CHAPTER - II
FOUR MEANS OF VALID KNOWLEDGE IN

NYĀYA PHILOSOPHY

Logicians accept four means of valid knowledge, they are perception, inference, comparison and verbal testimony.

PERCEPTION

Perception is the most fundamental source or court of appeal in any claim to knowledge though every knowledge need not arise from perception. Materialists in India and elsewhere admit sense perception alone as evidences. According to their opinion ‘seeing is believing’. Goutama’s definition of perception is the starting point of the Nyāyavaiśeṣikās epistemology. It is admitted by all philosophical schools to be the most basic and fundamental source of knowledge. The
classical definition of perception is given by Gautama in the fourth sūtra of the first chapter of the Nyāya sūtra. Perception is superior than inferential, analogical and verbal cognitions because with this pramāṇa our desire for certain knowledge is fulfilled. Hence it is predominant. When a person seeks the knowledge of an unknown object, if he is told of it by a reliable person and has the verbal cognition of an object, there is still a desire to see the things with his eyes. After seeing the thing directly he does not search any kind of knowledge about it. So we can understand that the perception is the final test for real knowledge and the eldest of the pramāṇās. Here Goutama was fully justified in putting perception first in his list of four pramāṇās. Without perception no other instrument of valid knowledge is possible. Hence perception is considered ‘supreme’ among the pramāṇās. Perception is the knowledge which arises from the contact of senses with its objects, and which is
determinate, unnamable, and non-erratic. Goutama defines perception by mentioning only its special cause (asādharāṇa-kāraṇa). Perception is the knowledge not due to the instrumentality of another knowledge. So it is known as jnana – akaranakam jnanam. It is the knowledge which occurs directly and immediately. Among to the Naiyāyikās perception is the knowledge which is not mediated by other knowledge. Inference is produced through the knowledge of a sign or linga. Upamana is produced through the knowledge of a Sadṛṣya-jñāna and verbal testimony is produced through the knowledge of a word but perception is not produced by the knowledge of any instrument of knowledge. In short, Vyapārijñāna, Sadṛṣya-jñāna, and padajñāna are the uncommon causes of Anumitijñāna, upamitijñāna and sābdaboda respectively. But any kind of knowledge does not become the uncommon cause of perception. The sense organs are hold as the uncommon cause of perception.
Goutama’s definition of perception is that
“Intuīrthasannikarṣotpannam jñānam avyapadēsyam
avyabhicari vyavasyātmakam pratyakṣam”\(^1\). Goutama’s
definition sets four conditions each of which is necessary for
a judgment. (1) It is derived from the contact between sense
organs and the object, (2) it is avyapadēsya ‘not verbal’ (3) it
does not wander (avyabhicari) and (4) it is definite
(vyāvasayatmaka). Perception is the knowledge which is
produced from the sense object contact and which is not due
to the words. The prominent position of this definition was
accepted by all the later Nyāyaphilosophers. So this is
known as the Nyāya definition of perception.

According to Annambhaṭṭa “Intuīrtha Sannikarṣajanyam
jñānam pratyakṣam”\(^2\). Viswanatha pañcānana says that
“Intuīyajanyam jnanam pratyaksam”\(^3\). The sense-object

\(^1\) N.S I 1.4.
\(^2\) Tarkasamgraha.
\(^3\) NyayaSiddhanta Mukthavali P.No.233.
contact is called sannikarṣa or pratyasathi. चक्षुरादिनामिनिद्रियाणां
घटादिभिर्भेदः सह सतिकर्षेण यत् जानं जायन तत् प्रत्यक्षमित् चतुराते।
Dignaga does not give any definition of perception, which is
well known as the knowledge of the object derived through
the channel of the senses. But he describes perception
which being freed from the pre-conception. It is unconnected
with name, genus etc. Suppose a man in twilight mistakes a
rope for a snake, his knowledge of the snake is a pre-
conception and it is not connected with the name, as we can
perceive a thing without knowing its name. Perception is
called Pratyakṣa because it arises through the relation to the
senses (aṅga aṅgamā ṛṭi). The āṅgā or sense organs are
dfive viz, eye, nose, tongue, ear and skin. The sense organs
have an important role in the theory of perception. The five
sense organs have different sense objects and they are of
different elements and they passes the property of the
elements to which they belong. Nose is the sense organ it is
produced from earth, its object is smell which is also the property of the earth. Tongue is the sense organ, it is produced from water, and its object is taste, which is also the property of the water. Eyes are the sense organ it is produced from light and its object is colour, which is also the property of the light. Skin is the sense organ, it is produced from air, and its object is touch which is also the property of air. Ear is the sense organ it is the either within the cavity of ear, and its object is sound, which is the property of ether.

The contact of the sense organs with the object is constituted as a nimitta kārana or efficient cause of perception. This contact has been mentioned separately in Goutama’s Pratyakṣa sūtra. In the process of perception the soul first comes in contact with the mind, then the mind contacts with the sense organs and lastly the sense organs comes in contact with the object. To produce the knowledge
of perception the union of the soul with the mind that of mind with the sense organs and the sense organs with their objects are needed.

