CONCLUSION

In the foregoing chapters, various aspects of socio-political, religious and constitutional issues leading to the partition of India have been studied. The events and policies pertaining to the Congress and the Muslim League raise a number of questions in mind with respect to the right or wrong measures and reactionary steps of the two parties and their responses to the demands and aspirations of the other. The voice of other minorities - Sikhs, Depressed Classes and Parsis, was considered negligible in the hue and cry of partition politics. While the causes of the partition of the sub-continent are numerous, some of the most important ones involving the Indian National Congress and the Muslim League, on the one hand, and the leadership and mass responses of the two communities on the other, have been perused through these pages.

During the second half of the nineteenth century, due to Dev Nagri movement, Sir Syed Ahmad Khan, who was once a great prophet of Hindu-Muslim unity, realized that the Hindus and the Muslims "would not be able to participate in any work with a sincere heart". The Congress which was dominated by the Hindus was not favoured by Sir Syed. His opposition to the Congress was because of Muslim backwardness. He wanted that the Hindus and Muslims should go side by side in all walks of life and he did not like any interference in his programme from any corner. Not to say the Congress, Sir Syed even opposed the Central National Mohammadan Association of Justice Ameer Ali who stood for political training to the Muslims. To Sir Syed only the academic pursuits were needed by the Muslim community and when they were well-up in academics, politics would itself find its course in Muslim community. On the other hand, Muslim Conferences evolved pan-Islamism and even Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan contemplated to launch an Islamic movement in recognition of the religious temperament of the Pushtu nation. This situation was militant "against

the improvement of communal relationships in other directions and led to the Muslims' demand of a 'separate identity'.

The influential groups of ulema and Muslim religious institutions played an important role in the partition politics. Ghulam Ahmed Qadiyani, Maulana Abdul Ala Maudoodi, Maulana Ashraf Ali Thanvi, Allama Mashriqui, Dr. Hamidullah, who were anti-modern, led the 'reactionary revivalism' and strengthened the idea of Muslim communalism. The ulema of Bareilly School (of Maulana Ahmad Reza Khan), Madarsa Nizamia at Pirangi Mahal (of Maulana Abdul Bari), Darul-Uloom of Deoband (of Maulana Mahmudul Hasan), Bahrul-Uloom at Pirangi Mahal at Lucknow (of Abdul Majid and Abdul Hamid - brothers), Nadwat-ul-Ulema, Lucknow (of Maulvi Abdul Karim Khan (orthodox)) and Dar-ul-Musannafin, Azamgarh (of Maulana Shibli Nomani) turned the 'Muslim communalism' into 'Muslim nationalism' and developed the concept of a separate identity of Muslims.

The reactionary ulema regarded the Qur'an as the most perfect, precise and correct Divine book superior to all other scriptures, such as, Bible, Ved and Gita. Their orthodoxism lined the Hindus and the Christians against them. The Hindus regarded the sub-continent as their 'Bharat Mata' and they wanted to liberate it from the British at all costs. These Muslims did not regard India religiously as pious, spiritual and attached to their, as the Hindus. Ghulam Ahmad Qadiyani advocated obedience and loyalty to the British Government. Maudoodi favoured Islamic rule, prejudicial to the Hindu Raj. Maulana Thanvi and Dr. Hamidullah supported the British. Allama Mashriqui thought independence of India as "wishful thinking". He said that the British rule was "far better and it was the duty of the Muslims to convince the British government that they should never accept the rule of the

majority. The real inheritors of power were Muslims and not the Hindus. The aim of his Khaksar Movement was "to be once again kings, rulers, world conquerers and supreme masters on earth". The Hindus became conscious of these sentiments and they organised themselves to counter the Muslims. This Hindu-Muslim divide influenced at every step the course of political process up to the partition of the sub-continent.

The liberal reformists in their own way contributed towards the development of religious and political separatist ideas. Sir Syed, a great guide and inspirer, criticised the orthodox ulema for misleading the community. He justified that "politics and religion are two different entities and that they should keep apart". He used the term 'nationalism' to denote the people and regarded all the Indians as "one single nation". Sir Syed, however, in 1893, characterised Hindus and Muslims as two "different nationalities", when Jinnah was practising law in London. Iqbal and Jinnah were inspired by this view of Sir Syed and they made it their ideological basis. Jinnah, at the 1938 Muslim League Session remarked that although a few Muslims in the past had seriously thought about the Muslims' interest, but their contributions must be gratefully acknowledged.

Hasrat Mohani published Urdu-e-Mualla propagating anti-British ideas and was expelled from the Aligarh College in 1903. Hakim Ajmal Khan, Maulana Abul Kamal Azad, Dr. M.A. Ansari, Syed Mahmud and Dr. Zakir Husain were the other prominent pro-Congress Muslims. Viqar-ul-Mulk and Mohsin-ul-Mulk, the right and left arms of Sir Syed, were afraid of the rising extremist activities of the Congress and wanted to save Muslims from indulging in the Congress. To save the

12. Ibid.
Muslim interests which were not being given due consideration in the Congress the Muslim leaders like The Aga Khan, Mohsin-ul-Mulk and Viqar-ul-Mulk were in search of a political platform to highlight the Muslim grievances. Viqar-ul-Mulk said: "We ... being in the minority, have our own special needs and require some means through which we can place them before the Government". In 1906, the Muslim Address given to Lord Minto contained a warning that if the representative institutions were not adopted with care and caution, it was likely, among other evils, to place 'our (Muslims) national interests at the mercy of an unsympathetic majority' (Hindus), and had, hence, appealed to the British rulers for help. They requested for reservation of separate seats for Muslims on Viceregal and provincial councils, high court benches, and municipalities, as well as on university senates and syndicates.

