Chapter - II

India’s Foreign Policy in the Post-Cold War Era

India’s response to the post-Cold War developments should be examined in the context of India’s reaction to the disintegration of the Soviet Union. It may be recalled that the Soviet Union was one of the major powers with which India had close economic cultural and technological relations. After the conclusion of Treaty of Peace & Friendship in 1971, India had signed several defence deals with the Soviet Union which had been the largest arms exporter to India. India recognized the break-away states like Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan of the former Soviet Union without delay and tried to establish diplomatic contacts with Russia’s political leadership. India tried to forge with them the same level of close relationship which it had with the Soviet Union. In this effort it tried to take into account the new developments in international scenario. This type of realism between India and erstwhile Soviet Union states was not out of the international context.

The second issue which has lost its ideological appeal in the post Cold War era was the end of bipolar system. After the collapse of the Soviet Union US emerged as the sole global power, India’s response to it, both at international and regional levels, became more important. India’s reaction to Gulf crisis is the case where India took up non-political stand in the United Nations Security Council. It provided refueling facility to the US aircrafts in Mumbai. Even after the Gulf crisis, India’s position on West Asia remained in favour of the US in the UN Security Council. India’s drift in its US policy came when India agreed for joint naval exercise with it. This shift can be regarded as one where India was exposed to new technological development. The strains in Indo-US relations on the issues of
Super 301 and Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) are more out of policy disagreements rather than the simple issue of bilateralism.

The disappearance of power blocs in international relations has created serious problems for bloc states. The importance of Pakistan in the US strategy in comparison to India can only be seen in this perspective. Now with the non-existence of blocs, the security needs of various states can be sole objective of foreign policy requirements. The growing distance between the United States and Pakistan on several issues has proved that a new thinking has come up, where old oppositions have changed and a new look has to be given to various foreign policy needs. This requires more mature action from foreign policy makers, both in India and US.

India has shifted its stand on Israel during the last few years, having established full diplomatic relations with it. This change in India’s attitude can be seen more in the light of the developments in West Asian politics. In this region that various Arab States have come to terms with Israel. India’s own stand, therefore, has changed. This kind of maturity was needed in view of our foreign policy needs. India’s growing relationship with Israel will give India a new opening and certain technological advantages in bilateral relations. Before establishing diplomatic relations with Israel, India had taken sufficient diplomatic care with result that her move has not been misunderstood by her Arab friends. Reviewing the bilateral relations in the new international setting is a welcome sign.

India’s own needs have to be viewed in the light of new changes and their implications in the regional context. India’s own regional setting has to be defined in terms of realities in South Asia. This is the region which can be addressed as Indo-centric and India’s size constantly keeps the pressure on other states of South Asia. With changes taking place in international relations and external intervening factors in south Asia have been reduced, the Indian role assumes special significance. India’s response to the new situation has to be directed at two clear cut areas, namely, the
economic, where the regional cooperation and facilities for mutual trade have been on the increase and, secondly, the political, where differences are more serious. It is in this field that India faces major challenges in South Asia. The tense relations with Sri Lanka, Bangladesh and Nepal created complications. Indo-Pakistan relations in the post-Cold War period have remained tense and there is no letup in this tension. The ever growing anti-India and terrorist activities by Pakistan in Kashmir have increased the tension between the two countries and reduced the chances of mutual cooperation.

India’s attitude towards China during this phase has to be viewed with a certain amount of realism. China’s own international problems and its own requirements in international relations have demanded new openings. The search for new role in Third World countries has yielded ample opportunities to China to develop cooperative relationship with India in particular. Keeping this in mind, India and China began a dialogue on border issue. Increased mutual trade and contacts between the two powerful Asian states have commenced. However, the outstanding issues between India and China cannot be resolved easily, as India suffers from certain limitations.

Recently, economic grouping and economic diplomacy have been on the rise, India’s contribution in these groupings is significant. With the liberalization of Indian economy, the thrust for investment and trade is natural. The emergence of South-South cooperation, integration of European economic system and creation of new economic blocs are recent development. The Indian response to these developments has been positive which is obvious from the fact that India tried to forge trade cooperation with South Asian countries on priority basis. India has intensified its effort at international level and helped the group of fifteen to develop. India has made efforts to forge bilateral trade relations with various countries, particularly with Russia, United Kingdom and Germany.
India's response to post-Cold War developments is more *ad hoc* and tentative. This kind of response is mainly because India is passing through a phase of international crisis, where leadership is weak and its ideological commitments are minimum. For a proper response to international changes, India's foreign policy debate will have to pass through the phase which needs more intensive debate and dialogue among the various sections who have been involved in the debate and decision-making at domestic level.

The end of the Cold War has led to the end of threat to India from the Cold War context of US-Soviet power rivalry. As an Indian scholar has described it, now there is no longer any overarching schism or strong systemic dualism. The nature of new global context which has emerged has been subject to different interpretations. They are no longer in existence but the end of the primary axis of the Cold War struggle has affected the other axes. The important emerging problems for conflict-in post Cold War era includes: (1) social struggles against Third World dictatorship; (2) periodic struggles against bureaucracies in communist world; (3) struggle within advanced countries for greater social and economic egalitarianism; (4) struggles by Third World elites through their states for greater advantage vis-à-vis influential Third World countries, e.g. for the New International Economic Order; (5) intra-state conflicts within Third and Second Worlds but not entirely absent from the First World, e.g. ethnic conflicts within states and between states for ethnic and other reasons.

So far as India is concerned it is faced by the fourth and fifth problems relevant for it. One wonders whether nonalignment can be useful strategy to deal with these problems. On the other hand, others have seen the post-Cold War period in a different way. A.K.M. Abdus Sabur notes that “the replacement of bipolar world with a unipolar one resulted in the establishment of unprecedented control over international system by the US and its allies”. He adds, “the great powers virtually united in a single bloc have embarked upon a policy of curbing the power and influence of regional
powers". S.D. Muni feels that, "in the one super-power situation, the US naturally enjoys grater initiative, influence and strength to design the regional strategic orders in the Third World". This greater initiative, according to Muni, will create new imbalances and tensions. He also refers to ferment in Third World of the release of democratic and developmental assertion, ethnic assertion, religious fundamentalism and weakness of the Third World political and economic system as providing excuses for US intervention. This greater American preponderance may not be a curse to all regional powers and small powers. They may even benefit some regional powers within the framework of America's perceived long and short-term geo-strategic interests. However, those regional powers which may come into conflict with American goals may suffer also.

During the Cold War, the American threat to India mainly occurred in the Cold War context, with US interested in military alliances against perceived communist menace, whereas India preferred the strategy of nonalignment. There were other issue areas of tension also, some partly resulting from America's alliance with Pakistan.

In the post-Cold War period, threat from Cold War context has disappeared. Similarly, India does not face direct security threat from the US, but the continuing US-Pak connection poses a threat. Even in the Cold War days the United States was willing to concede the status of a regional power to India after the creation of Bangladesh, Pakistan was exempted from India's sphere of influence. Even if we agree with Gowher Rizvi that either of the two super powers have any direct stake in India-Pakistan rivalry nor has South Asia ever been an area of high priority for them and that either interest arise not from their instinct interest in the subcontinent but primarily from their concern about each other during Cold War, the cold war and regional concerns messed up. America as a global superpower even in the post-Cold War era has a number of interests – economic and political and if Pakistan is willing to act as a surrogate and if in the process Pakistan
is strengthened economically, politically and military, the US may pose a security risk even if indirectly. Pakistan may be used by the US to counter fundamentalism, to counter ‘rogue’ states like Iraq or for providing route to Central Asian republics of former Soviet Union which is a vital region of oil deposits. America may also directly come into conflict with India by encouraging the movement for complete independence of Kashmir.

US’s global interests may also come in conflict with India’s interest. For example, America’s interest in non-proliferation along with its desire to preserve its monopoly in weapons and weapon technology for military as well as economic reasons on the stated ground that a capable Third World military power could some day come into conflict with India’s desire to become a self-reliant military power and possess latest military and civilian technology which she feels may award off threat from her neighbours. India feels that this power is no threat to the US. Therefore, India feels that either on moral or practical grounds the US is justified in putting pressure on India to sign the NPT or the CTBT or ask for fissile material cut off agreement.

