CHAPTER – 4
KARGIL OPERATION AND ITS AFTERMATH

4.1 INTRODUCTION

Usually relationships between any two countries are assumed to remain cordial and harmonious. But when we witness relationship between the two neighbouring countries i.e., India and Pakistan, it is conflictual. This synchronises with the time of partition when both the dominions were granted independence by the departing British authority in the sub-continent. The traumatic event of partition was caused by deep-seated religious antagonism between the two communities i.e., Hindus and Muslims. It may be added that when the Muslim League’s leader Mohammad Ali Jinnah staked the claim for an independent Muslim State, there was a section of Muslim community who differed from him and opted to remain in India. After granting independence to India and Pakistan, the British Government did not fully sever its links, but retained benevolent interest in the affairs of the sub-continent. Pakistan anti-India foreign policy, which was also a product of its domestic politics compulsion since 1947, waged full-fledged conventional wars and assorted mini skirmished across the LoC. So it had both overt and covert dimensions. The tribal invasion was an example of brutal intrusion just couple of months after independence.¹

Above all, India and Pakistan share a history of rivalry and conflict that spans over sixty years. Since their emergence as independent States from the detritus of the British Indian empire, India and Pakistan have gone to war four times: in 1947-48, almost immediately after independence, they fought a long and intense battle over the formerly independent State of Jammu and Kashmir; in 1965 they fought another war over the same piece of land; in 1971 the two engaged during the civil war that severed East Pakistan into the nascent State of Bangladesh; and in 1999 they fought once more in the mountains of Kashmir. In addition to these actual wars, twice during the past sixty years the
two countries have endured crises that brought them close to war. If a single most dominant characteristic of the relations between India and Pakistan since 1947 was to be identified then the finger would almost involuntarily point to the mistrust and lack of confidence between the two sovereign States, both highly sensitive to their separateness and sovereignty as young modern nation States burdened by a deeply shared, historically long continuity of civilisational and cultural bonds. Although the manifestation of this in the shape of animosities is not necessarily shared by the peoples of the two countries, many attitudes and perceptions among them have been shaped by this crisis of relationship at the State-to-State level. This factor has been central to the growth and sustenance of antagonisms. The degree and form of crisis in the relationship, and the rhetoric that goes with it, has varied with time, events and personalities; but the substance of it has remained. Both countries face serious national challenges of socio-economic development which require an environment of peace and stability at the very minimum, and preferably, detente and friendship at the optimum level. Conventional wisdom, particularly of the type propagated in the West, would have us believe that a deep-rooted hostility (between Muslims and Hindus, and thus by extrapolation, between the two countries) characterises the relationship. However realities do not support such a view.

Many people, in the two countries and outside them, make a fundamental mistake in approach when they cast Indo-Pak relations in the framework of ‘Hindu-Muslim’ relations. This is further compounded by trying to give this approach-misdirected legitimacy by the concept of a ‘historical, traditional’ Hindu-Muslim hostility represent a paradigm of inevitable confrontation and conflict. However, nothing could be farther from the truth. For nearly a thousand years Hindu and Muslim (and other religious) societies and States have co-existed in harmony in India; and where excesses were committed against one community, they were more a result of the medieval feudal approach of the ruling elites rather than a societal conflict. In fact the
16th century India represented a model of secular and communal harmony when Europe was being torn apart by religious and sectarian strife.²

The thesis of the religious basis of crisis in relationship does not hold even in the present times because it is negated by many realities: the friendly relations between India and the Muslim world, friendly relations between the Islamic Republic of Pakistan and the Hindu Kingdom of Nepal, the parallel crisis of relationship between Pakistan and Afghanistan-two overwhelmingly Muslim majority States, and so on. Above all, the fact that a very significant portion of the Muslim population opted to stay back in India, and now constitutes over 12 percent of its population making it the third largest Muslim population amongst all countries in the world, and represents an important part of the nation and State, and on the other hand, Muslim East Pakistan separated from Pakistan in less than a quarter century in a violent struggle, all negate the communal approach. The reality is that the two new sovereign States were established on not only differing sets of core values, but which are essentially contradictory to each other. Here, in fact, Pakistan was, and continues to be affected by a serious handicap.

Thus, religion cannot be the all-affective glue, which can cement and bind people for long. Culture, geography, economics, social cohesiveness and other variables keeps the people together. Many scholars and thinkers have opined that the geographical land mass which comprises India, Pakistan and Bangladesh today has a deep underlying cultural unity. Unfortunately some ideologues and proponents of a separate homeland for Muslims were carried away so much with their strongly held belief that they were not averse to division of the sub-continent.³ In this category were men like Mohammad Iqbal, Mohammad Ali Jinnah etc. The inevitable corollary of this mind-set and worldview meant that the leaders of Pakistan always looked to India with jaundiced eyes. Keith Callard, a well-known Canadian writer who insightfully observes: “It would be quite right to suggest that the feeling of the Pakistani towards India is one of simple hatred. Their attitude is rather one of intense rivalry to the point of bitter jealously”⁴.
Today, relations between India and Pakistan exist in a State of violent peace: a State in which friction points erupt into periodic battles or brief gory conflicts, but there is no war declared or undeclared. These friction points manifest themselves in different forms, ranging from low intensity conflict and border skirmishes, to a medium intensity conflict in a localised area. India and Pakistan are currently passing through a turbulent phase. There are grave misgivings over what the harvest might be of the present situation of neither peace nor war in which the two countries find themselves. If peace is to be preserved and conflict avoided, it will take all the Statesmanship the leaders of the two countries can bring to bear on the events and issues that have brought them to the edge of the precipice.

In view of the above discussion, the present chapter is an attempt to analyse and understands the dynamics of Indo-Pak relations in the present context and to examine the efforts being made by the government of the two countries to resolve the issues between them so far. The conflictual relations between the two countries resulted the Kargil war in 1999 causing large damages of life and property on both sides. Therefore, the chapter contains the detailed discussion of Indo-Pak war in Kargil and also analysis the situation thereafter.

4.2 INDO-PAK WAR IN KARGIL

It has been discussed in chapter-2 that Kashmir has been the main source of friction and conflict in Indo-Pak relations and that the social ideology of the people on the two fronts and the political strategies of both the governments are by and large responsible of the situation so prevailed. The Kargil war that occurred between India and Pakistan in the summer of 1999 was just the result of long prevailing conflicts between India and Pakistan over Kashmir. It has also been stated in chapter-2 that Atal Behari Vajpayee’s efforts immediately preceding the Kargil war did not prove of much help in restoring peace and solving the pending issues between the two nations. Before
going into the detail examination of Kargil war in 1999, let us first discuss briefly the root cause, which ultimately laid to this war.

4.2.1 ROOT CAUSE OF THE KARGIL WAR

The geographical area of Kargil is mountainous and so the terrain is hard rugged sparsely populated rugged, and military planners of Pakistan close the area to nibble away some chunk of land falling within the Indian side of LoC. The Kargil sector extends 168 km along the LoC, stretching from the Kaobal Gali in the West to Chorbatla in the East. The LoC itself runs along with watershed from Kaobal Gali to Kaksar and then from Shangruti onwards to Chorbatla. This total distance of about 80 km is glaciated and was unmanned by both sides till the Pakistan intrusion on May 1999.

It stretches southwards into the Zanskar range towards Padam, extending almost 230 km. Along this avenue there is a district infiltration route albeit a lengthy one to Kishtwar and Doda close to Umasila.\(^5\) Being Shia and Buddhist populated area, this avenue is an operational infiltration route has not been given much importance hitherto by Indian defence planners and military bigwigs. This lacuna underscores the importance of Kargil as its capture by an adversary would give a wide, encircling capability and a backdoor entry into the valley through the Great Himalayan range.

Along the LoC, there is glaciated and inhospitable terrain, which has below freezing point temperature making it very difficult for a Leh person or soldier to pass through. This stretch is almost 80 km. Even Austria-made Kolflach snow shoes, very costly Gorfex high-altitude gear, Russian made stormier tents does not provide full-proof protection to the jawans from rigors and vagaries of nature.\(^6\)

This area was very difficult for any organised force to negotiate and control and as threat was not anticipated, it was left unprotected. Still New Delhi had kept 121 (1) Infantry Brigade to look after the Kargil sector. After 1972, the Brigade was placed under 3 division based at Leh in Ledakh. The Kargil Brigade, which provided the only line of communication, found itself
always on a limb facing upto Pakistan in the crucial area. The downplaying of threat perception by New Delhi was mainly due to its China fixation and for which the 3rd division was deployed. It was undergirded by another variable, and that was PoK area posing no threat because of its terrain in military thinking and calculation because the positioning of 3 divisions was made in such a way that with its limited resources it had to square upto twin threats coming from two opposite direction at the same time i.e. Communist China and Pakistan from its PoK area. At the same time, the activation of Siachen conflict in 1984 and subsequent development of roads and tracks over the years within PoK had altered the situation gradually. So the ground reality was gradually becoming unfriendly for New Delhi.

The Dalunang intrusion was noticed in October 1987. It took place at a time when the Pakistani attempt had been foiled at Bilafond La in the Siachen area. Dalunang intrusion was on the Indian side, which had somehow escaped attention. As the track and other communication approaches to Dalunang village was widely believed to have residual land mines as a fall-out of the 1971 operations the area was left unpatrolled. The 121 Brigade was thus forced to chance its place of deployment to the Dras-Kaksar area.

The Dalunang intrusion of 1987 was a classic case of Pakistani soldiers crossing into LoC and India failed to resolve the issue in a firm manner, which emboldened Islamabad to what Pakistan, repeat such activity in 1999.

The Kargil intrusion did not begin in 1999 but it had its origins three years earlier. The Government of India taking cognizance of setbacks in the area set up a Kargil Review Committee, which observed, “From 1997 onwards there was increased activity in this sector, marked by heavy artillery fire. The magnitude of these exchanges rose two-fold in 1997 and three-fold in 1998, reports indicated training of an increasing number of militants in the Northern Area and the likelihood of their infiltration through the Mashkoh Valley”.

