4.1 Introduction

A review of related literature is an essential activity of scientific research projects. Literature review refers to both the activities involved in searching for information on a topic, as well as to the actual written report that summarizes the state of the existing knowledge on a research problem.

Literature review helps the researcher in many ways. It helps the researcher to assess what is already known, what is still unknown and untested, justify the need for its replication, throw some light on the feasibility of the study and the problems that may be encountered by the researcher, and to uncover methodological tools, which shed light on ways to improve the efficiency of data collection, obtaining useful information on how to increase the effectiveness of data analysis.

The literature review involves systematic identification, location, scrutiny and summary of written material that contain information of a research problem. The investigator followed these steps in the review of related research and non-research literature to broaden the understanding and to gain an insight into the selected problem under study. Limited research literature is available on studies of motivators of youth opting for officer cadre in the Armed Forces. Few studies have been done on identifying the socio-economic background of the Armed Forces officers and improving the attractiveness of the Armed Forces as a career option.
The study of the relevant and related literature is organized as follows:

4.2 Studies related to career choice and factors influencing career choice.

4.3 Socio-economic status of Armed Forces officers.

4.2 Studies Related to Career Choice and Factors Influencing Career Choice

Given the prevailing emphasis on Commercial values and business success in the USA, selection of military career is often believed to be a weak career choice. Among segments of the civilian public, entry into the military is often thought of as an effort to avoid the competitive realities of civil society. In the extreme view, the military profession is thought to be a berth for mediocrity (Janowitz, 1964).

Pendleton Herring, writing on the eve of the attack on Pearl Harbour, stated the issue with the complete tact of a Harvard Professor of Political Science. He writes that the best talent and the most enterprising and ambitious young men would not seek to make the profession of arms their life career. They went into business and the well-rewarded professions.

Selection of a military career, like the selection of any career represents the interplay of opportunity, plus a complex of social and personality factors. In one sense, to say that the military is a mediocre career choice, is an expression of a liberal ideology, which holds that, since war is essentially destructive the best minds are attracted to more positive endeavors (Albuquerque, 2001).
In assessing the selection of military career, two rather specific empirical questions could be investigated. First, it is true that during the period which the 1910–50 leaders were recruited, the military profession attracted persons whose basic intelligence was not equal to those in other professions. Second is the issue of motivation. Could it be that the underlying motivation for a military career is an expression of 'careerism,' whereby a person seeks what believes to be a non-competitive and protected route to the achievement of limited ambitions.

Upto the period of 1950, the meaning of career choice for the military elite suggests the following hypothesis. While for many persons, and even for majority the military career represented the pursuit of a relatively secure, safe and promising prospect more or less similar to other professions. For a substantial minority at least the choice of a military career was a strong decision. To speak of strong career choice means that a person feels that a particular occupation is singularly important to him, since he believes that it will give him the rewards and gratifications he wants. For such persons, the military career has overtones of a 'Calling', with a sense of mission (Nair, 1982).

For motive patterns, singly and in combination, were of consequence for those who rose to the level of General or Admiral by 1950: tradition or more precisely family and social inheritance, sheer desire for education and social advancement with or without a career commitment to the military, experience in military setting and 'boyhood' ambition. The potential officer’s choice was furthered by adequate and respectable level of personal security in peacetime and desire for an active, athletic-type career. An attempt to provide a full time career to military officers has been found to be a mathematical absurdity. Because 87% strength of officers are
required in the ranks of Major and equivalent and below (Chibber, 1986).

'The problems of the Officer Cadre of the Army' highlighted in USI Journal of April-June 1997 states, "over the past few years, sufficient number of young persons, men and women are not volunteering to join the officer cadre of the Army. On 1st January 1997, the deficiencies of officers in different 'Arms' and 'Services' of the Army were Armoured Corps 30.4 percent, Infantry 25.3 percent, Field Artillery 32.5 percent, Air Defence Artillery 27.7 percent, Corps of Engineers 31.5 percent, Corps of Signals 29.6 percent, Army Service Corps (ASC) 34.4 percent, Army Ordnance Corps (AOC) 27.9 percent, Corps of Electrical and Mechanical Engineers (EME) 32.9 percent, Minor Corps 20.3 percent, Special List cadre 36.8 percent. Total 29.7 percent deficiencies in any hierarchical structure will not exist and the higher levels of the hierarchy since the vacancies at higher ranks will be filled up by promotions. The deficiencies show up at the ranks of Captains and Majors in units. Such high percentages of deficiencies, in effect mean that 'Junior Leadership' is virtually non-existent in units. In blunt terms, the fitness for war of most units is very questionable. As on 1st January 1997 the deficiencies in the officer cadre of the Navy were 5.68% and the IAF 7.47%" (Balaram, 1997).