Further, in order to pursue her objectives the US may use sanctions.\textsuperscript{9} Muchkund Dubey, former Foreign Secretary of India, feels that as compared to 1968 the nuclear powers have much greater will power and determination. They have carefully worked out the strategy. According to Dubey, sanctions are likely to work because, “with the adoption of economic reform measures, India’s stake in global economy has become higher because of the integrated nature of economy due to globalization process, sanctions now can be applied to a much wider spectrum of flows and transaction - including foreign direct investment, technology transfer debt rescheduling and support by “international’ financial institutions”.\textsuperscript{10} Thus India even in the post-Cold War period is looking for a strategy which can increase her capability in unipolar world with US as the only super power endowed with what the Chinese describe as ‘comprehensive strength’.
India’s Policy of Non-Alignment

In the Cold War period, non-alignment had proved to be a useful policy to achieve foreign policy objectives both at the global as well as regional levels. Although the broad foreign policy objectives remain the same, the end of the Cold War has made nonalignment redundant at regional levels. The US and India, it was felt, had conflict of interests. India’s ability to cope with the conflict in objectives was limited by the emergence of unipolar world. Apart from nonalignment, other options like closer ties with the US; formation of anti-US hegemony group of India, China, Iran; alliances with European countries; strengthening of economic capability and diversification of relations with the Third World countries; strengthening of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC); strengthening of the UN and cooperation with Russia were considered. It was felt that utility of some of the options was limited in the post-Cold War and unipolar environment. Some options may or may not emerge at all. Other options like strengthening of the SAARC and the UN diversification of relations were worth pursuing although they may not immediately raise India’s capability to face the post-Cold War situation. Better Indo-US relations were desirable and could materialize to some extent but may not be in the way we wanted it, for in the post-Cold War unipolar world, the US has more options than India. This would lead to some *de facto* loss of independence for India.

On the other hand, India has no choice it will have to strengthen itself economically for creating a long-term impact on world politics as well as strengthen itself militarily. It will have to develop some kind of deterrence against the US also. There is also no justification for docile Indian diplomacy. Thus, if India values independence in foreign affairs, the people will have to make sacrifices. India’s decision to remain independent or get submerged into world structures by the US will also be affected by “domestic struggle by contending forces to shape and control the Indian state”.

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A renowned scholar of India’s strategy of nonalignment, A.P. Rana, wrote in 1991: “With the demise of the Cold War, India has in effect lost her foreign policy strategy.” On the other hand, some Indian scholars still regard the policy of nonalignment as useful for India even in the post-Cold War period. For example, one Indian scholar, Amitabh Matto, writes “NAM is needed not just to secure a niche for the developing world in the international system but more essentially to articulate an alternative view in international relations, to move beyond the abject realism of the Westphalia system and move towards an international society in which ideas matter as much as power”. He adds: “Only the NAM has the broad-based membership and legitimacy to raise these questions” and create a groundswell that could eventually be the first steps towards creating such an international society.

However, as Rana rightly says, foreign policy objectives should not be confused with foreign policy. He adds: “Nonalignment as a foreign policy and diplomatic instrumentality with a cutting edge in foreign affairs has lapsed into history with the Cold War…. And this is applicable to cognate capabilities as well as normative one.” However, India also actively participated in the twelve Summit of the Movement of Non-alignment countries in Durban in September, 2005. India as a founder member of NAM stressed on the continued commitment of NAM to its basic principles which remained valid in the post-Cold War era. India’s vital concerns at the summit included disarmament and security in the context of nuclear tests in South Asia, shaping the global economic agenda and reinforcing the international community’s condemnation of terrorism.

The end of Cold War, the resulting lack of US interest in preventing close Indo-Soviet ties, lack of Russian interest in special ties with India and her general pro-US, pro-West tilt removed a major obstacle in the way of improvement of Indo-US relations.
Not only that, an expectation was raised that in the post-Cold War period that the US would tilt towards India rather than towards Pakistan. The expectation was based on three assumptions:

1. In the absence of the Cold War, Pakistan’s value as an ally decreased but India’s importance increased due to a number of other factors.

2. There was a feeling among some Americans as well as Indians that, in the post-Cold War period, containment of Islamic fundamentalism would replace containment of communism as the chief objective of American foreign policy.

   Huntington’s theory of “clash of civilizations” was an illustration of this type of thinking. Therefore, Pakistan, being a theocratic state, could not be regarded as a dependable ally by the US in this clash. Some felt that there might be a convergence of US-Indian interest in relation to this objective.

3. New economic policy initiated by Narsimha Rao-Manmohan Singh for trade and investment for the US industrial and financial interests. The US too was looking for markets due to her compulsions and she considered India as one of the ten emerging markets. It was also expected that in general the US was to find three fourth of her markets in developing countries.

4. Others have made a plea to the US for giving more importance to India on the following grounds.\(^6\)

   (i) An increasing number of Indians in important occupations should persuade the US, a democratic nation and a nation of immigrants, to care for India.

   (ii) The US interest in the ideology of democracy, pluralism and secularism in the post-Cold war period would become real rather than rhetorical. India not only believes in these ideologies but has also put them into practice.
(iii) India’s interest in the Persian Gulf, southern tier of the Soviet Union, China and Southeast and the US concerns often develop and infrequently parallel US interests. Of course, this is a doubtful proposition.

(iv) India and the US share a strong interest in cooperating with each other to reduce drug related activities.

(v) In a world of trading blocs, it was useful for the US to have India well integrated with American trading bloc.

(vi) The US and India could work together to delegitimise and perhaps eventually eliminate nuclear weapons.

(vii) The US could act as a facilitator, and encourage India, Pakistan and China to develop confidence-building measures.

The arguments made above or expectations about better Indo-US relations are based on convergence of the Indo-US objectives. It also assumes that the stated objectives, but an analysis of official statements of the US objectives is also necessary. The following objectives are indicated on the basis of statements of President Bill Clinton and Secretary of State Christopher:

First, the US has a sense of assertive self-confidence that it has become the foremost political and military power which will be safeguarded by political means where possible and by force, where necessary.

Second, the US wishes to restructure international arrangements; which will ensure military superiority of the US, either unilaterally or in collaboration with its allies; political-strategic-economic arrangements which will provide continuous access to natural resources and raw materials; is international economic atmosphere in which the US access to markets maximized and secured; long term military superiority and economic competitiveness for the US, which will require creation of restrictive
regimes on military exports, transfer of technology and creation of sophisticated tariff and non-tariff barriers to protect the US interests; leading role in international stability and security in preventing conflicting situation to achieve the aforesaid objectives; restructuring the UN in such a way that the majority of members support US objectives. Although some of these objectives are occasionally described in rhetorical terms of stability, democracy, human rights etc.

The US Defence Planning Guide for post-Cold War era prepared in 1992, which discusses the US objectives in South Asia, talks of the 'discouraging Indian hegemonic aspirations over other states in South Asia and on the Indian Ocean'. A constructive US-Pak relationship was considered a key stone for achieving stability in South Asia. The Hank Brown amendment can be seen as part of this process rather than as an attempt to rectify any injustice done to Pakistan. New rationale for better relations with Pakistan is always found out. Sometimes, it is the use of Pakistan as a moderate Islamic state against fundamentalists or the use of Pakistan for safe and dependable trade route to Central Asian Oilfields. The Government of Pakistan has willingly obliged the US government in this regard till now, may be for its own reasons. Pakistan has obliged the US in pursuit of its global objectives by getting a price at the regional level.

As compared to this, India differed from the US in terms of global objectives not only in the Cold War period but in the post-Cold War period also. India's views of non-proliferation, Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, missile development and deployment, transfer of technology etc. differ substantially from the views of the US government when one goes into details. Mitchell Reiss describes India as a 'revisionist power'.

The US ambition to become a dominant world power and India's desire to be a revisionist power has potentialities for conflict. There is a dilemma for Indians here. In relation to the US which has what the Chinese describe as 'comprehensive national strength' there is India which as Rana
describes is “more vulnerably exposed to environment around her than at any time in the post-independence history”. Even if there is interdependence between the two, it is asymmetrical. Various suggestions have been made:

(i) A suggestion is made that India can act as a proxy to the US at least in relation to those objectives there is a convergence of interests, e.g. maintaining stability in South Asia.

However, natural convergence is one thing, co-option by the US for which India is not enthusiastic would be another thing. For India, with a strong tradition of national pride, well-developed sensitivities to unequal treatment with deep roots that go back to its colonial experience and recent historical commitment to autarky, it would be difficult.

(ii) Some Russians have stated saying in relation to the US that if there is no real partnership in objectives, it is better to stand alone; India may consider this advice.

(iii) Then there will be other US objectives the pursuit of which may harm Indian interests, either directly or indirectly as in the case of the Hank Brown amendment.

