PART I

HISTORICAL SETTING
CHAPTER I

INDO-PAKISTAN RELATIONS; THE INITIAL PHASE, 1947-54

The story of India-Pakistan relations has been a long series of discord and conflict. Both the countries are the most difficult and most important neighbour for each other. Dialogue is the most vital thing between the two countries. Their drift towards war begins when they cease to talk. Their relationship is a mixture of national prejudice, inflated psyche, injured ego and plain rivalry. This was rooted in the history of partition and the manner in which the subcontinent was divided into two separate countries, in which major roles were played by the imperialist policy of divide and rule, the conflict between the Indian National Congress and the All-India Muslim League, and the two-nation theory propounded by Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the growing awakening of the Muslim middle class and the fear of Muslim landlords of Hindu dominance, and the rise of Hindu chauvinism as symbolized by the Hindu Maha Sabha and Rashtriya Suwayam Sevak Sangh (R.S.S.).

The Indian subcontinent had evolved into one social, political and economic unit during 200 years of British rule. The division of this single unit into
India and Pakistan and the conflict and controversies between the two major parties (Indian National Congress and Muslim League) over partition, and the past experiences left a deep impact on the leaders of the two countries. These impacts later counted a lot in the formulation of the foreign policies of the two countries and coloured their world view. India and Pakistan have been caught up in one or the other problems. The problems faced by the two countries are discussed below.

1. Dispute over Boundaries

The disagreement between India and Pakistan over the demarcation line of the partition had been one of the biggest problems. These border disputes emanated from the Boundary Commission which were set up for both Punjab and Bengal under the Chairmanship of Sir Cyril Radcliffe. The Radcliffe Award was self-contradictory. Conscious of the defects Sir Cyril Radcliffe suggested that the final solutions was possible only in political arrangements. To remove the bottlenecks, a machinery for the settlement of disputes and for the prevention of untoward incidents was evolved through the Inter-

Dominion Agreement of May 1948. In December, 1948 a joint review of the working of May 1948 Agreement was made with justice A. Bagge (Sweden) as Chairman of new tribunal. Discussions were held from time to time at Inter-Governmental Conferences. In September 1953, an Eastern Zone Conference of Officials met to discuss the Bagge Award of February 1950. Among other things, it discussed the question of exchange of some enclaves in Cooch Bihar and East Pakistan as also the demarcation of the Eastern Boundary between India and Pakistan. Maps were signed and exchanged in January 1954. In 1955, part of Eastern border (in Patharia Hills) was demarcated in accordance with the Bagge Award. The Joint Steering set up in July 1953, discussed the problems of demarcating the western border in March 1955. In May 1955, the Home Minister of India and Pakistan agreed to give high priority to the work of demarcation and hoped to complete the work within three months. No doubt, Pakistan later on proposed for some amendment in the Agreement but by and large the border disputes between the two countries was solved.

3 Shukla, op. cit., p. 6.
2. The Refugees and Evacuee Properties

The rehabilitation of refugees and the settlement of their properties was the difficult problems before India and Pakistan in 1947 when the refugees crossed the new international border in search of a new homeland. They left all their urban and agricultural properties and carried only such movable belongings which the circumstances had permitted.

-Relating to the problems of immovable property, the negotiations, on August 29, 1947 started at a meeting of the Joint Defence Councils of India and Pakistan. As the stalemate continued, India decided to utilise the available evacuee property in India for the benefit of displaced persons. On October 9, 1954, The Displaced Persons (compensation and Rehabilitation) Bill was passed by the Parliament. Earlier, India and Pakistan had made strenuous efforts through Inter-Dominion Conference to come to a settlement but the issue was practically closed when Pakistan in February 1955, issued an ordinance to allot evacuee property to compensate the refugees.

The movable was not the matter of great problems because agreements related to the deposits in post offices, safe deposits in Banks, pensions and provident funds, the bills of contractors were reached at the first Inter-Dominion Conference (held from December 18 to 20, 1947). Many conferences and talks were called between the two countries for solving the problems of movable properties. In June 1950, Indo-Pakistan Movable Property Agreement was signed on the basis of Karachi Agreement. With this agreement, some problems were solved with a measure of success.

3. The Problem of Minorities

The treatment of minorities in both the countries particularly in Pakistan created serious problems between India and Pakistan. The en-moss migration from both the countries to each other in 1947 resulted in an ascending curve of communalism which worsened the already charged atmosphere. For the treatment of minorities in both the countries Nehru-Liaqat Pact was signed on April 8, 1950.

6 Shukla, op. cit., p. 227.
Both the governments tried to protect the minorities but they were not always able to control the aroused feelings of majority towards minorities in the initial stages of the partition. The first war was also occurred between the two countries after partition due to savage communal violence and the fighting in Kashmir. Each government accused the other of failing to protect the minorities and of instigating communal animosities, though they also issued joint appeals for peace and joint declarations designed to calm and protect the minorities. As the time passed, the people of both the countries forgot the very communal scene of partition and the feelings of sympathetic attitudes in the minds of the majority of both the countries towards minorities were developed. Minorities were given facilities and protection in both the countries in spite of some communal feelings propagated by some fundamentalist parties and organizations. Minorities in India enjoy safeguards under the Indian Constitution. The Muslim in India are moving towards the national mainstream and in Pakistan the Hindu minority is free to exercise the right granted to it through the Constitution. The minorities in Pakistan received a set back when Islamic provisions of the first Constituent Assembly dissolved in October 1954.

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4. Currency and Trade Relations

Another crisis arose between India and Pakistan when British Government in late 1949 devalued the pound by 30.5 percent. Most of the countries whose currencies were linked to pound sterling followed the suit. India also followed in devaluing her currency but Pakistan decided not to follow. This stand of Pakistan had direct repercussions on India. India refused to trade with Pakistan at the official exchange rate. The wheat and cotton of West Pakistan, the raw jute of East Pakistan and the manufactured goods of India no longer moved in trade. Business between the two countries stopped and they started searching for new markets for their raw materials. This trade war between Islamabad and New Delhi spoiled their chances of coming close to each other.

5. Financial Issues

The controversy over the financial issues, which dragged on for years, also served to widen the gulf between India and Pakistan. The problems came particularly over the division of cash balance of undivided

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India. The cash balance of undivided India before partition was 4,000 million rupees. Pakistan demanded 1,000 million rupees, but India did not agree. The matter, therefore, was referred to the Arbitration Tribunal, which had been set up to decide such cases of differences. In December 1947, however, the two governments arrived at a financial agreement under which Pakistan's share was fixed at 750 million rupees. Earlier as an interim measure, 200 million rupees had been awarded to Pakistan. But at a subsequent stage, the payment of cash balance to Pakistan got linked with the Kashmir issue, which led to a further deterioration in relations. Finally at Gandhiji's intervention, the dispute was settled and India agree to pay Pakistan her cash balance after deducting 50 million rupees as advance adjustment of certain claims against Pakistan.

6. Military Stores

During the partition, there was a bitter controversy between India and Pakistan regarding the distribution of military stores and equipments of the British India. To

11 Ibid., p. 28.
resolve this dispute a joint defence council under the Chairmanship of Lord Mountbatten was set up to supervise the division of armed forces and military stores and equipments. Military stores were divided 3:2 with India gaining Rs. 6 crores in lieu of the ordinance factories.

No doubt, this division of military stores did not satisfy both the countries fully but had got much success in normalizing the relations between them. Today, there is no such dispute. Both have their own autonomous institutions to build up their army and bureaucracy. If there could be sound understanding between them regarding their security, they could limit the unnecessary military budget and usefully employ it in some other constructive activity. Both the countries should initiate a joint administrative institutions to have a sound understanding of the similar problems.

7. **Princely States**

The princely states arose as a hurdle between India and Pakistan. They created the problems between the two countries in different ways at different times. Indian leaders thought that the existence of the princely states

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12 Shukla, op.cit., p. 3.
would be dangerous for Indian unity, disruptive of the economy and an efforts to all nationalists. So, they thought not to recognize those princely states as an independent state. On the other hand, Jinnah was aware that he could not hope to entice the Hindu Princes to join Pakistan, but if they choose independence it would weaken India and indirectly strengthen Pakistan.

India and Pakistan were able to integrate most of the princely states with a minimum of disruption but problems occured in only three of the princely states particularly and they prove as a bane for India-Pakistan relations.

(a) **Junagarh**: The first and least important problem of the three disputes concerned Junagarh which was having link with Pakistan by sea. This princely state was having 80 percent Hindu population at the time of partition but its ruler was a Muslim who on September 15, 1947 signed an instrument of accession to Pakistan. Resistance to the local government developed quickly and a rival government was set up. Early in November 1947, Indian troops marched in, taking the state over in the name of

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13 Barnds, *op.cit.*, p. 36.
the people. Pakistan took the issue to the United Nations but received no satisfaction. India held a plebiscite in February 1948 and the people voted in favour of accession to India. For all practical purpose that ended the issue but created a rift between India and Pakistan.

(b) Hyderabad: This was the second largest princely state. After the British departure, tensions and communal violence were continue till early 1948. India asked Nizam of Hyderabad to curb violence and liberalise his government but Nizam infuriated India by lending money to Pakistan rather than curbing the violence. India invaded and quickly won control over the princely state and Nizam was made as nominal ruler under a new government responsive to New Delhi. This act of India was criticised by western countries and Pakistan. Pakistan enjoyed seeing the India's embarrassment before the world.

(c) Jammu & Kashmir: Despite long and protracted verbal attacks between India and Pakistan, Junagarh and Hyderabad disputes were resolved. But the Kashmir dispute has been the focus of the threat for both the countries and due to this Kashmir dispute, many time border Skirmishes and undeclared war had taken place. The Kashmir issue is still

14 Ibid., p. 37.
a problem between India and Pakistan since partition.

The Jammu and Kashmir was dominated by Muslim majority but it was ruled by a Hindu Maharaja Hari Singh. After the departure of the British, Maharaja had the right to decide whether his state should be acceded to India or Pakistan.