Citing the possible reasons for deficiencies (De-motivators), he adds—pay, promotions, prestige and service conditions are important that make a service attractive. In spite of the best efforts of the chiefs of staff of the three Defence Services and their respective Headquarters over a period of 50 years, neither Pay Commissions nor the Government have paid much attention to what Defence Services have said. No attempt has been made by these agencies to provide
the officers of the Defence Services the same pay for the same length of service in comparison with the Indian Administrative or any other service as a basic necessity in pay structuring. Adequate compensation is not provided for hard living conditions, frequent movement all over India, living away from families and risk to life and limb, not only during wars which are infrequent but also during counter insurgency operations which are endemic. Most armies of the world build this element into the emolument structure or provide as Military Service Pay or X Factor Compensation. It is generally, observed that Chairman and non-bureaucrat members of pay commission, are sympathetic to the Defence Services when they visit and see the conditions in units in forward areas. However, they seem to forget these observations when making recommendations to the Government, perhaps under the overwhelming influence of members who are either serving or former bureaucrats. A vast majority of political leaders do not have sufficient ideas of the Defence Services, except perhaps the fact, that they take part in Republic Day Parades. Hence it has become a case of “Remembering God and Defence Services only when facing trouble”. It is very doubtful whether in present day India, ‘patriotism’ and ‘glamour’ and glory of the service play any great part in attracting good quality youth or even mediocre youth to join the officer cadre.

Summing up the dismal state of the officers cadre and the existing deficiencies, the highlights are:

4.21 *A sensible and equitable scale for the Defence Services has not been evolved by five successive pay commissions over half a century. Informed and dynamic political leadership to override bureaucratic obstruction to give the Defence Services their due does not exist.*
Measures to improve the image of the Defence Services in general, and the Army in particular, are not likely to emerge in a hurry because of deeply entrenched vested interests.

‘Patriotism’, ‘glamour’ and ‘glory’ are no longer operative factors.

Political management may improve, mitigating the rigours of service conditions.

Promotion prospects may improve gradually with better cadre management.

In a research project titled, “How to make a career in the Armed Forces attractive”, undertaken by Mahajan (1999), spread over a year and involving interaction at different levels and survey among serving and retired officers, he had questioned 1108 respondents. 534 serving (70 percent were Major equivalent and below) and 131 retired (mostly colonel equivalent and above) officers of the three services and 443 students.

The principal findings of the survey are:

Most serving officers are satisfied with the values that govern career choice and retention i.e. monetary compensation, professional development life style and social status.

Job satisfaction and promotional avenues are unsatisfactory, but can be alleviated by in-service reform.

Lack of married accommodation, quality education for children and truncated career are the main irritants in the quality-of-life indices.
4.314 The juniors hunger for better example and expect superior moral quality from senior officers.

4.315 The traditional non-material values of service life are still its most attractive features.

4.316 Certain non-institutional (organizational) trends have crept into the Armed Forces, which seek out of service appellate and associations to represent their interests.

4.317 Retired officers have no regrets for having joined the Armed Forces. However, they are deeply dissatisfied with the existing resettlement apparatus.

4.318 Students retain their respect for the Armed Forces and want to join them for traditional reasons but seek more flexible terms of service. They are quite ignorant about the Armed Forces.

4.319 Respondents were asked to give their suggestions (not under any specific headings) for improving the attractiveness of a service career. These suggestions are as follows:

**Fig 4.3 Measures to Improve Attractiveness of the Armed Forces**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Serving Officers</th>
<th>Retired Officers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Improve Monetary compensation</td>
<td>199 (12%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provide additional facilities</td>
<td>122 (8%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improve career Development</td>
<td>266 (16%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improve service culture</td>
<td>479 (30%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Facilities for families</td>
<td>170 (11%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Facilities for retirees</td>
<td>45 (3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improve civil-military relations</td>
<td>320 (20%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Suggestions received</strong></td>
<td><strong>1600 (100%)</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
4.4 The Principal Causes Affecting Armed Forces As a Career Choice.