Others have suggested that economic opportunities given by India to the US should be linked to US arms transfer to Pakistan. The suggestion assumes that the US opportunities in India are of advantage to the US only. It also assumes that the US interest in Pakistan is of secondary importance (in spite of various ways in which Pakistan can perform useful functions for the US) as compared to the US interest in Indian markets. Present evidence indicates that the US interest in Indian markets may not be paramount importance.

Still others have suggested further strengthening of economic relations between India and the US. Another suggestion made was India
should have withdrawn her ambassador from the US in the wake of the Hank Brown amendment. The treatment suggested is similar to the one adopted by China in relation to the US because of Taiwanese president’s visit to the US. Even if this suggestion is consistent with self-respect of India and for more dignified Indo-US relations in future, one doubts the capacity of the present Government of India to implement it. As a former foreign secretary of India, Muckund Dubey, points out in relation to the Indo-US nuclear relations:

"making clear-cut choices on crucial issues goes against the basic style of functioning and decision-making by this Government. The pattern of behaviour of this Government, describe from the action taken so far by it in the nuclear field, reveals that it indulge in platitudes regarding adhering to India’s traditional policies and in occasional bravado but ultimately succumbs to outside powers under pressure". It is against the background of these condition that India’s role in the UN in post-Cold War era is to be examined.

India’s Role in the Peace-Keeping Operations of the United Nations:

India’s glorious contribution to the Untied Nations peace-keeping operations since independence is a saga of dedication and commitment to the objectives of the United Nations Charter. This has been reflected not in terms of rhetoric and symbolism, but in physically demonstrated participation, even to the extent of sustaining casualties to personnel, and yet staying with the course. This contribution has been acknowledged by the members of the international community, successive Secretary General of the United Nations Secretariat, and by fellow peacekeepers from other countries of the world.

As we enter the twenty first century, there are many in India and abroad in the international community, who perceive for India a significant role in world affairs: which would mean playing a role in the various organs
of the United Nations. If we are to fulfill such a role with any degree of credibility, it is inevitable that India accept its share of the responsibilities that go with such a role.

Given its established professionalism, expertise and competence in the field of United Nations peace-keeping, India has a major contribution to make, particularly in the context of the fact that notwithstanding the criticism of some recent United Nations peace-keeping missions, as and when the next crisis arises, the international community, as well as the belligerents, will inevitably turn to the world body for assistance in resolving it.

UN peace-keeping is an innovation brought out by the operational exigencies of the UN. There is no legal, structure or constitutional basis for such activities as UN Charter has no provision for it. Moreover, it is neither a purely exercise in pacific settlement of disputes nor completely a collective coercive measure rather a unique activity combining some features of the both.

Finally, it is not only a distinct but also a dynamic concept changing according to the changed context of global milieu and requisite role of UN in that environment. India, which is a primary member of the UN even when it was not independent, had always taken keen interest in all the activities of the UN; hence its role in this unique activity is inevitable. At present when India is making tremendous efforts to play a more important role in the UN, through the acquisition of a permanent seat in the Security Council, it becomes pertinent to analyse its contribution towards all the UN activities in general and its role in peace-keeping in particular. However, during the post-Cold War era this concept underwent both "quantitative" and "qualitative" change. In the former context, its number has increased significantly from 13 operations from 1948-87 to 22 operations during 1988-1997.
Before analyzing India’s role, it is pertinent to examine why India is actively engaged in the UN peace-keeping activities.\(^{19}\) First of all, India’s foreign policy goals require a world order-based on peace and tranquility. Because its programme of nation’s defence and development could work smoothly only in a world order devoid of war.

Secondly, this concept was devised to do away with Great Powers’ intervention in disputes of smaller states which serves the goals of India’s policy of nonalignment. Through this approach India wanted to follow an independent foreign policy by keeping away from military blocs.

Thirdly, since its inception India was in favour of settling of disputes through amicable means by using Chapter VI of the UN Charter rather than Chapter VII of the Charter. It never liked the idea of using force by the UN. Nor did it want to create any kind of imbalance between the power and positions of General Assembly and Security Council as it evident from its absence on the voting for ‘Uniting for Peace Resolution’ of 1950.

Fourth, even before its independence India was always in favour of the right of self-determination to the states. Hence, it could not approve of any coercive or interventionalist activities taken without the approval of the concerned states or being forced upon it under Chapter VII.

Finally, India has abiding faith in the provisions enshrined in the UN Charter. Consequently, it had deep faith in the provisions of Article 1 of the UN Charter which specifies the purpose of UN will be: to maintain peace and security, and to that end: take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means and in conformity with the principles of justice and international adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace.
Thus, the objectives of UN peace-keeping are common with the foreign policy goals enshrined by India. Besides, they cherish the long tradition and contemporary outlook of India towards international relations. Hence, India was keenly associated with such activities of UN since its inception.

Significant role played by India in the UN peace-keeping operations is evident from its six fold activities.\(^{20}\)

Firstly, India, despite its limitations in terms of military and financial fields, took part in maximum number of UN peace-keeping operations. Though its participation in all the activities may not always be in large numbers, yet its commitments and sense of concerns have always been very right. Its involvement and conviction towards these activities can be gauged from the fact that even while it was engaged in war with its neighbours (1962 and 1965), it supplied troops for such UN activities. By going through the detail profile of its contributions from 1947 to 1955, during the 23 UN operations, a clear picture of India’s participation could be ascertained.

Secondly, India did not only send some soldiers to meet out the UN requirements, but also played a key role in many operations. Not only did its defence forces perform a collective role in a well disciplined and objective manner, but it also provide leadership to some important missions, such as Sinai (1956-57), Yemen (1963), Cyprus (1964), Namibia (1989), etc. where it provided force commanders. Besides, its officers served as member of supervisory commissions, military adviser to Secretary General and observers in number of UN activities. More important of them all, Lt. General Satish Nambiar was given the full responsibility to lead the UN peace-keeping operation in former Yugoslavia (1992).

Thirdly, the list of important defence and civilian personalities, associated with the UN peace-keeping activities, from India, is quite long.
To name all of them is not feasible. However, some of the important persons who served in the UN peace-keeping along with their assignment were.

Fourthly, India has not only been associated with such activities in implementing the UN directives, but has also helped the global organization in developing and conceptualizing the framework of UN peace-keeping. Though its active participation in the debates it tried its best to highlight the anomalies associated with this concept. Simultaneously, at present it is making all out efforts to finalise the norms of this framework in the changed context of global order. India’s organization of an international seminar in January, 1996, which was attended by of Kofi Annan (the then UN under Secretary General and present Secretary General), in this context is proof of its active concern for UN peace-keeping.

Fifthly, India has tried to setup a role-model through its activities associated with these operation. Though their exemplary courage 88 Indian personnel have lost their lives in course of these operations. Among them were three doctors who sacrificed their lives while providing medical care in Somalia. This led to an unprecedented hue and cry by the opposition parties in Parliament. But the then government did not withdraw its commitment in between. Besides, peace-keeping is costing India very heavily. Approximately, India is spending US $ 16 million per year on such activities. Simultaneously, it has increased the UN budget which ultimately has hiked India’s contribution to UN. But despite its poor economic conditions India has cleared all its dues to the UN pool in contrast to the major powers that have yet to pay huge share of their contribution towards this end.\textsuperscript{21}

Finally, not only the past and present role of India was very significant, but it is even concerned about the future responsibilities in this context. Visualizing the growing number of peace-keeping operations there is always a great need of troops for that purpose. In this regard, due to various hazards in such missions, numbers of countries contributing troops
have deceased. But India, keeping its long tradition and commitment to global peace and tranquility, took an important decision in 1995 to commit a Brigade Group to the UN Standby Force arrangement so that peace-operations would not by delayed due to lack of forces at UN command. This activity of India is likely to strengthen UN role of peace-keeping in future.

India’s peace-keeping role is paradoxical; it is a regional belligerent but also a global peacekeeper. For more than 50 years of the United Nations has been mediating between the two belligerents, India and Pakistan, over the dispute of Kashmir. The Indo-Pakistan quarrels over Kashmir continue to haunt the South Asian security environment. South Asia was also one of the first region where the UN experimented with peace-keeping by deploying observers to monitor the cease-fire agreement between India and Pakistan in 1948. However, the UN is nowhere near to resolving the Kashmir issue, which has only become more complex with growing cross-border terrorist activities and a serious nuclear race between India and Pakistan. The support of the two nations for the UN presence in Kashmir differs fundamentally. The underlying disagreements between the two countries concern the mandate and functions of the UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP). Pakistan strongly views the conduct of the UN plebiscite as the road to peace in Kashmir, but India no longer supports nor recognizes the presence of the UNMOGIP. New Delhi consents to that presence only because the UN wants it. India is strongly opposed to third party mediation of the Kashmir dispute, unlike Pakistan, which has sought to internationalise the issue. This is contrast of India’s more than eager support for UN third party mediation or peace-keeping operations in external conflict.