Pakistan put up pressures on Kashmiri by interrupting the flow of essential commodities to Kashmir. The Kashmir government protested on several occasions but to no avail. The economic blockage, however, failed to ensure Kashmir's accession to Pakistan. Against this backdrop on October 22, 1947, several hundred frontier tribesmen attacked the western borders of Kashmir and proceeded along the Jhelum Valley road towards Srinagar (the capital of Kashmir). Maharaja fled to Jammu and called for military help from India but Indian Government said that forces would be sent only if Maharaja acceded to India. Left with no choice, he did so on October 27, 1947. India immediately sent troops which landed at the airport in Srinagar to prevent the tribesmen from taking the city. Gradually, the Indian troops pushed the tribesmen out of the valley and began advancing on other areas.

This was the stage for the first war between India and Pakistan.

The Maharaja's accession to India was criticised by Pakistani leaders. Jinnah said that the accession of Maharaja through the suggestions of Mountbatten and the subsequent dispatch of Indian troops to Kashmir was as a part of well-planned conspiracy. Liaquat Ali also emphatically stated that the Maharaja's accession to India was a fraudulent in as much as it was achieved by deliberately creating certain conditions, with the object of finding an excuse to stage the accession.

Pakistan further pointed out that Maharaja had no authority left to execute the instrument of accession because his subjects had overthrown his government by a successful revolt and forced him to flee from the capital.

India ultimately on 1st January 1948 decided to refer the matter to the United Nations and filed a formal complaint against Pakistan in the Security Council. The Security Council asked both India and Pakistan not to

aggravate the situation but to do everything in their power to improve it, and established a mediatory commission known as United Nations Commission on India and Pakistan.

On September 29, 1948, Sheikh Abdullah was released and later on installed as the Prime Minister of Jammu and Kashmir. But Pakistan were against Sheikh Abdullah's installation and Jinnah demanded an impartial administration in the Valley. Nehru's reply was that Sheikh's administration was pure and impartial.

In 1952, an agreement was concluded between the Indian government and Sheikh Abdullah at New Delhi, regarding centre-state relations and Abdullah fully assured the Indian Government regarding Kashmir's accession to the Indian Union. But gradually a shift appeared in his policy and in his several statements, he limited that Kashmir might yet remain separate from both India and Pakistan. The culmination of this policy was that in his own party, the National Conference, deep tension arose and his cabinet colleagues, Girdharilal Dogra, Bakshi Gulam Mohammad and Shamlal Saraf were against his leadership.

18 Ibid., p. 29.
19 Ibid., p. 30.
Later on, Sheikh Abdullah was dismissed and Bakshi Gulam Mohammad was installed as the Prime Minister of Jammu and Kashmir on August 9, 1953. Finally Kashmir was regarded as an integral part of India. All these things were criticised by Pakistan. In the introduction of the White Paper published by the Government of Pakistan in January 1977, it was mentioned that the issue of Jammu and Kashmir is the outstanding international dispute in South Asia. As long as it is not justly settled; instability and discard will haunt the region. The two state Pakistan and India will be unable to establish their mutual relations as good neighbours.

From the above discussion, it becomes clear that the first Kashmir war was fought not for mere possession of territory not for strategic value alone. There was a strong ideological component to the motives of the two states. For Pakistan the possession of Kashmir was crucial to her ideology, namely that religious ideology could serve as the cornerstone of a state. To India, Kashmir, quite apart from its strategic significance, represented two fundamentally important issues. First its integration with India showed that even a Muslim majority province could thrive within a predominantly Hindu state, thus
validating the concept of the secular, democratic state. Additionally its integration had always considerable psychological import for key members of Indian elite, many of whom feared setting a precedent that might lead to the eventual "Balkanization" of India.

The origin of the Kashmir war can be traced to four major sources:

1) the existence of two competing ideological forces on the sub-continent,

2) irredentism on the part of the Pakistani leadership,

3) the strategic location of Kashmir and finally,

4) the lack of sufficient institutional arrangements by the British to ensure an orderly transfer of power.

8. **Indus Waters Dispute**

It was another source of friction between India and Pakistan. The origins of the dispute goes as far back as the partition. The differences arose in respect of the use of water. India and Pakistan recognised two things:

1) First, the need for an agreement to regulate the supply of water and,
ii) Secondly, the absence of an existing legal right entitling Pakistan to any supply without an agreement.

On December 18, 1947, Stand Still Agreement was signed. But later on supply of waters was discontinued by India when Stand Still Agreement was terminated. On April 24, 1948, the Prime Minister of Pakistan proposed an Inter-Dominion Conference for the settlement of the problem. Thereafter, the water supply was resumed. Regarding water dispute, a series of meetings were held between the two countries. But no permanent solution came out. In December 1950, Pakistan terminated the Agreement unilaterally but India refused to accept the notice of termination, and informed the U.N. Secretariat of the same. Pakistan also threatened to take the water dispute to the Security Council. These irritant views, showed by both the countries against each other, further brought the relations at standstill.

The World Bank President, Black, was asked to offer the mediation for solving the dispute. A series of Conferences took place between the two countries under

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the supervision of World Bank headed by Black. Some proposals were acceptable to one country sometime and someone to another sometime. Later in June 1955, an agreement was signed which provided for adhoc transitional arrangements. The Agreement affirmed the desire of both India and Pakistan to continue negotiations in an atmosphere of cooperation and goodwill. This agreement created the sound spirit and peaceful solution to both the countries.

9. Ideological Differences

Apart from the problems resulting directly from partition, there were problems relating to ideologies, power games and national interest. The problem of ideology can be traced back to the pre-partition days. The problem between the two countries arose on two counts namely Islam and Secularism. Jinnah's Presidential address at the Lohore Session of All India Muslim League of March 1940 created a rift in the minds of all the secular person. In that address, Jinnah said that the Hinduism and Islam are not religion in the strict sense of the word, but, are in fact different and distinct orders and it is a dream that the Hindus and the Muslim

can ever evolve a common nationality. The people of India and Pakistan witness the same type of feelings even after partition. Some chauvinistic parties and people of India also created the same feelings in the minds of Pakistani. Liaquat Ali Khan declared in the Constituent Assembly that "Pakistan was founded because the Muslim of this sub-continent wanted to build-up their lives in accordance with the teaching and traditions of Islam, as they wanted to demonstrate to the world that Islam provides a panacea for the many diseases which have crept into the life of humanity."

No doubt the above statements created a gap in bringing the two countries. But what the influences of these statements were in the minds of the people in the beginning after the partition they are not of the same spirit. As the time passes the influences of the statements were also cooled down, and many meetings were called between the two countries for normalization. In many fields, both the countries have also got much success.


Conclusion

In the beginning both India and Pakistan phased the problems of boundaries disputes, the problems of rehabilitation of refugees and the settlement of their properties, the treatment of minorities in both the countries, currency problems, the distribution of military stores and equipments of British India, and problems of Indus water disputes etc. But these problems were for time being. Later on, by and large, these problems were solved through talks, meetings and agreements by both the countries.

But the princely states Hyderabad and Kashmir created a big problem between the two countries. Both the states posed serious problems for the question of accession. The two states Hyderabad and Kashmir amounted to polar opposites of each other. Hyderabad had a Muslim ruler but a predominantly Hindu population. The conditions were reversed in Kashmir. The rulers were from minorities in both the states and both rulers hoped to become independent states after the departure of the British. These two factors led to difficulties in Indo-Pakistani relations because each side had a commitment to the states involved in the two states.
Pakistan, because of its Islamic character, felt compelled to show its solidarity with both the Nizam and the Muslims of Kashmir. Similarly India felt equally moved to identify with the Hindu of Hyderabad and the Maharaja of Kashmir. It felt to discredit the Nizam's claims to independence, because if his claims were given any credence, it could lead to the disintegration of the Indian Union, as the monarchs of the various princely states could all start asserting their demands for autonomy or independence. By the same token, Pakistani felt constrained to discredit Hari Singh's claims to independence for fear of appearing to foilsake their Muslims in a territory for which they felt responsible.

From the geographical and Muslim dominated point of view, Pakistan wanted that Kashmir should accede to Pakistan but this did not happen because India sent her troops to Kashmir on the invitation of Maharaja and Kashmir acceded to India. This step of India was vehemently criticised by Pakistan. On the other hand the Pakistan's claim over Kashmir was criticised by India.
Furthermore the carnage that accompanied Partition embittered the protagonists on both sides to such a high degree that the possibilities of misunderstanding increased dramatically. Each side had reason to mistrust the other and any generosity of spirit perished amidst the chaos and violence of Partition.
CHAPTER II

INDO-PAKISTAN RELATIONS 1954-64

During this period, India-Pakistan relations were disrupted by the external powers in one or the other way. Particularly the Pakistan's alliance with U.S.A. and with some regional organisations, and the India's relations with Communist countries laid the seeds of bitterness between the two countries.

1. Pakistan's Defence Agreement with the U.S.A.

Pakistan was and is still inferior to India in each and every field. So in order to come on equal level, Pakistan began to seek support from Western countries. Pakistan, from the very beginning, wanted to come in contact of Islamic countries and Western countries for every kind of help. In the early fifties, Pakistan could only look to the United States for this kind of help. U.S.A., in turn, was seeking allies in Asia to counter the growing influence of Communist countries particularly of China and Russia. The idea of a U.S.- Pakistani military relationship first came under serious considerations in Washington in 1951. In

the end of the year 1951, a limited arms assistance to Pakistan was approved by United States and agreement in principle was apparently reached by mid - 1952.

Pakistan initially desired to secure military assistance from Washington and thought to consider an exchange of air bases for military equipment. This military programme was vehemently criticised by Indians, Soviets, and Chinese. Nehru warned that U.S. Pakistani alliance would bring the cold war to India's borders, with far-reaching consequences in South Asia. Determined to protect his domestic position, Nehru directed the Indian Congress Party to mount public protest against the programme. India also warned Pakistan that this arms aid might cause India to move closer to U.S.S.R.