The Hindu organizations also added to the cause of partition. First, the Arya Samajists declared against cow-slaughter and promulgated 'Suddhi Movement', which became a source of chronic feud between Hindus and Muslims. The Hindus were waiting for the day when they would settle their account with Moslems and the Britishers. Secondly, they found in English education a means of getting rid of the reign of Muslim Nawabs. Thirdly, the teaching of Vivekanand that the Hinduism is the spiritual master of all the world gave them a pride and honour, while the Muslims, who had lost land, offices and honour and were avoiding to learn English, were reduced to a state of utter poverty and ignorance, but the fall of their former greatness rankled in their hearts.

The cause of the differences between the Hindus and the Muslims are also deeply rooted in the false and twisted representation of historical facts, such as, Muhammad Ghauri captured Delhi after killing Prithvi Raj Chauhan and Ghaznavi attacked Somnath having hatred against the Temple; 3,000 Brahmins committed suicide as Tipru wanted to convert them forcibly into the fold of Islam; Aurangzeb order demolition of Vishwanath temple of Varanasi; Shivaji (the Hindu) was a sore enemy of Aurangzeb (the Muslim); the battle of Haidighati between Rana Pratap 14. Advocate (Lucknow), August 22, 1903, UPNNR, 1903.
Singh and Akbar was a religious war; and Guru Govinda Singh was an enemy of Muslims. All these twisted stories were made public by the British to activate their policy of Divinity and Rule, which lasted until independence.

The Muslim religious schools were either pro-British or anti-British. The ulema of Bareilly School and Bahrul-Uloom of Lucknow were pro-British. Madarsa Nizamia (Lucknow), Deoband School, Mazharul Uloom (Saharanpur) and Qasimul-Uloom (Moradabad) were anti-British. These institutions played insignificant role in partition politics, but the Firangi Mahal ulema, led by Maulana Abdul Bari, created such an atmosphere, in which the Muslim began to breathe the communal politics. Abdul Bari founded the Majlis-e-Muqaddas-Islam mainly with the aim to establish the injunctions of the shariat; also founded the Anjuman-i-Khuddam-i-Kaaba to protect the holy places during the First World War and ignited the Khilafat Movement in association with the Ali Brothers and Gandhiji. Dr. M.A. Ansari and Hakim Ajmal Khan wanted a religious sanction for the demands concerning the Holy Places, which Abdul Bari endorsed and gradually entered the Muslim League and dominated the Muslim politics. At the Congress X-mas Session, 1920, at Nagpur, of the 4,582 (including Congressmen) delegates, 72 per cent were Muslims (including Hasrat Mohani), which gave it a "Muslim colour". The Muslims (Ulema) supported the adoption of Non-Cooperation led by Gandhiji. In protest Jinnah resigned from the Congress due to harsh attitude of Gandhiji. This was the first shock to Jinnah's heart, which made him to oppose the Congress making pathway to Pakistan.

Pressurised by the Khilafatists, Gandhiji launched the Civil Disobedience Movement on February 6, 1922, but due to Chauri Chaura incident he called off the movement on February 11-12, 1922, at Bardoli. The Khilafatists urged Hakim Ajmal Khan and Dr. M.A. Ansari to begin the civil disobedience movement, but since they refused, they were threatened with extreme measure. In consequence, both the nationalists resigned from the Khilafat Committee. Motilal Nehru warned Abdul Bari to refrain meddling in politics and to go back to the madrasas and

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maktabs. At last ulema took to spreading their views from mosque to mosque and village to village and up to the remotest and farthest to propagate that the Congress was an enemy of the Muslims, which created a gulf between the Hindus and the Muslims on the Indian sub-continent.

The role of the Princely states in the politics of partition was very shady and distinctly conducive to dismemberment of the country. After the Great Revolt, the Rajas, Maharajas and Nawabs accepted the British Rule in India. During 1940s, there were 565 Princely States - all subservient allies of the King Emperor George VI, under suzerainty of the Viceroy, to which the Secretary of State said "admits of no dispute". The princes, who acknowledged the paramountcy of the British Crown only, were enjoying the status and luxuries of monarchs within their own kingdoms. The Congress ideologies threatened the very basis of the princely order. The princes had made a cause with the British Government that political power, after Independence, would be retained by them. The Nehru Committee, commenting the Butler Committee Report (1927) charged that the British Government was seeking to convert the Indian States into an Indian Ulster. At the Round Table Conferences, the Maharaja of Bikaner demanded 'equal status' and 'dominion status'. The Nawab of Bhopal declared: "We can only federate with a self-governing and federal British India". The Indian states were not agreeable to accession with the federation according to the scheme of 1935 Act and their continued opposition delayed the prospects of not only freedom but even autonomy in India. Their tangible and intangible blessings and patronage to the revivalist and communal movements and organizations in the country did strengthen the communal interests. Being apprehensive of absorption of their states to free India, they supported the Muslim League. The Muslim League accepted their support to meet its ends though it, like the Congress, regarded the Ruling Princes "as reactionaries, autocratic and enemies of democracy".