**Intriyārtha Sannikarṣa (Sense object contact)**

Gautamāśas definition of perception gives an important position to the sense-object contact. Only through the sense-object contact we can understand the knowledge of all things. In Nyāyasūtra Gautama mentions only five senses. The contact of the sense with akasa or empty space does not result in any perceptual knowledge, because empty space is imperceptible for any one of the senses. The Buddhists object that neither the visual nor the auditory sense can function after reaching the object because there cannot be any actual contact between these and the objects perceived. A sense means the particular organ of the body where it is
said to be located. There is no sense over and above the organ. Uddyōtakāra Kumārila and Vacaśpatimisra critically refute the Buddhist view. This objection is not correct because without the contact between the sense and the object there cannot be any perceptible knowledge. So Gautama is justified in claiming that perception is the knowledge resulting from sense object-contact.

The opponent says that the perception cannot be produced when a person who is sleep or whose mind is preoccupied with other things. It is not a valid hetu, as it involves self contradiction i.e. it denies that the mind sense contact involved in perceptioniv.

Regarding this objection Vātsyāyana says that the perception could not be produced during the time of sleep

iv व्याहतत्वादहेतुः । (N.S., II, 1, 28.)
when one’s mind is pre occupied with other things, would seem to indicate that perception is brought about by sense object contact only. Moreover “तैद्यापदेशो ज्ञानविशेषणम्” इति सूत्रेण importance of the sense-object contact is perceived, hence the above mentioned object is not valid. So we can establish that the sense-object contact is more important in the knowledge of perception than mind sense contact.

Vātsyāyana also states that it was not the intention of sage Gautama to include all necessary causes of the perception in the aphorism. He only states the most important cause of the perception. There are five external organs and one internal organ. So there will be six kind of perception. In all these six kind of perceptions, the contact between the organs and the object is necessary. In each perception, the organs and objects vary. But the contact of
the mind with the sense organ, doesn’t vary. It is common to all perceptions.

**ARTHA OR OBJECT**

The word artha or object is used in the sūtra in the sense of only perceptible object. There is no perception without a contact between such an object and these senses. He uses the word artha to indicate that only the contact of the sense with the appropriate object results in its perceptual knowledge. The contact of the sense with the empty space or akaśa does not result in any perceptible knowledge, because empty space is imperceptible, i.e., not an object appropriate for any one of the senses.
Mind

The mind is an internal organ, but it has been separately mentioned because of its distinctive character. The senses are constituted by the elements, are restricted each to its own province, and possess attributes. The mind on the other hand, is not composed of any material element. It is the common cause of all cognitions. Although the mind has not mentioned by Goutama in his sūtra which states the sense organs, it has an important role in the process of perception. Some says that Goutama’s definition of perception is incomplete because it arises a doubt whether the mind and self have any part to play in the theory of cognition. Their objections are, the definitions of perception is untenable\(^\ast\). The perception cannot arise unless there is a

\(^\ast\)प्रत्यक्षत्क्षणानुपस्तिः असमानमवचनात्। (N.S. II,1,20.)
contact between self and mind\textsuperscript{vi}. Another objection is that, in this definition perception (dik) place, time and ākāśa would also have to be mentioned\textsuperscript{vii}.

Goutama answers to the above mentioned objections. According to him cognition is a quality of the self and its occurrence depends upon mind self contact is also regarded as a cause of perception. If the sense object contact did not depend upon the mind-sense contact, we would have simultaneous cognitions of the things. This is opposed to Goutama's description of the mind. The mind which is an atomic substance cannot be conjoined with more than one sense organ at a time. So perception does not arise merely from the contact of a sense-organ with its object, but it

\textsuperscript{vi} नात्ममनसोऽऽस्मिकारोभावेप्रत्यक्षोत्पत्ति:। (N.S. II,1,21.)

\textsuperscript{vii} दिग्देशकालकाटोष्णयेवंप्रसांः। (N.S. II,1,22)
requires also a conjunction of the mind, Uddyōtakāra also replies to the objections. He says that direction, place, time and ākāśa have no capacity to produce cognition because they are eternal and present everywhere. But this proximity is something, which cannot be avoided. If such factors are to be treated as the causes, there must be same special reason for it. For instance the hot touch of light is not regarded as the cause of its perception of its colours, though it is present at the time. The colour of the light is regarded as the cause of its perception because it has the capacity to produce the perception. In every form of knowledge the contact between mind self is involved, hence the above mentioned objection is not correct, whenever perception occurs there must be the mind self contact.

Goutama rejects the view that there is only one sense organ and other organs are the modification of it. The
objector says that the skin has extended all the sense-organs, so that when it is present there is perception and when it is absent there is no perception at all. Goutama criticizes this opinion that if we are accepted the skin organ is the only sense organ it would be able to apprehend all sensible objects. If the tactual organ is regarded as only sense organ the blind would perceived the colour and deaf would acquired the knowledge of the word. So this opinion is not correct. Again the tactual organ is treated as the only sense organ there would be simultaneous perception of colour, sound etc. The self would come in contact with the mind, the mind with the tactual organ and the tactual organ with sound colour etc. This simultaneous perception is impossible. Moreover on the destruction of this tactual organ all perception will be impossible.
The causes of Pratyaksajñāna

Perception occurs when our sense comes into contact with an object which has Mahatva it objects are not qualified by Mahatva they cannot be perceived. Hence one of the causes of perception is Mahatva. In the case of visual perception, contact of light is must. An object can be perceived only if there are the above said qualities. In the visual perceptions Udbhutarupa also considered as a necessary cause.