In spite of the protest and demonstrations U.S.A. went ahead with its plan to aid Pakistan and finally an arms agreement was approved on February 8, 1954 by America for Pakistan. This plan of United States to aid Pakistan definitely created a gap between India and Pakistan on the one hand, and between U.S. and India on

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the other hand. President Eisenhower gave an assurance to Nehru that the military for Pakistan was not directed against India and said that U.S. would come to India's aid if Pakistan were ever to use the arms for aggression against India, and offering to give sympathetic consideration to any Indian request for arms. Nehru regarded such assurances as meaningless and said that India's opposition to military aid was based on calculation rather than on principle.

The acceptance of military aid of U.S. by Pakistan created two problems especially. One was that Pakistan became the stooge in the hand of America and moved according to direction of U.S. Pakistan had no her own policies but was controlled by the other powers. Secondly, Pakistan's alliance with west deteriorated the relations between India and Pakistan, and India was compelled to have some alliance with some one for her defence protection.

2. Pakistan's Membership of SEATO and Baghdad Pact

For further help in military and economic fields, Pakistan joined South East Asian Treaty Organization

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4 Ibid., p. 97.
(SEATO) in September 1954 and Baghdad Pact (later named CENTO) in September 1955. Pakistan joined SEATO with the two aims. One is that Pakistan thought that if she did anything against the urging of America then her claim on U.S. military and economic assistance would be weakened. Second is that Pakistan got chance to raise her bilateral issues particularly Kashmir issue in the above Organization.

Pakistan raised Kashmir issue in various meetings of SEATO and Baghdad Pact. In the third meeting of SEATO that was held in March 1956 at Karachi, Pakistan highlighted the growing dissatisfaction in Kashmir. It was stated that the condition of law and order was worsening in Kashmir. In addition, the Government of Pakistan published exaggerated reports of the violations of borders by the Indian army personnel. In all this, Pakistan's main objective was to put Kashmir on the agenda of impending SEATO Conference.


6 Ibid.

For Pakistan's point of view the meeting of SEATO was an occasion of jubilation because Pakistani got chances to internationalise the Kashmir issue. In the Pakistan National Assembly, the Foreign Minister Mr. Hamidul Haq Choudhary said in March 1956, that Kashmiris should be given the right to decide their future has been accepted by the Member who formed the Council. He also added that the aggression against any member will be considered the aggression against all and all the member will come to rescue for the suffering member.

The SEATO pronouncement over Kashmir was vehemently protested by Indian Government. Nehru said that the reference to Kashmir issue in the SEATO communique "Confirmed our worst apprehensions about the organisations which it represents" and added that "this could only mean that a military alliance is backing one country namely, Pakistan in its dispute with India."

9 Debates (Lok Sabha, India), March 20, 1956, Vol. III, Col. 3042.
Like SEATO Conference, Baghdad Pact Council at Tehran in April 1956 also mentioned Kashmir as a dispute. In particular the Baghdad Pact Council emphasized the need for an early settlement of the Palestine and Kashmir disputes. On the one hand, Pakistan tried to bring the Kashmir issue in Baghdad Pact Joint Communique, and on the other hand, this communique was severely attacked in India. In June 1956, the All-India Congress Committee resolved that "The Committee regrets the reference to Kashmir in the recent meetings in Karachi and Tehran of the SEATO and Baghdad Pact Organisation.

India tried to solve the Kashmir issue bilaterally and put up this proposal before Pakistan, but Pakistan did not agree. Due to this, India's attitude had undergone a great change since 1955. India was no more apologetic as in the past. There was a new stress in India on a clear recognition of her own national interests. The endeavours of India for direct negotiations with Pakistan over Kashmir

10 *The Dawn*, April 21, 1956.
proved completely futile. So, India made her alliance with Soviet Union, Prime Minister Khurushchev of Soviet Union paid a visit to India in December 1955, and said that "the question of Kashmir as one of the states of the Republic of India, has already been decided by the people of Kashmir........... While in the Republic of India, we find an ally in the struggle for peace and peaceful solution of the unsettled problems, unfortunately we can't say the same about Pakistan. This statement of Soviet leader created a gap between the India-Pakistan relations.

Further the Bilateral Executive Agreement in 1959 between U.S. and Pakistan complicated the problems between India and Pakistan because this agreement was a full military alliance with United States. Under this agreement, U.S. committed itself to the preservation of independence and integrity of Pakistan and agreed to take "appropriate action including the use of armed forces," in support of that goal.


From the above discussion it becomes clear that Pakistan's primary interest of joining Baghdad Pact and SEATO was not because it perceived any major Communist threat but because it wanted to generate American support for its claims against India. This strategy is evident from the prominent member of the Pakistan Foreign Policy establishment. As S.M. Burke has said, "the arms aid given to Pakistan by America reduced the existing great disparity in the military capabilities of India and Pakistan, and enabled Pakistan to breathe easier than they ever had done before."

To Pakistan the military aid from America was an instrument to achieve the following ends.

a) To lessen the power inequality between her and India.
b) To reduce the burden of heavy defence expenditure necessitated by a strong and hostile India.
c) To receive diplomatic support in the solution of her dispute with India, and
d) To get increased quantities of economic aid for development purposes.

14 S.M. Burke, Mainsprings of Indian and Pakistan Foreign Policies (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1974), p. 143.
Pakistan's entry into the above pacts definitely affected the policies of the sub-continent. First it introduced the cold war into the region as Pakistani allied itself to the U.S. in an attempt to limit expansion of communism. Significantly, India, desired to come into contact of Soviet Union.

Second impact of Pakistan-U.S. link was that it provided Pakistan with an important source of both political and military leverage against India. Nehru's concern was clearly reflected in a number of statements that he made soon after the formation of the two pacts. In a speech before Lok Sabha in 1956, Nehru stated that "the Pakistani newspaper and the statement of responsible people in Pakistan make it perfectly clear that they have joined the pact essentially because of India."  

3 The United Nations and the Kashmir Dispute

India and Pakistan could not reach to any solution for Kashmir issue. In the period 1953-1956, many proposals were discussed directly between the two countries, but every direct negotiations proved fruitless.

15 J. Nehru, India's Foreign Policy (New Delhi: Publication Division, Govt. of India, 1961), p. 94.
Thus, the Kashmir issue went back to the Security Council again. At this juncture Pakistan took much interest to solve the Kashmir issue through U.N. because most of the permanent members of Security Council were in favour of Pakistan. Pakistan was gaining support from West on Suez Canal issue because Pakistan was totally in favour of West on this issue while India's main emphasis was on the sovereign rights of Egypt. In January 1957, the Foreign Minister of Pakistan, Feroz Khan Noon thought that it was an opportune moment to approach the Security Council to meet and take early action to implement the U.N. resolutions for holding a plebiscite in Kashmir. Feroz Khan Noon put up the following proposals before the U.N.

a) India should be persuaded not to accept the accession of Kashmir state,

b) The Security Council ought to direct India to accept all the terms and obligations of the international agreement for a plebiscite as embodied in the U.N. resolutions.

c) The U.N. force should immediately be stationed in Kashmir for protection and internal Security of the state.

16 Gupta, op. cit., p. 313.
Noon said that these proposals could solve the problems between the two countries and could bring peace in sub-continent. But these proposals were vehemently criticised in India and were rejected. On January 23, 1957, the Indian representative V.K. Krishna Menon, with full of quotations from documents and press reports, justified Kashmir's accession to India as perfectly legal and valid. Finally Menon accused Noon of distorting facts and completed his marathon speech by asking the Security Council to desist from unsettling the settled conditions in Kashmir and hoped that the peace in the region would not be disturbed under the weight of some of the super powers of the world. A significant point to note here is that for the first time India accused the Security Council of violating the very first article of the U.N. charter and for the deadlock on Kashmir issue at the provocation of Anglo-U.S. alliance. The Five-Power resolution was moved even before the Indian statement was completed. This was completely rejected by India. Menon challenged the legality of the resolution and

17 Ibid.
18 The Times of India, January 26, 1957.
charged that the resolution sowed the seeds of discard once more.

India was gaining some popularity and support from socialist countries. Soviet Union used her veto power saying that the resulting proposal would not contribute to the settlement of problems. The Chinese reaction also appeared favourable to India. The Prime Minister of China Chou En Lai advised both India and Pakistan to settle the dispute through direct negotiations. Later on many resolutions were passed by U.N. but no one can solve the Kashmir dispute. The Jarring Report of 1957 and the Graham Report of 1958 regarding Kashmir dispute also produced no result. As the border conflict between India and China widened, China came out with full throated support to Pakistan on Kashmir. On the other hand U.S.A. came close India as China vacated her seat. Nehru profusely lauded the Eisenhower visit of India. Now, U.S.A. stated to support India and China to Pakistan in each and every field. In 1960, China refused to discuss the boundary west of Karakoram Pass between Chinese Sinkiang and Kashmir. It was only

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after this, India realised that China had "declined to recognise the accession of Kashmir to India."

The U.N. efforts as well as super-powers' effort regarding Kashmir dispute ended with no result. All the efforts that U.N. had succeeded in doing about Kashmir was to keep the ball rolling without any clear end in view. This failure revealed that there was fundamental weakness of the existing international order. The super-powers exploited India and Pakistan as tools to serve their global interests. They maintained relationship of understanding friendship to advance their legitimate and illegitimate interests. The time honoured standards of justice and righteousness of cause were tagged with the super-powers' naked self-interest which they pursued. In this background, the Kashmir dispute had the dubious distinction of being a point of conflict between the two super-powers in the sense that they supported one or the other party in the dispute. In consequence, a workable solution could not be sought. It further risked procrastination to create conditions of permanent crisis on Kashmir.

In retrospect it will be pertinent to argue that both India and Pakistan regarded Kashmir as indispensable to them. The political strategic and ideological
controversies were advanced to secure better appreciation of their stand points. In their attempt to reorient the thinking and attitudes of the people in their respective countries, leaders of both the countries issued aggressive statements which were, many a time, divorced from the reality of international policies.