The factor of separate electorate and reservation is also of

crucial significance. In 1889, Charles Braudlaugh moved a bill in the British Parliament for establishment of a responsible government in India and recommended 'joint electorate'. Heck, the Aligarh College Principal, got 20,735 signatures of Muslims, representing that the Hindus wanted to stop cow slaughter and sent it to the Government demanding 'separate electorate'. The Muslims demanded equal number of seats because if the Hindus had "numerical superiority", the Muslims had "historical position". The Morley-Minto Reforms(1909) conceded separate electorate to the Muslims. The Congress rejected the Act as it had provided for separate representation to the Muslims as a community. Further, according to the Lucknow Pact in December, 1916, the Congress and the League agreed to 40% representation to the Muslims in Bengal and 30% in U.P., to which Malaviya and Chintamani were opposed. The Pact ensured that if in any province two-thirds of a community was against any measure or bill it should be dropped by both the communities. The Government made assertive provision for separate electorate in the Government of India Acts of 1919 and 1935, which lasted up to 1947. The Government conceded to communal electorate to drive a wedge between Hindus and Muslims, which inescapably caused partition of India.

The question arises whether the Nehru Report or Jinnah's amendments thereto abetted partition? The Report proposed joint electorate with reservation of seats for minorities on population basis with the right to contest additional seats. No seats were reserved for any community in the Punjab and Bengal. Protection to Muslim religious and cultural interests were given. Muslim majority and Hindu majority provinces were to be created on linguistic basis. In 1927, Jinnah's resolution for amendment were: (1) one-third of the elected representatives of both the Houses of the Central Legislature should be Muslims; (2) reservation of seats in Bengal and the Punjab

on population basis for ten years, having no right to contest additional seats; (3) residuary powers should vest in the provinces. These were lost though Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru pressed the conference to accept, which M.R. Jayakar prejudicially opposed. Jinnah, disheartened by this Congress attitude, presented his Fourteen Point demand in 1929 to safeguard the rights and interests of the Muslims.

Jinnah's emergence as the strongest spokesman of the Muslims was another important factor with a direct bearing on partition. Jinnah in December, 1938, at Patna threatened direct action. Nehru and Bose negotiated with Jinnah, who made the novel demand that the Muslim League should be recognized as the one and only organization that represented the entire Muslim community in India and that the Congress should speak only on behalf of the Hindus. Nehru claimed that there were about 100,000 Muslims on the Congress rolls and he could not accede to Jinnah's arguments. However, Jinnah exploited the Muslim sentiment and the Congress at last had to yield to Jinnah's claim.

Not a religious leader by personal disposition, Jinnah exploited the ulema for achieving the League's objectives. Jinnah's association with the ulema like Maulana Shaukat Ali and Bahadur Yar Jang was not secular and was not in accord with Iqbal's desire "to humanize politics through religion". Jinnah claimed to be the heir of Sir Syed's rational and progressive thought on religion and politics. The essence which came to Jinnah was that politics and Islam are the same. Therefore, he did not hesitate in propagating that the Congress domination would mean a great harm to Islam. Forcing Muslim children in schools to sing Bande Mataram song, Hindi-Urdu controversy, music before mosque etc. strengthened Jinnah's proclamation. Religion became 'big politics'. To keep aloof the Muslims from the Congress, he created a feeling of hatred in the hearts of Muslims against the Hindus and raised the slogan "Islam in danger" during the 1937 by-election, on the ground of false allegations of Congress atrocities. Nehru was shocked. Jinnah

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23. M.H. Rahman, Pakistan Review, April, 1954, p. 27.
24. See for details The Hindustan Times (New Delhi), November 7, 1988, under the head, 'League Spread Lies - Azad'.
ignited the Muslim passion for the safeguards of Muslim interests in India. Jinnah followed this policy and won success, which proves that Pakistan is not based on facts or principles but it has all the romance of a battle-cry and all the potentiality of a crusade.

If Jinnah introduced religion in politics, the Congress, the Hindu Mahasabha and the RSS are also responsible for creating an euphoria of a Hindu Raj. Arvindo and Pal argued that the people should worship Bharat Mata. The Arya Samaj movement for cow protection was associated with politics. The Muslim important papers - Comrade, Zamindar, Tauhid, Muslim Gazette, Al-Milal etc. and the Hindu important papers - Bengalee, Amrita Bazar Patrika (old), Yugantar, Sandhya, Vandamatram (new) etc. aroused the Muslim and Hindu sentiments respectively and lined up the Congress and the League against each other. Further, the speeches of Muslim and Hindu orthodox leaders drew a barrier between the Muslims and the Hindus. The Congress objection to the Muslims joining the League (dual membership) and allowance to the Hindus joining the Congress and the Hindu Mahasabha strengthened the idea that the Congress wanted to wipe out the Muslim League as a Muslim political platform. The leaders of RSS and Hindu Mahasabha - Malaviya, Lajpat Rai, Moonje and Jayakar - jointly forced the Congress nationalists - Nehru, Sapru and Gandhi - to be guided by them. The concept of Hindu supremacy in religion and culture, Gandhiji's using Hindu symbols and values and the Congress fight for majority interests on the pretext of retaining India's unity made Jinnah to a great extent to fight vigorously for a separate Muslim nation. "Gandhiji more than anyone else helped to transform Jinnah from a keen Indian nationalist into the architect of Pakistan."

