibid., p. 148.

43. Ibid., IV.1.25, p. 364.
44. Ibid., p.364.

45. Ibid., IV.1.14, p.357.
Ibid., 1.1.10, p.36.
47. Ibid., p. 39.

48. Ibid., iii, 2-18, p. 302.
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49. Ibid., iii.2.19, p.302.

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Ibid., iii. 2.33, p. 311.

Ibid., 4.1.64, p. 394.
Ibid., p.395.

Ibid., 1.1.9, p.36.

Ibid., 1.1.22, p.47.

Ibid., IV.1.21, p.362.

56. Ibid., p. 32.
58. Ibid., p.32.

59. Ibid., p.48.

60. Ibid., p.48.
61. Ibid., p.47.

62. Ibid., p.111.

63. Ibid., p.60.

64. Ibid., p.61.
Ibid., p.102.

Ibid., p.83.

Ibid., p.40.
68. Ibid., p. 153.

69. Ibid., p. 43.
Ibid., p. 424.

Ibid., p. 455.
72. Ibid., p.371.

73. Ibid., p.372.

76. Ibid., p.113.

77. Ibid., p.135.

78. Ibid., p.162.
79. Ibid., p. 261.

80. Ibid., p. 71.


83. Ibid., p.53.

84. Ibid., p.52.

85. Ibid., p.52.
86. Ibid., p.304.

87. Ibid., p.304.

89. Ibid., p.88.

90. Ibid., p.114.

91. Ibid., p.128.

93. Ibid., p. 185.

94. P. M. Kumaranan Nair, Tr. *Viswadarjanangal*, Rahul Sankrityayan,

P. K. Brothers, Kozhikkode, 1956, p. 806.

95. Ibid., p. 810.

96. Ibid., p. 990.