4. The Farakka Barrage Issue

The clash of interests between the two countries arose when India planned to construct a dam across the river Ganges at Farakka a few miles upstream from East Pakistan (now, Bangladesh) because due to construction of this dam, India wanted to divert the water of Ganges through a feeder canal into the Bhagirath to flush the Hoogly. India also claimed that due to this plan, the port of Calcutta can be saved from being silted up. As soon as India started taking keen interest in the plan and began the work to construct the barrage, Pakistan protested and asked India to consult her before going ahead with the project. In 1957, Pakistan suggested that the services of U.N. should be utilized to resolve the differences. Pakistan had complained that the


Barrage would reduce the supply of waters to Pakistan. Pakistan continued to cause worries to the Government of India. However, India was not keen to associate Pakistan with the Project in any way. As a result the matter was dropped for the time being. In July 1960, the subject was reopened and talks were held between the engineering experts of India and Pakistan. In October 1960, the two countries again discussed the problems. Some of the differences were ironed out but the matter was still a stumbling block in the mutual cooperation of the two countries.

The countries totally showed different aims for protecting their own interest and tried to find out as to what was most advantageous to their own countries. The higgle-haggling was basic, almost ritualistic forms of negotiation between the two countries of all kinds. Both the countries adopted the method to bend each other. But in spite of these differences, the meetings between the two countries got success in ironing out some of the differences.

24 Debates (Rajya Sabha, India), vol. XXII, Cols 4268.  
25 The Hindu July 1, 1960.
5. The Indus Waters Treaty

The river waters dispute had been one of the blocking factors between the two countries. Almost all the water disputes originated from the partition. Indus water dispute is also one of them. A series of conferences and meetings were organized between the two countries. Lastly, World Bank was asked to direct its efforts for finding a solution which could ensure the independence of the two countries in the matter of the operation of supplies of water falling to the share of each. In February 1954, the Bank had made the following proposals:

a) The water of eastern rivers Ravi, Beas and Sutlej should be used for India;

b) The water of western rivers Indus, Jhelum and Chenab should be for the use of Pakistan;

c) There should be a transition period during which Pakistan would construct a system of link canals to transfer water from the western rivers to replace the irrigation uses in Pakistan hitherto met from eastern rivers, and

d) India should pay the cost of constructing these replacement link canals to the extent of the
The good offices of the World Bank, however, survived the strains and stresses of Indo-Pakistan relations during the decade of complicated negotiations over the water dispute. By May 1954, the main issues standing in the way of a settlement had crystalized, although numerous controversies over the financial and technical issues had to overcome.

Finally, after the continuous eight years of discussion and negotiation between the two countries, with the mediation of World Bank, on September 19, 1960, the Indus-Water Treaty was concluded at Karachi by Field Marshal Ayub Khan and Pandit Nehru.

The treaty recognizes the need for fixing the delimitation in a spirit of goodwill and friendship, and defines the rights and obligations of the Government of India and Government of Pakistan concerning the use of water of the Indus river system. The treaty sets up a Permanent Indus Commission composed of two persons, one appointed by each Government. The Commission will have general responsibility for implementing

the provisions and will seek to reconcile any points of disagreement that may arise. In the treaty both the Governments recognised their common interest in the optimum development of the rivers and declare their intention to cooperate by mutual agreement to the fullest possible extent.

In the history of Indo-Pak relations the Indus-Water dispute is the only dispute where both the Governments have shown a positive spirit of cooperation. If in future, they follow the same spirit of cooperation and understanding, definitely they could settle all their outstanding disputes.

6. The Sino-Indian Conflict and Its Impact on Indo-Pak Relations

The Chinese border invasion of October 20, 1962, at several points in both Ladakh and NEFA (Northeast Frontier Agency) abruptly complicated not only India-China relationship but India-Pakistan relationship also. In the conflict, India suffered a big loss because Indian forces were grossly unprepared to face the Chinese onslaught.

27 Ibid, pp.128-129.
28 Barnds, op.cit., p. 175.
The Chinese conflict brought a profound consequences for both Indian foreign policy and national security policy. It clearly compelled India to give up the much vaunted non-aligned policy. Nehru who on a matter of principle had forthrightly rejected President Eisenhower's offer to provide arms if the need ever arose, now found himself turning to the United States for arms assistance. Nehru permitted a dramatic expansion of the Indian defence budget from 2.1 per cent of the GNP in 1961-62 to 3.0 per cent in 1962-63 and 4.5 per cent in 1964-65.

This arms race and defence budget expansion of India had important implications for its relationship with Pakistan particularly. Pakistani leaders became fearful that the infusion of arms into India from United States and the United Kingdom would give India a distinct qualitative and quantitative edge over Pakistan. Additionally, as India paid more attention to China and abandoned its commitment to nonalignment, the Pakistani leadership experienced another fears. G. Ahmad a former member of the Civil Service of Pakistan

said that "Pakistan's friends, U.S. and U.K., have decided to build up India's military potential without first insisting and assuring that India solve its grave differences with Pakistan."

Thus, India's programme of strengthening its defence system against China and modernizing its own military system was taken by Pakistan as a national threat. This arms proliferation of India had compelled Pakistan to come in closeness of China and an important border agreement with China was signed on March 2, 1963 in which Pakistan gave some of her territory to China. China and Pakistan also showed some of the Indian territory between Pakistani controlled Kashmir and the Chinese province of Sinkiang. These moves infuriated India because India was claiming that all of Kashmir was legally Indian and Pakistan had no territorial boundary with China. New Delhi also charged that Pakistan had surrendered some 2500 square miles of Kashmiri territory to China. In the reply, Pakistan said that she had surrendered no territory to China, and the agreement was provisional until there was a final settlement of the Kashmir dispute.

30 Dawn, April 9, 1963.
During the next two years, there was a proliferation of Sino-Pakistani contacts and activities. In 1964, China extended a $60 million credit to Pakistan for the purchase of Chinese goods. There were many cultural and air agreements between China and Pakistan also, but India's real apprehension, however, was not cultural missions or air agreements. New Delhi feared that China and Pakistan had formed a secret military alliance. This feeling was especially cultivated by Z.A. Bhutto, for his domestic politics as well as to increase India's apprehension, when he said on July 17, 1963 that "Any attack by India on Pakistan would no longer confine the stakes to the independence and territorial integrity of Pakistan. Any attack by India on Pakistan would also involve the security and territorial integrity of the largest state in Asia".

Thus, it seems that the Indo-Chinese conflict of 1962 had not deteriorated the relations of India and China but it had also abruptly complicated the Indo-Pakistani relationship. With this war, India

32 Ibid., p. 190.

also realized the great need of military capability in order to hold off China and Pakistan simultaneously.

**Conclusion**

From the forgoing discussion, it becomes clear that India-Pakistan relations were disrupted not only by their bilateral issues but the external powers in one or the other way had affected their relations. In the beginning of this period (1956-64), Pakistan matured her contact with Western and Islamic countries and received a lot of arms and economic aid especially from America. America also took the interest in supporting Pakistan for fighting with communism in South Asia region. Thus, this Pakistan-U.S. relations disrupted not only India-Pakistan relations but also brought cold war in the region. The arms aid to Pakistan from U.S. and Pakistan's joining the Baghdad Pact and SEATO that had provided a sense of security to Pakistan, compelled India to come in closeness of U.S.S.R. for maintaining balance of power in the region. Pakistan's primary interest of joining Baghdad Pact and SEATO was not because it perceived any major Communist threat but because it wanted to generate American support for its claims against India. Pakistan also took much interest to solve the Kashmir issue through
U.N. because most of the permanent members of Security Council at that time were in favour of Pakistan. But the U.N. efforts and Super Powers' efforts regarding Kashmir issue ended with no result. Super-powers exploited India and Pakistan as a tool to serve their global interests.

With the conflict of 1962 with China, India suffered much militarily and this brought a profound consequences to both Indian foreign policy and national security policy. From this defeat, India realized to strengthen her defence system. India which was only believing and following non-aligned policy, suddenly gave up her much vaunted non-aligned policy, and dramatically expanded her defence budget. With the formation of secret military pact between Pakistan and China, India realized the great need of military capability in order to hold off China and Pakistan simultaneously.
CHAPTER III

THE INDO-Pakistan WAR OF 1965 AND TASHKENT DECLARATION

Before occurring the actual war between India and Pakistan, a long list of the factors had affected the situations in the region in different ways. These factors compelled both the countries to opt different forms of foreign policy. Western arms aid and Indian defense build-up following the Sino-Indian war foreshadowed for Pakistan a seriously adverse shift in the balance of power. Seeking ways to offset India's growing strength, Ayub and his colleagues gradually changed the orientation of their foreign policy. Pakistan, after the 1962 conflict of India-China, opted new foreign policy. In order to take help from China, Pakistan limited her relations with U.S.A. and had only formal relations. On the other hand, India started to move away from the principles of non-aligned movement. Pakistan's reaction to India's defeat by China was a complex mixture of pleasure, fear and frustration. The first reactions to India reverses in Pakistan were both sweet and sour. The sweet part was the enjoyment one gets from seeing a neighbourhood bully meeting a bigger bully. The sour part was in knowing that there was an even bigger bully in the
1. Domestic Situation in India

As regional tensions expanded in the wake of the Chinese invasion of 1962, certain domestic changes in India and Pakistan also contributed towards the proclivity to resort to war. In November 1963, the Indian Home Minister Gulzarilal Nanda stated in the National Legislature that Kashmir had been fully integrated into India. This aroused a wave of protests in Pakistan, but the Indian Government did not seem to be unduly concerned about the Pakistan reaction. Pakistan brought its case against the Indian efforts to integrate Kashmir before the Security Council, but the Indian delegate M.C. Chagla reminded the Council that Kashmir had become an integral part of India.

While Kashmir's integration into the Indian Union was proceeding apace, Sheikh Abdullah, the "Lion of Kashmir", was languishing in Indian prisons. However, in April 1964, he was released partly because of the widespread political agitation in Kashmir in the wake of the

Hazratbal incident. After his release from prison, he went to Pakistan where he questioned the irrevocable character of the accession of Kashmir to India. He also contended, however, that the Kashmir dispute could be resolved only through amicable discussions between India and Pakistan. Despite Abdullah's remarks about Kashmir's accession, Prime Minister Nehru and President Ayub Khan agreed to meet in June 1964 to discuss the Kashmir problem and other outstanding bilateral issues. The meeting however did not occur because Nehru died, and the hopes of an early summit meeting between the two heads of governments receded. Shortly thereafter in June 1964, Shastri (Prime Minister of India) and Ayub Khan stressed the urgent need for Indo-Pakistan understanding, but these sentiments were not rapidly translated into policy and subsequent events on the sub-continent prodded the two nations towards war.

