CHAPTER-5 CONCLUSION

In the present study, an attempt has been made to examine the Indo-Pak relations. In an attempt of doing so, various dimensions that have a direct or indirect association with Indo-Pak relations are considered. The country was partitioned into Bharat (India) and Pakistan, now two independent nations. In this tragedy thousands of innocent people were killed. Whereas no body expected that independence would lead to instant paradise, yet majority thought that well begun would be half done. However, the ground reality stared us in face it was obviously had begun and half undone. It was but natural for India and Pakistan to be mutually antagonistic.

In the last sixty years, four wars were fought between India and Pakistan in 1947-48, 1965, 1971 and 1999 and they came close to war in 1987, 1990 and again they are on the border. But it has been found from this study that since India’s partition, Indo-Pak relations have been facing conflict and discord, mutual distrust and suspicion. It has resulted from a number of intricate factors like legacy, the difference in religion, race, conflicting national interests and objectives of ideology, power struggle between the two countries, the role they have played in international politics and various territorial disputes including Kashmir.

The major factor, however, has been perception of each other and of themselves. Most of the problems had arisen out of the perceptual divergence. This distance was created by the parity syndrome of Muslim League before the partition and the new State of Pakistan could not free itself from that syndrome. Indo-Pak relations have been sensitive and are found to be based on psychological consideration rather than actual circumstances. Furthermore, foreign policies of both the nations have been influenced by action and reaction against each other. Guided by various complexities and deficiencies that Pakistan inherited from the history, it had always a fear that India would try to destroy, in one way or the other, its very existence. In order to safeguard its political interest and to make herself secure, Pakistan had made all possible
efforts and even succeeded to a considerable extent in increasing a friendship
with China and other West Asian countries. It had also been in the good books
of United States. The purpose of extending her hand of friendship to these
countries was to divert all political power and the support of these nations in
her favour.

Thus, relations between India and Pakistan have always been adverse
and frictional. There had been different irritants on many occasions. In the
beginning, the issue of minorities, evacuee property, division of military stores,
canal-water dispute, border problem and the future of India States deteriorated
its relations with India and worked as blocking factors in the relations of the
two countries. This has generated a huge loss of life and property and destroyed
the close complimentarily of the two nations. Later the conflicting roles that
India and Pakistan played in World Politics put strains on Indo-Pak relations.

Pakistan’s policy of aligning with the Western and Islamic power added
to the problems and resulted in the worsening of its relations with India. By the
early 1960’s India and Pakistan have acquired enough experience in respect of
each others strategies and have also build up their armies to have grasp over the
situation of unforeseen war. The armies build up, coupled with Pakistan’s
membership in CENTO and SEATO had drawn both super powers into the
sub-continent. Finally, the Chinese invasion of 1962 on India had led to a
major infusion of U.S. arms into India and had strained U.S.-Pakistani
relations.

Although, a genuine equilibrium between India and Pakistan could not
and can’t be achieved because of the tremendous disparity in the inherent
strength and resources of the two countries. In terms of capabilities India is the
fifth largest country of the world, second in population, fourth in armed forces,
tenth in industrial potential, third largest pool of technical and scientific
manpower, six nuclear power and fourth to launch its own satellites. Pakistan
on the other hand, is strategically handicapped against India’s military might.
India has 3:1 superiority ratio in army, 5:1 in air force and 7:1' in navy. Due to
this disequilibrium, Pakistan will always watch for weakness in India and attempt to take advantage of this where possible.

The present Kashmir problem is not and should not be an issue between India and Pakistan. Unfortunately, given the unstable nature of Pakistani polity, the politicians of various hues and the military in Pakistan are attempting to fish in the troubled waters of Kashmir, after having significantly contributed to making it show, in their internal struggle for power. It is to be earnestly hoped that they understand the limits of the Pakistani mischief India would tolerate. Pakistan cannot damage Indian integrity or unity without its splintering into Sind, Punjab, Baluchistan, Pashtunistan and other component parts. This is not because India wants to do it, but any encouragement to Kashmir secessionism will have such a backlash effect on Pakistan. The history of the last four wars is before them. India does not want war. India considers a stable, strong and united Pakistan vital to its national interest.

