Chapter 1

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The Mughal Empire, which had dazzled the contemporary world by its extensive territories, military might and cultural achievements showed unmistakable signs of decay towards the beginning of the 18th century. The Mughal Emperors lost their power and glory and their empire shrank to a few square miles around Delhi towards the end of the century with Delhi itself being occupied by the British army in 1803. The unity and stability of the Empire had been shaken during the long and strong reign of Aurangzeb, yet in spite of his many harmful policies, the Mughal administration was still quite efficient and the Mughal army strong enough at the time of his death in 1707. Moreover, the Mughal dynasty still commanded respect in the country.

A sinister development in the later Mughal politics was the rise of powerful nobles who played the role of ‘King makers’. Wars of succession were fought even in the heydays of the Mughal Empire but then the royal princes were the principal contestants supported by powerful mansabdars. In the later Mughal period the ambitious nobles became the real contenders for political power and the royal princes receded in the background. The powerful nobles and leaders of different
factions used the royal princes as pawn in their game and set up and removed royal princes from the throne to suit their interests.

Bahadur Shah became the Emperor due to the untiring efforts of a lesser known but dedicated and loyal noble Munim Khan who was rewarded with the wizarat inspite of Aurangzeb’s desire to retain Asad Khan. Thus Jahandar Shah became the emperor not by his own strength but because of the able generalship of Zulfiqar Khan, a leader of the Irani party. Similarly, it were the Saiyid brothers who raised Farrukh Siyar to the throne in 1713 and pulled him down in 1719 when he ceased to serve their interests. Three puppet emperors, Rafi-ud-Darajat, Rafi-ud-daula and Mohammad Shah were raised to the throne by the Saiyids. The fall of the Saiyid brothers in 1720 came not because they had lost the confidence of the Emperor but was brought about more by the Turani faction under the leadership of Nizam-ul Mulk and Mohammad Amin Khan. And worst of all, these powerful parties were not political parties in the modern sense having different programmes for the welfare of the state but were factions looking for self-advancement, more often at the cost of the state and against the interests of the Mughal ruler.

William Irvine mentions the multiplicity of parties at the Mughal court. Among these four were prominent – The Turanis, the Iranis, the
Afghans and the Hindustani. The first three were descendents of foreigners from Central Asia, Iran and Afghanistan. Their number had greatly increased during the last twenty five years of Aurangzeb’s reign when he waged incessant war in the Deccan. Descendants from these foreigners held important military and civil offices in India. Among these the Turanis from Trans-Oxiana and Afghans from Khurasan and Fars were mostly Sunnis, while the Iranis from Persia were mostly undeclared Shias. In opposition to the Mughal or Foreign Party was the Indian born or Hindsutani party. It mainly comprised Muslims born in India, many of whose ancestors though originally immigrants had settled in India for generations. This party got the support of the Rajput and the Jat chiefs and powerful Hindu landlords. The Hindus who filled almost all the subordinate offices naturally ranged on their side. However it will not be correct to assume that the political parties were based entirely on ethnic or religious groups. As has been rightly pointed out by Satish Chandra that “slogans of race and religion were used by individual nobles only to suit their convenience and that the actual groupings cut across ethnic and religious divisions.¹

The Saiyids brothers, whose rise and fall constitutes the crux of the work, were Hindsutani Muslims and they prided themselves on

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being so. They were not prepared to accept the superiority of the Turani party or be treated as a conquered inferior or non-privileged race.

The Saiyids followed a tolerant religious policy, reminiscent of the days of Akbar. It was under their influence that Jazia was abolished in 1713 and after reimposition again abolished in 1719. Further, the Saiyids won over the confidence of the Hindus and gave them high posts. The appointment of RAtan Chand as Diwan is illustrative of their policy. They also won over the Rajputs to their side and transformed Raja Ajit Singh from a rebel to an ally Ajit Singh gave his daughter in marriage to emperor Farrukh Siyar. The Saiyids showed sympathy towards the jats and it was their intervention that the siege of the fort of Thuri was raised and churaman visited Delhi in April 1718. Above all, the Marathas sided with the Saiyids and Chhatrapati became a deputy of the Mughal Emperor.

The present study would also be looking at this hypothetical question as to whether the history of India would have taken a different course if the enlightened religious policy of the Saiyids had been continued by their successors in high offices.