Six kinds of sense-object contact

Six kinds of sense-object contact are Samyoga, Samyuktasamavaya, Samyuktasamavetasamavaya, Samavaya, Samavedasamavaya and Viṣeṣaṇaviṣeṣyabhāva.
The six kinds of perception is divided into two i.e. Nirvikalpa Pratyakṣa and Savikalpaka Pratyakṣa. According to Vatsyāyana and certain other like Kesāvamisra etc. the instruments. The instruments of perception is of three kinds. On certain cases it is the sense organ itself, in same cases it is the sense-object contact, and in certain others it is the knowledge itself.

The difference between Nirvikalpaka Pratyakṣa and Savikalpaka Pratyakṣa.

According to Annambṛṭṭṭa “Nisprakāraṁ jñānam Nirvikalpakaṁ and Saprakāraṁ jñānam Savikalpakaṁ”\(^{viii}\). The various process involved in perception first the soul prompts the mind, the mind get into touch with the sense organ, which in turn goes forward to contact the object.

\(^{viii}\) Tarkasamgraha P.No.20.
because the sense have the function of contacting the objects. After the sense-object contact immediately we get a knowledge of the thing that is Nirvikalpaka or indeterminate knowledge arises. This Visualises the object alone, as this is something without any idea of its name or any quality making the object definite. This instrument of such knowledge is the sense organ just as the axe is that of cutting. Here the sense-object contact is the mediate activity, just as the axe-wood contact is that of the instrument of cutting. After the indeterminate knowledge, the determinate knowledge or savikalpaka jñāna arises, which visualizes the object observed as something with a definiteness. In this cognition sense-object contact becomes kāraṇa. The indeterminate knowledge is the mediate and the determinate knowledge itself is the result. With the Savikalpaka jñāna we can understand the yatharthajñāna of an object that which includes a specification as this is Rama, this is brahmana this
is black. After the sense-object contact the Nirvikalpakajñāna originates hence the sense-object contact is the cause of it. After the Nirvikalpakajñāna a person tries to know the real knowledge of the object, thus the Nirvikalpakajñāna also is the cause of savikalpaka pratyakṣa. A savikalpakajñāna possesses ‘contents’. These content or visayās are broadly divided as viśeṣya or qualified, prakāra or qualifier and samsarga or connection. On Viśeṣya there is Viśeṣyata, in prakāra there is prakārata and in samsarga there is samsargata. In nirvikalpakapratyakṣa these contents will not occur. So through the Nirvikalpakajñāna the clear knowledge of the object cannot be produced because of the absence of the vivid knowledge of the three typed contents. The distinction between Nirvikalpaka and savikalpaka perception is absent not only in the Nyāyasūtra of Goutama, but also in the other sūtras of the Orthodox philosophical systems. The
Brahma-Sūtra of Bādarāyaṇa, which are hold to be the oldest philosophical sutras, do not give any definition of perception.

A clearcut difference between Nirvikalpaka and Savikalpaka perception was introduced for the first time in Indian philosophy by Dignāga. According to him Nirvikalpaka and Savikalpaka are not merely two kinds of perception with a differences of vividness and sequence, as was accepted by the Nyāyavaiśeṣika school. The difference between them is fundamental and qualitative. The Nirvikalpaka is transcendental is the sense that it grasp a transcendental reality of which, although we have a sort of awareness, we are never conscious in terms of thought. The reason is that our intellect can never grasp the external reality, which is in the form of the unique particular (Svalakṣaṇa) and is transcendental. The scope of the intellect is restricted to the generalized form (Sāmānyalakṣaṇa) i.e., the empirical or
phenomenal. The two types of knowledge like Nirvikalpaka and Savikalpaka are quite different not only in their nature but also in the sphere of their operation. The Orthodox realist and particularly the Nyāyavaiśeṣika never accept that kind of distinction between them. But the qualitative difference in the nature of two kinds of perception was accepted by the later Nyāyavaiśeṣika, and it is undoubtedly due to the influence of Dignaga school.

According to the Naiyāyikas Savikalpakapratyakṣa is of two kinds viz, laukika or ordinary perception and alaukika or extra ordinary perception. Ordinary perception is of two kinds – internal (mānasa) and external (bāhyā). In internal perception the mind which is the internal organ comes into contact with the physical states and processes like cognition, affection, contain, desire, pain, pleasure, aversion etc. External perception takes place when the five external
organs of sense come into contact with the external objects. The external sense organs are composed of material elements of earth, water, fire, air and ether and therefore each senses the particular quality of its element.

Alaukika is extraordinary perception is of three kinds — Sāmānyalakṣaṇa, jñānalakṣaṇa and Yōgaja.
Inference (Anumāna)

The Major source of valid knowledge in

Nyāya Philosophy

Among the four means of valid knowledge in Nyāya philosophy, the main stress is on Anumāna Pramāṇa because it is the most important method for acquiring new knowledge. Its nature, form and content has been discussed by all schools of Indian philosophy. Inference is the central topic in Nyaya system and through which we can infer the non-existence of things. Through inference we are able to gain knowledge about things not available at the moment to perception. For example, we are able to know the cause of an occurrence by inferring on the basis of observed lawful relationships even though we failed to observe the causing event. Perception only grasps present objects while
inference grasps objects in the past, present and future. Except Čārvākās all systematists admit inference as a means of valid knowledge.