The politicisation of the Kashmir question at the United Nations undermined India’s faith in multilateral diplomacy. The unanticipated adverse outcome, wherein the victim and the aggressor were placed on the same plane, drove India’s leadership away from multilateral initiatives to resolve the Kashmir problem. Indian intransigence, however, did not deter Pakistan from its quest for Kashmir. For the Pakistani leadership, the absorption of all of Kashmir into its realm remained a normative and strategic goal. At a normative level, Pakistan’s claims to Kashmir remained illogical: Pakistan’s identity as the homeland of the Muslims of South Asia made it a moral imperative to include Kashmir in its domain. But it was also a strategic imperative: Pakistan could be better defended if the entire State of Jammu and Kashmir were within its ambit. Committed to the pursuit of these ends, the leadership remained fundamentally unreconciled to the status quo and sought to exploit any opportunities to bring diplomatic and military pressures on India to cede ground on the Kashmir question. Pakistan’s inability to make India budge on this question in the multilateral and diplomatic arena led its leaders several
more times to formulate military strategies to wrest Kashmir from India. In this quest, they frequently exhibited false optimism, exaggerated the support of potential allies, and bolstered their self-image on the basis of dubious and flawed inferences. India remained equally determined to hold on to Kashmir to demonstrate its commitment to secularism. It ignored Pakistan’s demands and steadily lightened its grip on the State. These two antithetical strategies placed the two states on a collision course toward another war in 1965 and this war was also failed to resolve the Kashmir dispute.

Till 1965, India and Pakistan became rigid in their political ideology for each other. Whereas India followed the philosophy of secularism, a sense of communalism was reflected in Pakistan’s policy which pretended to be a Islamic friend for all Muslims within or outside the sub-continent. This was the chief reason why Pakistan always tried to get its hold on Kashmir, a predominantly Muslim populated State. But India being a secular State is always committed not to give away Kashmir at any cost as it is an integral part of the country. Thus, the Indian Government is shouldered by an additional responsibility of preserving the national integrity by ensuring sound security in the State of Jammu and Kashmir. The Indo-Pak war of 1965 had made it clear that neither Pakistan’s claim for occupying Jammu and Kashmir as Muslim State was genuine nor Pakistani army was capable enough of routing away Indian soldiers.

It did, however, have a number of unintended consequences for the politics of the region, and for India and Pakistan. At a regional level, the United States largely disengaged itself from South Asia in the aftermath of the war. American withdrawal from the region permitted the Soviets to expand their influence in the region and to curb Chinese efforts to play a significant role. At another, the war set a precedent for future Indo-Pakistani war: Indian and Pakistani Commanders relied on similar and mostly British battle tactics, lacked significant fire power, and did not engage in any significant tactical innovation. The consequences of the war for India were not far reaching. It’s
military, while not distinguishing itself, nevertheless performed far more creditably than it had in the 1962 border war with China. The Indian armed forces also did not suffer significant casualties.

In the Tashkent Agreement which was signed between the two countries by Shastri and Ayub, the important concessions were given by both sides. The Indians withdrew from a number of strategic positions that they had captured in Azad Kashmir, two of which were significant: the Haji Pir Pass and the town of Tithwal. The Pakistanis also gave up some of their territorial gains. But inspite of all these achievement, Tashkent Declaration had achieved nothing new at all in terms of permanent settlement of India-Pakistan problem. But it proved to be a temporary settlement of their problems and the ever lasting Kashmir issue could not be resolved because of suspicious and unyielding nature of the two nations.

It will be better for both countries if they devote themselves to the task of storming the fortress of poverty and economic backwardness. Ultimately the people may feel and realise that they need not antagonistic but friendly towards each other with a view to tackling the challenges before new millennium. Because the greatest enemy of India today is not Pakistan or China, but Indians themselves. Similarly, the greatest enemy of Pakistan is not India or America but the Pakistani themselves. The mutual mistrust is their common enemy, and they need to build up the bridges of understanding.