Since my study is confined to the role being played by a ethnic or national group i.e. Saiyid Brothers, of Barha, it would not be out of place to discuss in a nutshell the position of different ethnic national (or
regional) or religious groups) in the nobility of the Mughals at various periods.

Some modern writers have divided the nobility into 'foreigners' and 'Indians' identifying the former with the Mughals and the latter with Hindustanis and Rajputs. But such a division seems to be of doubtful validity for the seventeenth century. The word Mughal was loosely used to denote those who had recently come to the country from Iran and Turan. However the Mughals were not the representatives of any foreign power which had its economic and political interests outside the country. Once they joined the emperor's service, they made India their home, and hardly kept any contact with the land of their birth. One of the conditions of service was that they should bring their wives and children to the country. Since service generally lasted till death, and even after to progenies there was no question of returning to the country of their birth after retirement. Large numbers of the so-called Iranis and Turanis had lived in the country for one generation or more. They were thus wholly different from the English civil servant in India. Culturally too, the Mughal nobles did not form any distinctive group. Like the other immigrants at the Mughal court, the rapidly adopted the language and the manners and customs prevalent at the court and also introduced

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2. Satish Chandra, p. 15.
and influenced their own ways. They married in the country and assimilated the culture which had been gradually developed at the Mughal Court and was widely prevalent among the upper and to some extent even among the lower classes all over northern India.\(^3\)

By the second half of the 17\(^{th}\) century, the only group among the Indian Muslims which retained the tribal clan structure to any considerable degree were the Afghans. However, there was nothing like an Afghan party at the court in fact they were in the group of Indian Muslims. Culturally, too, the Afghans did not form a separate group, hardly any differences remaining between them and others on this score.

The Rajpts who formed a regional as well as a tribal clan group had shown themselves even less capable than the Afghans of overcoming their tribal clan disunity. Nor did they have the advantage of numbers. But their traditional position as rulers and leaders of Hindu society gave them a social status which Akbar was quick to recognize. The Bundelas like the Rajputs, too were a tribal clan cum regional group. But for various historical reasons they could not attain a position comparable to that of the Rajputs till well into the 18\(^{th}\) century.\(^4\)

As the empire expanded towards the Deccan, many Marathas (Deccanis) also entered the royal service. The problem of assigning the

\(^{3}\) Ibid., p. 16.

\(^{4}\) Satish Chandra, pp. 18-19.
Marathas a position which would accord with their aspirations and importance and which would not at the same time, upset the internal balance in the nobility or unduly strain the resources of the empire, proved a difficult one, and became a factor in the organization and growth of a movement in Maharashtra aimed at regional independence. Religions and sectarian differences also affected the nobles. Thus, among the Muslims there were Shiahs and Sunnis. Sectarian controversy and bitterness between the two sometimes ran fairly high. Shiahs were often identified with Iranis, there being a widespread belief that most of the Irani nobles were secretly or undeclared Shahi.

The nobility of the Mughals, although suffered from a number of internal weaknesses, was on a broad view, a remarkable institution which welded into a homogenous and harmonious whole, men belonging to different regions and tribes, speaking different languages and professing different religious and with differing cultural traditions.

During the later part of the seventeenth and in the early part of the 18th century, stresses were placed on the nobility which combined with its internal weaknesses, led to growing factionalism in the nobility and disrupted the empire.

5. Ahkam-i Alamgiri, p. 70 (ed. by J.N. Sarkar)
However, a principal characteristic of the history of the Mughal Empire in the 18th century was party or group politics. Its nature was, however, different from that of the personal groups centering round a particular person under the early Mughals in India. During the time of the Great Mughals, personal considerations sometimes led ambitious and rebellious princes and nobles like Kamran, the Mirza, Mirza Hakim, Khusrau, Mahabat Khan and others to form a group or coterie with their supporters. But usually such attempts were nipped in the bud and did not envelop the entire court. In the time of Jahangir, however, the waters of the court were seriously troubled on account of the machinations of Nur Jahan Junta in the Khurram Sahiryar rivalry. Under Shahjahan, again, the see-saw of Court politics pulsated with the dominance of Aurangzeb or Dara in imperial counsels particularly with regard to Golkonda and Bijapur. But in such moves the nobility as such played a secondary role, because the emperors were too strong.