Anumāna is defined as anuniyate onena i.e., by which something is inferred. The etymological meaning of anumāna in anu means after and māna means measuring. The suffix anu has the force of the instrumental. In the smoke-fire inference perception is the instrument which is concerned with the sign and it leads to the cognition of something not yet perceived. It is a mental judgment which arises after something has been heard or observed through certain steps of reasoning based on the observed things. Annambhatta’s definition of anumāna is ‘anumiti karaṇam’ anumānam\(^x\). परामर्शज्ञानन्यानन्द्विचित्रिति :। व्याकरणिविशिष्टस्य हेतो। पश्चात्तित्वज्ञानं परामर्श। paramarsa is the avyavahitapūrvavarthi kārana for

\(^x\) Tarkasamgraha.
anumiti which is called हित्त्वपरामर्शः। According to Annambhaṭṭa vyāptivisiṣṭa pakṣadharmaḥ dhetuḥ. The relation between hētu and sādhyā is called vyāpti. येन पश्च साध्यं साधयति स हेतुः। हेतुना यत् पश्च साधयैत तत् साध्यम्। हेतुना साध्यं यत्र साधयति स पश्चः।

After seeing the smoke in mountain a person ‘the mountain is along with fire’. This anumiti does not arise without the co-existence of the hētu and sādhyā. This relation between hētu and sādhyā already had seen in many places महानसः॥ यज्ञशाला कुःः। बहुधूमयोः केवलसहस्तरवर्षनं न व्यासिग्रहङ्कः ह्युः व्यविचारज्ञानविरहसहकृतसहचारर्ज्ञानस्येव व्यासिग्रहङ्कत्वम्॥। After understanding the relation between the smoke and fire the person arrives near to the mountain and there also he sees the smoke in the pakṣa with his own eyes i.e. पश्चथर्मताज्ञानम्।

Then he remembers the vyāpti and understand
‘विभिन्न्यायाधूमवानं पर्वततः’ इति। तत: विक्रमः वर्णांत् व्यास्तिविशिष्टं हेतु शास्त्रायारतः
पवित्रमेताज्ञानामात्रे जायते। तत: व्यास्तिमरणान्तरं व्यास्तिविशिष्टं हेतौ शास्त्रायारतः
तात्रः इति: पवित्रते चार्टिते इति जायते। अतः परार्मार्थं: विशिष्टविशिष्टावगाहि
भवति। एतस्य विशिष्टविशिष्टावगाहिण्याज्ञानस्य अनुमिति प्रति हेतुत्तमवस्मयम्यम्
। सन्त यत्र धूमं: विभिन्न्यातीति व्यास्तिज्ञानेन सामान्यत: धूमवत्तवेदशे बद्धः।
भवतीत्वेव ज्ञानं भवतुं मात्रम्। अतो अत्र विभिन्न्यातीति अथवा पवित्रते विभिन्न्यान्
इत्यनुसर्यूपार्थें विभिन्न्याविशिष्टावगाहिण्याज्ञानम्यम्।
विभिन्न्याविशिष्टावगाहिण्याज्ञानम्।
 एतद्विशिष्टविशिष्टावगाहि- ज्ञानं विभिन्न्यावर्षसं: स एवानुमिति प्रति चरमकारणम्।

**VYĀPTI**

Vyāpti is an important factor for attaining inferential knowledge. There is diversity of opinion among the scholars about vyāpti. The Navya Naiyāyikās accept that the knowledge of co-existence between hētu and sādhya as well as the absence of deviation are the causes of ascertaining
vyāpti\textsuperscript{x}. According to Annambhaṭṭa ‘Sāhacarya Niyamō vyāpti सह चरत इति सहचरो समानाधिकरणो , एकाधिकरणवृत्ति: तयोर्भावः साहचर्ये, सामानाधिकरण्यम्। So हेतुसमानाधिकरणात्यन्तरभावप्रतियोगिम-समानाधिकरणं व्यासिं:। Here smoke is hētu and mahānasa or kitchen is hētvadhikarana समानाधिकरणं धूमस्येति धूम: व्यासिविषिष्ट:। व्यासिं: हेतो: धर्मः। The hētu plays a key role in inference because without this we cannot infer. The knowledge of hetu leads us to the knowledge of the sādhya. In the context of inference a hetu is a thing whose relation to a Sādhyā is known. The coexistence between the hētu and the sādhyā are two types viz. ‘Niyata and aniyata’. Aniyata means variable or vyabhicārin and fixed. niyata means invariable or avyabhicārin. The relation between smoke and fire called Vyābhicāri because the fire without smoke can exist independently, e.g. in case of fireball there is no smoke.

\textsuperscript{x} Major Hetvabhasa P. No. 13.
In other words when we perceive fire on that account we cannot say there must be smoke. So vyabhicāritatva means that out of two things one can exist in the absence of other. On the other hand ‘avyabhi charitatva’ means not out of two things one cannot exist in the absence of the other. For example, the relation between smoke and fire is such that without fire smoke cannot exist. In our daily life we have seen in kitchen that smoke is always accompanied by fire. This type of concomitance shows that smoke cannot exist without fire. Again where there is smoke there is fire, where there is no fire there is no smoke. So we can say that smoke invariably exists with fire but fire need not invariably exist with smoke.

Goutama in his Nyāyasūtra, Vātsyāyana in his Bhāṣya and Uddyōtakara in his Nyāyavārtika do not mention Vyāpti.
Goutama's definition of Anumana is:-

‘अथ तत्पूर्वकं त्रिविधमनुमानं पूर्ववत् रोषवत् सामान्यतो विक्रम’.  