A peaceful solution to the Kashmir imbroglio which takes into account all these pros and cons is imperative. It would be rash to suggest instant solutions because there are many imponderables which affect and afflict the power structures in both India and Pakistan. But some aspects are clear. First, the issue related to Jammu and Kashmir can not be resolved by coercive force or military means alone. Secondly, India has to look at itself in the mirror and acknowledge the frustrations and alienation of a section of its citizens who live in an area of paramount strategic and security interest to us. These frustrations have to be overcome by political means and positive responses on the basis of
democratic principles. This can be done only by reviving the basis of democratic principles and the political dialogue by all available means. Perhaps a purposive beginning has been made in this regard with the elections to the Lok Sabha held in Jammu and Kashmir in May-June 1996 and the establishment of an elected government in Jammu and Kashmir with Dr. Farooq Abdullah as the Chief Minister. Thirdly, India must have the patience to counter all Pakistani efforts aimed at disrupting the political processes which we want to initiate despite our own constraints and limitations.

In the later years, Pakistan was seeking to significantly strengthen its defences to blunt any future Indian offensive. The war had also certain unanticipated consequences for the future of the security and stability of the sub-continent. Most significantly, the West Pakistani elite’s decision to leave East Pakistan only lightly defended stoked the embers of Bengali sub-nationalism. Significant numbers of Bengalis were already unhappy with the imposition of Urdu as the national language, inadequate Bengali representation in the civil services and the armed forces, and the disproportionate allocation of foreign assistance to West Pakistan. These incendiary conditions in East Pakistan would flare up within the next several years into civil war, which evolved into the third Indo-Pakistan war.

A gloomy picture emerged in the relations of the two nations when the war of 1971 burst out. In this war Pakistan was suffered more because she lost her eastern wing. This war once again proved and declared the superiority over Pakistan in respect of military power in South Asia region. The historical defeat of Pakistan in the 1971 war had made it realised the threat to its security and a challenge to its military capabilities. Pakistan thus, determines to develop its nuclear capabilities and the programme of nuclear armaments. This feeling of Pakistan got an impetus when India performs its 1st nuclear test in Pokhran in 1974. Pakistan’s claim of Jammu and Kashmir on the basis of religious composition got eroded and western Pakistani leaders persuaded East Pakistan to remain in the same quality.
The Bangladesh struggle for sovereign statehood owed its unique success to certain unique factors; the peculiar genesis and geographical and cultural nature of the pre-1971 Pakistan State, the policies and activities of the central ruling elite which facilitated the transition of the Bengali movement from an autonomist to an eventually secessionist struggle, the positive and decisive role played by a powerful and contiguous external patron, India, and finally, a favourable balance of global and regional forces.

Each and all of these factors helped and hastened the process of the emergence of Bangladesh as a sovereign State. At the climax of the struggle in November-December 1971 these factors became intertwined, affecting and being affected by one another, separately and collectively leading to the definitive outcome, the sovereign independent Bangladesh.

After 1971 the irritants were the fall out of the Indo-Pak war i.e. repatriation of the prisoners of war, delineation of the line of actual control in Kashmir, recognition of Bangladesh, resumption of over flights and means of communication and trade. Though Pakistan temporised on the above issues, yet they were amicably settled. But then it is difficult to change the psyche and equally difficult to change geography. There are certain environmental inputs, both exogenous and indigenous which make the South Asian sub-system confrontational. The contemporary irritants, however, are –

a. perception of each other's nuclear capability,
b. conflicting perception of the Soviet presence in Afghanistan,
c. divergent response to the threat posed by the super powers presence in the Indian Ocean and
d. Kashmir issue.

The war had ended; the cease-fire had come—but peace has not yet been achieved. India held over 90,000 prisoners of war and was in occupation of nearly 9,000 square kilometers of Pakistani territory. Pakistan was yet to recognise Bangladesh. Indira Gandhi realised that a mutually arrived at Indo-
Pak settlement was necessary for a durable peace. A hostile Pakistan would not only force to India to maintain a high level of defence expenditure but also enable outside powers to interfere in sub-continental affairs. A summit conference between Indira Gandhi and Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, the newly elected Prime Minister of Pakistan, was held in Shimla in June 1972; a great deal of hard bargaining took place and the two signed an agreement which came to be known as the Shimla Declaration. India agreed to return the Pakistani territory it had occupied, except some strategic points in Kashmir, mainly in the Kargil sector, which were necessary to safeguard the strategic road link between Srinagar and Leh in Ladakh. In return, Pakistani agreed to respect the existing Line of Control (LoC) in Kashmir and undertook not to alter it unilaterally by force or threat of force. The two countries also agreed to settle all their disputes through bilateral negotiations without any outside mediation by the U.N. or any other power. Indian also agreed to return the prisoners of war to Pakistan but this was to be contingent upon a Bangladesh-Pakistan agreement. This occurred the next year when Pakistan recognised Bangladesh in August 1973.