Among the many Third World peace-keepers, India has been singled out as having one of the longest and most consistent records of participation in UN peace-keeping operations. India’s participation in external peace operations began in the late 1940s when New Delhi made
representation in the first UN observer mission to Palestine. Following this, Indian soldiers became part of the first UN peace-keeping force deployed in the Gaza in 1956. Since then India has been consistently participating in and contributing troops to UN peace missions worldwide. As of December 2005, the country participated in 41 UN peace missions with a record of at least 50,000 Indian soldiers having donned the blue helmet in pursuit of global peace and security.  

In addition to its participation in UN peace missions, India has also demonstrated a capacity to launch its peace-keeping operation. This can be seen in the late 1980s when the Indian peace-keeping Force was created and deployed in Sri Lanka to manage the ethnic conflict and to contain the aggression and violence of Tamil Tigers who had been fighting for a separate state in the North. However, India’s experience in Sri Lanka was perceived more as an intervention reflecting departure from the traditional parameters of peace-keeping, and it solved nothing.  

Notwithstanding this, India has continued to participate in active representation in extra-regional peace operations under the aegis of the UN flag. Now Delhi has adopted a pro-active approach to the UN peace-keeping as parts of its new foreign policy orientations in the post-Cold War era. The phrase ‘proactive’ commitment is used to demonstrate India’s unreserved willingness to respond to the growing demands and challenges of UN peace-keeping in the post-Cold War era. While this is reflected in its consistency and size of participation, India’s pro-active commitment can be seen in its capacity to make large and simultaneous troop commitments in more operations than in the past. Along with this, India’s willingness to take risks and sustain its commitment in hazardous operations has demonstrated its reliability as peace-keepers.  

However, it is argued that India is politically motivated to participate in UN peace-keeping operations. The key source of its
motivation is related to its ambitions for 'great power recognition' in a highly competitive and unpredictable global system.

India's commitment to UN peace-keeping operations has moved to a new level in the post-Cold War era. In 1992, the Narsimha Rao regime reaffirmed India's commitment to UN peace-keeping operations by asserting that it 'will pro-actively support UN peace-ventures in the future'. In 1997, in his address to the UN General Assembly, former Prime Minister I.K. Gujral, said that 'as a country which places very great store on the UN's capacity to contribute to international peace and security [and peace-keeping activities]... India has vital interests in the UN'.

India's new level of commitment is reflected in its actual participation in post-Cold War UN peace-keeping operations. Its level of participation has increased significantly in line with the overall growth in the number of peace operations in the post-Cold War era. India has participated in 23 peace mission in about 15 different locations around the globe. India's highest level of participation has been in the early 1990s. In fact, the period 1990-94 has been one of the most active and assertive eras of UN peace-keeping in the post-Cold War era. India participated in different capacities in 12 out of the 18 new UN peace missions established during that time. Of the 18 new missions, seven were UN peace-keeping operations, and India made large troops-commitments in five of them (compared with the two during the Cold War). Some of the UN peace-keeping operations that it participated in the early 1990s have been in Cambodia, Somalia, Rwanda, Haiti and Mozambique.

Since the mid-1990s, India has also participated in a number of UN peace-keeping operations; namely in Angola, Bosnia – Herzegovina and Sierra Leone. India has also made high level troops contributions in some old peace-keeping operations that have been functioning since their launch during the Cold War. This can be seen in 1999 when deployed a large Indian infantry battalion as part of the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (first
established in 1978). In addition, India has participated in recent peace-keeping operations launched in some of the old troubled spots like the Congo, where it has contributed military observer and troops of the UN Organisation Mission in the Congo, which has been established to implement the Lusaka agreement signed in July 1999.

However, there is an ongoing debate among some scholars about India’s pro-active participation in post-cold War UN peace missions. According to the Indian defense analyst Srivastava, India must adopt a well defined policy for involving itself (in UN peace-keeping) keeping in mind of internal, external, and global defence tasks. It is argued, that although India, like the United States, the United Kingdom and Australia, should participate in UN mission abroad where they serve its national interest, it is important for it to exercise some reservations in terms of over-stretching its military defense and reassessing its priorities and needs at home vis-à-vis its global ambitions.

On the contrary, former military leaders like Indar Jit Rikhye think that India should move away from its ‘inward approach’ and see itself as part of the greater international effort and participation. He argues that India has the capacity to handle both its internal matters and to pursue its external goals at the same time. In fact, India has demonstrated this capacity when, despite its military confrontations with China in 1962 and Pakistan in 1965, it maintained its troops commitment to the missions in the Sinai and the Congo. Moreover, India has the capability and capacity to contribute because it has the third largest military in the world, and these forces should be put to good use for maintaining international peace and security. Therefore, a pro-active role is supported, and perhaps a further increase in its level of participation in UN peace-keeping operations.

One of the major strength of India’s participation in UN peace-keeping operation has been its ability to provide manpower support. India has on several occasions outnumbered the troop contribution of some of the
major powers and even other traditional peace-keepers. For example, in 1994, India emerged as the third largest troop contributor in the world. Its share represented 7.93% of the 75,000 troops deployed during that year. This was much higher than some of the major powers such as United States (1.34%), the United Kingdom (5.11%) Russia (2.02%), and also other G-7 countries, for instance, Canada (3.5%) and Italy (1.12%). In 1998, the total number of UN troops was 14,347. Of this, India’s share amounted to 6.41%. This was bigger than the contribution of some of the old peace-keepers like Canada (2.07%), and the Scandinavian countries, namely Norway (1.07%), Sweden (1.46%) and Finland (5.49%), as well as The Netherlands (1.18%).

India has also made large troop-commitment to recent peace-keeping operations. For example, India’s participation in Sierra Leone in 1999 was one of the biggest in terms of troop size and reinforces the consistency in its willingness to support peace-keeping operations. In fact, the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) has been one of the largest peace-keeping operations undertaken by India in the late 1990s. Of the 13 participating states that have been providing a total of 13,000 military troops, the Indian contingent (3151) in Sierra Leone was the second largest following Nigeria (3226). Hence, as of October 2000, India was ranked as the second largest troop contributor to UN peace missions’ worldwide.  

Second, in most cases, India has had no reservations as to where it deployed its troops under the auspices of the UN, New Delhi, to some extent, has developed a policy to go where the UN flag goes. Former Indian Prime Minister Narsimha Rao supported the idea of participating in distant locations by stating that ‘the international peace-keeping forces should be selected from regions and areas far removed from where they are to be sent for undertaking credible operations’. India has emerged in various UN peace-keeping missions in 15 locations world wide. It has provided military

However, India has also expressed reservations against some specific peace missions and has, consequently, decline to provide support. For example in 1992, India refused to be part of the UN Protection Force in former Yugoslavia (UNPROFOR). A primary reason for this was the heavy political involvement of the major powers and European states and also external player like the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). J.N.Dixit, India’s former foreign Secretary, asserted that, ‘in our judgement, first of all European powers had a pernicious finger in the Yugoslav pie. To go and command a force which would have been subject to contradictory political influence, European politics and the involvement of NATO... we thought it was good for India’. Moreover, India has always worked on the premise that it will assign its military for external use provided it functions under the auspices of the UN. This explains why India was hesistant to participate as part of UNROFOR. Nevertheless, India sent its top-ranking officer, Lieut Gen. Satish Nambiar to head the mission as the force commander of UNROFOR.

Another example of India’s reservations is its initial hesitation to participate in the UN operation in Somalia. India was not part of the first phase of the operation led by the United States in 1992 to enforce peace with a view to creating a secure environment for the delivery of humanitarian relief aid. New Delhi declined to deploy ground troops as part of this US led
Unified International Task Force (UNITAF) for two reasons. First, India was critical of the initial deployment of UNITAF because it had not met the condition of ‘request and consent’ by the host government. Second, India ‘does not subscribe to the “Lead Nation” concept’. Although, New Delhi decline to contribute troops, its participation came in other form India contributed a naval task force, under the command of Commodore Sampat pillai. The force comprised of three Indian Naval Ships (INS), namely INS Deepak, Kuthar and Cheetah to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance. However, India is willing to assist in the settlement of global conflicts, at the same time it aims to steer a middle path as part of its non-alignment.