From this sutra we can understand the anumāna follows on perception, Vātsyāyana interprets the word वह as perception of the relation between the problem or hetu and the probandum or sādhya (linga – linginsh – sambandha darsanam) as well as the perception of the proban (linga – darsanam). The proban or linga means 'the real reason' (hetu) as actually employed in inferential process. The probandum or lingi is the object actually inferred through the proban. Where there is the proban there is the probandum. The proban is the pervaded (Vyāpya) and the probandum it its pervader (Vyāpaka). Therefore, the relation between the proban and the probandum is the relation of the pervaded and the pervader (Vyāpyavyāpakabhava) i.e. called vyāpti.
Inference is defined as valid knowledge of a probandum from the knowledge of a proban in any subject of inference with invariable con-committance. It is made through the knowledge of a universal con committance between the probans and the prabandum. A proban exists in less sphere of time and place, e.g. smoke exists where there is a fire, but does not exist in heater. So its range is less than that of fire. A probandum exists in a greater sphere of time and space than a proban; e.g. fire exists in a red hot iron or a heater, where there is no smoke at all. So smoke may be called proban and fire may be called probandum due to their existence in the range of time space. A wide experience of con-committance is needed to affirm inference.

Vyapti is an important part in the process of inference. It is of two kinds :- anvayavyāpti and vyatirēkavyāpti. Anvaya vyāpti is ascertained by the knowledge of coexistence (sahacara) of
proban and probandum. Vyatirēkavyāpti is ascertained by the absence of probandum and absence of probans. Thus the invariable relation of fire and smoke is established by observing a number of times in which the two coexist (e.g. the kitchen) and further because of not observing any instance in which smoke exists without fire. ‘where there is smoke there is fire as in the kitchen’ is the affirmative (positive type of vyapti) ‘where there is no fire there is no smoke as in a lake’ is the negative type of vyāpti.

Vātsyāyana holds that ‘no inference can follow in the absence of perception’. Only when the observer has perceived fire and smoke to be related to each other, and then he is able to infer the existence of the fire on the next occasion when he perceives smoke.
Gautama does not divide Anumāna as Svārthanumāna and pararthānumāna but he divides it into three types pūrvavat, śeṣavat and sāmānyatodrṣtam.

Pūrvavat :- On the word ‘pūrvavat’ purva is related to the probandum. In this anumāna effect or karya inferred from the cause or karaṇam. e.g. when we see clouds rising in the sky, we infer that there will be rain. Here inference relates to the future.

Śeṣavat :- in the word ‘śeṣavat’ sesa stands for the object which belongs to the same as the probandum. In which the cause is inferred from the effect, e.g. when we see that the river is full and current is swifter, we infer that there was rain. Here the sesavat inference relates to the past.
Samanyatō drṣṭa :- The word ‘Samanyatōdrṣṭa’ means that which is related to the objects which are not perceptible. Bhaṣyakāra does not give any explanation about this kind of anumāna – but merely gives an example. We generally observed that whether a thing we saw in a place is seen in a different place at another occasion we come to the conclusion that it has moved, from this fact of general observation we infer the movement of the sun, even though we cannot perceive it. When the relation between proban and the probandum being imperceptible, the probandum is known from proban having the same nature with any other object. For. e.g. we infer Self from desire etc. are qualities. Qualities resides in a substance. We experience desire etc. They ought to have a substratum. Earth, water, fire, air etc. are not the substratum of desire. So we infer i.e. Self as the substratum of desire etc. Navīṇa Naiyāyikās divide anumāna as suārthānumāna and parārthānumāna.
Svārthānumāna or Inference for Oneself

By the svārthanumāna a person gets convinced in his own mind. For. e.g. after ascertaining vyāpti between smoke and fire in the kitchen, one happens to go near a mountain and sees an unbroken line of smoke from the mountain, reaching the sky. Then he doubts “whether there is fire on the mountain and immediately he recollects the vyāpti”. Here the sight of the smoke is the reason or hetu to infer the fire. Finally he concludes in his mind that as there is smoke, then the hill is possessing fire also i.e. mountain is fiery.
Parārthānumāna or Inference for Others

After inferring himself a person use five membered syllogism for instructing others. The five membered syllogism is known as Nyāya and each member is called avayava. By means of the avayava a person can infer the sādhya. The members of the syllogism are pratijña, hetu, udaharaṇa, upanaya and Nigamana. By means of the syllogism the hearer also understand the existence of the fire in the mountain, hence this is of the fire in the mountains, hence this is called parārthānumāna. Lingaparamarsa is the only cause for svārthānumāna and parārthānumāna. Annambhatta opined that lingaparamarsa is anumāna. Linga is of three types :- anvayavyatireki, kevalanvayi and kevalanvayavyatireki, Anvayavyatireki :- for example ‘where there is smoke there is fire’ as in the kitchen. We have observed this directly from
the kitchen, the presence of the smoke and fire. Where there is no fire there will not be the smoke. This is vyatirekavyāpti.

To which probans there are positive (anvaya) and negative (vyatirēkīs) co-committance that proban is called anvayavyatireki.