Towards the end of Aurangzeb’s reign, two groups of nobles, Irani and Turani were already raising their heads and seeking to come to the forefront of in Mughal Court. The Barha Saiyids were there, of course, but Aurangzeb inspite of their military skills had a poor opinion about them. After his death the controlling and unifying machinery went out of order with the practical abeyance of monarchy. So the importance
of parties or groups grew out of all proportions. It now came to be moulded more by the character of the nobles than by that of the rulers. In fact the emperors were largely responsible for this state of affairs because they were weak. Candidates were put on the throne by the self-centred nobles who wanted that the Emperor should reign and they should rule. They could neither govern themselves nor did they possess the power to judge the right persons who could become worthy and honest officers and ministers.

As has been mentioned earlier, this party politics can hardly be compared with the party government in a purely democratic state. Unlike modern political parties there was no common principle of work or firm party obligations in the Mughal court parties. It was the natural instinct of self-preservation which tempted the nobles to form such groups and keep the governmental machinery under themselves, and strengthen their own respective groups with the provincial governor, military commander and obedient feudal nobles and courtiers. What gave strength and cohesion to these groups was the family bond while ethnic identity added to the common interests of the group as symbolized by a recognized leader. What held the members of each group together were the traditional emotional attachment to certain cultural and political institutions.7

It is, therefore, necessary to have a knowledge of the character and composition of the political parties and their role in shaping the destinies of the state.

Broadly speaking the nobles of the later Mughal court were divided down to 1720 into three principal groups –

(i) The Hindustani party included those born in India or had settled for long here, e.g. many Afghan nobles, the Saiyids of Barha, as well as Khan-i-Dauran whose family came from Badakshan. The nobles of this group largely depended on the support of their Hindu friends. The Afghans were not prominent in Indian politics down to 1748, notwithstanding their numerical strength in the army.

(ii) The so-called ‘foreign’ nobles, collectively called ‘Mughals’ were subdivided into two groups according to the country of their origin. One of them, the Turanis came from Turan or Transoxiana, and other parts of central Asia. They were of Turkish origin and were mostly sunnis. They enjoyed much influence and power as fellow countrymen of the ruling race, the Mughals, and formed a large proportion of the army. The Turani leaders were highly distinguished both as generals and civil administrators.
The other foreign group was of the Irani nobles, coming mostly from Persian and Khurasan and they were mainly Shias. The Iranis excelled in civil administration, especially in revenue and secretariat work. But being Shias they were in a minority and their influence in the state was less except when their leaders were in power.

At first sight it would appear that race and religion constituted the basis of rivalry. But this division was not wholly exclusive. Even in one group there were members of the other groups. Hence this differentiation was not entirely based on religion or racial differences.

The leading figures in the Irani group were Alamgiri nobles, Asad Khan and his son Zulfiqar Khan, holding the ranks, 7000 and 6,000 respectively by the end of 1707. They were also highly influential. Zulfiqar was also a successful general. He was supported by Daud Khan Panni, Rao Dalpat Rao Budh Singh of Bundi, Rao Ram Singh Hara of Kota, all distinguished soldiers. This Irani group was very powerful and influential but it was not a racial group. Both Asad and Zulfiqar were Persians born in India. It was ‘a family-cum-personal’ group bound by family ties and personal relations of supporters. There was no clearly defined political programme of this group, except that Zulfiqar was interested in wizarat of Deccan even in Shahu and in negotiating with
the Marathas. Again he was favourably disposed towards the Hindu and his close association with the Bundela and Hada Rajputs was very significant. The group operated with a fair degree of cohesion which gave its effectiveness. After the fall of this Irani family in 1712, no other Irani noble rose to such high rank till the end of Mohammad Shah’s reign in 1748.

The famous Turani group which rose to prominence at the end of the seventeenth century and continued to hold power in varying degree till the middle of the 18th century was headed by Ghazi-ud-din Khan Firoz Jung. Like the group of Asad Khan mentioned earlier this was also a family group, well knitted together by ties of kinship and marriage and by common allegiance to the Mughal crown. But it was larger stronger more exclusive and consequently more cohesive. Other members of this family were Chin Qulich Khan, Mohd. Amin Khan, Abdus Samad Khan. However a serious setback of the Turanis was that the relation between Firuz Jang and Chin Qulich Khan was strained and Firuz Jung was blind. During the war of succession in the first two decades of eighteenth century (1707-20) the indifferent attitude of this

8. For details of his biography, Maasir-ul Umara, II, 872-879.
10. Ibid., I, 346-350.
11. Ibid. III, 69-74, He was the brother-in law of Amir Khan.
group, put them out of power, and paved the way for the rise of Zulfiqar Khan Abdullah Khan.