It is also believed that the Kargil intrusion of 1999 was originally conceived during 1987. After Altaf Gauhar, who once upon a time was Information Secretary to President Ayub Khan wrote in the daily Nation.
“......the Kargil intrusion ..... was authorised by Gen. Zia-ul-Haq in 1987. But at the final committee meeting where Gen. Zia was to approve it, the then Foreign Minister, Gen. (Retired) Sahibazada Yaqub Khan opposed it on the plea that as a former general, he knew that the posts that Pakistani soldiers would occupy were totally covered with snow almost throughout the year and it would be extremely difficult to have communication with them and meet their day to day needs. He said that some soldiers had died there and their bodies remained untraced so far”.

The academic and military question, which always crops up during the discussion of Kargil misadventure is why after all Islamabad backed up infiltration policy in and around Kargil and for what military and diplomatic gains. The following discussion attempts to unravel the true reason of the skirmish.

Pakistan is an Islamic State and increasingly it transformed itself into a fundamentalist country. At the same time, we notice that in Pakistan, there are three segments of society viz, civil, military and religious fundamentalist. In order to continue ruling, the government in power try to divert attention from the snowballing internal crises of Pakistan. Sometime they create tension on the border to internationalise the Kashmir issue. This is done to pollute the minds of ordinary Pakistani citizens so that the army, political leader and bureaucracy can rule Pakistan without any dissent or hindrance.

It is said that the Kargil intrusion followed the sequential nuclear tests conducted by the two South Asian adversaries in May 1998.

It is also understood that the real reason for Kargil war lies in Pakistan’s repeated failures to annex Jammu and Kashmir through full-fledged conventional wars. During the Kargil war, Pakistan planned a big operation to strike the Indian army’s centre of gravity in the northern part of Kashmir. Its strategic aim was to internationalise the Kashmir issue. Besides this Pakistan had also specific objective for Kargil war. They are as follows.

1. "Choke the strategic road linking Srinagar with Leh and prevent vital supplies for the ensuing winter reaching Indians troops in Ladakh."
2. Occupy Dras and Kargil and open up the LoC issue.

3. Capture heights in Battalik and Turtok areas to initially sever the Southern Siachen Glacier, and later, choke access to both the northern and southern glaciers along the Nubra river, and force India to back down on Siachen.

4. Control the Mushkoh Valley near Dras and use it as a major route for fresh infiltration.

5. Spread insurgency in Kargil district of Ladakh to ease the heat unleashed on military groups in the valley.

6. To bury the Shimla Agreement by altering the LoC and bring the Kashmir issue back on international stage”.

It is said that the intrusion plan was reportedly the brainchild of Pakistan’s Chief of Army Staff (COAS) Gen. Prevez Musharraf and Lt. Gen. Mohammad Aziz, Chief of the General Staff (CGS). They obtained ‘in principle’ concurrence, probably without any specifics, from Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif. After direction to President Bill Clinton’s point blank maintaining the sanctity of LoC, the Sharif agreed to withdrew its troop. But still Kargil can be remembered as a very important landmark in Indo-Pak tension-ridden relations.

The Kargil war encompassed the area from Turtok in the north to Mushkoh Valley. The important sectors pertaining to the terrain are Turtok, Chorbat La, Batalik, Kargil, Kaksar, Dras and Mushkoh Valley. Turtok lies on the Shyok river and has a population of about 1,500. Indian troops stationed at Turtok have to travel upto Leh from where they are transported across the 18,380 ft. high Khardung La. Therefore, the route lies along the Shyok Valley. Over 1/3 of the route to Turtok is the same as that for Siachen. Any Pakistani advance upto Shyok Valley would put pressure on the flanks of Indian soldiers traversing the route to Siachen and make the 3,000 m. high. The area of Chorbat La is part of the Batalik sector for operational purposes. Batalik sector lies to the north of the Indus River. There are many important villages along the river form the east to the west. They are Dah, Garkhum, Uradas and Batalik on the Indian side. There are three major nullahs (streams) flowing south from the LoC broadly dissecting the sector. These three streams join the Indus at
Batalik, Garkhum and Dah. Batalik’s ridges are less steep from the Pakistani side, and this is advantageous for the intruders who attempt of breach the LoC and occupy heights at 16,000 to 18,000 ft. without their movement being noticed. On Indian side, these positions had to be approached from very steep height i.e. upto 12,000 ft.\textsuperscript{11}

Kargil town lies at the junction of Shingo and Suru rivers. If one goes on along the Shingo, one would come to the village of Gangam, Bielargo, Olthingthang and Marol. They all come on the Pakistani side of LoC and were used as logistics bases. Point 4151 dominates Kargil town. It is 4 km North East of Kargil and about 3 km from the LoC on the Indian side. It is the key to the town’s safety from the barrage of Pakistani guns. This height was captured by India in 1965 war, but was returned to Pakistan after the Tashkent Agreement. Again it was captured in 1971 by Indian troops. Kaksar is a village, which lies to the west of Kargil. It is situated on the Southern bank of the Shingo river. Point 5299 dominates Kaksar, which is very close to LoC.

The Dras sector is dominated by the Tololing heights to the north and the Tiger Hills complex to the north-west. In between there is Sando Nullah. Tololing is on the Srinagar-Leh highway and one can monitor all the clandestine activities from this place. A road running along the Sando Nullah goes right up to Morpo La on the LoC. Beyond, on the Pakistan side, is the road to Gultari, one of their important bases. Road from Gultari lead to Faranshat in (PoK) and on to Shaqma. From the Pak side the Mushkoh Valley is reached through the 5,353 m. high altitude Marpola Pass. There is no other pass in the vicinity, hence, control of this pass is very vital otherwise it cuts off access to the Mushkoh Valley. On the Western side, the Mushkoh Valley empties itself through the Kaobal Gali and the Tillel Valley into Gurais, Spurs from this vantage-point Tiger Hill dominate the Mushkoh Valley.\textsuperscript{12}

Between April and June 1999, India and Pakistan almost plunged into another full-scale war along the Line of Control (LoC) in Kashmir. The conflict can be traced to the Pakistani attempt to infiltrate regular troops from the Northern Light Infantry and Kashmiri insurgents across a 150 Kilometre stretch
of the LoC at the three points in Batalik, Dras and Kargil in the spring of 1999. The intrusion proved to be a complete surprise for Indian military and intelligence officials, who had failed to anticipate a Pakistani military incursion across a most inhospitable terrain.\(^{13}\)

The central plan of Kargil strategy was to launch a big operation to strike at the Indian army's nerve-centre in the northern part of Kashmir. Again Pakistan thought of bringing back the Jammu and Kashmir issue as a centre of Indo-Pak tumultuous relations.

After the Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests of 1998, both countries had come under significant pressure from the United States and many of the other major powers to reduce bilateral tensions in South Asia. The pervasive belief in New Delhi and Islamabad that their overt acquisition of nuclear capabilities had significantly reduced the likelihood of war was not shared in other international capitals. In fact, a number of key American and other officials had underscored the increased risk of nuclear war in the region, given its conflict prone history.\(^{14}\)

It is impossible to adduce incontrovertible evidence that these pressures led Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and his Indian counterpart Atal Behari Vajpayee, to attempt the improvement in Indo-Pakistani relations that were seen in early 1999.\(^{15}\) However, it is not unreasonable infer that the widespread international condemnation of the Indian and Pakistani tests and the imposition of a raft of economic sanctions against both countries had induced the two leaders to initiate a dialogue on a series of outstanding issues.

In February 1999, Vajpayee with much fanfare had personally inaugurated a bus service between the border cities of Amritsar in India and Lahore in Pakistan. At the end of this bus trip, the two Prime Minister signed an agreement at Lahore, the capital of the Pakistani State of Punjab, reiterating the principles embodied in a number of previous agreements, including the Shimla Agreement of 1972. No doubt with a view toward addressing the professed concern of the great powers, most notably the United States, about the dangers of nuclear war in the region, the agreement also called upon the
two sides to take immediate steps for reducing the risk of accidental or unauthorised use of nuclear weapons and discuss concepts and doctrines with a view to elaborating measures for confidence building in the nuclear and conventional fields, aimed at prevention of conflict.\textsuperscript{16}

Indian officials had placed much hope in the Lahore process and genuinely believed that Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif was interested in ushering in a new era in Indo-Pakistani relations. They genuinely believed that it was in the mutual interest of both countries to work toward a pragmatic settlement of many outstanding disputes and felt that the moment was ripe to take steps toward those ends.

4.2.2 INTRUSION FROM PAKISTAN: A SHOCK TO PEACE PROCESS

Though Kargil stand-off had its genesis since the time of Zia-ul-Haq, but it got real momentum after Lahore Declaration (February 22, 1999).\textsuperscript{17} Despite the positive and cooperative sentiments expressed in the Lahore Agreement and in the weeks thereafter, the Pakistani military, with the acquiescence of Nawaz Sharif, planned a military operation in Kashmir designed to revive the Kashmir issue on the international agenda and possibly jump-start the flagging insurgency.\textsuperscript{18} Again, the all-too-familiar propensity of assuming eternal support without seeking proper confirmation characterised Pakistani decision-making.\textsuperscript{19}

A combination of Pakistani false optimism and Indian complacency contributed to the Kargil crisis of the summer of 1999. Pakistani decision-makers made a number of unwarranted assumptions about the likely response of the global community, particularly the United States, when they embarked on a bold manoeuvre to breach the LoC. They believed that even if they initiated a conflict along the LoC, it would be difficult for the great powers to accurately pin responsibility on Pakistan and, in any case, the United States would be loath to support the Indian position. The latter belief stemmed from
the Pakistani assessment of past American behaviour during Indo-Pakistani conflicts and tensions.

Indian obliviousness to the possibility of a Pakistani attempt to breach the LoC in the Kargil sector provided the requisite opportunity for Pakistan to undertake this enterprise. In fairness, this sector, according to military sources, is exceedingly difficult to adequately patrol because of the harsh and inhospitable terrain. Poor weather conditions also limit reconnaissance activities, and heavy snows, especially in the winter months, render movement exceedingly difficult, if not impossible.20

The events unfolded are as follows. On May 5, the Indian army’s 121st Brigade sent out a routine reconnaissance patrol in the Kaksar area along the LoC in Kashmir. The purpose of this patrol was to ascertain if the snows had melted sufficiently to enable the Indian forces to reoccupy the mountain redoubts that they normally abandoned in the winter months. The patrol was never heard from again. It was probably ambushed and all its members killed.