Kevalanvayi :- when one gives a statement such as the pot is named because it is an object of knowledge of this statement. The probans and probandum both are Kevalanvayas. Here there is only one kind of vyapti viz. where there is the statement of being the object of knowledge there is the namedness. As there is no negative concomitance, there probans are called kevalanvayas.

केवलव्यतिरिक्तः क्यतिरे कार्यव्यतिरिक्तं केवलव्यतिरिक्तं। यथा पृथिवीरेव भिन्नते
गन्धवत्तात्, यदितरेव न भिन्नते न तत्तत्वत् यथा जलम्।

The peculiar characteristic of this type of vyapti which makes it different from other type. Here the gandha or odour is the probans. The itarabheda or the difference from others is the
probandum. The earth is different from water etc, because it possesses the odour. Here we cannot say 'where there is odour', there will be earthness, because the complete earth is pakṣa, there are no sapakṣās. Only there are vipakṣās. Vipakṣās are those in which the negation of probandum is decided. In this anumāna water etc. are the vipakṣās, because there is the negation of itarabhēda i.e. the negation of probandum. Where there is the negation of itarabhēda, there will be the negation of odour (water etc.) Here only vyatirekavyapti is available. So this proban is an example of Kevalavyatireki.

The members of the parārthanumāna

The five members are Proposition, Reason, Example, Confirmation and Conclusion.
1. The proposition is the declaration of what is to be proved

2. The hētu is the means of establishing what is to be proved on the basis of similarity to a homogeneous or heterogeneous example.

3. An example is a familiar instance which, through its homogeneity or its heterogeneity to the probandum, has or has not the same quality as what is to be proved (prabandum).

4. The confirmation (उपनयः:) is the form of a resume of what is to be proved on the strength of the example ‘this so or this is not so’
5. The conclusion is the restating of the proposition with reference to the hetu. (हेत्वपदेशात् प्रतिज्ञायः पूनर्वचनं निगमनम्)

The parārthānumāna is considered as nyāyaprayōjya or nyāyasādhya. The five members of parārthānumāna is called syllogism or pancāvayava. The Vedantins and Mīmāṃsakās say that all the five members are not necessary for pararthānumāna. According to them प्रतिज्ञा, हेतु, उदाहरणम् उदाहरणोपनयनिगमनानि would be sufficient for pararthānumāna. The Buddhist says that only two members viz. udāharaṇa and upanaya would be sufficient. The naiyayikās opinions is that the incomplete syllogism, the hear mind would not pass through a methodical system of reasoning. The hearer would be put a lot of mental searching for the missing links, because the quickness of the mental activity and searching is not taken into account. Therefore the five members are
necessary to avoid the doubts of the hearer. This division of inference into svārtha and parārtha is one of the most vital topics in Indian logic. It clearly enabled the Nyāya system to reject the opinion of the opponents.

The Buddhist also accepted the two kind of inference svārthānumāna and pararthānumāna. They give different types of definition about svārtha and pararthānumāna.

हेत्वाभासः

Goutama’s Nyaya sūtra is the first arranged work on hetvābhāsa. The later Naiyayikās hold Goutama’s view regarding hetvābhāsa in the some modification.

Vātsyāyana points out that fallacies of the hetus are called hetvābhāsa because these hetu do not possess the
characteristic of the hetus proper and yet they appear like those hetus because of their similarity along with them.

Gangēśa provides three general definitions of hētvābhāsa there are: 1. Hētvabhāsa is the absence of the instruments of the inference. 2. Hētvabhāsa is that object which is known prevents the knowledge of linga from leading to an inference. Hētvabhāsa is that characteristic which prevents known inference. Gangēśa classifies hētvabhāsa as follows — savyabhicāra, viruddha, satpratipaksā; assiddha and bādhita.

1. By which object, a knowledge becomes opponent of the inference knowledge, that object is hētvabhāsa.

2. That, which is the content of the real knowledge which is the obstracter of an inferential knowledge, is the hētvabhāda.
UPAMĀNA OR COMPARISON

The Naiyāyikās accept upamāna as a third means of valid knowledge. The Buddhists reduce upamāna to perception and verbal testimony. The Sankhya and the Vaiśeṣika reduce it to inference. The Jainas reduce it to recognition or Pratyabhijna. The Mīmāṃsakas recognize it as a separate source of valid knowledge, but their account of it is different from that of Nyāya.

The sixth chapter of my thesis, I will highlight the importance and the necessity of accepting upamāna as a separate pramana.

SABDA OR VERBAL TESTIMONY

Verbal Testimony is considered as a separate means of proof or a channel of new knowledge. In Indian tradition
the understanding of the meaning of a sentence uttered is known as Sabdaboda. Through the Sabdaboda a successful communication holds between the speaker and hearer, when a sentence is uttered. When a sentence is uttered an attentive hearer cognizes the words and understand the meaning of the sentence. This cognition of the meaning of a sentence is qualificative cognition or Visistajñana. When a meaningful sentence is uttered, the hearer, if he knows the language and is to attentive to it, immediately understand the meaning of the word elements in the sentence.