2. Domestic Situation in Pakistan

While President Ayub Khan professed friendship after Nehru's death, it is reasonable to assume that he despaired of a negotiated settlement with India. Additionally,

given India's recent efforts to efface Kashmir's special status, he probably also concluded that either the issue be resolved by force or be forever abandoned. At this, certain domestic changes took place in Pakistan which made conditions propitious for a bold initiative. President Ayub Khan held the regime's first election and thereby tested his scheme of Basic Democracy. In this election, Ayub won a clear mandate in West Pakistan while Fatima Jinnah (sister of Mohammad Ali Jinnah) came with majority in East Pakistan. This weakened position in East Pakistan became an opportunity for Z.A. Bhutto to have power and prestige. So, Bhutto, in the wake of the anti-Indian hysteria generated by the Hazratbal incident, pushed the generals into a successful war with India. Commenting on the significance of the election, Wynne Wintour pointed out that 'weakened in the elections (in East Pakistan) and under pressure from Bhutto and the militants, Ayub Khan needed real success to restore the confidence of his government and of the attentive public. Since the base of the regime was in West Pakistan, that success had naturally to appeal to the values and goals of that region of the country where Kashmir and relations with India were the most powerful emotional issues.'

It is impossible to say for sure just how much Bhutto pushed Ayub to go to war to satisfy his personal ambitions. Nevertheless, it appears that Bhutto did play a key role, particularly since he was instrumental in expanding Pakistan's links with China during this crucial time. The importance of Chinese connection, was underscored in March 1965 when President Ayub Khan paid an eight day visit to China and China gave assurances help military support to Pakistan.

This military support to Pakistan by China cultivated an atmosphere of nervousness in India because Indian leaders and military thought that now they have to fight a two front war (one is with China and another is with Pakistan). While India was in no position to fight a two front war.

3. The Rann of Kutch Incident:

The tensions in this area had also became a hurdle between India-Pakistan relations. Though this area was both strategically and economically useless but jingoistic Indians have periodically claimed that oil reserves exist there. Skirmishes took place in this disputed area in January 1965 and both the countries

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claimed the border patrolling against each other. By all accounts, the Pakistani retaliated using regular troops. The fighting escalated quickly through the month of April 1965, with the Pakistanis trying out their new Patton tanks. Kutch affairs was a proving ground for Pakistani men and material. It gave the Pakistani military an opportunity to assess Indian strength and vulnerabilities. According to Sisir Gupta, "Above all the attack on Kutch was a rehearsal for the conquest on Kashmir. Before launching a full-scale attack there, Ayub thought it necessary to try his new American weapons."

The Indian defence strategy in 1965 against Pakistan also proved their inability to coordinate plans. This strategy was evident by Pakistan side particularly after the Kutch episode. This supposition also lends support to the thesis that the Kutch affair emboldened the Pakistani leadership and provided the necessary margin of confidence for an attack on Kashmir.

4. The Outbreak of War

Taking the advantage of India's assessed military weakness due to 1962 conflict of China-India and the

7 Ganguly, Op.cit., p. 84.
dangerously weak and frustrated position of India in Rann of Kutch episode, the Ayub Khan government of Pakistan launched its "Op Gibraltar" 1965. Pakistan started this operation with the hope that Kashmiris would rise in revolt and support the so-called Muslim liberators from Pakistan, but this hope of Pakistan was shattered as the Kashmiris joined their hands with the Indian troops in defeating and routing the Pakistani infiltrators. Some Kashmiris also gave slogans "We will help you capture Muzaffarabad if you want us." This atmosphere cultivated a good Army-Civil relationship during that turbulent period in the history of Kashmir.

Pakistan attacked India in 1965 basically due to three wrong impressions about India.

(i) Pakistan grossly overestimated the support of local populace,

(ii) Pakistan overestimated their attachment to notions of Islamic co-fraternity, and

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(iii) Pakistan underestimated the language barrier between the majority of the infiltrators and the Kashmiri population.

In this second Kashmir war no doubt both the countries suffered from each other. Sometime India crossed the borderline and sometime Pakistan crossed borderline at some places. But one important thing is that the outbreak of war signaled an important failure of U.S. policy in the sub-continent because all the economic and military aid of U.S. were suspended to both India and Pakistan. Due to this, U.S. was not having any influence on any country (either on India or Pakistan).

In spite of all these, U.S., Britain and the Soviet Union all insisted that stopping the fighting between India and Pakistan was the first order of business and cooperated in working out an acceptable terms. By mid-September 1965, the Security Council passed a resolution asking both parties to ceasefire. The U.N. General Secretary U. Thant subsequently consulted with President Ayub Khan and Prime Minister Shastri. India firstly accepted the cease fire on September 20, 1965 and two days later Pakistan. The fighting was over, and the peace process began.
5. The Tashkent Agreement and Its Achievements

After the cease-fire, no country was having the
guards to bring both the countries (India and Pakistan) at a negotiating table. China had already lost its image in the region in the eyes of Indian and in the World by supplying arms to Pakistan during the war. As far as super powers are concerned, United States was concerned with the Arab-Israeli problems. Further U.S. was beginning to expand the war in Vietnam, drawing its attention away from the South Asia region. The other power that was able to mediate the dispute was United Kingdom but she did not desire to take this responsibility on her shoulder alone. The Security Council also showed its failure in resolving the differences between the two parties. In these conditions, the chances of mediation was left for Soviet Union.

The two parties finally met in Tashkent on January 4, 1966. With considerably skill and a mixture of persuasion and Cajolery, Prime Minister of Soviet Union Kosygin succeeded in hammering out an agreement between India and Pakistan. On January 10, 1966, the Agreement

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at Tashkent was signed between India and Pakistan through the mediation of Soviet Union. The Agreement declared that "all armed personnel of the two countries shall be withdrawn not later than February 26, 1966, to positions they held prior to August 5, 1965, and both sides shall observe the cease-fire terms on the cease-fire line, less important provisions dealt with exchanging prisoners of war, restoring diplomatic relations, and resuming economic links and communications".

The importance of Tashkent Declaration lay in that it represented important concession on both sides. The Indians gave up strategic positions captured in the Azad Kashmir region, and the Pakistani agreed to withdraw from territory what they had seized in the conflict. The Indians backwaded down from their original position that Pakistan acknowledged its responsibility for guerilla infiltration.

Throughout the negotiations whatever Kosygin played his role was admired by many Indians and Pakistani as well. Mr. Jha (an Indian delegation spokesman) described the role of Kosygin as "very correct, cautious and constructive."

11 Ibid.
Pakistani were also very happy with the new role of Soviet Union and with their new status in Soviet eyes:

"Kosygin played his part not as representative of the world revolutionary movement but as a classical peacemaker in a classical situation of diplomatic mediation".

Lal Bahadur Shastri's death, after few ours of signing the Tashkent Declaration, also shocked the people of both countries, because he played very important role in bringing closeness between the two countries. But in spite of all sympathies towards Declaration, there were also criticism against it in both the countries. Opposition parties for their own political advantage, were ready to attack any point of government policy. The right wing party in India, the Jan Sangh, was highly critical of the Declaration and there was uneasiness in the more liberal ranks of the opposition. In Pakistan, the reaction was more violent; demonstrations occurred in Lahore, causing the death of at least two people. An opposition leader in the National Assembly of Pakistan, Mukhlesuzzaman Khan,

attacked Ayub for not consulting either cabinet ministers of the party about Tashkent, unlike Mr. Shastri, who had a mandate from his nation as well as the party.\textsuperscript{16}

The feeling against Tashkent Declaration was stronger in Pakistan than it was in India. Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto said that "Tashkent Declaration contains no specific solutions to our difficulties with India". Many peoples were demanding the solution of Kashmir and were saying:

"We had fought with our back not to leave Kashmiri in lurch. After all these sacrifices, where do we stand? The solution of Kashmir seemed to be as elusive as ever".\textsuperscript{18}

From the above discussion, it becomes clear that Tashkent Declaration had achieved nothing new at all in terms of permanent settlement of India-Pakistan problems. It brought a temporary respite between India and Pakistan.\textsuperscript{17}

\textbf{The Declaration} made no reference to the no war pact which India had desired for many years while it did reaffirm that disputes should be settled by peaceful means.

\textsuperscript{16} National Assembly Debates (Pakistan) Vol.1 (Nos.1-12) 1966, p. 373.

\textsuperscript{17} Ibid.

The one important result of Declaration was the Soviet diplomacy which got a chance to promote her policy towards the sub-continent. Soviet Union with this declaration got success in eroding western influence from the sub-continent and got chance to come in close to Pakistan.

The Soviet Union's aim to attempt a balance of power structure on the sub-continent came with its offer to supply Pakistan with arms and Air Marshal Nur Khan of Pakistan's satisfaction about arms deal between Soviet Union and Pakistan created a confusion among Indians about Pakistan. While Mrs Indira Gandhi, after meeting with Kosygin on 16 July 1966 in Moscow, publically stated that Soviet Union had not made any arms agreement with Pakistan. The rumours about the Soviet arms to Pakistan in 1966 gave Moscow the opportunity to test the reaction of Delhi to such a proposal. The Soviet leaders had also no desire to alienate India that is why in that year (1966), they increased arms sales to India.


After 1966, Pakistan began to indicate that Pakistan was ready to modify the western commitment. This official announcement was given by Pakistan only for taking the Soviet supports. Ayub Khan on September 25, 1967 also paid a visit to Moscow with his foreign minister Mr. Pirzada in this connection. Ayub thanked Soviet Union for its continuing assistance to India and Pakistan as far as establishing good relations were concerned, but remarked further that Kashmir stood in the way of such a relationship. Ayub Khan in this visit felt that the Soviet-Pakistan ties had been strengthened, but his primary assessment of the tour was seen in terms of India-Pakistan relations.