Shortly thereafter, as a consequence of the disappearance of the patrol, and increased reconnaissance, the Commanders of the 121st Brigade estimated that there were approximately 100 hostile intruders in the mountain peaks near Kargil. They also concluded that their Brigade had sufficient capabilities to dislodge the intruders. By May 15, their assessment of the strength of the intruders was dramatically revised upward, to some 800 intruders. The military authorities soon found that these groups had also breached the LoC in Mushkoh Valley, Kaksar and Batalik.21 Not until the last week of May did the Indian army realise that these hostile actors-regular Pakistani forces and Kashmiri insurgents-had occupied as many as 70 positions along the LoC. They now also came to the belated realisation that well over the initial estimate of 800 men were involved in this operation. Worse still, the intruders had occupied a number of strategic salient directly above the road from Kargil to Leh and were now in a position to cut off the northern portion of Kashmir from the rest of the State. Aerial surveillance revealed that the intruders were equipped with snowmobiles, artillery and substantial stocks of supplies.
The initial Indian reaction was clumsy due to a lack of good information about the intruder’s strength, disposition, and capabilities. Indian troops attempted to push their way up to heights of 16,000 ft and higher. But because of the lack of ground cover and the intruder’s command of the heights, the advancing Indian troops became easy targets for Pakistani snipers and gunners. After taking substantial casualties, the Indians realized that they would need considerably greater firepower to dislodge the Pakistani intruders.22

These incidents had an important fall out as in an important meeting between the Army Chief and the Prime Minister, it was decided that any necessary action has to be taken to evict the intruders. The military strategy was changed, as it was decided now to bring in the Indian Air Force to help out the Army in the common goal.

Accordingly, the Indian Air Force (IAF) carried out a first round of air strikes against the peaks on May 26.23 On May 27, the IAF launched a second round of air strikes with the objective of dislodging the intruders from Batalik, Turtuk and Dras. During the length of ‘Operation Vijay’ (literally, ‘operation victory’), as it was called, the IAF flew as many as 550 sorties. In conducting these air operations the IAF relied on Mirage-2000, MiG-21, MiG-23, and MiG-27 airplanes,24 of which it lost two: a MiG-21 and MiG-27.25 Indian authorities insisted that all air attacks were confined to areas that India deemed to be on its side of the LoC. Pakistani officials, however, claimed that the IAF planes had crossed the LoC and had struck targets within ‘Azad Kashmir’.26

On the same day May 27 the IAF also used MI-17 helicopter which was lost in the Kargil operation after a very successful attack on Tololing in the Dras sector. Intruders using a shoulder-fired surface to air stinger missile hit the chopper when it veered close to their hideout. MI-17 helicopters were not used in the war zone thereafter. Five air personnel died in this incident. These were to be the last losses suffered by the IAF, and has a spokesman said on May 28, “We have been operating in a very self-restrained manner and using air power in confined and difficult terrain”.27
The military engagement on land still continued with greater intensity. On May 26, an eighteen-man patrol from Grenadiers until ran into heavy concentration of infiltrators in the area of Tiger Hill. Suddenly, machine guns started firing from three sides. In this process of exchange of fire four Indian soldiers were killed. On May 29, a company led by Maj. Adhikari attempted an assault in the Tololing area. But they were stopped just 15 metres before their objective. The intruders rained fire on the attacking troops and pushed the company back 30 metres and even a little more backwards.

The decision to permit the use of air power marked a significant departure from past Indian attempts to deal with Pakistani incursions along the LoC. Indeed, not since the 1971 war had air power been used in support of military operations in Kashmir. The Indian forces resorted to the use of air power because they realised that it would be all but impossible to dislodge the intruders through the use of ground troops in frontal assaults, since crossing the LoC was rejected for political reasons.

The Government of India seeing that the contours of war is changing, decided to use another wing of its force i.e. Navy. Indian Navy employed its satellites, reconnaissance planes and other modes of intelligence gathering to monitor the movements of the Pakistan Navy. The Indian Navy came to know that Pakistani had alerted its Navy. Indian Navy was placed under high alert; it moved its Eastern fleet to join the Western Fleet in the Arabian Sea and deployed its maritime surveillance capabilities. These naval maneuvers ensured that the Indian Navy quickly took a forward position, thus denying Pakistan the initiative. Even the Navy had to take its position in order to improvise and use its ground based assets such as the Jaguar fighter-bombers.

Pakistan was surprised by Indian Navy’s deterrent deployment, which was given code name (Operation Talwar) that bottled up the Pakistani fleet in Karachi. This objective was mainly achieved by showing a massive build-up in the Arabian Sea. The navy was thus ready to impose a naval blockage of Pakistan’s coastline in the event of war.
Logistical, organisational and topographic limitations significantly hobbled Indian military operations. In the initial stages of the conflict, troops deployed in counter-insurgency operations in Kashmir were hastily moved to significantly higher altitudes, thereby seriously endangering their health. Furthermore, this drawing-down of troops engaged in counter-insurgency operations left other parts of the State vulnerable to terrorist actions. Finally, the terrain along the LoC greatly favoured the Pakistani forces. Nevertheless, by early June, the Indian army had made dogged progress and had managed to recapture some 21 positions. In launching their assaults, the Indian army brought in its Bofors howitzers and also relied on IAF sorties to soften up targets. These gains were made at considerable cost, as the Indian soldiers had to assault bunkers and redoubts at considerable heights while facing punishing fire from well-entrenched, fortified positions above them.

Though Operation Vijay was eventually successful, it proved to be extraordinarily costly in both human and material terms. While these operations proceeded, Indian decision-makers took considerable comfort from the fact that few, if any, States were supporting the Pakistani position. Most significantly, perhaps, the United States showed little inclination to support a Pakistani effort to bring the issue before the United Nations Security Council. Indian diplomacy moved into high gear as the Minister for External Affairs, Jashwant Singh, while preparing to leave for China, agreed to meet with his Pakistani counterpart, Sartaz Aziz, in New Delhi. Although he showed a willingness to entertain diplomatic solutions to the crisis, Prime Minister Vajpayee took a tough stance in a public speech, stating that his government would not rest until every intruder had been dislodged.

He also made clear that while India was prepared to hold talks with Pakistan, these discussions would be strictly confined to the resolution of the Kargil crisis. Eventually, New Delhi set a date for Sartaz Aziz’s visit (June 12) but insisted that the talks remain limited to Pakistan’s role in precipitating the Kargil problem.
The talks between Sartaz Aziz and Jashwant Singh proved infructuous. Aziz sought a ‘partial de-escalation’ in Kargil and made it contingent on an end to the Indian artillery barrages and air strikes. More to the point, he insisted that Pakistan had no control over the intruders. Singh, however, refused to accept any of Aziz’s formulations and insisted that the Pakistanis simply withdraw their troops.38

Only around June 14-16 did the Indian forces manage to retake key positions near Dras and Batalik. These two positions were deemed to be of considerable importance because they overlook the principal supply route for the Indian military to the Siachen Glacier, where India and Pakistan had been fighting a costly and stalemated battle since 1984.39 Around June 20, they managed to re-establish control over Batalik itself.40 Some several hundred Indian troops and officers perished in this battle and at least two IAF aircraft and one helicopter were shot down.

As the hostilities showed few signs of abating, in the last week of June Gen. Anthony Zinni, the Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Central Command visited Pakistan and pointedly told Prime Minister Sharif to call off his troops.41 In the aftermath of Zinni’s visit, Gordon Lanpher, a U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for South Asia, visited New Delhi to apprise his Indian counterparts of the substance of Gen. Zinni’s message to Islamabad and also to counsel restraint by the Indians. According to a well-known Indian journalist and commentator, Lanpher informed the Indians that Zinni had told the Pakistanis to start a prompt withdrawal of their forces from the Kargil region. More to the point, Zinni had reputedly refused to entertain Pakistani’s efforts to link the Kargil question with the broader Indo-Pakistani dispute over Kashmir.42

Despite Zinni’s warning, the conflict continued into early July. No doubt surprised by the intensity of the Indian attacks and the inability to persuade the United States and other powers to back Pakistan, Sharif visited Washington, DC, on July 4 in search of a face saving device.43 Much to Sharif’s surprise, President-Bill Clinton was unwilling to accept Pakistan’s claim that India was
responsible for provoking the crisis. By not accepting the Pakistani version of the origins of the Kargil crisis, the United States helped hasten its end. Unlike in the past, the United States also refused to mediate between the two parties.

Although Sharif’s visit to Washington underscored his realisation of the scope of his misadventure, various Kashmiri groups who were participating in the Pakistani effort in Kargil showed little inclination to bring their fighting to a close. One of the principal leaders involved in the insurgency, Syed Salahuddin, the head of the United Jihad Council, proclaimed that Sharif’s willingness to withdraw his troops was ‘tantamount to stabbing the movement in the back’.

The U.S. unwillingness to mediate stood in marked contrast to the Clinton administration’s propensity to intervene in a variety of regional disputes. Two factors explain in large part the American unwillingness to invest time and resources in mediating an end to this conflict. At one level, even in the post-cold war era, South Asia has remained a fairly low priority for most American administrations. At another level, although keen on preventing a full-scale conflagration in South Asia, the United States did not have any vital interests implicated in the region. Consequently, it remained loath to step into a region riven by a long-standing dispute with little or no prospect of easy or quick resolution.

As Sharif sought American intercession to find a face-saving way out of the imbroglio, India maintained its military pressure. These efforts started to meet with success by the first week of July, when the Indians recaptured yet another strategic peak, Tiger Hill. By the second week of July, the Pakistani forces were facing relentless artillery barrages and air attacks from the Indian military. A more sympathetic American response to Sharif might have emboldened him to allow the Pakistani military to persist with their plans. However, in the face of escalating losses and a paucity of international diplomatic support, Sharif was forced to reconsider the value of continuing military operations. By June 9, Pakistan had offered to send a special envoy to New Delhi to discuss de-escalation. Veteran diplomat Niaz Naik went to
New Delhi to meet the Principal Secretary to the Prime Minister (and national Security Adviser), Brajesh Mishra, to find ways to withdraw Pakistani forces from Kargil. Initially, India expressed little interest in talks but later agreed.