Jinnah's personal factor and pessimism also appear to have promoted him to pursue the goal of Pakistan. Jinnah's first wife, Emibai, died when he went to England. His second wife, a Parsi girl younger to him by twenty years, died in 1929, after separation. In 1928, he failed to secure any support for his view at the All-Parties Conference and his proposals and position were challenged. He with tears in his eyes said: "Jamshed, this is the parting of the ways."

Suffering from humiliation, he felt himself very low and was in a state of utter hopelessness. In 1934, Jinnah was offered the League's Presidency and he returned to India in 1935. Though he was quite hopeless about getting any concession from the Congressmen, he was pleased at the prospects of reconciliation between the Congress and the Muslim League, but having failed, he desperately decided 'once and for ever', for creation of a separate Muslim homeland i.e. Pakistan.

Did the ineffectiveness of the Federal Plan of the Government of India Act, 1935, helped partition? It is understood that the Act meant to give freedom and unity, but in reality it was not so. It meant to divert the demand of the Congress and the Indian Liberals for an early transfer of power at the centre. The Act envisaged central responsibility with reservation and safeguards upon the creation of an All-India Federation, but none was given a palpable share of power. It was not practically possible, as the Congress aimed a federation to control the provinces and the Muslim League and the British wanted a federation which be unable to control the provinces. The Congress, after the 1937 elections, began to favour the Federal Scheme, but opposing the Act, inviting the Princely States to enter the Federation to strengthen the Congress position, because there were more Hindu States than the Muslims. On the other hand, the Muslim League favoured the Act but opposed the Federal Scheme. In October, 1938, the Muslim League had resolved for the division of India on the basis of two federations - the federation of Muslim states and the federation of non-Muslim states. The League overambitiously demanded full independence of the Muslim majority states and permission to admit any other Muslim State beyond the Indian frontiers to join the federation. The League further demanded a block of autonomous states in the east and north-west and an extremely loose federation of sovereign states. Naturally, the Congress could not accept it and the federation failed to materialise.


The political atmosphere had been rendered bitter. The Muslim League established committees, which reported atrocities against Muslims in states where the Congress had formed its ministry. The allegation was, as Azad states, "wrong". Thus, it was a planned activity of the League to appeal the Muslims to desist from the Congress rule and defame the Congress nationalist policy. However, two incidents shocked the Muslims. First, after the 1937 elections, Nariman, a Parsi, was an acknowledged leader of the Congress Party in Bombay and it was expected that he would be elected as Chief Minister, but the majority of the members being Hindu in the Congress Assembly Party, Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel brought B.G. Kher into the picture and elected him the leader of the Congress Assembly Party in Bombay. The responsibility of this tragic event rests with Nehru, who was afraid of Patel's criticism. Secondly, in Bihar, Dr. Syed Mahmud, then General Secretary of the AICC, was the top leader and was expected that he would be elected Chief Minister, but instead Sri Krishna Sinha and Anugraha Sinha were called back to Bihar and Dr. Rajendra Prasad groomed them to the position of Chief Minister. These incidents spread a feeling that the Congress nationalism was doubtful and the position of Muslims would always be at stake under the Congress rule. In consequence, the League won all the Muslim seats in 1946, and by implication a sort of verdict from the community in favour of partition.

Whether Nehru's rejection of the League's proposal to form the coalition ministry in 1937 helped partition? Obviously, one rejects the others proposal due to some differences and opposition. It applies to Nehru's rejection too. The Congress and the League had contradictory urges: the Congress stood for democracy, secularism and common Indian nationality, while the Muslim League claimed to safeguard the interests of Muslims in India as a separate political entity. Further, there were heated exchange of statements between Nehru and Jinnah during the 1937 election campaign. In spite of differences, Khaliquzzaman (MI) helmed Rafi Ahmad Kidwai (Congress)

29. The Hindustan Times (New Delhi), November 7, 1988; Azad's '30-Page document'.
30. Ibid.
31. Ibid.
to return in U.P. They created an understanding between the Congress and the League and, hence, the League looked forward to forming a coalition ministry in U.P., but the Congress, after its unexpectedly sweeping victory in U.P. also, became power-mad and refused to give even two seats in the Cabinet to the Muslim League and rather started a 'Muslim mass contact', pressed for winding up of the League and imposed unacceptable conditions upon the League to join the coalition ministry, which caused great antagonism between the two parties and resulted in the resignation of the Congress Ministry. It further established that the Congress would not cooperate with the League in forming a coalition ministry, which proved a nail in the plank of future constitutional development and rendered partition inevitable. In fact, Nehru made a grave mistake of refusing to take the Muslim League and the communal problem seriously. Had the Congress been generous enough to take the two League members in the U.P. Cabinet, the Muslim League would have been disintegrated in U.P., which was its stronghold. Thus, gradually, becoming weaker and weaker it could have been lured to either merge with the Congress or at least there would have been no demand for Pakistan. In view of this, Maulana Azad in his 30-page document has held Nehru responsible for the partition.33