"The greatest advantage of this meeting was that we were able to apprise the Soviet leaders of developments subsequent to the Kashmir talks and inform them that, despite all our efforts, India is not agreeable to meaningful talks on Jammu and Kashmir."

The Pakistan government regarded the first official visit of Kosygin (Soviet Prime Minister) of April 17, 1968 as very important because it was hoped that

it would result in large economic benefits for Pakistan, and perhaps the long awaited offer to sell military equipment to Pakistan. So in order to show an alienation from west, Pakistan authorised the closure of American air base at Peshawar on April 6, 1968 few days before Kosygin was due to arrive in Rawalpindi. Foreign Minister of Pakistan Mr. Husain said "Pakistan had taken the step in keeping with our policy of developing bilateral relations of friendship and mutual understanding with all countries but its real intent went well beyond that. While Kosygin described his concluding tour of Pakistan as "a dialogue between friends" and Soviet's role as neutral in the affairs of the sub-continent. But in spite of all these open discussions, there were some secret dealings between Soviet Union and Pakistan. When Soviet Union, in July 1968, confirmed that she should go ahead with the arms sale to Pakistan, Mrs. Indira Gandhi expressed India's objections through a letter to Kosygin and said, that Pakistan had no reasonable justification for seeking to increase its armed strength, because of the large supply of military equipment given to Pakistan between 1954 and 1965 through its alliance. China's

24 Lok Sabha Debates (India), vol.18 (Nos. 1-5), 1968, July 22, 1968, Col. 288.
contribution to arming Pakistan reduced the justification for the Soviet Union's supplying of arms to Pakistan. Soviet arms sale to Pakistan were the subject of a heated debate in the Lok Sabha also. The opposition in Indian Parliament got a good opportunity to attack the government and to criticise its failure of foreign policy but no one in the Indian Parliament was knowing the quantity or the character of the arms or the condition of their delivery to Pakistan. Seeing the uproar in Indian Parliament over the arms sale, Ayub Khan mentioned that the equipment Pakistan would receive from Soviet Union represented only a very small portion of the U.S. $900 million Soviet aid which India received. All the Soviet aid, said Ayub in Tehran on his way to London on July 21, 1968, would fill certain small gaps in Pakistan's defences. This arms deal disrupted not only Indo-Soviet relations but also India-Pakistan. Pakistan happily accepted the Soviet help and used it as a propaganda weapon against India.

The officials in America were very cautious about the Soviet-Pakistan arms deal. After the announcement of Pakistan Soviet arms deal, U.S. sent a delegation to India

which held discussions with Indian ministers from 26-28 July 1968. U.S. also announced that there was no change in her policy concerning arms supply to the subcontinent, and U.S. would maintain the "lethal weapons" embargo on India and Pakistan.

Here it seems that inspite of the bilateral issues as a hurdle between India and Pakistan relations, the role of super-powers and great powers had been more dangerous between India and Pakistan. Because the super-powers only wanted their base, influence and their interest sometimes in India and sometimes in Pakistan. The Chinese continued military supply to Pakistan since 1965 war of India-Pakistan and Pakistan's receiving China's aircraft, tanks and foreign exchange to buy arms had further disrupted the India-Pakistan relations.

In 1969, the new Republican President, Nixon did not make any pronounced change in U.S. policy towards the Indian sub-continent. Nixon did not want to appear as the partisan of either country. He wanted to leave an impression of evenhandedness towards both countries. But later in 1970, Nixon changed his attitude towards Pakistan and personally decided to sell Pakistan twin-jet bombers, jet fighters and armored personnel carriers
with a reported value ranging from $15 million to $40 million. For all practical purposes, the U.S.-Pakistan alliance existed on paper only. Relations between India and United States became more distant when U.S. agreed to sell arms to Pakistan and when India ordered to closing of several U.S. cultural centres in 1970 with vague accusations that they were engaged in improper activities.

Conclusion

From the above account, the 1965 war demonstrated that Pakistan attacked on India by two reason basically. One is that Pakistan thought that India had become very weak because of 1962 war with China and India is not in a position to win the war. The second reason is that Pakistan believed that if it did not act in a decisive manner, the state of Kashmir would be integrated into India and international interest for Pakistan's concerns would dwindle.

The second Kashmir war of 1965 demonstrated the willingness of both sides to use substantial force to achieve particular ends. As a result, the Pakistani

leadership learned that the Indian armed forces could not be easily routed and had come a long way from the Chinese debacle of 1962. On the Indian side, the war provided a degree of comfort to the military whose prestige and morale had sunk to an all time low in the aftermath of 1962 conflict.

The biggest achievement between India and Pakistan was that the Tashkent Agreement was signed between the two countries through the mediation of Soviet Union. The importance of Tashkent Agreement lay that it represented important concessions on both sides. Both the countries agreed to withdraw from the territory that they had seized in conflict. But in spite of all these achievement, Tashkent Declaration had achieved nothing new at all in terms of permanent settlement of India-Pakistan problems. It brought a temporary respite to India-Pakistan hostilities. India and Pakistan remained suspicious and unyielding towards each other, and the Kashmir dispute remained as unresolved as ever.
CHAPTER IV

THE BANGLADESH CRISIS AND THE SIMLA AGREEMENT

The Bangladesh war is commonly thought to have begun on December 3, 1971 with a Pakistani air attack on a number of military bases in India's northwestern region. Despite the surprise nature of attack, it did little damage, and the Indian Air Force retaliated the next day, hitting several Pakistan air bases. But before occurring the actual war there were many factors which had contributed a lot for bringing a war like situation. This chapter examines the various factors that how they had affected the domestic and external policies and Foreign relation; and how they had made the situation more worse and finally how these situations created a rift between India and Pakistan.

1. Economic Disparities

After the 1965 war, Pakistan suffered from economic crisis. So, Pakistan did not care for the maintenance of her eastern wing and the people of eastern wing of Pakistan were badly affected. The economic disparities between the two wings of Pakistan had become so great and the

ideological bonds between the two wings were beginning to fray. Following the 1965 war with India, another source of resentment was the realization among the East Pakistani leaders that the Kashmir issue was essentially a West Pakistani cause, for which East Pakistan was being made needlessly vulnerable. As these issues began to divide the two wings, the ethereal quality of the ideological bonds became increasingly apparent.

2. Tashkent and Dismal Scene

The Tashkent declaration of 1966 that sought to bring about a lasting peace between the two countries (India and Pakistan) did not have the same significance for the two countries. The agreement was criticised in India as well as in Pakistan by some group of people, but in India majority of the people respected the agreement. Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri made it clear that agreement is an achievement because after a great deal of discussion the two countries agreed not to use force against each other and have decided to settle the dispute amicably.

On the other side in Pakistan, the student groups were actively encouraged by two religious parties Nizam-i-Islam and the Council of Muslim League. The students rioted in a number of major cities in Pakistan to express
their disenchantment with the agreement, while actually these studentS encouraged by religious parties were against Ayub's return in power. In contrast, the Awami League leader Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, whose base was almost solely in East Pakistan, and some other leaders refrained from criticizing the Agreement. Mujibur Rahman did not criticize the agreement because he did not want to antagonize the Indian leadership against himself and wanted to bring world attention towards the disparities between East and West.

3. The Language Problem

In Bangladesh crisis, language had also played very crucial role. It was a fundamental inability of the West Pakistani political leader to accommodate the hopes and demands of East Pakistan. In the break-up of Pakistan, more autonomy to East Pakistan. This demand culminated in the break-up of Pakistan. In East Pakistan, Mujibur Rahman, with a small group, also declined the invitation called by the West Pakistani political parties for a National Conference to discuss the key issues confronting the country. The Conference was completely failed because Mujibur Rahman, leading his group demanded the breakup of Pakistan. In East Pakistan, some leaders criticized the Agreement, and some leaders refrained from criticizing the Agreement because he did not want to antagonize the Indian leadership against himself and wanted to bring world attention towards the disparities between East and West.


3 Ibid., p. 79.
expectations of the majority of the East Pakistanis. Despite the common bond of Islam, profound differences between East and West Pakistan existed. The majority of West Pakistanis were either liking Urdu or speaking Urdu and the East Pakistani, Bengali. In addition the West Pakistani regarded Bengali Islam as tainted by Hinduism and thus in need of purification. Now it is clear that the relationship between East and West Pakistan was not only tenuous but also asymmetric. The West Pakistani leadership did not view their Eastern wing as equals and in fact dealt with them paternalistically at best, and exploitatively at worst. This language and cultural division increased the tension between East and West Pakistan, which culminated in the 1971 war.

4. **Pakistani Domestic Policies and Mujib's Six Points**

The Pakistani leaders had played different role in political field in order to show their personal image, importance and in order to establish themselves and in order to come in power. Even most of the leaders had not cared about national interest. These activities were seen in high spirit particularly between the 1966-1971 in

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Pakistan. This was the main reason of the dismemberment of Pakistan.

Sheikh Mujibur Rahman in February 1966 at the All Pakistan National Conference at Lahore, almost immediately after the Tashkent Agreement between India and Pakistan, gave his six point programme. Those were as follow:

i) There shall be a federal government at the centre. Elections to the federal legislature and the legislatures of the federating units shall be direct, and on the basis of universal adult franchise.

ii) Federal government shall be responsible for defence and foreign affairs only. All other functions shall be taken care of by the federating units themselves.

iii) There shall be separate currencies, or single currency but completely controlled by the regional reserve banks.

iv) Federating units shall provide money to the federal government for its functioning on the basis of a predetermined procedure.

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v) Federating units shall maintain their own foreign exchange accounts, and made foreign exchange available to the federal government on the basis of a predetermined procedure.

vi) Federating units can raise their own militias and para military forces as necessary, for national security.