The systems of philosophies like, Mimamsa, Nyaya and Vyakarana had dealt with the Sabdapramana. The Nyaya accepts the understanding of the sentence meaning as a distinct type of valid knowledge but the Vaisesika a sister school does not accept sabda as a
separate means of valid knowledge. According to them it includes under inferential knowledge. The systems of philosophies like, Mimamsa, Nyaya and Vyakarana had dealt with the Sabdapramana. Mimamsakas prefer Bhavanamukhyaviseyaka sabdabodha, Naiyayikas admit prathamantharthamukhya viseyaka Sabdabodha and Vaiyakaranas regard dhaturthamukhya viseyaka Sabdabodha. For example (1) The effort is having chaitra as the agent, rice as the object, cookedness as the result.
(2) The chaitra is having the effort that generates the action which generates the state of cookedness which resides in the rice.
(3) The action of cooking which is present this time is having the agent chaitra and rice the object. Sabdabodha originates from sabda or pada. Sabda is the karan or cause for sabdabodha. Although all pramanas are equally important in view of acquiring knowledge, Sabdapramana which is
mentioned as a fourth means of valid knowledge in Nyāya philosophy deserves much consideration. According to famous poetician Dandin “This whole universe will become totally dark if the light in the form of word does not illumine till the end of the worldly existence.” The word or language is the medium of expression. By using the words we can express our ideas to others and by hearing words we understand others ideas. According to the older section of Naiyāyikās or prācyās verbal cognition is directly produced from the words. Therefore the linguistic utterances of words are the actual means of verbal cognitions.

Goutamas definition of sabda is “Āptopadeśāḥ Sabdah”. According to Annambhaṭṭa “Āptavākyam sabdah”. A trustworthy person is called apta who has the direct knowledge of an object. Apti means the direct knowledge of an object. According to Vacaspatimisra the word ‘upadeśa’ stands for the advice for the benefit of others. So the advice
of the apta is regarded as Śabdapramāṇa. The word as an instrument of valid knowledge is of two kinds, having perceptible or drṣṭa and imperceptible or adrṣṭa of objects. The object which is attainable in this world is the one ‘having perceptible objects’ or drṣṭārtha and the object which is attainable in the other world is the one having imperceptible objects or adrṣṭārtha. (From this we can understand this division of words of the ordinary person and the seers).

Sabda is one of the twenty four qualities enumerated by vaiśeṣikas. Prastapadabhāṣya is the first systematic study and a scientific analysis of sound in the Vaiśeṣika field. Sound is proved to be the special quality of Ākāśa. Although the word śabda is used to denote the sabda as a quality and as a means of valid knowledge, there is difference in sense. The word 'śabda' when used in the sense of a means of valid knowledge either the word that is known or the knowledge of
a word is meant. Prācinanaiyāyikās say that *jnāyamanah śabdaḥ pramāṇam*. Annambhaṭṭa also accepted this view of the prācinanaiyāyikās. According to Navinananaiyāyikās padajñānas as a karana of sābdabodha. So they regarded padjñāna is a sābdapramāṇa.

\[
\text{Padajanya} \quad \text{Padārthopasthitih} \quad \text{vyāparah.}
\]

\[
\text{Padajanyatvasca vṛtya bodhya. Vṛttisca saktilakṣṇanyatarasambandhah. Tatha ca Padat saktya lakṣṇaya va padajanya padarthopasthitih sābdabote vyaparah. Phalam tu sābdabodhah.}
\]

According to Mukthavali :- *Padajñānam tu karaṇam dvaram tatra padarthadhihi sābdabodhah phalam tatra saktidhihi sahakariṇī.*

The knowledge of word is the instrument of verbal comprehension. The knowledge or recollection of the word meanings through word is the operation, verbal.
comprehension is the result, and the knowledge of denotative function or sakti is an aid. Sakti is of three kinds yoga, Rudhi and Yogarudhi.

Sakti or denotative function

The ancient Indian philosophers have studied completely the concept of ‘sabda’ as a pramana. The word has the power to denote a meaning. This power is called sakti. According to Naiyayikas the denotative power of the word is defined as the desire of God is the form of this meaning may be known from this word. Asmāt padāt ayamartho bōdhavyah iti Easwareccha Sakti. Denotative function is the relation of a word to its meaning. It is of the form of a divine will that such and such a word should denote such and such a thing. There are many devices to know the denotative power of the word. The Mukthavali Viswanadhapancanana explains the saktigrahopayah.
"Saktigraham
vyakaranopamanakōsapeavakyadvyavaharatascal Vākyasya
śesdvivr̥tvadanti sannidhyatasiddha padasya vṛddhaḥ."

The denotative function is apprehended by grammar, similarity, dictionary, statement of trustworthy person, usage, supplementary statement, paraphrase and contiguity of a well known word.

The denotative function is apprehended through the Vyakarana (Grammar) which gives the meaning of the roots. Thus one becomes aware of the meaning of the root भु as to be and that of एष्ठ to increase etc. The upamāṇa which gives the knowledge of an unknown object through the similarity of a well known object. Similarly the denotative function is apprehended through the dictionary. Thus we understand the meaning of “Vistarasarvah” as Viṣṇu, because that word
is included in the synonyms of Viṣṇu in Amarakoṣa. But Nyāyadarsāna does not accept all the opinion of the kōsakāra. For example, a dictionary tells us that the denotative function of words such as a ‘blue’ is with regard to the blue colour and as also to what is possessed of blue colour etc. but Nyāya darsan accept of clearness denotative function of the words like other etc is only with regard to blue colour alone. From the trustworthy persons also denotative function is known. For example, as from the statement of a trustworthy person the word ‘pika’ signifies a cuckoo, we get the denotative function of words such as pika.