India’s decision to contribute ground troops came about in 1993, following the take over of UNITAF by the UN, which also marks the second phase of the operation. The decision to deploy Indian ground troops came after much deliberation and debate based on a ground survey and study by two Indian delegates who visited Somalia early in 1993. The team constituted representatives, one each from the Ministry of Defense and the Foreign Affairs, and an ex-ambassador, who headed the mission. Following this visit, the Indian government was convinced that it was not possible to seek the consent of the host-state since there was no functioning government in Somalia. Only then did New Delhi consented to contribute ground troops, but as part of UNSOMII.

A recent example of India’s reservations on peace-keeping relates to the UN peace mission in East Timor. In spite of UN request India declined to participate as part of the UN Assistance Mission in East Timor. This is mainly due to its reluctance to support peace mission designed to serve the cause of ethnic separatism, which is also an issue of tension between India and Pakistan in Kashmir and domestically, within Indian states like Punjab and Assam. Although these example show that India, to some extent, maintain some kind of selectivity in its participation but, this is not reduced to its over all level of capacity in post-Cold War UN peace missions.
Third, India has demonstrated the capacity to make multiple troop-commitments at any one time. Given the fact that the UN launches peace mission as and when the need arises, there has been an increasing overlap of demands for ground forces. India has made simultaneous troop commitments in various UN peace-keeping operations. For example, during the period 1992-94, India made large troop commitments in Cambodia (1373), Mozambique (940), Somalia (5000) and Rwanda (800).

Fourth, India has also been catering to the growing demand for new types of ground personnel to carryout many of the civilian-based peace-keeping functions and duties. New Delhi has responded to this by incorporating civilian elements in its troop commitments. For example in Cambodia in 1992, India was one of the 80 peace-keeping countries that contributed a total of 21,000 troops to execute new peace-keeping roles. It contributed two infantry battalions (1 Assam and 4 JAK Rifles), 1373 troops, a field ambulance unit and military observers. In addition, India also contributed civilian personnel such as electoral supervisors, police monitors and civilian staff officers. India also contributed de-mining training units to provide instructions to other national contingents. India’s capacity to contribute large troops commitments and a variety of manpower support shows its willingness to respond actively to the new demands of UN peace-keeping in the post-Cold War era.

There is no point in making large and varied troop commitments without being a ‘reliable’ ground force. Reliable troop-contributors in terms of their willingness to take risks and capacity to sustain their commitment in dangerous operations over prolonged periods are most needed in managing intrastate peace-keeping operations of the post-Cold War era. In March 2000, UN Secretary General Kofi Annan convened an expert panel, headed by Ladkhar Brahimi, a former Algerian Foreign Minister, to conduct a new major study on peace-keeping. One of the recommendations of the Brahimi report was that peace-keepers in post-Cold War peace operations must be willing to take risks and have ‘staying power’.41
India has demonstrated its 'staying power' in many of the peace missions launched during the Cold War. In Sinai, India deployed its troops for 11 years from 1956. Nevertheless, what makes India’s present contribution significant is its ‘staying power’ in the present - day operational environment that are harsh, dangerous and risky. In traditional peacekeeping operations, peacekeepers were deployed in a relatively calm and predictable environment. Today, we find peacekeepers being deployed thinly across an entire territory where there are no clear cease-fire lines and no peace to ‘keep’. In such environments, peacekeepers can be exposed to high level of danger and even possible attack from heavily armed and unidentified belligerents. In spite of these risks, India has maintained its commitment until the end. In Somalia, for example, India demonstrated its staying power and the capacity to sustain its commitment in harsh and heavily militarized operational environments.

The UN Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) can be regarded as one of the most dangerous and risky operations undertaken in the post-Cold War era. In fact, some national contingents, particularly the US and Pakistani contingents became targets of General Aideed and his warring factions. The incident of 5 June and 3 October 1993 resulted in the loss of 24 Pakistani lives and 18 American lives in Central Mogadishu. India suffered severe setbacks in Somalia. Within four months of deployment, in April 1993, India had already suffered seven casualties. Ten days later on 1 September, three Indian doctors were also killed in a rifle grenade explosion in Baidoa. The loss of 10 Indian Jawans in Baidoa led to a great uproar in the Indian Parliament. The Opposition in the Rajya Sabha tabled a motion for the immediate withdrawal of Indian troops from the UN peace-keeping force in Somalia.  

The Indian government, however, continued its active involvement in Somalia based on the premise that it was their onus to fulfill their responsibility to the international community at large. As expressed in the
Tribune, ‘the killing of the soldiers should not provoke the Indian peace-keepers to follow the US example. The virtue of patience in such difficult situations cannot be over-emphasized’.\(^{43}\) It is also noted that the cry of ‘American life in danger’ is heard once too often, which only makes the peace-keepers to become more vulnerable when operating in such volatile operational theatres.

In The Hindu, it was pointed out ‘what contributed anarchy to the operation [in Somalia] was the American over-reaction to events on the ground. In contrast, Third World soldiers through their low profile are proving successful in helping to bring life back in Somalia.’\(^{44}\) The Indian military contingent was quite successful in controlling the level of violence in the area of its deployment; that is, in Baidoa (South of Mogadishu). Instead of reacting immediately in the event of an attack, a major tactic used by the Indian forces was a ‘wait and watch’ approach. In other words, the Indian officers did not return fire once the first shot was heard from the factions. The Indian troops, instead of exchanging fire, took time to study the situation and to identify the parties that started the shooting. As Brigadier Bhagat asserted [the Indian soldiers in Somalia] have come to assist them, not to suppress them further.

Despite all dangers, India was one of the few troop-contributing nations to have retained its original strength in the Somalia operation. The deteriorating security situation in Somalia led to several withdrawals by many troops-contributing states. In the course of 1993, Belgium (950 troops), France (1100 troops), Sweden (150 medical officers) and the United States (1400 military logistics personnel and 1350 troops) decided to leave Somalia. This in fact brought the UNOSOM II force level down to 22,000. In March 1994, Italy, Germany, Turkey, Norway, Greece, Kuwait, Morocco, Republic of Korea, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, Turkey and the United Arab Emirates also withdrew their contingents. Due to the massive withdrawals, the Security Council agreed to reduce the UNOSOM II force level to 15,000
before the operation was to be closed down in November 1994. India, along with Egypt, Zimbabwe, Malaysia and Nigeria, stayed on until the mission was drawn to a close.

On the contrary, India’s early withdrawal from Sierra Leone (2000) reflects in its lack of ‘staying power’ after all. Its decision to withdraw came at a time when the violence in Sierra Leone was becoming rampant. At one point UNAMSIL has coming under intense threat as the rebel groups captured UN peace-keepers and held them hostage. Subsequently, the UN was mobilizing greater support from member states to attempt to rescue the hostages and contain the increasing violent activities. India’s decision to suddenly withdraw the UNAMSIL might lead to suggestions that it was probably taking a precautionary measure to avoid the risk of its troops being captured by Foday Sankoh’s rebels. However, India’s withdrawal from Sierra Leone has been driven primarily by political factors rather than the unwillingness to take risks in the operation.