On July 12, following his visit to Washington DC, Sharif gave a nationwide television address in which he called for the withdrawal of the mujahideen from the mountain redoubts. It should be noted that Sharif carefully avoided making a public statement about altering any deployments of the Pakistani army. In effect, he was trying to maintain the fiction that the mujahideen had scaled these heights and seized the redoubts of their own accord. (Only in late July did Pakistani sources start admitting that their military forces had been deeply involved in the Kargil conflict). By July 14, the first set of infiltrators started to withdraw from their positions, ceding them to the advancing Indian forces. It was only toward the end of the month, however, that the conflict finally came to a close.

As mentioned earlier, the Pakistani infiltration had in part been designed to jump-start the flagging insurgency in Kashmir. On this score the Pakistanis saw a partial success. With the withdrawal of Pakistani forces from Kargil, the insurgency within the State of Kashmir continued unabated. On July 19 insurgents struck at the village of Lihota, in the Doda District of Jammu, killing fifteen civilians. In another attack, five other villagers lost their lives.

In India, which was in the midst of a national election campaign, the Pakistani climb-down was played up as a major military success. It remains an open question whether or not the Indian victory in Kashmir shaped the electoral outcome. The failure to anticipate and respond suitably to the Pakistani incursions, however, did lead to some self-assessment on the part of the Indian leadership.

And even as the government began its self-examination and sought to pinpoint the sources of the incursion, Indian defence planners started to draw up plans to prevent a future incursion. Among other measures, the Indian army planned to set up permanent posts every 200 yards along the LoC. It also decided to build all-weather bunkers at high altitudes, to enhance long-range
patrols, and to purchase a variety of sophisticated equipment needed for mountain warfare, including direction-finding equipment, snow clothing and goggles, snowmobiles, and heating equipment.58

The Defence Minister Mr. George Fernandes, in his written reply to a question in Lok Sabha, Stated that the Indian Forces suffered the following casualties during ‘Operation Vijay’. This table shows the Indian casualties under different headings.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indian Casualties 59</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Killed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Wounded</td>
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<tr>
<td>3. Missing</td>
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<table>
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<th>Air Force</th>
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<tr>
<td>5</td>
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|                     |
| 1. Army Killed      | 733 |
| 2. Officers         | 71  |
| 3. Special Services Group (SSG) | 68  |
| 4. ISI              | 13  |

It is not only that Indian soldiers were killed in Kargil war, but there was also Pakistani casualties. There were various estimates of Pakistani Army casualties, based on published material in Pakistan and from Indian calculation also.60

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pakistani casualties from Indian calculation</th>
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<tr>
<td>1. Army Killed</td>
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<td>2. Officers</td>
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<td>3. Special Services Group (SSG)</td>
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<td>4. ISI</td>
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</tbody>
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It is estimated that cost of war for India has skyrocketed upto Rs. 15 crore per day.61 It cost more than 8,000 crore for India to make Pakistan understand that it meant business. Reverse mobilisation of the troops back to the barracks cost Rs. 3,000 crore. Nearly the entire border and areas around the Line of Control (LoC) were mined. It cost the government Rs. 850 crore in giving compensation to civilians for any physical disability during the mobilisation period.62

A review of the total cost incurred during the Kargil conflict gives one a full picture of costs and expenditure. The government claimed that the 74-day
‘Operation Vijay’ total cost was Rs. 1,894 crore. The total number of shells used for firing was 2.5 lakh and the total expense for it was Rs. 1000 crore. The defence spending exceeded allocations by Rs. 2,409 crore in 1999-2000. The bill for supplies bought from ordinance factories has risen from Rs. 3,876 crore in 2000-01 to Rs. 5,972 crore in 2001-02. A leading Indian weekly India Today has observed.

The effect of Kargil on defence spending has been significant capital expenditure increased from Rs. 12,631 crore in 1999-2000 to Rs. 43,589 crore in 2002. “In the past three years, the government poured in Rs. 1,11,461 crore in the defence budget Rs. 79,725 crore as revenue expenditure and Rs. 31,736 for new technology armaments and replenishment”. The following graph shows how India had spent on defence.

4.3 POST KARGIL WAR DEVELOPMENT IN INDO-PAK RELATIONS

4.3.1 MILITARY COUP OVERTHIRED THE REGIME OF NAWAZ SHARIF IN PAKISTAN

After the Kargil war, the relationship between India and Pakistan settled back into a pattern of mutual recrimination. Outside pressure on the two to resolve their differences over Kashmir continued; some external powers particularly the United States, argued that the Kargil war had demonstrated that the nuclearisation of the sub-continent had not in fact reduced the likelihood of war. Before relations could be repaired following Kargil, however, a military coup overthrew the regime of Nawaz Sharif in Pakistan. Pakistan thus, once again came under army rule in October 1999. Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif sacked the Chief of Army Staff, General Pervez Musharraf, when he was away to Sri Lanka, on 12 October 1999. The army immediately revolted in support of its chief. The General returned to Pakistan in the evening, and announced dismissal of Nawaz Sharif and his government. Sharif was put under house arrest, television stations and airports brought under army control. General Musharraf was in control of the situation. He declared himself to be the Chief Executive of Pakistan. This fourth coup in Pakistan was the outcome of ongoing tussle between armed forces and the Nawaz Sharif Government. This, yet another failure of democracy in Pakistan was a matter of serious concern for India. Even the United States expressed unease at the coup. The U.S. had, reportedly warned the Sharif Government of likely civil-military confrontation and of a possible coup.

In the background of Kargil conflict, India had to prepare itself to face any consequences of developments in Pakistan. It was felt by Asia experts in Britain that Pakistani army knew that it was inferior to Indian armed forces in every respect. Therefore, it was not likely to undertake another misadventure against India. But, India’s foreign policy-makers had to constantly keep a watch on Pakistan’s future defence and foreign policy initiatives and changes. The only disturbing factor for India would be a nuclear Pakistan without a civil
government to ensure that the button was not pressed. Meanwhile, immediately after Pakistani coup Indian armed forces were put on full alert. But, Pakistan-sponsored militancy was intensified.68

The military coup contributed to Pakistan’s further isolation in the global community, as the United States imposed additional sanctions against the military regime. The international community’s disapprobation of Pakistan accused to India’s benefit. When U.S. President Bill Clinton visited the sub-continent in March 2000, he spent several days in India but made only a cursory stop of a few hours at the airfield in Islamabad-a pointed rebuke to the military regime. Nevertheless, in the first year after the Pakistani coup, bilateral relations slowly deteriorated. Two events held the potential to change the status quo: the opening of bilateral talks in Agra in July 2001, and the sudden reinvigoration of U.S. interest in sub-continental politics following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon, and the ensuing war to oust the Taliban in Afghanistan.69

4.3.2 AGRA SUMMIT

Both Indian Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee and Pakistan President Pervez Musharraf understood that the Kashmir dispute severely restricted their national goals, yet neither leader could, even if they wanted to, offer substantial concessions to the other side. That was the reality between the two countries. Capitalising on the surge in goodwill, the Indian Government decided to try to make progress in its own conundrum in Jammu and Kashmir. On November 19, 2000, at the start of the Muslim holy month of Ramadan, the government of Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee declared a unilateral cease-fire in the State. Initially, the cease-fire was to last until the end of Ramadan, but it was subsequently extended to cover the succeeding seven months. Yet despite this long cease-fire, the levels of violence in Kashmir showed few, if any, signs of ebbing. Vajpayee came under increasing pressure from all domestic quarters-popular, political, and institutional-to terminate the cease-fire.70
Indeed, the cease-fire was earning the government no dividends. Particular insurgent groups, most notably the Lashkar-e-Toiba and the Hizb-ul-Mujahideen, had simply disregarded its. Despite the restraint of the army and the paramilitary forces, the insurgents continued their random attacks on both military and civilian targets in the valley. The Vajpayee regime had also seen its efforts to engage the All Parties Hurriyat Conference (APHC) falter despite the appointment of a veteran politician, K.C. Pant, as an interlocutor. Politically, too, the cease-fire was exacting a significant toll, as more conservative elements within Vajpayee’s party and its ancillary organisations argued that the insurgents had construed the cease-fire as a form of weakness. Finally, pressures against this one-sided cease-fire were building within the armed forces. Thus, the cease-fire was called off on May 23, 2001. Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee on 24 May 2001 extended, an invitation to Gen. Pervez Musharraf, the Chief Executive of Pakistan (soon to declare himself President), to visit India to discuss possible means to improve bilateral relations. In his letter of invitation Prime Minister wrote: “India has, through dialogue, consistently endeavoured to build a relationship of durable peace, stability and cooperative friendship with Pakistan. Our common enemy is poverty. For the welfare of our people, there is no other recourse but a pursuit of the path of reconciliation, of engaging in productive dialogue and by building trust and confidence. I invite you to walk this high road with us”. Prime Minister also reiterated India’s desire to pick up the threads of Lahore and resume of Composite Dialogue. Musharraf readily accepted Vajpayee’s invitation, and a Summit was planned for July 14-16 in the northern Indian city of Agra, the home of the famed Taj Mahal.