The justification Indira Gandhi offered to the Parliament in July 1972 for signing the Shimla Declaration was significant. She said: ‘All I know is that I must fight for peace and I must take those steps which will lead us to peace... The time has come when Asia must wake up to its destiny, must wake up to the real needs of its people, must stop fighting amongst ourselves, no matter what our previous conflicts, no matter what the previous hatred and bitterness. The time has come today when we must bury the past.’

The Shimla Agreement helped to give a sense of direction to Pakistan’s search for national identity and it has given an opportunity to India show its sense of responsibility as a power which seeks a durable peace system with its neighbours. This agreement provided a congenial atmosphere and favourable opportunity in the region for trade and economic development.

The euphoria of India’s decisive victory over Pakistan lasted for a considerable span of time. Between 1972 and 1983, various governments in
New Delhi showed skill, tact and intelligence in dealing with the internal dimensions of the Kashmir problem. From 1984 onward, however, they returned to the extraordinary clumsiness, thoughtlessness, and downright deceit that had characterised domestic policy toward Kashmir in the 1950s and 1960s. These highly uneven policies of accommodation and manipulation ultimately culminated in an ethno-religious insurgency in December 1989 that once again gave Pakistan a chance to pray Kashmir out of the Indian Union. As the insurgency gathered strength in early 1990, some of the more astute and thoughtful Indian decision makers would privately question the sagacity of India’s 1971 intervention in the internal politics of Pakistan.

It has been felt that in the last sixty years, the reason has been the witness of many conflicts but one thing that emerges out on a thorough examination is that peace in the region has never been threatened-when a conflict has arisen between States whose economic stake holding on both sides-e.g., disputes between India-Nepal, India-Sri Lanka, India-Bangladesh-in all these cases the crisis have blown over mainly because of the large scale economic interests on both sides. But the same can not be said for Indo-Pak relations mainly because there are no economic and business stakes involved. It is here the catch lies-it is recommended that economic as well as political Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) be designed to help negate the feeling of hatred being fuelled on both sides of the border. The need to find sustainable development solution to the problems of the region might just be the queue that might bring about a rethinking in political brass of the two nations.

On 28 May 1990, India proposed a set of political Confidence Building Measures following which seven rounds of Foreign Secretary Level talks were held between July, 1990 and January 1994. The proposed CBMs were both military and non-military in character and included suggestions like introducing greater transparency in mutual military interactions, modalities to ally Indian concerns at Pakistan’s support of terrorism, chemical and biological weapons etc. Unfortunate, in the six rounds of discussions Pakistan demanded
that talks on Jammu and Kashmir should be taken under Article 6 of the Shimla Agreement. This clearly indicates that Pakistan wanted to give the highest priority to Kashmir in these talks, while pushing every other issue to the background. The Indian response was that the Shimla Agreement did not envisage compartmentalised and fragmented talks. Just one Article of the Shimla Agreement could not be picked up selectively. In January 1994, India and Pakistan exchanged non-papers on different aspects of the bilateral relationship. The six Indian non-papers dealt with CBMs, maintenance of peace and tranquility along the LoC, Siachen, Sir Creek, The Tubul Navigation Project and an Indo-Pak Joint Commission. The two Pakistani non-papers given in response dealt with a plebiscite in Jammu and Kashmir and measures to create a climate for peaceful resolution of the Jammu and Kashmir dispute. There were several clear cut divergences between the positions taken by the two countries on different issues in their respective non-papers. Consequently, the CBMs process initiated by the Indians got derailed. This process was again resumed in 1997 by the then Prime Minister I.K. Gujral. Prime Minister I.K. Gujral and his counterpart met four times during May 1997 and January 1998, but the divergent views on the irritants had again derailed the entire process.