International image could be a primary source of motivation for India’s active participation in UN peace-keeping operations. It is argued that India’s participation in Sierra Leone in 1999, for example, was mainly motivated by the desire to reinforce its global image and ‘great’ power identity. India’s desire for global recognition and ‘great power’ status in world affairs is no secret. Indian leaders from the outset have always sought ‘to corner a leading role for India in the international arena’. Hedley Bull argues that one basic criterion that defines ‘great powers’ is to be recognized by others as having certain ‘special rights and duties’ in the international system. In other words, ‘great power, recognition is linked to the fulfillment of global responsibility such as maintenance of international peace and security. Thus, participation in UN peace-keeping operations helps to shape its image positively by demonstrating India’s ‘good citizenship’ and its commitment to global responsibilities.
While international image-building could have motivated India’s new level of commitment to post-Cold War UN peace-keeping operations, India is also sensitive to the kind of image that is projected through its participation in UN peace operations. Being one of the traditional peacekeepers, India is keen not only to maintain its long-standing record of participation, but also lead peace operations. Although such appointments may be a rare opportunity, the idea of leading peace operations is closely linked to strengthening global image. Hence, appointments in peace mission matter greatly for India. For example, in Sierra Leone (2000) India had announced its decision to withdraw from the UN peace-keeping operation. This decision came after the Nigerian military’s demands to dismiss the mission’s Force Commander, India’s General Jatelay. The bickering between Gen. Jatelay and his Nigerian deputy General Mohammed Garba, caused a long-standing stalemate and personal rivalry. It began following the major crisis in May 2000, when Foday Sankoh’s warring faction, the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), captured and took 500 UN peacekeepers hostage. Nigeria blamed India’s incompetence for the debacle. India’s General Jetlay, who had unflattering opinions about Nigerian high command, accused his deputy of having secret connections with the RUF. He sent a secret memorandum allegedly ‘accusing Nigeria of deliberately seeking to sabotage the peace mission and colluding with rebels in illegal diamond deals’. The memo, which was published in a British newspaper, infuriated Nigeria. The friction between the two commanders worsened to the point that the Nigerian deputy made derogatory remarks about Gen. Jetlay and demanded his resignation. Kofi Annan had to interfere directly because the clash between the two commanders was affecting UNAMSIL’s ability to control the violence in certain parts of Sierra Leone. Human rights groups were also critical of the ability of UNAMSIL to control a new wave of violence coming from RUF. Hence, Kofi Annan re-called the two commanders to New York and attempted to reconcile their differences.
Despite several attempts, the differences between the two commanders could not be reconciled and Annan was left with no option but to fire one of his commanders.

There are several reasons why the choice was India’s Gen. Jetlay. First, the UN could not antagonize Nigeria, given the fact that it was the largest contingent in Sierra Leone, although the difference in troop contribution between India and Nigeria was only 75 soldiers. The dismissal of the Nigerian commander would have affected the participation of other African peace-keepers. Of the 13 troop contributing states, about three-quarters were from the region itself and, since the West has remained totally uncommitted to UNAMSIL, the UN could not risk losing the African peace-keepers. Second, before the arrival of the UN peace-keepers, Nigeria had led a West African peace force that fought against the RUF during the 9 year civil war in Sierra Leone. This experience would be an advantage for UNAMSIL if Nigeria stayed on since it is more familiar with the conflict, the ground situations and the region as a whole.

So, as of December 2000, India was replaced by Kenya as the Force Commander of UNAMSIL. But the UN indicated that it still wanted the Indian contingent to serve as part of UNAMSIL. India, however, as determined to pull its troops out completely. Several reasons have been advanced for this withdrawal. India has defended its withdrawal by saying that it wants to maintain its good relations with Nigeria. At the same time, it asserts that it is simply making room for the routine rotation, which gives other member states a chance to participate. Another argument put forth by New Delhi is that the UN has been seeking to mandate UNAMSIL under Chapter VII of the UN Charter because the ground situation has been deteriorating so rapidly that there might be a move to enforce peace in Sierra Leone. This would conflict with India’s policies on peace-keeping. But it should be noted that it did not take such factors into consideration when it willingly participated in the UN’s peace-enforcement operation in Somalia.
UNOSOM II) had independently launched an operation of a similar kind in Sri Lanka during 1987-89.

Finally, India’s decision to withdraw from Sierra Leone might be seen as nothing more than a ‘face-saving’ measure. The dismissal of General Jetlay means that India loses its opportunity to lead UNAMSIL. This may perhaps, be a major blow for a country that has been participating in UN peace-keeping operations since the 1950s. The dismissal may leave a black mark in its peace-keeping history and may even be detrimental to India, given its disease to impress the international community and to realize its greater global ambitions. So, India has pre-empted the dismissal by indicating its desire to withdraw from the mission and therefore, save face. The Secretary-General of the Organization of African Unity, Salim Ahmed, requested India to reconsider its decision to withdraw. But India was determined to pull a lot of Sierra Leone, rather than going on record as having been downgraded from commanding the mission to an ordinary peace-keeper.

Maintaining its international image, therefore, might be proposed as a fundamental determinant in India’s peace-keeping role. But not only does India see its role as an ordinary peace-keepers, it also values highly any leadership role that it has assigned.

India’s aims to demonstrate its credibility through its participation in the UN peace-keeping operations. Indeed, India has been operating in a new global system where the defining qualities of a ‘great power’ have changed. From India’s point of view, ‘great powers’ are made not just by their material capacities, but also by their dispositions; that is, by their willingness to articulate a vision for a preferred world and to accept the burdens of shaping that vision. At some levels, India’s strong support for UN peace-keeping in the post-Cold War era demonstrates its willingness to share the global burden and responsibility in creating a safe, secure and peaceful environment. At the same time, India has become more vigorous in
UN peace-keeping because it has been confronting competition from other nations that have similar global ambitions.

A third source of motivation for India's increased level of participation in post-Cold War UN peace missions could be that it provide opportunities to improve relations with other countries at bilateral or multilateral levels. As one Indian scholar notes, there is a 'blend between the larger goal of peace-keeping and India's narrower goal of improving bilateral and multilateral relations'. This can be seen in the recent establishment of a Joint Working Group (JWG) by the United States and India to expand their cooperation in peace-keeping and other activities of the UN. The two parties have agreed to 'deepen mutual understanding and cooperation' and to enhance the effectiveness of the UN's military interventions in various conflict zones. The Indo-United States JWG, which marks India's first institutionalised bilateral dialogue, aims to focus on various issues such as logistical support, training preparation and command structure.

However, India hopes to achieve very different results from its proactive support for the UN. Above all, New Delhi expects the UN to respect it domestic capacities and not to interfere in its domestic affairs, particularly Kashmir. India's consistent position all along has been for a bilateral resolution to the Kashmir conflict. In the words of former Foreign Secretary J.N. Dixit, India's:

'[Pro]active support to the UN, especially to the permanent members of the Security Council in [UN peace-keeping], will enable[it] to demand a quid pro quo that the UN should not interfere in matters of vital interest to [India] like Jammu and Kashmir'.

However, India's commitment to post-Cold War peace-keeping operations has taken shape in pursuit of its political interests. It is not naive to assume that states making active and direct contributions in many UN
peace missions at the field level also desire to play some influential role in the UN's decision making body on security matters. In addition to the financial benefits, although India is still owed about given an opportunity for high-level representation and participation in the decision-making circle within the UN Secretariat, New Delhi has, on various occasions, been explicit about its desire of playing a role in the upper management of the UN body. India's approach to the UN peace-keeping activities has been part of an 'interim measure to retain and enhance its role in the UN activities... and ensure proper high level representation for India in those branches of the UN Secretariat which deals with peace and international security are factored into UN decision-making'. Moreover, at the 2000 Session of the Special Committee on peace-keeping operations, India strongly supported the view that troop, contributing nations not only be consulted, but that they participate in the council decisions as well. Despite India's great desire to be included in key UN decision-making circles and its failure to realize this ambition, it has continued to participate in external peace missions without any serious reservations.

Administrative, budgetary and financial issues, in the United Nations peace-keeping operations:

Discussions relating to the financial situation of the United Nations were accorded highly priority in the Fifth Committee of the UN General Assembly following statements made by the Secretary General that the organization is facing an unprecedented crisis with practically no usable reserves and overwhelming debts to member states. Unfortunately, the Open Ended High level Working Group on financial situation achieved no result even after prolonged negotiations and consequently, the Secretary General continued to resort to borrowing from the peace-keeping accounts to finance routine and regular operations of the UN.

With further anticipated decrease of peace-keeping budget, the Secretary General will find it increasingly difficult to take recourse to this
action in the coming years. In all the debates on this issue, India called upon Member States in arrears to pay their contributions in full, on time and without condition and emphasized the need to work on arrangements that will lead to the clearing of financial backlog thereby ensuring smooth flow of funds in the future.

The question of financing UN peace-keeping operations has been engaging the continuous attention of the world community. As a major troop contributing country, India is vitally interested in this matter. While India is receiving current payments for participation in peace-keeping operations, there has been a considerable delay in reimbursement of past dues particularly reimbursement relating to contingent owned equipment provided by us. India has intensified its efforts with the UN Secretariat to reach settlement of its claims.57

Following part payment of arrears by the Russian-Federation and a few other countries, the UN paid India $ 7,861,391.60 during 1998. The UN owes India approximately $ 45 million.58 The rate of reimbursement remains extremely slow and the hope of receiving payment is nearly non-existent unless the United States which owes the UN more than $ 1.3 billion pays its arrears both for the regular and peace-keeping budgets.