In this regard Musharraf’s Statement made on June 25, 2001 is worth mentioning he said, “South Asia must come out of the pit of poverty and learn to live in peace and harmony. It is in this spirit that I have accepted the invitation of the Indian Prime Minister”. India’s initiative to resume dialogue with Pakistan, at the highest level, was consistent with our traditional approach towards Pakistan, based on the
Shimla Agreement and the Lahore Declaration, which commits both countries to pursue good neighbourly relations through dialogue and reconciliation. It is not surprising that the initiative was widely acclaimed, both nationally and internationally, as an act of great Statesmanship on the part of the Indian Prime Minister.74

President Musharraf, accompanied by his wife, Begum Musharraf, arrived in New Delhi on 14 July. He called on the President, who hosted a State banquet in his honour. The Vice President, Home Minister, the Minister of External Affairs, and the leader of the Opposition in the Lok Sabha called on him.75

When Musharraf arrived in Agra, popular and elite expectations on both sides of the border about the Summit were low. Prior to the Summit, Musharraf and his principal foreign policy advisers had made it clear that Kashmir would be the ‘core issue’ that they wanted to discuss at the Summit and demanded that the All Party Hurriyat Conference be made a party to the bilateral talks.76 Most of Pakistan’s attentive public, however, had made it clear that they would not accept the transformation of the Line of Control into an international border.77 On the other hand, Vajpayee and his political allies had insisted that they wanted the Summit to focus on Pakistani support for the Kashmiri terrorism. Additionally, they wanted to deal with bilateral issues such as to stop narcotics trafficking, and give up its claim to the disputes over Sir Creek and the Wular Barrage.78 Key individuals within Vajpayee’s party who advocated a tougher stance vis-a-vis Pakistan had publicly ruled out any territorial compromise on the Kashmir question.79 Additionally, a senior Indian army officer in charge of a critical command had publicly commented that the army was opposed to any troop withdrawal from the Siachen Glacier.80 Indian unwillingness to withdraw forces from the Siachen Glacier too upset the plans of Pakistan. Finally, and much to Pakistan’s Chagrin, New Delhi had made known that the APHC would not be a party to the bilateral talks.81 Consequently, there was a clear-cut divergence between the two sides on the agenda for the Summit.
As could be expected, the political atmosphere immediately prior to the formal meetings in Agra was decidedly mixed. The Indian side was unhappy with Musharraf’s decision to invite an APHC delegation to a pre-Summit reception hosted by the Pakistani High Commissioner in New Delhi. And during a dinner speech at Rashtrapati Bhavan, hosted by the President of India, K.R. Narayanan, Musharraf stated that the Kashmir dispute could not be militarily resolved.  

Despite these initial knots, an atmosphere of cordiality and civility seemed to prevail in the first formal meeting of the Agra Summit: the official Indian statement held that the talks had been ‘very frank, cordial, and constructive’. However, matters quickly started to go wrong. The first evening, for reasons that remain the subject of speculation, acrimony, and debate, the Indian Minister of Information and Broadcasting, Sushma Swaraj, held a press briefing for Doordarshan (India’s State-run television network), during which she summarised the issues that had been discussed at the talks. In her account she included such matters as India’s misgivings about ‘cross-border terrorism’, a full accounting of Indian prisoners of war held in Pakistan, and the need to initiate discussions on reducing nuclear tensions on the sub-continent. Missing in her remarks was any mention of the critical Kashmir issue. Whether her failure to mention the Kashmir issue was deliberate or inadvertent, the Pakistani side promptly took exception to it. Later that evening, following her press briefing, the Pakistani delegation issued a statement indicating that Vajpayee and Musharraf had spent most of their one-to-one meeting discussing Kashmir. Prime Minister focused on terrorism being promoted in the State of Jammu and Kashmir, and conveyed in clear terms that India had the resolve, strength and stamina to counter terrorism and violence until it is decisively crushed.

The second day of the Summit, July 16, started inauspiciously, as Musharraf chose to hold a breakfast press conference for Indian newspaper editors. To the surprise of this assemblage, the entire proceedings were broadcast live by a satellite news network. In this briefing Musharraf took an
especially tough line on the Kashmir issue and also made some intemperate remarks about ongoing violence in Kashmir. In the light of this statement and the remarks of the night before, the afternoon talks quickly unraveled. The two sides failed to agree even on the language for a joint communique, despite apparently valiant efforts on the part of the negotiators received little satisfaction from the Pakistanis on the question of their assistance to the Kashmiri insurgents, while the Indians themselves simultaneously refused to concede that Jammu and Kashmir constituted a ‘dispute’.

Later that evening, following a visit with Vajpayee, Musharraf called for another press conference. His request was, however, turned down on the grounds that adequate security precautions could not be taken in the time available. Following this refusal the Pakistani delegation left for Islamabad.

Pervez Musharraf departed grim faced at midnight on the 16 July 2001. He was deprived even of the spiritual succour by not being able to visit the shrines of the Chisti saints at Delhi and Ajmer. India’s official spokesman Niroopama Rao expressed disappointment at joint declaration not being made. Two things became clear at the midnight of 16 July. The first that the high expectations built up between the 14 July and 16 July afternoon among people of both Pakistan and India were abruptly shattered. Second that the fundamental differences between India and Pakistan on the core issues of cross-border terrorism and Kashmir instead of being resolved at the high level Vajpayee-Musharraf interaction were only re-affirmed by the two leaders. Foreign Ministers Jashwant Singh and Abdus Sattar at their press conferences on July 17 asserted that the Summit though not leading to any definite forward looking conclusions, was not a failure. It, according to them, marked the beginning of a process of re-engagement and dialogue between the two countries. Public perceptions, however, maintained that the Summit ended in a break down.

In the aftermath of the Summit, the BJP-led government came under considerable criticism both from the opposition in parliament and from within its own ranks. Some hard-line members of the BJP aimed their ire at Foreign

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Minister Jashwant Singh, in particular, while exonerating Vajpayee. Jashwant Singh, defending the government's decision to hold talks with Pakistan, contending that, contrary to the opposition's claims, the Indian side had made adequate preparations in fact had had an eight-point agenda.

The mood in Pakistan was much more upbeat. Musharraf largely and successfully blamed the failure of the Summit on the putative choices of Indian hard-liners. Some commentators attributed the perceived intransigence of certain members of Vajpayee's Cabinet to the upcoming State-level elections in Uttar Pradesh. Also, not surprisingly, Pakistani analysts arrived at a markedly different assessment of Musharraf's remarks and performance at the breakfast conference in Agra. Unlike the largely acerbic Indian assessment, in Pakistan his remarks and his manner were interpreted in a mostly positive light.

After all, what could be expected of Musharraf who openly though sarcastically had said while at Agra that he had better purchase his ancestral property and live safely in his native land than return to Pakistan setting all disputes with India? Once the disputes with India were settled, he knew, he would leave to face more serious domestic problems of Pakistan which the General would not be able to solve. Therefore, he too like his predecessors felt it convenient to continue playing the Kashmir card. But to Musharraf his India visit proved a personal success. His aggressive postures in his meetings with Indian editors sent his popularity graph soaring in Pakistan where the major parties like Pakistan People's Party and Pakistan Muslim League were opposed to his military dictatorship. And the Pakistani delegation left for Islamabad blaming the hardliners in the Bhartiya Janta Party for the failure of the Summit.

Against the backdrop of markedly divergent assessments of the Summit, the two sides agreed to hold ministerial-level and foreign secretary-level talks. The failure of the Agra Summit, however, had significantly undermined any constituency in India in support of talks with Pakistan. Soon after the Agra Summit, Pakistan extended formal invitations to Prime Minister and External Affairs Minister to visit Pakistan. However, a series of terrorist attacks in
Jammu and Kashmir including the massacre of Hindu pilgrims on 3 August and the attack on the Jammu Railway Station on 7 August, served to underscore the fact that though Pakistan professed a desire for dialogue in public, it was continuing to sponsor cross-border terrorism in India. It was thus obvious that Pakistan was unwilling to give up its strategy of confrontation, violence and deception, while dialing with India.

4.3.3 ATTACK ON WORLD TRADE CENTRE (WTC) AND REACTIONS BY INDIA AND PAKISTAN

Some desultory discussions in India proposed that Vajpayee meet with Musharraf at the United Nations General Assembly session in September 2001 to try to rejuvenate the peace process. The event of 11 September 2001, however, not only forced the postponement of the General Assembly but also transformed the terms of discussion between the two sides. On 11 September 2001, the United States became the victim of a set of well-planned and highly coordinated terrorist attacks. The perpetrators of the terror, who had hijacked four commercial airliners, managed to strike three out of four intended targets—the two towers of the World Trade Centre in New York city and the Pentagon just outside Washington, DC-Killing several thousand people, wreaking untold physical and economic damage on the United States and the world economic, and fundamentally transformed the international order. The attacks, without a doubt, had significant and far-reaching consequences for American national security and foreign policies, including those directed at South Asia. They were also likely to transform the dynamics of regional security in South Asia, although their full consequences in that area might not emerge for years. The immediate consequences of the attacks, however, particularly for Pakistan and Afghanistan, were clear and profound. The attacks also subdued the nascent efforts of the new administration of President George W. Bush to improve relations with India.

Prior to September 11, Pakistan had been consigned to the status of a virtual pariah State in the international system and especially in the U.S.
foreign policy calculus. Pakistan’s decision to test nuclear weapons in the aftermath of the Indian nuclear tests of May 1998, its disastrous violation of the Line of Control in Kargil in April 1999, and General Musharraf’s military coup had reaped only international disapprobation and brought on an increasing isolation from the world.¹⁰⁰ That downhill spiral, combined with India’s seemingly rising star, seemed to signal the start of a bleak period in Pakistani foreign relations.

But the exigencies of the prosecution of the anti-Taliban war in Afghanistan and the urgency of the hunt for terrorist mastermind Osama bin Laden instantly turned this trend around, as Pakistan became a ‘valued ally’ in the U.S. fight against terrorism. Two factors contributed to Pakistan’s renewed significance in U.S. eyes. American authorities asserted that bin Laden and his Al-Qaeda organisation were closely involved in the September 11 terrorist attacks. Bin Laden and his Al-Qaeda commanders had taken refuge in Afghanistan in 1996 after having been ousted from their previous base in Sudan.¹⁰¹ Pakistan’s shared border with Afghanistan and its extensive links with the Taliban regime made it necessary for the United States to renew and strengthen its diplomatic and military relationship with Islamabad.¹⁰² Any air sorties flown over Afghanistan from aircrafts carriers or from the U.S. airbase at Diego Gracia in the Indian Ocean would have to overfly Pakistani territory and therefore required Pakistani support.