The differences between the Congress and the Muslim League on important issues were also conducive to partition. Although the 'Election Manifestos' of the Congress and the League released during the 1937 elections were accidentally identical because both promised all sorts of things to all sorts of men, they differed in many ways. Jinnah's four and fourteen point demands were not acceptable to the Congress. They were in complete disagreement on important issues also: separate electorate, the communal award, the safeguards for the minorities, the Act of 1935, the idea of a constituent assembly

33. See for details The Hindustan Times (New Delhi), October 30, 1938 (Sunday).
34. See p. 57, Chapter II.
35. See pp. 62-63, Chapter II.
British sometimes lured the Congress and sometimes the Muslim League to have their support in the War Aims. The Muslim League gave unconditional support hoping British favour. The Congress tended to support on condition of immediate transfer of power. As the independence was not forthcoming, Gandhiji launched the 'Quit India' or 'Do or Die' Movement, opposed by the Muslim League, which thought it a forced pressure on the British for transfer of power to the Hindu majority, while Jinnah wanted the transfer after full constitutional settlement. Further, Wavell's February, 1944 declaration emphasised a 'united India', which Jinnah opposed. While the Congress wanted a strong centre, the League wanted a loose centre. The British could have solved the problem on some principles and norms such as that in the United States or in the USSR. However, the British policy only inflamed the Hindu-Muslim antagonism.

The newspapers also, perhaps inadvertently, lent credit to the League's demand for Pakistan. The Lahore Resolution did not mention 'Pakistan', as a single Muslim state or two separate 'autonomous' independent states. It was the Indian press, which next day, headlined the 'Lahore Resolution' as 'Pakistan Resolution', which was so retained. However, it was "a very effective response to Congress as it torpedoed the Congress claim to speak for India".

The Lahore Resolution was the offshoot of intense Congress-League disintegration and ill-feeling against each other. The Resolution embodied Jinnah's decision that partition was the only long-term solution of India's foremost communal problem. The efforts of the Congress leaders to reconcile Jinnah failed. Actually, the root of the resolution lay in the League's grievances against the Congress atrocities and its leaders steadfastness for a united India sacrificing the Muslim interest, which was intolerable to Jinnah, and which had set them pol's apart. Jinnah's two-nation theory and his demand for division of India into "autonomous national States" resulted in

38. See p.215, Chapt-r V (Wavell's declaration) and his opinion,p.219.
partition. The Congress refusal to the League's demand gave momentum to the demand for Pakistan.

It is alleged that Jinnah was solely responsible for the partition. In fact, the idea of dividing the country was not new. The partition scheme was based on the assumption that Hindu-Muslim differences were irreconcilable. The "terrible suffering" of the Muslims during the Congress ministries (1937-39) strengthened the fears of the Muslims that their religion and culture would be unsafe in the united India, dominated by the Hindus. Therefore, Khaliquzzaman was the first to convert Jinnah to the ideal of Pakistan in May, 1939, on the ground that partition was the only solution to the communal problem. Therefore, the partition of India should be viewed "against the background and in the context of nationalism as a living ideal or force". As other leaders were also voicing the same feeling, Jinnah became convinced of the idea of partition. Jinnah wanted a separate Muslim homeland to preserve Islamic instincts. He said: "I do not wish to quarrel with any community. We want to preserve and guard our inherent rights. Some Hindu leaders are, however, out to crush Muslims and I must warn them that this cannot be tolerated". Pandit Sunderlal held the Hindus responsible for the creation of Pakistan. Earlier, Jinnah did like a united India. When his demand for one-third of Muslims' representation in the Central legislature was rejected, he said: "I am not speaking on this question as a Mussalman but as an Indian ... The communities have got to be reconciled, united and made to feel that their interests are common ... We are sons of this land, we have to live together, we have to work together and whatever our differences may be let us not arouse bad blood. Nothing will make me more happy than to see Hindus and Muslims united". But it was Gandhiji who made Jinnah disappointed.

42. Ch. Khaliquzzaman, n. 16, pp. 210-11.
44. Ch. Khaliquzzaman, n. 15, p. 132.
45. *The Times of India* (New Delhi), January 24, 1940, p. 7.
V. M. Dumasia says: "It was Mr. Gandhi who was the father of Pakistan, not Mr. Jinnah. Mr. Gandhi had driven everybody to desperation."

What was the support structure of Jinnah's demand for Pakistan? The Muslims in the higher strata were divided into two groups - educated and landlords; and at the lower strata were the artisans and traders. The former was rich, forceful and influential in society and politics, while the latter, living throughout the length and breadth of the country, was "financially bankrupt, economically zero and educationally at the bottom of the ladder". The bulk of the rural Muslims of lower strata were ignorant of the political game being played for the partition of the country. They were only the onlookers guided by some eminent persons. Only a very few were able to purchase and read the newspapers. Therefore, Jinnah, for their emancipation spoke "of the economic and social grievances of the Muslims, because without their assistance, the Pakistan Resolution could not be materialised. "The Muslim bourgeoisie class was not happy about the competition which it had to face from its Hindu counterpart". Jinnah to attract the latter group to the League's objective of Pakistan declared: "I am an old man. God has given me enough to live comfortably at this age, why should I turn my blood into water ... run about and take so much trouble. Not for the capitalists, but for you, the poor people". In 1943, he assured 'decent living' to all those who did not get food even once a day. Jinnah was assisted by the educated people to fulfil this task. Thus, the Muslim League paid lip services to the ideal of socialism for the welfare of the people. The Raja of Mahmoodabad at the League Session in Lucknow declared: "the Muslims should follow the socialist programme for that would be in accordance with the Islamic principle" to attract the average Muslims in the name of Islam. Those who advocated Jinnah's socialism were "big landlords,