On the substantive issues on which the Fifth Committee focused its attention including Secretary General’s reform proposals. In the context of the budget consideration for 1998-99, India’s stand has been generally positive towards various proposals to introduce reform in the current procurement and asset management policy and procedures and on strengthening the internal and external oversight mechanism.

India’s Role in the United Nations in Post-Cold War Era:

In the post-Cold War era, India’s role along with other like minded nations has remained to create a democratic world order in spirit as India has been firm believer and supporter, faith for a world free of animosity and
hattered, unfettered by deprivation of any kind, and devoted to the perpetual quest for human happiness. The world and the people need peace, security and development. Therefore, the Indian quest in the coming year must have an assist in trying to make this dream a reality. This was the fundamental principle of India's foreign policy to supports world peace and peaceful settlements of international disputes, India is opposed all forms of violence, and aggression. It has full faith in the ideals of UN and has always been cooperating with the UN in all its socio-economic and political activities. India supports disarmament and advocates a nuclear weapon free world and is aware of its security concerns and wants to protect its National interests within the parameter of international peace and security. It has always been advocating in the reduction of conventional weapons and total ban on nuclear weapons.  

As part of its new UN policy, India has been actively participating in UN deliberations on areas such as environment management, human rights, sustainable development, population and women, and disarmament. For example, India represented the interest of many non-aligned countries in the UN Conference on Population and Sustainable Development and on Women. However, India was not successful in influencing some of the policies and outcomes in this conference due to the lack of 'political cohesion among the members of NAM' on policies relating to women and population. India also led a high powered delegation to the Rio de Janeiro 'Earth Summit', where it played an active role in discussions and meetings ensuring that the 'summit' safeguarded the ecological and economic interest of the developing countries.  

The above efforts of the UN have significantly contributed at least to the growth of awareness of many important issues which had been considerably neglected for a long time in the past. There are two kinds of problems confronting the world body. One set of problem is global issues such as environment, population, development and fatal diseases. They are beyond the
capacity of any single nation. The UN with its unique global role is crucial to progress for the sustainable solution of these problems. The second kinds of problem are ethnic conflicts that have erupted in the post-Cold War Era. It seems so vast that many people feel no need to act. But the alarming situation demands that the problem must be solved and the UN is essential to progress on both issues. Naturally people now have doubt and wonder whether the UN can hopefully be able to tackle such problems effectively. For this it is necessary that the UN has to maintain right balance between inaction and intervention, prudence and over reactions.

The question with wonder and fear now before every nation is whether the US is the only world power left to decide the fate of a particular country, which even, it targets for fulfilling its own selfish ends, or it alone should be the responsibility of establishing a just world according to the terms and conditions set by it. If it is so, then this trend of unilateralisation is likely to pose the biggest threat to the security challenges of the new millennium. If Iraq today, tomorrow Syria, Saudi Arabia, North Korea or any other sovereign country for that matter is likely to be the victim of this trend of American unilateralism. The approach and the power of the world organization has been side lined – Iraq War II brings a death blow to the world body, which the USA has delivered to be as “basket case”.

The aftermath of World Trade Center tragedy brought some new threats along the security concerns for the whole world. At the same time it provided an opportunity to the US to tackle such problem as per his desire in the guise of tackling terrorism. It was followed by anti terrorism operation speedily bringing with the cleaning separation against the Taliban regime to the bearing of fundamentalist organisations suspected to be behind these terrorist activities. In the guise of elimination of terrorism, the new threat of unilateralism and self righteousness of USA is definitely going to set a precedent that the evil enemy of this world is, be when even Washington close to Sodinate.
India took an active part in setting the agenda for the UN on the foregoing issues and influencing projects and policies which were discussed at the UN itself and at the various international conferences organized by the UN. By mid 1994, the Ministry of External Affairs was engaged in intense preparations for: (i) the February 1994 meeting of the Human Rights Commission; (2) the Copenhagen meeting on human development; (3) the international conference on Loomen in Beijing; and (4) the 50th Anniversary of the UN General Assembly Summit session. 

In the ultimate analysis, despite the idealism articulated, despite the optimism generated by the end of cold war and despite the expectations of a more peaceful atmosphere prevailing internationally, the UN still remains subject to considerations of super power strategy and real politik. This is ambience in which India will have to fashion its approach and structure its role in the UN and its allied agencies in the coming years. Secondly, the existing desperation that while specialized ministers would interact with various specialized agencies of the UN such as United Nations Children’s Emergency Fund (UNICEF), International Labour Organisation (ILO), World Health Organisation (WHO) or International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the overall formulation of policy and coordination of India’s participation in the activities of these agencies is subject to political assessments of Ministry of External Affairs and of the guidance of the Prime Minister.

India has a creative and leading role to play in ensuring the democratization of the UN and in dealing with these controversial trends affecting the functioning of the organisation, in effectiveness. In this regard it will depend on our networking and coordination of policies with other developing countries, aimed at generating collective and unified presumes for the UN reforms of the majority of its membership.

For a number of years, the philosophical attitude in India’s UN mission was “we live and learn”. After several years of low-key stance, India has begun to reassert itself at the UN.
An important factor in India’s new stand is that its relations with most of its immediate neighbours have seldom before been so good. India is up to date in paying its men in UN forces and has said it is not in the “business of making money” out of peace-keeping operations and the UN dues of $58 million to it will not deter it from paying its troops defining sovereignty and domestic jurisdiction, accommodate the growing impulse of human rights.

In the changing global context of the Post-cold war era, multiferism civil problems imputing on international arena demanded UN’s attention. At the same time the Security Council, once crippled by the Super Power statement is being seek by major powers as an effective means of taking international measures to prompt action and resolve conflicts having bearing on international stability. The UN has definitely taken a challenge as manifest with the declaration of “Agenda of Peace and Development of Peace” troops which, did not find a place in the charter.

The Clinton Administration waged a multipronged offensive to keep the UN under its control. On the one side, it continued to threaten member countries that unless they behaved well (supported the US in the UN and outside), they stood to provoke American displeasure and hostility. The US wants to keep the UN financially weak and dependent on its financial contribution in the form of its dues. It has created immense difficulties for the UN and under-mined its capacity to function by not paying its arrears both for budgetary and other expenses of the organisation to the time of tone than one billion.

While India’s stand irrespective of financial constraint was that its Mission Head, Parakash Shah said, “India has paid to full amount of all its soldiers out of its own funds despite the fact that it created a deficit in its own budget”. He also said that the UN owned money to India as far back as the UN operation in Congo. In a major diplomatic initiative, Prime Minister H.D. Dewegowda announced India resolved to continue to recognize the Rabbani regime in Afghanistan and pledged India’s political, diplomatic and moral
support to it. India was deeply aware of vital need for reconstruction, and of rebuilding the social and economic infrastructure of Afghanistan, which had been almost completely destroyed as a result of continued strife.

In September 1995, the Indian Foreign Minister, Pranab Mukherji, declared that "democracy and transparency cannot stop at the portals of the UN". Of course, one recognizes that power realities and questions cannot be wished away and must be reckoned with. Yet, however, argued that in spite of considerable efforts made by the UN for the protection of human rights, its records have been dismashed and more has to be done if the UN is to stick to its determination to "save the succeeding generations from the scourge of war".

The World Conference on Human Rights held in Viana in 1993, highlighted the enhanced international commitment to re-interpret the traditional norms, defining sovereignty and domestic jurisdiction and to accommodate the growing impulse of human rights.

In the changing global context of the Post-cold war era, multiferism civil problems need immediate attention of the UN for sure and certain solution of these problems acceptable to almost every nation of the world community. At the same time, the Security Council, once ampled by the super power statement is being seen by major powers as an effective means of taking international measures to preempt and resolve conflicts that have bearing impact on international stability.

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keep the UN financially weak and dependent on its financial contribution in the form of its dues, so that it could not be challenged everywhere on its biased policy.

It has created immense difficulties for the UN and undermined its capacity to function by not paying its arrears both the budgetary and other expenses of the organization to the tune of more than one billion.