Unlike during most of the cold war and after, when most Indian reactions to U.S. diplomatic difficulties and security threats had been equivocal at best, the attacks on the World Trade Centre produced in India a chorus of support for the United States. Indian officials, while lamenting the American failure to adopt a more forthright stance on Indian’s problems with terror, nevertheless, offered to cooperate with the United States to address the new threats.¹⁰³ Some Indian commentators called for strong and unequivocal support for the U.S. position.¹⁰⁴ But Indian support was not crucial for the conduct of the war, whereas Pakistan’s was. Furthermore, despite India’s expressions of solidarity with the United States and the U.S. war effort,
Washington could not forthrightly link the September 11 attacks to India’s concerns about terror in Kashmir emanating from Pakistan for fear of alienating a State that it urgently needed to prosecute the war effort. Thus, in the immediate aftermath of the September 11 attacks, no surge in Indo-U.S. relations was evident.

Pakistani support for the American war effort, however, was at best equivocal-General Musharraf’s personal pledge notwithstanding. Many groups and individuals within Pakistan did not support Musharraf’s decision to cast his country’s lot with the United States. The specific groups opposed to Pakistan’s support for the prosecution of a war against Al-Qaeda and Bin Laden were entirely predictable: among them were the Islamic political wing parties Jamat-i-Islami and Jamiat-ul-Ulema-e-Islam. Additionally, key members of the ISI actively worked to undermine the attempts at cooperation with the United States. Even some scientists connected with Pakistan’s nuclear weapons programme appeared to harbour pro-Taliban sympathies.

Musharraf’s decision to aid the United States, public Statements aside, stemmed less from his sympathy for the American cause and more from the exigencies confronting his beleaguered regime. Pakistan’s foreign debt at the time the crisis ensued stood at $38 billion, and the country’s ability to meet upcoming payments was in considerable doubt. Furthermore, despite his having donned civilian garb after declaring himself President in July 2001, Musharraf had not succeeded in bolstering his regime’s domestic or international legitimacy. No act of moral courage or altruism, casting his lot with the United States and the rest of the civilised world made virtue out of dire necessity. Musharraf also correctly calculated that if Pakistan did not cooperate with United States, at the very least the Vajpayee administration in New Delhi, which had been steadily improving its ties with the United States, would seek to marginalise Pakistan; at worst, Pakistan itself could be targeted because of its support for the Taliban. There was also every possibility of Pakistan becoming vilified for its supporting and sponsoring terrorism in Kashmir, which had so far received America’s silent approval. Having found itself
trapped between the devil and deep sea, Pakistan masqueraded as the strong U.S. ally in fighting the terrorists and at the same time lending secret help to Osama Bin Laden's network in his jehad against America. It may be surprising to know that America's most important ally in the sub-continent was sabotaging its war efforts. Evidence was not in wanting to prove that Pakistan was passing on crucial intelligence to its Taliban allies in Afghanistan. More than 7000 Pakistani 'tribesmen' equipped with automatic weapons, rocket launchers, and shoulder fired missiles had made their way to Afghanistan to fight alongside the Taliban. This was an exact repetition of what Pakistan did in Kargil in 1999 in its attempt to wrest Kashmir by force. This led to the ground troops from the U.S. and the Northern Alliance to face thousands of heavily armed 'tribesmen', trained and equipped by Pakistan, carrying mostly U.S. made weapons.\(^{111}\)

During the Afghan war U.S., like its Afghan war ally, has followed its usual double-dealing in its relations with India though the Bush administration tried its best to assuage India's suspicions about its renewal of the military and economic tie-up with Pakistan. While the U.S. Secretary of State Gen. Collin Powell highlighted Kashmir as central to the relations between India and Pakistan, later Donald Rumsfeld assured India that U.S. policy towards Pakistan would not be allowed to overlook the best interests of India.\(^{112}\) However the U.S. attitude towards India remained unchanged. Even after Taliban was weakened considerably and the U.S. war efforts ended, India's problems remained as they were, especially with regard to the Kashmir question.

In fairness, Musharraf's decision to aid the global effort against the Taliban and Al-Qaeda was not free of risk. As noted already, he faced considerable domestic opposition to his decision. As a consequence, even after agreeing to support the prosecution of the war effort in Afghanistan, he repeatedly expressed reservations about a protracted war in Afghanistan, for he was acutely cognizant of the tenuousness of his own position within the Pakistani polity.\(^{113}\)
4.3.4 PRESENT PHASE OF INDO-PAK RELATIONS:
A CRUCIAL APPRAISAL

In fact, growing terrorism in Kashmir and other areas constituted the post-Agra message from Pakistan whose acts of hate and violence continued. The Indo-Pak equation has changed to such an extent in recent years that, apart from asking the familiar question whether Pakistan can still threaten India seriously, one also asks whether the chances of normal relations between the estranged neighbours have improved, and if they have, whether in due course can one expect long-term peace. This question has assumed added significance in view of Indian Prime Minister, Atal Behari Vajpayee’s latest offer of friendship to Pakistan and reciprocal gesture on the part of Pakistani leaders. India has announced resumption of air links with Pakistan and reposting of its High Commissioner in Islamabad, which was withdrawn in the wake of Pakistan-sponsored terrorist attack on Indian Parliament in December 2001. Though this underlines political message of hope, yet if both the neighbours do not seize the qualitative opportunity and take more salutary steps than before to de-escalate the abnormal tensions in their relations, the war cloud could gather once again.

As we approach the crossroad in India-Pakistan relations, the reasons behind India’s largest-ever military mobilisation need to be recalled. To put it briefly, the Indian Government’s decision that the December 13 attack was the last straw on the camel’s back was not surprising. For more than a decade New Delhi had just chosen to absorb the pain from Islamabad’s strategy of bleeding it through a thousand cuts. Convinced that India would not be able to retaliate it for supporting cross-border terrorism, Pakistan believed that it had a free hand in fermenting violence across the border in Jammu and Kashmir and take it to high value targets in rest of the nation as well.

More significantly, attack on Parliament came after Pakistan’s repeated betrayal of several peace initiatives by the Vajpayee administration. As against a widely held expectation about pursuit of an unduly tough line in dealing with Pakistan by the BJP-led government, it actually exhibited on the contrary a
remarkable willingness to travel away from the ‘beaten path’ to explore the possibility of bringing a measure of peace and civility in relations with Pakistan and within Jammu and Kashmir. This is evident from the fact that despite Pakistan’s rebuffing of Prime Minister, Atal Behari Vajpayee’s Lahore peace initiative through Kargil perfidy in 1999, he took yet another bold peace initiative by implementing a unilateral cease-fire in Kashmir in the Islamic holy month of 


As India could not forever continue to absorb the pains of this support to the so called ‘freedom struggle’, which is nothing but an euphemism for Pakistan’s encouragement and abetment to terrorist violence in Kashmir, the attack on the Parliament house obliged India into confronting the source of the threat once and for all. Accordingly, New Delhi mobilised its troops on the India-Pakistan borders to demonstrate its resolve to fight the war against terrorism at all cost. Being a mature and responsible nation having understanding of the implications of a war between two nuclear armed neighbours and its international ramifications, New Delhi, however, and rightly decided to give diplomacy one more chance even while preparing for exercise of the last option, i.e., war.118 That is why, even while readying its defence forces for military action after the attack on Parliament, New Delhi did give priority to diplomatic offensive including recalling of its High Commissioner from Islamabad, slicing down the presence of Pakistani staff in its High Commission in New Delhi, terminating the New Delhi-Lahore bus service as well the Samjhauta Express, withdrawing permission to Pakistan to fly its aircraft through the Indian sky, and demanding the extradition of 20 persons accused of committing various terrorist acts in India. New Delhi also demanded from Pakistan an effective action against Pakistan based terrorist group such as Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT) and Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM).
As the Vajpayee Government did not expect any voluntary action on the part of Pakistan, it banked on the moral indignation of the international community, apart from mobilising its military forces. It made intensive consultation with leaders of important countries such as the U.S., Britain, Russia, Japan and China etc.\textsuperscript{119} This three-pronged Indian strategy—military build up, mobilising international pressure, and mounting bilateral pressure on Pakistan produced certain results. These moves not only obliged the Pakistan President Pervez Musharraf, to condemn religious extremism in his open address to his country on 12 January 2002, but also to ban certain terrorist outfits including LeT and JeM. Besides, he arrested hundreds of terrorists and detained their kingpin Maulana Masood Azhar, though as a balancing exercise he refused to handover any Pakistani national demanded by India and declared the Kashmir issue as forming the blood stream of every Pakistani.\textsuperscript{120}

But it soon became apparent that the Pakistani President was either unwilling or incapable or both to control the extremist forces radiating out of Pakistani soil against India. The Musharraf regime’s decision to soon free the detained extremists on the ground that no charges could be sustained against them was indicative of this reality. This emboldened the terrorist groups to first attack the Raghunath temple in Jammu and then to commit the gruesome massacre of Indians including 22 army personnel at Kaluchak in Jammu on May 14; and to kill a moderate and peace-inclined Kashmiri leader, Abdul Gani Lone in the same month of 2002. Islamabad on its part conducted a series of missile tests and reportedly shifted some of its forces deployed along Pakistan-Afghanistan borders to the eastern side bordering India to deter the Indian forces and warn the international community about implications of any Indian move to attack the terrorist camps operating within Pakistan. The Pakistani forces also resorted to heavy shelling across the Indian side of LoC forcing India forces to return the firing.\textsuperscript{121}

Besides, President Musharraf chose to address his country on May 27 in which he simply declined Pakistan’s involvement in cross border terrorism in India and appealed the global community to “ask India to move towards
normalisation of relations” with his country.\textsuperscript{122} This was quite contrary to his earlier address of January 12 assuring the world community to dismantle the terrorist networks active within Pakistan.\textsuperscript{123} Not surprisingly India described this statement as “mere verbal denial” about Pakistan’s “lethal export of terrorism”. The then Indian Foreign Minister, Jashwant Singh, described this statement as “both highly disappointing and dangerous”.\textsuperscript{124} The various spokesmen of the Indian Government, too, clearly declared, “India can not be penalised forever for its patience”.\textsuperscript{125} India’s expulsion of Pakistan’s High Commissioner in New Delhi, Ashraf Jehangir Qazi, reflected India’s cascading anger and a strong sense of frustration over Pakistan’s belligerent behaviour.\textsuperscript{126}