There was longstanding rivalry between the Irani and the Turani groups for power and position at the court. Both Zulfiqar and Chin Qilich Khan were ambitious to seize supreme power. At first the Irani group was superior not only in power and influence but also in prestige. The combined *mansabs* of the first few Irani nobles totaled 24,500/24,000 while those of the Turani group only 20,000/15,600. This rivalry between the Iranis and the Turanis did not, however, stand in the way of their combining against the Hindsutanis. But after the fall of the latter, the former two confronted each other fiercely.

During the war of succession after Aurangzeb’s death, the Turanis held aloof from Azam and deserted Kam Bakhsh. They remained in the background in the time of Bahadur Shah. They also deserted Rafi-us Shan in the civil war against Jahandar in 1712. In the contest between Jahandar and Farrukh Siyar, too they were bribed by the latter and remained passive at Samugargh. The Saiyid brothers gave important posts to the Turanis. Mohammad Amin Khan was appointed second *Mir Bakhshi* and was given the title of Itimad-ud-daula Nusrat Jung; his son, Qamaruddin Khan became paymaster of the *ahadis*; Chin Qilch Khan Bahadur entitled Nizam-ul Mulk was appointed viceroy of the Deccan
with headquarters at Aurangabad and with his deputies in the six provinces thereof.

During the period 1707-13, covering the reigns of Bahadur Shah and Jahandar Shah, the Irani party was strong with Asad Khan *Vakil-i-Mutlaq* and Zulfiqar Khan as first *Mir Bakhshi* and then *Wazir* (1712-13). Zulfiqar initially joined Azam during the struggle with Bahadur Shah but deserted him due to his personal defects. He was favourably disposed towards the Marathas securing the release of Shahu in 1707 and also towards the Hindus. He was instrumental in the accession of Jahandar. As *Wazir* he tried to monopolise power in his own hands. But owing to the differences with Kokaltash, a foster brother of Jahandar, he did not exert himself against Farrukh Siyar in 1713, leading to the fall of Jahandar Shah.

From the accession of Farrukh Siyar in 1713 to the first year of Muhammad Shah's reign (1720) the Hindustani party remained in power under the Saiyid brothers. Without attempting to monopolise power the Hindsutani Saiyids sought the cooperation of the Alamgiri nobles. But their pro-Hindu, pro-Maratha policy lack of administrative experience and their friction with the emperor led to a reaction against them on the ground of their policy being anti-Islamic and anti-
monarchical. Hence, they lost their ascendancy in 1720 as a result of the combination of the Iranis and the Turanis.\textsuperscript{12}

While explaining the phenomenon of the decadence of Mughal power, Historians generally lay stress on the social and moral degeneration of the privileged few who grew indolent, self-satisfied and indifferent in their duties. For instance Ahsan Ijad\textsuperscript{13} the author of the *Shahnama-i Deccan* criticizes the character of the nobility and attempts to interrelate its decline with the break-up of political power. He burns with indignation at the corrupt and luxurious life of Aurangzeb’s successors, factional rivalries among the nobles, and their cowardly behaviour in dealing with the enemies of the Mughal government.

The age being one of political decline and economic distress there runs a thread of gloom through the entire contemporary historical writings. The contemporary writers, who saw the Empire passing into the turmoil of strife, and it vast structure ultimately breaking down before waves of insurgency and foreign invasions, did not hesitate to condemn the unwise policies of the Emperor and their inefficient conduct of administration. They denounced the kings for their impolitic and inexpedient acts in regard to military operations and administration;

\textsuperscript{12} J.N. Sarkar, pp. 28-29.
\textsuperscript{13} Ahsan Ijad is also the author of Farrukh Siyarnama, which deals exclusively with the political history of Farrukh Siyar.
even matters relating to their private life were subjected to severe criticism.\(^{14}\) Bahadur Shah was blamed for his extreme munificence in lavishing gifts and privileges of office and power on undeserving persons.\(^{15}\) Jahandar Shah was depicted as a drunken profligate\(^{16}\) while Farrukh Siyar was called a prisoner of indecision.\(^{17}\) Muhammad Shah was accused for his indolence and intemperance which made him incapable of holding the self-seeking nobles under control.\(^{18}\) A number of *Ibrat Namahs* (Kamraj’s, Mirza Mohammad’s and Qasim Lahori’s) were written in this period showing the political anarchy of this period.