The respondents' chief concern is in respect of improving in-service culture, civil-military relations and career development (65% of the suggestions). The study points to six principal causes that influenced career choice for the Armed Forces.

4.41 Poor politico-bureaucratic management of the Armed Forces creating a feeling among existing incumbents of not being allowed to realize potential.

4.42 Continuous whittling down of the authority and status of the senior hierarchy by government thus discrediting it and making it appears inept in the eyes of the subordinates.

4.43 An entrenched feeling in the Armed Forces that the commitment expected of them is, not matched by the society's commitment to them.

4.44 There is a lack of internal cohesion in the officer corps, caused principally by perceived poor moral quality of senior leadership and its inability to lead by example. Consequently, some negative societal values (e.g. sycophancy, individualism and consumerism) have permeated its ranks.

4.45 Poor management of ex-servicemen's welfare and resettlement.

4.46 Poor PR and media relations.
4.5 Studies Related to Socio-Economic Status of Armed Forces Officers.

In a presentation on Military and Society on 20-21 October 1986 at Vigyan Bhawan in New Delhi, it was held that the profile of the officer cadre had dropped to a lower middle class and perhaps even below that. The motivation, inspiration and priorities of the officers had changed. Unlike the King Commissioned Indian Officers (KCIOs) and the pre-world war-II Indian Commissioned Officers (ICOs) the values of today's officer were the same as in the civil; political clout and economic power. Therefore, the ethos is shifting from traditional values to self-interest and contractual rights. She went to the extent of suggesting that the motto at Chetwode Hall at the IMA could now be read in reverse. She referred to a research conducted by her in 1981, wherein she obtained views of 50 Lt Cols and 500 young Officers of between 1 to 10 years service (Awasthy, 1986).

4.51 The Findings of the Survey

4.511 The most acutely felt stresses were financial stringency, separation from family, problems of children's education and provision for a house.

4.512 Along with this, i.e. at the same level, was the concern at the curbing of initiative and self-expression.

4.513 Two major considerations of an army officer priority wise were:

4.5131 Socializing and pleasing the boss.

4.5132 Professional competence came a poor second.
Chapter 4

Review of Literature

4.514 *Husbanding resources and making contacts for post retirement competed strongly for the third place with training and welfare of troops.*

4.515 Assured re-employment for five years after retirement would ease the tension of 51 percent of all respondents.

4.516 90 percent of the senior respondents (Colonels and Brigadiers) affirmed a change in the attitude of young officers whose concern was with money, professional competence and furtherance of their career.

4.517 Accent was on pleasing the boss to obtain a good ACR.

4.518 Career furtherance rather than competence in the exercise of command was the consideration.

4.519 Seniors tend not to stand by their subordinates. If anything goes wrong they tend to make a scapegoat of them.

4.520 Cadets at the officers training establishment are reluctant to opt for fighting arms. Where as the vacancies for ASC and other services are over subscribed by over three times.

4.521 **Stagnation and Selection System:** Even after 1980/81 cadre review of 34851 officers in the Army, 87.78% are in the rank of Major and below, 10.11%, Lt. Col/Colonel and only 3.11% are Brigadiers and above. In a batch of 100 passing out of the Academy in a given year, 60 will become Lt. Cols. of whom only 50 will become Colonels, 20 will reach the rank of Brigadier, 8 of Major General and 2 that of Lt. General. She
compared this with the scope in the IAS where everyone reaches the rank of Joint Secretary and stated that although the cadre of Army officers is 10 times as large as the IAS, it has only one full General as against many scores officers of the rank of Secretary to the Govt. of India.

4.522 Performance Appraisal: The confidentiality of the ACR goads the officer into sycophancy. Marking standards vary and those who are lucky to serve under generous ‘awarders’ do well. Assessment is based on traits and is not a review of job performance. There is a high degree of subjectivity and often influenced by non-professional issues, regimental preferences and personal equation.