With Ghali at the helm of the UN and elevation of Ms. Albright as the US Secretary of State, it was feared that the UN’s independence and activism would be in danger. The US inspired by its success in torpedoing Ghali re-election bid, mights be tented to further consolidate its group over the UN. But there are few redeeming features. The “Unipolarity” of the world is already under strain. The US claim that “its leadership is indispensable to the world” is not without challenges. Besides the determination of Paris to contain the influence of the US in European affairs, the emerging axis between Russia and China may result in countervailing the American domination. Further, while the US domination of the UN in the Post-cold war years has been well pronounced, it has not been a total surrender by the UN. In December 1995 the General Assembly condemned Israel for its rule over the holy city of Jerusalem by 133 to one veto. While Israel was the only country to vote against the resolution, 13 countries including the US abstained from voting.68

Being inspired by the success of the “UN troops” in the war against Iraq in 1991 in the desert war, George Bush, the President of the United States, declared his support for a new world order whose main elements would be collaboration between the US and Russia both inside the United Nations and outside it, to maintain international peace and security, for an active role to be played by the UN.69

The world confronts a new American approach to world affairs during the Bush Administration in January 2002. The Indian response to the tumultuous development, since then has been along unexpected line. While the
liberal opinion in the Europe, the Middle East, and Asia remains extremely critical of the Bush Administration's policies, India's reaction has either been muted or supportive of the new line of Washington on key global issues a clear cut deviation from its earlier stand. Perhaps this was the first occasion that even the staunchest of the traditional American allies challenged the Bush Administration's policies. India, which on the basis of its past record was expected to lead the charge against the United States in various international forums, has often ended up on the side of Washington.

Post Iraq war, no doubt is left that Washington is prepared to mobilize all the resources under its own command as the world's richest economy and advance society and is exercising the political will to pursue objectives that until recently world have been considered outlandish. This has raised the spectra of 'neo imperialism' in the world even as for many in the US imperial so longer a world with negative connotations. This development has led to representing a political American role in the world that is at once assertive, beings and progressive. Although, questions have been raised, in the wake of American difficulties in handling the post war situation in Afghanistan and Iraq and about the' competence and credibility of American imperialism'. Still there is no doubt about the new power of the United States and its ability to exercise it in the pursuit of its political objectives.70

Social Human Rights and Humanitarian Issues

India participated actively in the discussions on human rights issues in session of the UN Commission on Human Rights, the Economic and Social Council and the General Assembly. There was a special significance to the discussion of human rights issues as December 10, 1998 marked the 50th anniversary of the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Special commemorative sessions were held by the General Assembly and several other UN bodies to mark the occasion. Special events were also organised in India, where a series of activities overseen by a National Committee under the Chairmanship of Minister for Home Affairs was organized to mark the occasion.
The year also marked the five-year-review of implementation of the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action adopted at the conclusion of the World Conference on Human Rights held in 1993. The adoption of the Declaration on Human Rights Defenders by the General Assembly at its 53rd session was a significant development.

In the discussions on human rights India called for constructive, balance and cooperative approach to human rights issues, emphasizing the universality, indivisibility and inter-relatedness of all rights and inter-dependence of democracy, human rights, development and international cooperation. It was necessary to depoliticize any consideration of human rights and pursue measures and approaches which can lead to concrete results in the promotion and protection of human rights everywhere.

India also critically examined the ‘rights-based’ approach in relation to human rights in general and right to development in particular, as also shortfalls in the international community’s response to the challenge to human rights posed by terrorism, extreme ideologies, and market force in an era of globalisation and the implications of recent scientific advances for the right to life, etc.

India pointed to the persistent neglect of economic, social and cultural rights that had led to a human rights paradigm that was partial and where even the recent interest in economic, social and cultural rights was modeled on civil and political rights. It was stressed that ‘legitimate concern’ for human rights should also be reflected in efforts to eradicate poverty from a human rights perspective and in a spirit of solidarity and brotherhood.

The 54th session of the Commission on Human Rights was held in Geneva from March 16 to April 24, 1998. India participated actively in the Commission's deliberations. The resolution of tolerance and pluralism initiated by India was able to attract 58 cosponsors during the session,
demonstrating the widespread support to that the theme commanded among the members and observers of the Commission, and was adopted by consensus.\textsuperscript{72}

The resolution on the Right to Development, where again India played an important part, was presented by the group of Non-Aligned countries in the Commission and was adopted without a vote in the Commission, though similar consensus did not prevail at the time of adoption of a resolution on the Right to Development in the 53\textsuperscript{rd} session of the General Assembly. Following adoption of the resolution, the Chairman of the Commission has appointed Dr. Arjun Sengupta, well-known Indian economist as the independent expert of the Commission of the Right to Development.

The election of Soli Sorabjee during the 54\textsuperscript{th} Session of the Commission on Human Rights to the special Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and protection of Minorities was followed by the election in September Justice P.N. Bhagwati, Human Rights Committee of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. With these, eminent Indian continued to serve with distinction as members of important human rights bodies, including Shanti Sadiq Ali as member of the Committee on Elimination of Racial Discrimination; Abid Hussain as Special Rapporteur on the freedom on \textit{expression}; Kapil Sibal on the working Group of Arbitrary Detention and Soli Sorabjee as Special Rapporteur on Nigeria.\textsuperscript{73}

India hosted the Seventh Asian Pacific Workshop on Regional Cooperation for the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights in New Delhi in 1999. The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights and former President of Ireland, Robinson visited New Delhi and addressed the opening session of the workshop jointly with the Minister of External Affairs. The Workshop adopted a set of agreed conclusions and decided to enhance capacity building by focusing on four areas of national plans of action, human rights education, national institutions and strategies for the
realization of the right to development and economic and social and cultural rights, agreed at the 1998 Tehran Workshop. Robinson met with several Indian leaders and non-governmental organizations active in the field of human rights, during her visit.

India maintain its position in support of the advancement, empowerment and human rights of women in the Commission on the status of women as well as the General Assembly, highlighting the initiatives taken by the Government in implementing the Beijing Platform of Action, particularly with regard to the girl child, mainstreaming the gender perspective in policies and programmes of the government, and increasing the participation of women in decision-making through continuing efforts to guarantee one-third of all seats in the national Parliament and state assemblies for women by legislation. India co-sponsored a number of women centered resolution in the Commission on Human Rights and in the General Assembly, including a resolution first moved by the Netherland in 1997, on 'Traditional and customary practices injurious to women’s health.'

India played an active role in the 49th session of the Executive Committee of the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees held in October, 1998. The importance of international solidarity and burden-sharing, the need to take into account the economic and social consequences of massive flows into the developing countries and India’s own policy towards refugees were highlighted during the session. India called for effective and durable solution to refugee crises and stressed the need for involving developing countries in evolving such solution as refugee problems affect the developing countries most. It also highlighted the imperative of international cooperation for dealing with refugee problems. The 36th Session of the Commission on Social Development was held in New York from February 10 to 20, 1998, India was represented by Member Secretary, Planning Commission. The priority theme of the session was “Promoting social Integration and Participation of all people, including
disadvantages and vulnerable groups and persons”. India participated actively in the deliberation as the theme was of special interest to India, and assisted in the negotiation of agreed conclusions adopted at the end of the session.

India actively participated in the first Humanitarian Affairs Segment of Economic and social Council (ECOSOC) held in July 1998. The agreed conclusion adopted at the end of the Segment fully reflect our concerns, namely that assistance must be undertaken at the request of recipient countries, who should also play a major role in planning the delivery of humanitarian assistance. India also played a major role in the drafting of resolutions relating to humanitarian assistance during the General Assembly. The small drafting group which excluded India and which used to negotiate the resolution on Afghanistan, including Special Assistance to War Stricken Afghanistan, was disbanded this year.

Environmental and Sustainable Development Issues

The Sixth session of the United Nations Commission on Sustainable Development was held in New York from April 20 to May 1, 1998. The Indian delegation was led by Suresh P. Prabhu, Minister of Environment and Forests. The Indian delegation emphasized the importance of transfer of environment mentally sound technologies on concessional and preferential terms as well as the provisions of predictable and adequate financial resources in achieving the objectives of economic growth and sustainable development.

The Fourth Conference of Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) was held in Buenos Aires from November 2-13, 1998. The Indian delegation was led by Minister of Environment and Forests, Swesh P. Prabhu. There was renewed pressure for developing countries to accept voluntary commitments on Green House Gas Emissions but this was successfully resisted India, as Coordinator on Kyoto
Protocol Mechanisms on behalf of the Group of 77 and China, played an active role in ensuring that the concerns of developing countries were adequately addressed. A Work programme on Mechanisms leading up to the sixth session of the Conference of Parties has been agreed upon.

The Second Conference of Parties to the UN Convention to the Combat Desertification was held in Dakar, Senegal from November 30 to December 11, 1988. The Indian delegation emphasized the need for the full operationalisation of the Global Mechanism which is scheduled to be revived, as provided in the convention, at the third conference of parties. India’s nominee has been included in the adhoc panel on traditional knowledge set up by the Committee on Science and Technology.
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