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48. The Times of India (New Delhi), December 3, 1941, p. 6.
51. Ibid., p. 196.
52. Hector Bolitho, n. 26, p. 158.
title-holders and selfish people, who looked to their class and personal interests. Thus, the object of the establishment of Pakistan to a great extent was determined "by the class affiliations of the leadership" and not "by the bourgeoisie class".

The British favour to the Muslim League proved a milestone in the history of creation of Pakistan. Gandhi and Rajendra Prasad met Jinnah in New Delhi on November 1, 1939, but a new round on communal talks did not last long. Gandhi remarked: "Janab (Mr.) Jinnah Saheb (Sir) looks to the British power to safeguard the Muslim rights. Nothing that the Congress can do or concede will satisfy him". Further, the British August Offer (1940) assured the League that no constitutional development would be made without the consent of the Muslim League. The League declared that the British masters were better than the Congress and the Hindus; hence, there could be no unity between the Muslims and the Hindus. Cripps also favoured the Muslim League. Cripps explained that "in case a majority of less than 60 per cent of members of Provincial Assembly voted in favour of accession or non-accession, the minority legislators would have the right to demand a plebiscite ...". The Muslim League accepted the proposal, but Nehru and the Congress leaders refused to accept it, as they thought that the Muslim majority provinces would accord accession to form Pakistan. Had the Congress accepted the Cripps proposal, the Muslim majority provinces and many Princely States, at later stage, could have joined the Congress. However, the Cripps Mission formally accepted the principles of Pakistan for the first time and sowed the seeds of partition.

After the departure of the Cripps Mission, the Congress and the League began to accuse each other and the gulf of differences got very much widened. Rajagopalachari recognised that the root of all the catastrophe was the Congress-League differences on the question of Pakistan. Therefore, he began to advocate the acceptance of Pakistan. Rajaji's acceptance of Pakistan paved the way for other

57. See p. 179, Chapter IV.
leaders to present their own proposal for solution of this problem and the Congress began to tend towards the acceptance of Pakistan.

Another question which comes to one's mind is whether Jinnah's rejection of the Federal Scheme, which he once accepted, was a political intrigue for partition? Jinnah in his fourteen points had demanded a federal system and provincial autonomy. Gandhiji and Maulana Azad agreed to the transfer of power to the League and offered the August, 1943 proposal, which envisaged the formation of government by Jinnah and the largest measure of autonomy to the federal states with the right for secession; thus, accepting the basic demand of the League included in Jinnah's fourteen points. The Congress anticipated that in case of injustice, there would be riots and the League government would become impracticable. Further, the Hindu majority states could have joined together and the Muslim majority states, being weak, could have been forced to join the Congress federal states. Moreover, there was no assurance that the Muslim majority states would join together under the leadership of Jinnah; hence, Jinnah opposed the proposal at the cost of India's unity in order to save his position and the Muslims in India, at large.

Gandhi-Jinnah talks commenced on September 9, 1944, and ended on 27th. Before the talks, the Hindu Mahasabha severely opposed the League's demand for Pakistan, and both the Hindu Mahasabha and the Muslim League threatened 'direct action', but none of them ventured beyond duelling in words. On the other hand, the British Government was antagonised with the Congress policies against the British War Aims and Gandhiji was denied interview with the Viceroy. Gandhiji realised that the only solution lay in an agreement with Jinnah on the basis of Rajagopalachari's formula, which Jinnah had turned down. Therefore, Gandhiji negotiated with Jinnah to talk with him on the basis of partitioning India, which caused provocation of Hindus and the Sikh minorities in Punjab. Savarkar asserted: "The Indian provinces were not the private properties of Gandhiji and Rajaji so that they could make a gift of them to anyone they liked". Gandhiji did his

58. See p. 62, Chapter II.
59. See p. 212, Chapter V.
60. R.C. Majumdar, n. 18, p. 713.
best to bring Jinnah down to a settlement but Jinnah rejected all the proposals of Gandhiji, which had even the slightest possibility of decrating the creation of Pakistan.