These points were basically a demand of regional autonomy for East Pakistan. These points also dramatically limited the power of the central government to the areas of defence and foreign affairs, Ayub outrightly rejected all these demands on the ground that they smacked of secessionism. Mujibur Rehman in April 1966 was arrested under the defence of Pakistan rules and the East Pakistan safety ordinance on a charge of sedition. This marked the start of the two-year jail term for Mujibur Rehman which culminated in the Agartala Conspiracy case of 1968. The alleged aim of the conspiracy was to capture a part of East Bengal and set up an independent government. On January 7, 1968, Rehman along with thirty-four others including some civil and military officials were arrested in connection with the Agartala Conspiracy case and put on trial on June 19, 1968. With this arrest

6 Ibid.
of Mujibur Rehman, his popularity grew so much. Autonomist sentiment continued to swell in East Pakistan despite Rehman's absence. Later on at the time of Mujib's trial, charges were dropped against him. These dropped charges against Mujib proved a failure to Ayub's regime which was a milestone on the path to its own disintegration and that of Pakistan. The prominent historian of the Pakistani Army Fazal Muqeem Khan also said by criticising the attitude of Ayub Khan "The Agartala Conspiracy Trial provoked adverse reactions and whispers about trumped up charges received credence. The accused person began acquiring an image of heroes and fighters for East Pakistan's rights.

However, the furore against the trial of Mujibur Rehman and some other leaders was so loud that the politicians in both the wings started to unite among themselves. A democratic Action Committee under the leadership of Nasrullah Khan was organised which called for the liberalization of some of the harshest aspects of the regime. Forced with this barrage of opposition, Ayub began to capitulate, first by dropping the Agartala

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conspiracy case and releasing Mujibur Rehman then by calling for a Conference in March 1969. But the Conference of the political leaders was failure because of regional feelings and violence erupted once again. On March 25, 1969, Ayub handed over power to General Yahya Khan who reimposed the Martial Law.

Faced with the continuing demands of the various political parties and Mujib's insistence on the Six Point Programme on November 28, 1969, Yahya promised to hold elections and also expressed a desire to dissolve West Pakistan. Yahya proved to be true to his word, and from January 1970 permitted full political activity. Following extensive discussions with the various contestants for Power, Yahya came out with legal Framework Order on March 31, 1970. It included five basic principles designed to guide and direct any political arrangements but it was a far cry from the expectations of Mujib's Six Point Programme and did not succeed in bringing the national spirit in Awami League and in some other political leaders because the Order was having some dictatorial attitudes.

The shortcomings of the Legal Frame Work Order were not lost on Mujib and the Awami League who continued to press for regional autonomy. The fundamental inability and unwillingness of Yahya's regime to concede certain basic political demands and grievances fueled Mujib's campaign. In fact, one can argue that what was emerging within Pakistan were two separate nationalisms:

a) The nationalism of West Pakistan was predicated on the predominance of the West over the East and,

b) The nationalism of the East was based on relationship of parity.

No longer could the supposedly transcendent quality of any ideology or rule contain the opposing nationalisms. The tangible differences had become too great to be ignored.

The two natural disasters of August and November 1970 in East Pakistan further gave a set back to the Pakistan nationalism, because these disasters were a havoc for the people and properties both, and whatever the help was expected by the people of East wing of Pakistan was not come into reality. The Army which was

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called for help did nothing except to provide minor help and playing cards sitting in barracks, organising cinema shows, and relaxing.

In the national election of December 7, 1970, Mujib's victory of 160 seats out of 162 in East Pakistan and other parties' poor performance indicated the polarization of popular feelings between East and West Pakistan. Faced with this unexpected outcome, the leaders of regime and Bhutto thought that the primacy of the military and the West were in jeopardy with a Bengali majority in the National Assembly. Thus, Yahya acting in concert with Bhutto decided to postpone the convening of the National Assembly indefinitely. When in March 1971 Yahya announced a meeting of all major parties in Decca, Mujibur Rehman earlier refused to attend but later responded under increasing pressure from the more radical members of his own party and issued a new set of demands:

a) the withdrawal of Martial law,
b) the transfer of power to elected representatives,
c) the return of troops to their barracks, and
d) an inquiry into recent police firings.

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Simultaneously, Mijib called for a state-wide non-cooperation movement which proved to be a complete success. A last effort at negotiations broke down over the issues of investments and foreign trade. Shortly thereafter, Yahya denounced Mijab's non-cooperation movement as an "act of treason". Mijib and some Awami League members were arrested and the West Pakistani leaders also refused to hand over power to the elected representative of East wing. Later on March 25, 1971 the Pakistani Armed forces cracked down in Dacca.

In fact, the Pakistani crisis demonstrated that the cultural ties, like those of ethnicity and language had kept Muslim apart. The divisions arising out of these ties had, of course, been exacerbated by the economic grievances of the East against the West. In addition the poor representation of Bengali in Armed forces and civil services and their exclusion from the decision making circles make the people of Eastern wing disenchanted. Thus under these circumstances, it became impossible to hold a nation together.

5. The Bengali Secessionist Movement and India's Role
   No doubt the above factors were sufficient in and of themselves to bring about the break-up of Pakistan but India's role is also unforgettable that she had played in
encouraging the secessionist forces of Pakistan through economic support, moral support and giving training to them. These attitudes of India became a hurdle between the relation of Pakistan and India.

The official Indian reaction to the crackdown in Dacca was taken by Pakistan as an interference in the internal matter of Pakistan because Mrs. Indira Gandhi on March 27, 1971 said in Lok Sabha. "The values for which the victorious Awami League stood were our values...... for which we have always stood and for which we have always spoken". She also said "we have always 12 raised our voice for those who have suffered". From this moment India shifted her previous policy by providing support to a secessionist movement in Pakistan. India started to train and arm Bangladeshi forces inside India and extended covert support to the Bangladesh provisional government to organize a guerilla war in 13 East Pakistan. The Bangladeshi resistance movement known as the "Mukti Bahini" (Liberation brigade) was placed under the command of a retired East Pakistani colonel M.A.G. Osmani.

These trainings and support to Bangladeshi guerilla by India further disrupted the relation between India and Pakistan, because this guerilla organization with the Indian support disrupted the line of communication by blowing up bridges, power lines, and telegraphic equipment, by killing collaborators and by harrying the West Pakistani authorities in general.

As the crisis in Pakistan grew and spilled over into India, the Indian leaders inched closer to a policy of confrontation but before going into any confrontation India wanted to show the crisis of East Pakistan to the international community and later wanted to receive world opinion in her own favour. In this connection Mrs Gandhi sent Foreign Minister Swaran Singh on an international tour of many countries. Mrs Gandhi herself paid a visit to Western Capitals in October and November 1971 and she met with partial success in convincing the U.S. leadership to cut off arms to Pakistan. However, evidence shows that this cutoff was by no means complete, and an specified amount of American weapons did trickle into Pakistan during the course of conflict.

On the other hand, India got much success in focussing the problems of East Pakistan and refugees in the eye of Soviet Union. The Soviet President Podgorny on April 13, 1971 urged the Pakistani leadership to end the "bloodshed and repression" and to arrive at a political settlement with Mujibur Rehman and other politicians who have received such convincing support by the overwhelming majority of the people of East Pakistan at the recent general elections. Later on a treaty of peace, friendship and cooperation was signed between India and Soviet Union on August 9, 1971 in New Delhi. The treaty, both in its substance and timing, was having two important foreign policy objective -

a) For the Soviet Union, it appeared to legitimise further the Soviet security role in South Asia at low political cost and second,

b) From the Indian security perspective, the treaty provided a check on what was held to be the nascent political axis between Washington, Peking and Islamabad, while preserving India's scope for Independent action.

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The signing of the treaty between India and Soviet Union was taken by Pakistan in a serious way. Even many western observers expressed concern that India might seek to take advantage of the assurance given by the treaty in the crisis of East Pakistan. Soviet Union herself accepted the statement of Mrs Gandhi that India is determined to take all necessary measures to stop the flow of refugees from East Pakistan to India and to ensure that those refugees who are already in India to return to their homeland without delay. After the signing of treaty the Soviet arms were also reported to reach in India that encouraged India to move towards confrontation with Pakistan without any hesitation.

6. The Outbreak of Hostilities

In light of the rapidly deteriorating situation in East Bengal, the New Delhi Government felt compelled to act militarily on December 3, 1971. The strike came on when Pakistani provided the military rationale for direct Indian intervention by attacking several Indian Air Force bases in North-western India. Mrs Gandhi who was in

Calcutta at the time, flew to New Delhi where she proclaimed a state of emergency and said that the country was on a "war footing" and "the war in Bangladesh has become a war on India".

India in retaliation also gave a befitting reply and attacked many important Pakistan places. The Indian Army supporting the Bangladesh guerrilla forces, was able quickly to overrun the former East Pakistan. In the west though the conflict was more balanced, the Indians were able to capture some territory in Kashmir. Lastly Pakistan was defeated by India and Pakistan surrendered herself before Indian Armed forces. Indians also got success in trapping 90,000 Pakistani soldiers. East Pakistan was separated from Pakistan and became an independent state known as "Bangladesh".

In this war, no doubt, India had suffered economically as well as militarily but Pakistan suffered a lot and also lost her eastern wing. From this war India showed her superiority in arms forces and established her permanent image in the eyes of the world. Soviet Union was also benefitted with this war because the successful use of Soviet arms by Indian forces, coupled

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with the perceived failure of Chinese and American policies, permitted the Soviet Union to emerge after the conflict with its prestige as a reliable, effective partner enhanced both in India and the broader South Asia region.

To grapple with the issues in India-Pakistan relations during the war, it is necessary to understand the nature of Indian support in Bangladesh struggle for liberation. In this connection it is needed to ask three questions—
(a) Why did India choose to militarily intervene?
(b) What were the forces which supported or opposed India's intervention and why,
(c) What India wanted to gain?

India's interest in the Bangladesh war was primarily politico-strategic. India and Pakistan have been locked in a conflictual relationship ever since the partition of the sub-continent. The two wars that they have fought (1947 and 1965) changed neither the power balance nor the political equation. Therefore, the political turmoil in East Pakistan in 1970-71 which culminated in a civil war was for India a golden opportunity to dismember its enemy, India's military intervention on behalf of the Bangladeshi freedom fighters was indeed motivated by this resolve. The presence of 10 million odd East Pakistani
refugees on its soil and the establishment of an exile government in Calcutta merely provided the necessary justification for its action. The atrocities done by the Pakistani government upon unarmed people of East Bengal was condemned by Indian parliament in March 1971 unmistakably and the parliament assured them that their struggle and sacrifices will receive the whole hearted sympathy and support of the people of India.