Similarly from usage also the denotative relation is apprehended. For instance an elderly person giving directions says “Bring the jar” and hearing this another elderly person who is told to do so brings the jar, reflecting on this, a boy who stood near concludes that the act of bringing a jar is
the result of the words, ‘Bring the jar’. Then in expressions like ‘Remove the jar' and 'Bring the jar', he understands by a process of inclusion and exclusion the denotative function of words such as a jar with regard to the jar etc. as connected with certain acts. Similarly from supplementary statement also denotative function is apprehended. As in the sentence the porridge should be of a yava, the word yava is used by the Āryans to signify a particular long-owned grain (bārely) while the mleccas use it in the sense of panic seed (kangu). With regard to this we have the statement, ‘Now other herbs become dry, in spring season, but (bārly) yava stand flourishing. From this supplementary statement we conclude that the denotative function of the word is with regard to the grain with long awns (barely and its use to signify panic seed is due to a mistaken notion about its denotative functions, for it is cumbrous to assume multiple denotative functions. In words like Hari, however, since there is no decisive
reasoning one way or the other, we have to assume multiple
denotative function. Similarly from paraphrase also we
apprehend denotative function. Paraphrase is a statement of
the meaning of a word through a synonym. For instance the
sentence, 'There is a jar', is paraphrased by sentence, 'there
is a pitcher', hence the word 'jar' is known to denote a
pitcher. Similarly the word 'cooks' is paraphrased the words
'does the cooking, from this we conclude effort. Likewise
from the contiguity of well known word also denotative
function is apprehended. As in a sentence like, 'A pika is
signing sweetly in this mango tree, the denotative function of
the word pika is apprehended to be with regard to a cuckoo,
because of the contingents of the word 'mango tree'.

**Cause of verbal cognition**

Three distinct causes are needed to produce the
śabdabodha, i.e, a unique (extraordinary) cause
asādharanakārana or instrument (kārana) (II) an intermediate cause (dvara) such as operation vyāpara and (III) an associate or auxiliary cause (sahakāri). For instance, in the process of producing a pot, here the stick is the instrument through which the pot is produced. Here the movement of the potter's of the potter's wheel is the operation in producing the pot and the same is the intermediate cause or operation. In this process clay etc, is the help in producing the pot, hence it is the associate cause. The knowledge of the words (padajnana) is the unique cause, the recollection of the word meanings produced from the words (padarthadhi) is the intermediate cause or operation and the knowledge of the functional relation such as expressive power between words and meanings (saktidhi) is the associate cause or auxiliary cause.

Other auxiliary factors are required are (1) syntactive expectancy (ākaṅkṣa) (2) sematic competency (yōgyata) and
sannidhi or proximity. Annambhatta and Kesavamisra regarded the definition of the means of verbal comprehension as the works of a trustworthy person viz, Āptavākyam sabdaḥ iti. Padasamūho Vakyamarthaparisamāptau iti bhāsyakaraḥ Vakyalakṣaṇam vadati. Vākya is a collection of words which have three special qualities i.e., ākāṅkaṇa yogyata and sannidhi For e.g., cat, camel, man, elephant, dog is not a sentence as it is wanting in verbal expectancy or ākāṅkaṇa among them. Similarly ‘spray with fire’, is not a meaningful sentence as the two words are lacking in yogyata here ‘fire’ and ‘spraying’ are not capable of being construed together, because the instrumental case in ‘agnina’ denotes that the fire is the instrument for the act of praying and fire is not capable of becoming such an instrument in as much as ‘fire and act of spraying’ do not join together through cause effect relation. Therefore the words ‘angina sincet’ do not establish a meaningful sentence. Similarly if the word ‘gām’ and ‘ānaya’
are uttered one by one with an interval of an hour between them the words lack proximity. Therefore the vākya or sentence is only such a collection of words which have all the three characteristic at the same time, e.g., ‘Jyōtiṣṭomēna svargakāmo yajēta’ one desirous of attaining heaven should perform the sacrifice ‘Jyōtiṣṭomena naditire’ (five fruits on the bank of the river) are correct sentence.

According to the mīmāṁsakās this ‘sakti’ is another padārthā or category, but Naiyāyika consider it as Samkēta sometimes a secondary meaning is denoted by the word. Here the word, by its power of lakṣaṇa denotes the secondary meaning.
Lakṣaṇa or implication

Lakṣaṇa which means relation with the denotative sense of the words. Sakyasambandhah gangāyam ghosah ityatra gangapadasya tire lakṣaṇa. Gangapadsya sakyarthah pravāhaḥ.

Inshort without knowing the pramāṇās, we cannot conceive the reality of this world, as the pramāṇās are the only source to knowing the pramēyās. The naiyāyikās advocated four means of valid knowledge viz, perception, inference, comparison and verbal testimony. In Mānamēyaprakāśika, Harijivandas defines pramāṇās are the right knowledge known by its use. The pramāṇa is the righteousness of any knowledge known by its use. Here pramāṇa means pramā, this definition is made to avoid false knowledge like the knowledge of silver in a shell. The use of the pramāṇa is to get the rightness of any object.
Visisṭādvaitin admit that every knowledge is valid, ‘sarvajñānāṁ yathārtham’. The word pramāṇa denotes the rightness and utility of any knowledge, since it discriminates valid knowledge from invalid knowledge. To conclude the definition of pramāṇa, it is right knowledge and its rightness is known by its use in any time.