The Vicerov held that though communalism was deplorable, but it was a standing fact. He aimed at the protection of minorities. Wavell had to carry out Churchill's directives that no constitutional agreement should be made without the consent of the Muslim League. Thus, Jinnah had the power of veto, which he exploited shrewdly to ensure the creation of Pakistan. Jinnah's manipulation of the power of veto caused an impasse to constitutional development. Jinnah proposed the number of representatives in the Executive Council for forming an interim government i.e. 5 Muslims, 5 Hindus, one Sikh, one Scheduled Caste and two others, with the assertion to retain the right to nominate all the Muslim members, to which the Congress objected as it claimed the right to include in their quota members of all communities. Jinnah demanded that all the five Muslims should be taken from the Muslim League and "no decision objected to by the Muslims should be taken except by a clear two-thirds majority, or something of the kind". As the Congress did not agree to it, the Simla Conference failed to reach an agreement. The cause of the failure of the Conference was that it did not include representatives of the Hindu Mahasabha, the Krishak Proja Party, "omnis etc., and the other leaders played, more or less, the part of dummies. However, the failure of the Conference, all the more, immensely strengthened the position of the League, which could make or mar the fortunes of the Muslims in India. Therefore, the Muslim leaders had no chance of a political career in future remaining outside the League's circle. The Muslim League became the only door for the Muslims to enter into positions of power and profit. Consequently, wavering and middle-of-the-door Muslim politicians tended to gravitate to the Muslim League, which helped in the process of the partition of the country.

The Muslim League had acquired a mass Muslim following by the end of 1945. In the 1945-46 elections to the Central Legislative Assembly, the League won 96.6 per cent of the total votes cast in the Muhammadan constituencies and the Congress secured 91.3 per cent

61. See p. 263, Chapter VI.
of the total votes cast in the non-Muslim constituencies. The results of the elections of the Provincial Legislative Councils established the Congress and the League as the two major political parties in India. The success of the Muslim League "loaded the dice heavily in favour of Pakistan", while the Congress hoped to thwart the Muslim League even after creation of Pakistan to make a united India. But since the Muslim League refused to take part in the Interim Government, the British sent a Parliamentary Delegation to envisage principle for settlement. At last, Attlee on March 15, 1946, declared that "it would be a great mistake to stake out the claims of rival communities", which ended the veto power of Jinnah on constitutional process. Had Attlee's declaration come in the thirties, the League being weaker could have come down to a settlement preserving the unity of India. However, since Churchill's government did not intend to grant independence before the end of the War and the Congress and the League and other minorities could not reach a common solution, Jinnah's power of veto made the League so strong that even after Attlee's declaration the partition became inevitable.

As to the long-term plan (May 16, 1946) of the Cabinet Mission, the Congress and the League first accepted but later shied away from it. First, the Plan was not acceptable to the Muslim League as it did not envisage formation of Pakistan including the six provinces (Assam, Bengal, the Punjab, Sind, NWP and Baluchistan). The League also did not agree that Pakistan should consist of only the Muslim majority areas. The Muslim League threatened 'Direct Action', if power was transferred to the Congress. Secondly, Maulana Azad's view that the Indian federation should deal with defence, foreign affairs and communications granting maximum autonomy to the provinces, was accepted by Gandhiji, but was opposed by Sardar Patel. The Mission had to reconcile these two rival standpoints. Cripps opined that "the gulf between these two points of view is by no means unbridgeable". The Muslim League wanted common subjects like defence and foreign affairs to be dealt with by treaty arrangement, and the Congress wanted a

62. See p. 293, Chapter VI.
64. Ibid.
federal centre for administering these two subjects. On April 29, 1946, AIMI had forwarded a resolution to the Mission reiterating the Pakistan demand, but in his proposal forwarded on May 11, he did not provide for the partition of India, but for a confederation of Pakistan and the rest of India. On May 6, 1946, the Congress informed the Mission that it totally opposed the idea of sub-federation within a federation, and on May 12, communicated that "groups of Provinces may be formed". Gandhiji stated that the constituent assembly to be set up under the Congress-League agreement would not be bound by the terms of settlement but would be free to alter them. However, as the League did not agree to a 'bigger Pakistan' within a constitution of 'Indian Union', and the Congress did not agree to 'Indian Unity' at the risk of division of India into many parts, the Long-Term Plan failed. However, the Short-Term Plan for establishment of a constituent assembly and the interim central government, was implemented.

On July 7, 1946, Nehru, regarding the acceptance of the Cabinet Mission Plan in toto, in a militant tone said: "We are not bound by a single thing except that we have decided for a moment to go to the Constituent Assembly". Azad ridiculed that "he (Nehru) had every intention of modifying the Plan". With regard to going to the Constituent Assembly, Nehru, on July 10, emphasised the sovereign character of the Constituent Assembly and said: "but what we do there we are entirely and absolutely free to determine". He also stated that the

69. Bombay Chronicle (Bombay), July 11, 1946.
70. V.P. Menon, n. 67, p. 280.
problem of minorities was domestic. Nehru made a great tactical blunder in making these statements. Maulana Azad says that "this was not the first time that he did immense harm to the national cause. He had committed an almost equal blunder in 1937". Jinnah later stated: "The Congress and the League were both parties to the agreement, and it was on the basis of distribution among the Centre, the provinces and the groups that the League had accepted the Plan. Congress was neither wise nor right in raising doubts. It should have accepted the Plan unequivocally if it stood for the unity of India". Vacillation gave Jinnah the opportunity to divide India.

Nehru's statement caused Jinnah's uproar and the AIML Council on July 27, withdrew its acceptance, and drew up a plan of direct action, which ultimately led to the failure of the interim government and the Mission Plan. Had the Congress and the League accepted the Mission Plan faithfully, as Maulana Azad stated, 'the history might have been different'. Stalvad deplored that the Mission Plan was smashed by the 'wobling and vacillating attitude' of the Congress leaders. He commented: "The cherished boon of a United India had fallen into their lap, but they by their own want of political wisdom threw it out and made it beyond their reach". The Mission also is to be blamed for changing its stand which caused disappointment to Jinnah, who had thought that the Plan would be a stepping stone to an independent Pakistan.