Regarding the intervention, there was a mixed reaction to India's military support. The various heterogeneous forces - the conservatives and liberals, the radicals and rightists, the secularists and religious zealots, the civilians and military, and so on had closed their ranks on one point, i.e. overpowering the Pakistani military Junta and winning independence for Bangladesh. But over the question of strategy in general, and India's military role in particular, there were disagreements. By and large, the protagonists of conventional war were in favour of India's intervention while those who favoured a peoples war were not. But in the western wing of Pakistan and some other Muslim countries the people were not in favour of India's intervention in Bangladesh on almost all points.

As far as India's gain is concerned, India had four principal objectives -

i) To see that Pakistan lost its eastern province and its power was reduced.

ii) To see the refugees returning to Bangladesh, 

iii) to see that the Communists, particularly pro-Chinese variety, did not gain in political strength through the liberation movement, and 

iv) to see that the new nation accept India's pre-eminence in the region as a fact of life.

In spite of the above points, India was benefitted on other issues. As Pakistan came apart, its claim on Kashmir also eroded in a major way. The inability of the West Pakistanis to convince their brethren in the East to remain in the same polity, made it exceedingly difficult for the Pakistani leadership to lay a claim on Kashmir on the basis of its religious composition. Naturally, India took advantage of the discrepancy between fact and theory.

7. The Simla Agreement and the Peace Process

The turbulent period 1970-71 marked a turning point in international politics in South Asia in general and India-Pakistan relations in particular. The period
witnessed the genesis of an internal political crisis within the United Pakistan, the secessionist movement and the civil war in East Bengal, the Indian intervention and culminating in the emergence of Bangladesh as a result of the Indo-Pakistani war of 1971. The Simla Agreement of 1972 was a milestone because it formed the legal basis for settling the problems arising out of the Bangladesh war and for normalisation of India-Pakistan relations and establishment of durable peace in the sub-continent.

The Simla Agreement was signed on July 2, 1972 by Indian Prime Minister Mrs Indira Gandhi and Pakistani President Mr. Z. A. Bhutto. The accord reiterated the desire of both the countries to normalise their trade, political and economic relations etc. In her Rajya Sabha speech on August 2, 1972 on the Simla Pact, Mrs. Indira Gandhi stressed the need for peace in the sub-continent in these words: "I have always believed, and I do believe even today that India's major enemy is not Pakistan, it is not even big powers, which are interested in their sphere of influence. India's greatest enemy is the economic backwardness of the country. It is the poverty of the country. If we do not have that handicap, we would have done many things in the world. We can
overcome this handicap, if we have peace".

Mr. Bhutto too had shown positive response in this direction and said that "Pakistan wants peace with India, not because it is afraid but because peace is necessary for the progress of nation".

At Simla, India, even after winning the war, did not try to impose her views over Pakistan but make Pakistan a partner in peace and peace based on equality was concluded. In order to initiate the process of the establishment of peace, India and Pakistan agreed that "their forces shall be withdrawn to their side of the international border. The withdrawal shall commence upon entry into force of this agreement and shall be completed within a period of thirty days of".

Both countries implemented almost all the provisions of the agreement within a short duration of three years of the conclusion of the pact. In the past several agreements were signed between the two countries with the intention of resolving their disputes and establishing

21 Rajya Sabha (India), Debates, August 2, 1972.
peace between them as well as in the region, but none of them proved useful in establishing cooperative understanding and durable peace in full spirit. Upto some extent, Indus Water Treaty of 1960 was more helpful in dissolving the controversial problem of division of Indus Water between India and Pakistan and it is the only problem which had been settled since 1947 between them, and the rest of the treaties were of very short term significance and all of them failed to resolve actual tension. Now the obvious question is how far the Simla Agreement differs from the rest of the agreements and to what extent it has succeeded in establishing durable peace.

The significance of the Simla Agreement and its unique character were highlighted in the statements of prominent political leaders in both the countries.

Sardar Swaran Singh, erstwhile External Affairs Minister of India, in his report to Parliamentary Consultative Committee attached to his ministry said, "The Simla Agreement was very much unlike the other agreements between India and Pakistan and particularly the Tashkent Declaration of 1966. According to him there were following differences between the two:
1. The Tashkent accord had been achieved through the good offices of a third country namely the Soviet Union, while the Simla Agreement was the result of bilateral negotiations.

2. India and Pakistan, under Tashkent Agreement, agreed to withdraw their forces to the 1949 Cease-Fire Line in Jammu and Kashmir, whereas according to the Simla Agreement, the UN-Supervised cease-fire line was replaced by a mutually demarcated Line of the Actual Control.

3. Under the Tashkent Declaration, India insisted on the use of some of United Nations machinery for reconciliation but there was no such provisions in the Simla Agreement.

Similarly, Bipinpal Das, the then Indian Deputy Foreign Minister of India, while discussing the text of Simla Agreement, called it, "a sound and excellent beginning, a right step in the right direction, a herald of new era, an era of peace, progress and prosperity not only for India and Pakistan but for whole of Asia and perhaps a shining light house in the entire world". He further

23 Ibid., p. 66.
said that for the first time both countries had agreed to settle all disputes through bilateral negotiations.

Mrs Gandhi said that the Simla Agreement was in pursuance of domestic and international policies followed by India in three years.

Mr. Bhutto said, "Peace in the subcontinent was not only in India's interest but equally in Pakistan's".

It is only the Simla Accord that taught Mr. Bhutto about his own condition as well as of his own country. Bhutto realized that if he failed to establish friendly and cordial relations with India, he will lose considerably his prestige in the eyes of Asian countries as well as among his own people, because India had normal relations with all her neighbours. This caused great change in his thinking and till yesterday the so-called war like Bhutto who was always talking about wars and destruction at once realized the importance of durable peace, and took necessary and concrete steps to gain durable peace.

24 Ibid., pp. 69-70.
25 Ibid., p. 72.
In pursuance of the Simla Agreement that trade and cooperation in economic and in other fields will be resumed as far as possible, the two countries signed a Trade Protocol on November 30, 1974 at Rawalpindi providing for resumption of trade from December 7, 1974. According to the Protocol, the two countries decided that the trade would be in convertible currency and to begin with generally on a government to government basis or through government controlled trade corporations of the two countries unless otherwise agreed. This would prevent speculative exchanges and illegal leakages, and would help in establishing trade through mutually beneficial channels.

Regarding the provision of payments in convertible currency, some problems arose between the two countries because it was in the interest of India to have trade in rupees. The problem was overcome when India gave concession to Pakistan. The two countries also decided in the Protocol that the trade would be on the basis of the "most favoured nation" principle in accordance with the provisions of the GATT.

28 Ibid., p. 208.
29 The Hindustan Times, January 11, 1986.
The Protocol noted immediate possibilities of commencing trade in cotton, engineering goods, jute manufacturers, iron ore, railway equipment, rice and tea. The leader of Pakistani delegation, Ejaz Ahmed Naik, Characterised the Protocol as a major step towards normalization of relations in the Indian subcontinent in accordance with the Simla Agreement. No doubt, the signing of the Simla Agreement laid the foundation of new contacts and opened possibilities of meaningful trade. But the actual trade started only after the signing of the Trade Agreement of January 23, 1975. This agreement firstly was valid for one year and later it was extended for another period of two years. In this agreement it was made mandatory that both the countries have to treat the times of imports and export strictly for home consumption. Both the countries also decided that such items under no circumstances would be re-exported to other countries.

In one of the most spectacular developments since the Simla Pact, India and Pakistan agreed to re-establish diplomatic relations by exchanging ambassadors and decided

30 Chopra, p. 209.
31 Kalim Bahadur, "India and Pakistan", International Studies, Vol. 27 (3-4).
32 Chopra, p. 213.
to restore rail, road and air links after three days talks in the middle of May 1976 at Islamabad. Mrs Gandhi expressed the hope that the Islamabad accord would lead to a "proper climate of understanding" between the two countries. On the other hand, Bhutto also assured Mrs. Gandhi that Pakistan would implement the accord by the agreed date".

In spite of the above talks, regarding different matters, many developmental cooperation were discussed between the two countries. It is only in the Simla Agreement both countries for the first time decided to solve the dispute on any issue bilaterally.

Conclusion

From the above discussion, it becomes clear that the ideological crisis threatened the very existence of United Pakistan. It was the ideological differences that created the internal crisis in Pakistan, and the East Pakistani peoples refused to accept a subservient role and desired for autonomy. This autonomist demands were met with harsh measures by Pakistan and India got an opportunity to support the autonomist movement. In India, the refugees were coming from Bangladesh. So India

33 Chopra, p. 224.
thought that it was cheaper to go to war than to absorb the refugees into its already bloated population. Finally these factors propelled India and Pakistan on a collision, and East Bengal was separated.

In this war of 1971, India unquestionably established her military superiority not only over Pakistan but even in South Asia region. With India's superiority in the region, it made sense for Pakistan to develop some nuclear capability. Resentment against India for its part in 1971 war and the dismemberment of Pakistan reinforced long-held animosities and feelings of strategic vulnerability, which fielded the desire for nuclear weapons.

As Pakistan came apart, its claim on Kashmir also eroded in a major way. The inability of the West Pakistani to convince their brethren in the East to remain in the same polity, made it exceedingly difficult for the Pakistani leadership to lay a claim on Kashmir on the basis of its religious composition. Naturally India took advantage of the discrepancy between fact and theory.
For the establishment of durable peace in the sub-continent and for the settlement of problems arising out of Bangladesh war, Simla Agreement played very important role. The greatest merit of the Simla Agreement is that the two countries decided to renounce the use or threat of use of force against each other, to put an end to the era of conflict and confrontation, and commit themselves to standing cooperation and peaceful coexistence.

The Simla Agreement for both Indian and Pakistani leaders served as a guidepost towards peace-building. It helped to give a sense of direction to Pakistan's search for national identity and it has given an opportunity to India to show its sense of responsibility as a power which seeks a durable peace system with its neighbours. The Simla Agreement not only reduced the development of nuclear and arms race in the region but it had imporved the trade and economic development also.