The nuclear tests by India and Pakistan in May 1998, added an additional dimension to the Indo-Pakistan relations. Prime Minister A.B. Vajpayee and his Pakistani counterpart Nawaz Sharif met on July 29 in Colombo and again on September 23 in New York. Both of them had agreed to restart the process of CBMs as early as possible. In February 1999, Prime Minister A.B. Vajpayee traveled to Lahore at the invitation of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif in a bid to normalise relations and begin a new chapter. At Lahore both sides agreed to “intensify their efforts to resolve all issues, including the issue of Jammu and Kashmir”, and also reaffirmed their “condemnation of terrorism in all its forms and manifestations…….” The Lahore Declaration reiterated the determination of both parties to implement the Shimla Agreement “in Letter and Spirit”.

220
In a broader perspective, the Lahore Declaration was a sincere effort on India's part to tackle the difficult and complex irritants between the two nations against the nuclear backdrop and was acclaimed the world over. Unfortunately, Pakistan did not give a chance to the Lahore Declaration. The Kargil intrusion constituted a cynical breach of the trust on which the Lahore process was posited.

The 1999 war between India and Pakistan in Kargil offers one useful test of the two competing positions about nuclear stability and instability in South Asia. Despite the over nuclearisation of the region, an undeclared war did take place. However, no reliable evidence has yet emerged that either side contemplated a resort to nuclear weapons during this conflict. More to the point, unlike in the 1965 war, when Pakistan attacked India in Kashmir, in 1999 India did not resort to prompt horizontal escalation. Instead, it carefully limited the war to a particular arena and did not even attempt to cross the Line of Control into Pakistani territory after dislodging the Pakistani troops from its own lands.

A meeting of the Indo-Pak Joint Commission was held in August 2000, in which Iran attempted to persuade India to consider the economical and technically sound trans-Pakistan pipeline. It is expected that Pakistan would gain an estimated $600 million in transit fees. Therefore, this project will be really heavily beneficial for Pakistani economy. Similarly, another project has been under consideration between the two countries is the export of surplus electricity from Pakistan to northern India. The estimate was that if Pakistan had a surplus capacity of 200 megawatts for export, it could earn as much as $1.2 billion per year for perhaps upto twenty years.

To start these projects, Pakistan has to change track on its 'Kashmir first' policy, shifting gear to a process of building cooperation and confidence in other areas without necessarily giving up its position on Kashmir. Pakistan should also stop cross border terrorism in India. On the other hand, India must also take the lead in economic openness to its smaller neighbour. The gulf
between the two is too wide to be bridged in the foreseeable future without major geostrategic or radical policy changes in the region, but we should always remember one thing: “The difficult we can do straight away, the impossible takes us a little time”.

In order to improve bilateral relations with Pakistan, India extended an invitation to Pakistan’s chief executive, Gen Musharraf to visit India. Musharraf who was soon to declare himself President of Pakistan accepted it and the meet slated for 14-16 July 2001, took place at Agra. However, this did not produce anything as expected. Musharraf and his foreign policy makers wanted to bring Kashmir into focus and demanded that the All Party Hurriyat Conference be made a party to the bilateral talks. Vajpayee and his government’s coalition friends on the other hand insisted on Pakistan withdrawing support to Kashmiri terrorism, stop narcotic trafficking and give up its claims on Sir Creek and the Wular Barrage and stood stoutly against Musharraf’s no-compromise stand on Kashmir question. Indian unwillingness to withdraw forces from the Siachen Glacier too upset the plans of Pakistan and naturally the summit ended a failure. The attack on US World Trade Centre and Pentagon allegedly by the Bin Laden and his Al-Qaeda terrorists on 11 September 2001 brought some changes in the American attitude to Asiatic affairs, and Pakistan proved to be its fortunate beneficiary. She gained greater importance against the backdrop of the US decision to fight Taliban and Afghan terrorist.

India’s military deployment on the borders after 13 December 2001, terrorist attack on Indian Parliament all cumulatively have kept the cup of embittered relations overflowing without any let-up. Again twice in the year 2002 in January and June India was on the range of war against Pakistan. Prime Minister A.B. Vajpayee wanted to strike on PoK-based terrorists, but Pakistan cleverly shifted their camps pre-empting Indian options. Government wanted limited action. The military thought otherwise, saying the forces should cross the Indo-Pak borders. The leader of Pakistan especially Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto’s
dreamt of attaining parity with India in nuclear field was realised in May 1998. General turned President Pervez Musharraf on 4 January 2000 stated that Pakistan would not hesitate to use nuclear weapons if its security was threatened. On 24 January 2000, while inaugurating an international conference on Asian Security in New Delhi, Defence Minister Mr. George Fernandes had declared “India’s readiness to fight any limited conventional war under the nuclear shadow”.