After the Kaluchak massacre, India and Pakistan were thus on the verge of fighting the fifth war with much more devastating potentials than the earlier ones. As indicated at the outset, while the Anglo-American pressures—beginning with South Asia trip of the British Foreign Secretary, Jack Straw, followed by visits to this region by U.S. Deputy Secretary of State, Recharl Armitage, and the U.S. Defence Secretary, Donald Rumsfeld, could defuse the escalating crisis and General Musharraf once again promised this time to the visiting U.S. Defence Secretary that he would permanently dismantle the infrastructure of terrorist network in Pakistan, but Islamabad had not implemented its commitment.\textsuperscript{127}

This is evident from continued terrorist violence in India including the attack on Akshardham temple in Gujrat in August 2002, killings and intimidation to disrupt the Jammu and Kashmir Assembly election in September 2002, the massacre of Kashmiri Pundits at Nadimarg village in the troubled State in March 2003, and attack on Jammu and Kashmir Radio Station in April 2003. This showed that the fragile peace now obtaining in South Asia could get disturbed and Prime Minister Vajpayee’s third bold attempt to make peace with Pakistan after failure of his Lahore and Agra mission might fail again due to the Musharraf regime’s incapacity to control the influx of terrorists into the Indian side of LoC and their subsequent acts of violence. In the nine years that Pakistan had succeeded in artificially prolonging the
violence in Kashmir, more that 9,000 Kashmiri civilians lost their lives at the hands of their self-proclaimed liberators. Despite or perhaps because of this, as the MORI poll in April-May 2002 revealed, even fewer Kashmiris (6 percent) were prepared to contemplate their future as Pakistanis. The reign of the Bharatiya Janata Party too ended without having found a final solution to the Pakistan malady and its by product, the terrorist violence in Kashmir.

But Pakistan continued to masquerade as peacemaker on the one side while on the other went on sponsoring terrorist activities in Kashmir. One may recollect that the very day Gen. Musharraf expressed his desire to have lasting peace with India there were terrorist attacks on Indian establishment in Kashmir. To the press query about his meeting with India’s External Affairs Minister, Mr. Natwar Singh, Musharraf expressed his longing to see India-Pakistan peace process move on a smooth channel. Both, he said, “need to move on CBMs and the dialogue process in tandem with each other”. But the very same day the press reported on the sluggish progress of the Indo-Pakistan talks on the Siachen. The first discussion since 1999 on this area of conflict “remained deadlocked over the ‘authentication’ of maps showing the existing positions of Indian soldiers on the heights of the Salotor range and Pakistani soldiers at its base”. While the Indian side took the stand that an agreement on Siachen would take place only if both sides agreed to authenticate maps, which marked out the Indian positions on the Actual Ground Position Line (AGPL) Pakistan wanted to resolve it on the basis of the Shimla Agreement of 1972, implying that India had ‘violated’ the Shimla accord by occupying the Salotor in 1984. Simultaneous was the terrorist strike on the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) camp in the Rajbagh area of Srinagar killing nine personnel. Thus, from the very beginning the talk on Siachen appeared unlikely to bear any fruit. The Foreign Ministers level talks on Kashmir was again bound to collapse with Pakistan Foreign Minister, Khurshid Mahmud Kasuri making controversial statement on Kashmir which according to India’s External Affairs Ministry was “not in consonance with the spirit” with which it has conducted the dialogue so far. There was again attempt from the
Pakistani side to complicate the Kashmir issue further. Pervez Musharraf's urge for British mediation in the Kashmir question was not in line with the Shimla Agreement. He said, “I would love Britain to play a role as an intermediary in resolving the Kashmir dispute” and that the “British help behind the scenes will keep up the pressure”.134 Besides, the increasing America-Pakistan arms deal was bound to derail all attempts at solving the Kashmir dispute since it made Pakistan arrogant.135 India, raising concerns over the proposed U.S. arms supply to Pakistan told the United States in December 2004 that the nature of the arms sought to be supplied had little relevance to the war against terrorism.136 Attacking the move for U.S. arms supply to Pakistan, Indian defence officials said, “the Indo-Pak peace process has started gaining momentum and the cease-fire has been holding since November last year and induction of sophisticated weapons at this stage will start an arms race and disturb the dialogue”.137

Again there started the Bus-Diplomacy, which the Indian authorities thought would lead to better bilateral relations. By December 2004 Islamabad had agreed to start a bus service between Amritsar and Lahore. According to Pakistani Punjab’s Chief Minister, Parvez Elahi Pakistan Government agreed in principle for this bus service and he said, “it was your (India’s) turn to complete the rest of formalities”.138 There were moves to have Memorandum of Understandings (MoUs) signed between the agricultural universities of Faisalabad and Ludhiana to undertake research in agriculture, horticulture and agro-processing.139 Punjab Chief Minister Amrinder Singh mooted several schemes including the waiving of entertainment tax on Punjabi films made in Punjab especially in view of Elahi’s statement, “we have an age old common cultural heritage and civilisation and, therefore, it is our foremost duty to respect the sentiments of the Sikh community”.140

The year 2005, a landmark in Indo-Pakistan relations, proved eventful with the starting of Srinagar-Muzaffarabad bus service and the India’s visit of Pakistan President Pervez Musharraf, which happened almost simultaneously. The launch of the bus service from 7 April 2005, as agreed between India and
Pakistan during the visit of India’s External Affairs Minister to Pakistan in February 2005, was acclaimed by Pakistan as a “significant development and a confidence building measure”. “The decision to launch the bus service is a very good gesture which will revive links among the Kashmiris on both sides of the LoC”, Pakistan’s Foreign Ministry said in a press briefing. Both the nations as well as Kashmiris on either side of the Line of Control were jubilant over the bus service as they saw in it an unprecedented opportunity to solidify the bilateral relations and the people-to-people contact between Indians and Pakistanis. The Kashmiris celebrated the occasion ignoring all the terrorist threats since it would help them meet their long lost kith and kin from both sides of the LoC. Hopes ran high when the bus moved from Srinagar carrying the passengers despite the previous day’s terrorist attack on the hotel they were lodged in. It was a moment of emotional bursting for the passengers, mostly of the pre-partition days. India’s Prime Minister Dr. Manmohan Singh used the occasion to thank all those who made the new move a success. This, he said, “would not have been possible but for the cooperation of the Government of Pakistan and especially President Pervez Musharraf”. Mr. Singh hoped that this would lead to the settlement of many unsolved issues between the two notions, and he expressed his readiness to “hold the hand of Pakistan so that we could usher in peace and development for our people, especially in the State of Jammu and Kashmir”. He also took advantage of the occasion to announce several schemes for the all-round development of Kashmir including plans for employment generation, electrification of villages and incentives for industries. He declared the starting of the Urban Employment Scheme with Rs. 12 crore being set apart for it. Jammu and Kashmir Chief Minister, Mufti Mohammad Sayeed described it as “the road to peace in Jammu and Kashmir” which could not be cowed down by the militants’ threat. Things appeared to have improved though the terrorists still had their hideouts in the Valley. Commenting on the general situation in Kashmir born out of the newly started diplomacy and strict military vigilance India’s Chief of Army Staff, General J.J. Singh said, “there is smile on the face of the common man, they are
speaking out and there are visible signs of prosperity” and expressed the hope, “the region will soon become the centre of South-East-Asia”.

But, despite all the media hype of the bus launch as a “historic moment” and a great step among the latest Confidence Building Measures, some crucial issues remained unsolved. Because, this bus service did not evoke any warmth from Pakistan as it did in India. Indeed it was India alone that became over-jubilant over it. Comparing to the over-enthusiasm shown at the function arranged to celebrate the bus service, which was marked by the presence of India’s Prime Minister, Dr. Manmohan Singh and the Chairperson of India’s ruling United Progressive Alliance, Mrs. Sonia Gandhi and the carnival-like atmosphere it created in Srinagar, the arrival and departure of the bus was not a high profile affair in Muzaffarabad. Neither the Pakistan President, nor Prime Minister, nor even its Foreign Minister was present to flag off the bus. India achieved nothing diplomatically, politically, culturally or economically from this venture. Thinking it right, one can only say that it was one more addition to the bunch of follies India has been committing over the years in respect of Indo-Pakistan relations. Indeed in an adolescent joy, everyone seemed to have forgotten that as far as India was concerned Muzaffarabad formed a part of India under Pakistani occupation. Having made too much of the bus service, India was only strengthening the claim of Pakistan over ‘Pakistan Occupied Kashmir’. By describing the Srinagar-Muzaffarabad bus service as India-Pakistan bus service India was inadvertently affirming that Muzaffarabad as well as the entire PoK is Pakistani territory. One may hereafter naturally doubt India’s propriety in calling this area as ‘Pakistan Occupied’ any more. It would only strengthen the aggressor’s claim to a piece of territory it had unlawfully grabbed from India and continues to occupy. Besides, by allowing the passengers to come only on the strength of scant travel documents, India has made it easy for terrorists to cross over. There was no way of checking whether the passengers are bonafide citizens of PoK. Especially in a State where the control of the Government of India has often been in a paralyzed State, where almost all its administrators with their scant pro-Indian credence could only
remain mute spectators to the terrorists ruling the roost, all the rigours on the terrorists’ spree in crossing the LoC could only go loosened. These were facts, which the usual run of Indian political leadership found it difficult to digest.