4.6 Recruitment Trends of the Indian Armed Forces

During an address at USI on 14\textsuperscript{th} February 1977 contended that brilliant youth of the country did not favour joining the officer corps. The following statistics were indicative of certain trends:

4.61 "At the Indian Military Academy, in 1974-75 only 70\% of the vacancies was subscribed and in the Technical Arms it was a mere 50\%. As far as the quality of the intake was concerned, 88\% of the candidates were in the lowest acceptable grade".

4.62 At the National Defence Academy, 30\% of the intake was sons of JCOs and NCOs, 20\% were the sons of Civilians who had sent their sons to Sainik Schools, and 40\% were those who did not make the grade for Universities.

4.63 A bare 10\% were the sons of service officers of which 9\% fell in the category of those who could not make the University grade. For the past two to three years hardly any son of a
General Officer joined the National Defence Academy. The implications of these statistics cannot be glossed over with impunity. Although this malady is not peculiar to our country, but we can drive no comfort from the fact that other nations too are not finding it easy to adapt to changing times and changing motivations. That these changes are of deep consequence cannot be denied. To substantiate this point a few quotations may be a matter of interest - “The British soldier of the Second World War himself was less simple in his loyalties and psychology, better educated than his predecessor in the Great War. He had grown up in an era of radio and the cinema and the popular press. He was not so trusting and obedient as the 'Tommy' of 1914-18. Resentment of unemployment and of the general failure of the traditional ruling class to tackle resolutely the economic, social and political problems had led to suspicion and cynicism. The men of Second World War did not show the same qualities of stoical endurance as those of the Great War. Divisions lost their fighting 'edge' more quickly. A lower proportion of causalities than in the Great War were needed to bring a unit to the point of needing relief.

This was the price paid for higher effective intelligence and initiative. The British Army of Second World War required intelligent management by its leaders. Public Relations became a respectable military activity. The styles of leadership altered from somewhat remote and formal authority of the C-in-C and army Commanders in the great war to a more personal kind of leadership – commanders like Auchinleck, Alexander, Montgomery, and most important of all, Slim became immediate and personal figures to the troops, not merely embodiments of command to whom was owed, unquestioned respect and obedience. Within the above quotation, there is much food for thought (Janowitz, 1964).
During the discussion on “Recruitment into the Officer Corps of the Armed Forces” held at USI on 14th Feb. 1977, it was unanimously accepted that today’s youth disliked hard work and hazardous life and the inadequacy of emoluments. Youth preferred to join commercial concerns or Government’s administrative and foreign services, rather than forces. It is quite incorrect to interpret. The large number of applications for commissioning is being indicative of enthusiasm for life in the forces. It is economic necessity, which drives them into services. The acceptance of all elements of society into the officer ranks, due perhaps to socio-economic changes, means firstly, that mediocre will form the great majority of the officer intake and that such material however well trained, cannot produce the form of leadership (in its widest sense) which exudes complete confidence. Secondly, a dilution of standards for commissioning (and this has been repeatedly resorted to) cannot be tolerated beyond a certain point. In-service training however, intense and efficient, can achieve only limited success.

During USI Editors Guild Seminar on “The Soldier and his Alienation from Society” it was contended that relative importance of different motives for a man joining the Armed forces is difficult, if not impossible, to reconstruct. An official questionnaire study of about 8000 graduates at West Point, USA concluded, “relative to compelling factors for entering west point almost all indicated that honour and prestige was the most important reason” (Grant, 1996).

In the past, officers were traditionally drawn from the land owning or wealthy classes and other ranks from Yeomen’s stock. Therefore, there was no problem of their rehabilitation as officers on retirement went back to their estates or lived on their private income. With the ushering in of the new social order, the type of intake into the Armed Forces, both officers and other ranks materially changed.
officers and men now came into Defence Forces for careers and depend only on pay and allowances for their livelihood.

One of the strongest motivating factors is the urge of an individual to reach his full potential and level of competence. The lack of openings in the services denies him this legitimate need causing deep-rooted frustration and affecting the quality and output of his work.

4.7 Summary

This chapter dealt with the review of literature related to present study. Literature was reviewed in the areas of motivating factors for students opting for Armed Forces and socio-economic background of the defence respondents. The review of literature helped the investigator to develop a deeper understanding of the problem under study and development of the tool for data collection and interpretation of the findings. The next chapter deals with research methodology used in the present study.