Kuldip Nayar who led an Indian Parliamentary delegation in the middle of 2003 was indeed jubilant over the warm reception the team got from the Pakistanis. He wrote, “We, the nine parliamentarians were swept off our feet by love and affection showered upon us at Lahore, Islamabad and Karachi. It was almost a people’s war against the age-old prejudice and hatred against India”. At Lahore Nayar and his team was surprised at the rousing reception accorded to them and the warmth with which they were entertained at the dinner hosted by the India-Pakistan Soldiers Initiative for Peace (IPSIP). The Jamat-i-Islami, which too did not seem to be averse to the move for peace, has given their first ever reception since the birth of Pakistan. Indeed many of the people and organisations in Pakistan are for shedding all differences with India and they find fault with the military set up for its abhorrence for achieving a solution to Indo-Pak problem.

There started the Bus-Diplomacy, which the Indian authorities thought would lead to better bilateral relations. In December 2004 Islamabad had agreed to start a bus service between Amritsar and Lahore. According to Pakistani Punjab’s Chief Minister, Parvez Elahi Pakistan Government agreed in principle for this bus service and he said, “it was your (India’s) turn to complete the rest of formalities”. There were moves to have Memorandum of Understandings (MoUs) signed between the agricultural universities of Faisalabad and Ludhiana to undertake research in agriculture, horticulture and agro-processing. Punjab Chief Minister Amrinder Singh mooted several schemes including the waiving of entertainment tax on Punjabi films made in
Punjab especially in view of Elahi’s statement, “we have an age old common cultural heritage and civilisation and, therefore, it is our foremost duty to respect the sentiments of the Sikh community”. In the year of 2005, a landmark in Indo-Pakistan relations, proved eventful with the starting of Srinagar-Muzaffarabad bus service and the India’s visit of Pakistan President Pervez Musharraf, which happened almost simultaneously. The launch of the bus service from 7 April 2005, as agreed between India and Pakistan during the visit of India’s External Affairs Minister to Pakistan in February 2005, was acclaimed by Pakistan as a “significant development and a confidence building measure”. “The decision to launch the bus service is a very good gesture which will revive links among the Kashmiris on both sides of the LoC”, Pakistan’s Foreign Ministry said in a press briefing.

But, despite all the media hype of the bus launch as a “historic moment” and a great step in Confidence Building Measures, some crucial issues remained unsolved. Because, this bus service did not evoke any warmth from Pakistan as it did in India. Indeed it was India alone that became over-jubilant over it. Comparing to the over-enthusiasm shown at the function arranged to celebrate the bus service, which was marked by the presence of India’s Prime Minister, Dr. Manmohan Singh and the Chairperson of India’s ruling United Progressive Alliance, Mrs. Sonia Gandhi and the carnival-like atmosphere it created in Srinagar, the arrival and departure of the bus was not a high profile affair in Muzaffarabad. Neither the Pakistan President, nor Prime Minister, nor even its Foreign Minister was present to flag off the bus. India achieved nothing diplomatically, politically, culturally or economically from this venture.

Closely following the launch of the bus service was the visit of General Pervez Musharraf on 16 April 2005. In his first visit after the failure of the Agra Summit of 2001 India once again rose from her somber mood to welcome the General. In a moment of high emotion Musharraf touched down at the Sanganer airport of Jaipur, Rajisthan’s capital city on his way to pay homage at
the Mausoleum of the Sufi saint Khwaja Moinuddin Chisti. Describing his India visit as ‘historic’, he said “We have come here with a massage of peace and unity ... we have prayed that in times to come, all differences between India and Pakistan are resolved and peace returned”. The visiting delegation that accompanied the General who was in India to watch the final one-day cricket match between India and Pakistan at Ferozeshah Kotla on 17 April.