Closely following the launch of the bus service was the visit of General Pervez Musharraf on 16 April 2005. In his first visit after the failure of the Agra Summit of 2001 India once again rose from her somber mood to welcome the General. “For India” as an expert on Indo-Pakistan relations commented, “the external environment has never been so good for pursuing a vigorous peace process with Pakistan”. True, Pakistan’s policy of patronising terrorism against India and its people had not been given up. However, it appeared that the over-all situations had much changed owing to many developments. Islamabad’s attempt to masquerade as the global level fighter on terrorism in the company of the U.S. government and simultaneously sponsoring terrorist activities in Kashmir had been successfully exposed by India soon after the attack on Parliament in December 2001. Besides, India’s status had steadily risen, especially in her relations with China and the US. The fact that China, which was an ally of Pakistan, changed her stand disheartened Pakistan very much. Her call to forge a CPC-BJP relation along with the government-to-government contact proved path breaking. By 2004 the BJP had gone from power, but as such the Indo-Chinese goodwill started during the rule of Vajpayee’s National Democratic Alliance did not die out. It may be noted that just days before Musharraf’s arrival in India there was signed the Indo-Chinese accord on some guiding principles to resolve the boundary dispute with China. This achieved considerable gains in bilateral trade and the promotion of strategic partnership with Beijing. The Washington visit of India’s External Affairs Minister in the third week of April 2005 with blueprints to create a new strategic partnership with the United States was certainly a new development. This visit, which Mr. Natwar Singh termed as constructive and positive received a warm welcome in Washington. It was indeed a great acceptance India got when the U.S. Secretary of States Ms. Condoleezza Rice acknowledged that, “… international organisations in
general will have to take into account India’s growing role in the world in order to be updated and to be effective”.

India was soaring high in U.S. opinion. “The message from Beijing and Washington” was thus “unlikely to be lost on General Pervez Musharraf.” Naturally India, as its Foreign Secretary Mr. Syam Saran said, looked forward to the friendly visit of the Pakistan President, which it hoped would be “constructive” with “forward-looking results”.

In a moment of high emotion Musharraf touched down at the Sanganer airport of Jaipur, Rajasthan’s capital city on his way to pay homage at the Mausoleum of the Sufi saint Khwaja Moinuddin Chisti. Describing his India visit as ‘historic’, he expressed his confidence that there were chances of optimism in boosting up the neighbourly relations, as there was a change in the environment, which had become more congenial and friendly than that-which had prevailed in Agra during his last visit. He said “We have come here with a massage of peace and unity ... we have prayed that in times to come, all differences between India and Pakistan are resolved and peace returned”.

The visiting delegation that accompanied the General who was in India to watch the final one-day cricket match between India and Pakistan at Ferozeshah Kotla on April 17 included Pakistan’s first lady, Begum Sheba Musharraf, the Information Minister, Sheik Rashid Ahmad, Foreign Minister, Khurshid Mehmud Kasuri, the Minister of State for Religious Affairs, Amir Liaqat Hussain, Minister of State for Education, Gulam Bibi Bharvana, Advisor to Prime Minister on Women’s Welfare, Nilofer Bhaktiar, the Foreign and Information Secretaries and other dignitaries.

The talks between General Musharraf and India’s Prime Minister Dr. Manmohan Singh were marked with all cordiality and friendship, which according to reports, sent a clear message across the world that the two nations born of the common tradition are out to cut the long drawn ice. Both the leaders agreed that their army had required acting in close cooperation so that differences over implementing Confidence Building Measures might well be addressed, especially in regard to Siachen issue and maritime boundary in Sir
Creek. Dr. Manmohan Singh and General Musharraf had a 40-minute one-to-one dialogue after a two-hour-long delegation level meet during which they came up with a broad vision to cooperate more effectively to promote cross border exchanges along the Line of Control as well. At the meeting held in Hyderabad House, Singh zeroed in on the responsibility of both the countries to project themselves as role models for the entire region in opening up trade routes and adding transport links that would expedite economic cooperation.\(^\text{153}\)

The discussions led to emergence of ideas regarding a range of possible steps desirable to improve bilateral amity. These included Kashmir centred CBMs leading to a more porous LoC like the suggestion of seven meeting points for the relatives, cross-LoC trade, increasing transport linkages and establishing more communication links, reviving the joint commission on trade and business and setting up a joint business council to improve contacts between private sectors on both sides, giving top priority to Iran-Pakistan-India gas pipeline proposal along with looking at other energy resources in the region, and developing appropriate transit facilities to improve trade relations with Central Asian and West Asian regions.\(^\text{154}\) Dr. Singh however reminded the Pakistan President that all steps could be expedited if only Pakistan would stick to and honour its commitment to curb terrorism and that it was the duty of both the countries to ensure that no terrorist elements thwart positive movements and ambience.

Friendship seemed at its emotional heights with the Pakistan President having met his Indian counterpart Dr. A.P.J. Abdul Kalam who waxed on the need of maintaining fraternal relation between the two countries. Dr. Kalam, India’s top philosopher scientist thus put it in his usually imaginative diction: “It is essential for India and Pakistan to place all their acts CBMs in one incubator or basket and then watch the eggs nurture in this basket of goodwill and also see that no one kicks it over”. He further adds, “We should harness or direct all our energy to nurture this goodwill and no third party should be allowed to enter and damage it”.\(^\text{155}\)
General Pervez Musharraf found this a good occasion to share pleasantries with L.K. Advani, Leader of Opposition in Lok Sabha. He presented the BJP leader with an album containing photographs from Advani’s school days till his last visit to Pakistan. Along with this, which Advani termed a “precious gift” Musharraf extended his nation’s invitation to India’s rightist Hindu wing leader to visit Pakistan. Advani accepted it and hinted at his probable visit likely to take place in June 2005 itself. Later, expressing satisfaction at the outcome of the talks between General Musharraf and Dr. Singh, Advani hoped that it would lead to “concrete measures”. To him it was a matter of gratification that “the whole process which was initiated by the previous National Democratic Alliance government and the joint statement in 2004 are moving forward”. He described the talk as another step in the fulfillment of the 2004 Islamabad agreement signed between General Musharraf and India’s former Prime Minister, Mr. A.B. Vajpayee wherein the former had agreed that, “he would not allow Pakistani soil to be used for anti-India terrorist activities”. “It is desirable that we should continue talks like this to resolve our mutual differences since one of the reasons for the growth of terrorism is the mutual mistrust between the two countries”. Advani said, appreciating the Singh-Musharraf meeting.156

Musharraf invited Mrs. Sonia Gandhi, the Chairperson of the ruling United Progressive Alliance, on a discussion. She accepted the invitation, and the meeting was marked with great fondness and enthusiasm. In his thirty-minute meeting with her he discussed various aspects of the bilateral relations.157

He also called on former Prime Minister, Atal Behari Vajpayee with whom he struck a personal rapport and developed a lot of respect despite the failure of the Agra Summit. Vajpayee was all admiration of the General who sought support for carrying forward the peace process and there were exchange of pleasantries and gifts.158

But as usual Kashmir continued to be a hard nut to crack. True, both General Musharraf and Dr. Singh agreed that there could not be any time
bound solution to Kashmir. But differences arose with the Pakistani leader having raised the possibility of including Kashmiris in the dialogue process and the Indian Prime Minister pointing out the Kashmir issue as one India was committed to address and that it did not take Kashmiri Muslim outfits into account. The Kashmiri Muslim separatist organisations have urged General Musharraf to include them in the ongoing talks relating to the Kashmir imbroglio. The meeting between President Musharraf and Kashmiri Muslim organisations held at Pakistan House on 17 April was attended by moderate Hurriat leader Mirwaiz Umar Sheik, hardliner Syed Ali Shah, Democratic Freedom Party Chief Shabir Shah, Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front’s Yaseen Malik and Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Forum Chief, Javeed Mir. “Any talk between India and Pakistan are incomplete without the involvement of the people of Jammu and Kashmir, who are a primary party to the dispute. So we asked General Musharraf to press India to include the true representatives of the people in the ongoing dialogue process”, said Mirwaiz Umar Farooq, the Hurriyat Chairman. They said that they had apprised the General of their views on the situation in Jammu and Kashmir. Mr. Syed Ali Shah Geelani in his 90-minute meeting with Musharraf told him that the current Confidence Building Measures were meaningless unless human rights violations and killings were stopped in Jammu and Kashmir. To bring about a “just and amicable” solution India should take some tangible steps in line with the spirit of the U.N. Security Council resolutions, he said. In a three-paged memorandum to Musharraf detailing the alleged killings and human rights violations in Jammu and Kashmir, Geelani demanded that India withdrew its military, central forces and released all “Freedom fighters” detained in jails. He unrolled before Musharraf the allegedly sad plight of the people of Jammu and Kashmir as if to some one in whom he saw the saviour expected to help the so-called “freedom fighter” to bail Kashmir out of the hell into which India had put it. Naturally this helped Musharraf to act in the best interest of Pakistan by using the Kashmiri separatist organisations as a cat’s paw in continuing his country’s proxy war with India. But for this, the government of India was to be
blamed since its having played into the hands of Pakistan by letting the ball of Kashmir issue rolled into the enemy’s court, because Kashmir issue, exclusively India’s national question, is something to be decided by India alone without allowing Pakistan to thrust its oars into it. Besides, a nation’s interference in the neighbouring country’s internal affairs is against all accepted canons of international relations. As Kashmir issue was India’s internal affair, India should not have approved of Musharraf’s talk with the Kashmir separatists, nor have given them permission to go to Pakistan with a memorandum of their grievances against Indian security forces. Indeed India should have ensured that the General behave as an honoured guest. She should not have helped him contribute to the worsening of Kashmir situation. By allowing Musharraf to do so India was committing another blunder. If Jawaharlal Nehru committed the blunder of taking the Kashmir issue to the United Nations what the then governments were doing was more foolish than what Nehru did. It is as if they were seeking the help of an alien and enemy nation and its virtual agents, the secessionist outfits of Kashmir to resolve the dispute. And the General returned making the Kashmir as well as all issues concerning Indo-Pakistan relations more messy than earlier. Consequently, the talks could only end in utter failure. Even the warmth and goodwill generated by India’s Leader of Opposition’s visit in June 2005 failed to ensure better relations with Pakistan. Advani’s assertion that Mohammad Ali Jinnah was highly secular though he happened to fall into the rut of communalism, and that he wanted the nation he fathered to follow the secular credentials, as could be expected, could not lead to any positive improvement in Indo-Pak relations. Indo-Pak relations are passing through critical stages which require concerted efforts by both the governments to change their mind set and political ideology against each other and to join hand in hand to extend all kinds of political, economic and social cooperation for each other and to face the challenges posed by developed countries. But presently the violation of cease-fire agreement of 2003 by Pakistan reflects that both the countries will take still many more years for building up their mutual understanding.
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