Nevertheless, any act of insubordination on the part of the nobles was unbearable to the historians. They gave full vent to their indignation at the local leaders who made a bid to secure shares, compatible with their might in profits the empire could offer.\(^{19}\) In the struggle for supremacy between the centre and the provinces the historians are divided into two groups; some display enthusiastic partiality towards the Imperial Centre, while others lend their support to the local chieftains and provincial governors. Historians like Qasim Aurangabadi, Mansa Ram, author of *Maasir-i-Nizami*, Yusuf Mohamma Khan, author of

\(^{14}\) Zahiruddin Mallick’s article in Mohibbul Hasan’s edited Historians of Medieval India, p. 176.

\(^{15}\) Khafi Khan, vol. II, 601-2, 627-27; *Ibratnama*, Kamraj, f. 36a.

\(^{16}\) Nuruddin Faruqui, Jahandarnama, Aligarh Rotograph, ff. 36-38.

\(^{17}\) Mirza Mohammad, Ibratnama, Patna Ms 95-96.

\(^{18}\) Yahya Khan, Tazkirat-ul Muluk, Aligarh Rotogrpah, f. 132b.

\(^{19}\) Mirat-i-Waridat 644-45.
Tarikh-i-Fathiyah, and others who compiled their works in Deccan, supported the Nizam-ul-Mulk in his conflict with the centre. But writers, like Ashub, Rustam Ali, Shafi Warid, Mirza Muhammad held the Imperialist point of view. It appears however, that their loyalty was to the Mughal crown and not to one who wore it.

In an atmosphere filled with faction feuds, historians felt constrained to take sides and advocate the cause of their group leaders and patrons.

The prolonged conflict between Farrukh Siyar and the Saiyid brothers kept the Imperial Court in a state of almost continuous alarm and unrest while recording these momentous events the historians of 18\textsuperscript{th} century seem to be sharply divided in their attitude to the selection of facts and their interpretations. A set of writers bitterly criticized the Saiyid brothers for their misdeeds; others on the contrary, lay the entire responsibility for all the evils of the government on the shoulders of Farrukh Siyar. The Saiyid brothers are referred to in disparaging terms for their acts of insubordination, inordinate ambition for power and their indifference to the actual discharge of administrative duties.\textsuperscript{20} In like manner, Farrukh Siyar is accused of his feeble and fickle policies in dealing with the all powerful ministers.\textsuperscript{21}

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\textsuperscript{20} Ahwal ul Khawagin, f. 77a.
\textsuperscript{21} Mirza Muhammad, Ibratnama, ff. 102-3.
Khafi Khan explicitly states that Farrukh Siyar committed a serious mistake in conferring the highest civil and military posts on Saiyid Abdullah and Hussain Ali who were untrained and inexperienced in administrative matters. On the other hand, Qasim Lahori, who calls himself a slave of the Sadaat, manifests enthusiastic partiality towards the Saiyids and holds the emperor responsible for driving the Saiyids to desperation by his breach of faith and intrigues against them. Mirza Mohammad and Shafi Warid allege that nobles like Mir Jumla, a Mughal and Khan-I Dauran an Indian born Muslim, having become jealous of the rise of the Saiyid’s to power, resolved to preserve their privileges by means of back stage intrigues. These nobles instigated the Emperor against the Wazir and the Mir Bakhshi and thus fermented strife at the court.

Yahya Khan, the Mir Munshi of Farrukh Siyar, adds other factors which contributed to the widening of the rift between the king and his ministers. He writes that, apart from the dispute over appointments to the posts of Wizarat Sadarat and Diwan, Farrukh Siyar expressly disapproved of the introduction of Ijaradari and abolition of the jiziya.

Muhammad Ashub surveys the whole situation from a sectarian point of view.