To say that as the object of the Muslim League was no less than the institution of Pakistan and, hence, they would not have worked, in any case, for the goal of preserving the unity of India, does not hold ground in view of the fact that the League accepted the Mission's Long-Term Plan with groups of provinces, which had to retain the unity of India, but due to outbursts of the Congress leaders, Jinnah changed his mind and stuck to the determination for having Pakistan. The League had anticipated that, at the later stage, the groups of Muslim provinces would opt for creation of Pakistan, but the Congress adhered

71. The Hindustan Times (New Delhi), November 7, 1988.
72. Ibid.
to its policy of 'united India' being proud of their majority position and its hold on Assam and NUFP. The Congress accepted the 'grouping' as optional because the Mission proposal, being deliberately vague, had at one place stated that it might form groups (i.e. optional grouping) and at other place stated would form groups (i.e. compulsory grouping). The Muslim League accepted the compulsory grouping. However, the British Government supported the League's interpretation to make its position stronger. The Congress made a wise decision by rejecting the compulsory grouping. Had the Congress accepted it, the provinces in groups (P) and (C) would have given the Muslim League after ten years a 'big Pakistan' and India would have been left with a weak minimal centre.

The British interest in partition is also viable. The British wanted to create Pakistan to make India and Pakistan a weak country to exploit their economic resources in their own interest. The Indians had realised that the British foreign policy was reactionary and interventionist. The Soviet liberal policy towards China and Persia, economic planning and social welfare attracted the Indian socialists. They recognised the British as capitalist and exploitative; and the Soviet Union as progressive standing for peace and freedom. The Indians' hope was dashed to the ground when the US President Roosevelt, remained silent when the Soviet Union advocated at the UN San Francisco Conference (April, 1945) for freedom of Asia and African countries. The members of the British Cabinet were divided on the question of granting independence to India. The Parliamentary Delegation had recommended acceptance of Pakistan, the sooner the better, while Arthur Bottomley wanted to preserve British trade interests in India and Turnbull desired an economic price for acceding to Moslem demand for Pakistan. Therefore, Attlee and the Cabinet Mission decided to divide India and accordingly made their declaration. On the one hand, they wanted to retain the British interests to revitalise their economic position, which had become poor after the Second World War

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76. Clause 19(v) of the Cabinet Mission Plan.
and, on the other hand, they saw that India was boycotting the British goods and the Muslim League had expressed willingness to have trade relations with the British. The British anticipated that they would exploit Pakistan as it would be too weak to defend its boundaries and to strengthen its economic position. This policy affected the Pakistan boundary, reducing it to a 'moth-eaten Pakistan'.

The failure of the interim government, the League's boycott of the Constituent Assembly, the failure of the London Conference, antagonism and disagreement between the Congress and the Muslim League, communal orgy, arson and destruction in recurrent riots had created a state of civil war beyond control during 1940s. Therefore, to hand over power as early as possible, Attlee on February 20, 1947, declared that power would be transferred to responsible Indian hands by a date not later than June, 1948, without entertaining veto of any party. Mountbatten succeeded in bringing the Congress and the League and leaders of other minorities to agree to a partition plan and preponed the date of independence to August, 1947.

During March 31 and April 4, 1947, Gandhiji had proposed to Mountbatten that Jinnah should be given the option to form a Cabinet and the Congress would guarantee its cooperation freely and sincerely. If Jinnah rejects this offer, the same offer to be made mutatis mutandis to the Congress. The suggestion involved replacement of Jinnah in place of Nehru; hence, Jawaharlal Nehru and Sardar Patel called the proposal 'unrealistic' and forced Gandhiji to withdraw. As a result Gandhiji on April 11, 1947, withdrew the proposal. Had the proposal been put into action after acceptance by Jinnah, the partition could perhaps still have been avoided. Further, with the passage of time, Jinnah's government, being that of minority, could have weakened after the British had left, and the power could have come to the Congress hand, but Nehru and Patel did not like to wait so long. If on the one side Jinnah wanted power in forming Pakistan, Nehru and Patel wanted their rule in India as early as possible.

Some critique charged Jinnah that his failure in life was the cause of transferring his private motives into public purposes. His role in politics proves, as the critiques accept, that he was "a man
of ambition", which has the characteristics of being "strong-headed, insistence, hard won", whose "mind raced years ahead of most of his contemporaries, British and Indian alike", which helped him to gain Pakistan.

To sum up most important causes of the partition of India, among others, in short, are: the deep rooted antagonism between the Hindus and the Muslims, fundamental differences between them i.e. difference in culture and civilization, language and literature, art and architecture, name and nomenclature, sense of values and proportion, laws and jurisprudence, social and moral codes, customs and calender, history and traditions, aptitudes and ambitions, outlook on life, mentality etc., which made the Congress and the League antagonistic to each other causing, on the one hand, Jinnah's rise as an uncompromising leader of the Muslims and, on the other, Nehru's and Patel's zest for power, and, ultimately, the partition of the Motherland.