The talks between General Musharraf and India’s Prime Minister Dr. Manmohan Singh were marked with all cordiality and friendship, which according to reports, sent a clear message across the world that the two nations born of the common tradition are out to cut the long drawn ice. Both the leaders agreed that their army had required acting in close cooperation so that differences over implementing Confidence Building Measures might well be addressed, especially in regard to Siachen issue and maritime boundary in Sir Creek. Dr. Manmohan Singh and General Musharraf had a 40-minute one-to-one dialogue after a two-hour-long delegation level meet during which they came up with a broad vision to cooperate more effectively to promote cross border exchanges along the Line of Control as well. At the meeting held in Hyderabad House, Singh zeroed in on the responsibility of both the countries to project themselves as role models for the entire region in opening up trade routes and adding transport links that would expedite economic cooperation.

The discussions led to emergence of ideas regarding a range of possible steps desirable to improve bilateral amity. These included Kashmir centred CBMs leading to a more porous LoC like the suggestion of seven meeting points for the relatives, cross-LoC trade, increasing transport linkages and establishing more communication links, reviving the joint commission on trade and business and setting up a joint business council to improve contacts between private sectors on both sides, giving top priority to Iran-Pakistan-India gas pipeline proposal along with looking at other energy resources in the region, and developing appropriate transit facilities to improve trade relations with Central Asian and West Asian regions. Dr. Singh however reminded the
Pakistan President that all steps could be expedited if only Pakistan would stick to and honour its commitment to curb terrorism and that it was the duty of both the countries to ensure that no terrorist elements thwart positive movements and ambience.

There had been open and proxy wars between two countries India and Pakistan. Both India and Pakistan should take a concrete step to resolve the dispute and inaugurate a new chapter of cooperation and to solve the much deferred domestic social problem.

A serious effort should be made by both the countries who are geographically proximate, yet have acted as distant neighbours. The first fall out should be serious pruning of bloated defence budgets and the ruling elites of both the countries should divert the funds for socio-economic development of toiling masses who suffer from endemic poverty, malnutrition, illiteracy and backwardness of all sorts. Even outstanding economists, social thinkers, intellectuals politicians, human rights activists have been harping on this theme unremittingly since long time. And to top it well-meaning friends in both India and Pakistan and all across the world. India spends on its defence just 2.8% from its Gross Domestic Product, while Pakistan significantly spends 4.8% from its GDP. Much of its defence allocation is used by Islamabad in prosecuting a low intensity conflict against India. It become obvious that military expenditure is draining both the poor nations and one random examples speaks a lot. It costs Rs.10 crore a day to maintain troops along the Line of Control (LoC) to prevent another Kargil war. Over and above this other hefty financial outlay has to be made for hinterland security. And this applies to Pakistan too.

A kind of pessimism is reflected from our assessment of Indo-Pak relations. The on going study has witnessed frictions in the relations between the two countries ever since the partition of India. A strong disagreement has always been observed between the two nations in all fields, particularly in arms build up and acquisition of nuclear technology. With the passage of time, both
India and Pakistan have acquired strong military power equipped with sophisticated weapons. This may result in heavy losses on both fronts if a new war is provoked from either side.

Our analysis of the past events and present scenario of Indo-Pak relations suggest that the prospects of a modus vivendi are still not very bright. Even after the commendable efforts made by the two countries to improve their mutual relations, sharp differences are often visible in respect of their policies and responsibilities for each other. Though the internal political tension in Pakistan during the last couple of years has somewhat diverted its attention and has marginally reduced the terrorist activities in India sponsored by it. Even the elections are over there; less sign of political stability in Pakistan is seen. This is not in favour of India too. Political stability in both the countries is a prerequisite for continuous bilateral talks between India and Pakistan.

In order to ease the tension of on-going dialogue and Confidence Building Measures should be encouraged. We have many examples from history that war cannot bring peace, and it applies to Indian sub-continent as well. Both India and Pakistan should come to the negotiating table and discuss their mutual problems. Both the governments should be people friendly irrespective of the divide of religion, caste, languages etc. Kashmir is the part and parcel of Indian Union and it cannot be given to Pakistan under any circumstances. Even if Kashmir is given to Pakistan, whether Pakistan would ever stop terrorist activities in India is a million-dollar question and another issue will come up to increase the tension.