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22. Khafi Khan, 738.
23. Tarikh-i-Saltanat-i-Farrukh Siyar ff. 1b, 2a, 66b.
25. Mirat-i Waridat, 505.
view. He ascribes the cause of the conflict to an outstanding hostility between the Mughals and the Sadat of Barha. According to him, the Saiyids monopolized all higher public employment, and the Mughals, the backbone of the Empire, faced unemployment and economic distress.27

Rustam Ali Khan author of the Tarikh-i Hindi, a highly summarised and condensed work, glorifies the spectacular feats of gallantry performed by Husain Ali Khan. His acts of generosity and liberal patronage to saints and men of letters are also praised.28 But Ashub prefers to ignore these achievements and virtues of Husaini Ali Khan. He takes pains to bring forth the vices of his character.29 Worthy of note is the fact that nearly all historians fail to reveal the underlying pattern of Husain Ali’s conciliatory policy towards Marathas, Rajputs and Jats. They betray a spirit of prejudice against the Saiyids and misrepresent their methods of dealing with the zamindars and the regional leaders. True, their system of alliances with the local potentates was envisaged to isolate Farrukh Siyar, but this indirectly contributed to make the royal authority paramount in areas where disorders on a wide scale prevailed.30

27. Tarikh-i Sahadat-i-Farrukh Siyar was Julus-i Muhammad Shah, ff. 70a, 43.
28. Tarikh-i Hindi, 772.
The disgraceful deposition of Farrukh Siyar and his cruel treatment raised a storm of anger against the Saiyids. Not only the discontented nobles felt indignant at the wrongs done to the king, but the humble ranks of the society were also stirred to wrath.\textsuperscript{31}

The victorious ministers dishonoured the Mughal throne filled public posts with their relations and adherents and inflicted severities on the person of the fallen monarch. Even those historians who had hitherto, justified the stand of the Saiyids suddenly changed their attitude and used harsh language in condemning them for these wicked acts. This is particularly true of Mirza Qasim Lahori\textsuperscript{32} and Muhammad Qasim Aurangabadi\textsuperscript{33}.

In contradictions to their earlier observations with regard to the irresolute and weak-kneed policy of Farrukh Siyar these writers now censure the methods followed by the Saiyid brothers. Another significant issue on which the narrators of these events differ from one another, is the bitter struggle for supremacy between the Saiyids and the Muhgals. For an understanding of the origin, scope and nature of the clash of interests between the two groups of the ruling party, it is necessary to explain the historian’s group alignments, his associations

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\item \textsuperscript{31} Shahnama-i-Munawwar Klam, f. 32b.
\item \textsuperscript{32} Tarikh-i-Saltanat-i-Farrukh Siyar, ff. 76-77, 80.
\item \textsuperscript{33} Ahwal-ul Khawaqin, 88a, 145b, ff. 152.
\end{itemize}
and source of inspiration which influenced his views. Most of the works were written either under the patronage of Muhammad Shah or the Nizam ul Mulk, the acknowledged leader of the Mughals. For instance Khafi Khan completed his work in the reign of Muhammad Shah and served for a long time under the Nizam-ul Mulk. Muhammad Bakhsh Ashub was a Mughal and he represents the Mughal viewpoint in interpreting the scramble for power Muhammad Qasim Aurangabadi, Ahsan Ijad Yusuf Muhammad Khan, Munim Khan Aurangabadi, Mansa Ram and others compiled their chronicles when the Nizam ul Mulk was at the zenith of his power.

These writers, as employees of the government in the Deccan, were bound by strong ties of personal loyalty to the Nizam-ul Mulk who patronized and encouraged them. The Saiyids have few historians to advocate their case. Rustam Ali Khan and Ghulam Husain Tabatabai\footnote{Ghulam Hussain Tabatabai, Siyar-ul Mutakhkhirin (text) Calcutta II, 1836, 21-22, 30, 37-39.} might be included in this list of the Saiyids supporters. Reflecting on these divergent opinions, Khafi Khan writes: ‘in the times of Farrukh Siyar men have shown a partiality or animosity to one side or the other exceeding all bounds. They have looked to their own profit and loss, turned the reins of their imagination accordingly. The virtues of one side
they have turned into faults, while they have shut their eyes to the faults of the others'.

Khafi Khan, in spite of his tall claims to honesty and frankness in recording events, could not conceal his sympathies for the Nizam-ul Mulk. He tries to gloss over the faults of his patron and finds faults with his enemies. He holds that the Nizamul Mulk was averse to the idea of calling Saiyid brothers as namak-ba haram and haram namak. But the Nizam ul Mulk himself used these abusive terms for the two brothers in each and every arzdasht and letter he sent to the Emperor and to his friends and subordinates. Reflecting on rumours that Saiyid Abdullah Khan was poisoned to death at the instigation of the Nizam ul Mulk, Khafi Khan tried to defend the position of his patron. Without going deep into the matter and investigating the truth, he concluded that God alone knew the reality.

35. Khafi Khan, 726.
36. Ibid., 940.